SC Case Digest: Carpio

Morales v. CA and Binay,

Jr. (G.R. No. 217126-27,
10 Nov 2015)
By Foggy

Greetings, Abogados!

This is a commentary (not really a digest)

on the landmark case recently issued by
the Supreme Court En Banc, entitled
Carpio Morales v. CA and Binay, Jr., G.R.
No. 217126-27, 10 November 2015.
You must be familiar with this case. The
media covered it really well in view of the
personalities involved (but we wonʼt dwell
with those people here – the most youʼll
get would be the title of the case). More
importantly, this case finally got rid of the
pesky old condonation doctrine, albeit in
a scholarly fashion. The case tells us how
the condonation doctrine came about,
unraveling the mystery behind it, and why
it was subsequently upheld in several SC
decisions. Let me try to point out why you
should read this case, even for leisure, to
wit: (1) it has a TON of citations on a wide
range of legal topics; (2) it makes
reference to foreign laws and doctrines;
(3) there is a clinical dissection of the
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board
of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (1959)
(hereinafter referred to as “Pascual”) on
the condonation doctrine; and (4) in true
SC fashion, the case is Solomonic
innature.

Five (5) issues were discussed in this

case, namely:

\. Whether the Petition filed before the

SC, without resorting to the filing of
a motion for reconsideration, was
the Ombudsmanʼs plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy;
^. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”)
has subject matter jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition;
`. Whether the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”)
enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension issued by
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;
d. Whether the CA acted in grave
abuse of its discretion in issuing said
TRO and WPI; and
e. Whether the CAʼs directive for the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay,
Jr.ʼs petition for contempt was
improper or illegal.

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Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales (Photo credit:
inquirer.net)

In dispensing the First Issue, the SC

ruled that the Ombudsmanʼs petition falls
under the exceptions that a prior motion
for reconsideration must be filed, citing
the case of Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No.
179492, 5 June 2013, which held as
follows: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved.
(Emphasis supplied on the grounds relied
on by the SC in this case, in ruling that no
motion for reconsideration was needed.)

(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 0.)

As to the Second Issue, the discussion

revolved around Sec. 14 of Republic Act
No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act (RA 6770), more
particularly its 2nd Paragraph states:

“Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ o

Now the SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph

of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague,
unconstitutional and invalid. The SC relied
on its ruling in the landmark case of
Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998),
which, in turn, held that the 4th
Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is void, as
it had the effect of increasing
theappellate jurisdiction of the SC without
its advice and concurrence, inviolation of
Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
This tells us that lawyers should always
be wary of reading RA 6770 since case
law has affected itso much – maybe itʼs
time to update it.

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Senate President Salonga (Photo credit:
senate.gov.ph)

Interestingly, the SC mentioned the

Senate deliberations cited by the
Ombudsman, in the crafting of RA 6770.
It quoted the exchanges between
Senators Jovito Salonga, Edgardo
Angara, Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and
Neptali Gonzales, which merely led the
SC to be suspicious on whether said
Senators were talking about Sec. 14, RA
6670, or some other provision. In other
words, while the throwback was
appreciatedby the SC, the discussions
were not really useful in this case.

Regardless, the SC still ruled thatthe

remedy of Binay, Jr. – the filing of petition
for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to assail the
Ombudsmanʼs preventive suspension
order – was valid, citing the cases of
Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong,
G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and
Dagan v.Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 184083, 19 November 2013. Itʼs just
sad that the sorry end of Second
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770 came as
collateral damage in this case. The SC
justified its taking up this issue on its own
motion, or ex mero motu, which it
canrightfully do, since it is, after all, the
SC.

(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 1.

The Third Issue is where it starts to

become more interesting.Here, the
Ombudsmanʼs history was discussed,
citing heavily from the case of Gonzales III
v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014
(hereinafter referred to as “Gonzales”).
You can imagine the Ombudsman smiling
from ear to ear while reading this portion,
but this form of flattery should lead one
to be suspicious.

What can be picked up from the Gonzales

case is that the Office of the
Ombudsmanʼs independence covers
thefollowing: (1) it is the creation of the
Constitution; (2) it enjoys fiscalautonomy;
and (3) it is insulated from executive
supervision and control. Onthis basis, the
SC held that the Ombudsman was meant
to be protected frompolitical harassment
and pressure, to free it from the
“insidious tentacles of politics.” (Oh, what
imagery does this give.) Since the SC is
apolitical, then Gonzales should not be
interpreted toshield the Ombudsman
from the judicial review power of the
courts. After all, there is no politics in the
judiciary, right?

After the Ombudsman, it is now the SCʼs

turn to give an exhaustive recap of its
own history. Starting from the definition
of Judicial Power, the SC went on the
discuss its expanded scope ofjudicial
review enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran,
G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, then the
evolution of itsrule-making authority in
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361
Phil. 73 (1999). The SC pointed out that
Congress, in relation to RA 6770, has no
authority to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and rules allowing the
issuance of an injunction form part of the
courtʼs inherent power, which (now, citing
foreign case law) enable the judiciary to
accomplish itsconstitutionally mandated
functions.

The SC ruled that Congressʼ passing of

the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770,
which prohibits the issuance of an
injunction, is an encroachment of the
SCʼs rule-making authority. An injunction,
after all, is merely a provisional and
auxiliary relief to preserve rights in esse.
However, the SC noted that it has not
consented to this as it has not issued
rules of procedure through an
administrative circular. Thus, pending
deliberation, the SC declared the First
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as
ineffective, “until it is adopted as part of
the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued
therefor.” Abangan ang susunod na
kabanata.

Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly

bruised. To sum it up: The Second
Paragraph was declared unconstitutional,
and the First Paragraph was now deemed
ineffective. As such,the CA was held to
have correctly issued the injunctive relief
in enjoining thepreventive suspension
against Binay, Jr.

(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 2.)

The Fourth Issue is where the

condonation doctrine was taken up. To go
right at it, the SC abandoned the
condonation doctrine, but ruled that the
CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the WPI, as it did so based on
good case law, considering that the
abandonment is prospective in nature.

In abandoning the condonation doctrine,

the SC emphasized that this was a
jurisprudential creation that originated in
the 1959 Pascual case, which was
decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is
notable that there was no legal precedent
on the issue at that time, and the SC
resorted to American authorities. The SC
stated what appears the sole basis forthe
condonation doctrine in Pascual, to wit:

The weight of authorities x x x seems

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Much has happened since the 1935 Constitution.
(Photo credit: en.wikipedia.org)

As can be read above, it is clear that no

real justification was given for the
condonation doctrine, except that “it
seems to incline” towards American
authorities. On this regard, the SC made
its own investigation, and found that there
was really no established weight
ofauthorities in the United States (“US”).
In fact, 17 States in the US have already
abandoned the condonation doctrine, as
pointed out by the Ombudsman. The SC
went on to adopt the findings of the
Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with
the caveat that said cases are merely
“guides of interpretation.”

Perhaps the greatest victory in this case

for the Ombudsman is that it was able to
convince the SC not to adhere to stare
decisis, thereby enriching Philippine
jurisprudence on this matter. This is
important, as its effects are far-reaching,
since we now have additional basis to
petition the abandonment of old
ineffective case laws. For this moment of
glory, allow us to quote directly from the
case, viz:

Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on

The SC then proceeded to dissect

Pascual, and went on to enumerate the
notable cases that applied Pascual, which
included cases issued under the 1987
Constitution. Pascual was tested under
existing laws, to see if there exists
legislation to support Pascual, e.g. 1987
Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code, Code of Conductand Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, Local Government Code of
1991, and Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The
SC ruled:

"Reading the 1987 Constitution togethe

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Office of the Ombudsman (Photo credit: philstar.com)

The SC made it clear that Pascual has no

statutory basis at all. By abandoning the
condonation doctrine, the SC would
remove this defense oft-times used by
elected officials, of which the SC was
aware of, as it made mention of the
databrought forward by the Ombudsman,
to wit:

“To provide a sample size, the Ombudsm

(Score: Ombudsman– 2; Binay, Jr. - 2.

The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the

order to comment directed to the
Ombudsman was illegal, was refused to
be resolved on the ground there are no
contempt proceedings yet. It is the claim
of the Ombudsman that since she was an
impeachable officer, she could be
subjected to contempt. However, no due
course has been given to the contempt
action, thus, the Ombudsmanʼs claim was
premature.

(Score: Ombudsman – 2; Binay,Jr. -2. N

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Justice Perlas-Bernabe (Photo credit:
sc.judiciary.gov.ph)

So there you have it! The case was

Solomonic, in my opinion, as both parties
walk away with something. This review
also does not do justice on how well this
case was penned by Associate Justice
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. So please go
read the case on the SC website, or just
click here.

Some final thoughts:

Expect this case to be taken up in

Constitutional law classes on judicial
review, SCʼs rule-making power, and
the Ombudsman as a constitutional
body.
It is interesting to wait for the SCʼs
future rules with regard the matter
on the issuance of injunction under
Section 14, RA6770. We hope that
this actually comes into fruition.
This case may be cited by
practitioners who intend to file a
petition at the SC without prior
motion for reconsiderationbefore the
CA.
Lawyers with politician clients should
really take note of this case, as it
removes a vital defense in
administrative cases filed against
them. Good thing that this is
prospective in nature.
Bar candidates must watch out for
this, as it may come out in next
yearʼs Bar Exam in the subject of
Political Law.
Please read, as well, the Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion of Associate
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who
concurred on the SCʼs ruling on the
ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of the First
Paragraph and Second Paragraph,
respectively, of Sec. 14, RA 6770,
but dissented on the revisitation on
the condonation doctrine. Justice
Bersamin postulates that
condonation must apply only after
the conduct of anadministrative
investigation, not while such officer
is undergoing investigation. As such,
the CA, according to Justice
Bersamin, wrongly applied the
condonation doctrine, as such, said
doctrine should not have warranted
a re-examination by the SC.

Cheers, Abogados!