[G.R. No. 136303.

July 18, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANTHONY
MELCHOR PALMONES, ANTHONY BALTAZAR
PALMONES,
Facts:
Brothers Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones were both charged
with murder. That allegedly accused-appellants shot SPO2 ASIM MAMANSAL, in a dark place,
together with his paramour, while riding home in Kidapawan, Sultan Kudaratthat last April 27,
1997. The inflicted gunshot wounds on the vital parts of MAMANSAL'S body caused of the
death of the victim.
The prosecution witnesses presented on trial were Sonny Boy Redovan, the nephew of the
victim. He testified that in that same evening in the emergency room of Kidapawan Doctor’s
Hospital the victim declared that his perpetrators were “Juany and Tony Palmones” which were
the nicknames of the two accused-appellants. Another witness presented was Police Inspector
Alexander Tagum, who came in the emergency room about and hour later also testified that he
was able to ask the victim, about the identity of his perpetrator, and that were Juany and Tony
Palmones.

The conviction of the two accused-appellants was based largely on the alleged dying
declaration of the victim made to the two witnesses of the prosecution.

Hence, this appeal by the accused-appellants to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. The court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of ASIM MAMANSAL as
an exception to the hearsay rule.

2. The court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of ASIM AMAMNSAL as
part of the Res Gestae Rule.

Ruling:

1. On the first issue:

Yes, it was error for the court to consider Mamansal's statement as dying declaration for
failure to prove that the declaration was made “under a consciousness of impending death”
which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die from his
wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand,
or there must be “a settled hopeless expectation.”

Sec. 31. Dying declaration. – The declaration of a dying person, made under a
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is
the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must
concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the time it
was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was
competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder,
murder or parricide win which the decedent was the victim.

In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the
declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made under
the consciousness of impending death.

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2. On the second issue:

Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res
gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is
critical. The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether
statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1)
the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the
statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when
he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the
statement itself.

Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim,
we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly
uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed
from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered
the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made
these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for
treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an
intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation.These
circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by
Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res
gestae.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones are ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are being held for some other legal grounds.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 89213. September 8, 1995.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REDENTOR

ESQUILONA, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Public Attorney’s Office for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE; DYING DECLARATION AS AN EXCEPTION; RULE
FOR ADMISSIBILITY. — An ante mortem declaration is entitled to highest credence, as it should so be, for
scarcely would a person who knows of his impending death make a careless, let alone false, accusation.
There is no question to our mind that the statement of the victim just a few hours before his death so meets
the requirements for its admissibility in evidence as a dying declaration i.e., that (1) it concerns the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) that at the time it is made, the declarant is
under a consciousness of being on the verge of death., (3) that he is a competent witness; and (4) that his
declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant
is the victim. Moreover, the statement of the deceased, even assuming its impermissibility as a dying

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declaration, would still have strong probative value as part of res gestae. This rule merely requires that (a)
the statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made during a startling occurrence or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto; and (c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence.

2. ID.; ID.; ALIBI CANNOT PREVAIL UNLESS ACCUSED PROVED THAT IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
HIM TO BE AT THE SCENE OF CRIME AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION. — It is well-settled that courts
have always looked upon the defense of alibi with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it is inherently
unreliable but likewise because it is rather easy to fabricate. For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for
the accused to prove that he has been elsewhere when the crime is committed but that he must further
demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission.

3. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; MUST BE PROVED AS THE CRIME ITSELF.
— Treachery cannot be presumed; it must, instead, be proven as fully as the crime itself. Here, we see no
real proof to show that treacherous means have been employed by accused-appellant in committing the
offense.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

On the night of 21 January 1985, at around eight o’clock, Honorato Laurio, Sr., was shot while preparing at
home the soybeans he would use for sowing the following day in Sitio Malbug, Barangay Batuila, Baleno,
Masbate. The victim’s wife, Lourdes Rapsing, rushed to the kitchen, from where the direction of the gunfire
had been heard, and there she saw her bloodied husband sprawled by the door. Just as she reached over to
cuddle her husband, the latter remarked that Redentor Esquilona had shot him. She caught momentarily a
glimpse of the man winning away towards the creek at the back of their house.

The victim’s 9-year old son, Honorato Laurio, Jr., hurrying down the stairs at the sound of gunshot, had
come face to face with Redentor Esquilona, who was holding a, homemade gun called "lantaka," before the
latter fled towards the nearby creek. The lighted lamp and the evening moon enabled him to recognize
Esquilona.

At around eleven o’clock that same evening, Honorato Laurio, Sr., succumbed to the two bullet wounds —
one on his abdomen and the other on his breast — that he had sustained.

On 25 March 1985, an information was filed with the Regional Trial court of Masbate (Criminal Case No.
4703), Branch XLIV, charging Redentor Esquilona with Murder. The information read: jgc:chan robles .com.p h

"That on or about January 21, 1985, in the evening thereof, at sitio Malbug, barangay Batuila, Municipality
of Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused with intent
to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and with the use of a superior arm did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with a homemade gun ‘lantaka’ one Honorato Laurio y
Manlapaz hitting the latter on the chest and abdomen, thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his
instantaneous death." 1

The accused pleaded "Not, Guilty" to the charge. His testimony, as well as that of his witness Dominador
Montilla, attempted to show that he and Montilla were having a drink the latter’s house, when they heard
gunfire, a common occurrence in the area, at or about the time of the shooting incident at the Laurio
residence. The house of the accused is about 500 meters away from the Montilla dwelling and 400 meters
from the victim’s home.

On 09 March 1989, after a protracted trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding accused
Redentor Esquilona guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and adjudging thusly: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"WHEREFORE, viewed from what transpired during the trial of this case, this court, being convinced of the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is being found guilty of the crime of MURDER, he is hereby
sentence to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA after considering that it was qualified with treachery
and there being no mitigating circumstances. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs of the suit. The detention of the accused
before he was able to put up his bond for the temporary liberty is counted in his favor and shall serve the
sentence at the National Penitentiary." 2

In this appeal, the accused insists that the evidence against him is not enough and falls short of the
quantum of proof required to sustain a conviction.

That accused-appellant was the one responsible for the killing of Honorato Laurio, Sr., could hardly be
disputed.

We begin with the victim’s own dying declaration testified to by the widow thusly: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"Q. At that time, do, you know of any unusual incident that happened in your house?

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"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Please tell the court?

"A. That evening I was in our house . . . and my husband is in the kitchen cleaning the soybeans. After that
I heard somebody fired a gun. When I went to the kitchen, I saw my husband full of blood. Then he told me
that he might die.

"Q. What did you do when you saw that your husband full of blood?

"A. I helped him and he told me that the one who fired his gun, . . . because he can still talk . . . the one
who shot was Redentor Esquilona.

"Q. You said that when you helped him, your husband told it was Redentor Esquilona who shot him. Did he
say anything more aside from that statement, of, your husband?

"A. No more, sir.

"Q. Why, what happened to your husband?

"A. I told him to just keep strong and I will bring you to the municipal building, but then at about 11:00
o’clock in the evening he died." 3

An ante mortem, declaration is entitled to highest credence, as it should so be, for scarcely would a person
who knows of his impending death make a careless, let alone false, accusation. 4 There is no question to our
mind that the statement of the victim just a few hours before his death so meets the requirements for its
admissibility in evidence as a dying declaration, i.e., that (1) it concerns the cause, and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time it is made, the declarant is under a
consciousness of being on the verge of death; (c) that he is a competent witness; and (d) that his
declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant
is the victim. 5 Moreover, the statement of the deceased, even assuming its impermissibility as a dying
declaration, would still have strong probative value as part of res gestae. This rule merely requires that (a)
the statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made during a startling occurrence or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto; and (c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence.

Additionally, positive identification was made by young Laurio who stated that upon rushing down the stairs
soon after the gunshots were heard, he came face to face with accuse appellant. 6 He, testified that the
distance between him (Laurio, Jr.) and the assailant was merely six meters, the place was sufficiently
lighted, and the Laurio and Esquilona families were neighbors of long standing. 7 It would have been
unlikely for Laurio to have mistaken appellant for somebody else.

Accused-appellant’s contention that young Laurio did not immediately inform the police authorities of the
assailant’s identity was belied by both Laurio and Pfc. Manuel Bravante. Laurio, Jr., testified: jg c:chan roble s.com. ph

"Q. Were you investigated by the policeman when they came to your house?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What did the policeman do if any?

"A. The policeman asked whether I saw the man who shot my father.

"Q. Did he ask you who was that person who shot your father?

"A. Yes. sir.

"Q. What was your answer?

"A. Redentor Esquilona." 8

Pfc. Manuel Bravante, corroborating, Laurio, Jr., confirmed the latter’s testimony; thus: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"Q. And what time more or less did you arrive in the house of Honorato Laurio, Sr.?

"A. About 10:30 o’clock in the evening.

"Q. And what did you do immediately after you arrived at the house of Honorato Laurio, Sr.?

"A. We conducted the investigation on the person of the widow and her children.

"x x x

"Q. You also told the court that you investigated the son of Honorato Laurio, Sr., do you know that son
whom you investigated?

Page 4 of 10
"A. Honorato Laurio, Jr.

"Q. And what did you ask him in connection with the death of his father?

"A. I asked him whether it is true that he saw the accused Redentor Esquilona who shot his father.

"Q. And what was the answer to that question by (sic) Honorato Laurio, Jr.?

"A. According to him he saw the accused." 9

Against the case for the prosecution, accuse-appellant could only muster the weak defense of alibi. It is
well-settled that courts have always looked upon this defense with caution, if not suspicion, not only
because it is inherently unreliable but likewise because it is rather easy to fabricate. 10 For alibi to prosper,
it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he has been elsewhere when the crime is committed
but, that he must further demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 11

We believe, however, that the trial court has erred in appreciating treachery and in having so considered it
as an attendant circumstance. 12 Treachery cannot be presumed; it must, instead, be proven as fully as the
crime itself. Here, we see no real proof to show that treacherous means have been employed by accused-
appellant in committing the offense.

Accused-appellant committed the crime of homicide. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the prescribed penalty under Article 249, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code,
is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that can
be imposed on accused-appellant is an indeterminate sentence of anywhere within the full range of prision
mayor; as minimum, and reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The award of indemnity should be
increased to P50,000.00, in conformity with the prevailing policy.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is
declared GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty, of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor; as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum, and he is further required to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

Costs against Accused-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, SR. y AMORES, VICTORINO
BACUAC y QUISEL, FELIX ESTRELLADO y BACUAC,
PABLITO RENDOQUE y ABIO, QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR.
y ABIO, and ESPERATO SALAQUIN y BACUAC,accused,

PABLITO RENDOQUE y ABIO, QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR.

y ABIO, and ESPERATO SALAQUIN y BACUAC, accused-
appellants.

Facts: On or about 8:00 P.M. of April 21, 1988, Abundio Sido and the members of his family were resting
inside their house, when a a group of armed men, six in number, arrived. One of them shouted "Abundio
Sido lumabas kayo, mga military kami." In return, Abundio answered, "you come up, we will talk upstairs."

The group however, insisted that he come down and so, Abundio instructed his wife Florida to open the
door. The latter, accompanied by her daughter Elvie who was holding a kerosene lamp, proceeded
towards the door to open it.

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When the door was opened, Florida and her daughter by the aid of the kerosene lamp were able to
recognize the six armed men standing in front of their house wearing fatigue uniforms as Pablito
Rendoque, Esperato Salaquin, Quinciano Rendoque, Sr., Quinciano Rendoque, Jr., Victorino Bacuac and
Felix Estrellado. With the exception of Quinciano Rendoque, Sr. who was seen carrying a revolver, the
rest were all armed with shotguns.

On that occasion when the door was opened, Pablito Rendoque shouted "fire" to his companions. In
obedience to his order, Esperato Salaquin and Quinciano Rendoque, Jr. aimed and fired their respective
shotguns towards the direction of the wall inside the house where Abundio was sitting.

As a result, the victim was hit at the back and on the left shoulder by pellets which caused his death.
Thereafter, the armed group left leaving Abundios dead body behind.

Following police investigation, a criminal complaint for murder was filed against all six (6) accused. At the
preliminary investigation, they waived the filing of counter-affidavits. The Municipal Trial Judge issued a
Resolution finding sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that accused are probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial, and forwarded the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental for the filing of the appropriate Information.

Upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by counsel, entered pleas of "not guilty."

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Elvie Sido, the 15 year-old daughter of the victim;
(2) Florida Sido, the widow of the victim, both eyewitnesses to the shooting incident; (3) Dra. Bienvenida
Palongpalong, Municipal Health Officer of San Jose, Negros Oriental, who conducted the post-mortem
examination on the victim and testified that the cause of death was "severe hemorrhage resulting from the
(gunshot) wounds of the victim."

Testifying on their behalf, appellants interposed the defenses of denial and alibi.

Appellant Pablito Rendoque claimed that on April 21, 1988, from 7:00 PM until 7:00 AM, he was on duty
as a security guard at Master Footwear in Dumaguete City. His testimony was supported by the
testimonies of several witnesses.

Eduardo Dingal, his co-security guard, testified that appellant Pablito Rendoque relieved him from duty at
7:00 P.M. of April 21, 1988. Dingals wife, also testified that she visited her husband at Master Footwear at
7:00 P.M., and saw appellant Pablito Rendoque take over her husbands post.

Ernesto Amistoso, a member of the PNP, San Jose, Negros Oriental, also testified that the day after the
incident, he confirmed with Dingal that appellant Pablito Rendoque relieved him from duty the previous
night. Aniano Eliseo, Officer-In-Charge of the Sherlock Security Agency, testified that he conducted an
inspection of the guards of the agency and saw appellant Pablito Rendoque at his post in Master
Footwear at around 7:00 on the night of the incident.

The other five accused testified that on April 21, 1988, from 6:00 PM until around 8:00 AM, they were in
the house of Placido Despojo at Sto. Nio, San Jose, Negros Oriental to attend an "Anti-Communist Trust
In Oriental Negros" (ACTION) seminar, which however, was postponed to the following day. Placido
Despojo confirmed this fact.

Millard Generoso, the District Commander of ACTION, testified that on April 22, 1988, the day after the
incident, the five accused, except for appellant Pablito Rendoque, were at his house in Calindagan,
Dumaguete City from around 8 oclock in the morning up to 11 oclock in the evening attending the
seminar.

The defense also presented as its witness Patrolman Fred Redira, who testified that on the night of the
incident, one Celso Turtal reported to him that he (Turtal) was requested by the wife of the victim to inform
the authorities that the victim was shot by "unidentified men."

The defense also presented Patrolman Antonio Ramirez, the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station, and
the custodian of the police logbook containing the aforesaid report. Patrolman Ramirez testified that he
prepared the affidavits of Elvie and Florida Sido wherein they stated that the persons who shot the victim
were Pablito Rendoque and Esperato Salaquin only.

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However, Patrolman Ramirez claimed that the Municipal Mayor borrowed the affidavits and never
returned them again. He also testified that the affidavits of Elvie and Florida Sido which were presented to
him in court for identification were new affidavits, and not the ones which he prepared.

On January 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the three (3) appellants. As already
stated, their three (3) co-accused were acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, the present appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witness
and disregarded the alibi of the defense.

Held:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently held that the determination of credibility of a witness is
properly within the domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe his demeanor and bodily
movements. Findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to great respect, and even finality, unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of
weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied by the trial judge which, if
considered, would have affected the case. In the present appeal, after a thorough review of the records,
no cogent reason justifies our departure from the aforecited salutory rule. We are constrained not to
disturb the factual findings of the trial court.

The two eyewitnesses, Elvie and Florida Sido, positively identified appellants as the perpetrators of the
fatal shooting. Both clearly narrated on the witness stand the extent of the appellants participation in the
incident. They categorically testified that appellant Pablito Rendoque gave the order to "fire," and in
obedience to such order, appellants Esperato Salaquin and Quinciano Rendoque, Jr., fired their guns
(known locally as bali-ontod) against the victim. Witness Elvie Sido said that as the shooting was going
on, she was rooted on the spot, looking at the faces of the men firing at her father. Although the incident
occurred at nighttime, the house of the victim was sufficiently illuminated by two kerosene lamps
(lamparillas), one carried by the daughter of the victim and another located near the victim, which cast
enough light for purposes of identification. Numerous cases have held that illumination coming from a
kerosene lamp (also called "gasera") is sufficient for purposes of identification of an assailant. Aside from
the sufficient lighting, the two eyewitnesses were familiar with the faces of the assailants because they
were townmates, and appellants did not even bother to hide their identities by covering their faces.

Appellants admitted that they could not ascribe any ill-motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely
testify against them. Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to
perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus
worthy of full faith and credit. The fact that the witnesses were the daughter and the widow of the
deceased could not impair their credibility. Blood or conjugal relationship between a witness and the
victim does not per se impair the credibility of the witness.

As to the police logbook which was presented in evidence to prove the contents thereof, we have held
that entries in the police blotter should not be given undue significance or probative value, as they do not
constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof. Entries in police blotters, although regularly done in the
course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth stated in such entries and
should not be given undue significance or probative value because they are usually incomplete and
inaccurate. Sometimes they are based on partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting and hearsay,
untested in the crucible of a trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellants PABLITO RENDOQUE, ESPERATO
SALAQUIN AND QUINCIANO RENDOQUE, JR. guilty of the crime of MURDER and sentencing them
to RECLUSION PERPETUA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to damages. Appellants are hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs against appellants.

Page 7 of 10
EUGENIO VS COURT OF APPEALS
239 SCRA 207

FACTS: Nora Eugenio was a dealer of Pepsi Cola. Her husband used to be a route manager of Pepsi Cola. Pepsi Cola
filed a complaint for a sum of money against the Eugenio couple alleging that on several occasions, the couple
purchased and received on credit various products from two of Pepsi Cola’s plants and they had an outstanding
balance on each plant and that the couple failed to pay despite oral and written demands. In their defense, the
couple presented receipts issued to and received by them from Pepsi Cola’s route manager, Estrada. The court
rendered decision in favour of Pepsi Cola asking the couple to pay the company.

ISSUE:

RULING: Pepsi Cola failed to prove that Estrada, who is its duly authorized agent with respect to petitioners, did not
receive those amounts from the latter. As correctly explained by petitioners, “in so far as the private respondent’s
customers are concerned, for as long as they pay their obligations to the sales representative of the private
respondent using the latter’s official receipt, said payment extinguishes their obligations.” [Eugenio vs. Court of
Appeals, 239 SCRA 207(1994)]

Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor-in-interest
or any person authorized to receive it.39 As far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to have been
performed within the scope of the agent’s authority, if such is within the terms of the power of attorney, as written,
even if the agent has in fact exceeded the limits of his authority according to an understanding between the principal
and his agent.40 In fact, Atty. Rosario, private respondent’s own witness, admitted that “it is the responsibility of
the collector to turn over the collection. [Eugenio vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 207(1994)]

[G.R. No. 143561. June 6, 2001]

JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT and POWER
CO., respondents.

G.R. No. 143561.

June 6, 2001
JONATHAN D. CARIAGA,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT and
POWER CO.,
respondents
.
FACTS:
Jonathan Cariaga v. CA June 6, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes Nature: Petition for
review on certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting Jonathan

Page 8 of 10
Cariaga of qualified theft Facts: Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light &
Power Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were

involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the
matter and catch the perpetrators. In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt.
Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired
Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the pseudonym “Canuto Duran”. ‘Duran’
became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said that his
‘boss’ needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area.
Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to
him. ‘Duran’ was able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his
cousin named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). ‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end
when Sgt. Villasis ‘apprehended’ him on February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in
order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo
and another person came to the police station and confessed to their participation as
“fence” for Jonathan Cariaga. The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo
as witness as the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan
Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a
labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latter’s alleged illegal dismissal.
Issues:
Whether or not Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible as evidence; Siton is a
credible witness; guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven
DECISION:
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 1995 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
(1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it
admitted the sworn statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a witness “unable to testify” in
court. In Tan v. CA , the Court has held that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of
witnesses subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was
neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely 4
hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but,
it did not in the present case.
(2) Credible. (3) Guilty.
Cariaga vs CA
358 SCRA 583, G.R. No. 143561, June 6, 2001
Qualified Theft
FACTS: Luis Miguel Aboitiz, employed as Systems Analyst of the Davao Light & Power Company, Inc.
(DLPC), whose duty was to devise systems, procedures or controls to promote efficiency, prevent losses
due to waste, pilferage or theft of company property, etc., received reports that some private electricians
were engaged in the clandestine sale of DLPC materials and supplies. He initiated a covert operation with
the following objectives: (1) ascertain how DLPC materials were being stolen, the frequency of the thefts,
who were perpetrating the thefts; and (2) `catch' at least, one (1) DLPC employee that may be involved.

He then hired one Florencio Siton, a welder by occupation and a Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF)
member, as his undercover agent under the pseudonym 'Canuto Duran', an 'electrician from Kabakan,
Cotabato.'

'Canuto Duran' struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician. He told Ricardo that
his boss ordered him to buy electrical materials to be brought to Diwalwal.

Ricardo offered to supply 'Canuto Duran' with electrical materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom
he can procure the same. 'Canuto' purchased small electrical wires which, according to Ricardo, came
from his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga.

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Later on, Ricardo introduced 'Canuto' to Jonathan at Miguel Store. It turned out that Jonathan was the
assigned driver of DLPC Service Truck 'S-143. 'Canuto' inquired from Jonathan if he could supply him with
two (2) 15 KVA transformers. Jonathan replied that he could for P16,000. 'Canuto' placed an order for the
transformers. The deal did not materialize, however, as 'Canuto's' boss (Miguel Aboitiz) who would
provide the funds happened to be out of town. Jonathan appeared piqued. To appease him, 'Canuto'
assured him that they shall continue their 'business' relationship. Not long after, he placed an order for a
lightning arrester. Ricardo, Jonathan and 'Canuto' agreed to meet at the corner of Jacinto and Arellano
Streets.

Jonathan got DLPC Truck 'S-143' which was inside the DLPC Compound at Ponciano Reyes Street and drove
it to the designated meeting place, leaving 'Canuto' and Ricardo at Miguel Store. After a while, Ricardo
and 'Canuto' followed. On the way, 'Canuto gave Ricardo P1,800. At the meeting place, Ricardo gave the
money to Jonathan, after which the latter got a lightning arrester from his truck's toolbox and handed it
to Ricardo, who, in turn gave it to 'Canuto'.

A few months later, Ricardo accompanied 'Canuto' to Jonathan's house to get a roll of Electrical Wire No.
2 (300 meters long) valued P5,010 and 2 lightning arresters with cutout, valued P1,185.75 each, or
P2,371.50 for both from Jonathan. 'Canuto' paid P2,500.00 only for the items. He gave the money to
Ricardo; Ricardo, in turn, gave it to Jonathan.

Siton's undercover work came to an abrupt end on when members of Sgt. Villasis' team 'apprehended'
'Canuto' and turned him over, including the electrical wires that he previously purchased from Jonathan
through Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station. The team was unable to arrest Ricardo as he had already
left when the team arrived at his house. 'Canuto Duran' 'confessed' in order to persuade Ricardo – and
the others who were involved – to likewise come out with the truth. Thus, Ricardo confessed to their
crimes.

Ricardo revealed that he acted as a fence for his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga and 'Canuto Duran', that the
items that 'Canuto Duran' bought from Jonathan, thru him, were DLPC properties. Jonathan Cariaga was
then convicted of the crime of qualified theft by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft despite him being a mere laborer

HELD: Yes. The information alleged that petitioner was an employee of DLPC; that he had access to the
electrical supplies of said company; and that with grave abuse of confidence; he stole electrical materials
belonging to DLPC. The prosecution established that petitioner who was permanently assigned as driver
of Truck "S-143" had charge of all the DLPC equipment and supplies kept in his vehicle, including lightning
arresters, cut-out and wires, which were generally used for the installation of transformers and power
lines; and specifically stored therein for emergency operations at night when the stockroom is closed.
While the mere circumstance that the petitioner is an employee or laborer of DLPC does not suffice to
create the relation of confidence and intimacy that the law requires to designate the crime as qualified
theft, it has been held that access to the place where the taking took place or access to the stolen items
changes the complexion of the crime committed to that of qualified theft. Thus, theft by a truck driver
who takes the load of his truck belonging to his employer is guilty of qualified theft as was proven in this
case. The trial court correctly considered petitioner's use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the
crime as a generic aggravating circumstance thus raising the penalty to its maximum. While the
aggravating circumstance of "by means of motor vehicle" was not alleged in the information, there is
evidence that the same was employed to facilitate the commission of the crime. A generic aggravating
circumstance may be proved even if not alleged. The theft could not have been effected without the aid
of the motor vehicle, as proven by the prosecution, the service truck was used in storing and then
transporting the stolen electrical materials to the place where they were sold.

RATIO: Access to the place where the taking took place or access to the stolen items changes the
complexion of the crime committed to that of qualified theft.

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