UST

Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

Art. 2 NCC otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
1. cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
Republic of the Philippines executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances
is sought:
EN BANC
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64,
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298,
303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360,
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800,
[MABINI], petitioners, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,
vs. 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P.
DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107,
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
Bureau of Printing, respondents. 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209,
211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248,
251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289,
291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327,
ESCOLIN, J.: 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385,
386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600,
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702,
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

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c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64
& 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196,
1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595,
1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762,
1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804,
1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844,
1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868,
1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933,
1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028,
2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-
454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-
528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560,
563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611-
647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852,
854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22,
25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120,
122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354,
360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the
meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a
rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the defendant, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of
the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910
case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while
the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at
large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one
of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary
Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for
the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of
authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it
would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist,
the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the
rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the
general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this
case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of
the Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's
legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to
institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent
the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette
is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
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Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court
has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as
it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at
hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section
1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official
Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that
at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people
are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to
the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the
Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de
leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad
con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads:
"There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
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duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as
tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class
of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of
a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of
instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of
Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their
official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in
the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that
the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted
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upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and
it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of
this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published
in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though
some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it

appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of Separate Opinions
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by
the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said

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There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed
in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however,
to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due
process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that
such publication required need not be confined to the Official
Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not
follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under
all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force
and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question.
Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out.
It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any
statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or
effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate
opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is
the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur
in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if
it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the
level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential.
What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be
in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity.
Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural
effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published.
For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence
could have conducted themselves in accordance with their
provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could
arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances"
could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is
contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
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course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process
aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must
still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could
in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology,
there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no
further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of
a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force
of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the
opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive
acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be
devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go
too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable
consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such
a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos,
Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and
of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court
has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can
be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on
due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by
Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code,
there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of
Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
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Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the
Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity
[date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity"
is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil
Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by
the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been
duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of
due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one
year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is
not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of
prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in
the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its
publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for
its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree
provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I
would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a
date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes
effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect
to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should
be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws
as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither
is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any
statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already
provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may
be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law
with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it
clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different
period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of
notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the
proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the
Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the
Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
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Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
"all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until
but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said due publication thereof.
law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially
an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act
No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will
take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume
that role. Separate Opinions

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires
notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound
by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg
to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication
in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed
in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however,
to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: 1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due
process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or

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executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that
such publication required need not be confined to the Official
Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not
follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under
all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force
and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question.
Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out.
It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any
statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or
effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate
opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is
the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur
in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if
it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the
level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential.
What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be
in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity.
Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural
effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published.
For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence
could have conducted themselves in accordance with their
provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could
arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances"
could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is
contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process
aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must
still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could
in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology,
there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no
further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of
a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force
of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the
opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive
acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be
devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go
too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable
consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such
a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos,
Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and
of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court
has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can
be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on
due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by
Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code,
there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of
Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the
Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity
[date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity"
is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil
Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by
the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been
duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of
due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one
year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is
not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of
prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in
the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its
publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for
its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree
provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I
would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a
date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes
effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect
to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should
be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws
as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither
is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any
statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already
provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may
be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law
with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it
clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different
period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of
notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the
proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the
Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the
Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and
"all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette
but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially
an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act
No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will
take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume
that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires
notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound
by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg
to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication
in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to
the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and
issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until
due publication thereof.
Footnotes
1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shag be recognized, access
to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
shag be afforded the citizens subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012;
Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City
Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose
Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95
SCRA 392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil
848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of
the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843;
Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security
System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil.
179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et
al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

9 93 Phil.. 68,. Teehankee, J.:

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court
after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the
Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her
letter-request regarding the respective dates of
publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential
issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted
by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-
publication of other presidential issuances.
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959,
per the late Chief Justice Paras.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
Plana, J.:

11 129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph.
He mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of
the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v.
Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the
Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21:
"The legislature shall provide publication of all
statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force
until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs.
Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing
Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-

50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-

24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
2.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. in his
capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS;
ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS MADE
TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
AND TO INFORMATION. — The categorical statement by this
Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective
seeks to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time,
ensure to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
information on matter of public
concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure or a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in
the dispositive portion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask
the following questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"
?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication" ?
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should
be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that
the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed
first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject
decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently
not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came
next the February Revolution and the Court required the new
Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening
events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding,
he submitted that issuances intended only for the interval
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did
not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in
full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision
under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported
by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."cralaw virtua1aw library
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the
parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6
is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days
from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication),
it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as
a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they
may affect before they can begin to operate.cralawnad
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person
knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all.
It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly
to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only
to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public
as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by
the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely
to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by,
say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel
or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention
of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices
were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that
six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10
and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication
without indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a
clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be
made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this
kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing
law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2
of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a
law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously
has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of
a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not
our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.chanrobles law library
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least
as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said
Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested
by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication
as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to
examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant
motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over.
This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic,
with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain
the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or
reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts
of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead
of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice
to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr ., and Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
While concurring in the Court’s opinion penned by my distinguished
colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few
observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa,
I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the
previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective
thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the
legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices
of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus,
in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of
two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although
covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two
presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980,
one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then
President’s nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor
vehicle equipped with air-conditioner. This was further exacerbated
by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication
before any law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the
part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people
their constitutional right to due process and to information on
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written
by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a
few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect
immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as
coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the
Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such
statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally
to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and
without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be
to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process
clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to
and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been
throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such
application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a
government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a
statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other
medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory
norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and
reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the
Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may
therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without
creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent
statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until
such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil
Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, pp. 242-250.
2. Ibid., pp. 244-248.
3. Id., pp. 271-280.
4. Id., pp. 288-299.
5. Id., pp. 320-322.
6. 136 SCRA 27, 46.
7. Rollo, p. 246.
8. Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee,
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and Lorenzo Relova.
9. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V.
Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos, Efren I. Plana, Serafin P. Cuevas,
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

and Nestor B. Alampay.

10. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

11. Justice B. S. de la Fuente.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
3.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of
Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as
Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was
filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for
short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from
enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16,
Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37,
Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong
and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the
task of processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment
and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA,
to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for
Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses
suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE
Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series
of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over
the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the
protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the
recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby
temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE
through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of
household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to
be issued for said purpose.
In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the
Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise directed
to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of
prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued
Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991,
providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the
accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire
Filipino domestic helpers.
Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and
Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong.
Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to
operationalize the temporary government processing and
deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from
the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
agencies for said skill and host market, the following guidelines and
mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy.
I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement
Unit (HWPU)
An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or
HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of the
various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry
segment:
The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with
appropriate units and other entities concerned:
1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment
Agencies
2. Manpower Pooling
3. Worker Training and Briefing
4. Processing and Deployment
5. Welfare Programs
II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for
Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or Principals
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs
for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in Manila
directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong
Kong.
xxx xxx xxx
X. Interim Arrangement
All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to
be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under the name of the
Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be
processed with the HWPU.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine
Consulate General in Hong kong a list of their accepted applicants in
their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance
shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting
contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of their respective
pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower
pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued
Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of
employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the
recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong
Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining
to the government processing and deployment of domestic helpers
(DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts which
have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to
30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment
Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring
DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which
requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at
the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine Consulate General where
a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who
failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to
the POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila
for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs
shall be allowed.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted
applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this list
of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be
allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p.
36, Rollo.)
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for
prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars
and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:
1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of
the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power
to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the
power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation
of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized
to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis
ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the
POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1,
1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas
employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is
broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct
Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing
system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment
and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor
Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development
Board the power and duty:
3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino
contract workers on a government to government arrangement and
in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . . (Art. 17, Labor
Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or
representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for
overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of
employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance
therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of
the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72,
79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in
the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the
particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from
the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the
petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of
Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful
reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the
same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly
or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People
vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate
conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police
power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To
"restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and
whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster,
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first
and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons"
(Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180
SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order
No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business
operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of
domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the
"mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner
may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong
and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for
other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end,
rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of
placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges
committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying
domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid and
justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since
the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is
affected with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing
Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial
measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This
is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that
recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by
private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily
suspended effective July 1, 1991."
The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to
recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying
of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the restriction of
the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the
unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing
applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and
not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-
65, Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police
power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable
for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is
otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and
other government agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general
circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing
supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.) under the aforementioned laws of the land.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements SO ORDERED.
provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo,
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the JJ., concur.
rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures
to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by
them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987).
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146
SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.
(p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in
question may not be enforced and implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The
implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991,
and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991,
by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
4.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital
punishment is the amplitude of legal protection accorded to the
offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to
minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human
fault. Indeed, there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by
the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the crime.
Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by the grace of
executive clemency. But, even before that, all convictions imposing
the penalty of death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The
cases at bar, involving two death sentences, apostrophize for the
condemned the role of this ultimate judicial intervention.
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate
informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with
serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335
and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:
That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at
Barangay Pulot Center, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused by means of force, threat and intimidation,
by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia
Taha to her damage and prejudice.1
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal
Detention:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan,
Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
a private individual, and being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha,
and by means of deceit did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of 17 years
old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said
Mia Taha of her liberty against her will and consent and without
legal justification, to the damage and prejudice of said Mia Taha.2
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not
guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial was terminated, a joint
trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court.3
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January
21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn
Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the
Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was
studying. When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass
through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there
was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody
suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the
hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on
the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize
her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his
voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics
teacher at PNS.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty
with one hand while holding the knife with the other hand, opened
the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her
private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first
experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter
a word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually
pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant
not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of
him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else
she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her
skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate
of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house
where she lived. She did not see where appellant went after she left
him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her
landlady but she did not mention anything about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home
to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not
tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might make
good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant
arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the
latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds because
she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed,
she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want
her parents to get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in
silence, with Mia following behind appellant, towards the highway
where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for
the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because
appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle.
The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's
Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a
room where they staye d for three days. During the entire duration of
their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to
leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously
guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never
drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with
appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to
the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where she was raped
by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the
room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on
January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to
know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing
person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain
Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she
was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with
appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District
Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined by Dr. Rogelio
Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking,
conscious, coherent Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia
majora and minora, hymenal opening stellate in shape, presence of
laceration superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis,
approximately 1/2 cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration
noted, hymenal opening admits 2 fingers with slight resistance,
prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with
slight resistance, presence of laceration, longitudinal at the fossa
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can
admit an average size penis in erection with laceration.4
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in
stellate shape and that there was a laceration, which shows that
complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of
the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock position,
he could not say that there was force applied because there were no
scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also
examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries.
The patient told him that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the
letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she never loved
appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did
to her; and that she did not notice if there were people near the
boarding house of her cousin. She narrated that when appellant
started to remove her panty, she was already lying down, and that
even as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she
was afraid. She could not remember with which hand appellant held
the knife. She was completely silent from the time she was made to
lie down, while her panty was being removed, and even until
appellant was able to rape her.
When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not
know if he was armed but there was no threat made on her or her
parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked
permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house with
appellant walking ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset
Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid. However, she
admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife at her.
She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice
if there were other people inside. She likewise did not ask the
appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary
doorknob, similar to that on the door of the courtroom which, even if
locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that
there was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they
stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she never
noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up,
appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter
arrived at their house in the morning of January 22, 1994, she
noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When
she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter
merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with
appellant because she knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia
and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her
husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could
not find them there, she went to the house of appellant because she
was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's
wife told her that he did not come home.
Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the
incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went
to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto
Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to
the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where she
made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she
returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed
her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's
willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus
settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to
see her daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem
who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified that when
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by
appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not
return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia
to the hospital where the latter was examined and then they
proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and
kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn
statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and
offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their part, her
husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them,
Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave
them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an
affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping
pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before
Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she
agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted.
Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to
graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly because of
what happened.
The defense presented a different version of what actually
transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August,
1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS). Although he did not
court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I
love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious
relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on
December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as lovers.
Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot Elementary School at
the poblacion because he was the coach of the Palawan delegation
for chess. At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at
his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she then decided
to spend the night there with him.
Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20,
1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS, was looking inside the
school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS,
when she heard voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room.
She went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal
na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo."
Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door and was
startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked
them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour but the two,
who were obviously caught by surprise, could not answer. She then
hurriedly closed the door and left. According to this witness,
complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair with
appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped,
Erna Baradero informed appellant's wife about it when the latter
arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.
Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an
affidavit in connection with the present case, but the same was not
filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was executed
and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn
statement, later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero
alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha about the
latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a married
man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that
she loves appellant very much.
Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M.,
Mia Taha went to his office asking for help with the monologue that
she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to
meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However,
when he reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia
waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a bench near
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the road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked
about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They stayed there
for fifteen minutes, after which complainant returned to her boarding
house just across the street while appellant headed for home some
fifteen meters away.
It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant,
Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at PNS and who was then
on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked
what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely
replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to
the store and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta watering the
plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago
returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant and she noticed
that they were quite intimate because they were holding hands. This
made her suspect that the two could be having a relationship. She,
therefore, told appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class
and was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go home.
Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them
seated on the same bench. Filomena further testified that she had
tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had a
heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had
likewise told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the
trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant appearing on the
letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is familiar
with the same because Mia was her former student. On cross-
examination, Filomena clarified that when she saw the couple on the
night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did
not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading
with her.
In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant
met Mia's mother on the road near their house and she invited him to
come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty
minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from her
mother for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did
so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a plastic bag
and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained her things
which she was bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and Mia
went to the poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and
then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.
Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and
there was no more available transportation, so she suggested that
they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was nothing
wrong in that because they already had intimate relations, aside from
the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide
should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to stay at the
hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their
registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the
funds they had solicited. That evening, however, appellant told
complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a
certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a
motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did
not bring complainant along because she had refused to go home.
The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the
house of complainant's parents and informed them that Mia spent
the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would
just fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and waited for
them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he
decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while waiting
near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends.
Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to Sunset Garden where
they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from the
inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was opened by her.
Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were
doing, but she merely answered that what she was doing was of her
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
own free will and that at that moment her father was not supposed to
know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant
did not know, however, was that appellant had already reported the
matter to her parents, although he opted not to tell her because he
did not want to add to her apprehensions. Isagani Virey further
testified that when he saw appellant and complainant on January 23
and 24, 1994, the couple looked very happy.
Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire
stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January 22 to 24, 1994, because
he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove to
him. Appellant knew that what they were doing was wrong but he
allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would
commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant, on
January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the
house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the matter.
Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him
at his aunt's house to ask for assistance in procuring transportation
because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were already
looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City.
Virey accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife
was a co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter refused to help
because of the complicated situation appellant was in.
Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a
complaint had been filed against appellant and after finding out that
there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem who
is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house
that same day and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem
suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites but
appellant refused because he was already married. It was eventually
agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of appellant and
make arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that
day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's
house.
The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant
could no longer afford to pay their hotel bills, the couple were
constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando
Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two days.
They just walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden to
Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven
hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as
well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the couple were
very happy, they were intimate and sweet to each other, they always
ate together, and it was very obvious that they were having a
relationship.
In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called
appellant "Papa." While they were there, she would buy food at the
market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch
television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to
go with appellant despite the fact the he was a married man, Mia
told him that she really loved appellant. She never told him, and
Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she was
supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also
testified that several police officers lived within their neighborhood
and if complainant had really been kidnapped and detained, she
could have easily reported that fact to them. Mia was free to come
and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never
locked because the lock had been destroyed.
On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was
merely an acquaintance of his; that it was Naem who went to the
lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's
mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police
Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant from the lodging house and
brought him to the municipal hall.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with
appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed him that
complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house
the next day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994,
appellant was not able to talk to complainant's parents because they
merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell
her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her.
Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her that within
one hour he was be going to the police station at the municipal hall
so that they could settle everything there.
After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of
Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo
who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police
station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and
relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to
talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994,
appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the
police station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape
and kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to
appellant on different occasions two letters from complainant dated
February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's
teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify
the handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he
came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance
was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims that
he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day
he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father
because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request
his mother to talk to complainants in order to settle the case.
Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at
and raped Mia Taha on January 21, 1994. However, he admitted that
he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already on
January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they
never had sexual relations. Appellant was told, when complainant
visited him in jail, that her father would kill her if she refused to
testify against him, although by the time she testified in court, her
father had already died.
Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit
relations in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan,
which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have
a relationship with her because he wanted to change her and that was
what they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that, during the time
when they were staying together, Mia had allegedly asked
permission to leave several times but that he refused. On the
contrary, he claimed that on January 27, 1994 when she told him
that her parents wanted to see her, he readily gave her permission to
go.
He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they
left her parents' house on January 22, 1994, but which she left
behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on
January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the
provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.
Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the
provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant for his arrest
was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a
counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty.
Paredes, it was no longer necessary since the complainants had
already executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed
a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with
these cases.
On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that
she delivered any letter to appellant when the latter was still
detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination,
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she
clarified that she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding
with appellant.
Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the
testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the incident at the Orchids
Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the
boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise
negated the claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21,
1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant contending that
she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she
disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night
of January 21, 1994. She vehemently disavowed that she and
appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since there
never was a time that they became sweethearts.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following
testimonies of the defense witnesses: that she told appellant "iwanan
mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered "wala kang
pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her
relationship with appellant; that she was the one who registered
them at Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left her
at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani
Virey came to their room and stayed there for five minutes, because
the only other person who went there was the room boy who served
their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting
help for transportation; and that she was free to roam around or to go
out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.
Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she
went to see him at Narra, Palawan to have sex with him and claims
that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still in Grade
VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo"
when she allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him, since the
letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she
threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since she
never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset Garden and at
Edward's Subdivison, she was not being guarded by appellant.
However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her
signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4" and admitted that
the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on
Exhibits "1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers,
she also admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all
belong to her.
On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the
Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in these cases,
identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in
jail on February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty
at that time, he asked her what she wanted and she said she would
just visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he had
a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting area
which is around ten meters away from his post, and then he saw her
hand over to appellant a letter which the latter immediately read.
This witness declared that appellant never requested him to testify.
Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver,
testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, he was plying his
regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by
Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there
were already several passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off
at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the
Sunset Garden.
On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the
maximum penalty of death in both cases.6 By reason of the nature of
the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on
automatic review.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape7 and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention8 filed by Mia Taha and
Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's
Point issued a resolution9 on February 4, 1994 finding the existence
of a prima facie case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the
spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha executed an affidavit of
desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention.10 However, pursuant to a joint resolution11 issued on
March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and
for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed
against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both
charges.
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of
the court below, on the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the
crime of rape despite the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle
in reviewing the evidence adduced in a prosecution for the crime of
rape as cited in its decision reiterating the case of People
vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303).
III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had
consummated the crime of rape against private complainant.
IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to
Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the defense.
V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the
crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention as the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and completely ignoring the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.
VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied
admission of guilt on the part of the accused-appellant in view of the
offer to compromise.
VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be
indemnified in the sum of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes committed.
IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for
each of the crimes charged on the accused-appellant despite the fact
that the crimes were allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7659.12
A. The Rape Case
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It
exposes both the accused and the accuser to humiliation, fear and
anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear
for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or
acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the
participants can testify as to its occurrence. 14This notwithstanding,
the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without
regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a
sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is
then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to
carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.15
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of
State authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of
innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him.
Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the
weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused may be
convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the
offended woman, provided such testimony is clear, positive,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court
in reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of
rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought
to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind
that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but
harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent;17 (2)
that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution;18 and (3) that the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.19
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply
demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there was no
rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of
rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful
plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction of the crime of rape under paragraph (1),
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same
was accomplished through force or intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure
of doubt that appellant had sexual congress with complainant against
her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21, 1994,
she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her
cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied
such a serious imputation and contends that on said date and time,
he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find
appellant's version more credible and sustained by the evidence
presented and of record.
According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the
boarding house, appellant was already inside apparently waiting for
her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that
she was going there on that particular day and at that time,
considering that she does not even live there, unless of course it was
appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who
happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the
imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a generic intent
with an indeterminate victim was never established nor even
intimated by the prosecution.
Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is
precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as regards the setting
of the supposed sexual assault.20 It will be noted that the place where
the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence but a
boarding house where several persons live and where people are
expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even bother to
elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding
house had remained closed for some time, in order that it could be
safely assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at any given
time.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he
went to the boarding house upon the invitation of complainant
because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for
the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the
house because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat
on a bench outside the house and talked. This testimony of appellant
was substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both
appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding
house, and that she even advised them to go home because it was
already late and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of
witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school building. On
rebuttal, complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that
night. Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction.21
It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged
ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly
accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they
eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural
tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he
had raped,22and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given
the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further
exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon
is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as
practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected
that one who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself
from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all
other things and circumstances related to the offense which could
possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as
to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.
It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove
that the accused was at the scene of the crime are admissible as
relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a
circumstance tending to identify the appellant.23 Consequently, it is
not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let
himself be seen with the complainant immediately after he had
allegedly raped her.24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion
that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany complainant
up to the gate of the house, considering its strategic location vis-a-
vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the
street,25 and the PNS schoolbuilding which is only around thirty
meters away.26
Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident
she went directly to her boarding house where she saw her landlady.
Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to corroborate the
story of complainant, despite the fact that the former was the very
first person she came in contact with from the time appellant
allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan boarding house after
her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly did not
talk, the landlady could at least have testified on complainant's
physical appearance and to attest to the theorized fact that indeed
she saw complainant on said date and hour, possibly with
dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all.
We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version
that it was Mia Taha who invited him to the boarding house to help
her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest.
This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her
the following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that
same school affair.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding
house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that she was at the
boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was
her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was
not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that
on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding
house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her
narration, she gave another version and said that when she reached
the boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding
in order to cover up or realign the same with her prior inconsistent house where you said Danny Godoy raped you?
statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this single A None, Sir.
episode, thus: COURT:
Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the Q So, the house was empty?
evening, do you remember where you were? A Yes, Your Honor.
A Yes, sir. Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?
Q Where were you? A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor.27 (Corrections
A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir. and emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx 2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of
Q Why were you there? force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to her neck.
A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The
COURT: physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the
Q Conversing with whom? prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-
A With my cousin, Your Honor. legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny,
Q Your cousin's name? however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the
A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor. charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by
xxx xxx xxx appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO: The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr.
Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you Divinagracia, was a week old and already healed, and the conclusion
please relate to this Honorable Court how that rape happened? therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the
A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening. date which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since the
COURT: same findings and conclusion are likewise consistent with
Q Of what date? appellant's admission that coitus took place with the consent of
A January 21, 1994, Your Honor. complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994.28 Further, rather
xxx xxx xxx than substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid theory and the
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO: supposed date of commission of rape, the finding that there were no
Q Then what happened? evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more
A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I credence to appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a later date and
passed (through) the kitchen and then when I opened the door the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical
somebody grabbed me suddenly. force.29In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the
xxx xxx xxx

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by physical
evidence showing use of force.30
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6
o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-legal expert opined that it
could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On
further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was
not applied.31 He also added that when he examined the patient
bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises.32 The absence of any sign
of physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of
complainant's consent to the act.33 While the absence in the medical
certificate of external signs of physical injuries on the victim does
not necessarily negate the commission of rape,34 the instant case is
clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast
doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the
laceration corroborated complainant's assertion that there was sexual
intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the alleged use
of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not
considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal
element of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts necessary to
constitute another equally important element of the crime.35
Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really
strong because she was afraid of appellant. Again assuming that a
sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless strongly
believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is
evident that complainant did not use the manifest resistance
expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity.36 She failed
to make any outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her and
dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no evidence on
record that she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on
the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and
inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate
that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any
force of whatever nature or form.
Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too
conveniently general and ruefully unconvincing to make this Court
believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her
by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or objected at
all to the involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the
kind of resistance expected of a woman defending her virtue and
honor.37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped
renders doubtful her charge of rape,38 especially when we consider
the actual mise-en-scene in the context of her asseverations.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress
are not essential, and need not be presented, as they are not
indispensable evidence to prove rape.39 We incline to the view,
however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other
corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving the
rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other
way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is
inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been presented
to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical report
which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of the
essential elements of the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the
irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of
complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously
militate against the prosecution's cause.
II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the
alleged assault is of the utmost importance as tending to establish
the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a
conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained from the
uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied
beyond doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape was
committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be
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reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the
case. 40
Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape,
appellant went to her parents' house and asked permission from
them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy.
Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply that
appellant was armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to
leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor intimidated
by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed threat
previously made by appellant does not inspire belief since appellant
was alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no showing
of any opportunity for him to make good his threat, even assuming
that he had really voiced any. On the contrary, complainant even
admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from her
parents for her to accompany him.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can
only be described as paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to be
abnormal.41 It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing the
person who had allegedly raped her only the day before, she did not
accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and
disgust.42Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the
presence of her parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if
only for such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from
pursuing any evil design. From her deportment, it does not appear
that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the
mind of complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is
totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be expected
of a person who had just suffered the ultimate invasion of her
womanhood.43
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions
to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous
female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and
condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law
and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without
those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and
circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency
to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been
sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While
they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape
victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally
bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the
law.44
The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing
the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to
support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and
conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of
the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts.46
The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony
of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident. Indeed, it is
easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim had to
testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill
her if she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had
sexual intercourse with her. The question then that confronts the trial
court is whether or not complainant's testimony is credible.47 The
technique in deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on
isolated parts of that testimony. The correct meaning of the
testimony can often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire
testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in
relation to what else has been stated.48
In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to
be desired. The court below made no serious effort to
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dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence
for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in
rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be accepted
with precipitate credulity.49 In finding that the crime of rape was
committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the
testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident
and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be
reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to
consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events
which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a
quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the
actual truth could have been readily exposed.
There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's
testimony which inveigh against its being accorded the full credit it
was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other,
the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of
conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic and
fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal
of said judgment.50 Thus:
1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein
appellant at the Sunset Garden and around three times at Edward's
Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations.
If this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor
could have overlooked these facts with their obvious legal
implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant
with only one count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's
representations is further magnified by the fact that even the trial
court did not believe it, as may be inferred from its failure to
consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to uncharitably
assume that it was similarly befuddled.
2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never
explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner
that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his
innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases,
this claim that complainant now advances appears to be a common
testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.
3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and
three nights and that she never noticed if appellant slept because she
never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side by
side with appellant, complainant admitted that everytime she woke
up, appellant was invariably in bed beside her.51
4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it
was always locked and it could not be opened from the inside. But,
this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:
Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?
A No, Sir, it was locked.
Q Can you describe the lock of that room?
A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.
ATTY. EBOL:
Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the
door be locked and opened from the inside.
COURT:
Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself
if you can open that door from the inside.
CLERK OF COURT:
Witness holding the doorknob.
COURT:
The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic)
inside you can open it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held?
A There was, Your Honor.
Q What is that?
A The one that slides, Your Honor.
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Q And that is used when you are already inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.52 (Emphases ours.)
5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's
Subdivision, beyond supposedly offering token or futile resistance to
the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no attempt to flee
or attract attention to her plight.53 In her own declaration,
complainant mentioned that when they checked in at Sunset Garden,
she saw the cashier at the information counter where appellant
registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact that appellant at
that time was admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a room
boy usually went to their room and brought them food. If indeed she
was bent on fleeing from appellant, she could have grabbed every
possible opportunity to escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What
likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to present these
two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have
bolstered or corroborated complainant's story.
6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January
22, 1994, they left the house together and walked in going to the
highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that appellant
went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had
evil motives, that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond
comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling such fear in
complainant that she could not dare take advantage of the situation,
in spite of the laxity of appellant, and run as far away from him as
possible despite all the chances therefor.
7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the
filing of the rape case, complainant was dropped from school and
was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and
commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that
the school authorities were heartless people who turned their backs
on her and considered her an outcast. That would be adding insult to
injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia and her
parents were never heard to complain about this apparent injustice.
Such complacency cannot but make one think and conclude that
there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the drastic
action taken by the school and the docile submission thereto by the
Taha family.
On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial
court's decision was replete with sweeping statements and
generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's
testimony, declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and then
hastened to conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in
effect rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the strength
of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of that of the
defense, which is totally repugnant to the elementary and time-
honored rule that conviction should be made on the basis of strong,
clear and compelling evidence of the prosecution.54
IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and
complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart theory" does
not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if
the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in
truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either
the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not
improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is
uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would
rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that
the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to
admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal,
is precisely what happened to appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by
the highly credible testimonies of several witnesses for the
defense, viz.:
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994,
she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a bench in front of the
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house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and the couple
were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit
affair with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the
house at Edward's Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia why she
decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia
answered that she really loves him.55 He heard her call appellant
"Papa".56 The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.57
3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on
redirect examination that he asked Mia if she knew what she getting
into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved
Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When he was
trying to give counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if
appellant left her, she would commit suicide.58 He could see that the
couple were happy together.59
4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal
Engineering Office where he worked was located within the
premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and
that when he was advising appellant that what he was doing is
wrong because he is married and Mia is his student, complainant
reacted by saying that no matter what happened she would not leave
Godoy, and that if she went home her father would kill her.60 He
also observed that they were happy.61
5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day
before the alleged rape incident, inside one of the classrooms and
they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal
na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas
tayo."62 She tried to dissuade complainant from continuing with her
relationship with appellant.63
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate
relationship with complainant, which were substantially
corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted.
The rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare,
unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed
assertions of appellant.64 Mere denials are self-serving negative
evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the
declarations of credible disinterested witnesses.65
Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have
supplied. They were replete with details which could have been
known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability
thereto.66 His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the
earmarks of truth. This is not to say that the testimony of appellant
should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must have colored
his account, even on the assumption that he could be trusted to stick
to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much in his version that
does not strain the limits of credulity. More to the point, there is
enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality.67
Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is
improbable, ridiculous, nonsensical and incredible is highly uncalled
for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not mandatory. It
is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible one.68 It does not
apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the
testimony and the supposed inconsistencies arise merely from a
desire of the witness to exculpate himself although not completely.69
Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by
the evidence presented by the defense, the most telling of which are
her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to
the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis
and emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:
27 Feb. 94
Dane,
Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.
Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation
ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko
ng one week. pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko.
pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila ako.
Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan
nila akong maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng
bahay kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon
doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko.
tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong
luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa
pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto
alas 9:00 ay dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang
kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor Lozot. Mag busina ka
lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat
ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang disisyon mo
maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.
alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka
pagkain ko hahaluan nila.
Please sir . . .
(Sgd.) Mia Taha70
3/1/94
Dane,
I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa
kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat
sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong
suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig
ko na magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa
Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa
DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit
naisipan kong lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na
masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay
sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot
samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil gusto kong
masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita
dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul
nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong
iniisip mong minahal lang kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa
iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon ang hangarin ko
sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo.
kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin
ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko
kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa
may guardiya pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang
pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan
ng mga magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong
hindi makakain maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may
masama akong hangarin sa iyo.
Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2
darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak kong anong
oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam
mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay inuutusan akong
lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi
ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay
sa tulong niya.
Love you
(Sgd.) Mia Taha71
There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters
eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's handwriting
which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other
defense witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as
belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and Erna
Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of complainant
and highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder
committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these
qualified witnesses and refusing to give any probative value to these
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two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no
handwriting expert was presented to analyze and evaluate the same.
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned
document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting experts, is
not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting.72 This is so
since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge
of the handwriting of such person. The said section further provides
that evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge.73
The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's
handwriting on the basis of the examination papers submitted to
them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise
carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with
the standard writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for
comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions of the
lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written
by one and the same person. More importantly, complainant herself
categorically admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters
belongs to her.
It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the
trial court again chose to turn a deaf ear to this conclusive portion of
complainant's testimony:
ATTY. EBOL:
Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and
Filomena Pielago were your teachers?
A Yes, sir.
Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this
incident of January 21, 1994, am I not correct?
A That is true, sir.
Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been
your teachers you took examinations in their classes in their
particular subject(s)?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your
teachers, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it
appears to be your test paper and with your signature and the
alphabet appears in this exhibit appears to be that of Mia Taha,
please examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is your test
paper?
A Yes, sir.
Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this
Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable Court if you are familiar with
that.
A What subject is that?
Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.
A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.
Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that
signature?
A That is min(e), sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math,
are you familiar with that signature?
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
A Yes, sir.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?
A That is my handwriting, sir.
Q Also Exhibit "2"?
A Yes, sir.74
While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never
delivered any letter of complainant to herein appellant, the witness
presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was
the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time, testified of his
own accord because he knew that what Casantosan said was a
blatant lie. Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor requested
him to testify for the defense, as related by the witness himself.
Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony
of witness Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went
to visit appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned out to
be the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense.
V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by
appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This inference does
not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the
bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes
which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever
may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been
held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show
that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some
other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the
offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.75
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense
overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense
charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from
appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is
an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that
he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant.
As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he
declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of
these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his
mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases.
Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during
the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's
mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said
meetings.76
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time
the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of
compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.77 In another
case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from
the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the
accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to
settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs,
that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent
further deterioration of the relations between the parties.78
VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not
looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts as to
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the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's
explanation about the filing of criminal charges.79
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are
very revealing. Most probably written out of desperation and
exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents,
complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo,
aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig
ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her
ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his
predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape
charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the
intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid
retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure
exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her
account of the alleged rape.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in
the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which
brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.80 It
could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in
the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an
effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging
tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.
Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not
sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, that is not always
the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose
too many instances of false charges of rape.81 While this Court has,
in numerous cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction rendered
by trial courts in rape charges, especially where the offended parties
were very young and presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a
story just to secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the
Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and acquitted
the accused when there are strong indications pointing to the
possibility that the rape charges were merely motivated by some
factors except the truth as to their commission.82 This is a case in
point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that
the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test of moral
certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of
appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of complainant's feelings
for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her teacher,
he should have acted as adviser and counselor to complainant and
helped her develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting
her.83Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in a prison
as an instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual
confinement of his conscience as a measure of divine retribution.
Additionally, these ruminations do not rule out such other legal
options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory
law.
VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on
the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a
person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally
disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an
accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more
presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions conflict,
one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his
innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each
presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for
each presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as
the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must,
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of
the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient
to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's
guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues.84
The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been
explained in this wise:
In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of
the complaining witness, on the theory that she will not choose to
accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and
indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth.
The rape victim who decides to speak up exposes herself as a
woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably
sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a
cheapened woman, never mind that she did not submit to her
humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she
will be the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be
titillated by the intimate details of her violation. She will squirm
through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled,
relating every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the
most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will
argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the
sexual act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be
challenged and maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she
will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been
lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape victim
chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation
rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a
woman decides instead to come out openly and point to her
assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its
consequences. . . .85
The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon
the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial
part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a
probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact
that he had the opportunity to do so.86 Its purpose is to balance the
scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the
lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their
command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and
influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set
free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a
doubt.87 This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in
evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than
upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.88
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in
conjunction with the overwhelming evidence in favor of herein
appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that the
constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must
prevail in this particular indictment.
B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable
proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty.89 In the present charge for that crime,
such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution.
Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from
pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave
and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence
thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant, as
hereunder explained:
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to
fetch her at her parents' house the day after the alleged rape incident.
In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to permit
her to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they
left the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her
parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is difficult
to comprehend how one could deduce from these normal and
innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive
complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case where a
kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious circumstances
as described by complainant.
Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family,
complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag which later turned
out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at
Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered
to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a
ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed to
prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a
pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and
consent of her parents who passively looked on without comment.
Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the
room which they occupied, whether at Sunset Garden or at Edward's
Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from the inside.
We must, however, recall that when she was asked on cross-
examination about the kind of lock that was used, she pointed to the
doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that the door of
the courtroom be locked and then asked complainant to open it from
the inside. She was easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted
that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could also be
opened from the inside in the same manner. This demonstrably
undeniable fact was never assailed by the prosecution. It also failed
to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the room which was
occupied by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be
locked because the lock thereof was broken.
When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked
along the national highway in broad daylight. Complainant,
therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other
people and free herself from appellant if it were true that she was
forcibly kidnapped and abused by the latter.90 In fact, several
opportunities to do so had presented themselves from the time they
left complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel
and in the lodging house.
According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant
the day after they went to Sunset Garden to inform them that Mia
spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned
by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the other hand,
the allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the police
about her missing daughter was not supported by any corroborative
evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the police officer to
whom she allegedly reported the incident ever identified or
presented in court.
We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to
prove any motive on his part for the commission of the crime
charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge
where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime.91 It
is true that, as a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is
immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not have to
be proved.92 Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any
motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the accused
becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in
order.93 Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or her
mother can any ill motive of a criminal nature be reasonably drawn.
What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst,
immoral though it may be.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to
admit in evidence the bag of clothes belonging to complainant which
was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its announced
supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought from a
department store. Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere
surmise or speculation, aside from the fact that on rebuttal the
prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or clarification
from complainant about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our
impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of discretion by the
court below. Matters which could have been easily verified were
thus cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on
such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by said court.
We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly
regarded disquisition of this Court against the practice of excluding
evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court:
It has been observed that justice is most effectively and
expeditiously administered where trivial objections to the admission
of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical
objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case
of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the
early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any
certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not; and where there is
no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the
evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon
the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected
later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle
over which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall
into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal,
often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the
effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step
which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the
admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as
to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to
know the law and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case,
to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to
the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the materials
before it necessary to make a correct judgment.94
At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of
these cases sufficient and substantial evidence which warrant and
demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take this
opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and experience of
mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital
punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously
imposed, it generates resentment.
Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No.
7659 which reimposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes
took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its
publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin,
Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal,95 and not on
January 1, 1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Danny Godoy is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641
of the Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,
Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith,
unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, 12 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 1-2; Rollo, 184-185.
Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and 13 People vs. Managbanag, G.R. No. 66550, November 27, 1987,
Panganiban, JJ., concur. 155 SCRA 669.
Puno, J., took no part. 14 People vs. Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987, 153
Footnotes SCRA 487.
* He is also referred to as Dane Godoy in some parts of the record. 15 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, 12th ed., Sec. 14, pp. 41-
1 Rollo, 10. 42.
2 Ibid., 11. 16 People vs. Sequerra, G.R. No. 58574, October 12, 1987, 154
3 In its decision, the trial court declares that it "took only eight (8) SCRA 657.
days to conduct and finish the joint trial of these cases — on April 17 People vs. Del Pilar, G.R. No. 75852, August 11, 1988, 164
27, 28 and 29, 1994, and on May 10, 11, 12, 13 and 18, 1994. The SCRA 280.
promulgation of the decision in these cases is set on Monday, May 18 People vs. Capilitan, G.R. No. 73382, February 15, 1990, 182
23, 1994, five (5) days after these cases are finally terminated and SCRA 313.
submitted for decision." (Rollo, 57). 19 People vs. Bacdad, G.R. Nos. 71719-20, May 8, 1991, 196
** His name is spelled Naim in some portions of the record. SCRA 786.
4 Original Record, Vol. I, 42. 20 People vs. Co, L-38052, July 14 1988, 163 SCRA 453.
5 Ibid., 126; per Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. 21 People vs. Taruc, G.R. No. 74655, January 20, 1988, 157 SCRA
6 The trial court imposed the death penalty for kidnapping with 178.
illegal detention pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as 22 People vs. Herrick, G.R. No. 85137, July 12, 1990, 187 SCRA
amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. 7659, which provides for the death 364.
penalty where the victim was raped. However, the conviction for the 23 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, 12th ed., sec. 185, p. 367.
rape which was allegedly committed with the use of a deadly 24 People vs. Sujetado, G.R. No. 103967, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA
weapon and punished in Art. 335 of the said Code, as amended by 382.
Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, with reclusion perpetua to death, the said 25 TSN, May 10, 1994, 27.
court does not state what aggravating circumstance was present to 26 Ibid., id., 8.
warrant the death penalty by the application of Art. 63 of the same 27 TSN, April 27, 1994, 8-18.
Code. 28 TSN, May 13, 1994, 68.
7 Original Record, Vol. I, 40. 29 People vs. Baderes, et al., L-38413, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA
8 Ibid., 41. 253.
9 Ibid., 7. 30 People vs. Ganduma, G.R. No. 64507, April 25, 1988, 160 SCRA
10 Ibid., 115. 799.
11 Ibid., 44. 31 TSN, April 28, 1994, 12.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

32 Ibid., id., 15. 54 People vs. Austria, et al., G.R. No. 55109, April 8, 1991, 195
33 People vs. Co, supra, fn. 20. SCRA 700.
34 People vs. Alfonso, supra, fn. 14. 55 TSN, May 10, 1994, 39.
35 State vs. Raymond, 124 P. 495. 56 Ibid., id., 57.
36 People vs. Cabading, G.R. No. 74352, June 6, 1989, 174 SCRA 57 Ibid., id., 38.
48. 58 Ibid., id., 81-81.
37 People vs. Geneveza, G.R. No. 74047, January 13, 1989, 169 59 Ibid., id., 63.
SCRA 153. 60 TSN, May 11, 1994, 10-11.
38 State vs. Raymond, supra, fn. 35. 61 Ibid., id., 29.
39 People vs. Managbanag, supra, fn. 13. 62 TSN, May 12, 1994, 12.
40 People vs. Baderes, et al., supra, fn. 29. 63 Ibid., id., 29.
41 People vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 95849, March 4, 1993, 219 SCRA 64 See People vs. Villarin, G.R. No. 96950, January 29, 1993, 218
502. SCRA 165.
42 People vs. Nuñez, G.R. No. 79316, April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 65 See People vs. Sonico, G.R. No. 70308, December 14, 1987, 156
34. SCRA 419.
43 Ibid., id. 66 People vs. Damaso, et al., G.R. Nos. 41490-92, October 18,
44 People vs. Herrick, supra, fn. 22. 1990, 190 SCRA 595.
45 People vs. Ola, L-47147, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 1. 67 People vs. Godoy, L-31177, July 15, 1976, 72 SCRA 69.
46 Amarante, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 76386, 68 People vs. Pacis, et al., L-32957-58, July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA
October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46. 540; People vs. Baao, G.R. No. 68574, July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 476.
47 People vs. De la Cruz, G.R. Nos. 92442-43, March 23, 1992, 207 69 People vs. Ocimar, et al., G.R. No. 94555, August 17, 1992, 212
SCRA 449. SCRA 646.
48 People vs. Reception, et al., G.R. No. 94127, July 1, 1991, 198 70 Original Record, Vol. I, 113.
SCRA 670. 71 Ibid., 114.
49 Gatmaitan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 76500, August 72 Bautista vs. Castro, etc., et al., G.R. No. 61260, February 17,
2, 1991, 200 SCRA 37. 1992, 206 SCRA 305.
50 People vs. Nuñez, supra, fn. 42. 73 Court Administrator vs. Villanueva, etc., et al., A.M. No. MTJ-
51 TSN, April 27, 1994, 74. 90-460, June 3, 1993, 223 SCRA 41.
52 Ibid., id., 72-74. 74 TSN, May 18, 1994, 34-38.
53 See People vs. Llarena, G.R. No. 74182, December 19, 1989, 180 75 U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97 (1914).
SCRA 289. 76 TSN, April 28, 1994, 38.
77 People vs. Pido, G.R. No. 92427, August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 45.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

78 People vs. Macatana, et al., G.R. No. 57061, May 9, 1988, 161 means that its effectivity was on the 15th day after such publication.
SCRA 235. Had it been made effective after 15 days following its publication,
79 Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 68624, the effectivity would have been on the 16th day thereafter. This is an
June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 552. accepted mode of computing dates of effectivity and was last
80 People vs. Castillon, et al., G.R. No. 100586, January 15, 1993, adopted in fixing the effectivity of the Family Code (see Art. 257,
217 SCRA 76. Executive Order No. 209 and Memorandum Circular No. 85, Office
81 People vs. Pascua, G.R. No. 82303, December 21, 1989, 180 of the President, dated November 7, 1988).
SCRA 472, and cases therein cited.
82 People vs. Ganduma, supra, fn. 30.
83 See People vs. Padero, G.R. No. 106274, September 28, 1993,
226 SCRA 810.
84 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1, 12th ed., Sec. 89, pp. 173-
174.
85 People vs. Andaya, G.R. No. 86364, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA
660.
86 Wharton, op. cit., Sec. 93, p. 186.
87 People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 86172, March 4, 1991, 194
SCRA 601.
88 Wharton, loc. cit., p. 188.
89 People vs. Puno, et al., G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993, 219
SCRA 85.
90 People vs. Leoparte, G.R. No. 85328, July 4, 1990, 187 SCRA
190.
91 People vs. Manliguez, et al., G.R. No. 91745, March 4, 1992, 206
SCRA 812.
92 People vs. Tiengo, et al., G.R. No. 55832, November 20, 1984,
133 SCRA 290.
93 People vs. Cunanan, et al., L-17599, April 24, 1967, 19 SCRA
769.
94 Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil. 807 (1929).
95 People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA
555. Since it was declared effective 15 days after its publication, this

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
5.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125982. January 22, 1999.]
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and MARIANO C.
GABORNE, Respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action
of certiorari seeking to review the decision of the Commission on
Audit that affirmed the ruling of Corporate Auditor Mariano C.
Gaborne disallowing in audit the payment of death benefits in the
amount of P43,107.19, to the heirs of the late Brig. General Arturo
T. Asuncion, who died on November 16, 1987, in a helicopter crash,
for the reason that a reserve officer like him of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines was not at that time a compulsory member of the
Government Service Insurance System.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The facts may be succinctly related as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
In November 1936, Congress enacted Commonwealth Act No. 186,
creating the Government Service Insurance System (hereafter GSIS)
to provide insurance coverage and retirement benefits to government
officials and employees, replacing the existing pension systems
established in prior laws.
Section 4 of Com. Act No. 186 provided that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 4. Scope of application of System. — Regular
membership in the system shall be compulsory upon —
x x x
"(d) All officers and enlisted men of the Regular Force, Philippine
Army;"
The original act has undergone various amendments that increased
its coverage and the insurance benefits granted to members of the
System.
On December 2, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising
legislative powers enacted Executive Order No. 79, Section 1 (c) of
which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1 (c). A reserve officer who has satisfactorily rendered a
total of ten (10) years continuous active commissioned military
service shall not be reverted to inactive status, except upon his own
request or for cause, up to the time he reaches the compulsory
retirement of thirty (30) years of service or fifty six (56) years of
age, whichever comes later but not later than sixty (60) years of
age."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 16, 1987, Brig. General Arturo T. Asuncion met his
untimely death in a helicopter crash.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
On December 11, 1987, the board of trustees of the GSIS in
resolution No. 566, approved the compulsory insurance coverage of
reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (hereafter
AFP) falling under the provisions of Executive Order No. 79.
In time, the heirs of the late General Asuncion filed a claim with the
GSIS for payment of death benefits due to him as a member of the
System.
On January 12, 1987, GSIS Deputy General Counsel Meynardo A.
Tiro gave an opinion that "Reserve Officers with ten (10) years of
continuous service have now the same status as regular members of
the AFP under Executive Order No. 79 of President Aquino and are
therefore, entitled to the same insurance coverage and benefits as
regular officers of the AFP." 1
On September 4, 1990, Melanio D. Fabia, vice-president, Legal
Services Group, GSIS, also gave an opinion that compulsory
coverage of reserve officers AFP took effect on December 23, 1986,
the day following E. O. 79’s publication in the Official Gazette. 2
On the basis of the aforesaid legal opinion, on January 4, 1991, the
GSIS Quezon City Branch (military) paid the claim of the heirs of
Brig. General Asuncion.
In the course of audit of the account, Auditor Mariano C. Gaborne,
then corporate auditor’s office officer in charge, GSIS disallowed in
audit the payment of the claim, pointing out that at the time of his
death, General Asuncion was not a member of the GSIS despite E.
O. 79.
The Manager, GSIS, Quezon City Branch I (Military) elevated the
case on appeal to the Commission on Audit en banc.
On January 24, 1995, the Commission on Audit (en banc) denied the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the local auditor.
On August 5, 1996, the Legal Services Group of the GSIS received
copy of the COA decision duly transmitted by letter dated July 26,
1996 of Assistant Commissioner Sofronio L. Flores of the
Commission on Audit.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. We grant the petition.
The disallowance of the payment of death benefits to the heirs of the
late Brig. General Arturo T. Asuncion was based on the ruling that
he was not a member of the GSIS at the time of his death on
November 15, 1987, in a helicopter crash. According to auditor
Gaborne, Executive Order No. 79, dated December 2, 1986, was
effective only on its implementation by resolution (No. 566) of the
GSIS board of trustees adopted on December 11, 1987, which was
after the death of Gen. Asuncion.
We do not agree. The aforecited executive order provides for
compulsory membership in the GSIS of qualified reserve officers of
the AFP like General Asuncion. It was effective at the time of the
death of General Asuncion. Hence, it becomes the duty of the
auditor to approve and pass in audit the valid claim of his heirs for
death benefits. The Commission on Audit’s disallowance amounts to
a grave abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth Act No. 186, enacted on November 14, 1936, as
amended, provides that membership in the system shall be
compulsory upon all regular officers and enlisted men of the Armed
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
Forces of the Philippines.
Executive Order No. 79, issued on December 2, 1986, has the force
of law. 3
By the terms of this enactment, qualified reserve officers, meaning,
those who have satisfactorily rendered a total of ten (10) years of
continuous active duty commissioned service in the AFP shall not be
reverted to inactive status except upon their own request, or for
cause.
Thus, they have the same status as regular commissioned officers of
the AFP, who are unquestionably compulsory members of the
System.
The question that arises is when is the executive order effective?
The President issued the executive order on December 2, 1986. It
was published in the Official Gazette on December 22, 1986.
Thus, E. O. No. 79 is effective fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette, or on January 07, 1987. 4 At that
time, the late General Asuncion was a reserve officer who had
rendered a total of ten (10) years of continuous active duty service
commission in the AFP. Hence, he was compulsorily covered as a
member of the GSIS on the date he died on November 15, 1987, in
line of duty in a helicopter crash. Consequently, his heirs are entitled
to payment of death benefits.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Next, according to auditor Gaborne, the optional insurance policy
issued to the late General Asuncion had lapsed on April 30, 1984,
due to non-payment of premiums. The optional insurance policy
referred to, however, is distinct from the compulsory coverage
membership in the GSIS. The optional insurance policy was issued
on the basis of a voluntary application under existing regulations and
lapsed in April, 1984, due to non-payment of premiums. On the
other hand, qualified reserve officers were covered by compulsory
membership in the GSIS under Executive Order No. 79 effective on
January 07, 1987, regardless of whether or not the premiums were
paid. Of course, the unpaid premiums, if any, may be deducted from
the proceeds of the policy.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition
for certiorari. We SET ASIDE the Commission on Audit’s decision
dated January 24, 1995, and direct the latter to allow in audit the
payment of death benefits to the heirs of the late Brig. General
Arturo T. Asuncion.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Petition, Annex "B-3", Rollo, p. 22.
2. Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 24-27
3. Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr., 223 SCRA 217; Miners Asso. of the
Phils., Inc. v. Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA 100.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

4. Article 2, Civil Code of the Philippines; Tañada v. Tuvera, 136
SCRA 27.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
G.R. No. 105364* June 28, 2001
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-
N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V. FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch
39 of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Manila, the
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
LIQUIDATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS
BANK,respondents
KAPUNAN, J.:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) when Congress had mandated its
rehabilitation and reopening?
This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition
with Petition for Preliminary Injunction and application for Ex Parte
Temporary Restraining Order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central
Bank, for brevity) filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the
Philippine Veterans Bank, the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311.
Thereafter, the Philipppine Veterans Bank Employees Union-
N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V.
Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and
benefits with said court in SP-32311.1
After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the
employees were made. However, due to the piecemeal hearings on
the benefits, many remain unpaid.2
On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent
judge from hearing the above case on grounds of bias and hostility
towards petitioners.3
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169
providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank.4
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the
bank.5
Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of
authority allowing the PVB to reopen.6
Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of
PVB, respondent judge continued with the liquidation proceedings
of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set
to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion
of another lawyer, while petitioners’ claims have been frozen to
their prejudice.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation
court became functus officio, and no longer had the authority to
continue with liquidation proceedings.
In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to
issue a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the trial court from
further proceeding with the case.
On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA)
and its 162 security guards filed a Motion for Intervention with
prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had
filed a motion before Branch 39 of the RTC of Manila, in SP-No.
32311, praying that said court order PVB to pay their backwages
and salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders
No. NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and
NCR-02-A; and, that said court, in an Order dated June 5, 1992,
approved therein movants’ case and directed the bank liquidator or
PVB itself to pay the backwages and differentials in accordance with
the computation incorporated in the order. Said intervenors likewise
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
manifested that there was an error in the computation of the
monetary benefits due them.
On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this
Court, dated July 6, 1992, filed their Comment opposing the Motion
for Leave to File Intervention and for exclusion from the operation
of the T.R.O. on the grounds that the movants have no legal interest
in the subject matter of the pending action; that allowing
intervention would only cause delay in the proceedings; and that the
motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal
basis and would render moot the relief sought in the petition.
On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention
praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in connection with the issuance
by respondent judge of several orders involving acts of liquidation
of PVB even after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169. PVB further
alleges that respondent judge clearly acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.
We find for the petitioners.
Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The
Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act No. 3518,
Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes",
which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on
January 2, 1992 and which was published in the Official Gazette on
February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the
Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the
period of three (3) years from the date of the reopening of the head
office.7 The law likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation
committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions
of the same.8
Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee
submitted the proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the
Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to
Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13,
1992 with the respondent judge praying that the liquidation
proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of
R.A. No. 7169.
On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board
Resolution No. 348 which approved the Rehabilitation Plan
submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee.
Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority
allowing PVB to reopen.
On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination
of the Liquidation Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with
the respondent judge.
As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992,
issued a temporary restraining order in the instant case restraining
respondent judge from further proceeding with the liquidation of
PVB.
On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors
to the public and started regular banking operations.
Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the
subsequent developments has rendered the liquidation court functus
officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped of the
authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.
Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling
with creditors and debtors.9 It is the winding up of a corporation so
that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the
process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and
dividing surplus or loss.
On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes
a reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a
continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and
reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful
operation and solvency.10
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It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically SO ORDERED.
opposed or contrary to the concept of rehabilitation, such that both Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago,
cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation JJ., concur.
proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of
the subject bank.
Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB * This case was transferred to the ponente pursuant to the resolution
that R.A. No. 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or in AM No. 00-9-03-SC. Re: Creation of Special Committee on Case
fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and, the Backlog dated February 27, 2001.
contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of
said law is conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by
the Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view that Footnotes
1
both contentions are bereft of merit. Rollo, p. 5.
2
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the Ibid.
3
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a Id.
4
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature Id., at 6.
5
has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause Id.
6
"unless otherwise provided." Id.
7
In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides: Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 7169, Official Gazette, February 24,
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval. 1992, p. 963.
8
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law Sec. 7, Ibid.
9
effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. Wilson vs. Superior Court in and for Santa Clara County, 2 Cal.2d
No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on 632, 43 P.2d 286, 288.
10
January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date. Ruby Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 445
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for (1998).
the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on
February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the
Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed
by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. Respondent Judge
is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further proceeding
with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.

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6.
G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS
G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS
TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152161
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14
of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The
Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was
filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero
and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the
petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of
Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive
Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the
Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry
A. Salapuddin, then also a member of the House of Representatives.
Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of
Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills
originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate,
respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE
USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION PROPAGANDA,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ‘OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE,’ AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;"1
…
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE
HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND
CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION
PRACTICES."2
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A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of
the Senate3 and sixteen (16) members of the House of
Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee
submitted its Report,5 signed by its members, recommending the
approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on
February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed an amendment to
the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P.
Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could
no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol
thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto.
Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the proposal. However,
upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the
return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for
proper action.6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives
elected anew its conferees7 to the Bicameral Conference
Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of
Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of
conferees9 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that the House consider the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen
observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral
Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the
reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep.
Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the
approval of the report until the other members were given a copy
thereof.11
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote
on the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House approved
the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no
abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and
Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider.
Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his
doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his
vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure was
regular.12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of SB
No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate
President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by
the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the
consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742,"
and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into
law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners’ Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring
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every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its
title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the
subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,
while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act
No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving
intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates
against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective
official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is
no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his
certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office
even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered
ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its
entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law,
not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take
effect upon its approval" is a violation of the due process clause of
the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication
of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed.
The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the
constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:"14
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the
House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those
members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the
May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents’ Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, urge this Court to dismiss the petitions contending,
preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute
the present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
overruled by the majority of the members of the House of
Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have
suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the
assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the
petitioners’ allegations that "irregularities" attended the enactment
of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification
signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress,
constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed
rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance
the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it
encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise,
including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general
subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates
the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official
by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the
one which he is permanently holding, such that he is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by
including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of
considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective
office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now
placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective
terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, vice-
presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code need not be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act
No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the act
a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that
the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and
every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act
relating to its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need
not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective
officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A
substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials;
elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based
upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected
by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as
the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No.
9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constitution
as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of
violations thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be
observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be
entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of due process is
premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep.
Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and
Secretary General of the House of Representatives did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those
members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001
elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No.
9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared
otherwise by the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first
rule on the procedural issue raised by the respondents, i.e., whether
the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the
petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as
members of the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and
registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges
the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy is "to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several
cases involving issues of "overarching significance to our
society,"17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad
v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside
the procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and
subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator
Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of
Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180
(An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then
members of the House of Representatives which impugned as
unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734
(Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in
Chiongbian v. Orbos.19 Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the
petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other
petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716
(Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance.20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise
allowed by this Court to challenge the validity of acts, decisions,
rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez,23Albano v. Reyes,24 and
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had
declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the
constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has
been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of
"overarching significance" that justifies this Court’s adoption of a
liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover,
with the national elections barely seven months away, it behooves
the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite
apropos:
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public
policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It
may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation
that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable
necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six
months away, reinforce our stand.27
Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one
which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.29
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians
of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether
a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by
the fundamental law.30And where the acts of the other branches of
government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn
and sacred duty to nullify the same.31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the
substantial issues raised by the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No.
6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered
ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules
and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus
bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or
unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of
an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede
the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a
technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections
through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not
only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during the
election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises or permits for the operation of media of
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communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal
opportunity for public service, including access to media time and
space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information
campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act
No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To
require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in
the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for
an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions
of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one
subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
particular matter are particularly instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all we’re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it
broader so that it would cover this provision [referring to the repeal
of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? That’s
all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the
nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that
even with the term "fair election practice," it really covers it,
because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted
earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I
think, I’m very comfortable with the title "Fair Election Practice" so
that we can get over with these things so that we don’t come back
again until we find the title. I mean, it’s one provision which I think
is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation
actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title
implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, let’s get it over with.
To me, ha, it’s not a very touchy issue. For me, it’s even a very
correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in
the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos
na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what
you’re ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
It’s not the title per se, it’s the coverage. So if you will just kindly
bear with us. I’m happy that there is already one comfortable senator
there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it
would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that we’re all
comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
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Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
true that the bulk of provisions deals with the area of propaganda REP. MARCOS:
and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be
indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of changed...
free, orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices." But THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one. O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal...
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section REP. PADILLA:
2, paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall ensure Mr. Chairman, why don’t we use "An Act rationalizing the holding
candidates for public office that may be free from any form of of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending
harassment and discrimination. for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the Code?"
existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment or THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the Why don’t we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election
playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a Practices Act?"
rider. REP. PICHAY:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation.
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
very clearly put it, that it is covered in the Declaration of Principles Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the House REP. MARCOS:
contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it The Fair Election.
expressly provides for fair election practices because ... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): O, Fair Election Act.
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, REP. MACARAMBON:
but we are looking for a title that is more generic so that then we Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to
have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think that’s the enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure
theory. So, there is acceptance of this. equal opportunity for public service through fair election practices?
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe REP. PICHAY:
we should say the special provision on elected officials. So how is Fair election practices?
that? Alam mo ito ... REP. MACARAMBON:
REP. MARCOS: Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Wala nang practices nga.

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REP. PICHAY: Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure
Wala nang practices. into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act. encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the
(Informal discussions) concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive
REP. PICHAY: dominion of the political branches of the government.39 It is not for
Approve na iyan. this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act." whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
The rest wala nang problema ano? means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
VOICES: legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised
Wala na. in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature,
REP. MACARAMBON: and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them
Wala na iyong practices? within the range of judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v.
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its
O, wala na? We will clean up. pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable
REP. MARCOS: purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the
Title? law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and
The short title, "This Act ..." orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): achieved.
You’re back to your No. 21 already. Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that
REP. MARCOS: the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
The full title, the same? legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
That’s the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short public.42 In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were
title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act."38 not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon
as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of
with and repealed. The executive department found cause with the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators
were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution43
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates
the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
the other.44 The Court has explained the nature of the equal
protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions.46 On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office
by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure47 while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.48
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and
employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging
in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to
vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed
to take part in political and electoral activities.49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging
under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the entire law should be
nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued
thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference
Committee) members by the House during its session on February 5,
2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for
approval on the floor without copies thereof being furnished the
members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report
submitted by it was not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof
as well as its senator-members at the time it was presented to and
rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and
that its alleged Report was instantly made and passed around for the
signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of
the first one that convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as
well as that of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC that
convened on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that
comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and
jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it
appears in § 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the provision that "This Act
shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC
that was furnished the members during its consideration on February
7, 2001, did not have the same § 16 as it now appears in RA No.
9006, but § 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742,
reasons for which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7,
2001, did not "contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in or amendments to the subject measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is
Section 12 of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact,
this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to the
compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof.
The said provision states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. – Any elected official who
runs for president and vice-president shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.50
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy
of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill
doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. A review of cases51 reveals the Court’s consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the
salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the
petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the
House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance
the courts have no concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the
formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor.
The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,53 viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression,
all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in
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enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared
that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.’"
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006
which provides that it "shall take effect immediately upon its
approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the entire
law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened
or extended….55
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated
in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express
statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched
principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve
themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.
That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the
government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine
whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power.57No such transgression has been shown in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Annex "A," Petition.
2
Annex "B," id.
3
Senators Raul S. Roco, Francisco S. Tatad, Vicente C. Sotto III,
Gregorio B. Honasan, Robert S. Jaworski, Teresa Aquino-Oreta,
Loren Legarda-Leviste and Sergio Osmeña III.
4
Representatives Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., Imee R. Marcos, Benasing
O. Macarambon, Jr., Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Roseller L. Barinaga,
Hussin U. Amin, Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr., Constantino G. Jaraula,
Alipio Cirilo V. Badelles, Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Eleandro
Jesus F. Madrona, Ernesto A Nieva, Aniceto G. Saludo, Eduardo R.
Gullas, Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Sergio Antonio F. Apostol,
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. and Roy Padilla, Jr.
5
Annex "C," Petition.
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6 26
Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 62, February 5, 2001, Supra.
27
pp. 12-13. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835 (1969).
7 28
Representatives Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr., Jacinto V. Paras, Augusto Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53 (1999).
29
"Boboy" Syjuco, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Carlos M. Padilla, Aniceto In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
30
G. Saludo, Jr., Gerardo S. Espina, Ricardo V. Quintos and Isidro S. Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, supra.
31
Rodriguez, Jr. SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII, CONSTITUTION reads:
8
See note 6. Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
9
Representatives Carlos M. Padilla, Salvio B. Fortuno, Dante V. in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Liban, Roan I. Libarios, Nestor C. Ponce, Jr., Loretta Ann P. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
Rosales, Magtanggol T. Gunigundo and Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr. actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
10
See note 6 at 20. and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
11
Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 64, February 7, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
2001, p. 29. on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
12 32
Id. at 32-35. A rider is a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
13
202 SCRA 779 (1991). (Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]).
14 33
SECTION 1, ARTICLE XI, CONSTITUTION. Alalayan v. NPC, supra.
15 34
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962).
16 35
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633 (1962). Underscoring ours.
17 36
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
37
SCRA 485 (2000); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987).
38
(1992); Osmeña v. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. Records of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1742 and House Bill No.
221 (1991); Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 9000 (Committee on Electoral Reforms), November 23, 2000, pp.
SCRA 317 (1991); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965). 95-99.
18 39
281 SCRA 330 (1997). Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 (1989).
19 40
245 SCRA 253 (1995). Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 US 422, 80 L Ed 772
20
235 SCRA 630 (1994). (1935). See also Garcia v. Corona, 321 SCRA 218 (1999); Samson
21
Supra. v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 54 (1999); Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
22
232 SCRA 110 (1994). Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA
23
235 SCRA 506 (1994). 424 (1968).
24 41
175 SCRA 264 (1989). Supra.
25 42
246 SCRA 334 (1995). Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
43
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws (SECTION 1, ARTICLE III,
CONSTITUTION).
44
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999).
45
Ichong v. Hernandez, supra, citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, pp. 824-825.
46
For example, under the Constitution, the grounds by which the
tenure of the members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Sec. 16, Art. VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office
or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Sec. 16 (3), Art. VI: Expulsion as a disciplinary action for
disorderly behavior;
c) Sec. 17, Art. VI: Disqualification as determined by resolution of
the appropriate Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and
d) Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. VI: Voluntary renunciation of office.
Further, under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution, the President and
the Vice-President, along with other impeachable officers, may be
removed from office "on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust."
47
Section 46, Chapter 7, Title I, Subtitle A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in
part, that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and
after due process." Further, Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code
enumerates the "grave offenses" which are grounds for dismissal
upon the commission of first offense as follows: dishonesty, gross
neglect of duty, gross misconduct, being notoriously undesirable,
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, falsification of
official document, physical or mental incapacity or disability due to
vicious habits, among others.
48
Officers and employees holding primarily confidential positions
have terms of office which expire upon loss of confidence in them
by the appointing authority. (Hernandez v. Villegas, 14 SCRA 544
[1965]).
49
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) reads in full:
Sec. 55. Political Activity. – No officer or employee in the Civil
Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage,
directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity or take part in
any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or
influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body.
Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer
or employee from expressing his views on current political problems
or issues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates for public
office whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and
employees holding political offices may take part in political and
electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the
acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
50
MEMORANDUM of the Petitioners in G.R. No. 147387, pp. 19-
20.
51
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra; Morales v. Subido, 27
SCRA 131 (1969); Casco (Phil.) Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347
(1963); Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
52
Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
53
277 SCRA 268 (1997).
54
146 SCRA 446 (1986).
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55
Id. at 452.
56
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after publication.
57
See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,
supra; Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997); Bondoc v. Pineda,
201 SCRA 792 (1991); Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750
(1991); Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA
774 (1967).

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
7.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA
BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA
BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and
LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void
two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of
Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De
Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed
entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final;
and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for
not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out
building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but
the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the
Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated
on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-
day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually
denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30,
1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October
27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly
applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-
day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208),
this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate
Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15,
1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said
rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which
the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February
27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June
30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA
306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of
time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.
R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible
for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should
be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents,
is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to
DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
8.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University
from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and
dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof
thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As
established by the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the
respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties,
it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949
took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After
finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College
of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff
finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and
including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school
years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college,
Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the
dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant
university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies
in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because
his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his
connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and
chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University,
plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter
university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in
defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic
merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the
ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to
him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant
and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and
including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or
the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from
Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To
secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his
records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the
latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused
until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded
to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum
under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from
defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as
above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant
and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University,
I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private
Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject
of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools,
colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show
that some schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving
students — for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-
curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students
should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such
scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the
same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these
scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is
understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when
they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep
students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students
who have enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they
could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not
be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the
period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right
of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves
the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that
plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue
on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant
University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87;
that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the
plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this
notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records,
unless said refund were made, and even recommended to said
Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release
said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the
court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was,
accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum
of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in
1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said
amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary
damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of
litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the
Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract
with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum
above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim
for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the
contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to
the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the
ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of
Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory,
not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision
"may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply
because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover,
defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had
been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor
published in the official gazette.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower
court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not
to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos University.
The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects,
transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the
case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential
to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The
aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of
public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed,
out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or
not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University
on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case
of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann.
Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state,
courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial
decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It
might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or
establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but
courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the
four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been
consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the
doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of
justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object,
operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy
vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly
the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not
entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951,
which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open
challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because
the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And
finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6,
1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against
public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration
or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of
society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good moralsor
tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The
policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the
understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound
policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this
definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it
received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in
some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University
of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to
gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other
schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are
patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an
established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well
as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades,
Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
9.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University
from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and
dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof
thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As
established by the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the
respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties,
it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949
took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After
finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College
of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff
finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and
including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school
years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college,
Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the
dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant
university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies
in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because
his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his
connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and
chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University,
plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter
university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in
defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic
merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the
ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to
him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant
and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and
including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or
the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from
Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To
secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his
records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the
latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused
until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded
to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum
under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from
defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as
above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant
and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University,
I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private
Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject
of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools,
colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show
that some schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving
students — for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-
curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students
should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such
scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the
same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these
scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is
understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when
they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep
students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students
who have enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they
could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not
be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the
period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right
of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves
the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that
plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue
on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant
University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87;
that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the
plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this
notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records,
unless said refund were made, and even recommended to said
Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release
said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the
court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was,
accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum
of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in
1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said
amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary
damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of
litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the
Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract
with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum
above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim
for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the
contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to
the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the
ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of
Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory,
not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision
"may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply
because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover,
defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had
been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor
published in the official gazette.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower
court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not
to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos University.
The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects,
transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the
case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential
to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The
aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of
public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed,
out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or
not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University
on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case
of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann.
Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state,
courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial
decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It
might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or
establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but
courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the
four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been
consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the
doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of
justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object,
operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy
vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly
the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not
entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951,
which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open
challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because
the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And
finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6,
1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against
public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration
or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of
society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good moralsor
tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The
policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the
understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound
policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this
definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it
received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in
some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University
of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to
gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other
schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are
patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an
established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well
as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades,
Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
10.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University
from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and
dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof
thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As
established by the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the
respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties,
it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949
took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After
finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College
of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff
finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and
including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school
years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college,
Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the
dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant
university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies
in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because
his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his
connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and
chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University,
plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter
university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in
defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic
merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the
ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to
him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant
and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and
including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or
the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from
Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To
secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his
records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the
latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused
until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded
to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum
under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from
defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as
above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant
and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University,
I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private
Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject
of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools,
colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show
that some schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving
students — for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-
curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students
should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such
scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the
same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these
scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is
understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when
they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep
students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students
who have enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they
could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not
be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the
period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right
of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves
the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that
plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue
on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant
University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87;
that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the
plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this
notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records,
unless said refund were made, and even recommended to said
Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release
said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the
court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was,
accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum
of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in
1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said
amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary
damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of
litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the
Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract
with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum
above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim
for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the
contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to
the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the
ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of
Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory,
not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision
"may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply
because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover,
defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had
been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor
published in the official gazette.
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower
court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not
to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos University.
The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects,
transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the
case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential
to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The
aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of
public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed,
out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or
not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University
on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case
of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann.
Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state,
courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial
decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It
might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or
establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but
courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the
four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been
consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the
doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of
justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object,
operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy
vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly
the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not
entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951,
which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open
challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because
the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And
finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6,
1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against
public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration
or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of
society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good moralsor
tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The
policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the
understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound
policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this
definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it
received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in
some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University
of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to
gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other
schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are
patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine
UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an
established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well
as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades,
Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

11. newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987 otherwise provided.
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the
IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws publication in the Official Gazette.
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
.;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a
publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed
some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada.
et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when
it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic release and limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function
of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are
more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out
regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil
Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective
must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

12.
CHAPTER 5
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS
Section 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is
otherwise provided.
Section 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect
unless the contrary is expressly provided.
Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. -
In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated
in all the official languages, the English text shall control, unless
otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or
mistake, the other texts may be consulted.
Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law
which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which
impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall
thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.
Section 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no
one from compliance therewith.

UST Faculty of Civil Law – 1BB

13.
CHAPTER 2
BUDGET POLICY AND APPROACH
Section 3. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to formulate and implement a National Budget that is an
instrument of national development, reflective of national
objectives, strategies and plans. The budget shall be supportive of
and consistent with the socio-economic development plan and shall
be oriented towards the achievement of explicit objectives and
expected results, to ensure that funds are utilized and operations are
conducted effectively, economically and efficiently. The national
budget shall be formulated within the context of a regionalized
government structure and borrowings of all levels of government
and of government-owned or controlled corporations. The budget
shall likewise be prepared within the context of the national long-
term plan and of a long-term budget program.