Page 1 of 165

G.R. Nos. 119964-69 September 20, 1996

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICTORINO DEL MUNDO, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

Accused-appellant Victorino del Mundo was charged with six counts of rape filed by his ten-
year old daughter, Marivic del Mundo, before Branch 27, RTC-Cabanatuan City. 1 The
records of the case show that the incidents of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 5977, 5978, 5980,
5981 and 5982 were committed on different days in October 1993 while that in Criminal
Case No. 5983 took place on July 22, 1994. Hence, the court a quo took cognizance of the
fact that only Criminal Case No. 5983 is covered by Republic Act No. 7659 2 which took
effect December 31, 1993.

The criminal complaints, all six of them similarly worded except the time of commission,
state:

The undersigned accuses VICTORINO DEL MUNDO of the crime of rape, committed
as follows:

That sometime in October, 1993, at 8:00 a.m. or thereabout, in the City of

Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of MARIVIC DEL MUNDO, a ten (10) year old child who is her (sic)
natural child, against the latter's will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Cabanatuan City, this 23rd day of August, 1994.

Finding that the complainant, the accused, the witnesses and the evidence in these six (6)
cases are common to all the cases, the court a quo tried them jointly.

Among those who testified for the prosecution was Dr. Jun Concepcion, City Health Officer
of Cabanatuan City who conducted Marivic's medico-legal examination. The medico-legal
report dated August 23, 1994 3 reads:

xxx xxx xxx

OCCULAR (sic) INSPECTION of the body plus the external reproduction organ

— Negative for any evidence of external physical injuries like hematoma nor
abrasions.
 Page 2 of 165

INTERNALLY

VAGINAL CANAL — with the use of gloves, nasal speculum with special lightened
instrument.

(+) Abrasion, old, 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock.

(+) Whitish vaginal discharges with in the canal blocking the opening
of the cervix

(+) Ruptured with remnants of the hymen within the vaginal opening.

IMPRESSION = Positive for history of vaginal penetration.

(Sgd.)
JUN B.
CONC
EPCIO
N
JUN B.
CONC
EPCIO
N, M.D.
Medica
l
Officer
V
Medico
-Legal
Officer

Dr. Concepcion testified that the contents of and entries in the medico-legal report he
prepared are true and correct, that is, there were abrasions, injury and lacerations at 3 and 9
o'clock positions and that the hymen was ruptured indicating a penetration of the vagina. The
salient portions of Dr. Concepcion's testimony were quoted in the court a quo's joint decision,
thus:

Q And with respect to the examination of her external part of her sex
organ, what are your findings?

A There was evidence of external injury, sir.

Q How about in the internal examination of the sex organ of the

victim?

A Internal examination shows that there was (sic) six penetration, sir.

Q In this medico-legal report there is an entry here which says

"abrasion old 3 and 9 o'clock. . ." Will you please tell us what does
this entry mean?
 Page 3 of 165

A 3 and 9 o'clock indicates the position of the injury sustained by the

victim in her private internal organ, sir. (p. 6, tsn, hearing of Oct. 27,
1994)

xxx xxx xxx

Q How about this last entry which I again quote: "Rupture with
remnants of the hymen within the vaginal opening." Tell us as to what
this entry mean (sic)?

A It simply means that if the hymen is ruptured there is penetration,

sir.

Q As a result of this medical examination conducted by you, what

was your impression?

A After that my overall impression, sir, that there is really a

penetration, sir, of the vagina.

Q That is your medical impression?

A It is medical impression, sir, there is vaginal penetration. (p. 7, tsn,

hearing of Oct. 27, 1994). 4

Thereafter, all documentary and testimonial evidence were offered by the prosecution and admitted
by the Court. When the time came for the defense to present its evidence, complainant Marivic del
Mundo was called as witness. She identified an affidavit of desistance executed by her dated
November 17, 1994, the salient portions of which are hereunder quoted:

1. Na, ako and siyang naghahabla sa isang asunto Kriminal na lalong kilala bilang
Criminal Case No. 5981, 5983, 5977, sa salang Rape, People of the Philippines
vs. Victorino del Mundo na nabibinbin dito sa Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Cabanatuan City, Branch III;

2. Na wala na akong interest pang ipagpatuloy and aking nasabing habla sapagkat
matapos ang isang masusing paliwanagan ay napagalaman namin na ang lahat ay
bunga lamang ng hindi pagkakaunawaan at kami ay nagkasundo na;

3. Na, dahil dito ay magalang kong hinihiling sa Kgg. na Taga-usig ng Lungsod ng

Kabanatuan na pawalang bisa na ang aking nasabing habla o asunto. 5

Notwithstanding complainant's affidavit of desistance, the court a quo sentenced accused-

appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Cases Nos. 5977, 5978,
5980, 5981 and 5982, and death in Criminal Case No. 5983. Hence, these cases were
elevated to this Court on automatic review.

On August 11, 1995, the Judicial Records Office of this Court sent notices to Attys. Napoleon
Reyes and Adriano Magbitang of the Provincial Legal Assistance Office, Nueva Ecija,
directing them to file appellant's brief and another letter addressed to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, to confirm the confinement of accused-appellant within
five days from receipt hereof.
 Page 4 of 165

In a letter dated August 17, 1995, Assistant Director Jesus Villanueva of the Bureau of
Corrections informed this Court that accused-appellant was received therein on February 11,
1995.

On October 6, 1995, Atty. Procopio Beltran of the IBP Free Legal Aid Program filed a Formal
Entry of Appearance for accused-appellant, which we resolved to note in our resolution of
November 14, 1995.

Under date of January 24, 1996, accused-appellant, thru his counsel, filed a verified motion
for new trial on the following grounds:

1. New and material evidence has been discovered which the defendant could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced in the trial which, when
introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment.

2. Irregularities have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the defendant.

3. The principal witness and alleged victim has recanted her testimony which, if not
considered, will result in a miscarriage of justice.

Aside from Marivic's affidavit recanting her testimony, accused-appellant, thru his counsel,
submits to this Court annexes to afford him the opportunity to establish his innocence of the
crime charged and to warrant a new trial, the most important of which is Annex "L" 6 —
Medico Report of the examination conducted on Marivic del Mundo by the NBI Medico Legal
Division, bearing Living Case No. MG-95-993, dated August 30, 1995 re: determination of
her physical virginity. The pertinent findings read:

xxx xxx xxx

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Pubic hair, fine, short, scanty. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette,
tense. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact. Hymenal orifice
measures 1.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.

CONCLUSIONS:

Physical Virginity Preserved.

Approved: Examined by:

(Sgd.) Alberto Reyes (Sgd.) Aurea P. Villena

Alberto M. Reyes Aurea P. Villena, M.D.
Chief Medico Legal Officer

Noted:

(Sgd.) Prospero A. Cabanayan

Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D.
Deputy Director, Technical Services
 Page 5 of 165

In our resolution of February 20, 1996, we resolved to require the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment within ten days from notice. In its comment dated March 21, 1996, the
Solicitor General interposed no objection to the motion for new trial in the interest of
substantial justice.

After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, this Court notes that aside from the
recantation by complainant Marivic del Mundo, the medical report submitted and issued by
the Medico Legal Division of the NBI is diametrically opposed to the medico legal report of
Dr. Jun Concepcion, City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City, which was relied upon by the
court a quo in rendering the judgment of conviction inasmuch as it was submitted four weeks
after the last act of rape committed by accused-appellant in 1994. Although the NBI Report
executed a year later stated that Marivic's physical virginity was preserved, the earlier report
by the Cabanatuan City Health Officer stated that there were abrasions, injury and
lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions and that the hymen was ruptured, indicating a
penetration of the vagina. While the NBI-Medico Legal report cannot be considered new and
material evidence which accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial, 7 we grant the motion for new trial on the broader ground of substantial
justice, taking into account the variance in the two aforesaid reports. It is the sense of this
Court that such serious discrepancy raised substantial doubt as to the guilt of the accused-
appellant. Furthermore, the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is death. Here is a
situation where a rigid application of the rules must bow to the overriding goal of courts of
justice to render justice to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his
innocence of a crime of which he is charged.

The rule for granting a motion for new trial, among others, should be liberally construed to
assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations
are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both
parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such
truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities. 8

In the case of Jose v. CA, 9 the Court held:

Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to aid and not to
obstruct the proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispense justice, for
otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion.

Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for
the purposes of justice or, in a proper case, disregard them. In this jurisdiction, in not
a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not
mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of
counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de oficio to
represent the accused in the trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a
stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.

Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the
severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice.

WHEREFORE, we hereby SET ASIDE the judgment of conviction of accused-appellant

Victorino del Mundo and REMAND the cases to the court a quo for a new trial only for the
 Page 6 of 165

purpose of allowing said accused to present additional evidence in his defense. The trial
court shall inform this Court of the final outcome of the cases within a reasonable time.
Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 7 of 165

G.R. No. 137933 January 28, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN BARING, JR., accused-appellant.

BUENA, J.:

Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted for statutory rape committed against a
seven-year-old girl in an information that reads-

"That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several occasions thereto, in the Municipality of
Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation
taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of the victim who is only seven (7)
years old, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of
one Jennifer Donayre, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."1

On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision dated January 20, 1999,
convicting accused-appellant of rape, to wit –

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of rape,
the accused-Valentin Baring Jr. is sentenced to die by lethal injection and to pay the victim
an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 plus moral damages of another ₱50,000.00 plus the cost of this
suit.

"SO ORDERED."2

In a sworn complaint,3 Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin Baring, Jr., her grandmother’s common–
law husband, of raping her on several occasions. It appears that Jennifer was living with her
grandmother in Dasmariñas, Cavite. She does not know her real father since her mother and father
were separated.4 Since 1990, when she was about 8 months old5 until 1997, she was left under her
grandmother’s care and custody. She calls Valentin Baring, Jr. as "Papa."6

According to Jennifer, the repeated sexual abuse happened when she was about 6 years old
whenever she was left alone in the house. Accused-appellant would touch her private parts, and on
such occasions, accused-appellant would remove her panty, mount on her and violate her. She
informed her grandmother that accused-appellant sexually abused her.7

On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in
Dasmariñas, Cavite. She learned from her daughter that the latter was sexually abused by accused-
appellant. Acting on her daughter’s accounts of sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the National
Bureau of Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter, Jennifer underwent a medical examination
at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr.
Dennis G. Bellen, the medico-legal officer at Camp Crame found that Jennifer was in "non-virgin
state physically." The examination disclosed a "congested, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing
 Page 8 of 165

laceration at 9 o’clock position and the external vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiner’s smallest
finger."8

For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations against him.9 According to accused-
appellant, he has been living with Jennifer’s grandmother for ten (10)10 or eighteen (18)
years.11 Accused-appellant claimed that Jennifer was not living with them during the time the alleged
rape occurred.12 Later on, he testified that prior to July, 1997, Jennifer was living with them since
1990.13 However, Jennifer was taken from them sometime in July 1997, but he does not know why.14

The trial court meted out its judgment of conviction on the basis of the victim’s clear, trustworthy and
positive testimony that she was raped several times by accused-appellant. Because of the penalty
imposed, this case is now before us on automatic review.

On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel, filed a petition before this Court to
dismiss the case that is subject of our automatic review because (i) the three-page double-spaced
decision of the trial court is bereft of material facts supporting the conviction; (ii) the medico-legal
certificate is merely a scrap of paper since the physician who conducted the examination was not
presented as a witness that deprived accused-appellant of his right to cross-examination; (iii) the
case of attempted homicide filed by the victim’s grandmother against accused-appellant was
provisionally dismissed; and (iv) accused-appellant was merely a "fall guy" and that another person
is responsible for the commission of the crime charged against him.15

In the appellant’s brief filed on November 4, 1999, accused-appellant assigns the following errors-

"The lower court erred:

"I. In promulgating a brief and short decision with material facts that have been omitted with
no allusions to the transcripts of records erroneous of tenses and grammar jotted by the
Court Stenographer.

"II. In denying the accused his right to plead for a DNA Test to determine that the blood
found in the panty of the victim is not his but of another man, Venancio Mendoza, live-in
husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer Donayre, the victim.

"III. In not finding the accused as a ‘fall guy’ framed up to take the place of Venancio
Mendoza, live-in husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer, whose behavior in the courtroom
as a witness has been beyond normal."16

The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.17 This vital
requirement is not only demanded from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly required to
give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code18 whose
roots may also be traced to the Constitutional mandate.

A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and
legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the
decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is
imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the
nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain a statement of the
applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal’s assessments and conclusions on the case. This
practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive
portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions
 Page 9 of 165

of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision.19 Compliance with this requirement will
sufficiently apprise the parties of the various issues involved but more importantly will guide the court
in assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent with the facts and the law.

In the case at bar, the trial court’s decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such
doubt may be engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant but by the
trial court’s failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the
evidence presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the evidence
presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the
decision.

Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape despite
prosecution’s failure to present the examining physician to appear in court depriving him of his
constitutional right to confront a witness against him.20 However, a review of the transcript of
stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel waived presentation of the medico-legal
officer and thus, was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said witness, to wit-

"PROS. ORQUIEZA:

Your Honor, I was informed by the mother of the private complainant that the doctor is no
longer connected with the Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City but was
reassigned to the Eastern Police District at Mandaluyong City.

"PROS. ORQUIEZA:

I just prefer that a subpoena be sent. We have to ask for the postponement.

"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:

We can dispense with the testimony.

"COURT:

Provided this is admitted.

"COURT:

Do you admit the due execution and authenticity of the report of the doctor?

"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:

We admit everything written here because (sic) doctor says.

"COURT:

Yes, whatever is written there, do you admit that?

ATTY. ABUBAKAR

Yes, your Honor.

 Page 10 of 165

"COURT:

No need to present the doctor

"PROS. ORQUIEZA:

We will no longer present Dr. Dennis G. Bellen of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City. We have here the xerox copy of the
medico legal report no. M-2831-97.

"COURT:

Will you show that to Atty. Abubakar.

"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:

Yes, your Honor.

"COURT:

Admitted.

You dispense the testimony of the doctor.21

A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape.22 It is well
entrenched in our jurisprudence that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the
accused of the crime.23 Besides, testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are credible,24 and
the testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit.25

Accused-appellant likewise impugns the credibility of the victim by pointing out that the rape was
filed one year after its commission, which allegedly leaves doubt as to the real identity of the culprit.

Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any doubt over the credibility of the
complainant nor can it be taken against her.26 The following realities justified the delay in the filing of
the case against accused-appellant: (1) the victim was merely six years old when she was sexually
abused; (2) the victim lived separately from her mother and was left under her grandmother’s care;
and, (3) the victim’s sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather.

According to accused-appellant, he was simply ‘framed-up’ and that another person also raped the
victim.27 He avers that his allegation is supported by the testimony of the victim’s mother Jenelyn that
the victim was likewise abused by the latter’s husband.

The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by accused-appellant cannot be
overturned by the bare denial and defense of being ‘framed-up’ interposed by accused-appellant.
The victim made a positive, clear and categorical declaration pointing to accused-appellant as the
person who sexually ravaged her-

"Q: Are you the same Jennifer Donayre the private complainant against the accused
Valentin Baring, Jr.?
 Page 11 of 165

"A: Yes, sir.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Q: Who is your father?

"A: I do not know the name of my father because my father and mother are separated.

"Q: If your father is in the courtroom can you point to him?

"A: Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man inside this courtroom when asked given [sic] his
name as Valentin Baring.)

"Q: Is he your true father?

"A: No sir. He is my stepfather.

"Q: You were pointing to your stepfather, do you know what things or particular things, if
any, he did to you?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: What were those particular things your stepfather had done to you?

"A: He raped me.

"Q: When your stepfather raped you, what actually did your stepfather do to you?

"A: He removed my panty.

"Q: What did your stepfather do after removing your panty?

"A: He placed himself on top of me.

"Q: Was he naked when he placed himself on top of you?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: When he was on top of you, did he place his penis inside your private parts?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: What did you feel when his penis was inside your private parts, if any?

"A: I felt pain.

"Q: Was your private part bleeding as a result of the insertion of the penis of your
stepfather into your private parts?

"A: Yes, sir.

 Page 12 of 165

"Q: Did he kiss you while he was on top of you?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: What parts of your body or face was kissed?

"A: My cheek.

"Q: Where did this happen?

"A: Dasmariñas, Cavite.

"Q: In whose house or place?

"A: In the house of my grandmother.

"Q: Who are the residents of that house at that time?

"A: At that time nobody was in the house because they were working.

"xxx xxx xxx

"Q: Can you recall if the rape you mentioned to us happened while you were 7 years old, 6
years old? What was your age then if you can recall?

"A: 6 years old.

"Q: How many times did your stepfather do to you these things you mentioned to us that is
by placing (sic) on top of you and inserting his penis into your private parts and kissing you?

"A: 10 times.

"Q: Do you know how to count?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: How many is this? (prosecutor is depicting two fingers)

"A: Two, sir.

"Q: How about this, how many? (Prosecutor is depicting five fingers).

"A: Five, sir.

"Q: How about this?(Prosecutor is depicting 10 fingers)

"A: Ten, sir.28

Accused-appellant even contends that the failure of the prosecution to establish the dates when the
other alleged rapes were committed justifies the outright dismissal of the case.29
 Page 13 of 165

Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face.30 When all the essential elements of the crime of rape are stated in
the information, an accused is sufficiently apprised of the charged against him. Moreover, the
precise time of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of rape.31 Neither is
the exact date of commission of rape an element of the crime32 for the gravamen of the offense of
rape is sexual intercourse without consent.33

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court denied him his right to subject the blood found on the
victim’s panty for DNA testing.

The records reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel initially asked the court to subject the alleged
blood found in the victim’s panty to a DNA test for comparison with accused-appellant’s
blood.34 However, he voluntarily withdrew his proposition.35 Obviously, accused-appellant’s counsel is
misleading the Court. It was even accused-appellant’s counsel who recalled the submission for DNA
testing. The alleged denial of accused’s right to avail of the DNA tests is a futile attempt to confuse
the issues. He lost sight of the categorical testimony of the victim pinning him down as the
perpetrator. It would have been more prudent for him to attack this damaging evidence directly. It
must be noted that in the prosecution of rape cases, the presentation of the bloodstained panty is
not even essential.36 The victim’s credible testimony, standing alone, is sufficient basis for the
conviction of accused-appellant.

Cases subject of our review, especially those in the nature of child sexual abuse, often involve
victims of tender years. On account of the increased number of children coming into the realm of the
judicial system, we adopted the "Rule on Examination of a Child Witness" to govern the examination
of child witnesses who may either be victims, accused or witnesses to a crime.37 This rule ensures an
environment that allows children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma,
encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.38

In line with our foregoing thrust to protect children, we observed the peculiar physical examination
performed by the doctor on the seven-year-old victim in this wise-

"GENITAL

There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex and slightly gaping with the pinkish
brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating, the same disclosed a congested,
fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 9 o'clock position. External vaginal
orifice admits tip of the examiner’s smallest finger."39 (emphasis ours)

This Court is disturbed by the method of physical examination done on the seven-year-old victim.
We noticed that in the examiner’s effort to show the existence of abuse, the examining physician
inserted his smallest finger, as shown in the medico-legal report that the ‘external vaginal orifice
admits tip of the examiner's finger.’

It bears to stress that this particular manner of establishing evidence – by determining the
diameter/hymenal opening in rape cases – was a common practice in the past. With the passage of
R.A. 7610, this Court has nonetheless allowed the utilization of the same kind of evidence in the
prosecution of Child Abuse cases. In light however of radical medical developments and findings,
specifically as to the determination of the existence of child sexual abuse, this Court deems it
necessary to firmly adopt a more "child sensitive" approach in dealing with this specie or genre of
crime.
 Page 14 of 165

In the international scientific community, recent medical studies have shown that measurement of
hymenal opening is unreliable in determining and/or proving child sexual abuse –

"The diameter of the hymenal opening previously has been used as a diagnostic criterion for
abuse. More recent studies have shown this to be undependable (Paradise, 1989).Factors
affecting hymenal and anal diameter include the examination position (McCann, Voris,
Simon, & Wells, 1990) and the degree of relaxation of the child. The anal diameter is also
affected by the presence of stool in the ampulla. Hymenal diameter may increase with age
and with the onset of pubertal development."40

In fact, there is no evidence, nor published research studies which show that enlarged hymenal
opening diameter is any more common in abused than in non-abused children."41 Thus -

"In the latest revision of the classification system, ‘enlarged hymenal opening’ is also
removed as a criterion that should be considered suspicious for abuse. With labial traction,
the hymenal opening may appear quite large, especially to the less experienced clinician,
and internal structures such as vaginal ridges, rugae, and vaginal columns may be
visualized. This is purely a matter of how much traction is applied, and the degree of patient
relaxation, and has no proven correlation with past sexual abuse. Likewise, it is not possible
to obtain accurate measurements of the dilated hymenal opening, unless photographs are
taken at the point of maximal dilation and measurements are taken from the photographs
using a calibrated measuring device. Rings of different sizes that are etched into eyepieces
of certain types of colposcopes can be used to estimate diameter size but not to obtain exact
measurements."42

Hence, insertion of a finger or any foreign matter inside the hymenal opening under the pretext of
determining abuse is unnecessary and inappropriate. The Philippine Judicial Academy [PHILJA]
training program for family court judges,43 through the auspices of the U.P.-P.G.H. Child Protection
Unit, sanctioned that in prepubertal girls44 without active bleeding, all that is needed is an external
examination with a good light source and magnification. Be that as it may, the physical findings
alone will not be conclusive of child sexual abuse, for a child who gives a clear, consistent, detailed,
spontaneous description of being sexually molested may still have normal genital examination.
Despite the physical or laboratory findings, however, a child’s clear and convincing description of the
abuse has a high rate of probability.

We are not at all uninformed in this regard for we, in a plethora of cases, have consistently upheld
the full weight of a young victim’s unwavering testimony.45 Also, there is Section 22 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness, which categorically states:

Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His
testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or
judgment subject to the standard proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.

What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate to reiterate, is that forensic examination –
inclusive of physical examination and forensic interview – of sexually assaulted children [adolescents
included] must be conducted with maximum sensitivity to the young victim’s feelings of vulnerability
and embarrassment. Great care must be observed in order to make the examination less stressful
lest they be more traumatic to the victim than the very assault itself. The value of collecting evidence
should always be weighed against the emotional cost of the procedure and examination of the child.

We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed by the trial court. The single information
filed against accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6334-98, charged him with the crime
 Page 15 of 165

of "Multiple Statutory Rape."46 Even then, accused-appellant cannot be held answerable for the other
incidents of rape committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that
each of the other rapes charged should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.47

Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the Revised Penal Code, imposes death penalty when the victim is
a child below seven (7) years old. The allegation in the information specifically stated that "xxx the
victim xxx is only seven years old" which clearly rules out the application of this specific provision
that can justify the imposition of the capital punishment. Paragraph No. 1 of the same article which
warrants the imposition of the death penalty if the crime of rape is committed where the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common–law spouse of the
parent of the victim,48 will not apply for while the victim is under eighteen (18) years old, the accused-
appellant is not the common-law husband of the victim’s mother. The trial court therefore erred in
meting out the death penalty upon accused-appellant for qualified rape. Thus, accused-appellant
may only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In line with our prevailing jurisprudence,49 we sustain the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00 civil
indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Case
No. 6334-98, finding accused-appellant Valentin Baring, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 16 of 165

G.R. No. 225642-43

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 17 February 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
HC Nos. 01226-MIN and 01227-MIN affirming in toto the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 of Davao City (RTC). The RTC found Juvy D.
Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G. Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) different
charges of rape.

THE FACTS

The two (2) Informations in this case read:

Criminal Case No. 64,964-09

That on or about February 10, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after boxing
her legs.3

Criminal Case No. 64,965-09

That on or about February 11, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will, immediately after
grappling her.4

These two (2) cases were jointly tried before the RTC, and Amarela and Racho's appeals, although
separate, were consolidated in the CA on 13 November 2015.5

The RTC summarized the factual milieu of this case:

Prosecution presented [AAA], single, housekeeper and a resident of [XXX], Calinan, Davao City. On
February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was watching a beauty contest with
her aunt at Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. The contest was being held at a
basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. The only lights available were those coming
from the vehicles around.

She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong
Cooperative near the basketball court. Between the cooperative building and the basketball court
were several trees. She was not able to reach the comfort room because [ Amarela] was already
waiting for her along the way. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was
shocked and was no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day
care center. He punched her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed
 Page 17 of 165

her. She tried to resist him but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He
placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull
movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to her rescue [so] Amarela fled.

The three (3) persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her.
So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no longer around,
she proceeded on her way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought her first
to the Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Dumandan stayed
behind So Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt's house instead.

xxxx

[AAA] then said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to
lie down. When she refused, [Racho] boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking
him but he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of
[AAA]. [Racho] then inserted his penis into [AAA]'s vagina. After consummating the act, [Racho] left
her. So [AAA] went home alone.

When she reached home, her parents were already asleep. She went inside her room and cried.
The following morning, she decided to leave home. Her mother was surprised at her decision until
eventually, [AAA] told her mother about what happened to her. She told her [eldest] brother first who
got very angry.

They reported the matter to the police and eventually [ Amarela] and [Racho] were arrested.6

For the defense, Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what
happened with AAA:

Defense presented [Amarela] who confirmed the fact that on February 10, 2009, he attended the
fiesta celebrations in Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. He said he met private
complainant, [AAA], at the cooperative building at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [AAA] asked
him if he knew a person by the name of Eric Dumandan who was allegedly her boyfriend. After a
while, Eric Dumandan passed by and so he told him that [AAA] was looking for him. Then he left.

Amarela said he had a drinking spree with his friend Asther Sanchez. While drinking, he felt dizzy
and fell down from the bench. So Sanchez brought him to the house of his elder brother Joey in
Tawan-tawan. He did not know what happened next because he slept and woke up at six o'clock in
the morning.7

On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping her:

Defense also presented [Racho], a resident of Sitio Maligatong, Barangay Tawan-tawan, Baguio
District, Calinan, Davao City. He testified that he was at the house of his mother on February 10,
2009. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, [AAA] arrived with Godo Dumandan. [AAA] was asking
for help while crying because she was allegedly raped by three persons in the pineapple plantation.

His mother advised her to just take a bath and change clothes and sleep at his brother's house. But
[AAA] wanted to go home. Since he was the only one who was not drunk, Racho was instructed by
[his] mother to accompany [AAA] in going to her aunt's house.
 Page 18 of 165

When they reached Caniamo, [AAA] did not want to be brought to her aunt's house because she
knows the latter would just scold her. Instead, she wanted to be conveyed to their house at Ventura.
Since Ventura was far, Racho did not go with her and instead went back home.

When asked about the charge of rape against him, Racho said he could not have done that because
his hand is impaired while showing a long scar on his left arm. This was a result allegedly of a
hacking incident on September 21, 2008. He offered a Medical Certificate (Exh. 1) issued by Dr. Lugi
Andrew Sabal of the Davao Medical Center which indicates that Racho was confined in the said
hospital from September 21, 2008 up to October 1, 2008 after an operation on his left forearm. He
said that his left arm was placed in a plaster cast but that he removed the cast after three (3)
months. He said that even after he removed the cast, his arm was still painful and he could not move
it around.

Racho said he was surprised when policemen came to his house on February 11, 2009 and invited
him to the police station because there was a complaint for rape against him.

Anita Racho testified that she was at home in the evening of February 10, 2009 together with her
husband and sons Bobby and [Racho]. Godo Dumandan arrived together with [AAA] who was
allegedly raped by three (3) men. [AAA] appeared madly and wet so she advised her to take a bath
and not to go home anymore since it was late. [AAA] insisted on going home, so she asked her son
[Racho] to accompany her. [Racho] at first refused pointing to his elder brother Bobby to accompany
her. He eventually brought [AAA] home. He came back at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and
then he went to sleep.

The following day, she was surprised when [Racho] was arrested allegedly for raping [AAA]. [Racho]
denied raping [AAA].8

Ruling of the Trial Court

In its joint judgment, the RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho,
to be clear, positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their
denial as these could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and
Racho were convicted as follows:

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 64964-09 finding
[Amarela] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.

In Criminal Case No. 64965-09, judgment is hereby rendered finding [Racho] GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.9

The Assailed CA Decision

 Page 19 of 165

Before the CA, Amarela and Racho pointed out that although there were other witnesses, the only
material testimony on record was that of AAA. They argued that there were several circumstances
casting doubt on AAA' s claim that she was raped because her testimony does not conform to
common knowledge and to ordinary human experience.

In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto finding no reason to reverse the
trial court's factual findings. It held:

[AAA] has testified in a straightforward manner during her direct examination and remained steadfast
in her cross-examination that Amarela sexually abused her on February 10, 2009, and [Racho]
abused her five hours later. The first rape incident took place in the daycare center. She was pulled
by Amarela while she was on her way to the comfort room located at the back of the x x x
cooperative building. Private complainant, full of mud and wet, with dress tom, took refuge at the
house of her boyfriend and sought for help. Her boyfriend's father took her to the house of the in-
laws of her cousin. [AAA], who was still wet and muddy, begged the mother-in-law of her cousin that
she be taken to the house of her aunt. While the in-laws of her cousin helped her by having escorted
her to her aunt's house, it turned out however, that [Racho] her escort had another plan in mind.
[Racho] sexually abused [AAA], who had no more strength to fight him.

The records render no reason to reverse the factual findings of the court a quo. Both of the
appellants' denials miserably fail in contrast to [AAA's] positive identification of the accused-
appellants as the person who sexually abused her. There is no doubt in our mind that both
appellants had carnal knowledge of [AAA]. Her credibility is cemented by her lack of motive to testify
against the two appellants, Amarela and [Ra.cho]. There is no evidence to suggest that she could
have been actuated by such motive. The People has ably demonstrated the existence of the
elements of Rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, which states:

xxxx

The Court sees no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that in matters of credibility of
witnesses, the assessment made by the trial court should be respected and given preponderant
weight. [AAA's] ordeal is so traumatic that she would rather forget the whole incident. But once a
rape victim has decided to seek justice, that means she is willing to recall the dastardly detail of the
animalistic act committed on her person.

[Racho] would have us believe that the charge against him was merely fabricated because,
according to him, being raped by two different assailants, on two different occasions and only hours
apart, is contrary to the normal course of things.

We are not convinced.

The Supreme Court has once said that rape in itself is prompted by the abnormal need of a man to
overpower and control a woman by way of sexual abuse. There is no typical mode, norm, or
circumstance in committing rape or sexual abuse for the evil in man has no conscience. In fact, in a
catena of cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that rape is no respecter of time or place. Thus, we
cannot agree with [Racho]'s argument that just because [AAA] had been raped five hours earlier, the
possibility that she might get raped again is nil.

Undeterred, appellants posit that [AAA's] testimony is not substantially corroborated by medical
findings as the medical certificate does not show any physical injuries resulting from the alleged use
of force by the appellants.
 Page 20 of 165

We do not agree.

The absence of any superficial abrasion or contusion on the person of the offended party does not
militate against the claim of the latter whose clear and candid testimony bears the badges of truth,
honesty, and candor. It must be stressed that the absence or presence of visible signs of injury on
the victim depends on the degree of force employed by the accused to consummate the purpose
which he had in mind to have carnal knowledge with the offended woman. Thus, the force employed
in rape need not be so great nor of such a character as could not be resisted. It is only that the force
used by the accused is sufficient to enable him to consummate his purpose.

Appellant Amarela also argues that [AAA] could not have identified her assailant because it was very
dark at the place where [AAA] was allegedly pulled by her assailant and the place where she was
allegedly raped.

[AAA], in her re-direct examination, testified that she knew it was Amarela who raped her because
she saw Amarela's fact while Amarela brought her from the cooperative building to the daycare
center.

Time and time again, the High Court has repeatedly ruled that positive identification prevails over
denial, a negative defense that is inherently unreliable. We have no reason to doubt [AAA's]
unwavering assertions positively establishing the identities of the two accused-appellants. We find
the guilt of each of the accused-appellants to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto. 10

OUR RULING

More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape
cases are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In
doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly
admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to
protect her honor. 11 However, this misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the
accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice.

The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case
of People v. Tana, 12 the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns
raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador,
said:

It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused
unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor.
We cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place
unless it did actually take place.13

This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would
have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault;
today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino
woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic
role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent
and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.
 Page 21 of 165

In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or
cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused
may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.14 Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable
doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to
the credibility and story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes constrained to rely
on the observations of the trial court who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling and at times unfriendly,
examination.15 It has since become imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial
court be accorded great respect by this Court; for it can be expected that said determination is based
on reasonable discretion as to which testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of
belief.16 Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the trial court, especially when they are
affirmed by the appellate court,17 this rule is not absolute and admits exceptions, such as when some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, and
misinterpreted.

We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before us, to wit:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the R TC' s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments
and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly
when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.18

After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable doubt
lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following circumstances,
particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the version of AAA's story
appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in court; (2) AAA could not
have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first
time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under the stage against her
will; and (4) the medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any
signs of forced entry.

First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the crowd at the
beauty contest and made it easy for Amarela to grab her without anyone noticing:

Q: Now, you said that you watched the beauty contest at around 7:00 in the evening on Feb. 10,
2009. After that, Ms. Witness, while watching, what did you do?

A: I was on my way to the CR.

Q: And where is the CR located?

 Page 22 of 165

A: Near the coop.

Q: Can you please tell us the name of that cooperative?

A: Cooperative.

Q: Can you recall the exact name?

A: Maligatong Cooperative.

Q: And, where is this Maligatong Cooperative, Ms. Witness, in relation to the basketball court where
the beauty contest was held?

A: It's near.

xxxx

Q: Now, between the basketball court and the cooperative you referred to, what separates these two
buildings?

A: Durian trees and cacao.

Q: You said that you were going to the CR located at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative to
relieve yourself. And, were you able to go to the CR at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative?

A: Nomore.

Q: Why not?

A: [Amarela] was waiting for me.

Q: Exactly, can you please tell us the location where he was waiting for you?

A: At the back of the cooperative.

Q: And, upon seeing [Amarela] at the back of the cooperative, Ms. Witness, tell us what happened?

A: He pulled me.

Q: Going to what place?

A: Going towards the day care center.19

Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA away from the beauty
contest stage to the day care center:

6. At around 6:00 in the afternoon, I, my aunt [BBB] together with her siblings and grand children
went back to Maligatong Cooperative Building to watch a beauty contest. My companions stayed at
the multicab at the parking area of said building, while my cousin [CCC] and I went closer to the
stage. While at there, the person of [Amarela], drunk, suddenly appeared and introduced himself to
 Page 23 of 165

me. I resisted to get his hand on my hands because he is holding it tightly and forcibly brought me to
the back portion of the building. I asked for help but nobody heard me maybe because of the high
volume of the sound system.

7. While at the back of said building I saw my boyfriend Eric Dumandan coming and [Amarela] told
him, "Ran (Eric's palayaw) naa si gemma diri!" and Eric responded, "ahh! tinga-a."

8. When Eric left us, [Amarela] grabbed me going to the purok beside the daycare center of Sitio
Maligatong, Brgy. Tawan-Tawan, Baguio District [more or less] 20 meters away from the
[cooperative] building. I shouted for help but still nobody heard me.20

It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex parte are usually
incomplete and inadequate.21 We usually brush aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and
do not impair the credibility of the rape victim.22 In this case, however, the version in AAA's affidavit-
complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she
was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to
the rest room when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA's retraction
because it goes into whether it was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will.

If we were to take into account AAA's initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the vicinity of
the stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against her
will. Thus, AAA's version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away
from the crowd watching the beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA
was being taken away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when she was
grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement reflect another story that differs from her court
testimony? To our mind, AAA's testimony could have been concocted to just make her story
believable rather than sticking to her original story that Amarela introduced himself and pulled her
away from the stage. We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a minor detail because it casts
some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth - that she was abducted against her will before
she was raped.

Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts
AAA's credibility in question. Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on
the lone testimony of the victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and
consistent with human experience. We must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the
testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable.

Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole
incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not
illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's face:

Direct Examination

Q: Now, what separates this beauty contest from what you were testifying a while ago as the
daycare center?

A: Coconut trees, durian trees, and cacao.

Q: ·what else?
 Page 24 of 165

A: Several trees.

Q: How about grass?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, can you please tell us the illumination in that place?

A: It was dark.

Q: Why is it that it was dark?

A: Because there was no lighting.23

Cross-Examination

Q: Since it was already night time, it was very dark at that time, correct?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And when you went to the CR to relieve yourself which CR was located at Maligatong
Cooperative building, it was also dark on your way?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now, while under the makeshift stage of that day care center, it was dark, very dark?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And you cannot see the face of [Amarela], was not clear to you because it was very dark,
correct?

A: Yes, ma' am.24

Re-Direct Examination

Q: At the time that you said that while [Amarela] was undressing you could not see his face, would
you confirm that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about his body?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why, Ms. Witness?

A: It was dark.
 Page 25 of 165

xxxx

Q: Now, at the time that you were raped you said that it was too dark, how did you then identify that
[Amarela] was the one who raped you?

A: I know him when he brought me from the Coop.

Q: From the Coop. to the day care center that was the time that you identified him?

A: Yes, sir.25

From AAA's testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting
conditions in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela
while she was being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to clarify as
to how she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care center was
dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again draw
reservations from AAA's testimony.

Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. The
identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.26

Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked, and then
raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience. She said:

Q: At the day care center, where exactly did he bring you?

A: Under.

Q: Under what?

A: Under the makeshift stage.

Q: You said there was also a makeshift stage at the day care center?

A: Yes.

Q: Was it finished makeshift stage or not?

A: Not yet finished.

Q: You said that he brought you under that makeshift stage?

A: Yes.

Q: Please tell us how did you fit in that makeshift stage?

A: Because the flooring is about 2 feet high.

 Page 26 of 165

Q: Since you said he pulled you towards that makeshift stage, what was your reaction, Ms. Witness?

A: I was scared.

Q: And what did you do?

A: I did not know what to do then.

xxxx

Q: Now, after that, what happened, Ms. Witness?

A: He pushed me under.

Q: What happened after that?

A: He [punched] me in my abdomen.

Q: What else did he do to you?

A: I felt weak.

Q: After that what happened?

A: He undressed me.

Q: While he was undressing you, what did you do, Ms. Witness?

A: I was just lying down.

xxxx

Q: What else did he do to you while you were resisting his advances?

A: He boxed my upper left thigh.

Q: .What did you feel when he boxed your left thigh?

A: I felt numbness.

xxxx

Q: Now, you said that he undressed you, Ms. Witness, and you said he also undressed himself.
What, then, [did he] do to you?

A: He placed himself on top of me.

Q: What did he do after that?

 Page 27 of 165

A: He inserted his penis in my sex organ.27

From this, AAA would like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and
place himself on top of her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible for
two human beings to move freely under a stage, much more when the other person is trying to resist
sexual advances. Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to the makeshift
stage without any sign of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was being held against her will, AAA
could have easily called for help or simply run away.

Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the medico-
legal officer. The medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that AAA had no
pertinent physical findings/or physical injuries:28

FINDINGS
GENERAL PHYSICAL FINDINGS
Height 5 feet & 4 inches Weight 44 Kg
Awake, afebrile, not in respiratory
General Survey
distress
Conscious, coherent, respond well to
Mental Status questions when asked and maintained
eye to eye contact
Pertinent Physical Findings/Physical Normal Findings
Injuries
ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
External Genitalia Normal findings
Urethra and Periurethral Area Normal findings
Perihymenal Area and Fossa (+) Hyperemic/Erythematous
Narvicularis perihymenal area.
(+) Complete laceration at 9 o’clock
Hymen and 3 o’clock positions with minimal
bloody secretion on the lacerated area.
Perineum Normal findings
Discharge None
Internal and Speculum exam Not done
Anal Examination Good Sphincteric tone
DIAGNOSTIC AND EVIDENCE GATHERING
Pending laboratory results
Forensic Evidence and Laboratory
(Spermatocyte determination gram
Results
staining).
IMPRESSONS
Anogenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.29
 Page 28 of 165

Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held that a medico-
legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in
nature.30 In convicting rapists based entirely on the testimony of their victim, we have said that a
medico-legal report is by no means controlling.31 Thus, since it is merely corroborative in character, a
medico-legal report could even be dispensed with.32

A medico-legal's findings are at most corroborative because they are mere opinions that can only
infer possibilities and not absolute necessities. A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual
incident, cannot testify on what exactly happened as his testimony would not be based on personal
knowledge or derived from his own perception. Consequently, a medico-legal's testimony cannot
establish a certain fact as it can only suggest what most likely happened.

In the same way, a medico-legal's findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged
rape victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the medical
examination on AAA, she diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a blunt force or
penetrating trauma.

In a study conducted by Radostina D. Miterva,33 the most common sites for lacerations were
determined, "in rape victims with ring-shaped hymens, lacerations were most commonly located as
followed at dorsal recumbence of the patient: (1) one laceration at 6 o'clock position in 42.02% of
cases; (2) two lacerations at 5 and 7 o'clock positions in 24.55% cases; (3) three lacerations at 3, 6
and 9 o'clock positions in 45.36% of cases; and (4) four lacerations at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock positions
in 25% of cases."

These findings were supported by an earlier study that described patterns of genital injury resulting
from sexual abuse.34

However, in a similar study comparing injuries from consensual and non-consensual intercourse, the
authors discovered that the statistical results of the locations of vaginal laceration are almost the
same.35 Their findings suggest that the injuries are similar after consensual and non-consensual
intercourse.36

From all this, we observe that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish
consensual from non-consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the
frequency of lacerations and whether they are located in different positions) to determine whether
the sexual act was consensual or not. If the frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of
the vaginal orifice, then it would be a good indicator that there was sexual abuse. On the other hand,
if the lacerations are found in a specific area, it could indicate forced rape, but could also suggest
consensual intercourse.

In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the
hymen. Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the probability
that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's thighs-when she
said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have had consensual
intercourse.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the
female.37 It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is
alleged and shown to be without her consent.38 Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is
not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving
consent.39 The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to
 Page 29 of 165

penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals,
prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.40

Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, We must bear in
mind that the burden of proof is never shifted and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits. Whether the accused's defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It
is fundamental that the prosecution's case cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.41

As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases. This means that
1âw phi 1

both Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony. When we rely on the
testimony of the private complainant in rape cases, we require that her testimony be entirely
credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For when certain parts would seem unbelievable, especially when
it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the victim's testimony as a whole does not pass the test
of credibility. Since we doubt AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela, we have to consider
her testimony against Racho under the same light.

In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's house, but
instead forced her to go inside a house along the way. While inside the house, Racho supposedly
boxed AAA's abdomen, undressed himself, placed himself on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into
AAA's vagina. Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left AAA to go home by herself.42

We find it odd that AAA was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Godo Dumandan's
house to seek help. Instead, she was brought to the Racho residence where she told Neneng Racho
what happened. Again, instead of reporting the incident to the police, AAA insisted that she be
brought to her aunt's house nearby. This is way beyond human experience. If AAA had already told
other people what happened, there was no reason for her not to report the incident to the proper
authorities.

Faced with AAA's doubtful narration before she went home alone, we are inclined to believe Racho's
version that they parted ways when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. To begin with, Racho
did not even want to bring AAA to her aunt's house nearby.43 If he had the intention to have sex with
AAA, Racho would not have declined her mother's instruction. To add, Racho said he left AAA by
herself because he did not want to bring AAA to her house since this was in another town from her
aunt's house.44 His reason for leaving AAA to go home alone is supported by the fact that he was
able to immediately come home right after he left with AAA. Unlike AAA's testimony, the version
offered by Racho is corroborated by the testimony of his mother.

Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, we
have dismissed such defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving, and, more often than not,
uncorroborated. To recall, Racho did not deny that he accompanied AAA to her aunt's house, but he
said he left her when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. Racho's mother corroborated this
part of the story. To our mind, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have easily
raised these defenses and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have likewise
covered up this story, but she did not and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night. If indeed
Racho raped AAA that night, the best defense available for him was alibi which he thought he did not
have to raise, given that he was telling the truth when he left AAA by herself to go home. To our
mind, these are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be telling the truth.

In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported
by proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty.45 Absolute guarantee
of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least,
 Page 30 of 165

be moral certainty on each element essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of
the offender.46 Thus, the prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and
persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.47

The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether
AAA's ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its
part to convince the court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the
government to present a logical and realistic account of every alleged crime, and they should, to the
best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a conviction. But here we cannot ascertain what
happened based on the lone testimony of AAA. It should have been the prosecution's duty to
properly evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho.

Henceforth, we are constrained to reverse the R TC and the CA rulings due to the presence of
lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as
quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an
acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11 of Davao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 64964-09 and 64965-09, as well as the 17 February
2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226 and 01227-MIN are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho are ACQUITTED of the charge of rape
on the ground of reasonable doubt. Their IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody is hereby ordered
unless they are being held for other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 31 of 165

G.R. No. 192150 October 1, 2014

FEDERICO SABAY, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 23, 2009 and the
resolution3 dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.

The CA affirmed the April 28, 2008 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 126, finding petitioner Federico Sabay guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of
Slight Physical Injuries. The RTC decision in tum affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC)
judgment.

The Antecedent Facts

At around three o’clock to four o’clock in the afternoon of June 12, 2001, while the petitioner and his
daughter Erlinda Sabay (Erlinda) were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of Godofredo
Lopez (Godofredo), the latter confronted the petitioner about his (the petitioner’s) alleged intrusion
into Godofredo’s property. A verbal altercation ensued between them.

In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object. The
petitioner joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredo’s face, breaking the latter’s eyeglasses.
Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy.5 The petitioner and Erlinda then shouted at
Godofredo and threatened to kill him.

Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and pacified the three. But in the course his
efforts, he was hit in the hand with a bolo.6 The neighbors intervened not long after and pacified the
parties.

The Medico Legal Certificates7 dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo suffered a contusion on
the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while Jerviesustained a wound in
his right palm.

On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against the petitioner before the
barangay.8 The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the recommendation of the building
inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-aayos9 (Kasunduan) dated June
20, 2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to
make the promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties.10 Thus,
the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action.

The petitioner was accordingly charged before the MTC with the crime of Physical Injuries under two
(2) Informations11 that read:

Criminal Case No. 209934

 Page 32 of 165

That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a bolo one JERVIE LOPEZ, thereby inflicting
upon the latter physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance for not more than
seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work for
the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 209935

That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a bolo one GODOFREDO LOPEZ, thereby
inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance for not
more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his
habitual work for the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The petitioner, together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light Threats12 for allegedly
uttering threatening words against the private complainant, Godofredo.

When arraigned, both accused pleadednot guilty to all the charges. Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following eyewitnesses: Rodolfo Lata, Sr. y Dolping
(Rodolfo) and Dina Perez y Alapaap (Dina) (who both testified on the details of the crime);
Godofredo; Jervie; and Dr. Melissa Palugod (Godofredo’s attending physician). The defense, on the
other hand, presented the petitioner, Wilfredo Verdad and Caridad Sabay.

The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in self-defense. He narrated
that on the date of the incident while he was putting a monument on his lot, Godofredo suddenly hit
him with an iron bar in his right hand, causing him injuries. Jesus Lopez (Jessie), Godofredo’s son,
went out of their house and with a .38 caliber gun, fired the gun at him. To defend himself, he got a
stone and threw it at Godofredo.

The MTC’s and the RTC’s Rulings

In its decision, MTC believed the prosecution's version of the incident and found the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical injuries. The MTC, however, dismissed
the light threats charged, as this offense is deemed absorbed in the crime of slight physical injuries.
Further, it absolved Erlinda for the crime of light threats as there was no allegation that she uttered
threatening words against Godofredo.

The MTC rejected the petitioner’s claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory
supporting evidence. The MTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that there had been unlawful
aggression by Godofredo; he did not even present the medical certificate of his injury as evidence.
The dispositive partof its decision reads:
 Page 33 of 165

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Federico Sabay y Bactol is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries and is meted a penalty
ofimprisonment of Eleven (11) Days for each count as there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance.

SO ORDERED.

In due course, the petitioner appealed his judgment to the RTC, which fully affirmed the MTC’s
decision.

The petitioner sought recourse with the CA, arguing in this appeal that: (1) the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case in view of the prosecution’s failure to offer the Certification to File an Action
in evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in not sustaining his claim of self-defense.

The CA’s Ruling

The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held that even
if there had been no formal offer of exhibit pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on
Evidence, the Certification to File an Action could still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it
has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has been incorporated into the
records of the case. Noting that the Certification to File an Action was identified by the complainants
and is attached to the records of the case, the CA ruled that an exception to Section 34, Rule 132 of
the Rules on Evidence could be recognized.

The CA also dismissed the petitioner’s plea of self-defense. The CA ruled that self-defense is
essentially a factual matter that isbest addressed by the trial court; in the absence of any showing
that both the MTC and the RTC overlooked weighty and substantial facts or circumstances that
could alter their conclusion, the appellate court saw no reason to disturb their factual ruling.

On March 22, 2010, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; hence, the present
petition.

The Issues

On the basis of the same arguments raised before the CA, the petitioner questions: (1) the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the criminal cases in view of the alleged inadmissibility ofthe
Certification to File Action; and (2) the lower court’s finding of guilt, its appreciation of the evidence
and its rejection of the claim of self-defense.

The Court’s Ruling

We find no reversible error committed by the CA and affirm the petitioner’s conviction for two counts
of slight physical injuries.

On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the lower courts erred in disregarding the existence of
the Kasunduan executed by the parties before the Lupon. This existing settlement between the
parties rendered the Certification to File an Action without factual and legal basis, and is hence null
and void. The petitioner also contendsthat the CA erred in not holding that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the criminal cases in view of the noncompliance (i.e., issuance of the Certification
toFile an Action despite the existence of an agreement) with conciliation procedures under
Presidential Decree No. 1508.
 Page 34 of 165

We see no merit in these contentions.

The Office of the Barangay Captain Cannot be Precluded From Issuing a Certification to File an
Action Where NoActual Settlement Was Reached; the Certification to File an Action

Issued by The Office of The Barangay is Valid.

The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Luponfor conciliation prior to the
institution of the criminal cases before the MTC. The parties in fact admitted that a meeting before
the Lupontranspired between them, resulting in a Kasunduan.

Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduanthat embodied their agreement was
never implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the building inspector failed to make his
promised recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay Captain was thus compelled to issue
a Certification to File an Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any settlement.

The CA correctly observed and considered the situation: the settlement of the case was conditioned
on the recommendation of the building inspector; with no recommendation, no resolution of the
conflict likewise took place.

Furthermore, the BarangayCaptain, as a public official, is presumed to act regularly in the

performance of official duty.13 In the absence of contrary evidence, this presumption prevails; his
issuance of the disputed Certification to File an Action was regular and pursuant to law.14 Thus, the
Barangay Captain properly issued the Certification to File an Action.

Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain’s issuance of the
Certification toFile and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants
the dismissal of the criminal cases before the MTC. As we held in Diu v. Court of Appeals:15

Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had
already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. Similarly, in
Garces v. Court of Appeals,16 we stated that:

In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D.
1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its
jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the petitioner’s case; the claimed irregularity in
conciliation procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification to File an Action, did not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity merely affected the parties’ cause of
action.17

The petitioner next contends thateven if there was a valid Certification to File an Action, the lower
courts still erred in admitting the Certificate into evidence as the prosecution did not formally offer it
as required by the Rules on Evidence. He emphasizes that in Fideldia v. Sps. Mulato,18 the Court
held that a formal offer is necessary because judges are required to base their findings solely upon
evidence offered by the parties. In the absence of a formal offer, the Certification is not admissible
pursuant to Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, and cannot be considered by the court.

We do not find this argument sufficiently persuasive.

 Page 35 of 165

The Certification to File an Action is Admissible.

Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any
evidence that has not been formally offered.19 Formal offer means that the offering party shall inform
the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence, to assist the court in ruling on their
admissibility in case the adverse party objects.20 Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot
take notice of this evidence even if this has been previously marked and identified.

This rule, however, admits of anexception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the
formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.

The cases of People v. Napat-a,21 People v. Mate,22 and The Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v. The
Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al.,23 to cite a few, enumerated the requirements so that evidence, not
previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of
the case.

In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are
present. As the lower courts correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an
1âwphi1

Action during his crossexamination, to wit:24

Q: And I’m referring to you thisCertification from the Office of the Brgy. docketed as 181-01, is this
the one you are referring to?

A: This is with respect to the hitting of my head.

Atty. Bihag: At this juncture, your Honor, we would like to request that this particular certification
referring to the case 181-01 entitled Mr. Godofredo Lopez, Mr. Jervie Lopez versus Mr. Federico
Sabay and Mrs. Erlinda Castro, be marked as Exh. "1" for the defense. [TSN, Godofredo Lopez,
page 119; emphasis ours.]

Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit "1" and
attached to the records of the case.25 Significantly, the petitioner never objected to Godofredo’s
testimony, particularly with the identification and marking of the Certification. In these lights, the
Court sees no reason why the Certification should not be admitted.

The Claim of Self-Defense

On the claim of self-defense, we recognize that the factual findings and conclusions of the RTC,
especially when affirmed by the CA as in this case, are entitled to great weight and respect and are
deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.26

In the absence of any indication thatthe trial and the appellate courts overlooked facts or
circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, we will not disturb their factual
findings.27

We thus uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of the crime of slight
physical injuries fully established during the trial. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected the
petitioner’s claim of selfdefense because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.
 Page 36 of 165

Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
implies the admission by the accused that he committed the acts that would have been criminal in
character had it not been for the presence of circumstances whose legal consequences negate the
commission of a crime.28 The plea of self-defense in order to exculpate the accused must be duly
proven. The most basic rule is that no self-defense can be recognized until unlawful aggression is
established.29

Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove that he satisfied
the elements required by law;30 he who alleges must prove. By admitting the commission of the act
charged and pleading avoidance based on the law, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence
to prove that the facts that the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence is immaterial after he admitted the commission of the act charged.31

In this case, the petitioner admitted the acts attributed to him, and only pleads that he acted in self-
defense. His case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful aggression – that Godofredo hit him
with an iron bar on his right hand.

As the RTC and the CA pointed out, the petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed self-defense
because he did not even present any medical certificate as supporting evidence, notwithstanding his
claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he everpresent the doctor he allegedly consulted. His
contention, too, that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie
was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses – Rodolfo and Dina – who both testified that it was the
petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.

The prosecution eyewitnesses' testimonies were supported by the medico legal certificates showing
that Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion on his left
cheek. These medico legal findings are consistent with Godofredo' s claim that the petitioner hit him
and inflicted physical injuries.

In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
slight physical injuries, as the lower courts found. His claim of self-defense fails for lack of supporting
evidence; he failed to present any evidence of unlawful aggression and cannot thus be said to have
hit Godofredo as a measure to defend himself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the decision dated October
23, 2009 and the resolution dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31532.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 37 of 165

G.R. No. 207098 July 8, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NONIETO GERSAMIO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this present appeal is the Decision1 dated 25 April 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR. HC-CR No. 00906 affirming the Decision2 dated 14 January 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 29 of Toledo City, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. TCS-4609, finding Nonieto Gersamio
(herein appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA,3 but,
deleting the portion ordering the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support the child of AAA.

Two (2) separate informations were filed against the appellant charging him with rape committed in
1999 and on 28 August 2002 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. TCS-4608 and TCS-4609,
respectively. The appellant was later acquitted in Criminal Case No. TCS-4608 per the
abovementioned RTC Decision dated 14 January 2008 for prosecution’s failure to specify with
certainty the exact month in 1999 when the offense was committed.4 Thus, only Criminal Case No.
TCS-4609 is the subject of this instant appeal.

The Information docketed as Criminal Case No. TCS-4609 subject of this appeal reads:

That on the 28th day of August 2002, at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, at
Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [herein appellant], with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, violence and intimidation and having carnal knowledge
with the complainant [AAA], 15 years old, a minor, at the time of the incident against her
will.5 (Emphasis supplied.)

On arraignment, the appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged.6 After the pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA, the victim herself; BBB, the grandmother of AAA;
and Dr. Shiela Faciol (Dr. Faciol), Medical Health Officer of Pinamungajan, Cebu, who conducted
the medical examination on AAA.

The prosecution’s evidence was engaged in the establishment of the following facts:

AAA’s first sexual ordeal at the hands of the appellant happened sometime in 1999, when she was
only 13 years old, having been born on 11 April 1986.7 It was repeated for several times thereafter.
The last incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002. On the said date, at around 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, while AAA was about to enter their house, the appellant, who was then hiding behind a
coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her towards the back of their house - a banana
plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry as the appellant pointed a knife at her neck. The
appellant also put a handkerchief over her mouth and told her not to say a word. At the banana
plantation, the appellant commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted, prompting the former to kick
the latter in her thigh. When AAA was already lying on the ground, the appellant removed her tshirt,
short pants and underwear. The appellant also threatened to kill AAA. Defenseless, AAA simply
 Page 38 of 165

cried. The appellant then lay on top of AAA and began kissing her on her cheeks and later on her
lips. After a short while, the appellant, who was no longer wearing any shirt, pulled down his shorts
and brief with his right hand while his left hand was still holding the knife. Thereafter, the appellant
held his penis, inserted it inside AAA’s vagina and made push and pull movements. AAA felt pain
and cried. After satiating his lust, the appellant immediately stood up, kicked AAA on her thigh and
instructed her to wear her panty and short pants. The appellant likewise wore his brief and short
pants. Before leaving, the appellant warned AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone what
happened between them.8

Out of fear for her life, AAA suffered in silence. She never told anyone about the dreadful acts done
to her by the appellant. However, on 2 September 2002, AAA’s grandmother, BBB, discovered her
pregnancy because of the changes in her physical appearance. When asked about the father of her
child, it was then that AAA disclosed to BBB her harrowing experiences at the hands of the
appellant, which began in 1999 when she was only 13 years old, the last of which was on 28 August
2002. Such sexual advances by the appellant resulted in her pregnancy.9 At once, BBB went to the
house of the appellant and confronted him regarding what he did to AAA. Nonetheless, in order to
save AAA and their whole family from shame as the appellant is AAA’s uncle, being the first cousin
of AAA’s mother, BBB would just like to keep the matter among themselves and merely asked the
appellant to acknowledge and support the child of AAA. The appellant, however, denied the
accusation and he even got mad at BBB. Leaving with no other choice, AAA, accompanied by BBB,
sought the assistance of their barangay Captain and they told the former the whole incident. The
Barangay Captain then advised them to have a medical examination, which they did.10

Dr. Faciol, who conducted the physical examination on AAA, found that (1) AAA was already five
and a half months pregnant; (2) no contusion or laceration on AAA’s sex organ;11 and (3) AAA’s
hymen is not intact anymore. Dr. Faciol likewise stated that AAA told her that she was last rape by
her perpetrator about a year ago, i.e., 28 August 2002, and she was so scared at that time because
the perpetrator had a knife. Dr. Faciol also clarified that after 8 to 10 days from the time the victim
was raped, there would no longer be any indication or manifestation of rape on the victim’s vagina.
Thus, she could no longer determine if the penetration was forceful. Even so, Dr. Faciol declared
that her aforesaid findings did not exclude the possibility of rape.12 AAA and BBB subsequently
proceeded to the police station, submitted the result of the medical examination and narrated the
whole incident of rape committed by the appellant against AAA.13

For its part, the defense presented the appellant and his mother, Dominga Gersamio, whose
testimonies consist of sheer denials and alibi. Their version of the case is as follows:

The appellant vehemently denied that he raped AAA. He maintained that from 1999 until 2002 he
was in Cebu City working as a driver of a public utility jeepney (PUJ) and that he only went home to
Pinamungajan, Cebu, every Saturday afternoon. While working as a jeepney driver, he stayed at the
shop of his brother in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. From 1999 up to 2000, he had a girlfriend, who isa
teacher previously assigned in Consolatrix Academy. He admitted having known AAA, being the
granddaughter of her mother’s older sister. He claimed that on 22 September 2002, her mother
informed him that he was being accused of raping AAA. He got angry as it was not true and he
never had any sexual relationship with AAA. On the same day, to their surprise, AAA and BBB went
to their house asking him to support AAA’s child. But, he refused. He stated that prior to the filing of
this case, his family and that of AAA were still in good terms even though they had a previous
misunderstanding regarding a video cd allegedly stolen by AAA. He is also willing to submit himself
to DNA testing to determine the paternity of AAA’s child but he has no money to spend for it.14

Dominga Gersamio corroborated the appellant’s testimony that AAA and BBB went to their house
asking the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support the child AAA was carrying in her
 Page 39 of 165

womb. But, the appellant refused and got angry, as he is not the father of AAA’s child. AAA and BBB
then went home and, thereafter, charged the appellant with rape.15

After both parties presented their evidence, the trial court rendered its Decision dated 14 January
2008 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, thereby, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court similarly ordered the appellant to (1)
pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; (2) acknowledge or recognize AAA’s offspring resulting
from the rape; and (3) support AAA’s child in the event his means improves after serving his
sentence.16

The appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s 14 January 2008 Decision was denied
for lack of merit in the Order17 dated 5 May 2008.

On appeal,18 the Court of Appeals, in its now assailed Decision dated 25 April 2012, affirmed the
guilty verdict and the sentence imposed by the trial court. It deleted, however, the portion ordering
the appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child, as the issue of whether the child
is of the appellant is yet to be resolved in a full-blown trial.19

Hence, the instant recourse20 alleging that the Court of Appeals fatally erred in affirming the
appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. TCS-4609 despite the inherent weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence to support the verdict.21

The appellant argues that AAA is not a credible witness and her testimony is also not credible being
replete with several material inconsistencies, contradictions and improbabilities. Firstly, AAA claims
that the 28 August 2002 rape incident was the proximate cause of her pregnancy but it was belied by
the result of her own medical examination conducted in September 2002 confirming that she was
already five and a half months pregnant at that time. To explain this inconsistency, AAA asserts that
the appellant started raping her when she was still 13 years old until she became pregnant but
nothing on record substantiates this claim of repeated prior rape incidents. Secondly, AAA’s
behavior negates her claim of rape. Assuming the appellant with the use of force or threat had
repeatedly raped her, there seemed to be no signs that she suffered trauma as a consequence
thereof, or at least a change in behavior. Moreover, even if the rape was perpetrated by means of
threat, such threat was not imminent as the appellant was not always around her. Yet, AAA never
reported to her grandmother or uncle or teacher that the appellant had repeatedly raped her until her
grandmother noticed the physical changes in her body. Thirdly, while AAA cries repeated rape, this
was not the reason why she charged the appellant with that crime but the latter’s refusal to
acknowledge paternity and to support the child she was carrying in her womb. Ill motive can
therefore be attributed to AAA in filing the case against the appellant, which ill motive was
corroborated by the very own testimony of BBB.22 The appellant further contends that Dr. Faciol is
not an expert witness in the field of rape cases and physical examination of child abuse. Thus, her
opinion on the matter has no probative value at all. Even the medico-legal report she made is
incompetent to prove the 28 August 2002 rape incident. Based on the record, AAA’s physical
examination was conducted eight days after the 28 August 2002 rape incident, however, the medico-
legal report of Dr. Faciol did not indicate any trauma on AAA’s genitalia nor any healed lacerations
on the labia majora, labia minora, vaginal canal and/or fourchette. In other words, both Dr. Faciol’s
testimony and her medical findings could not prove the charge of rape against him.23

With all the foregoing, the appellant claims that since his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, he must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged.

This Court believes otherwise.

 Page 40 of 165

Noticeably, the appellant’s arguments primarily hinge on the issue of AAA’s credibility. Settled is the
rule that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is concerned, this Court adheres to these
jurisprudentially established guidelines: (1) it gives the highest respect to the trial court’s evaluation
of the testimony of the witnesses because of its unique position in directly observing the demeanor
of a witness on the stand, and from its vantage point, is also in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses; (2) in the absence of any substantial reason that would justify the reversal
of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower
court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of
the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded; and (3) the rule is even more
stringently applied if the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court.24

A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to overturn the findings of both
lower courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility and that, indeed, the appellant raped her and his guilt
was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

It is evident in the transcript of stenographic notes that AAA’s testimony, in contrast to the claim of
the appellant, was clear, credible, convincing and worthy of belief. Her narration of how she was
sexually abused by the appellant on that fateful afternoon of 28 August 2002 was given in a
categorical and straightforward manner. She unwaveringly described to the trial court how the
appellant raped her. She recounted in detail that while she was about to enter their house, the
appellant, who was hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her to the back of
their house - a banana plantation. With a knife pointed at her neck, she could not do anything but
cry. The appellant also put a handkerchief over her mouth and told her not to say a word. At the
banana plantation, the appellant commanded her to lie down. Though she resisted, the appellant
overpowered her. While lying on the ground, the appellant removed her tshirt, short pants and
underwear. The appellant also threatened to kill her. Defenseless, she simply cried. The appellant
then lay on top of her and began kissing her on her cheeks and then on her lips. After a short while,
the appellant, who was no longer wearing any shirt, pulled down his shorts and brief with his right
hand while his left hand was still holding the knife. Thereafter, the appellant held his penis, inserted it
inside her vagina and made push and pull movements. She felt pain and cried. After satiating his
lust, the appellant immediately stood up, kicked her on her thigh and instructed her to wear her panty
and short pants. The appellant likewise wore his brief and short pants. Before leaving, the appellant
warned her that he would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between them.25

AAA’s trustworthy account proved all the elements of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act
was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age.26 The appellant in this case had
sexual intercourse with AAA, which he accomplished through force, that is, with the use of a knife he
threatened to kill AAA to make her succumb to his bestiality. Indubitably, the appellant committed the
crime of rape against AAA.

Regarding the alleged inconsistencies, improbabilities and contradictions in AAA’s testimony pointed
out by the appellant, this Court finds them all inconsequential as they refer to trivial matters that have
nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of rape, that is, carnal knowledge through
force or intimidation. Further, discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness
referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not
impair her credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not coached or rehearsed.27

Here, even though the result of AAA’s physical examination conducted in September 2002 showed
that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not necessarily follow that
the appellant could not have authored the 28 August 2002 rape against her. Contrary to appellant’s
 Page 41 of 165

view, AAA’s pregnancy is immaterial to the issue since pregnancy is not an essential element of the
crime of rape. So, whether the child whom the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by
some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was
testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. As long as the elements of rape are present and proven
by the prosecution, the accused could be adjudged guilty thereof notwithstanding the attendance of
other matters that are completely irrelevant to the crime.28

The appellant’s assertion that AAA’s behavior belies her claim that she was raped, as there seemed
to be no signs that she suffered trauma as a consequence thereof, or at least a change in behavior,
is futile. Victims of a heinous crime, such as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in
accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to
an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in
an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under
emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among
victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with different circumstances.29

As to AAA’s delay in reporting the rape incident until BBB noticed the changes in her physical
appearance, the same can be attributed to her tender age and to the threat made upon her person
by the appellant. Even if the appellant was not always around, the fact that he is her uncle and he
lives nearby is more than enough to cause fear on AAA since he could make good of his threat at
anytime. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, AAA’s failure to report the rape incident is not an
indication of fabricated charges. If she did not become pregnant she would not have revealed the
humiliating, painful experience she suffered in the hands of someone whom she may have regarded
as a father.30 Moreover, this Court in People v. Pareja31 citing People v. Ogarte32 explained why a rape
victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:

The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or
to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not
sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated.
Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape
never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and
pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats to
kill or hurt their victims.33 (Emphasis supplied)

With respect to the appellant’s allegation that AAA and BBB acted with ill motive in filing the rape
case against him as he refused to acknowledge paternity and to support the child AAA was carrying
in her womb, this Court considers it preposterous. As can be gleaned from the testimonies of AAA
and BBB, they tried to settle the matter with the appellant not only because they belong to the same
family, but, more so, to avoid exposing in public the disgraceful thing done to AAA by the appellant.
But, the latter denied the commission of the crime and even got mad at them.

Leaving with no other choice, AAA, together with BBB, sought the assistance of their Barangay
Captain and later filed the case against the appellant. To the mind of this Court, the action taken by
1âwphi1

AAA and BBB after the appellant’s denial of the commission of the crime was not prompted by any ill
motive but by the desire to seek the truth and get justice for the wrong done to AAA. As succinctly
explained by the Court of Appeals, thus:

x x x the filing of the rape charge was done by [AAA] not by mere desire to exact revenge or ill
motive but was driven by the heinousness of the crime and the feeling of degradation and for the
lone purpose of ferreting the truth.
 Page 42 of 165

"Undergoing all of the humiliating and invasive procedures for the case – the initial police
interrogation, the medical examination, the formal charge, the public trial and the cross-examination
– proves to be the litmus test for truth, especially when endured by a minor who gives her consistent
and unwavering testimony on the details of her ordeal."34

Moreover, as this Court has pronounced in Rondina v. People,35 ill motives become inconsequential
if there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the
liability of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically identified the appellant as her ravisher. Her
account of the incident was given credence by both lower courts to which this Court conforms. Thus,
the appellant’s flimsy allegation of ill motive is immaterial. Besides, no woman would concoct a story
of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and
scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the
culprit apprehended and punished.36 This Court equally finds erroneous the appellant’s contentions
that Dr. Faciol is not an expert witness, thus, her testimony cannot be given any probative value and
that both Dr. Faciol’s testimony and her medical findings could not prove the charge of rape against
him. In prosecutions for rape, the testimony of an expert witness is not indispensable for a conviction
for rape. Such is not an element of rape. By declaring that the appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina, the victim said all that was necessary to prove rape. Also, it is well settled that medical
findings of injuries in the victim's genitalia are not essential to convict the appellant of rape. Hymenal
lacerations are not an element of rape. What is essential is that there was penetration, however
slight, of the labia minora, which circumstance was proven beyond doubt in this case by the
testimony of AAA.37 Moreover, Dr. Faciol clarified that after 8 to 10 days from the time the victim was
raped there would no longer be any indication or manifestation of rape on the victim’s vagina.38 This
would precisely explain the lack of any injury on AAA’s genitalia.

Now, in comparison to AAA’s positive and categorical testimony and her positive identification of the
appellant as her rapist, the appellant could only muster denial and alibi as his defenses. As this
Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the
crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony, which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere
denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed
and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.39 In the case at bench, the
appellant miserably failed to prove that he was not at the scene of the crime on 28 August 2002. As
comprehensively discussed by the Court of Appeals:

For one, no sufficient independent evidence was presented to support [the] appellant’s claim that he
was in Cebu City on [28 August 2002], driving a public utility jeepney (PUJ) and that he went home
only on Saturday afternoons, and that after he stopped driving sometime in 2002, he lived in his
brother’s shop located in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City.

As proof of his being a professional driver, he presented his professional driver’s license.

For another, it has been established from the testimony of [AAA] that her house is not far from the
house of the appellant and that she had to pass by [the] appellant’s house before reaching her
house. Based on the foregoing, this court can safely conclude that, due to the proximity of the two
houses to each other, it was not physically impossible for [the] appellant to be at the scene of the
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.
 Page 43 of 165

Still for another, [AAA] could not have made a mistake in identifying the appellant as her rapist, as
the latter not only lived in her neighborhood and is known to her for many years prior to the rape
incidents being her mother’s first cousin.

In the face, therefore, of the positive identification by [AAA], [the] appellant’s self-serving denial and
alibi cannot prevail.40

In light of the foregoing, this Court affirms appellant’s conviction for simple rape.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. The lower courts, therefore, correctly imposed the said penalty.

This Court likewise sustains the award of ₱50,000.00 moral damages by the lower courts. Moral
damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape on the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.41 In addition
thereto, this Court finds it proper to also award ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00
exemplary damages to AAA. Civil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been
committed.42 Exemplary damages are also called for, by way of public example, and to protect the
young from sexual abuse.43 Furthermore, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.44

Finally, this Court similarly affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering the
appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of evidence thereof. In
this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant when she was medically examined in
September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on 28 August 2002 was not the cause of that
pregnancy. Though there were allegations of repeated rape from 1999 up to 28 August 2002, only
two Informations for rape was filed, i.e., the rape incidents in 1999 and on 28 August 2002. And, the
appellant was acquitted for the rape committed in 1999 for prosecution’s failure to specify with
certainty the exact month in 1999 the offense was committed. With these, the appellant cannot be
ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s child.

Needless to say, the foregoing does not affect the earlier findings of this Court on the guilt of the
appellant for the crime of rape committed on 28 August 2002. To repeat, not only is the impregnation
of the rape victim not an element of rape;45 it must also be stressed that AAA stated that the
appellant repeatedly rape her since 1999 until 28 August 2002.46 Although the appellant cannot be
held liable for such alleged rapes, as this case does not cover other incidents of rape prior to 28
August 2002, AAA's testimony on this point provides a possible explanation for her childbirth on 5
January 2003 as her child turned one on 5 January 2004.47 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 25 April 2012 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple rape is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the appellant is further ordered to pay
AAA civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts of 1!50,000.00 and 1!30,000.00,
respectively, plus interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 44 of 165

G.R. No. 215331

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
LUDIGARIO BELEN y MARASIGAN, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision1 dated July 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 05610, affirming the Decision2 dated December 20, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, which convicted Ludigario Belen y Marasigan (appellant) of
two counts of simple rape.

On February 2, 2006, appellant was charged with qualified rape under Article 266-A (1) (a), in
relation to Article 266-B (6) (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
8353 and in further relation to Section 5 (a) of RA 8369 in two separate informations, the accusatory
portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 9563

That sometime in July 1999 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his
moral ascendancy, with intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, through the use of a deadly weapon - a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of AAA,3 an eight (8)-year-old minor, against her will and without
her consent; the crime having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationshipthe
complainant being the daughter of his common-law wife, and minority, thereby raising the said crime
to that of QUALIFIED RAPE, which is aggravated by the circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of the said
victim.

Contrary to Law. 4

Criminal Case No. 9564

That sometime in July 1999 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his
moral ascendancy, with intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, through the use of a deadly weapon - a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of AAA, an eight (8)-year-old minor, against her will and without
her consent; the crime having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationshipthe
complainant being the daughter of his common-law wife, and minority, thereby raising the said crime
to that of QUALIFIED RAPE, which is aggravated by the circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of the said
victim.

Contrary to Law. 5
 Page 45 of 165

Appellant, assisted by counsel, was arraigned6 on April 1 7, 2008 and pleaded not guilty to each
charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

The prosecution presented AAA, Police Senior Inspector Dean C. Cabrera (PSI Cabrera), the
medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and BBB, AAA's
mother.

AAA testified that she was 8 years old in 1999 and that appellant is the husband of her mother but
they were not married; 7 and that they were all then living in Purok I, Buntong Palay, San Mateo
Rizal. 8 At 4 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1999, she was playing outside their house when she was
called by appellant to go inside the house. Once inside, appellant locked the door and poked a knife
at her and ordered her to remove her clothes to which she complied.9 Appellant instructed her to
bend over and he inserted his penis into her vagina. 10 Thereafter, appellant placed himself on top of
her, moving up and down while she was crying. 11 The rape incident happened for about half an hour
in her mother's room. 12

At 7 o'clock in the evening of the second week of July 1999, while her mother was at work and she
was then sitting at home, appellant entered the house and told her to undress to which she complied
as he threatened her not to make noise or tell her mother. 13 Appellant asked her to bend and
inserted his penis into her vagina14 then she was told to lie down and appellant went on top of her
and inserted his penis in her vagina and started moving up and down. The rape incident happened
for about half an hour while she was crying.15 Appellant raped her several times more which only
stopped when her grandmother took her to her uncle's house in Divisoria.16 It was only in 2005, when
confronted by her mother as to the truth that she was raped by appellant, that she had finally told her
that she had been repeatedly sexually molested by appellant. 17 She had never told her mother about
her ordeal before because appellant threatened her. 18

PSI Cabrera testified that he conducted a physical and genital examination on AAA on December 8,
2005 as requested by the Chief of Police of San Mateo, Rizal, 19 and in this connection, he issued a
Medico Legal Report stating that the victim sustained deep-healed laceration of the hymen at 6:00
position.20 He stated that the finding of laceration on the hymen would hardly give any proof to the
number of times that a sexual abuse had taken place. 21

BBB, AAA's mother, testified that appellant is her live-in partner for 10 years,22 and that she was
staying with AAA and appellant in the latter's house in July 1999. On November 11, 2005, AAA told
her that appellant had molested her but kept silent because of appellant's threat that he would kill
them. 23 Her mother took AAA after the latter finished grade 2 and brought her to an uncles' house in
Divisoria.24 AAA was 8 years old and in grade 2 at the time of the rape incidents.25

Appellant denied the charges and claimed that AAA is the daughter of BBB, his live-in partner with
whom he separated in 1999;26 that in 1999, his mother-in-law brought AAA, who was then 7 years
old, to Manila to study, and did not visit her since then; 27 that BBB was masungit, so he left their
house and lived alone in another house; and that BBB got mad when he left her and told him that
she would file a case against him.28 They filed a case against him to get his property. 29

On December 20, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 9563, accused Ludigario Belen y Marasigan is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
 Page 46 of 165

Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the victim the amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

2. In Criminal Case No. 9564, accused Ludigario Belen y Marasigan is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the victim the amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No pronouncement as
to cost.

Accused Ludigario Belen y Marasigan is to be credited for the time spent for his preventive detention
in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 6127 and EO 214.
Accused Ludigario Belen y Marasigan is hereby ordered committed to the National Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinlupa City for service of sentence. 30

The RTC found that AAA gave a detailed recount of her sexual ordeal in a candid and
straightforward manner; that the medico-legal report stating a deep healed laceration at 6 o'clock
position with conclusion that "genital examination reveals remote history of blunt force or penetrating
coma" clearly bolstered AAA's allegation that appellant sexually molested her in her younger years.
The RTC, however, did not find the two rape incidents as qualified rape even if AAA's birth certificate
was marked and offered, since the Local Civil Registrar of San Mateo, Rizal had presented a
certification that it had no record of AAA's birth, thus, failing to prove her minority.

Appellant filed his appeal with the CA. After the Solicitor General filed his Appellee's Brief, the case
was submitted for decision.

On July 11, 2014, the CA rendered its Decision which denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Both parties manifested that they would no longer file supplemental briefs as they had already
exhaustively argued their issues in their respective briefs.31

Appellant argues that the prosecution miserably failed to overthrow the presumption of innocence in
his favor. He contends that the bulk of AAA' s testimony was supplied by the prosecutor who even
made presumptions and legal conclusions even before hearing the evidence. He claims that AAA's
testimony is doubtful as it is inconsistent with the medico-legal report findings of only one laceration
in the victim's hymen.

We affirm the lower court's conviction of appellant for two counts of simple rape.

Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, states the elements of the crime of rape as
follows:

Article 266 -A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

 Page 47 of 165

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.

We have scrutinized the records of this case and are convinced that appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA with threat and intimidation, thus, against her will and without her consent. AAA categorically
declared that in two separate instances, appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina while she
was crying. Her testimony on the first rape incident, to wit:

Q. Where were you sometime in the month of July 1999 around 4:00 in the afternoon which is the
subject of this complaint?

A. I was in our house at Purok I, sir.

Q. What were you doing at that time?

A. I was playing, sir.

Q. You were then, as you said, 8 years old?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at that time who were there in your house?

A. Ludigario Belen, sir.

Q. While you were playing outside your house, what, if any, transpired at around 4:00 in the
afternoon?

A. He called me, sir.

Q. Who called you?

A. Ludigario Belen.

Q. And what did you do after you were called?

A. I approached him, sir.

Q. And what happened next after that?

A. He asked me to go inside the house.

Q. What happened next after that?

A. He locked the door, sir.

Q. And after locking the door of your house, what, if any, did he do if he had done anything?
 Page 48 of 165

A. He told me to remove my clothes, sir.

Q. Did you comply?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you comply?

A. Because he threatened me, sir.

Q. How did he threaten you?

A. He poked a knife at me, sir.

Q. You said that you had undressed, what were you wearing then at that time?

A. Iwas wearing shorts, sir.

Q. And what were your undergarments?

A. Shorts and panty, sir.

Q. What were your upper garments at that time?

A. T-shirt, sir.

Q. You said that you removed your clothes.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Including your undergarments?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After that what transpired next after that?

A. He asked me to bend over, (pinatuwad) sir.

Q. Thereafter, what did he do to you?

A. He removed his shorts, sir.

Q. After he removed his shorts, what did he do ifhe had done anything?

A. That was the time he raped me, sir.

Q. How did he rape you, can you describe what he did to you?

A. He inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.

 Page 49 of 165

Q. After inserting his private part into your private part, what did he do to you?

A. He moved on top of me, sir.

Q. How did he move, can you describe it?

A. In an up and down movement, sir.

Q. When he was doing this, what were you doing?

A. I was just crying, sir.32

As to the second incident of rape, AAA declared:

Q. In the month of July, how many times were you raped?

A. Three times, sir.

Q. More or less, what time of the day would have this occurred, the

second time that you were raped?

A. 7:00 o'clock in the evening.

Q. The first incident in July, you said that it was committed at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon in
1999?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The second time was also at 7:00 o'clock in the month of July?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The second time that this happened to you in the month of July 1999 at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, what were you doing then, if you can remember?

A. I was seated inside our house, sir.

Q. What were you doing then, at that time?

A. None. I was just sitting, sir.

Q. And what did the accused do to you?

A. He called me, sir.

Q. What is the full name of the accused?

A. Ludigario Belen, sir.

 Page 50 of 165

Q. What is his relation to you again?

A. He is my stepfather (tatay-tatayan), sir.

Q. He is not your biological father?

A. No, sir.

Q. So the second time that this happened to you in the year 1999, what did he do while you were
inside your house at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening?

A. Inutusan po nya ako na maghubad ako dahil gagalawin nya ako, sir.

Q. Did you do what you were told to do?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You said that he asked you to remove your clothes, what were you wearing then at that time?

A. Shorts and panty.

Q. After removing it, what if, any, happened next after that?

A. Pinatuwad po nya ako and then he inserted his penis, sir.

Q. Where were you at that time?

A. I was inside the room, sir.

Q. You were on the floor, on what part of the room were you stooping down?

A. Inside the room of my mother, sir.

Q. On the floor or what kind of furniture?

A. On the floor, sir.

Q. After he had done that, what did he do to you?

A. He went on top of me, sir.

Q. When you say "moving" what kind of motion was he doing?

A. He was moving up and down, sir.

Q. At that time, what clothes was he wearing?

A. He removed, sir.
 Page 51 of 165

Q. Madam witness, you said that he went on top of you, after going on top of you, what did he do?

A. No more, he dressed up, sir.

Q. You said that he was moving back and forth, how did he do that?

A. While he was on top of me and he did that sir.

Q. You said that before that, you were asked to stoop down?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then you said that he went on top of you, what did he do to turn you over?

Q. Madam witness, you said that you were first asked to stoop down?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On the floor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then you testified before the Honorable court that he went on top of you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So how did it happen that you were facing him when he went on top of you when you said that he
first asked you to stoop down, that would mean that if you are stooping down, your back was facing
him, not your head facing him?

...

A. After asking me to stoop down, he told me to lie down, that is why I was facing him, sir.

Q. After he had gone on top of you, what did he do, if he had done anything?

A. He mashed my breast, sir.

Q. After doing that, what else did he do?

A. He continued what he was doing, sir.

Q. What was he doing?

A. He was moving on top of me, sir.

Q. While he was doing that, what were you doing?

A. I was crying, sir.

 Page 52 of 165

Q. Why were you crying when you said he was just on top of you.

A. Because he inserted his penis in my vagina and after that he moved sir.

Q. How long did he continue moving on top of you?

A. More than half an hour, sir.

Q. After that you said that he just left you there inside the room?

A. Yes sir and he told me to dress up.33

It was clearly established that the first rape incident was accomplished with the use of a knife which
proved that appellant employed threat in AAA's life. As to the second rape, while there was no force
and intimidation used by appellant on AAA, the fact that appellant is the live-in partner of her mother
and with whom she had been living with since she was 2 years old, established his moral
ascendancy as well as physical superiority over AAA. Appellant's moral ascendancy and influence
over AAA substitutes for threat and intimidation34 which made AAA submit herself to appellant's
bestial desire. It is doctrinally settled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim
renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape committed by a close
kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.35

We agree with the RTC's conclusion that AAA testified in a candid and straightforward manner. The
evaluation of the trial court judge from the viewpoint of having observed the witness on the stand,
coupled by the fact that the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court, is binding on the court unless it
can be shown that facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted which, if
considered, would affect the disposition of the case in a different manner,36 which is not present in
this case.

Appellant argues that most of the details of the alleged rape incidents were elicited from AAA
through leading questions; that a reading of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) showed that
she was consistently led to her answers by the trial prosecutor's questions, hence, it cannot be said
that her testimony was straightforward and a categorical disclosure of the events that transpired.

We find such argument without merit. We quote with approval the CA's disquisition on the matter, to
wit:

A perusal of the AAA's testimony reveals that the prosecution did not proffer leading questions.
Assuming arguendo that the questions are leading, the defense failed to object as soon as the
alleged leading questions were asked. It is too late in the day for appellant to object to the
formulation of the offer and the manner of questioning adopted by the public prosecutor. Appellant
should have interposed his objections in the course of the oral examination of AAA, as soon as the
grounds therefor became reasonably apparent. As it were, he raised not a whimper of protest as the
pub!ic prosecutor recited his offer or propounded questions to AAA. Worse, appellant subjected AAA
to cross-examination on the very matters covered by the questions being objected to; therefore, he
is barred from challenging the propriety thereof or the admissibility of the answers given.37

Appellant contends that while AAA alleged that she was raped many times when she was 8 years
old, however, it was shown by the medico-legal report that she had only one laceration in her hymen
which was at 6 o'clock position and deeply healed; and that there is a possibility that this laceration
 Page 53 of 165

could have been done by any other male person aside from appellant since the actual genital
examination was only done in 2005 when the victim was no longer living with the appellant under the
same roof.

We are not impressed.

In People v. Ferrer,38 we held:

It is settled that laceration is not an element of the crime of rape. The absence of lacerations does
not negate rape. The presence of lacerations in the victim's vagina is not necessary to prove rape;
neither is a broken hymen an essential element of the crime.x x x

xxxx

We accordingly reject accused-appellants arguments which hinge on alleged inconsistencies

between the statements made by the private complainant vis-a-vis the medical examination and
report. The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly held that a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, and no law requires a
medical examination for the successful prosecution thereof. The medical examination of the victim or
the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape as the
testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The
medical examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate is merely corroborative in
character.39

Accordingly, what is crucial is that AAA's testimony meets the test of credibility, which serves as the
basis for appellant's conviction.40 Notably, PSI Cabrera, in his cross examination, had clarified that it
is possible that a person being raped or a hymen, or a vagina being penetrated by a penis would
create a laceration at the same spot just like a lightning hitting on the same spot.41 Therefore, AAA's
straightforward testimony that appellant had raped her twice is not at all negated by a finding of only
one laceration in her hymen.

We have been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims especially in sensitive
cases of rape,42 as no young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her
private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and
scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.43

Appellant denies the charges and imputes ill motive on the part of AAA and her mother. It is well
settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion
that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and
categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of the complainant
and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence.44

Appellant's allegation that AAA and her mother filed the cases against him in order to get his
properties does not inspire belief. For appellant's allegations of ill motive to be credible, he should
substantiate the same by clear and convincing evidence which he failed to do, as he even admitted
that the properties are not yet titled in his name but with the govemment.45 We have ruled that no
mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to
a prosecution for rape if she was not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person
responsible for her child's defilement. 46 We find that AAA and her mother are not impelled by any
improper motive in filing rape charges against appellant but to obtain justice for what AAA had
suffered in the hands of appellant.
 Page 54 of 165

We agree with the RTC as affirmed by the CA that appellant is guilty of two counts of simple rape
only and not of qualified rape as charged. Rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.47 Well-settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the
Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. 48 The informations alleged that
AAA is eight years old and appellant is the common law husband of AAA's mother. The relationship
of AAA with appellant was admitted by the latter but AAA's age was not sufficiently proved during
trial. The victim's minority must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.49

We held in People v. Pruna50 that:

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is so-ught to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims
mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In this case, the prosecution presented a copy of AAA's birth certificate but the same was not
authenticated, hence, could not be given any probative value. While attached to the records is
1âwphi1

AAA's baptismal certificate51 which showed that she was born on July 27, 1991, which the defense
admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original, however, the same was not offered in evidence.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence
 Page 55 of 165

which has not been formally offered and that the purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. Furthermore, while BBB testified that her daughter was 8 years old at the time of the rape
incidents, she admitted that she did not know when AAA was born, hence, her testimony as to AAA's
age could not be considered as sufficient compliance with paragraph no. 3 of the guidelines in the
Pruna case.

While in People v. Balo,52 we had appreciated pieces of evidence and circumstances which were
actually established by the prosecution in determining the age of the victim, to wit:

In the case at bar, several documents were presented in court indicating the very young age of the
victim; first, while assisted by her grandmother, AAA stated in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that she
was five (5) years of age; second, the Request for Genital Exam indicated that AAA was five (5)
years old; third, the Sexual Crime (Protocol) Form stated that the age of AAA was five (5) years old;
fourth, the Initial Medico-Legal Report showed that AAA was five (5) years of age; fifih, Medico-Legal
Report No. R07-757 reflected that AAA was five (5) years old; sixth, the personal circumstances of
the victim when she testified on June 24, 2008 stated that AAA was five (5) years old and she
likewise answered that she was five (5) years old when asked about her age; and seventh, the
accused failed to controvert that AAA was four (4) years old at the time the crime was committed
when the court inquired about it while he was testifying.

In this particular case, these pieces of evidence, together with the physical appearance of the victim
when she testified, would have been sufficient basis for !he lower court to ascertain the tender age of
the victim when the crime was committed. Furthermore, the Medico-Legal Report prepared by Police
S/Insp. Dr. Ebdane, a government physician who took an oath as a civil service official, means that
she is competent to examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the
government. As such, the Medico-Legal Report carries the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her functions and duties. As regards the other documents, under Section 44,45 Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. To be sure, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, law enforcement agencies of the government similarly enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their official functions. Verily, if baptismal certificates or school records are
allowed to be presented in court to establish the age of the victim in the absence of a birth certificate,
with more reason should Medico-Legal Reports and comparable documents be allowed to ascertain
such circumstance in similar cases.

Consequently, notwithstanding the fact that AAA's original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or school records, were never presented by the prosecution, the Court agrees with the
lower court and the appellate court that AAA's minority was duly established by the evidence on
record.

We, however, find those pieces of evidence wanting in this case. AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay was
executed when she was already 14 years old and thus, the initial medico-legal report also showed
that she was 14 years old when she was examined. Hence, AAA's allegation that she was 8 years
old when she was raped was not proved by these documents.

Article 266-B of RA 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, states that whenever rape
is committed through force, threat or intimidation, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. However,
whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, such as a knife in this case, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In the first incident of rape, it was committed with the
use of a knife which is a deadly weapon, thus the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code states that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no
 Page 56 of 165

aggravating nor any mitigating circumstance had been proved, We find that the RTC correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. As to the second rape incident, since the moral
ascendancy of appellant over AAA took the form of threat and intimidation on her, the RTC likewise
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant.

We, however, modify the damages awarded by the RTC in the two rape cases pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Ireneo Jugueta. 53 The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should
all be increased to P75,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this decision until
fully paid. 54

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 11, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05610 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should all be increased to P75,000.00 for each
count of rape. The monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 57 of 165

G.R. Nos. 143435-36 November 28, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ALEX FLORES y LOPEZ, appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95,
convicting appellant Alex Flores y Lopez of attempted murder in Criminal Case No. Q-99-84269 and
consummated murder in Criminal Case No. Q-99-84270 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in the latter case.

The Indictments

The appellant was charged with attempted murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about the 7th day of June 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent
to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of murder
directly by overt acts by then and there stabbing one GERY QUEZON y BUO with a fan knife, but
the said accused was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
murder as a consequence by reason of some causes, other than by his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, said GERY QUEZON y BUO was able to parry the thrust, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

He was charged of murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 7th day of June 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent
to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of SONY QUEZON y BUO, by then and there stabbing the victim with a fan knife, hitting
him on the chest, while said victim was sleeping, thereby inflicting upon said SONY QUEZON y BUO
serious mortal wound, which was the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

The appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1999, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty.

As synthesized by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution is as follows:

The prosecution presented Dr. Tomas Suguitan, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy
on the body of the victim of the murder case, Sony Quezon y Buo; Gery Quezon y Buo, the
prosecution’s eyewitness; PO2 Marlon Rivera, the police investigator; Dr. Aida Ico, the medico-legal
 Page 58 of 165

officer who treated the victim in the attempted murder case, Gery Quezon y Buo; and S/G Rotelo
Miro, the security guard of Baliwag Bus Terminal, whose testimonies may be summed as follows:

On June 7, 1999 at 4:00 in the morning, inside the construction site at Annapolis Street, Cubao,
Quezon City, Gery Quezon, the victim in the attempted murder case (Crim. Case No. Q-99-84269)
and his brother, Sony Quezon, the victim in the murder case (Crim. Case No. Q-99-84270) were
sleeping when the accused, Alex Flores, a co-worker of the victims, who slept on the upper portion
of the building being constructed, suddenly stabbed the chest of Sony Quezon who was lying on the
floor. Thereafter, Gery Quezon, who was sleeping near his brother Sony Quezon heard his brother
shouting "Putang ina mo" that awakened him. Before Gery Quezon could help his brother, the
accused suddenly stabbed Gery Quezon twice with a batangas knife which the latter was able to
parry. The two (2) stabbing thrusts, however, caused injuries on Gery’s hands. Thereafter, the
accused, Alex Flores, ran while the two brothers, Sony and Gery, gave chase. The two (2) brothers,
Gery and Sony, however, failed to catch up with the accused as the latter was running very fast and
Sony Quezon suddenly stumbled on the pavement. When Gery Quezon saw his brother stumbling
on the pavement, Gery Quezon carried and boarded him to the hospital. At the hospital, Gery
Quezon was treated as may be shown from the Medical Certificate (Exhs. "F" to "F-2"), while Sony
Quezon was declared dead on arrival. As a result of the incident, Gery Quezon executed a Sworn
Statement (Exhs. "G" to "G-2") detailing as to how the stabbing incident took place.

In the meantime, the accused Alex Flores, who ran away from the construction site, was seen in the
vicinity of the Baliwag Transit not far from the place of the incident by a tricycle driver who called the
attention of security guard, Rotelo Miro, from the bus station. Alex Flores was immediately
apprehended by the said security guard. The accused was turned over to the police station for
further investigation. Security guard Rotelo Miro later on gave his sworn statement (Exhs. "J" & "J-
1") to the police investigator.

Meanwhile, police investigators led by PO2 Marlon Rivera, respondent to the crime scene and found
within the vicinity of the place of the incident a balisong or lanseta which the police officer turned
over to the Crime Laboratory Services to determine the presence of human blood as evidenced by
the Letter-Referral addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory Services (Exhs. "I" to "I-2").

The body of Sony Quezon was then referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory for autopsy as seen in the
Letter-Request dated June 7, 1999 (Exhs. "A" & "A-1") and in connection therewith, Gery Quezon,
brother of Sony Quezon, executed a Certificate of Identification and Consent for Autopsy (Exhs. "B"
& "B-1").

Dr. Tomas Suguitan, medico-legal officer, then conducted an autopsy on the body of Sony Quezon
and placed in writing his findings in Medico-Legal Report No. M-0512-99 (Exhs. "C" to "C-4"), the
pertinent findings of which state as follows:

...

1. Abrasion, frontal region, measuring 0.5 x 0.2 cm., 6.5 cms. right of the anterior midline.

2. Stab wound, left mammary region, measuring 1.7 x 0.7 cm., 1.5 cms. from the anterior
midline, 8 cms. deep, 119 cms. from the heel, directed posteriorwards, upwards and
medialwards, fracturing the sternum at the level of the 3rd rib, piercing the pericardial sac
and the ascending aorta.

...
 Page 59 of 165

Aside from the Medico-Legal Report, Dr. Suguitan likewise prepared a human sketch detailing the
locations of the wounds (Exhs. "D" to "D-2") sustained by the victim. Finally, he prepared a
Certificate of Death (Exhs. "E" to "E-3") of Sony Quezon which he signed at the dorsal portion.

Dr. Suguitan gave the expert opinion that the victim died because of the stab wound on the chest
(Exhs. "D" to "D-2") as it penetrated the aorta, a big blood vessel which connected directly to the
heart, and the stab wound was caused by a bladed instrument. He further testified that the abrasions
might have been caused by a direct contact of the skin with a rough surface and are consistent with
falling to the ground.

Gery Quezon, the eyewitness and the victim of the attempted murder case, was himself treated at
the East Avenue Medical Center for his wounds by Dr. Aida Ico which medico-legal findings are
embodied in the Medico-Legal Certificate issued on June 7, 1999 (Exhs. "F" to F-2"), the pertinent
portion of which are hereby quoted as follows:

...

1. laceration dorsum, L wrist (4 cms.)

2. laceration web bet. thumb & index finger L (4 cms.).

After the investigation of the case and the pieces of evidence already collated, P/Insp. Timoteo
Gascon Pacleb made a Letter-Referral (Exhs. "H" to"H-2") addressed to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for the conduct of inquest proceedings.4

The trial court summarized the evidence of the appellant, thus:

On June 6, 1999 at about 11:00 in the evening, the accused was having a drinking session with
Gery, the victim in the attempted murder case, and a certain Rick inside the construction site at
Annapolis Street, Cubao, Quezon City. Gery and Rick had a heated argument regarding the liquor
that they were drinking. Because there was so much noise, he called Gery’s attention and
demanded him to be quiet which irritated Gery. Thereafter, he went to the upper floor on the left side
while Gery and Rick were left behind. At 4:00 in the morning of the following day, while he was going
down near the door, Gery hit him with a piece of wood. After he was hit, he turned around and
picked up a piece of wood and both he and Gery were struggling for the possession of a piece of
wood. During the struggle, the fan knife of Gery Quezon fell from Gery’s waist to the ground which
he picked up. While Gery was attacking him, he saw Gery’s brother armed with a piece of wood and
at that point, the two Quezon brothers hit him with pieces of wood and in defense of himself, the
knife he picked up was used by him to repel and prevent the attack of the two (2) brothers which
unfortunately hit the chest of Sony Quezon. Thereafter, he ran away and proceeded to the Baliwag
Bus Terminal to surrender to the police authorities. Thereat, he was arrested by the security guard
and was later brought to the hospital for treatment of the wounds he sustained as shown in the
Medico-Legal Certificate dated June 7, 1999 (Exhs. "1" & "1-A" issued by Dr. Enouel Steve C.
Battung of the East Avenue Medical Center, which is quoted as follows:

...

"Laceration, 2 cms. (L) zygomatic area."

...
 Page 60 of 165

Aside from the medico-legal certificate, the doctor likewise prepared a diagram (Exhs. "2" to "2-C")
indicating the location of the wound.5

The trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of the crimes charged, the decretal portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:

1. In Crim. Case No. Q-99-84269, the Court finds the accused, Alex Flores y Lopez, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder and, there being one mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender (par. 7, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code), is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional minimum, as the minimum penalty, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as the maximum penalty; and

2. In Crim. Case No. Q-99-84270, the Court finds the accused, Alex Flores y Lopez, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in and penalized by Article 248,
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and, there being one mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender (par. 7, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code), is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Sony Quezon y Buo, the amount of
₱50,000.00, as death indemnity. The Court cannot award actual or compensatory and moral
damages as the prosecution offered none in the recovery of the same.

IT IS SO ORDERED.6

The appellant appealed the decision of the RTC contending that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty despite the manifest inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witness Gery Quezon; and
in rejecting his plea of self-defense.

The appellant asserts that it was impossible for him to have stabbed Gery Quezon, as he was lying
on top of the table and Sony Quezon was between them. He could not have stabbed Gery Quezon
on the left portion of the chest, because the appellant was on the latter’s right side. Thus, Gery
Quezon could not have parried the appellant’s thrusts, considering that the deceased Sony Quezon
had been stabbed on the chest and was bleeding profusely. It is incredible that he managed to give
chase to the appellant as he fled from the situs criminis.

The appeal is partially meritorious.

Like alibi, self-defense is a weak defense. It is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.7 It is a time-
worn excuse resorted to by assailants.8 If the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence
is shifted on him, to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the following
essential elements: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence, because having admitted the killing, the testimony of the witnesses of the
prosecution can no longer be disbelieved.9

Whether the accused acted in self-defense, complete or incomplete, is a question of fact best
addressed to the trial court.10 The consistent ruling of this Court is that the findings of facts of the trial
 Page 61 of 165

court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties and its assessment of the probative
weight of the evidence on record, as well as its conclusions on its findings are accorded high respect
if not conclusive effect. This is because of the trial court’s opportunity to observe and monitor at
close range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of witnesses as they testify. This rule, however,
is inapplicable where the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of the case.11 The Court
scrutinized the records of the case and we find no reason to deviate from the trial court’s finding that
the appellant failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense when
he stabbed the victims.

First. After stabbing the victims, the appellant fled from the situs criminis to the Baliwag Transit
Terminal where the policemen arrested him. The appellant threw the knife he used to stab the
victims towards the direction of the gate of the building under construction.12 He did not proceed to
the police station to surrender to the police authorities and report that he stabbed the victims in self-
defense. The appellant’s flight from the situs criminis and his failure to surrender himself and the
knife he used to kill the victims belie his plea of self-defense.13

Second. When the policemen arrived at the situs criminis, they found the fan knife used by the
appellant in stabbing the victim. They did not find any pieces of wood.14

Third. The appellant contradicted himself when he testified that Sony Quezon hit him on the left
cheek with a piece of wood,15 as he earlier testified that it was Gery Quezon who hit him on the
cheek.16 He later changed his testimony when he stated that Sony Quezon hit him on the
back,17 adding that Gery Quezon also hit him on the left shoulder.18 But the medical certificate the
appellant adduced in evidence shows that he only sustained a wound on the left cheek.19 There is no
showing that he sustained any injuries on his head, back and shoulder.

Fourth. The appellant testified that as he and Gery Quezon were hitting each other with the pieces of
wood they were each armed with, Gery’s fan knife fell and the latter forthwith picked it up:

Q And what happened to you after you were hit with a piece of wood?

A I turned around and picked up the piece of wood.

Q What part of the body were you hit when you (sic) first hit by Gery?

A My back. (Witness pointing to his back at the left portion of his shoulder.)

Q What happened next after you were able to get a piece of wood?

A We hit each other with a piece of wood that we were holding.

Q After that, what happened next?

A While we were hitting with (sic) each other with the piece of wood, his fan knife fell.

Q After that, what happened next?

A He picked it up.

Q After picking it up, what happened next?

 Page 62 of 165

A The two brothers helping (sic) each other in hitting me.20

On cross-examination, the appellant asserted that when he hit the body of Gery Quezon with a piece
of wood, the fan knife fell from the latter’s waist. After Sony Quezon hit him with a piece of wood on
the cheek, the appellant then picked up the knife and stabbed Sony Quezon with it, thus:

Q (sic) The quarrel between Gery and I came ahead and we hit each other with a piece of wood,
Your Honor, and after I hit him with a piece of wood on his arm, a knife fell to the ground and his
brother Sony approached me and hit me on the check. I picked up the knife and I stabbed Sony on
the chest.

Q So when you were hit and you picked up the knife, where was Sony Quezon in relation to you?

A He was seated on the chair inside the place where we were quarreling with his brother, Your
Honor.

Q So, what was the position of Sony Quezon when you stabbed him?

A He was seated, Your Honor.

Q Are you sure he was seated?

A He was already standing when I stabbed him, Your Honor.

Q I will ask you again. When he hit you with a piece of wood on the left cheek, you fell?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And then you picked up the knife?

A Yes, Your Honor.21

The appellant also testified that while he was picking up the fan knife, Sony Quezon hit him on the
back with a piece of wood. The appellant then stabbed Sony Quezon on the cheek and fled to the
Baliwag Transit Terminal.

Fifth. The appellant’s laceration on the left cheek is not conclusive proof that Gery Quezon and his
brother Sony Quezon were the unlawful aggressors and that the appellant acted in self-defense. We
agree with the ratiocinations of the trial court, thus:

The court does not likewise believe the asseverations of the accused that the brothers Quezon hit
him with pieces of wood several times before the accused stabbed Sony and Gery Quezon. For, if
this were so, the accused could have suffered hematoma or contusion or at least an injury brought
about by the use of a piece of wood. Albeit the accused tried to corroborate his claim of being hit by
pieces of wood, he could only show a lacerated wound on the cheekbone which is not even a fatal
wound. The lacerated wound could not even be considered a conclusive evidence that it was caused
by a piece of wood as the wound could have been caused by the knife during the scuffle between
the accused and Gery Quezon that ensued after the accused made two (2) stabbing thrusts on Gery
Quezon. Notably, it is the evidence of the prosecution that is credible, consistent, and in accord with
the physical evidence. Gery Quezon categorically and candidly testified that it was a knife that was
used by the accused in inflicting a single stab wound on Sony Quezon’s chest while he was
 Page 63 of 165

sleeping. The medico-legal findings clearly show that a single penetrating stab wound with a
trajectory of posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards at the chest with the use of a knife had
caused the death of the victim. Gery Quezon likewise testified that he sustained stab wounds on his
hands which he used in parrying the stabbing thrusts of the accused. Said claim is strongly
supported by the medico-legal findings to the effect that Gery Quezon’s hands sustained stab
wounds. Physical evidence is mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates high in the
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence (People vs. Nepomuceno, 298 SCRA 450).22

The Crimes Committed by the Appellant

The trial court erred in appreciating treachery against the appellant. The Court has ruled that to
prove treachery, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused made some
preparations to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the consummation of the crime or to
make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself. A killing at the spur of the
moment is not treacherous.23 Treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused when the witness
did not see the commencement of the assault.24 Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the
aggression commenced, treachery cannot be considered.25

In this case, Gery Quezon admitted that he did not see the appellant stab his brother. He testified
that when he woke up, the appellant had already stabbed Sony Quezon. The appellant then
proceeded to stab him as he awoke:

COURT: (to the Witness)

Q So, why do you say that he was stabbed once?

A Because I heard him shouting once and after I heard him shouting once, that was the time that I
woke up, Your Honor.

Q But by the time that you woke up, your brother was already stabbed?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And that you did not actually see your brother being stabbed once as you have claimed a while
ago?

A Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. STA. ANA: (to the Witness)

Q And when you woke up, according to you, the accused stabbed you?

A Yes, sir, when I woke up he also stabbed me.

Q What was your position when Alex Flores stabbed you?

A I was lying on top of the table with my two hands placed behind my head, sir.

Q How come that you were able to parry the thrust of Alex Flores when both of your hands were
pinned by your head?
 Page 64 of 165

A When I was awakened, I saw Alex Flores making thrust at me and in the nick of time, I was able to
parry his thrust, sir.

PROS : (to the Court)

May we request that the vernacular be placed on record "sinangga ko ang saksak niya."

COURT: Granted.26

All told then, the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of homicide in Criminal Case No.
99-84270 and attempted homicide in Criminal Case No. 99-84269.

The Proper Penalties for the Crimes

Committed by the Appellant

The trial court erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the
appellant. To be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same must be
1âwphi 1

shown to have been spontaneous and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or
he wishes to save them the trouble and expense that will be incurred in his search and capture.27 In
this case, the appellant fled to the Baliwag Transit terminal after stabbing the victims. He was
preparing to board a bus when the police authorities arrived and arrested him. The appellant is, thus,
not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. The imposable penalty for attempted homicide under Article 249 in relation to
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional which has a range of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide,
the appellant may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years and six (6) months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. For the felony of attempted homicide, the appellant may be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period
to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period, as
maximum.

Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

for the Two Felonies

In Criminal Case No. 99-84269, the Court did not award any moral damages to the victim Gery
Quezon. But according to Article 2219, paragraph 2 of the New Civil Code, the victim is entitled to
moral damages in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Victim Gery Quezon testified on
his injuries and the physical suffering and anxiety he felt from his wounds. Considering the nature of
his injuries, he is entitled to moral damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 99-
84270, the trial court did not award actual damages for failure of the prosecution to prove the same.
Nevertheless, the heirs of the victim, Sony Quezon, are entitled to temperate damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00.28

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 95, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
 Page 65 of 165

In Criminal Case No. 99-84269, the appellant is convicted of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code and there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony, is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of prison mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years and six (6) months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. The appellant is directed to pay to the heirs of the victim Sony Quezon
the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

In Criminal Case No. 99-84270, the appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
homicide under Article 249 in relation to Article 6, last paragraph, of the Revised Penal Code, and
there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony, is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from five (5) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium
period, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, in its
medium period, as maximum.

The appellant is ordered to pay to the victim Gery Quezon the amount of ₱10,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 66 of 165

G.R. No. L-18746 January 31, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
FREDERICK G. WEBER accused,
FIELDMEN'S INSURANCE CO., INC., bondsman-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Cabello, Bendijo & Fajardo for bondsman-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This appeal (concerning confiscation of a bond filed in a criminal case) was certified to Us by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 21 July 1961, in CA-G.R. No. 01323-CR, as it involves purely
questions of law.

Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., posted a bond of P3,500.00 for the provisional liberty of Frederick G.
Weber, a German alien accused of "Falsification of Public or Official Document", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 49099 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, in an information dated 17 July
1959. Hon. Judge Jesus Y. Perez, presiding over Branch III, set the arraignment of the accused on 3
February 1960. Since the accused did not appear on that day, the court on the same day issued an
order as follows:

On motion of counsel for the accused Frederick G. Weber on the ground that said accused is
still weak and cannot come to court as attested to by the verified Medical certificate issued
by Dr. Pedro R. Arenas, let the arraignment of the accused set for today be postponed to
February 27, 1960, at 8:00 o'clock in the morning.

The Chief Medical Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation is hereby ordered to
conduct a medical examination of the accused Frederick G. Weber, who resides at 1675
Santiago Street, Paco, Manila, to determine whether said accused is in a physical condition
to appear before this court for arraignment and to submit his report of said examination as
soon as possible.

Let a copy of this order be furnished the Chief Medical Officer of the NBI.

In compliance with this order, Dr. Rosalino V. Reyes, Chief Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, examined the accused personally on 4 February 1960, and filed a 3-page
report to the court, dated 15 February 1960. In his report, Dr. Reyes said in part that the accused "is
one who is prone to the extent of feigning or pretending to be physically weak by all means to justify
his failure to appear in court in a previously set date," and recommended that the accused be placed
in a suitable institution under a competent government neurologist for observation and examination.

On 27 February 1960, accused again failed to appear for arraignment, and his counsel asked for a
postponement of the arraignment, claiming that the accused had a nervous breakdown. In view
thereof, the court a quo forthwith issued an order —

... that herein accused Frederick G. Weber be confined in the National Mental Hospital for
examination and observation as to his mental state to determine whether or not he is in a
condition to appear for arraignment in this case. Should said accused fail to submit himself
for confinement in the National Mental Hospital within one (1) week after receipt of copy of
 Page 67 of 165

this order, let the corresponding warrant for the arrest of said accused issue forthwith in
order that he may be arraigned.

In the meantime, on 10 March 1960, accused, through counsel, filed a motion praying for a one-year
postponement of the trial of his case, which motion was accompanied by sworn affidavits of four
doctors certifying as to the alleged weak physical state or condition of the accused. The lower court
denied the one-year motion for postponement, in its order dated 26 March 1960:

... Considering that the defendant has not yet been arraigned so that the issue in this case is
not yet joined, the defendant's motion is premature.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äw phï1.ñët

It appearing that the defendant had not complied with the order of the Court dated February
27, 1960 ordering said defendant to be confined for examination and observation as to his
mental state in the National Mental Hospital, the Court hereby orders that the corresponding
warrant for the arrest of the defendant for failure to appear for arraignment issue
forthwith. The bond filed for the provisional release of the defendant is hereby declared
forfeited in favor of the government. The bondsmen of the defendant are hereby given a
period of thirty (30) days within which to produce the person of said defendant and show
cause why judgement in the amount of their bond should not be finally entered against
them. (Emphasis supplied)

The bondsman, Fieldmen's Insurance Company, Inc., filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to
Produce the Accused", dated 2 May 1960, and the trial court, on 6 May 1960, granted the bondsman
up to 28 May 1960 to produce the body of the accused, with the warning, however, that it would be
the last extension. Since appellant corporation failed to produce the body of the accused for
arraignment on 28 May 1960, the court a quo, on 28 June 1960, ordered the issuance of the
corresponding writ for the execution of the total amount of the bond. On 14 July 1960, appellant-
bondman, in a "Motion for Partial Execution of Bond", pleaded that its liability be reduced to 10% of
the amount on the ground that the accused was seriously ill. The said motion was not, however,
accompanied by a sworn medical certificate. The lower court held in abeyance the consideration of
this last motion for partial execution, and at the same time ordered again the Chief Medico-Legal
Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation to submit another report, in its order dated 26 July
1960. On the following day, however, the court a quo set aside its order of 26 July 1960, thereby
denying the motion for partial execution of the bond. In view of the importance of this last order of
the lower court of 27 July 1960, the same is hereby quoted in toto:

This Court has issued an order dated July 26, 1960 ordering the Chief Medico-Legal Officer
of the NBI to examine the herein accused for the purpose of determining whether or not said
accused is really seriously ill as he claims and holding in abeyance the resolution of the
motion dated July 14, 1960 filed by the accused's bondsman, Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc.,
for the partial execution of the accused's bail bond until the report of the Chief Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI is submitted to this Court. However, on examining the records of this case,
the Court has found out that the Chief Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, upon order of this
Court dated February 3, 1960, had already physically examined the accused and had
submitted his report, dated February 15, 1960, wherein the said Chief Medico-Legal Officer
had found out that the accused "is one who is prone to the extent of feigning or pretending to
be physically weak by all means to justify his failure to appear in court." The report
recommended that the accused be placed in a suitable institution and under a competent
 Page 68 of 165

government neurologist for a sufficient time for a more thorough examination and
observation of his mental state. In view of this recommendation and in view of the accused's
persistent claim that he is ill and his continued failure to appear for arraignment, the court
issued an order on February 27, 1960 directing that the accused submit himself, within one
week from receipt of copy of said order, to the National Mental Hospital for observation and
examination as to his mental state to determine whether or not he is in a condition to appear
for arraignment but the accused ignored the aforesaid order and never submitted himself for
examination at the National Mental Hospital even up to the present time. He not only defied
the court's order but consistently failed to appear for arraignment thereby resulting in the
issuance of the order of March 26, 1960 directing for the arrest of the accused and the
confiscation of his bail bond. The accused's bondsman was unable to produce the person of
the accused despite an extension of time expiring on May 28, 1960 within which to produce
the accused, for which reason, the Court on June 23, 1960 issued an order executing the
accused's bail bond. The bondsman now asks for the reduction of its liability on its bond to
10% of the amount thereof but the Court finds no justification for such reduction.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sets aside its order of July 26, 1960, and denies, as it
hereby denies, the motion for partial execution filed by the accused's bondsman.

Let copy of this order be furnished the Chief, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who is hereby
ordered not to proceed anymore with the examination of the accused.

It is from this last order that the bondsman appealed.

In view of the damaging report of Dr. Rosalino V. Reyes of the NBI, it was incumbent upon the
bondsman to show to the complete satisfaction of the court that the accused was seriously ill. No
expert testimony whatsoever was offered to convince the court that Frederick G. Weber was not
pretending to be sick. The bondsman could have presented easily any of the four doctors to testify
as to his alleged malady, or it could have requested the court to see for itself his real condition.
Appellant could likewise have surrendered Weber any time. In short, the bonding company did not
take any steps to protect its interest. It did not exert any effort to show its good faith in endeavoring
to comply with the orders of the court. Mere allegation that the accused is seriously ill is not
sufficient. In fact, there are strong grounds to suspect that the accused was purposely delaying the
trial of his case of which appellant may be chargeable, at least, with constructive knowledge.

However, no permanent injury to public interest appears to have been caused by the appellant's
default, for our examination of the records of the Court of First Instance of Manila shows that the
accused Weber has been subsequently arraigned and tried. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
the bondsman is entitled to a mitigation of liability (Peo. vs. Bustamante, G.R. No. L-13665, 24 Sept.
1959), although not to the ten per centum prayed for, which would be irrisory and will stimulate,
rather than deter, bondsman to hinder speedy trials and prompt dispatch of cases. A reduction of the
forfeiture to P1,000.00 would serve the interests of justice in this regard.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is modified, and the forfeiture reduced to P1,000.00, to be
paid by the appellant-bondsman within five (5) days from finality of this decision. Without costs in this
instance.

Parenthetically, the Court notes the conspicuous failure of the Office of the Solicitor General to file
the government's brief notwithstanding six extensions totalling 85 days granted by the Court of
Appeals, aside from the reglementary 30 days provided for in the Rules of Court. In the interest of
public service, let a copy of this decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for whatever remedial
measure he may deem proper to take. So ordered.
 Page 69 of 165

G.R. No. L-54567 March 22, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMETERIO DINOLA, accused-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

CORTES, J.:

Upon complaint by Marilyn Caldosa, the appellant-accused Emeterio Dinola was charged before the
Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Palo, Leyte with the crime of robbery with rape under
the following information:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about the 21st day of October, 1977 in the Municipality of Alangalang,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a deadly weapon, and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge with
one Marilyn Caldosa, and that on the occasion thereof, the said accused, by the use
of force upon the same Marilyn Caldosa, and with intent to gain, did then and there
wilfully and feloniously take and carry away the wrist watch of Marilyn Caldosa, to her
damage and prejudice in the amount of P300.00, the money value of the watch.

Contrary to law. [Rollo, p. 8.]

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded "not guilty" [Rollo, p. 10]. After trial, the court a
quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with rape and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
victim in the amount of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00) and to pay the costs [Rollo, pp. 11-12].

From the judgment of conviction, the accused filed the present appeal assigning the following as
errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE IMPROBABILITIES IN THE

TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT MARILYN CALDOSA.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING THE BURDEN UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE AND IN NOT ANALYZING THE STATE'S EVIDENCE TO ARRIVE
AT A CONCLUSION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [Rollo, p. 65.]

The evidence for the prosecution consisted primarily of a medico-legal certificate and the testimonies
of complainant Marilyn Caldosa and Dr. Sherlito Siao, the doctor who conducted the physical
examination on Caldosa after the incident allegedly occurred.

The medicolegal certificate of the complainant stated the following findings:

 Page 70 of 165

Findings:

No external sign of physical injuries

INTERNAL EXAM:

Introitus:

Admits 2 examining fingers with slight pain.

— There is an incomplete laceration of the hymen at 6 o'clock position

— There is a contusion 0.5 cm. at the 1 o'clock position of the hymen

Cervix: Negative Sperm Exam: Negative for

spermatozoa

Uterus: Not Enlarged

Discharges: None

xxx xxx xxx

[Exh. "A"; Rollo, p. 5.]

Dr. Sherlito Siao, a resident physician of the Daniel T. Romualdez Memorial Hospital testified to the
following:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [T]hat on October 21, 1977, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he conducted
a physical examination of Marilyn Caldosa in connection with an alleged rape case;
that his findings were reduced to writing Exhibit "A" which witness identified; that
there were no signs of external physical injuries; that there was incomplete laceration
[of the hymen] which did not extend to the base and it is possible that there was
sexual contact; that there was injury to the hymen caused by a blunt instrument,
perhaps a male organ, and could have been caused by forcible insertion; that no
spermatozoa was found as there was perhaps no ejaculation, recent washing or
there was no penetration of the male organ, and that the victim was possibly raped.

xxx xxx xxx

[Trial Court Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 23.]

The testimony of complainant Marilyn Caldosa was summarized by the trial court as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . That she knows the accused, . . . and that she has known him for more than a
year as the accused resides in front of their house and had previously worked for
 Page 71 of 165

them and they would oftentimes converse as they are friends; that on October 21,
1977, at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, she was at home sleeping [alone] in the
house of her aunt, Gertrudes Vda. de Barraza, who was then in Tacloban . . .; that
she was awakened by a voice saying: "Do not make a noise or I will kill you. If you
will not accede to a carnal knowledge I will count from one to three and I will kill
you."; that she noticed a small bolo pointed towards her breast and she [was]
frightened . . .; that the person then placed himself on top of her and placed his penis
inside her vagina by push and pull; that the first push was not successful and the
person tried many times to put his penis inside [her] vagina until he was able to do so
and [she] felt pain; that while the person was on top of her, she did not resist as he
was (sic) big while she is small and she cannot overcome him; that after having
carnal knowledge [with] her, the person lighted a candle and when he saw her
"Citizen" watch valued at P300.00 he grabbed it from her; that after the candle was
lighted, she saw that the person was "Eme" whose full name is Emeterio Dinola . . .;
that the accused left after grabbing her watch while she stayed in bed as she was
afraid and at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning she went to the bathroom and
washed her vagina as she felt dirty; that at about 5:00 or 6:00 o'clock in the morning,
she went to the house of the son of her aunt in Barrio Binongtuan and they went to
the Provincial Hospital in Tacloban City to have her painful vagina treated, arriving
there at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning; that she was not treated that morning as
the doctor on duty was not there and they were requested to return in the afternoon;
that they were given a prescription for the medicine which the son of her aunt bought
while she went to school; that she went back to the hospital in the afternoon and she
was physically examined by Dr. Sherlito Siao.

xxx xxx xxx

[Trial Court Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 23-25.]

The accused denied the complainant's allegations and offered the following counter-statement of
facts:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . That on October 21, 1977, at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at home
in their farm at Barrio Caiguihan, Alangalang, Leyte, about 1 kilometer from the
Poblacion of Alangalang; that the house belongs to his father Inocentes Dinola and
living with them were his step-mother and a half-brother; that he does not know
Marilyn Caldosa and her statement that he raped her and stole her watch is not true
as he knows nothing about it; that it is not true that he lives infront (sic) of the house
of the victim in the poblacion as he lives in the farm; that he does not know Gertrudes
Vda. de Barraza; that he was fetched from the house of Filemon Ramos at Calle
Retana, Alangalang, Leyte on October 21, 1977 by Patrolman Augusto Salvatierra
who told him that the Chief of Police wanted to see him; that he went with Patrolman
Salvatierra to the Municipal Building but the Station Commander was not there; that it
was only "Cocoy" Caples who was there and who immediately maltreated him; that
he was never informed why he was summoned; that he was boxed, kicked, and
maltreated in many other ways by "Cocoy" Caples, including being thrust at or
jabbed with a pistol; that "Cocoy" Caples boxed his ears with his (Caples) palms and
blood came out and he lost consciousness; that he was maltreated in the office of the
Chief of Police; that while he was in the Municipal Building on October 21 1977, he
did not meet Marilyn Caldosa and he did not see her the next day; that on October
 Page 72 of 165

22, 1977 he was inside the jail and during the whole time that he was in jail in
Alangalang he never saw Marilyn Caldosa; that the charge against him is a mere
fabrication.

xxx xxx xxx

[Trial Court Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 28-19.]

The testimony of the accused was corroborated by the only other defense witness Diosdado Dinola,
the accused's half brother.

As in most rape cases where the complainant is the main prosecution witness, the issue boils down
to her credibility.

The accused assails the credibility of complainant Marilyn Caldosa by pointing to the following
factors which, according to the accused, negate the complainant's allegation of the use of force on
her: (1) there were no external signs of injuries on her body; (2) the complainant did not make any
resistance as in fact her hands were just on her sides during the time the forced intercourse
allegedly occurred; and (3) she did not say anything to stop her assailant from consummating the
act.

In the medico-legal certificate prepared by Dr. Sherlito T. Siao, it was stated that Marilyn Caldosa
sustained "[n]o external sign of physical injuries" [Exh. "A"; Rollo, p. 5]. This statement was
confirmed by the doctor when he took the witness stand [TSN, August 1, 1978, p. 3]. But from this
medical finding alone, it can not be concluded that there is no truth in the complainant's allegation of
rape. The Court has already ruled that the absence of external signs of physical injuries on the
complainant does not necessarily negate the commission of the crime of rape [People v. Malabad,
G.R. No. 63219, November 28, 1984, 133 SCRA 392; People v. Monteverde, G.R. No. 60962, July
11, 1986, 142 SCRA 668; People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 74653, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 568].

But the accused, in order to impugn further the credibility of the complainant, relies on the latter's
admission that during the time the accused was on top of her, her hands were on her sides and that
she did not say anything to stop the accused.

It is true that when asked if the complainant resisted the accused while he was on top of her, she
said that she did not [TSN August 1, 1978, p. 10]. She also admitted that during all the time that the
accused was on top of her, her hands were just on her sides [TSN, September 20, 1978, p. 19].
However, it must be remembered that according to the complainant, when she was roused from
sleep by the accused, the latter held a bolo to her chest and threatened to kill her if she made any
noise [TSN, August 31, 1978, p. 9]. Moreover, when asked to explain why she offered no resistance,
she consistently stated both on direct and cross-examination the following: "I cannot resist him
because he is bigger and I am small" [TSN, August 1, 1978, p. 10; "I did not anymore [resist]
because he was (sic) big and I was (sic) small" [TSN, September 20, 1978, p. 19].

The Court has already ruled that rape may be committed even if no force was used, intimidation
being sufficient. Intimidation includes the moral kind such as fear caused by threatening the girl with
a knife [People v. Garcines, G.R. No. L-32321, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 653]. The Court has
likewise held that the admission of the victim that her hands were on her sides while the accused
was on top of her does not mean that she consented to the act [People v. Modelo, G.R. No. L-
29144, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 639]. The complainant in this case, is a seventeen (17) year old
lass while the accused is a thirty four (34) year old laborer. In complainant's words: "he is bigger and
I am small." Considering, the size, age and strength of the accused, coupled by his use of a bolo to
 Page 73 of 165

threaten the complainant, the Court rules that the complainant's failure to resist the accused does
not detract from the fact that the latter employed intimidation in order to have sexual intercourse with
the latter. The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs
only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having
sexual intercourse with the victim.

The accused next takes issue with the statement of the complainant that after he allegedly raped
her, he lighted a candle, enabling the complainant to see his face and recognize him. The accused
finds it incredible for a perpetrator of a crime to give the victim the chance to identify him. Thus, it is
concluded by the accused that the complainant has fabricated a tall tale of rape involving the two of
them.

But in this day and age, it is not uncommon for criminals to be careless about or to even intentionally
reveal their identities to their victims. The failure by a criminal to conceal his identity would not make
the commission of the crime any less credible. Bragadoccio among criminals is not uncommon. Very
often too, they are secure in the thought that they have instilled sufficient fear in their victims that the
latter will not give them away to the authorities.

The complainant in this case was able to identify her assailant with certainty. When asked on the
witness stand who had assaulted her, she replied that it was the accused, Emeterio Dinola [TSN,
August 31, 1978, p. 7]. On being told to identify her rapist and with the permission of the trial court,
she stepped down from the witness stand and tapped the accused on the shoulder [Id.] The trial
court found the complainant to be a credible witness, and with good reason. A careful reading of the
record of the case shows the complainant's testimony regarding the circumstances of the rape and
the identity of the rapist to be direct, lucid forthright and, being totally untainted by contradictions in
any of the material points, deserves credence.

Lending further credence to the testimony of the complainant is the oft-repeated observation of the
Court that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she had been criminally
abused and ravished unless that is the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor [People v.
Itano, 109 Phil. 912 (1960); People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 62387, June 19,,1985, 137 SCRA 99; People
v. Ramilo, G.R. No. 52230, December 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 258; People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. L-
40988, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 153]. As the trial Court noted:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [A]t the time of the incident the complaining witness was only 17 years old,
single, and a college student. She was then at the stage of life when an individual
prepares for the future. This Court cannot conceive that such a person would
seemingly jeopardize her future by the filing of the instant case with its resultant
adverse social effects unless the charges were true. She would not willingly go
through the rigors of a public trial wherein she would have to relate, in detail, the
atrocity committed upon her person unless she was sure that it was the accused who
committed such an atrocity.

Further, aside from the allegation that the instant case is a mere fabrication, no
evidence has been adduced by the defense as to why the complaining witness would
fabricate a case against the accused. [Trial Court Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 32.]

Finally, the Court finds significance in the fact that the complainant sought medical examination
immediately after the incident [TSN, August 31, 1978, p. 12]. This fact, taken together with the other
 Page 74 of 165

circumstances of the case, indicates that the fresh laceration found by the doctor on her hymen
[Exh. "A"; Rollo, p. 5] was inflicted against her will.

In fine, the Court, after a thorough examination of the entire record of the case, finds no substantial
reason to depart from the established rule that the Supreme Court regards with respect and will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, unless certain facts
of substance and value have been overlooked which if considered, might affect the result of the case
[People v. Sinaon, G.R. No. L-15631, May 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 260; People v. Abonada, G.R. No.
50041, January 27, 1989; People v. Pedrosa, G.R. No. 56457, January 27, 1989].

Having sustained the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the complainant, the defense put
up by the accused, alibi, must necessarily fall. The Court has consistently held that the alibi of the
accused that he was not at the rape scene cannot stand against the positive identification made by
the complainant [People v. Soriano, G.R. No. L-32244, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 740; People v.
Deus, G.R. No. 63729, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 660; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752,
September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569]. Alibi is inherently a weak defense [People v. Datahan, G.R.
Nos. 77107-08, January 21, 1988, 157 SCRA 215] especially, where as in this case, the same was
corroborated only by a relative of the accused [People v. Manuel, G.R. No. L-44461, April 15, 1988,
160 SCRA 248; People v. Macabenta, G.R. No. 72476, February 14, 1989].

The accused, in this case, was not satisfied in abusing the complainant. After satisfying his criminal
lust and upon seeing the watch on the girl's wrist, he again threatened to kill the complainant if she
did not hand over the watch. The complainant refused to give it but he forcibly grabbed it from her.
[Sworn Statement of Marilyn Caldosa dated October 22, 1977, p. 1; Rollo, p. 3]. The accused was
charged and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape.

However, it does not appear from the record of the case that when the accused entered the house of
the complainant, he already had the intention to rob the complainant. In fact, the complainant
testified that after she was raped by the accused, the latter lit a candle, saw the watch on her wrist,
threatened to kill her if she did not give it to him and forcibly took it from her [TSN, August 31, 1977,
pp. 10-11]. Hence, the taking of the watch by the accused was more of an afterthought, even
accidental. If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even
before the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed [See People v. Canastre, 82 Phil.
480 (1948)]. However, if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after committing
rape also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be
viewed as two distinct offenses.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby MODIFIES the judgment of the court a quo by finding the
accused guilty of two independent crimes of rape and robbery. The accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of not less than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, to not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor [Art. 294, par. 5, RPC in
relation to Act No. 4103, as amended] for the crime of robbery and to restore to the victim the watch
which was taken or to pay its value in the amount of three hundred pesos (P300.00). As for the
crime of rape, since it was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the accused must suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua [Art. 335, Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. III, Sec. 9 (1) of the
1987 Constitution] and indemnify the victim the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
[People v. Viray, G.R. No L-41085, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA 135].

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 75 of 165

G.R. No. 205230 March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ERNESTO VENTURA, SR., Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Accused-appellant Ernesto Ventura, Sr. (Ventura) challenges in this appeal the Decision1 dated April
13, 2012 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04133, which affirmed
with modification the judgment2 of conviction for Rape rendered against him on May 27, 2009 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 194, in Criminal Case No. 05-0366.3

Through the testimonies of the victim herself (AAA),4 her aunt BBB,5 Barangay Tanod Ronaldo
Antiporda (Antiporda),6 and the medico legal officer,7 the prosecution’s case was summarized as
follows:

On March 24, 2005, at about 2:00 a.m., BBB had just came from a wake and was passing by the
bakery of Ventura’s son when she saw Ventura, naked from waist down, on top of a woman on a
bench in front of the bakery. BBB coughed to get their attention and Ventura immediately stood up,
put on his pants and entered his house. BBB then realized that the woman was her niece, AAA, who
was then only 17 years old, unschooled and has a mental disability. She then held AAA’s hands and
brought her home. Thereafter, BBB confronted AAA who confessed that she was already
impregnated by Ventura and admitted that the latter was sexually abusing her. Upon learning this,
BBB sought help from the employer of AAA’s sister who accompanied them to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) to file a complaint8 against Ventura.9

Thereafter, the members of the CIDG went to AAA’s barangay hall, and Antiporda was one of the
barangay tanods who was tasked to escort them to the residence of Ventura. Antiporda testified that
upon arriving at Ventura’s house, he informed Ventura of the complaint against him and invited the
latter to the barangay hall. Ventura, with his wife, voluntarily went with them. At the barangay hall,
the wife of Ventura approached AAA and asked her for forgiveness.10

AAA narrated that she was near the bakery of Ventura’s son when Ventura asked her to lie down on
the bench. Ventura undressed her, went on top of her, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. After
succeeding in having carnal knowledge of her, Ventura threatened AAA by poking a knife at her
while instructing her not to tell anyone about the incident.11 She was then forced by Ventura to
accompany him in selling pandesal until the early morning, and she could not escape him because
he was holding her hands and would not let her go.12 AAA said that Ventura would give her clothes
and money every time he would rape her and instructed her not to tell anyone of the sexual
assaults.13

The Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory testified that based on
his interview with AAA, he found out that AAA was mentally deficient.14 His initial and final medico
legal report revealed that AAA was already pregnant and that there was definite evidence of abuse
or sexual contact.15

For his part, Ventura16 denied the charge against him and invoked the defense of alibi alleging that
he did not rape AAA on March 24, 2005 as he did not leave his home because he was busy making
 Page 76 of 165

bread for their bakery with his children, and it was already 10:00 a.m. when he was able to leave
their bakery. He also admitted having knowledge that AAA has a mental defect.17

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment18 on May 27, 2009, convicting Ventura of the crime charged
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay AAA by way
of damages the amount of ₱100,000.00. The trial court viewed the findings of the medico legal
officer that AAA was already pregnant at the time of her physical and medical examination as clear
proof and manifestation that she is a victim of rape, particularly in her case who was then only 17
years old, mentally deficient, illiterate, unschooled, and thus, incapable of giving rational consent to
any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. The trial court also noted that Ventura failed to present any
defense as to the explicit testimony of AAA that she was also sexually abused by him on other
occasions since the only denial he interposed was against the consummated rape done on March
24, 2005.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification as to the award of
damages. The CA ordered Ventura to pay the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.19 Ventura then appealed his conviction
to this Court.20

The Issue

Whether the guilt of Ventura for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court’s Rulings

The appeal lacks merit.

In the Information21 filed before the RTC on March 31, 2005, Ventura was charged with rape of a
demented person under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:

That on or about the 24th day of March 2005, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having moral ascendancy, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of victim [AAA], 17[-]year old minor, a demented person and with mental capacity below
18 years old, against her will and without her consent, the accused knowing the victim’s mental
disability at the time of the commission of the crime, which acts are demeaning to the demented
minor.22 (Emphasis ours)

Article 266-A, paragraph 123 of the RPC, as amended, provides for two circumstances when having
carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape, to wit: paragraph 1(b) –
when the offended party is deprived of reason; and paragraph 1(d) – when the offended party is
demented.

Under paragraph 1(d), the term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition
of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual’s former intellectual
level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, under paragraph 1(b),
the phrase deprived of reason has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.24 Since AAA is mentally deficient, she should properly be
classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented." Hence, carnal
knowledge of a mentally deficient individual is rape under subparagraph b and not subparagraph d
of Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, as amended.25 Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to paragraph
1(d) in the Information will not exonerate Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection, and
 Page 77 of 165

the particular facts stated in the Information were protestation sufficient to inform him of the nature of
the charge against him.

From the foregoing, all that needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the rapist
and his victim, and the latter’s mental retardation.26 This Court has repeatedly held that "mental
retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of
witnesses and even the observation by the trial court."27 The trial judge’s assessment of the
credibility of witnesses’ testimonies is accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real and
testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses.28 The rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the appellate court.

In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate
through the testimony of BBB and the medico legal officer, and the trial court’s observation. It is also
worthy to note that the defense did not dispute but even admitted the fact that AAA is suffering from
mental retardation. Though AAA proceeded with much difficulty in describing the sexual abuse made
on her, no convincing reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial
court with respect to the assessment of her testimony, the same being straightforward, candid, and
worthy of belief. This Court is also convinced that AAA has no ill-motive to manufacture such a tale if
it were not true.

In impugning AAA’s accusation of rape against him, Ventura interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. As can be gleaned from the records of this case, Ventura’s argument centered only on the fact
that it was impossible for him to rape AAA on the said date and time of the incident because he was
busy making bread at their bakery, and the only time he left their house was at 10:00 a.m. Even
assuming that he worked inside their bakery the whole day, it was not impossible for him to commit
the crime because the rape took place on the bench located just in front of their bakery.

The fact that no consummated rape happened on March 24, 2005 based on the testimonies of BBB
and the medico legal officer, as well as the absence of lacerations on AAA’s vagina, pointed to by
Ventura cannot work in his favor. The absence of hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina upon
medical examination does not negate the fact of rape. A freshly broken hymen is not also an
essential element of rape.29 In the context it is used in the RPC, carnal knowledge does not
necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.30

AAA’s failure to recall the exact date of the first rape and the number of times she was sexually
assaulted by Ventura prior to March 24, 2005, does not militate against her credibility since rape
victims are not expected to cherish in their memories an accurate account of the dates, number of
times and manner they were violated.31 This is especially true in the case of AAA who obviously
cannot be expected to act like an adult who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. AAA’s testimony
was clear that every time Ventura would rape her, he would threaten her against revealing the
offense. Given AAA’s mental condition, it can well substitute for violence and intimidation enough to
cow her into submission.

The Court had repeatedly held that the exact date when the victim was sexually abused is not an
essential element of the crime of rape,32 for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman. Indeed, the precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such,
the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated.33 Inconsistencies and
discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be
considered grounds for acquittal.34 Hence, the allegation in the information under Criminal Case No.
 Page 78 of 165

05-0366, which states that the rape was committed on or about March 24, 2005, is sufficient to affirm
the conviction of Ventura in the said case.

Lastly, the trial court had observed that Ventura’s actions were detested by his family because
despite having a large kin,35 none of them testified for Ventura’s defense or did anything to support
his case. They did not even bother to visit him while he was in jail.36

In sum, the defense of denial as well as the points advanced by Ventura miserably failed to cast
doubt on his culpability. The prosecution was able to prove that Ventura is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8353. Taking into consideration the presence of the special qualifying circumstance of
Ventura’s knowledge of AAA’s mental deficiency, the same being properly alleged in the Information
charging the appellant of the crime of rape and proven during trial, this Court has no option but to
impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 ofR.A. No.
9346.37

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated April 13, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 04133 which found accused-appellant Ernesto Ventura, Sr. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 79 of 165

G.R. No. 192239 June 5, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RICARDO PAMINTUAN y SAHAGUN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The Court decides the appeal filed by accused-appellant Ricardo Pamintuan y Sahagun from the
Decision1 dated November 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03449.

On September 6, 2004, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353. The accusatory portion of the Information stated:

That sometime in September 2003, in the XXX, Philippines, the accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly commit abusive acts and lascivious conduct upon the person
of AAA,2 a minor, 11 years old, by then and there dragging her inside the room, kissing her on the
lips and breast, undressing her and inserting his penis in her vagina and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her against her will and consent thereby gravely endangering her survival, normal
development and growth.3

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 During the trial of the case, the prosecution put
forward the following witnesses: (1) AAA, the victim; (2) Maria Cristina E. Viray, the Bantay Bata 163
social worker; (3) Police Officer (PO)1 Aireen Talattad;5 and (4) Dr. Merle Tan.

AAA testified that accused-appellant was her uncle since the latter was the cousin of her father,
BBB. He was also the common-law husband of her mother, CCC, as her parents had already
separated. She could not recall when accused-appellant and CCC started to live together. He would
stay in AAA’s house in XXX then he would return to his house in Bulacan. AAA related that in
September 2003, accused-appellant started to sexually abuse her inside their house. He pulled her
to her mother’s room when nobody else was around. He touched her breasts and her vagina.
Afterwards, accused-appellant was able to insert his penis into her organ. He was only able to insert
his penis halfway but the same hurt AAA. She cried and fought back by boxing him but he continued
to assault her. He also kissed her lips and licked her vagina. She said that she did not bleed after
she was raped.6 Accused-appellant succeeded in abusing her seven times.7

AAA said that she revealed the incident to her sister, DDD, who informed their aunt, EEE, who was
the sister of their father. AAA was then vacationing at EEE’s house when the latter learned about the
incident. EEE forbade AAA from going back home in XXX. She did not tell CCC about her ordeal
because she was afraid of accused-appellant. According to AAA, her cousin told her that whenever
the accused gets drunk, he would pour gasoline in their house and threaten to burn it.8 AAA
presented in court her birth certificate, which showed that she was born on November 6, 1992.9

On cross-examination, AAA stated that she filed the case against accused-appellant because he did
rape her. Prior to that, she recalled an incident when he was even caring towards her. Back then,
she was not yet angry with him.10
 Page 80 of 165

Maria Cristina E. Viray testified that AAA and EEE went to the Bantay Bata 163 office on May 28,
2005. They asked for assistance regarding the rape case filed against accused-appellant. She made
them fill up a form to provide an account of the incident. In her account, AAA narrated that at around
September to October 2003, accused-appellant dragged her into a room, pulled up her clothing, and
kissed her breasts. AAA boxed accused-appellant in the chest. He then took off AAA’s shorts and
panty and undressed himself. Afterwards, there was a penetration of AAA’s vagina.11 Viray stated
that she did not conduct a detailed interview of AAA anymore so as not to further traumatize her.
She asked AAA if she was willing to go forward with the case and the latter answered in the
affirmative. Viray added that she was convinced that AAA was indeed raped by the accused-
appellant.12

The testimony of PO1 Aireen Talattad was dispensed with after the parties stipulated that she was
the investigator on the case, that she caused the preparation of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of AAA,
and that she could identify AAA and accused-appellant.13

Dr. Merle Tan testified that she was a consultant at the Child Protection Unit of the University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH) in Manila.14 She presented in court a medical
certificate dated December 29, 2003 issued by the PGH, which was the Final Medico Legal Report
Number 2003-12-0061.15 As AAA was already interviewed by the police, she only asked additional
clarifying questions. She inquired from AAA if the latter already had a boyfriend or if there were other
perpetrators of the sexual assault. AAA answered both questions in the negative. As to the medico-
legal report, the impression that Dr. Tan noted down was that there was "no evident injury at the time
of examination but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse. Further investigation, such as
witnessed account or careful questioning of the child is required."16

On cross-examination, Dr. Tan stated that when she examined AAA in December 2003, she did not
see any injury at all, not even healing injuries. According to her, however, the same may be
explained by the rate with which an injured hymen can heal. Dr. Tan further informed the trial court
that in rape cases, different injuries could be inflicted upon the victim, depending on a number of
factors. Said factors include the degree of force used in inflicting the injury, the size of the blunt
object, and the method with which the injury was caused. Dr. Tan also stated that some studies in
the United States suggest that if the perpetrator of the rape is not a stranger to the child victim, the
injuries inflicted on the latter are a little bit less serious. If there was an insertion in the vagina of a
minor child, the resultant injury, if any, would depend on how the insertion was done. Moreover, an
insertion would not necessarily lead to a laceration in the hymen in view of the changes occurring in
the body of a female child. As the estrogen production in the child’s body increases, the hymen
becomes more stretchable and elastic. Thus, even with seven insertions, the presence of a
laceration would depend on how the insertion was done and the length of the healing time, if there
were injuries inflicted.17

For his defense, accused-appellant testified that AAA was his niece as he was the cousin of AAA’s
father. He was also the common-law husband of AAA’s mother, CCC. Accused-appellant denied
AAA’s accusation of rape against him. He stated that CCC’s children had a grudge against him, as
they did not want him to live with their mother. He also said that a cousin of his, named Marie,
likewise held a grudge against him and CCC.18

The Ruling of the RTC

On June 17, 2008, the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, adjudged19 accused-appellant guilty of statutory
rape and sentenced him thus:
 Page 81 of 165

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, this Court finds that the prosecution was able
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in committing the crime of Rape under
Article [266-A], par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act 8353, and hereby
sentences Ricardo Pamintuan Y Sahagun to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; further, to
indemnify [AAA], the amount of Fifty Thousand (Php50,000.00) Pesos, as civil indemnity; the
amount of Fifty Thousand (Php50,000.00) as moral damages, and to pay the costs.20

The RTC found that AAA was only about 11 years old when she was raped by accused-appellant.
The trial court gave more weight to her testimony, which was found to be categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and delivered in a frank manner. The trial court also downplayed the
absence of injuries on the part of AAA as a result of the sexual abuse, citing rulings of the Court that
such may be attributed to numerous factors and that the hymen of the victim need not be penetrated
or ruptured for rape to be consummated. On the other hand, accused-appellant’s unsubstantiated
defense of denial was disregarded by the trial court. Accused-appellant was only convicted of
statutory rape punishable by reclusion perpetua as the qualifying circumstance of relationship, i.e.,
that he was the common-law husband of AAA’s mother, was not alleged in the information.

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.21

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On November 24, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the RTC in this wise:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The June 17, 2008 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38 is AFFIRMED in toto.22

The Court of Appeals was convinced that the elements of the crime of rape had been proven in this
case. The appellate court gave more weight to AAA’s testimony as compared to the bare denial of
accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument of accused-appellant that the
absence of external signs, indicating that AAA was sexually abused, negated her claim of rape. The
appellate court ruled that carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse,
does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. As the
relationship of AAA to accused-appellant was not specifically alleged in the information, the Court of
Appeals held that no qualifying circumstance was attendant in the case.

The Ruling of the Court

On appeal23 before this Court, accused-appellant again pleads for his acquittal, arguing that "the trial
court gravely erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that [his] guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt."24 Accused-appellant insists that the medical findings and the testimony of
Dr. Merle Tan belied AAA’s claim that she was raped seven times. Accused-appellant points out that
if he indeed sexually assaulted AAA seven times, she must have sustained genital injuries or
trauma. However, none was found by Dr. Tan. As the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual
intercourse with a woman without her consent, accused-appellant posits that the absence of
gynecological injuries negated AAA’s accusation of rape.

The Court sustains the conviction of accused-appellant.

The crime of rape is defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

 Page 82 of 165

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Article 266-A(1)(d) provides the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are:
(1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented.

The element of carnal knowledge was established by the testimony of AAA. Her identification of
accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual attack was positive, consistent and steadfast; her
narration of the incident, detailed and straightforward. When she was recounting her ordeal before
the trial court, she was overcome with emotion and shed tears on more than one occasion. She did
not waver in her stance even as she underwent cross-examination by the counsel for the defense.
These factors impress upon us that AAA’s claim against accused-appellant was not at all fabricated.

Jurisprudence teaches that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a
woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity.25 Moreover, we held in People v. Oden26 that "the spontaneity with which the victim has
detailed the incidents of rape, the tears she had shed at the stand while recounting her experience,
and her consistency almost throughout her account dispel any insinuation of a rehearsed testimony."

Contrary to accused-appellant’s protestations, the testimony of AAA that she was raped seven times
was not actually contradicted by the medical findings of Dr. Tan. This much is distinctly clear from
the conclusion reached by Dr. Tan in the medico-legal report, which we quote:

IMPRESSIONS

No evident injury at the time of examination but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse.
Further investigation, such as witnessed account or careful questioning of the child, is
required.27 (Emphasis ours.)

Nowhere in the medico-legal report was there a definitive statement from Dr. Tan that AAA could not
have been subjected to sexual abuse. If the above quoted statement was not clear enough, Dr. Tan
took the time to explain her findings in her testimony before the trial court. In essence, Dr. Tan
explained that in rape cases, an insertion in the vagina of a minor child victim would not necessarily
result in an injury, such as a laceration of the hymen. The presence or absence of injuries would
depend on different factors, such as the forcefulness of the insertion, the size of the object inserted,
the method by which the injury was caused, the changes occurring in a female child’s body, and the
length of healing time, if indeed injuries were caused. Thus, the fact that AAA did not sustain any
injury in her sex organ does not ipso facto mean that she was not raped.

The Court has often held that "full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor
is the rupture of the hymen necessary, to conclude that carnal knowledge took place; the mere
 Page 83 of 165

touching of the external genitalia by a penis that is capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge."28 We also said in People v. Opong29 that:

In People v. Capt. Llanto, citing People v. Aguinaldo, we likewise affirmed the conviction of the
accused for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victim’s hymen since medical findings
suggest that it is possible for the victim’s hymen to remain intact despite repeated sexual
intercourse. We elucidated that the strength and dilatability of the hymen varies from one woman to
another, such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse; on the
other hand, it may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse can
ensue.

xxxx

It also bears stressing that a medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape
case, it being merely corroborative in nature. The credible disclosure of AAA that appellant raped her
is the most important proof of the commission of the crime. (Citations omitted.)

In this case, AAA was carefully questioned by the respective counsels for the prosecution and the
defense and the trial court judge herself. AAA consistently incriminated accused-appellant as the
person who sexually abused her by inserting his penis into her vagina, although a full penetration
was not accomplished. To our mind, AAA’s testimony clearly proved the element of carnal
knowledge.

The accused-appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged is insufficient to exculpate him. Well
established is the rule that "a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely
overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the
crimes attributed to him."30 The Court also finds unconvincing the reason ascribed by accused-
appellant on the part of AAA to accuse him of rape, i.e., that AAA and her siblings disapproved of
him as their mother’s common-law husband. We find this argument flimsy and totally bereft of any
corroboration. We already ruled that "motives such as resentment, hatred, or revenge have never
swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. Further, ill
motives become inconsequential if the rape victim gave an affirmative and credible declaration,
which clearly established the liability of the accused."31

As regards the age of AAA, the prosecution presented her certificate of birth to prove that she was
born on November 6, 1992. Thus, at the time of the commission of the crime in September 2003,
AAA was only a few months shy of being 11 years old.

With respect to the imposable penalty in this case, the Court affirms the judgment of the RTC that
accused can only be convicted of statutory rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9346,32 provides:

Art. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
 Page 84 of 165

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

The age of AAA was duly alleged and proven in this case. However, AAA’s relationship with
accused-appellant, i.e., that accused-appellant was the common-law spouse of her mother, was not
specifically alleged in the information. Although this circumstance was proven during trial, the same
1âw phi 1

cannot qualify the crime committed. We held in People v. Ramos33 that "as a special qualifying
circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the
accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt."

We also affirm the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. However, the award of exemplary damages is in order. The Court had occasion to rule in
People v. Arcillas34 that:

According to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the
civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." The law
permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of AAA to exemplary damages on
account of the attendance of her minority and the common-law relationship between him and her
mother. It did not matter that such qualifying circumstances were not taken into consideration in
fixing his criminal liability, because the term aggravating circumstances as basis for awarding
exemplary damages under the Civil Code was understood in its generic sense. x x x.

(Citations omitted.)

We also stated in People v. Nebria35 that the award of exemplary damages in rape cases is proper in
order to protect the young from sexual exploitation and abuse. Thus, we further award ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages in light of current jurisprudence.36

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03449 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 is awarded. Accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay
legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 85 of 165

G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:p

Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous
crimes is concerned and while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain as yet another burning issue, we
are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society
for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.

Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for the crime
of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y

PILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the
complaint, aggravated by the fact that the same was commited by the accused who
is the father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH, as provided for under RA. No. 7659, to pay the complainant
Rodessa Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.1

We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:

COMPLAINT

The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE,

committed as follows:

That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant,
his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to
her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW 2

Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio,
entered the plea of "not guilty."

These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief:

This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.

Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born

on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three
 Page 86 of 165

brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents
are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The
victim lives with her family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St.,
Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9,
1994, TSN).

Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three
brothers in their house as her mother attended a gambling session in another place,
she heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out
of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid). As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo
Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p.
12, ibid). Before she could question the appellant, the latter immediately, removed
her panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid). Thereafter, appellant likewise
removed his underwear and immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa.
Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing
her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid). While appellant was pumping on her, he
even uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and to which Rodessa answered: "Tama
na Papa, masakit" (p. 16, ibid). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued
with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her mother
if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother would be killed by
appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid of
appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.).
The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place
when her mother was out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time,
Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn told
Rosalie, Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay
Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter,
Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.).
From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).

Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when
her mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her side.
However, when appellant was detained, her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa
naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong" (pp. 39-40, ibid.).

When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma.
Cristina B. Preyna,3 the complainant was described as physically on a non-virgin
state, as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant
(TSN, Aug. 22, 1995, pp. 8-9).4

On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:

. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the
RAPE charge against the accused was only the figment of her mothers dirty mind.
That her daughter's complaint was forced upon her by her grandma and the answers
in the sworn statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE was
motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal
Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City,
which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the accused in order to
persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance after it
turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was substituted with the crime of
 Page 87 of 165

RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her mother came to know about the
affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the custody of the
Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to her.

She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her
husband poured alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She identified the
certification issued by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification
based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-owned by accused
and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the
latter being the paramour of her mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and
participation over the lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's
accepting the fact that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to
conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real wife.

Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant
has a very strong motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE since she was
interested to become the sole owner of a property awarded to her live-in partner by
the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project. That he could not have committed the imputed
crime because he considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a painter-
contractor and on the date of the alleged commission of the crime, he was painting
the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh. 4).
The travel time between his work place to his residence is three (3) hours
considering the condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a
document denominated "Contract of Services" duly accomplished (see submarkings
of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11
years old like Rodessa, the said female organ will be "mawawarak." That it is
abnormal to report the imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother of the
victim.

Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug
pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal
portion of the judgment of conviction ordering the accused to be confined at the
Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it was her
wish that accused should be meted the death penalty.

Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's
grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime because of her greed to become
the sole owner of that piece of property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal
Project, situated at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid
cross-examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his mind
considering that he treated Rodessa as his own daughter. He categorically testified
that he was in his painting job site on the date and time of the alleged commission of
the crime.

Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the
laundry woman and part time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at one time,
she saw Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging
washed clothes on the vacant lot, she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her
private parts. The masturbation took sometime.

This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth
and last witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting
 Page 88 of 165

tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa viewing an
X-rated tape. Rodessa according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute.
That (sic) she corroborated the testimony of Mrs. Punzalan by stating that she herself
saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room of her house.5

In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the lower court
dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward testimony of the ten-year old
victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower
court likewise regarded as inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that the
extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and that the
accused is not the real father of the said victim.

The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower
court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER

MOTIVE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER? THAT
PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE
IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.

2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE

HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO
THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED,
NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.

3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE

OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS IN PARAÑAQUE ON THE DATE
AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR.6

Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty, requires a
thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court remains guided
by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused though innocent to
disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for
the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 7

Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the scales of
justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the rape
charge was merely concocted and strongly motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the
NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal
grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event that the
accused-appellant shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her
favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the
live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records of the National Housing Authority (Exh.
"3"). The accused-appellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by
 Page 89 of 165

Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in
partners would have the property for their own.8

We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her
10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply on account of her
alleged interest over the disputed lot.9

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she
has no motive to testify against the accused. 10

We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which the
trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial court not surprisingly
noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.11 Once
again, we rule that:

. . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as
to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight, for testimony of young and
immature rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No
woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to
a public trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra). 12

The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation against him is malicious and
baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accused-appellant was already naked when he
dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the said accused-
appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's
sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while the accused was
executing pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court
wherein she related that, when the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the accused said
"Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn
statement that it was the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed on her
granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court , Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one
who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a secret.13 These alleged
discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa
inside the room where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony
that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever
words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's
private organ against her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination
of which version earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother learned about the rape is
inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.

As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: 14

This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of
the witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole
coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the
witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to he expected that
he will be able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total
recall.
 Page 90 of 165

After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.

With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear and
concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if that be the fact,
it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. 15 In his
testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he could not have raped Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so. 16 This Court
gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light of our ruling in
the case of People v. Melivo, supra,17 that:

The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying
degrees of distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female reproductive organ
is normally limited only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors
being minor. The female reprodructive canal being capable of allowing passage of a
regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much
lesser size, including the male reproductive organ, which even in its largest
dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of he

vaginal wall, though not as extensive as appellant might have expected them to be,
indicate traumatic injury to the area within the period when the incidents were
supposed to have occurred. (At pp. 13-14, emphasis supplied)

In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18 A mere knocking at the doors
of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full
entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a conviction. 19 In the case, Dr. Freyra, the
medico-legal examiner, categorically testified that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina
were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as narrated by the victim to have taken
place in April, 1994. 20

Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant erroneously
argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in support of the accused-
appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring
so. 21 In view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely testify against
the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other witnesses, should
be completely disregarded. 22 More importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak
becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of
the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa. 23

The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some painting job
at the house of one Divina Ang in Parañaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not
proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at the time of the commission of the offense.

The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the complaint,
dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. 24 Rodessa
positively identified his father accused-appellant, as the culprit of Statutory Rape. Her account of
how the accused-appellant succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on
her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is rehearsed and
 Page 91 of 165

fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion Rivera as asserted by
the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court,
more than two decades ago, are relevant and worth reiterating, thus:

. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are
young and immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is
marked receptivity on its, part to tend credence to their version of what transpired. It
is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable
to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection.
Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone.
The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account It may reflect
a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for such
institution There is all the more reason then for the rigorous application of the penal
law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly
remarked that with the advance in civilization, the disruption in public peace and
order it represents defies explanation, much more so in view of what currently
appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where the prospects of
relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, self-restraint should even be more
marked. 25

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty imposed by the
trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he
was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother. 26 On direct examination, he admitted that before the
charge of rape was riled against him, he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided
for her food, clothing, shelter and education. 27 The Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of
the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-
in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination that she, the accused-
appellant, and her five children, including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only. 28 At any
rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot
save him from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law.
Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely
within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term "common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim."

The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough
to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of
sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive
 Page 92 of 165

and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and influence
over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving.
The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face
the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 93 of 165

G.R. No. 199894

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In every criminal case where the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence, he is entitled to
acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.

The Case

The accused seeks to undo the decision promulgated on March 24, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03702,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on November 17, 2008
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, in Manila convicting him of rape. 2

Antecedents

The accused was charged with rape under the following information, to wit:

That on or about March 14, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, and fraudulent machination, have carnal knowledge with said AAA, 3 by then and there
texting the latter to see each other at the corner of Augusto Francisco Street, inviting her for a stroll
at Rizal A venue, ordering food from Jollibee, bringing her at Aroma Motel under the pretext that they
will just talk and eat their food thereat, entering a room at said motel and locking the door, pulling her
on the bed and kissing her,underssing (sic) her and thereafter inserting his penis into her vagina
then succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.4

Evidence of the Prosecution

At around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 2006, AAA, a housemaid, received a text
message from the accused asking if they could meet. He was then working as a security guard near
AAA's place of work. AAA accepted his invitation and met with him on Augusto San Francisco
Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, where they boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Rizal A venue in Sta.
Cruz, Manila. Arriving in Sta. Cruz, they entered a Jollibee restaurant on Rizal Avenue and ordered
food. They later on went to a nearby house, later identified as the Aroma Motel. She refused to go
up the stairs of the motel, which impelled him to hold her by the hand and pull her upstairs, insisting
that they would only talk and eat. He then talked to a male attendant who ushered them into a room.

Upon entering the room, AAA tried to leave, but the accused closed the door and pushed her
towards the bed. She still attempted to leave but the door was locked. He pulled her back to the bed,
telling her that he loved her. Instead of responding to him, she said that she needed to go to the
toilet. Once inside the toilet, she called her cousin, Alberto German (German), a police officer, but
she was unable to give him her exact location after her phone ran out of charge. It was then when
the accused barged inside the toilet and again pulled her back to the bed. He forcefully undressed
 Page 94 of 165

her completely, went on top of her, and forcibly inserted his penis inside her vagina. She kept on
punching to try to stop him, but to no avail. After he was done, she immediately put on her clothes
and left the room. But she was compelled to ride with him in the same passenger jeepney because
she did not know her way back.

Upon arriving home, she promptly reported the incident to German, who instructed her to contact the
accused and agree to meet with him again so that they could apprehend him. She did as instructed.
Just as they agreed, the accused went to the meeting place, where German quickly approached him
and introduced himself as a police officer. The accused tried to run away, but German seized him
and brought him to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for investigation.

Dr. Wilfredo E. Tierra, the NBI medico-legal officer, conducted the medico-genital examination of
AAA. He found the presence of fresh deep hymenal laceration at 5 o'clock position with edges
bleeding; abrasion measuring 1.3 cm. on the left breast; and contusion measuring 1.5 cm. on the
right hand of AAA. 5

Evidence of the Defense

The accused denied the accusation.

The accused claimed that he and AAA had first met on January 6, 2006, and became friends; that
their friendship had blossomed into romance, with them becoming lovers after two months; that they
had gone out once on a date on March 6, 2006, and had agreed to go out on a date again on March
14, 2006; that on the latter date, they had met at Augusto San Francisco Street, Sta. Ana Manila,
and had proceeded on board a passenger jeepney to the Jollibee restaurant on Rizal Avenue; that at
the Jollibee restaurant, he ordered food and asked her whether they would push through with their
plan to go to a motel; that after she assented, they walked together to the motel, where a room boy
led them to their designated room, which had a doorknob that could be locked from the inside; that
once they entered the room, she went to the restroom and later came out wearing only a towel; that
she told him that she loved him, and they started kissing each other; that she took off the towel,
while he undressed; that she did not resist when he went on top of her and inserted his penis in her
vagina, but he stopped when she told him that she was not yet ready; that they then got dressed, left
the motel together, and boarded a passenger jeepney; that after parting ways, she called him
through his cellphone and asked if they could see· each other again; and that once he arrived at the
meeting place, a police officer later identified as German arrested and handcuffed him.

Also testifying for the Defense was the mother of the accused. She asserted that AAA was already
her son's girlfriend prior to the incident; that when she went to the police headquarters upon learning
of her son's arrest, she saw AAA but the latter asked her to talk to German instead; that German told
her: Wala nang madami pang usapan, basta mangako ka sa akin na magbibigay ka ng ₱200, 000.
00; and that she asked AAA about what had really happened, but the latter refused to answer her
query.6

Ruling of the RTC

As stated, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused CARLITO CLARO Y MAHIN A
Y GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of
 Page 95 of 165

reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim, AAA the total amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs. It appearing that accused is detained, the
period of his detention shall be credited in the service of his sentence.

SO ORDERED.7

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant APPEAL is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated November 17, 2008 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Criminal Case No. 06-
242729 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.8

The CA regarded AAA's testimony as credible; and ruled that the presence of bruises and abrasions
on the body of AAA proved that she had been subjected to bodily harm before he accomplished his
lustful desires. It observed that the fact that the parties had gone home together after the incident
was sufficiently explained by AAA's statement that she had no choice but to go with him because
she did not know her way back.

Issue

Did the R TC and the CA correctly find and pronounce the accused guilty of rape beyond reasonable
doubt?

Ruling of the Court

The Court acquits the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

It is noticeable that the versions of AAA and the accused ultimately contradicted each other on
whether rape or consensual sex had transpired between them. Their contradictions notwithstanding,
the circumstances - whether based on her recollection or on his - indicated that she had willingly met
with him on March 14, 2006 in order to go on a lovers' date. Their meeting on Augusto San
Francisco Street in Sta. Ana, Manila, and their going together by jeepney to Rizal Avenue, where
they entered the Jollibee restaurant to share the meal were undoubtedly by their prior agreement. It
was while they were in the restaurant when they discussed checking in at the Aroma Motel, but once
she assented to their checking in the Aroma motel, they walked together towards the motel, and
entered together.

The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of strong
corroboration. 9 This is because the mere fact that the accused and the victim were lovers should not
exculpate him from criminal liability for rape. In People v. Orquina, 10 the Court observed that an
allegation of a "love relationship" between the parties, even if found to be true, did not eliminate the
use of force to consummate the crime because the gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge of a
woman against her will and without her consent. As declared in People v. Gecomo: 11
 Page 96 of 165

It should be borne in mind that love is not a license for carnal intercourse through force or
intimidation. Even granting that appellant and complainant were really sweethearts, that fact alone
would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her
will. From a mere fiancee, definitely a man cannot demand sexual submission and, worse, employ
violence upon her on a mere justification of love. A man can even be convicted for the rape of his
common-law wife.

It is a time-honored tenet that the appreciation and assessment by the trial judge of the credibility of
witnesses are accorded respect primarily because the trial judge personally observed the conduct
and demeanor of the witnesses as to enable him or her to determine whether they were telling the
truth or merely fabricating it. 12 Another tenet of long standing is that the factual findings of the CA
affirming those of the trial judge are generally binding upon the Court, which is not a trier of
facts. 13 Based on these tenets, it would be easy to simply affirm the conviction of the accused herein
especially considering that both the RTC and the CA regarded AAA as a credible witness whose
testimony was worthy of belief.

Yet, it is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual intercourse interposed by
the accused. To be noted first and foremost is that he and AAA were adults capable of consenting to
the sexual intercourse. The established circumstances - their having agreed to go on a lovers' date;
their travelling together a long way from their meeting place on board the jeepney; their alighting on
Rizal Avenue to take a meal together; their walking together to the motel, and checking in together at
the motel without the complainant manifesting resistance; and their entering the designated room
without protest from her - indicated beyond all doubt that they had consented to culminate their
lovers' date in bed inside the motel.

Although she claimed that he had held her by the hand and pulled her upstairs, there is no evidence
showing that she resisted in that whole time, or exhibited a reluctance to enter the motel with him.
Instead, she appeared to have walked with him towards the motel, and to have entered it without
hesitation. What she did not do was eloquent proof of her consent.

Noting the medico-legal findings of bruises and abrasions on AAA, the CA concluded that she had
been subjected to some "bodily harm" by the accused to force himself on her, to wit:

x x x In the case before Us, We are convinced that the element of force was present. This is shown
by the fact that the accused-appellant held private complainant's hands to the point of dragging her
up the stairs of the motel, and by the fact that he pushed private complainant to the bed when the
latter tried to escape. Moreover, as We have mentioned above, the presence of bruises and
abrasions on private complainant's body evince the fact that latter was subjected to bodily harm
before accused-appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her. 14

That the medico-legal examination of March 14, 2006 turned up with the findings of abrasions on
AAA's left breast and contusions on her right hand did not necessarily mean that the accused had
applied force in the context of forcing her to have sex with him. The conclusion of the CA was,
therefore, too sweeping, for it inexplicably ignored the probability of consensuality between the
parties. Such findings did not justify the full rejection of the demonstrable consensuality of their
sexual intercourse. Moreover, the mere presence of abrasions and contusions on her did not
preclude the giving of her consent to the sexual intercourse, for abrasions and contusions could also
be suffered during voluntary submission of the partners to each other's lust. Such possibility calls for
us to open our minds to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse resulted from consensuality
between them.
 Page 97 of 165

In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 15

In the face of all the foregoing, we have reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused for rape.
Reasonable doubt –

x x x is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on
moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which,
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors
in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty,
of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law
independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent
until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is
entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability,
though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely
to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and
satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends
upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute
certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether. 16

The requirement of establishing the guilt of the accused in every criminal proceeding beyond
reasonable doubt has a long history that even pre-dates our Constitutions. As summed up by
jurisprudence of American origin:

The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The 'demand for a higher degree of
persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, (though) its
crystallization into the formula 'beyond a reasonable doubt' seems to have occurred as late
as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by
which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.' C.
McCormick, Evidence 321, pp. 681-682 (1954); see also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence, 2497 (3d
ed.1940). Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law
jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence does
'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
administered.' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155' 1451 (1968).

Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof
of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required. See, for example,
Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 , 358
(1895); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253, (1910); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 569
-570, 349, 350 (1914); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174, 1310 (1949); Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790, 795, 1005, 1006 (1952); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138, 136, 137
(1954); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526, 1342 (1958). Cf. Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432 (1895). Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that '(i)t the duty of the Government to
establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of
the boasts of a free society-is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the
historic, procedural content of 'due process." Leland v. Oregon, supra, 343 U.S., at 802 -803
(dissenting opinion). In a similar vein, the Court said in Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S., at
 Page 98 of 165

174 , that '(g)uilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by
evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some extent
embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that
standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard
men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and
property.' Davis v. United States, supra, 160 U.S., at 488 stated that the requirement is implicit in
'constitutions ... (which) recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the
protection of life and liberty.' In Davis a murder conviction was reversed because the trial judge
instructed the jury that it was their duty to convict when the evidence was equally balanced regarding
the sanity of the accused. This Court said: 'On the contrary, he is entitled to an acquittal of the
specific crime charged, if upon all the evidence, there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable
in law of committing crime .... No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless
the jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence before them .. .is
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged.' Id., at 484, 493, 360.

The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual
error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-that
bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.' Coffin v. United States, supra, 156 U.S., at 453. As the
dissenters in the New York Court of Appeals observed, and we agree, 'a person accused of a crime
... would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness,
if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as
would suffice in a civil case.' 24 N.Y.2d, at 205, 299 N.Y.S.2d, at 422, 247 N.E.2d, at 259.

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal
procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake
interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty
upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not
condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. As
we said in Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S., at 525 -526: 'There is always in litigation a margin of
error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party
has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error
is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process
commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of
... convincing the factfinder of his guilt.' To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is
indispensable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective
state of certitude of the facts in issue.' Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile
Law, 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 (1967).

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect

and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the
1avvph i1

moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his
guilt with utmost certainty.

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
 Page 99 of 165

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. 17

Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the guilt
of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. It further means that
the courts should duly consider every evidence favoring him, and that in the process the courts
should persistently insist that accusation is not synonymous with guilt; hence, every circumstance
favoring his innocence should be fully taken into account. 18 That is what we must be do herein, for
he is entitled to nothing less.

Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused herein was not overcome. His acquittal should follow, for, as we
have emphatically

reminded in Patula v. People: 19

x x x in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove
each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that
crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon
the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution
arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the
Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of
proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the
presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by
the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not
discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in
identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.20

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETSASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on March 24, 2011 affirming the conviction for rape
of CARLITOCLAROy MAHINAY under the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
21, in Manila; ACQUITS CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY for failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; ORDERS his immediate release from the National Penitentiary unless there are
other lawful causes warranting his continuing confinement thereat; and DIRECTS the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections to implement the release of CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY in accordance
with this decision, and to report on his compliance within l 0 days from receipt.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 100 of 165

G.R. No. 192232 December 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSE ESTALIN PRODENCIADO, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the February 4, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02861 affirming with modification the May 25, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 13, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case Nos, 3206-M-2000 to 3209-M-2000 which found
appellant Jose Estalin Prodenciado (Prodenciado) guilty of two counts of Statutory Rape and two
counts of Simple Rape.

Factual Antecedents

Prodenciado was charged with two counts each of Statutory Rape and Simple Rape committed his
own daughter, "AAA."3 The Informations for the charges narrate:

Crim. Case No. 3208-M-2000 for Statutory Rape

That in or about the year 1993, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threats, force and intimidation and
with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of his daughter "AAA," a girl 8 years of age, against her
will and consent.

Contrary to law.4

Crim. Case No. 3209-M-2000 for Statutory Rape

That in or about the year 1995, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threats, force and intimidation and
with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge ofhis daughter "AAA," below 12 years old, against her will
and consent.

Contrary to law.5

Crim. Case No. 3206-M-2000 for Simple Rape

That on or about the 13th day of August, 2000 at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of threats, force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal
knowledge of his daughter "AAA," a girl14 years of age, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.6
 Page 101 of 165

Crim. Case No. 3207-M-2000 for Simple Rape

That on or about the 13th day of August 2000 at about 11:30 in the morning, in the municipality of
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by
means of threats, force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of his
daughter "AAA," a girl 14 years of age, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.7

Upon arraignment, Prodenciado, assisted by counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty to the
crimes charged.

The Prosecution’s Case

As summarized in the Appellee’s Brief,8 the prosecution’s case is premised on the following facts:

"AAA" was born on December 13, 19859 to common[-]law spouses "BBB", a housewife, and Jose E.
Prodenciado (a.k.a. Rommel), a fisherman. The couple has five (5) children[,] with "AAA" being the
eldest. At the time the rape incidents took place, appellant and "AAA"resided at Sta. Barbara,
Baliuag, Bulacan.

xxxx

Sometime in 1993[,] at around noon, "AAA" brought food for appellant at the hut by the river where
her father usually rests after fishing. Suddenly, appellant pulled out a knife, poked it at her and told
her to go upthe hut with him. As soon as they reached the hut, appellant removed both their clothes
and told "AAA" to lie down on the floor. Appellant lowered himself atop "AAA" and inserted his penis
into her vagina.

After satiating his lust, appellant dressed and warned "AAA" not to tell anybody what happened[,] or
else[,] he would kill her mother. At that time, "AAA" was only eight (8) years old.

xxxx

The incident was repeated sometime in 1995 when "AAA" was then [10] years old and was in Grade
III.

While appellant was fishing near their place in Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan, he told "AAA" to go
with him to the hut. "AAA" obeyed and once there, she was instructed to take off her clothes. She
was made to lie down on the floor and while [in] that position, appellant [laid] on top of her. Appellant
then inserted his penis inside her vagina and raped her. There were no other people in the hut that
day.

Afterwards, appellant told her to put on her clothes and go home. "AAA" did as she was told and
upon reaching their house, she prepared to go to school. She did not report the incident to her
mother. She could not recall the exact date when she was raped the second time.

xxxx
 Page 102 of 165

On August 13, 2000, appellant repeated his dastardly acts. This time, "AAA" was sexually violated
not once but twice that same day.

At around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, "AAA," was doing the laundry by the river while appellant
was sharpening his bolo nearby. Suddenly, appellant, clutching his bolo, approached "AAA" and
dragged her towards the hut. At that time, the victim’s mother[,] "BBB," who was then cooking by
their stove outside the house about two (2) meters away[,] and two younger siblings saw appellant
pulling "AAA" towards the house. As appellant climbed the stairs, he warned "BBB" not to follow
them.

Inside the hut, appellant raised "AAA’s" blouse and forcibly took off her shorts and underwear.
Appellant kissed "AAA’s" lips and breasts then mounted her and consummated his bestial desires.
After satisfying his lust, appellant told "AAA" to dress up and go downstairs. "AAA" did as she was
told and resumed doing her laundry chores.

A few minutes thereafter, or at around 11:30 o’clock that same day, appellant, still holding his bolo,
called "AAA" and told her to go upstairs again to fix the clothes. "AAA" obeyed and, once again, she
was sexually ravished by her father.

On both times that "AAA" went down the hut with appellant, "BBB" noticed her daughter to be crying.
At that point, "BBB" suspected that "AAA" was being sexually abused by appellant. "BBB" wanted to
ask her daughter what appellant did to her, but she could not since they were constantly being
watched by appellant who was always armed with a bolo.

When Edwin, a neighbor, dropped by their place and talked with appellant, "BBB" took advantage of
the opportunity and advised "AAA" to report the incidents to the police. Subsequently, "BBB" devised
a plan to report the matter to the police authorities. "BBB" asked appellant’s permission to leave the
house on the pretext of buying medicines. Before she left, appellant warned her not to do anything
behind his back ("walang traiduran"). "BBB" then immediately proceeded to the police station where
she and the police officers plotted appellant’s arrest.

The following day, appellant was fishing by the river when the policemen arrived. "BBB" guided the
police towards the river and on their way thereto, she destroyed the fence so that the police would
be able to pass by without being noticed by appellant.

"BBB" called out [to] her husband and told him to come over as there was a snake. Knowing that
"BBB" was scared of snakes, appellant rushed to her side. The police immediately closed in on
appellant and effected his arrest.

Thereafter, "AAA" and "BBB" executed a complaint and caused the investigation of the rapes
committed against the victim. The victim was referred to the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office, Philippine National Police (PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan. Police Senior Inspector Ivan Richard A.
Viray, a Medico-Legal Officer, performed a physical examination on the victim. His Medico-Legal
Report No. MR-146-2000 disclosed his findings, thus:

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

PHYSICAL BUILT - Light built

PHYSICAL STATUS - Coherent female subject

 Page 103 of 165

BREAST[S] - Are conical in shape with light brown areola and nipples from which no
secretion could be pressed out

ABDOMEN - Is flat/soft

PHYSICAL INJURIES - No external signs of application of any form of trauma

GENITAL:

PUBIC HAIR - Scanty growth

LABIA MAJORA - Are full, convex and coaptated

LABIA MINORA - In between labia majora, pinkish brown in color

HYMEN - Elastic fl[e]shy type with the presence of deep healed laceration at 2 and 3 o’clock
positions

POSTERIOR FOURCHETTE - V-shaped or sharp

EXTERNAL VAGINAL

ORIFICE - Offers strong resistance to the examining index finger

VAGINAL CANAL - Narrow with prominent rugosities

CERVIX - Is firm/close[d]

PERI-URETHRAL &

PERI-VAGINAL SMEARS - Are negative for spermatozoa and negative for gram (-)
diplococci.

During the trial, [Dr.] Viray elucidated on the procedureshe undertook in examining the child
and gave his impressions on his findings, viz: (1) subject is in non-virgin state physically; and
(2) there are no external signs of application of any form of trauma.10

Appellant’s Defense

As set forth in his Accused-Appellant’s Brief,11 Prodenciado alleged that he could not have committed
the rape in 1993 as he was then a construction worker with a project in Pulilan, Bulacan and that the
nipahut where the alleged rape took place was built only in 1994. Anent the alleged rape in 1995, he
contended that "AAA" and "BBB" lived with his mother-in-law during that year and that "AAA" never
visited him in the nipahut by the river at any timethen. With regard the alleged rape on August 13,
2000, Prodenciado averred that "AAA" was already working in a factory at that time and she likewise
did not pay him any visit during that period.

Prodenciado asserted that "AAA" must have been impelled by anger in filing the cases against him
as he used to scold her for accepting suitors at a very young age. There were even occasions that
he hit her for coming home late. However, as "AAA" later on admitted to him that the suitors were not
 Page 104 of 165

hers but her mother’s, Prodenciado likewise surmised thathis wife wanted toget rid of him so she can
live-in with one of her suitors. In fact, immediately upon his detention, "BBB" already started living-in
with another man.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On May 25, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds [the] accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Statutory Rape thru carnal knowledge on two (2) counts in Crim. Case Nos. 3208-M-
2000 and 3209-M-2000, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for
each count (Total: Two (2) reclusion perpetua).

The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱100,000.00
for each count (Total: ₱200,000.00).

The Court likewise finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape thru
carnal knowledge on two (2) counts in Crim. Case Nos. 3206-M-2000 and 3207-M-2000, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count (Total: Two (2) reclusion
perpetua).

The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱50,000.00
for each count (Total: ₱100,000.00).

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA issued the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed decision is
AFFIRMED but MODIFIED by reducing the amount of civil liability from ₱100,000.00 to ₱75,000.00
for each count in Criminal Case Nos. 3208-M-2000 and 3209-M-2000, increasing the civil liability
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 for each count in Criminal Case Nos. 3206-M-2000 and 3207-M-
2000; and for appellant to pay private complainant the sums of ₱75,000.00 and ₱25,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages, respectively[,] for each count of rape against her.

SO ORDERED.13

Issues

Thus, this appeal. Both parties manifested that they were adopting the briefs they filed with the
CA.14 Hence, the Court shall resolve the assigned errors contained in Prodenciado’s Accused-
Appellant’s Brief, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

II
 Page 105 of 165

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [PRODENCIADO] GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLEDOUBT OF THE CRIME[S] CHARGED.15

Our Ruling

We sustain Prodenciado’s conviction.

"AAA’s" testimony deserves full weight and credence.

In People v. Sanchez,16 we reiterated the guidelines laid down by this Court in addressing the issue
of credibility of witnesses on appeal, viz:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments
and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly
when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.17

Here, the trial court found "AAA’s" testimony to becredible as it was made in a simple and consistent
manner. Notably, the CA agreed with the RTC on this point and saw no reason to overturn the same.
And upon perusal of the records of this case, this Court likewise sees no reason to depart from the
lower courts’ assessment of "AAA’s" testimony. Indeed, her statements pertaining to the identity of
Prodenciado as her violator and the perverseacts he visited upon her were straightforward and
categorical. Moreover, "[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age
and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."18

In rape cases, the date of commission is not an essential element of the offense.

Prodenciado, however, makes much of"AAA’s" failure to pinpoint the dates when she was raped.
According to him, this does not only render "AAA’s" credibility suspect, but likewise deprived him of
the full opportunity to defend himself thereby violating his right to due process.

Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that it isnot incumbent upon the victim to establish
the date when she was raped for purposes of convicting the perpetrator. This is because "[i]n rape
cases, the dateof commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its
occurrence,"19 which in this case, was sufficiently established by "AAA."

Moreover, Prodenciado’s assertion that he was deprived of the full opportunity to defend himself by
reason of "AAA’s" failure to disclose when the alleged rapes were committed was raised only during
his appeal. In People v. Aboganda,20 the Court declared that:
 Page 106 of 165

[I]f the accused really believed in the allegedly defective information and the prejudice to his rights,
he should have filed a motion for bill of particulars before his arraignment. We, thus, also rule in the
instant case that it is too late for accused-appellant to protest the [unspecified] dates found in the
informations against him.21

What is telling here instead is that despite his insistence that his right to due process was violated,
Prodenciado entered pleas of not guilty, went on to deny raping "AAA" and, in the process, even
offered a number of excuses to extricate himself from the consequences of his transgressions.

It is understandable that "AAA" has no clear memory on when the alleged rapes were committed as
she was still a minor when the incidents occurred and when she took the witness stand to testify
against her father. Yet, despite her age, and as the Court likewise foundin the similar case of People
v. Dominguez,22 she was "able to narrate the incidents, albeit not exactly with the same coherence as
a fully capacitated adult witness would."23 Thus, just as in the said case, "[l]eeway should be given to
witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse."24

"AAA’s" failure to immediately report

the rape incidents does not detract from
the fact that they were committed;
neither does "AAA’s" resumption of a
normal life after the incidents negate rape.

Prodenciado also finds fault in AAA’s failure to report the alleged rape incidents. He avers that if
"AAA" was indeed sexually abused, she should have wasted no time in reporting the matter to her
mother, brothers and sisters, other relatives and/or to the police considering that she was neither
pushed against the wall nor under Prodenciado’s watch 24 hours a day.

The Court notes, however, that "AAA" was able to satisfactorily explain why she kept silent about the
rapes for years and why, even if she had the chance, she did not run away or shout for help. She
testified, viz:

Q: x x x [A]ccording to you, appearing on page 5 of the transcript, [o]n August 13, 2000[,] allegedly
the accused in this case raped you at 11:00 in the morning?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you still recall where you proceeded after 11:00 in the morning of that date?

A: Yes, sir. I just remained there.

Q: You did not go anywhere?

A: [No], sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, you did not leave the house because, according to you, at 11:30[,] you were
again raped, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: There is a difference of 30 minutes. Do you want to impress to this Honorable Court that after the
first incident you just stayed there and waited for the other incident to occur?
 Page 107 of 165

A: No, sir, because he did not allow us to proceed to my lola’s house, sir.

Q: You made mention of the word "us[.]" When you mentioned the word "us[,]" you were with
somebody then and you were not alone?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, on that very date of August 13, 2000[,] you were with a person name[d]
[BBB]?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And this [BBB] is your mother

A: Yes, sir.25

xxxx

Q: Do you want to impress before this Honorable Court that the incident occurred in 1993 and you
k[ept] quiet about [it] until the year 2000?

A: Because the accused kept on telling me that if I report the matter he would kill me and my mother,
sir.

Q: Do you want to impress before this Honorable Court that in the year 2000 the accused did not
threaten you anymore because you already went to the police authorities and you were not afraid
anymore?

A: He warned me not to report the incident, sir.

Q: But you still reported the same?

A: Yes, sir.26

xxxx

Q: x x x [Y]ou will agree with me when I say that you had all the time to run away from the hut?

xxxx

A: I was nervous at that time, sir.

xxxx

I was afraid to run, sir.27

xxxx
 Page 108 of 165

Q: The only reason why[,] according to you[,] you did not shout in your answer[,] and I quote [from
page] 10, [of the February 21, 2002 transcript], "even [if I] shout[,] nobody can hear me," am I
correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Nobody can hearyou considering the fact that your mother was there?

A: My mother can hear me, sir, but [she] cannot do anything.28

xxxx

Q: Ms. Witness, x x x you said thatwhen you were raped by your father your mother was around and
you said you did not ask for help because your mother could not do anything, what do you mean by
that?

A: Because (referring to the accused) he was armed with [a] bolo (itak), sir.

Q: Are you afraid of itak?

A: I am afraid "baka patayin po ako[,"] sir.29

Clearly, "AAA" did not reveal to anyone what Prodenciado was doing to her out of fear that he might
make good his threats to kill her and her family. Indeed, in one case, we have recognized that "[t]he
fear of [the victim] that her father would kill her and the other members of her family, should she
report the incident to her mother or the police, is not so unbelievable nor is it contrary to human
experience."30 Besides, "the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not an indication of
a fabricated charge and does not detract from the fact that rape was committed."31

Prodenciado also questions the facilitywhereby "AAA" was able to resume her life despite the
supposed rape incidents. He avers, viz:

Not only did "AAA" fail to mention what ought to have been a traumatic experience to her older
sister, brothers and to her mother much earlier than she did, but she had apparently been able to
resume her life, as wellas her role as the obedient daughter to the accused-appellant, despite the
alleged rape. Most notable was her revelation during her direct testimony on February 21, 2002,
about the alleged rape that happened in 1995.

"AAA" recalled that after she was allegedly sexually molested by the accused, she was in fact sent
home, to which she obeyed and even mustered the courage to go to school after what could have
been a harrowing experience. x x x32 (Emphases supplied)

This hardly convinces. It has been held that "different people react differently to different situations
and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful experience,"33 such as rape. Verily, some victims choose to suffer in silence;
while others may be moved to action out of a need to seek justice for what was done to them. Then
there are those who opt not to dwell on their experience and try to live as though it never happened.
To the Court’s mind, thisis how "AAA" tried to cope with the harrowing experience that befell her.
Moreover, since she was just a young girl when all these rapes were committed against her, "AAA"
simply knew no other way of life than what she was accustomed to.
 Page 109 of 165

A medical report is merely corroborative to a claim of rape.

Prodenciado also points out that the result34 of the medical examination done on "AAA" merely
confirms the fact that she had already engaged in sexual intercourse and this does not necessarily
mean that it was with him.

While it is true that the result of "AAA’s" medical examination only supports the fact that "AAA" has
already had sexual intercourse and does not by itself establish that it was her father, Prodenciado,
with whom she had sex, this does not divest the results of medical examination of any relevance. In
People v. Cial35 it was explained that:

[T]he examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the victim and
on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature, extent and location
of the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among others, that "AAA" suffered hymenal
lacerations. This refers to the location and nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial
could not be expected to establish the cause of such lacerations with particularity because he has no
personal knowledge of how these hymenal lacerations were inflicted on "AAA." He could only
surmise that the lacerations could have been caused "by activities like cycling, horseback riding x x x
or the insertion ofa hard object into the vagina of the victim x x x such as the penis."36 (Emphases
supplied)

Clearly, the result of the medical examination and the testimony of the examining physician thereon
are essential to establish only the nature, extent and locations of the wounds and not the cause
thereof. Verily, "AAA’s" medical certificate reveals that she sustained hymenal lacerations. The
examining physician, Dr. Viray, testified as to the location and nature of the same. However, Dr.
Viray did not state on the said medical certificate or in his testimony the exact cause of said
lacerations as he has no personal knowledge as to how they were inflicted on "AAA." He could only
theorize that they may have been caused by the insertion of a hard object, such as an erected
penis.37 It is only "AAA" herself who can positively state the source of her hymenal lacerations. And
as shown by the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, she has sufficiently demonstrated that
it was her own father, Prodenciado, who caused the same when he repeatedly raped her.

In any case, this Court has already concluded that a medical report is not even material for purposes
of proving rape as itis merely corroborative in character and, thus, can be dispensed with
accordingly.38 In fact, the Court has consistently maintained that:

x x x The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly held that a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, and no law requires a
medical examination for the successful prosecution thereof. The medical examination of the victim or
the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape as the
testimony of the victim alone, ifcredible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The medical
examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate is merely corroborative in
character.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Prodenciado’s defenses of denial and alibi do not deserve credence.

Prodenciado would also have this Court believe that"AAA" and "BBB" had an axe to grind against
him, thus, the filing of the rape cases. He claims "AAA" may have harbored ill-feelings against him
for his having hit her ("napagbuhatan ng kamay") a number of times for entertaining suitors at a
young age and for coming home lateat night. "BBB," on the other hand, wanted him incarcerated as
she wanted to live-in with another man.
 Page 110 of 165

The Court, however, finds Prodenciado’s theory not only flimsy but also unsupported by any proof,
and, thus, unworthy of credence.

In People v. Amistoso,40 the Court had the opportunity to discuss that:

Alleged motives of family feuds, resentment, or revenge are not uncommon defenses, and have
never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who remained
steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examinations, especially a minor as in this case.

Moreover, the Court finds it difficult to believe that a young girl would fabricate a rape charge against
her own father as revenge for previous maltreatment, ruling in People v. Canoyas follows:

We must brush aside as flimsy the appellant[‘]s insistence that the charges were merely concocted
by his daughter to punish him for bringing in his illegitimate daughters to live with themand for
maltreating her. It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for
examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with
her family, to shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that
could mean the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not
have been aggrieved. Nor do we believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply
because she wanted to exact revenge against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and
maltreating her. (Citations omitted.)

Neither is the Court convinced that BBB would use and manipulate her own daughter, "AAA," to
wrongfully accuse Amistoso, her husband and "AAA’s" father, of rape, just to cover-up her alleged
affair with another man. It is unthinkable that a mother would sacrifice her daughter[‘]s honor to
satisfy her grudge, knowing fully well that such an experience would certainly damage her
daughter’s psyche and mar her entire life. A mother would not subject her daughter to a public trial
with its accompanying stigma on her as the victim of rape, if said charges were not true. (Emphases
supplied)

On the contrary, more telling is the fact that Prodenciado, in his testimony before the trial court, first
stated that he never hit the victim. Later and in an apparent effort to discredit "AAA" by imputing that
she was unduly resentful of him, he admitted that he hit her several times for returning home late.41

Anent Prodenciado’s other averments, i.e., that the nipahut where he allegedly raped "AAA" in 1993
was built only in 1994; that in 1995, "AAA" and "BBB" lived with the latter’s mother and the former
never visited him in the hut; and, that "AAA" was already working at a factory on August 13, 2000
and did not pay him any visit during the said period, suffice it to say that these are mere allegations
without proof. Moreover, it has been held that the defense of denial is inherently weak and self-
serving, especially if uncorroborated.42

Neither does Prodenciado’s alibi hold water. In order for the Court to consider the defense of alibi, it
must be shown that "it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
when it was committed."43 A perusal of Prodenciado’s testimony would show that despite his
adamant position that he could not have committed the rape in 1993 as he was then employed as a
construction worker in Pulilan, Bulacan, he was, however, unable to demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the crime when the rape incidents
occurred. Consequently, Prodenciado’s defense of alibi must fail. Moreover, alibi "cannot prevail
over ["AAA’s"] positive identification of [Prodenciado] asthe perpetrator of the crime."44

Appellant is liable for one count of

 Page 111 of 165

statutory rape and three counts of

qualified rape.

Coming now to the proper designation of the crimes committed, we are mindful of the fact that "AAA"
was born on December 13, 1985. Thus, she was only 8 years old when she was first raped by her
father in 1993; 10 years of age during the second rape which took place in 1995; and 14 years old
when the last two rapes were committed in the year 2000. It must also be pointed out that different
laws on rape are applicable to the rape cases subject of this appeal. During the commission of the
rape in 1993 (first rape), Article 335(3) of the RPC was the prevailing statute for the crime of rape,
viz:

Art. 335. When and how rapeis committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge ofa
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

As such, the CA was correct in upholding Prodenciado’s conviction for statutory rape and imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.45 However, in view of Republic Act No. 934646 (RA 9346),
he is not eligible for parole.

For the rape in 1995 (second rape), Article 335 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659 was already the
pertinent law in rapecases. The relevant portions thereof provide:

Art. 335. When and how rape iscommitted. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall x x x be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
 Page 112 of 165

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law-spouse of the parent of the victim

x x x x47 (Emphases supplied)

Here, the Information for the second rape subject of Criminal Case No. 3209-M-2000 alleges that the
rape was committed by appellant upon his own minor daughter "AAA," who was then 10 years old.
These were eventually proved during trial. Thus, it was correct for the trial court to hold Prodenciado
liable for rape under Article 335(3) of the RPC, albeit with the modification that it is qualified by the
attendant circumstances of minority and relationship48 which, as mentioned, were sufficiently alleged
in the Information and ultimately proved by the prosecution in the course of the proceedings below.
Accordingly, and in view of RA 9346,49 we impose upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
in lieu of the death penalty, without eligibility for parole.

Similarly, in the last two rape cases committed in 2000,the prosecution properly alleged in their
corresponding Informations and duly proved during trial that they were committed through force and
intimidation; that the victim "AAA" is a minor; and, that appellant as the offender is the victim’s father.
Hence, the trial court should have also found Prodenciado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape, not simple rape, under the now prevailing provisions on rape cases which is Article
266-A of the RPC, in relation to Article 266-B thereof. Pertinent portions of which provide:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed.- Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

xxxx

Article 266-B. Penalty. - x x x

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

As such, his penalty therefor shall also be reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for parole for each of
the two counts of qualified rape.

Damages awarded

For the statutory rape committed by Prodenciado against "AAA," we affirm the CA’s award of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However, the award of moral damages must be reduced to
₱50,000.00 while the award of exemplary damages must be increased to ₱30,000.00.
 Page 113 of 165

As regards the three counts of qualified rape, "AAA" is entitled to the following awards: ₱100,000.00
as civil indemnity for each count; ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each count; and ₱100,000.00
as exemplary damages for each count.50

Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the February 4, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02861
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant Jose Estalin Prodenciado is: (1) hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count of STATUTORY RAPE and three counts of QUALIFIED
RAPE; (2) sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, for the
statutory rape and for each count of qualified rape; (3) ordered to pay the victim "AAA" ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, in Criminal Case No. 3208-M-2000 (statutory rape), and (4) ordered to pay "AAA"
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. 3209-M-2000, 3206-M-2000 and
3207-M-2000 (qualified rape). Appellant is also ordered to pay interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 114 of 165

G.R. No. 209786

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JERRY c. PALOTES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The Court decides the appeal filed by the accused-appellant Jerry C. Palates from the
Decision1 dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 01301, which
affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. CBU-78851. The trial court adjudged the accused-
appellant guilty of one count of rape.

On January 5, 2007, the prosecution charged the accused-appellant of committing rape against
AAA3 in the following manner:

That on or about July, 2005 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, did then and there willfully and unlawfully have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], a 14-year
old MINOR with the mental abilities of an 8 to 9-year old child, without the consent and against the
will of the latter and knowing the mental disability of said minor at the time of the commission of the
crime.4

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.5 During trial, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) AAA,6 the private complainant; (2) BBB,7the
mother of AAA; (3) Dr. Naomi N. Poca,8 the medico-legal officer who examined AAA; and (4)
Rosemarie C. Gonato,9 a psychologist who examined AAA. The defense, on the other hand,
presented the testimonies of (1) the accusedappellant Jerry Palotes;10 (2) Rose Bistes,11 a friend of
the accusedappellant’s common-law wife; and (3) Marina Abella,12 the owner of the house rented by
the accused-appellant. Thereafter, Loren J. Borines,13 a forensic chemist from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), testified on the results of the court ordered Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test that
she conducted.

The Prosecution’s Version of Events

As summarized in the Brief for the Appellee14 filed before the Court of Appeals, the prosecution’s
pertinent factual allegations are as follows:

The fourteen (14) years old minor victim, AAA, also known as ["ZZZ,"] lives with her mother BBB and
her father CCC in YYY, Cebu City. AAA has the mental abilities of an 8-9 years old child. She is an
illiterate and no longer goes to school.

Sometime prior to July 2005, AAA was asked by her neighbor, Dimple, to buy a diaper. While AAA
was on her way back to her neighbor’s house, she was pulled by appellant Jerry Palotes inside the
latter’s house. Appellant then held AAA, laid her down, removed her short pants and underwear. He
then lowered down his brief up to hi ees, kissed AAA’s lips and neck and inserted his penis into
AAA’s vagina. When AAA felt pain, appellant stopped and told her to go home. Upon reaching
home, she did not tell her mother about what happened because she was scared.
 Page 115 of 165

The second time that the appellant had sexual intercourse with AAA was when her friend called her
to take care of her niece while Jerry was also inside the same house. Appellant then invited the
minor victim to enter the house, pulled her inside and closed the door. He held AAA’s hands, laid her
down, removed her short pants and underwear, kissed her lips and neck and inserted his penis and
pushed it inside AAA’s vagina despite her pleas not to continue. When appellant kept on pushing his
penis inside [her] vagina, AAA felt that her vagina was wet. Appellant Palotes took off his shirt and
wiped her vagina with it. He advised AAA not to tell anyone about what happened and the latter went
home.

The third time that appellant had sexual intercourse with AAA was when he was washing clothes in
front of the minor victim’s house. They had a chat, with appellant telling AAA that she was beautiful.
She just smiled. He then rushed washing his clothes and told AAA to get inside the house while he
hang dry his clothes. When AAA was inside the house, the appellant followed her and removed her
short pants and panty.

He then inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina just like what he did last time. He then told AAA not
to tell anyone and it would be between the two of them. Afterwards, AAA went home.15 (Citations
omitted.)

As regards the subsequent events and the medical examinations conducted on AAA, the
prosecution stated that:

On September 23, 2005, AAA was brought by her mother, BBB, to her grandmother in [XXX], Cebu.
Her grandmother noticed that AAA did not have her monthly period. BBB and the grandmother
brought AAA to a Health Center in [XXX] where it was known that AAA was already pregnant for five
(5) months. When BBB tried to ask AAA who impregnated her, AAA would just keep her silence and
say nothing.

They then brought AAA to the Pink Room of VSMMC for medical examination where it was
confirmed that AAA was indeed pregnant. AAA finally told her mother that it was Jerry Palotes whom
she had sexual intercourse [with] but she cannot recall when it happened. BBB identified appellant
Jerry Palotes as their neighbor who lives in front of their house. She then asked the appellant but he
strongly denied it. AAA gave birth last April 5, 2006.

Dr. Naomi Poca, a resident physician at the Women and Children Protection Center of the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Hospital in Cebu City, brought the medical records of the minor victim particularly the
medical chart which includes the Medical Certificate, Intake Form, and Medico- Legal Certificate.
She interviewed the victim and her mother and together with Dr. Amadora, the OB gynecologist
connected with the Center, conducted a physical examination on AAA. The medical report stated
that AAA suffered "a complete transection at 6 o’clock position extending to the fossa navicularis and
her ano-genital examination findings are definite for blunt or penetrative trauma to the hymen. Dr.
Poca noted that the transection indicates that blunt forces were applied to the hymen of the vagina
and the blunt penetrating trauma applied to the hymen caused its laceration.

Dr. Rosemarie Gonato, a psychiatrist, conducted a psychological evaluation on AAA. She confirmed
that AAA’s mental age is equivalent to 6 to 7 years of age and places her functioning within the mild
mental retardation [range].16 (Citations omitted.)

The prosecution presented the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit A – the Affidavit17 of AAA;
(2) Exhibit B – the Affidavit18 of BBB; (3) Exhibit B-1 – the Birth Certificate19 of AAA; (4) Exhibit C –
the Medico-Legal Certificate20 of AAA; (5) Exhibit C-1 – the results of the Anogenital Examination21 on
 Page 116 of 165

AAA; (6) Exhibit C-2 – the Interview Sheet22 reflecting the interview of AAA conducted at the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Hospital; and (7) Exhibit D – the Psychological Evaluation Report23 on AAA.

The Defense’s Evidence

The defense countered the prosecution’s statement of facts with the testimonies of its own witnesses
which were condensed in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant24 filed before the Court of Appeals,
thusly:

To refute the allegations of the prosecution, the defense presented the accused Jerry C. Palotes,
Marina Abella and Rose Bistes.

Accused Jerry C. Palotes strongly denied the allegations against him and alleged that when this
case was initially filed at the Office of the Barangay [YYY], [AAA] could not identify or remember who
sexually abused her. She was merely prodded by her relatives to point him as the perpetrator in their
desperate effort to get financial support for the child. He surmised that since the complainant gave
birth to the child in April 2006, he could not have been the father of the child since he was always not
in his rented house. Moreover, since he has a live-in partner, there was no opportunity for him to do
the alleged act aside from the fact that he does not have any sexual desire on her because he
treated her as a younger sister considering her mental condition and her being a child of tender age.
Further, he heard from among the neighbors that the complainant would usually go with other people
and was even seen sleeping together with a certain Junjun, a balut vendor. There are also rumors
that a certain Berto, a taxi driver, who frequently visited the place, was also seen together with
complainant. Since complainant is very susceptible to suggestion, she merely adopted the
suggestion by some of her relatives including her mother that he [the accused] should be pointed out
as the one who fathered her new born child. Furthermore, on two occasions, [he] was approached
by the mother of the complainant telling him that she would not pursue the filing of the case if he
promise[d] to shoulder the hospital expenses when the complainant would give birth as well as the
expenses for food, milk and other needs of the child.

Marina Abella testified that she is the owner of the house rented by the accused. She also lives
within said vicinity and she can attest to the fact that accused is not usually at the rented house as
he was busy in his work as a janitor. She also attests to the fact that she saw [AAA] in the company
of several people; children, men, women and even strangers. The charge against accused was
merely a product of prodding by some of the relatives of the complainant for the purpose of getting
support from accused.

Rose Bistes testified that she is one of the neighbors of the accused. She can attest to the fact that
accused is known to be good in their place.25 (Citations omitted.)

The defense also submitted in evidence the following documents: (1) Exhibit 1 – the Counter-
Affidavit26 of the accused-appellant; (2) Exhibit 2 – the Affidavit27 of Rose Bistes; and (3) Exhibit 3 –
the Affidavit28 of Marina Abella.

During trial, the defense requested for the conduct of a DNA test in order to prove that the accused-
appellant was not the father of AAA’s child.29 The RTC granted this request in an Order30 dated May
21, 2009.

On May 6, 2010, Loren J. Borines, the NBI forensic chemist who conducted the DNA testing,
testified that she analyzed the buccal swabs and blood samples taken from the accused-appellant,
AAA and DDD, AAA’s child.
 Page 117 of 165

The results of her examination were contained in a report designated as DNA Case No. DNA-09-32,
wherein she concluded that "there is a 99.9995% Probability of Paternity that [the accused-appellant]
is the biological father of [DDD]."31

The prosecution marked as its Exhibits E and E-1, respectively, the report of Borines entitled DNA
Case No. DNA-09-32 and the visual aid32 she displayed when she testified in court.33

The Decision of the RTC

The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of one count of rape in its Decision dated February 10,
2011. The dispositive portion thereof provides:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is rendered finding accused, GERRY C.
PALOTES, GUILTY as principal beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE pursuant to Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. 8353 and sentences him to an indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua under the first paragraph of Article 266-B.

He is also ordered to pay the minor through h[er] parents the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(Php50,000.00[)], for and as civil damages.

Costs de oficio.34

The trial court ruled that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses established the fact that AAA
was not only a 14-year old minor but she had the mental abilities of an eight to nine-year old child.
According to the RTC, the accused-appellant himself admitted that he treated AAA as a younger
sister given her mental condition and her being a child of tender age. Likewise, Marina Abella, a
witness for the defense, acknowledged that AAA was mentally deficient.

The RTC ascribed greater weight to the testimony of AAA. The trial court noted that the same was
replete with specifics on how the accusedappellant sexually abused AAA and she alone could have
supplied such details. The RTC further observed that AAA’s testimony was given in a straightforward
manner. If there were inconsistencies therein, the trial court deemed the same inconsequential given
AAA’s mental condition. As regards the corroborative testimonies of the defense witnesses Marina
Abella and Rose Bistes, the trial court concluded that the same were hearsay evidence. Given that
so many persons allegedly talked to said witnesses, not one of them testified for the defense. The
RTC added that the insistence of the accused-appellant that he be subjected to a DNA test together
with AAA and DDD, and the positive result of said test, had no bearing on the outcome of the case
since paternity is not an element of rape.

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

On appeal,35 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant for one count of
rape in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the February 10, 2011 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Cebu City is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION
that the accused-appellant JERRY PALOTES is ORDERED to pay AAA, [through] her parents, the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity plus interest of 6% per annum
reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.36
 Page 118 of 165

The Court of Appeals found that despite AAA’s mental condition, she clearly identified the accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the rape and the father of her child. The appellate court posited that
AAA’s testimony was complete with specifics on how the accused-appellant sexually abused her.
Her categorical and consistent identification of the accused-appellant was devoid of any showing of
ill motive and the same, therefore, prevailed over the latter’s defenses of alibi and denial. The Court
of Appeals also ruled as credible and consistent the sworn statement of AAA dated April 27, 2006,
wherein she made a candid and straightforward narration of how the accused-appellant raped her.
To the appellate court, AAA’s mental retardation per se did not affect her credibility and the
inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony on collateral and minor matters were not enough to discredit the
same. Moreover, AAA’s assertion that the accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her was
substantially corroborated by the medical findings on her vaginal injuries.

The Ruling of the Court

In his appeal37 before this Court, the accused-appellant reiterated his argument that the trial court
erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant admitted that he knew of AAA’s mental
handicap and he claimed that other people merely prompted AAA to execute her sworn statement.
The accused-appellant further alleged that the testimony of AAA was unclear and inconsistent, thus
falling short of the required credibility to be the basis of the accused-appellant’s conviction. As the
evidence of the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, he argued that his
acquittal must follow.

The Court finds no merit in the accused-appellant’s appeal.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Thus, for a charge of rape to prosper under the above provision, the prosecution must prove that: (1)
the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force,
threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under twelve years of age or was demented.

The element of carnal knowledge in this case was adequately established by the testimony of AAA.
Before the trial court, AAA stated that a neighbor asked her to buy diapers. After buying the diapers,
she was on her way to her neighbor’s house when she encountered the accusedappellant. The latter
made AAA get inside his house and made her lie on the floor. The accused-appellant removed his
shorts and underwear and that of AAA’s. He lay beside AAA and started kissing her lips and neck.
 Page 119 of 165

He then inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and she felt pain. Afterwards, AAA went home. AAA did
not tell her mother about the incident because she was afraid of the accused-appellant. AAA also
positively identified the accusedappellant in open court and she denied that her mother merely
forced her to wrongly accuse him.38

The RTC found worthy of credence the above testimony of AAA and her positive and consistent
identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Court of Appeals similarly
held AAA to be a credible witness when it affirmed the accused-appellant’s conviction. After
reviewing the testimony of AAA, as well as the records of this case, the Court finds no reason to
deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts. Verily, we see no justification to disturb the
lower courts’ appreciation of the credibility of AAA’s testimony. As discussed in Dizon v. People39:

Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration, as in this
case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and was in the best position to discern whether
they were telling the truth. When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
as in the present case, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. (Citation omitted.)

Furthermore, the testimony of AAA that she suffered sexual abuse was bolstered by the Medico-
Legal Certificate (Exhibit C) issued by Dr. Naomi N. Poca, a physician at the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Hospital in Cebu City, which revealed that AAA was in a non-virginal state and was in fact pregnant.
Dr. Poca concluded that: "[a]nogenital examination findings are definite for blunt or penetrative
trauma to the hymen. Pregnancy, uterine, 20-24 weeks age of gestation by fundal height."40

To disprove the charge against him, the accused-appellant denied AAA’s accusations and
interposed an alibi. In his counter-affidavit that was made part of his testimony, the accused-
appellant claimed that at the time when the alleged sexual abuse occurred in July 2005, he was
busy looking for a job so he was not always in his rented house in YYY, Cebu City. Moreover, the
accused-appellant alleged that he had a live-in partner such that there was no opportunity for him to
commit the crime charged. Said refutations, however, ring hollow.

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses; unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim.41 In the case of an alibi, the
requirements of time and place should be strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the
accused must not only show that he was somewhere else but that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.42

The accused-appellant in the instant case utterly failed to substantiate his allegations. In his cross-
examination, he stated that in July 2005, he was indeed the neighbor of AAA in YYY, Cebu City. At
that time, he said he was busy looking for work but only within the city. Furthermore, he would return
to his house in YYY everyday after his job hunting.43 Clearly, the alibi of the accused-appellant is at
most unspecific and vague as to his exact whereabouts and the fact that he goes back everyday to
his house – the locus criminis in this case – does little in proving the requisite physical impossibility
of his presence therein when the crime was committed.

Other than his own flimsy testimony, he presented the testimonies of defense witnesses Rose Bistes
and Marina Abella.44 However, said testimonies were insufficient to validate the accused-appellant’s
averments.
 Page 120 of 165

Rose Bistes merely stated that the accused-appellant could not have committed the crime charged
because he was known in their locality to be a good person,45 but she admitted in her cross-
examination that her knowledge of the case was only derived from what a certain Fe Berdin told
her.46 Marina Abella, on the other hand, stated that the accused-appellant could not have raped AAA
because he was "not usually at [his] rented house as he was busy in his work as [a] janitor" and that
she saw AAA in the company of other male persons anyone of whom could have fathered AAA’s
child.47 On cross-examination, however, Marina Abella said that she could not even remember the
month and year when the accused-appellant was busy working as a janitor, nor could she recall the
time when AAA was supposedly raped by the accused-appellant.48 Clearly, the testimonies of the
above witnesses hardly provide any concrete corroboration of the accused-appellant’s allegations.

Set against the credible testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-appellant as
her abuser, the latter’s self-serving denial and alibi cannot absolve him of the crime charged.

Carnal knowledge of a woman who is mentally deficient constitutes rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as such a woman is automatically
considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. We held in People v. Caoile49 that "the
phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from
mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation." Accordingly, what needs to be proven are the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.50

That AAA was mentally deficient – thus, deprived of reason – when the accused-appellant
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her was clearly established in this case. Dr. Rosemarie
Gonato, a psychologist at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Hospital, testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of AAA. The results thereof indicated that "[AAA’s] mental age [was]
equivalent to a child [of] 6 to 7 years of age and x x x her functioning [was] within the mild mental
retardation."51 Dr. Gonato also issued a Psychological Evaluation Report, which was marked in
evidence by the prosecution. Moreover, as found by the trial court, the accused-appellant himself
admitted that he knew of AAA’s mental deficiency52 and defense witness Marina Abella likewise
attested that AAA had a mental problem.53 Therefore, the Court sustains the conviction of the
accused-appellant of the crime charged.

Incidentally, the Court notes that the prosecution filed only one information for rape against the
accused-appellant yet in the statement of facts set out in the Brief for the Appellee filed before the
Court of Appeals, the prosecution related three instances of rape committed by the
accusedappellant against AAA. Nonetheless, we agree with the lower courts that the accused
should be penalized for only one count of rape. This is so as AAA testified to only one count of rape,
without any mention at all of any other instance of sexual abuse. No other evidence was presented
to substantiate the alleged second and third incidents of rape. Settled is the rule that every charge of
rape is separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.54

The Proper Penalty

The accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental deficiency at the time he committed the rape
qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death in accordance with Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Said provision pertinently provides:

ART. 266-B. Penalties. – x x x.

xxxx
 Page 121 of 165

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

xxxx

10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental condition was specifically alleged in the
information, proven by the evidence of the prosecution and admitted by the accused-appellant
during trial, said qualifying circumstance is applicable. Thus, the proper imposable penalty in this
case is death. However, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346,55 the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.

As to the accused-appellant’s civil liability, the trial court ordered him to pay AAA the amount of
P50,000.00 as "civil damages." The Court of Appeals, thereafter, modified the same by awarding
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of judgment
until full payment thereof.

Following our recent ruling in People v. Cataytay,56 which is akin to the present case involving the
crime of qualified rape punishable by death but reduced to reclusion perpetua, the Court increases
the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed against the accused-appellant as follows:
Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; Pl00,000.00 as moral damages; and Pl00,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Additionally, we impose 6% interest per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 01301 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amounts
of indemnity and damages are increased as follows: Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; Pl00,000.00 as
moral damages; and Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts are also subject to interest at
1âwphi1

the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 122 of 165

G.R. No. 208749 November 26, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision1 dated March 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 05374, which upheld the Decision2 dated November 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City (stationed in Taguig City), Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. 139521,
convicting Anecito Estibal y Calungsag (accused-appellant) of the crime of Rape under Article 266-
A(2), in relation to Article 266-B(5)(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 83533 and in further relation to Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 8369.4

The falloof the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Anecito Estibal y Calungsag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole
in lieu of the death penalty; and to pay AAA5 the amount of PhP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; PhP
75,000.00 as moral damages, and PhP 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.6 (Citation omitted)

Antecedent Facts

The accusatory portion of the Information7 for rape against the accused-appellant filed on February
6, 2009 reads:

That on or about the 5th day of February, 2009 in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while taking advantage of his moral
authority and ascendancy and with his intention to gratify his sexual desire upon his daughter [AAA],
by means of force, violence and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
succeed in having sexual intercourse with the latter against her will and consent, the said crime
having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority, as the said
accused being the natural father of the victim, a thirteen (13)[-]year[-]old, a minor atthe time of the
commission of the crime, which is aggravated by the circumstances of abuse of superior strength
and dwelling, all to the damageand prejudice of the said victim [AAA].

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The accused-appellant, 43 years old, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on March 9, 2009. But
during the pre-trial, BBB, wife of the accused-appellant and mother of AAA, the minor victim,
disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case. Her reasons were that she pitied the accused-
appellant and, according to her, AAA had already forgiven her father. But having entered the
accused-appellant’s plea, the trial court refused to entertain their desistance.9
 Page 123 of 165

At the trial, four witnesses came forward to testify for the prosecution. The testimony of the first
witness, Dr. Jesille Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) who conducted the medicolegal examination on AAA, was
stipulated by the prosecution and the defense, as follows:

1. That she is a Police Chief Inspector of the PNP particularly assigned at the PNP Crime
Laboratory as Medico Legal Examiner;

2. That she was the one who conducted the medico-legal examination on the minor victim on
February 5, 2009;

3. That she reduced her examination into writing and issued the Initial Medico Legal Report
Case No. R09-288 which Anogenital findings are diagnostic of previous blunt force or
penetrating trauma (to the hymen);

4. And that she also issued other documents in relation to the examination.10

The parties also agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of Michael Estudillo (Estudillo) and Ronillo
Perlas (Perlas), members of the Barangay Security Force (BSF) who arrested the accused-appellant
as he was coming home from work at 6:00 p.m. on February 5, 2009, to wit:

1. That BSF Michael Estudillo and BSF Ronilo Perlas are members of the Barangay Security
Force x x x;

2. That in the evening of February5, 2009 while they were on duty at x x x, the minor victim
and her mother appeared at their office and reported that the victim was molested or sexually
abused by the accused; and that based on this report, they proceeded to the house of the
perpetrator;

3. That while on their way, they met the accused and informed him about the complaint of
the minor victim and eventually arrested him without the corresponding warrant of arrest and
brought to their office;

4. That based on the incident, they referred the case to the Taguig City Police Station for
proper disposition; and

5. That they have no personal knowledge as to the incident.11

Concerning AAA and BBB, several subpoenas were sent to their address for the taking of their
testimonies, but they never appeared. On April 13, 2010, it was reported to the court that they had
moved out of their house, and subsequent subpoenas were returned unserved.12

The prosecution’s last witness, Police Officer 3 Fretzie S. Cobardo (PO3 Cobardo), was the officer
assigned at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Women and Children Protection Center of Taguig
City. It was she who investigated the above incident and took down the sworn statement of AAA late
in the evening of February 5, 2009. Her testimony was also stipulated, as follows:

1. that she is a member of the PNP assigned at the Women and Children Protection Desk,
Taguig City Police Station;

2. that she was the investigating officer at the time the accused was brought to the police
station;
 Page 124 of 165

3. that she personally encountered the private offended party and the accused;

4. that she brought the private offended party to the PNP Crime Laboratory for Genito
Physical Examination;

5. that she was present at the time the private offended party executed an affidavit
complaint;

6. that she was the one who brought the private offended party and the accused for inquest
proceedings;

7. that she has no personal knowledge as to the incident which gave rise to this case;

8. that Exhibit "A" was the same document executed by the mother of the victim as well as
the victim herself before her;

9. that Exhibit "G" was the same Medico Legal Report that was transmitted to her by the
PNP Crime Laboratory;

10. that she was the one who received the Initial Medico-Legal Report.13

On clarificatory questioning by the court, PO3 Cobardo narrated how she was trained to prepare for
her assignment as desk officer at the PNP Women and Children Protection Center; that during her
investigation of AAA and BBB, they were both crying; that without being asked leading questions
and without being coached by her mother, AAA, 13 years old and a first-year high school student,
revealed in detail how the accused-appellant abused her for several years and how he raped her
that morning of February 5, 2009; that AAA told that the first time she was raped by her father was
when she was in Grade III, but this was the first time she was telling anyone about the rapes; that
BBB told PO3 Cobardo that she could not imagine how her husband could commit such an outrage
against their own daughter; that from her own observations of AAA’s demeanor, PO3 Cobardo was
convinced that she was telling the truth.14

The accused-appellant’s defense consisted mainly of denial. From his testimony, the court learned
that the accused-appellant, his wife BBB and their two children, AAA and CCC, livedin a one-room
house in Taguig City; that he and his wife were employed as security guards in Taguig City; that on
February 4, 2009, his wife was on night duty and came home the next morning; that on the night of
the alleged rape, he and his two children retired for the night at around midnight, and thus, he could
not have sexually abused his daughter AAA between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on February 5, 2009;
that he and his wife used to fight about her brothers Romulo and Rey Santos, whom he now
suspected of influencing AAA to file the complaint for rape against him, although he treated themas
his own brothers; that he was arrested by the Barangay Tanodat 6:00 p.m. on February 5, 2009 as
he was coming from work.15

Relying on PO3 Cobardo’s testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the RTC considered the
spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by PO3 Cobardoas part of the res
gestae, and convicted the accused-appellant. The court said:

Thus, the court considers the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by PO3
Cobardo. Moreover, there is nothing on record that would compel the court to believe that said
prosecution witness has improper motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Accordingly, it shall uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties. Further,
 Page 125 of 165

the testimony of PO3 Cobardo was corroborated by the findings of Dr. Jesille Baluyot of a shallow
healed lacerations at 4 and 8 o’clock and deep healed laceration at5 o’clock positions in the hymen
of AAA which Anogenital findings are diagnostic of previous blunt force or penetrating
trauma.16 (Citations omitted)

Below is the pertinent portion ofPO3 Cobardo’s testimony cited by the RTC:

COURT –

Some questions from the Court.

Q PO3 Cobardo[,] you were the one who investigated the minor victim in this case?

A Yes[,] Your Honor.

Q Could you tell the Court what is the appearance of the victim at the time of the
investigation?

A At that time Your Honor the victim was together with her mother, they were crying.

Q Both were crying?

A Yes[,] Your Honor.

Q When you conducted the investigation[,] the mother was present?

A Yes[,] Your Honor, the mother was present.

Q You were aware of course when you inquired the age of the minor?

A Yes[,] Your Honor.

Q When she narrated the incident[,] was she coached by the mother?

A No[,] Your Honor, the victim was not coached by the mother. It was the victim who stated
all the incident.

Q Did you make, did you use leading questions in conducting, propounding the questions?

A No[,] Your Honor.

Q How did you ask the victim? Was it in a question and answer where first you will ask the
victim to narrate the incident?

A Yes[,] Your Honor. First I asked the victim to narrate the incident.

Q And then you propounded question in the question and answer form?

A Yes[,] Your Honor.

 Page 126 of 165

Q After obtaining all the facts relative to the incident?

A Yes[,] Your Honor.

Q And you found out that, was that the first time that the incident happened or several times
already?

A During that interview[,] Your Honor[,] I found out that the victim was sexually abused by her
father several times when she was in Grade III.

Q You mentioned that the victim and her mother during your investigation were both crying?

A Yes[,] Your Honor[.]

Q Did you inquire why?

A The mother told me that she could not imagine that her husband molested their daughter.

Q How about the daughter? Did you inquire? Did you allow her some time to rest?

A She was crying[,] Your Honor[,] since it was her first time to reveal the incident.

Q So you asked her why she was crying?

A Yes[,] Your Honor.

Q Because, I notice, actually I noticed in the preliminary question you stated "hindi ako
magagalit, kahit ano ang sasabihin mo sa akin, naiintindihan mo ba lahat ng sinabi ko". It
may be a preliminary question because you have attended seminars on this. Is that right?

A Yes[,] Your Honor.

COURT –

So judging from the preliminary question[,] I know that you had undergone seminars on how
to conduct questions on child abuse cases.

WITNESS

Yes[,] Your Honor.

COURT –

Q Are you convinced that the victim is telling the truth?

A Yes[,] Your Honor, I am convinced.

Q Why are you convinced? Convinced based on your questions that you propounded, why
are you convinced?
 Page 127 of 165

A Because for a father and daughter relationship it’s not good, it’s not easy to accused [sic]
your father of sexual abuse.

Q So judging from the appearance of the minor she would be able to tell the Court that she is
telling the truth?

A Yes[,] Your Honor.

Q How many seminars have you attended relative to on how to conduct examination on child
abuse?

A Many times already[,] Your Honor.

x x x x17

Significantly, it appears from the sworn statement,18 executed by AAA before PO3 Cobardo, that she
first revealed her ordeal to her cousin DDD that same afternoon of February 5, 2009. With DDD’s
help, BBB confronted her daughter AAA, who told her that the accused-appellant did not only rape
her that morning, but had sexually abused her several times since she was in Grade III.

Appeal to the CA

On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant maintained that due to the absence of AAA’s testimony,
the prosecution failed to establish the circumstances proving beyond reasonable doubt that he raped
his daughter; that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and
BSF Perlas, not being themselves victims or witnesses to the "startling occurrence" of rape, cannot
create the hearsay exception of res gestae [literally, "things done"]; and, that the medical findings of
Dr. Baluyot do not prove that he had carnal knowledge of AAA but only that she had had sexual
relations.

In its appellee’s brief, the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) asserted that although AAA did not
personally testify, and none of the prosecution witnesses had any direct knowledge of the sexual
molestation of AAA by the accused-appellant, his guilt was fully established by circumstantial
evidence. In particular, the OSG argued that the testimony of PO3 Cobardo concerning what AAA
narrated to her during her investigation was part of the res gestae pursuant to Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. The OSG reasoned that AAA had just undergone a startling occurrence at the time she told
PO3 Cobardo that she had been raped by her father that morning, a statement which PO3 Cobardo
found spontaneous and credible; that the gap between the sexual assault and the time when AAA
made her narration to PO3 Cobardo was too short to permit fabrication by AAA of such a serious
accusation against her own father; and, that AAA made the charge in the presence of her mother
could only have lent credence to her claim. Moreover, the claim of rape by AAA is corroborated by
Dr. Baluyot’s finding that she has genital lacerations, in contrast to the accused-appellant’s only
defense of a general and uncorroborated denial.

The appellate court agreed withthe RTC and the OSG that the testimonies of the three prosecution
witnesses, PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas, form part of the res gestae, although none
of them was a participant, victim or spectator to the crime. According to the CA, "they heard what
[AAA] said when she reported the sexual abuse committed against her by accused-appellant
Estibal."19 To further quote the CA:
 Page 128 of 165

Thus, in this case, even if prosecution witnesses BSF Estudillo, BSF Perlas and PO3 Cobardo were
not present during the startling occurrence experienced by AAA, they heard what she said when she
reported the sexual abuse committed against her by accused-appellant Estibal. There is no merit to
the argument of accused-appellant Estibal that, since prosecution witnesses BSF Estudillo, BSF
Perlas and PO3 Cobardo were "neither participants or victims or spectators to the crime of rape
being charged against the accused-appellant" their testimonies could not be considered as part of
the res gestae.

The testimonies of said prosecution witnesses comply with the above-mentioned requisites, viz.,
there is no question that the sexual abuse committed by accused-appellant Estibal against her
daughter AAA was a startling occurrence and a traumatic experience, at that; she had no opportunity
to contrive or devise falsehood when she reported the crime to BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas and
narrated the incident to PO3 Cobardo hours after the incident; and, the statements she made was
relative to her sexual abuse by accused-appellant Estibal and its attending circumstances.

There might be an intervening period between the time the crime of rape was committed and the first
time it was reported by AAA to the prosecution witnesses. However, said intervening period of less
than twenty-four (24) hours is so short a time for AAA to fully recover physically and emotionally from
such a traumatic and harrowing experience, considering her tender age of only thirteen (13) years
and the fact that her abuser is her own biological father.

Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a
crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the
declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened,
between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus
restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.

Indeed, the statements made by AAA before BSF Estudillo, BSF Perlas and PO3 Cobardo were
spontaneous and her utterances were inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any
opportunity to fabricate a false statement.

There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a
number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to: (1) the time that has
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the
place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given,
(4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement
relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. The Supreme
Court, in People v. Manhuyod, has explained the import of the first four factors; thus: "x x x (C)ases
are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling event
and the making of the declaration. What is important is that the declarations were voluntarily and
spontaneously made ‘so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which
they illustrate or explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the
ideas of design or deliberation.’

"As to the second factor, it may be stressed that ‘a statement made, or an act done, at a place some
distance from the place where the principal transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such
spontaneity as would render it admissible.’

"Anent the third factor, ‘[a] statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the time when it
was made, the conditions of the declarant was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the
occurrence on his mind still continued, as where he had just received a serious injury, was suffering
 Page 129 of 165

severe pain, or was under intense excitement. Conversely, a lack of spontaneity may be inferred
from the cool demeanor of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in
making a statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a different
statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence.’

"With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there intervened between the
event or transaction and the making of the statement relative thereto, any circumstance calculated to
divert the mind of the declarant which would thus restore his mental balance and afford opportunity
for deliberation."20 (Citations omitted)

Automatic review by the Supreme Court

Without the res gestae exception, the evidence of the prosecution would consist mainly of hearsay
statements by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas all reiterating what AAA allegedly told
them. The same question, whether res gestaeas an exception to the hearsay rule must be
appreciated from the factual circumstances of the case, is now before this Court in this automatic
review.

To pardon her father, AAA chose to ignore the trial court’s subpoenas to testify in her rape
complaint, thus leaving missing a vital component in the prosecution’s case, her eyewitness account.
But in itself, her pardon would not have worked the dismissal of the rape case since it was given
after the complaint was filed in court.

AAA never appeared at the trial proper despite several subpoenas for her to testify, and subsequent
subpoenas could not be served after her family moved to a new but unknown address on April 13,
2010. Recall that at the pre-trial, BBB told the court that she was no longer interested in pursuing the
case against the accused-appellant since her daughter had already pardoned him. It has, however,
been held that even if it is construed as a pardon, AAA’s desistance is not by itself a ground to
dismiss the complaint for rape against the accused-appellant once the complaint has been instituted
in court.21

In People v. Bonaagua,22 the accused tried to invoke the affidavit of desistance executed by the
minor victim’smother stating that they would no longer pursue the rape cases against him. But the
high court pointed out that since R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law, took effect in 1997, rape is no
longer considered a crime against chastity. Having been reclassified as a crime against persons, it is
no longer considered a private crime, or one which cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the aggrieved party. Thus, pardon by the offended party of the offender will not extinguish his
criminal liability.

"As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation.
Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily
be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on be repudiated, and
criminal prosecution would thus be interminable."23

The gravity of the crime of rape and its imposable penalty, vis-á-vis the ease with which a charge of
rape can be made, compels the Supreme Court to conduct a thorough review of rape every
conviction.

A charge of rape by its very nature often must be resolved by giving primordial consideration to the
credibility of the victim’s testimony.24 Because conviction may rest solely thereon, the victim’s
testimony must be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
 Page 130 of 165

course of things,25 it must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, the victim’s credibility
must be put on trial as well.26

But if for some reason the complainant fails or refuses to testify, as in this case, then the court must
consider the adequacy of the circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution. In People v.
Canlas,27 the Court said:

Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the combined effect of the pieces of
circumstantial evidence must inexorably lead to the conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds
from direct or circumstantial evidence.28

xxxx

x x x Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts and
coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to
be proved. Conviction may be warranted on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.29 (Citations omitted)

The Court is called upon to review the verdict of conviction below, keeping in mind the following
principles as guidance: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, albeit innocent, to disprove; (2) considering
that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme care; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must succeed or fail on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to derive strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense.30

In essence, the res gestaeexception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations must have
been "voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of
the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and weremade under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation."

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules." Res gestae, one of eleven (11) exceptions to the
hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130, thus:

Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place orimmediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.

In People v. Ner,31 this Court elaborated on Section 36 of Rule 130 as follows:

[T]hat declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the act or occurrence in
litigation, although not precisely concurrent in point of time, if they were yet voluntarily and
spontaneously madeso nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which
 Page 131 of 165

they illustrate and explain, and weremade under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the
idea of design or deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of
the act or transaction itself.32 (Italics in the original)

The Court enumerated three essential requisites for the admissibility of a given statement as part of
res gestae, to wit:

All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of res gestae,is that it be made
under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he
had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an
account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question
or its immediate attending circum[s]tances.33 (Citations omitted)

There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1)
that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.34

In People v. Dianos,35 the Court acknowledged that there are no hard and fast rules in determining
the spontaneity of a declaration, but at least five factors have been considered:

By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime, immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion there being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement become admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay rule
of inadmissibility. x x x.

There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a
number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the
place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given,
(4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement
relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. x x x.36 (Citations
omitted and italics in the original)

In People v. Jorolan,37 the Court emphasized that there must be no intervening circumstances
between the res gestae occurrence and the time the statement was made ascould have afforded the
declarant an opportunity for deliberation or reflection; in other words, the statement was unreflected
and instinctive:

An important consideration is whether there intervened between the occurrence and the statement
any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant, and thus restore his mental balance
and afford opportunity for deliberation. His statement then cannot be regarded as unreflected and
instinctive, and isnot admissible as part of the res gestae. An example is where he had been talking
about matters other than the occurrence in question or directed his attention to other
matters.38 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)

In People v. Salafranca,39 the Court cited two tests in applying the res gestaerule: a) the act,
declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact orevent
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself; and b) the said evidence
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
 Page 132 of 165

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents
of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way,
res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
asto exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestaeis, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.40 (Citations omitted, emphasis ours and italics in the original)

By way of illustration, in People v. Villarama,41 the 4-year-old rape victim did not testify, but the
accused, an uncle of the victim, was convicted on the basis of what the child told her mother. The
Court said:

The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her age, the victim could not
havehad the sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her mother that her uncle made her lie down,
took off her panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina.

The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is unimaginable, more so to a four-

year-old child. Such a brutal experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth
was still crying when her parents arrived reinforces the conclusion that she was still in a traumatic
state when she made the statements pointing to appellant.

xxxx

x x x [I]n Contreras, the victim’s statement that she had been sexually molested by the accused was
not received under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, because her statement did not refer
to the incident witnessed by Nelene but to a general pattern of molestation of her and her
companions by the accused. In contrast, Elizabeth’s declaration to her mother regarding the then
just concluded assault were so full of details specific to the incident that there could be no doubt she
was referring to the same incident witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.42

In People v. Velasquez,43 the 2-year-old rape victim told her mother the following: a) "Si Tatang
kakayan na ku pu." ("Tatang has been doing something to me."); and b) "I-tatang kasi, kinayi ne pu
ing pekpek ku kaya masakit ya." ("Because Tatang has been doing something to my private part,
that is why it hurts.") The girl then showed her mother her private part, which was swollen and
oozing with pus, and then she gestured by slightly opening or raising her right foot, and using her
right finger, to show what the accused had done to it.44 The Court ruled:

We hold, therefore, that Aira’s statements and acts constitute res gestae, as it was made
immediately subsequent to a startling occurrence, uttered shortly thereafter by her with spontaneity,
without prior opportunity to contrive the same. Regail’s account of Aira’s words and, more
importantly, Aira’s gestures, constitutes independently relevant statements distinct from hearsay and
admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered.

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact
that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the
 Page 133 of 165

statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.45 (Citation omitted)

In People v. Lupac,46 the Court accepted as part of res gestae the 10-year-old victim’s denunciation
ofher uncle to a neighbor whom she met soon after she managed to get away from her uncle after
the rape, uttering the words "hindot" and "inano ako ni Kuya Ega."47

In People v. Moreno,48 shortly after the three accused left the house where the complaining victims
workedas maids, the maids told their employers, who had just arrived, that they had been raped.
The employers testified in court on these statements. The Court held that the maids’ statements
were part of res gestae since they were spontaneously made as soon as the victims had opportunity
to make them without threat to their lives. The Court said:

This exception is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy because made
instinctively, "while the declarant’s mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the
shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances at the time are the reflex
products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action." Said natural
and spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the testimony of the same
person on the witness stand.49 (Citations omitted)

But in People v. Contreras,50 the accused was acquitted in one of several statutory rape charges
because, among other things, the prosecution failed to present the victim, a 6-year-old girl, and the
court found that her alleged res gestae statement referred not to the incident or circumstance
testified to by the witness but rather to a general patternof molestation which she and her
companions had endured for some time already.

AAA’s statements to the barangay tanodand the police do not qualify as part ofres gestae in view of
the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time between the rape and the
declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity for reflection.

In People v. Manhuyod, Jr.,51 the Court stressed that in appreciating res gestaethe element of
spontaneity is critical. Although it was acknowledged that there is no hard and fast rule to establish
it, the Court cited a number of factors to consider, already mentioned in Dianos.The review of the
facts below constrains this Court to take a view opposite that of the RTC and the CA.

It is of particular significance to note that in her sworn statement to the police, AAA admitted that she
first revealed her ordeal of sexual abuse to her cousin DDD in the afternoon of February 5, 2009,
although her mother BBB had returned from her overnight guard duty that morning. Shocked by
what AAA told him, DDD relayed to BBB "na may problema [si AAA]." BBB thus confronted her, and
AAA in her own words narrated that, "kaya kinausap na po ako ni Mama kung ano ang problema ko
kaya sinabi ko na po ang ginawa sa akin ni Papa ko po kaya nalaman na lahat ni Mama ang
panggagahasa sa akin ni Papa."52

After an anguished silence of five years, finally AAA found the courage to reveal to her mother her
heart-rending saga of sexual abuse by her own father. Emboldened by her cousin DDD’s moral
support, AAA told her mother that she had been hiding her dark secret since Grade III. But as soon
as BBB learned, events quickly took their logical course. With BBB now leading the way, BBB and
AAA sought the help of the barangay tanodthat same day between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to have
the accused-appellant arrested. At around 6:00 p.m., they were able to arrest him as he was coming
home. Later that night, AAA accompanied by BBB gave her statement to PO3 Cobardo of the PNP
women’s desk.
 Page 134 of 165

AAA’s revelation to DDD and BBB set off an inexorable chain of events that led to the arrest of the
accused-appellant. There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or
instinctive about the declarations which AAA made to the barangay tanodand later that night to the
police. Her statements werein fact a re-telling of what she had already confessed to her mother
earlier that afternoon; this time however, her story to the tanods and the police was in clear,
conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve, exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally
exposed and put behind bars. AAA made her declarations to the authorities precisely because she
was seeking their help to punish the accused-appellant. There was then nothing spontaneous about
her so-called res gestaenarrations, even as it is remarkable to note that while AAA was giving her
said statements to the police, her father was already being held in detention, and the investigation
was conducted exactly to determine if there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.

Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related happenings, starting with the occurrence of a
startling event which triggered it and including any spontaneous declaration made by a witness,
participant or spectator relative to the said occurrence. The cases thisCourt has cited invariably
reiterate that the statement must be an unreflected reaction of the declarant, undesigned and free of
deliberation. In other words, the declarant is spontaneously moved merely to express his instinctive
reaction concerning the startling occurrence, and not to pursue a purpose or design already formed
in his mind. In People v. Sanchez,53 the Court be labored to explain that startling events "speak for
themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the unprompted language of the participants:"54

Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those exclamations and statements made by either
the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement." A spontaneous
exclamation is defined as "a statement or exclamation made immediately after some exciting
occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it
isobserved by him. The admissibility of such exclamation is based on our experience that, under
certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be
produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the
utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the
immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during
the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,’ the
utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by
him." In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself
may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant ratherthan the declarant speaking for
himself. Or, stated differently, "x x x the events speak for themselves, giving out their fullest meaning
through the unprompted language of the participants. The spontaneous character of the language is
assumed to preclude the probability ofits premeditation or fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the
moment is regarded, with a good dealof reason, as a guarantee of its truth.55 (Citations omitted)

The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory statements of AAA to the barangay tanodand the
police are part of the res gestae occurrence of the rape. This is error. It is obvious that AAA had by
then undergone a serious deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose own outrage as the betrayed
wife and grieving mother so emboldened AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of
her father. Here then lies the crux of the matter: AAA had clearly ceased to act unthinkingly under
the immediate influence of her shocking rape by her father, and was now led by another powerful
compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her father.
 Page 135 of 165

Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the original declarant was not
placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-examination by the defense, except in a few
instances as where the statement is considered part of the res gestae.

This Court has a situation where the incriminatory statements allegedly made by AAA were
conveyed to the trial court not by AAA herself but by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas.
In particular, PO3 Cobardo made a summation of what she claims was AAA’s narration of her
ordeal, along with her own observations of her demeanor during the investigation. But unless the
prosecution succeeded in invoking res gestae, their testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay,
since AAA’s statements were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional
right of the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.

Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value, and unless it is part of res gestae, the appealed
decision runs contrary to the well-settled rule against admitting hearsay evidence, aptly described as
"evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others."56 The
hearsay rule puts in issue the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence, since the
statement testified to was not given under oath or solemn affirmation, and more compellingly, the
declarant was not subjected to cross examination by the opposing party to testhis perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness, on whose reliability the entire worth of the out-of-court
statement depends.57 It is an immemorial rule that a witness can testify only as to his own personal
perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. His testimony cannot be proof as to the truth
of what he learned or heard from others.58 But equally important, Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights
guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet
the witnesses face to face x x x." By allowing the accused to test the perception, memory, and
veracity of the witness, the trial court is able to weigh the trustworthiness and reliability of his
testimony. There is no gainsaying that the right to confront a witness applies with particular urgency
in criminal proceedings, for at stake is a man’s personal liberty, universally cherished among all
human rights.

In Patula v. People,59 the Court rendered a helpful disquisition on hearsay evidence, why it must be
rejected and treated as inadmissible, and how it can be avoided:

To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus
devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that
states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court.
The personal knowledge of a witness isa substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence
that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed
fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the
credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extra judicial source of her information.

In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the
facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is
not in court and under oathto be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then
depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is
not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.

It is apparent, too, thata person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to
answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that
 Page 136 of 165

she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice,
but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is
hearsay just the same.

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of
the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only whenmade on the witness stand, subject
to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion
to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay
rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard
the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of
utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between
(a)the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b)the truth
of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to
preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands tobe denied
because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the
adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.

To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a
dispute while also safeguarding a party’s right to cross-examine her adversary’s witness, the Rules
of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial trial or
hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Courtformalizes this solution, viz.:

"Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.– The examination of witnesses presented in a trial
or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode ofanswer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally."

The second solution is to require that allwitnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the
adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly:

"Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.—Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in
the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue."

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal
cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x,"
the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal
proceedings.
 Page 137 of 165

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about
the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or
solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel
to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor
upon whose reliability the worth of the out of-court statement depends.60 (Citations omitted, emphasis
ours and italics in the original)

When inculpatory facts are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty
required for conviction.

It is well-settled, to the pointof being elementary, that when inculpatory facts are susceptible to two
or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence
does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.61 A forced application of the
res gestae exception below results if the Court says that AAA’s incriminatory statements were
spontaneous and thus part of a startling occurrence. It produces an outright denial of the right of the
accused-appellant to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty, not to mention that he was also
denied his right to confront the complainant. As the Court held in People v. Ganguso:62

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This
1âwphi1

reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course,
mean such degree of proof as excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense
charged.63 (Citations omitted)

This Court’s views are not a condonation of the bestiality of the accused-appellant but only indicate
that there is reasonable doubt as to his guilt entitling him to acquittal. As the Court stated in People
v. Ladrillo:64

Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: sympathy for
the victim and admiration for her in publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous misfortune, and
condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges
must look at a rape charge without those proclivities and deal with it withextreme caution and
circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every
woman decrying her having been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While
they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she
demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice
based on the law.65 (Citation omitted)

It needs no elaboration that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.66 "[T]he burden
ofproof rests on the [S]tate. The accused, ifhe so chooses, need notpresent evidence. He merely
has to raise a reasonable doubt and whittle away from the case of the prosecution. The
constitutional presumption of innocence demands no less,"67 even as it also demands no less than a
moral certainty of his guilt.68
 Page 138 of 165

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is hereby ACQUITTED. His

immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for another lawful
cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action
he has taken within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 139 of 165

G.R. No. 191254 October 13, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROEL "RUEL" SALLY, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before this Court on appeal is the Decision dated December 15, 20091 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02948, which upheld the convictions of accused-appellant Roel "Ruel" Sally
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-56820 and Q-94-56821, decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 37 in Quezon City on June 7, 2007.

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-56820, accused-appellant was charged with Murder in an Information
dated April 11, 1994, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of January, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one EDWIN LUCAS Y SIMON, by then and there hitting him with an iron pipe (tubong bakal),
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of
his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the [heirs] of the said Edwin Lucas y Simon.2

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-56821, accused-appellant was also charged with Murder in an
Information dated April 11, 1994, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of January, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, and qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one JOSE BERSERO Y SINGCO, by then and there hitting him on his head with an iron pipe
(tubong bakal), thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Jose
Bersero y Singco.3

Upon motion of the prosecution,4 these cases were consolidated, as they were founded on the same
facts and the prosecution would be presenting common evidence in both cases.

Although a warrant of arrest for accused-appellant had been issued on April 19, 1994, considering
that he had not been apprehended, the case was ordered archived on October 27, 1994.5

In 2003, accused-appellant was finally arrested. At his arraignment on February 23, 2004, he
pleaded not guilty to both charges.6

The prosecution presented Roger Lara as the sole witness to the killing, along with Renato Lucas,
the brother of the deceased Edwin Lucas, to testify as to the income of Edwin at the time of his
death, and Dr. Valentin Bernales of the Medico Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), to interpret the necropsy report pertaining to the two victims.
 Page 140 of 165

Roger Lara testified that on the night of January 29, 1994, he was in a drinking session that lasted
until 1:30 a.m. the following morning with accused-appellant, victims Edwin Lucas y Simon and Jose
Bersero y Singco, among others, inside the Nikon Iron Works office located along Commonwealth
Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City. Their drinking companions left earlier, leaving behind Lara, accused-
appellant, and the two victims. Lara testified that he was falling asleep inside the office when he
heard a noise coming from the shop. When he investigated the matter, he saw accused-appellant
hitting the sleeping Jose Bersero with a piece of pipe. Lara further stated that accused-appellant
then rushed towards him and attempted to hit him, but he avoided the accused and ran.7 He testified
that he also saw accused-appellant attack the sleeping Edwin Lucas with a pipe. Lara then went to
their employer’s house to report the incident.8 When he and the employer, Virgilio Reyes, reached
the shop, they only saw the bodies of the two victims, as accused-appellant was no longer there. He
then reported the matter to the police.9

Renato Lucas testified that his brother, Edwin Lucas, worked at the Nikon Iron Works, and had a
salary of PhP 140 a day at the time of his death.10

Dr. Valentin Bernales of the NBI interpreted the necropsy reports on Jose Bersero and Edwin Lucas.
The reports had been prepared by Dr. Juan Zaldariaga, the attending medico-legal officer for those
cases but who had resigned earlier. Dr. Bernales testified that from the report on Jose Bersero, the
victim died of traumatic head injuries on January 30, 1994, inside 888 Commonwealth Ave., Quezon
City, and that the body was found at 7:15 a.m. He also testified that based on the report on Edwin
Lucas, the victim died of traumatic head injury on January 30, 1994, and that the body was found at
7:15 a.m.11

In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that on January 30, 1994 at about 1:30 a.m., he had been
working at the Balintawak Market in Quezon City as a manual hauler, a job he had for nine
years.12 He testified that his work lasted from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.,13 and that he did not work for
Nikon Iron Works.14 He further testified that he did not know Edwin Lucas or Jose Bersero, nor did he
know anyone who worked for Nikon Iron Works. He denied killing Lucas and Bersero, and that he
had no knowledge of the matters testified to by Roger Lara.15

After considering the evidence for both sides, the trial court rendered its Decision on June 7, 2007,
finding accused-appellant guilty in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-56820-21, the dispositive portion of the
decision reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is herby rendered sentencing ROEL "RUEL" SALLY, to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua in Crim. Case No. Q-94-56820 and to pay the heirs of Edwin Lucas y Simon
the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity;

In Crim. Case No. Q-94-56821, likewise, ROEL "RUEL" SALLY, is likewise sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Jose Bersero y Singco the sum of P75,000.00,
as indemnity.16

The Case before the CA

In his appeal, accused-appellant claimed that the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the crimes
charged, or assuming that he was indeed guilty of the crimes charged, the RTC should have
convicted him of homicide instead of murder.

He claimed that Lara’s testimony was inconsistent and contradicted his Sinumpaang Salaysay,
which had been executed at the police station. He further claimed that the prosecution had failed to
 Page 141 of 165

prove the existence of treachery when it failed to present as evidence the iron pipe, which was used
in the killings.

The CA found the testimony of Roger Lara to be credible and convincing, and thus upheld the RTC
decision. The CA found the need for modifications, however, when it came to the award for
damages, by reducing the award of civil indemnity to PhP 50,000, and awarding moral and
exemplary damages. The dispositive portion of the CA decision, thus, reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 7 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
87, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-56820 and Q-94-56821 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS such that in both cases:

1. The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is REDUCED TO P50,000.00

2. Appellant Roel "Ruel" Sally is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Edwin Lucas and Jose
Bersero the amounts of P50,000.00, P25,000.00 and P25,000.00 as moral, exemplary and
actual damages, respectively

SO ORDERED.17

Hence, we have this appeal.

The Ruling of this Court

The appeal is without merit.

Addressing the errors raised by accused-appellant in his appeal before the CA, we find no reason to
reverse the RTC.

Accused-appellant claims that the testimony of the sole witness Roger Lara in open court on
February 3, 2005 is inconsistent with the latter’s sworn statement executed on January 30, 1994.

The inconsistency accused-appellant sees is more apparent than real.

In his sworn statement on January 30, 1994, Roger Lara related the events as follows:

T: Maaari bang isalaysay mo sa akin ang buong pangyayari?

S: Nang ala 1:30 ng madaling araw ika 30 ng Enero 1994 nagkakainuman po kami nila
ROGER, JOSE, RUEL at iba pang kasamahan namin sa trabaho sa loob ng NIKO IRON
WORKS kung saan kami ay nagtratrabaho, nang marami nang na-iinum itong si RUEL
kinukulit po si Mang JOSE at EDWIN kaya sinaway siya ng dalawa na kung lasing na siya
(RUEL) ay matulog na, pagkatapos po nagkaroon ng pagtatalo sa pagitan ni RUEL at ng
dalawa kumuha po ng patalim itong si RUEL pero naawat ito ng iba pa naming kasamahan.
Pagkatapos po nang natutulog na si Mang JOSE at si EDWIN nakarinig ako ng gulo sa labas
ng aming barracks at nakita ko na pinalo ni RUEL si Mang JOSE ng tubong bakal at nang
ako’y lalabas na sa barracks ako naman ang pinalo mabuti na lang at aking nailagan at ang
hinarap nito ay si EDWIN habang siya’y natutulog.

T: Ano ang ginawa mo nang makita mo ang pangyayari?

 Page 142 of 165

S: Tumakbo po ako sa labas ng bakuran dahil baka ako ay patayin din.

T: Saan ba natutulog si Mang JOSE at si EDWIN?

S: Si Mang JOSE po ay nasa labas at si EDWIN ay sa barracks na aming pinaka-opisina.

T: Saan pinalo si Mang JOSE at si EDWIN?

S: Sa ulo at batok.18

This, accused-appellant claims, is at variance with the witness’ testimony on February 3, 2005,
related as follows:

COURT

Q You only presume that the accused attacked Mang Jose outside because of the noise that
you heard. Therefore, you did not exactly see the accused attacking Mang Jose using an
iron pipe.

A It is like this, Your Honor. When I heard the noise I peeped and there I saw outside the
accused hitting Mang Jose and when I came out, the accused also attacked me but I was
able to avoid it. After that, he went inside the office and attacked Edwin.

xxxx

ATTY MATEO:

Q Mr. Witness, did I get you right that you are maintaining that you saw the accused
attacking Mang Jose despite the fact that you were sleeping?

A I was sleeping but I was awakened by the noise and when I opened the door to see what
is the noise about, I saw the accused attacking Mang Jose.

Q You made mention that the accused also attacked you but you were able to evade his
attack and then you scampered away because of the fear for your life. Is that correct?

PROSECUTOR:

Already answered.

ATTY MATEO:

Q So because you ran away you would not know when the accused turned to Edwin and
attacked Edwin.

A When I went out of the office because I was awakened by the noise, I saw the accused
attacking Mang Jose and he hit me in fact only I was able to avoid it. So I ran away, but
when I looked back, I saw the accused hitting Edwin with an iron pipe. (Witness
demonstrating holding an iron pipe hitting Edwin).
 Page 143 of 165

COURT

Q Where was Edwin at the time that the accused was attacking Mang Jose, he was inside
the office sleeping?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q By the time you were already outside the office you were able to leave the area because
of your fear for your life?

A Yes, Your Honor. He might kill me also.

Q And because of your feeling of fear for your life your instinct was to immediately leave the
place and did not mind anything more what is happening?

A Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. MATEO:

Q And because of that you would not be in a position to see that and it would be impossible
for you to see the accused attacking Edwin?

A The truth is when I ran away, I looked back and I saw Roel going inside the office where
Edwin was sleeping.19

There is no real inconsistency between the sworn statement and the testimony of Roger Lara. While
accused-appellant would have it appear that Lara would have been unable to witness the killing of
Edwin Lucas, he latches onto the portion of the sworn statement relating the fact of Lara’s running
outside after the killing of Jose Bersero. That fact did not preclude Lara from witnessing the killing of
Edwin Lucas, and his testimony in open court actually clarifies the matter, that he saw accused-
appellant kill Edwin Lucas because Lara turned and looked back after he had put some distance
between himself and accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant cannot point to alleged differences between the sworn statement and the
testimony of Roger Lara to exculpate him. As held in People v. Dabon:

The most honest witnesses may make mistakes sometimes, but such innocent lapses do not
necessarily impair their credibility. The testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in
its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein. It is a matter of judicial
experience that an affidavit, being ex parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestions, sometimes for want of suggestions and inquiries, without the
aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary
for the correction of the first suggestions of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that
belongs to the subject. Affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the
testimony given in open court. Therefore, discrepancies between statements of the affiant in his
affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him.20

Accused-appellant made an effort to show that witness Roger Lara was motivated to testify in favor
of the prosecution as he had been asked to by the relatives of the victim, Edwin Lucas. This
endeavor of accused-appellant deserves short shrift. Whether or not the victim’s relatives contacted
Roger Lara or asked him to testify in the present case is immaterial, as Lara was merely reiterating
 Page 144 of 165

what he had stated in his sworn statement executed on the day of the killings. For personal motive
on the part of a witness to testify against the accused to be appreciated as showing bias, its
presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.21 Accused-appellant has failed to show that
Lara was impelled by improper motive to testify, thus Lara’s testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.

In his defense, accused-appellant raises the defense of alibi. This defense must fail in the light of the
credible testimony of Roger Lara. Alibi is the weakest defense not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate. It is generally rejected when the accused is
positively identified by a witness.22 Accused-appellant states that he was elsewhere at the time the
killings occurred, namely at his alleged work as a hauler at the Balintawak Market in Quezon City.
However, he failed to produce any corroborating witness to his alleged presence there, or even
failed to show that he was indeed employed as such. The RTC thus correctly disregarded the
defense of alibi. It is well-settled that alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible
corroboration but also does not, on its face, demonstrate the physical impossibility of the presence of
the accused at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.23

The RTC found the testimony of Roger Lara more credible than that of accused-appellant. It is
hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the witnesses and observed
their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court is deemed to have been in a better position to
weigh the evidence.24 Accused-appellant has failed to show that the trial court misappreciated any of
the facts before it; thus, there is no need to deviate from the established doctrine.

Accused-appellant also questions the finding that treachery attended the killings, qualifying the crime
to murder, instead of homicide. To support this argument, he points out the failure of the prosecution
to prove that an iron pipe was used in killing Jose Bersero and Edwin Lucas. It was pointed out that
the weapon was not retrieved or presented in evidence, nor was the medico-legal officer certain if an
iron pipe would cause the injuries suffered by the victims.

Accused-appellant misses the point entirely.

Whether or not an iron pipe was used to kill Jose Bersero and Edwin Lucas is irrelevant. It was the
lawphil.net

testimony of Roger Lara that accused-appellant killed Jose Bersero and Edwin Lucas by hitting them
with an iron pipe while they were sleeping. It is beyond argument that the unconscious victims would
have been unable to defend themselves from the attack of the accused, regardless of the weapon
used. Article 14, paragraph 16(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides, "There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make." This precisely covers the situation
that accused-appellant took advantage of, when he attacked the victims while they were sleeping.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting
victims, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victims.25

The RTC was correct in appreciating the circumstance of treachery accompanying the act, which
qualifies the killing to murder under the first paragraph of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, not
homicide.

Anent the damages awarded in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-56820 and Q-94-56821 by the trial court
as adjusted by the CA, they should be modified.
 Page 145 of 165

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-56820, the CA only awarded the reduced civil indemnity of PhP 50,000 to
the heirs of Edwin Lucas y Simon without handing out moral and exemplary damages. Of course in
murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at PhP 50,000, requires
no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused’s responsibility
for it.26 On the other hand, moral damages of PhP 50,000 are awarded in view of the violent death of
the victim which does not necessitate any allegation or proof of the emotional sufferings of the heirs.
Likewise, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the heirs of Edwin Lucas y Simon are also entitled to
an award of PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, because the commission of the crime of murder
was attended by an aggravating circumstance whether ordinary or qualifying, as in this case.27 Art.
2230 of the Civil Code provides:

In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 1avv p++il

With respect to the dispositions in Criminal Case No. Q-94-56821, the award of PhP 25,000 as
moral damages shall be raised to PhP 50,000, and the amount of PhP 30,000 shall be awarded as
exemplary damages in lieu of the previous CA award of PhP 25,000 in accordance with current
jurisprudence.28

Likewise, the PhP 25,000 in damages awarded by the CA was mislabeled in the dispositive portion
as "actual damages," whereas these were properly called "temperate damages" in the body of the
CA decision. Art. 2224 of the Civil Code provides, "Temperate or moderate damages, which are
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty." This amount of PhP 25,000 was awarded by the CA to the victim’s families in
lieu of actual damages, as the families failed to present proof of burial as well as medical expenses.

Accused-appellant has been proved to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged,
and must answer for all the effects of his conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with modification the Decision dated December 15, 2009 of the
CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02948. As modified, the CA Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing ROEL "RUEL" SALLY, to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua in Crim. Case No. Q-94-56820 and to pay the heirs of Edwin Lucas y Simon
the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages and PhP 30,000 as
exemplary damages;

In Crim. Case No. Q-94-56821, likewise, ROEL "RUEL" SALLY, is likewise sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Jose Bersero y Singco the sum of PhP 50,000
as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages and PhP
25,000 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 146 of 165

G.R. No. 170473 October 12, 2006

[Formerly G.R. No. 146283]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
BERNIE TEODORO y CAPARAS, appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00515, which affirmed the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)3 of Macabebe,
Pampanga, Branch 25, sentencing Bernie Teodoro y Caparas (appellant) to the penalty of death for
the crime of rape.

On 28 October 1999, appellant was charged in Criminal Case No. CBU-99-2459-M for rape in an
Information4 filed by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Vivian T. Dabu, which reads:

That on or about the 1st day of October 1999 at about 10:30 o’clock in the evening, in the
barangay of xxx, [M]unicipality of xxx, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused BERNIE TEODORO Y
CAPARAS, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with [AAA5], 5 years of age, while the latter was
sleeping at her house.

Contrary to law.

The evidence of the prosecution, consisting of the sworn statements and testimonies of the victim
and eyewitnesses, established the following facts:

The victim, AAA, was five (5) years old at the time of the incident. On 1 October 1999, AAA and her
aunt, BBB,6 were sleeping in one room of their house at Barangay xxx, xxx, Pampanga, along with
AAA’s brother and sister. As the windows of the room had no screens, the four (4) slept under two
(2) mosquito nets, with AAA occupying one of them with her brother, and the others in the second.
The room was illuminated by a 25-watt electric bulb and two (2) small bulbs installed at the altar.7

At about 10:30 in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when she was awakened after a man, later
identified as the appellant, managed to gain entry into the bedroom, approach the sleeping AAA,
mount her and insert his penis into her vagina.8 AAA screamed, causing BBB to awaken. BBB
quickly switched on the main light and saw the man she recognized as the appellant inside the
mosquito net, atop AAA.9 They were both half-naked. Appellant got out of bed immediately and
covered his private parts. BBB asked appellant how he was able to enter their room but the latter did
not answer. BBB called and shouted for her mother, CCC,10 who was watching television
 Page 147 of 165

downstairs.11 When CCC reached the room of AAA, she saw appellant suddenly jump out of the
window.12

Thereafter, AAA complained that her private parts were aching. Upon inspection, BBB and CCC
noticed that it was swollen and reddish. When asked what appellant did to her, AAA relayed the
incident to her aunt and grandmother. AAA was brought to the hospital the next day. Appellant was
arrested the following night.

The medical examination conducted on AAA revealed that AAA’s external genitalia and perineum on
the labia majora bore a "bilateral 0.5 cm, LCM abrasion," while on the labia minora, the anterior
portion towards the clitoris had a fresh abrasion about 0.5 cm with minimal bleeding.13

Dr. Ma. Socorro Ibuen-Posadas (Dr. Posadas) who examined AAA eventually testified on the
medical findings. She stated that the injuries found on the private organ of AAA could have been
caused by a man’s private organ forced to penetrate her vagina. The fresh bleeding indicated that
the injuries sustained were recent, or at least not more than three (3) days from the time of the
examination.14

Appellant denied the accusation and raised the defense of alibi. He averred that he spent the night
at his uncle’s house in xxx, xxx, Pampanga at the time of the incident, a claim separately
corroborated by his uncle. He further asserted that when he was about to go to xxx Church the
following day, he met the father of AAA, who confronted him about the said incident. Despite
denying the accusations hurled against him, AAA’s father still beat him and brought him to the police
station.

At the trial, appellant also questioned the credibility of Dr. Posadas as an expert witness as she had
not completed the necessary training in the field of her expertise and she was under the supervision
of a senior officer who was not a signatory to the medico-legal report.

The RTC, in a Decision dated 29 September 2000, found appellant guilty of rape and imposed the
penalty of death pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353,15 otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997. The RTC also awarded P75,000.00 "by way of damages."

The legal conclusions reached by the RTC are concise enough to allow reproduction in full, herein:

The Court finds the explanation of the accused too shallow to be given credit and weight. It is
unthinkable that a five[-] year old girl, of tender age, as well as her aunt and also her
grandmother, would concoct the story of so heinous an offense without any serious and valid
reason.

The defense of alibi by the accused cannot prosper as he was not able to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity. In this
case[,] his defense that he was in xxx during the commission of the crime could not be
appreciated considering that the place of [the] incident can be negotiated for about 10 to 15
minutes. In the absence of strong and convincing evidence, alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by the victim as well as her witnesses. The record does
not show that the victim as well as her kins [sic] have ill-motive against the accused.

As to the Medico[-]Legal OB-Gyne Report, which has been objected [to] by the accused thru
counsel that the doctor who issued the same is not qualified[,] could not be sustained as the
examination and findings are merely corroborative in character. The doctor is found to be
qualified to testify on her findings.
 Page 148 of 165

The defense of the accused that the victim is an incompetent witness is of no moment. It
must be borne in mind that the victim is an innocent, wholesome and naive five-year old girl,
that this Court, or anyone for that matter, cannot expect to articulate and verbalize all
answers thrown at her. Being a child and a victim of rape, her testimony can be expected to
be quite inconsistent and ambiguous although factual.16

Pursuant to this Court’s decision in People vs. Mateo,17 the case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals on 7 September 2004. On 30 August 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modification
the RTC decision. Sustaining the finding of guilt, the appellate court further ordered appellant to
pay P50,000.00 in moral damages,18 in addition to the earlier award of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.19

In denying the appeal, the appellate court expounded on the findings of the RTC. It accorded full
credence to the candid, forthright and consistent testimony of AAA in identifying the appellant who
raped her and concluded that the testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature are
credible. The appellate court noted that AAA’s testimony was corroborated not only by witnesses but
by medical findings, as well. Debunking the twin defenses of denial and alibi of appellant, it stressed
that denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and categorical testimony of AAA and it was not
physically impossible, as the trial court found, for appellant to be present at the crime scene.20

Appellant alleges in his brief that the trial court erred (1) in finding him guilty beyond reasonable of
the crime of rape, and (2) in imposing the death penalty.21

Appellant impugns the credibility of AAA, pointing out that when asked how she knew she was
raped, she answered "because my vagina hurts." He claims that the trial court erred in accepting this
testimony as sufficient to establish the rape. Moreover, appellant capitalizes on the medical finding
that there was no laceration on the vagina to exculpate himself from criminal liability.22

In the review of rape cases where the credibility of the complainant is in question, this Court
consistently relies on the assessment of the trial court. As aptly noted by the Solicitor General, the
findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great weight and
respect.23 Indeed, the trial court judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the
complainant, having personally heard her and observed her deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. 24

It has been consistently held in a long line of cases that when a woman, more so if she is a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. 25 In fact, the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused
of the crime. AAA’s straightforward account of the incident categorically established the commission
of the crime of rape:

Q Do you remember what happened to you one evening while you were asleep in your
house?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. PANGILINAN

Questioning

What happened to you?

 Page 149 of 165

WITNESS

Answering

My vagina was aching, sir.

Q Why was your vagina aching?

A Someone went on top of me, sir.

Q Is he a man or a woman?

A A man, sir.

Q And what did that man do to you?

A He inserted his penis, sir.

Q To what?

A To my vagina, to wit "petching," sir.

Q So you were hurt when that man was inserting his penis to your vagina?

A Yes, sir.26

Furthermore, AAA was able to positively identify appellant as the malefactor:

Q When she turned on the light, did you see the man who sexually abused you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you see his face?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know his name?

A No, sir.

Q If that man who sexually abused you that evening by inserting his penis to your vagina is
in the courtroom, will you point to him?

A Yes, sir. That man.

(Witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom, who, when asked, gave his name as Bernie
Teodoro)27

Moreover, AAA’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the medical findings as testified to by
the medico-legal expert, Dr. Posadas, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
 Page 150 of 165

The testimony of Dr. Posadas established the fact that there was contact with the labia which
effectively consummated the crime of rape,28 thus:

Q One of your findings doctora, on the external genitalia and perinieum [sic] of the patient,
on the labia majora[,] it is stated here: Bilateral 0.5 cm, LCM abrasion. Another findings[sic]
on the labia minora: Anterior portion towards the clitoris abrasion about 0.5-1 cm, minimal
bleeding, fresh abrasion.

Could you [kindly] explain to this Court doctora in layman’s term, what do you mean by your
first findings?

WITNESS

Answering

There are injuries to the skin, it could be a cut, sir.

ATTY. PANGILINAN

Questioning

And where did you find this doctora?

A Labia Majora, I even drew it, sir.

Q And also another finding at the Labia Minora?

A It is the same findings. It is anterior towards the clitoris. It is just the medical term going to
the clitoris, sir.

Q You also made a finding of minimal bleeding, where is this bleeding you found?

A From the abrasion, sir.

Q At the Labia Majora?

A Yes, sir.

Q How about this fresh abrasion?

A It is the same thing, sir, the bilateral cut on the skin.

Q In your medical opinion, Dra., what could have caused these injuries you found on the
private organ of the victim?

A It could be caused by a force, sir.

Q Could you consider a private organ of a man forced the said penis to penetrate/enter the
vagina of victim [AAA] who is a 5 year old girl, could it be the cause on [sic] the injuries you
found?
 Page 151 of 165

A Probably, sir.

Q The alleged crime was committed on October 1, 1999 and you examined her on October
2, 1999, could you tell us if the injuries you found on the private organ of the victim is
compatible to the date of infliction[,] madam?

A There is a [sic] fresh bleeding, fresh injuries. It could only be recent, it could be less than 3
days, sir.29

On cross-examination, the medico-legal witness confirmed the medical findings that injuries were
definitely sustained in the labia:

Q In your medical certificate, your findings are stated here: Bilateral 0.5 cm., 1cm abrasion.
{W]ill you tell us the exact location of this?

A I just told you, it is in the anterior portion towards the clitoris, ma’am. Are you familiar with
the genitalia?

ATTY CRUZ

Questioning

Of course, I am a woman.

WITNESS

Answering

I even drew it. Would you like to see my drawing?

ATTY. CRUZ

I would like to see your drawing.

WITNESS

(Witness showing the same) So, this is the clitoris, this is the hymenal ring, this is the labia
majora[,] there is a 0.5-1cm abrasion.

Q In the labia majora?

A In the labia majora, ma’am.

Q Not in the labia minora?

A Yes, ma’am, because the labia minora of the child is not yet fully developed.

Q How about the vaginal orifice, where is that?

A It is inside the vagina, ma’am.

 Page 152 of 165

Q Covered by the hymen, am I right?

A Yes, ma’am. This is the hymenal ring, it is intact. (Witness referring to her drawing).

Q The injuries are in the labia majora?

A Yes, ma’am.30

Thus, the contention of appellant that there were no lacerations in the vagina does not merit any
consideration. In that regard, it has been held that the medical examination of the victim is merely
corroborative in character and is not an element of rape.31 Likewise, a freshly broken hymen is not
an essential element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate rape.32

Appellant challenges the qualifications of Dr. Posadas to testify as an expert witness.33 While the
medical findings are merely corroborative in character and therefore not indispensable in the
successful prosecution of the crime of rape, nevertheless we sustain the competency of Dr.
Posadas. It is sufficient that the medico-legal witness was able to establish to the satisfaction of the
court that she possessed special knowledge on the question that requires expert opinion, gained
through years of study in medical school, passing the medical board examination and practicing as
an O.B. Gyne resident.34

Apart from the testimony of the victim and of the doctor who examined her, the case for the
prosecution was fortified by the eyewitness’ testimonies of BBB and CCC. BBB, who was sleeping in
the same room as AAA, testified in court:

Q Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court what was that unusual incident that happened
inside your room?

A My niece [AAA] suddenly shouted and then cried, sir.

xxxx

Q When you heard her shouting, what did you do?

A I stood up from where I was lying down, sir.

ATTY. PANGILINAN

Questioning

Did you switch on the light?

WITNESS

Answering

Yes, sir.

Q What did you see inside the mosquito net of your niece?
 Page 153 of 165

A I saw Bernie on top of my niece, sir.

Q Inside the mosquito net?

A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q When you saw Bernie Teodoro on top of your niece [AAA], did you see if he was wearing
an apparel?

WITNESS

Answering

He was not wearing clothes [from the] waist down, sir.

ATTY. PANGILINAN

Questioning

Do you mean he was naked [from the] waist down?

A Yes, sir.

Q What about your niece, [AAA], did you see her?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you see on her body?

A She was not wearing panty, sir.35

On the other hand, CCC was watching television in the same house when she heard AAA shouting.
Said the witness:

Q While you were watching t.v. at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening do you remember if
there was anything unusual that happened in your house?

A Yes[,] sir. [M]y granddaughter suddenly shouted[,] sir.

Q What were the shout[s] of your granddaughter[,] if you remember?

A She was calling me[,] sir[,] and after a short while [BBB] was awaken sir.

Q Will you tell us the exact words of your granddaughter when she was calling you?

A She shouted "Nanay", "Nanay" sir.

Q When you heard your granddaughter calling you[,] what did you do?
 Page 154 of 165

A I immediately stood up[,] sir[,] and ascended the stairs.

xxxx

Q What did you see?

A I saw Bernie Teodoro about to stand while he was looking at [BBB] and then afterwards he
jumped out over [sic] the window sir.

Q You said you saw Bernie Teodoro. [W]hat was his position when you saw him?

A He was naked [from the] waistdown[,] sir.36

Clearly, both eyewitnesses for the prosecution corroborated each other in identifying appellant as
the perpetrator.

Appellant reiterates before the Court his defense of alibi. He testified that at the time of the incident,
he was sleeping in the house of his uncle at xxx, xxx, xxx, Pampanga. His testimony was
corroborated by his uncle.

It is well-settled that alibi is one of the weakest defenses because it is easily fabricated.37 For alibi to
prosper, the appellant must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed, he must also convincingly demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at
the locus criminis at the time of the incident.38 In the instant case, it was established that the house
of the uncle of appellant, where he purportedly was at the time of the commission of the crime, was
only 10 to 15 minutes away from the place of the incident.39 Thus, it was not physically impossible for
appellant to be at the scene of the crime when it happened, rendering his defense of alibi unworthy
of credit. As correctly observed by the appellate court:

Appellant miserably failed to prove the requisite impossibility of committing the crime of rape.

First. Appellant failed to prove that he was nowhere in the vicinity of the crime at the
appointed time. Against the prosecution witnesses’ positive testimonies that appellant was
seen in their room naked from waist down, come out of the mosquito net where the naked
child victim was on the appointed time, and later on jumped out of the window, the latter had
nothing to offer but denial. Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of the
prosecution witness and the negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly
deserves more credence and is entitled to greater evidentiary value.

Second. Appellant failed to prove the physical impossibility of his being present at the crime
scene at the time of its occurrence considering that it would take only about 10-15 minutes to
negotiate the distance from xxx, xxx to xxx, easily to bring within the space of time consumed
the commission of the crime. Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be
present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.40

Moreover, the alibi of appellant is unavailing against the positive identification made by the victim
and other witnesses, especially so when the alibi is corroborated only by a relative of the appellant.
Hence, the testimony of the uncle deserves scant consideration because of his perceived bias in
favor of appellant.
 Page 155 of 165

Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should be sustained.
However, in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the penalty of death
cannot be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon appellant is reduced from death
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.41

With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we affirm the RTC decision in awarding civil indemnity in
the amount of P75,000.00 which is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.42 We however, modify the
award of moral damages to P75,000.00,43 in light of the prevailing jurisprudence that the victim is
assumed to have suffered such damages.44 The presence of the qualifying circumstance of minority
necessitates the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.45

WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 99-2459-M and Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00515 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim, AAA,
identified in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 156 of 165

G.R. No. 75029

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIEGFRED FAJARDO, accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, at Malolos, Bulacan,
which found accused Siegfred Fajardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify the offended party
in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

The evidence adduced by the prosecution which formed the basis of the appealed decision is
summarized by the trial court as follows:

As alleged by the prosecution, at around 7:00 p.m., of August 19, 1982 complainant while
walking alone near her home in Pulong Yantok, Angat, Bulacan was accosted by the
accused who held her arm saying he loves her, whereupon she retorted "Are you crazy".
She tried to extricate from his hold but the accused boxed her in the stomach where, she fell
to the ground unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she was already naked while
the accused was standing zippering his shorts, after which he ran away. She felt weary. Her
whole body was painful and blood was oozing from her private part which was likewise very
painful. There were two buttons ripped from her olive green CAT uniform which is now soiled
(Exh. A); her orange T-shirt (Exh. B) was beside her, the front portion of her colored blue
pants (Exh. C) was torn, the shirt was soiled (Exh. D) and her yellow shorts which doubled
as panty (Exhs. E, E-1) was bloodied. She dressed and walked to the house of her aunt Fely
Ocampo and reported that she was raped. Her aunt requested somebody to fetch
complainant's father. The father arrived and after investigating complainant immediately
reported the matter to the barangay captain, then with complainant, reported the same to the
police in Angat, Bulacan where she gave a written statement (Exh. F). That same night, they
proceeded to Dr. Renato V. Cruz in Angat but she was medically examined only the following
day. According to Dr.Cruz's findings (Exhs. H & H-1) the hymenal part admits one (1)to two
(2) fingers with slight difficulty. Presence of old lacerations (more than 30 days old) were
found at 3:00, 7:00 and 10:00 o'clock of the hymen. Also found was a 1/4 inch diameter
abrasion, at upper outer quadrant of the left breast, Dr. Cruz advised complainant to have a
vaginal smear to determine the presence of semen. He did not discount the possibility of
rape since according to him the hymen is elastic but is sure that there were no new
lacerations. The father later asked for a copy of Exh. H but was not given and doubting the
doctor's findings alleging the latter's relationship with the accused, brought his daughter to
the NBI and was examined at 11:30 a.m., of August 12, 1982 (Exh. 1). Dr. Nieto Salvador
found the hymen superficially lacerated 7:00 o'clock but healing, edges are slightly
edematous and with fibrin formation; deep laceration at 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock, edges
edematous. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries on the body and the hymenal
lacerations were healing, the NBI medico-legal concluded. Amplifying, Dr. Salvador said that
the injuries were inflicted two or three days before examination as fibrin formation which
indicate healing was present. As a result of the rape, complainant suffered sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and besmirched reputation. (pp. 1-3, Decision of Trial Court)
 Page 157 of 165

The accused-appellant states that complainant Ma. Charity Lazaro was his girl friend and that he
never raped her.

The facts from the appellant's viewpoint are rather sketchy. He alleges in his brief:

The private complainant Ma. Charity Lazaro, who was then 17 years old on August 9, 1986
was walking towards home at about 5:00 in the afternoon. She was met by the
accused/appellant who was then a boyfriend of said private complainant. The
accused/appellant accompanied her to the house of the private complainant. They were
talking about their relationship while walking along the street and before they parted they
kissed each other at a place near the gate. The accused/appellant after bailing (sic) goodbye
went home.

Later in the evening Marcelino Agustin, uncle of the private complainant went to the house of
the accused/appellant and told the accused's father that the accused embraced the private
complainant. He, however, advised the father of the accused not to see the barangay captain
as he might meet there the father of the complainant.

On August 31, 1982, Ma. Charity Lazaro accompanied by her father filed a complaint for
Rape against the accused. Said complainant and his father Leopoldo Lazaro gave sworn
statements and after preliminary examination conducted before the Municipal Trial Court of
Angat, the same was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. (P. 39,
Rollo)

The appellant states that the lower court erred:

A. IN FINDING THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IN

ESTABLISHING THE CRIME OF RAPE.

B. IN CONSTRUING THE GENITAL FINDINGS ON THE SUBJECT CONSISTENT WITH RAPE.

C. IN OVERRULING THE MEDICAL AND GENITAL FINDINGS OF A PRIVATE PRACTITIONER.

D. IN NOT BELIEVING THE THEORY OF THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.

E. IN FINDING THE ACCUSED AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ALLEGED CRIME. (p. 2 —

Appellant's Brief)

The alleged inconsistencies mentioned by the appellant in his first assignment of error are so flimsy
that they can be dismissed without much discussion.

The appellant cites the testimony of Ma. Charity Lazaro on August 18, 1983 where she was asked if
any conversation transpired between her and the accused when the latter held her arm. Her answer
was, "None sir." (p. 6, t.s.n., August 18, 1983). On September 22, 1983, the testimony of the same
witness was:

Atty. Mangahas:

Q What was the first thing did the accused do so that you came to realize that he was
accosting you?
 Page 158 of 165

A He held me in my arm, sir.

Q What arm, left or right?

A Right arm, sir.

Q Without any conversation between you and him?

A There was a conversation, sir.

Q Please inform this Honorable Court what was that conversation?

A He said that he loves me very much but I told — him what are you crazy? (TSN,
September 22, 1983, pp. 15-16).

The conversation supposed to be inconsistent with the earlier answer is hardly any conversation at
all.

The second inconsistency refers to time. On August 18, 1983, the complainant testified that she was
raped at 7:00 P.M., on August 7, 1982. During her cross-examination on September 22, 1983, she
testified that she reached the scene of the crime at 6:00 P.M., of that date.

The absence of precision in stating the time of the crime is understandable. The testimony of the
complainant as to when the crime was committed is based on an estimate of time and not reference
to a timepiece.

The appellant also questions the complainant's statement that Siegfred Fajardo was never her suitor
by pointing out that when he accosted her, he stated that he loves her. Fajardo's "loving" the
complainant does not necessarily mean he was her suitor.

The discrepancy between the findings of the private physician and the Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation is explained by the trial court in its decision as follows:

The court is thus confronted with two sets of conflicting medical certificates, one issued by
Dr. Cruz and the other issued by Dr. Salvador, medico-legal (sic) of the NBI. The medical
certificate issued by the former dated August 15, 1982 (Exh. H; Exh. 2) found old healed
lacerations (more than 30 days old) while the latter's medical certificate dated August 12,
1982 (Exh. 1) concluded that the 3 lacerations two of them deep were fresh and healing
(around two or three days old) exactly coincided with the alleged rape of August 9, 1982.

Despite his findings however, Dr. Cruz did not discount the possibility of rape and suggested
a vaginal smear. On the other hand NBI medico-legal was emphatic that complainant had
sexual intercourse and the lacerations were the result of such intercourse (p. 19, TSN., April
12, 1984). After carefully assessing the evidence, the court is of the opinion that greater
weight should be given to Exh. I. The medical examination conducted by the NBI which is a
police agency under the Department of Justice tasked by the government to conduct or
perform medico-legal work should be afforded full faith and credit because not only could Dr.
Salvador be categorized as a disinterested witness, he also enjoys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty. On the other hand, Dr. Cruz being a private
medical practitioner in Angat, Bulacan, can not avail of this presumption. His private clinic is
well known there and serves the general public, his relatives, friends, and acquaintances.
 Page 159 of 165

The testimony of complainant's foster father that Dr. Cruz is related to the accused cannot
just be dismissed casually and it becomes credible when it remained unrebutted. He is
therefore not a disinterested witness. Precisely, because of this and Dr. Cruz's refusal to
furnish a copy of the medical certificate, that Lazaro (complainant's foster father) has
deemed it wise to seek the help of the NBI. (Decision of trial court, pp. 3-4).

We see no error in the decision of the trial court to give greater weight to the medical findings of the
NBI physician. Not only is he a medico-legal expert whose duty is to look into medico-legal cases but
he is a completely disinterested witness.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the question of credibility should be resolved against the
appellant. He argues:

Appellant's testimony that complainant's uncle, Marcelino Agustin, followed him home after
having seen appellant embrace complainant near the gate of the house, and reported the
matter to appellant's father who suggested that they see the barangay captain about the
incident but later decided not to, is utterly incredible. Why should a simple embrace between
sweethearts be of such serious concern to the boy's father? Why did the defense not present
appellant's father and complainant's uncle to corroborate his testimony? And if complainant
and appellant were really sweethearts and were getting along very well, why would she
accuse him of such a serious and heinous crime? All these cast doubts on appellant's
version. On the other hand, it is inconceivable that a barrio lass could relate such a woeful
story replete with details if the same did not actually happen. There was absolutely no
reason for her to falsely accuse appellant. Moreover, her alleged inconsistency, that of
declaring that no conversation transpired between her and appellant, and then later on
admitting that he professed his love to her which she spurned; as wen as the alleged
disparity of her testimony that she was raped at 7:00 p.m., and her statement on cross-
examination that she reached the place of incident about 7:00 (sic) p.m., are trivial and minor
so that they do not impair the complainant's credibility.

Complainant's torn and bloody pants, soiled shirt, abrasion in her breast and three fresh
lacerations on her hymen are mute but eloquent proof of her dishonor. AN appellant could
say in this regard was that the torn and bloody clothings could have been intentionally done
before their presentation in court. (pp. 6-7, Appellee's brief).

The usual indemnity awarded in rape cases is P20,000.00. The records do not indicate any special
reasons to warrant raising the indemnity to P50,000.00 as ordered by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED except for the P50,000.00
indemnity which is REDUCED to TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS P20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
 Page 160 of 165

G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989

DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN
RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-
operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger
Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing
the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in
the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3)
three months.

An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against
Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987,
the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information
punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision
handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyond
reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and
appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The
accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00
representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant
paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's
fees and to pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)

Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.

At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present evidence to
establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's
counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on
the ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil
liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor, however, did not move
for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.

The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the
Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of P 10,000.00,
compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate court, on
 Page 161 of 165

January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities.

Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was,
however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs return.
Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the
owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the
decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the
nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for
reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to
raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision which
has become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275, which enunciates that "the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed
against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than to render a
decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it
even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains that the
tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be
enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid
undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.

It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for the
following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary
to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the so-
called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not
be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party
to the criminal proceedings.

Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-
operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was
given, or in a separate civil action.

The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads thus:

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.

Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to the present case, the
former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana.
Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the
primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the
New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability
under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-
contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for
 Page 162 of 165

the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-
aquiliana.

In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the
criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2)
that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent
(Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however,
arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of
the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court,
because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the
Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed
upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the
employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the
execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v.
Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be
considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution
has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a
general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution."

The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made
no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate
complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is
clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the
question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is
already implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris,
115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction
sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the
defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement
of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has
no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and
has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the
decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly
prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."

Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary
writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become final and
executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary
liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes
ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary
liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute
an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for
subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the
employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.
 Page 163 of 165

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution
is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the
subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 164 of 165

A.M. No. 981-CFI July 29, 1977

GIL GEÑORGA, complainant,

vs.
HON. PEDRO C. QUITAIN, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Masbate, Branch II,
Masbate, Masbate, respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

It was the issuance of a warrant of arrest against complainant Dr. Gil Geñorga the former municipal
health officer of Claveria, Masbate, thereafter assigned to Tayasan Negros Oriental, for his failure to
appear as government medico-legal witness in a pending murder case before respondent Judge
Pedro C. Quitain of the Court of First Instance of Masbate, that started the train of events leading to
this administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. The
excuse offered for such non-appearance was the fact that he had previously sent a telegram to
respondent Judge seeking information as to whether he would be reimbursed for the traveling
expenses to be incurred and that he had received no reply. As a result thereof, he "terribly suffered
from the humiliation of having been arrested and confined in the headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary as if [he] were a criminal, from May 9, 1975 to May 14, 1975 when, upon [his] repeated
pleas that [he] was not going to escape, the Provincial Commander o f Negros Oriental, allowed
[him] to proceed to Masbate alone at [his] own expense." 1 That he did, and he was able to testify.

Respondent Judge then dictated in open court the order for his release. Thereafter, in the chambers
of the latter, when he sought to explain why he f to appear, he complained that he was ignored and
treated with discourtesy. That was the basis for his charge of conduct unbecoming a district judge.
Respondent Judge was required to comment on such complaint. He submitted an eight-page
explanation, the relevant portion of which follows: "Clearly, this charge stemmed from the order of
arrest issued by the undersigned against the complainant for his failure to appear in Court on March
5, 1975, in spite of a subpoena duly served upon him as a government witness in the case
hereinabove mentioned. True, the complainant addressed a telegram to the undersigned, in exact
words, to wit: "[Advice undersigned agrave (sic) party Masbate Masbate province shoulder traveling
expenses per them appear government witness Azanares case March 5 ... Dr. Geñorga]." True, the
undersigned did not make any reply because it was the honest conviction of the undersigned that he
is not duty bound to make any inquiry for the complainant, much less advice the complainant in any
manner, not to mention the fact that the telegram carried the tone of an order. It lacked the element
of courtesy since the telegram did not sound as a request. It is also true that the complainant did not
appear in Court on March 5, 1975 that he might testify as tie last witness for the prosecution. Hence,
on March 5, 1975, the undersigned, on motion of the Fiscal, ordered the complainant arrested ... .
There is no doubt that the complainant received the subpoena issued by the undersigned requiring
him to appear on March 5, 1975 so he could not testify for the government. This is borne out by the
records of the case." 2 Further: "In passing, may it be said that as a national employee, the complainant
knows that he is entitled to traveling expenses, per diems and official time, every time he complies with a
subpoena. This must he the reason why he secured from the Clerk of Court a Certificate of Appearance
which was accordingly issued to him. ... May it be said further, that if in the past the complainant had not
been reimbursed his expenses which he had incurred in similar instances, the reason could only be that
the claim for reimbursement had not been legally and vigorously pursued." 3 As to the allegation that his
conduct in chambers when complainant was explaining his inability to appear was unbecoming a judge,
respondent Judge stated the following: "In fairness to the complainant, the undersigned does not hesitate
to state that the complainant was very courteous when he was talking to the undersigned in chambers.
Certainly, the undersigned had no reason to be discourteous, as he was not in fact so, to the
complainant. On the contrary, after hearing the complainant's explanation, the undersigned told the
 Page 165 of 165

complainant that the respondent, while sympathizing with the complainant for the latter's experiences (sic)
of having spent his own funds for trips made as a witness in criminal cases, there was no way out of the
predicament except to obey the subpoena. And after considering the complainant's explanation, the
undersigned issued an order in chambers accepting the explanation as satisfactory and ordering at the
same time the immediate release of the complainant, ... . The issuance of the said order is inconsistent
with the claim of complainant that his explanation made in chambers was ignored by the undersigned." 4

The matter was then referred to the Acting Assistant Judicial Consultant Lorenzo Relova of the Court
of Appeals for study, report and recommendation. In a memorandum submitted to the Court dated
June 29, 1977, after setting forth the above facts and in the light of People v. Montejo, 5 he
recommended that the charges be dismissed. He explained why: "It is submitted, therefore, that
Respondent cannot be administratively held liable. To hold otherwise would be allowing a [disregard] of
the coercive power of the courts to compel attendance in court of cited witnesses. (Section 5 (e) of Rule
135 of the Rules of Court). This is not to mention the very satisfactory explanation of the Respondent on
all the charges imputed against him. Furthermore, Complainant was furnished a copy of the
comment/explanation of Respondent as early as July 15, 1975 ... , but up to now, no reply was ever
received by the Court from Complainant. It would seem that Complainant is satisfied of the explanation of
respondent Judge."6

This Court accepts such recommendation. The aforecited case of People v. Montejo is in point. The
decisive question therein raised is whether a court of first instance hearing a criminal case may compel by
subpoena the attendance of a witness in his sala in Zamboanga City, when the known address of such
witness is at Montalban, Rizal. It was argued that under the Rules of Court, 7 a witness is not bound to
attend a hearing if held outside the province he resides unless the distance be less than 50 kilometers
from his residence to the place of trial. Such contention did not command the assent of this Court. Thus:
"It is loathe to clip what undoubtedly is the inherent power of the Court to compel the attendance of
persons to testify ii a case pending therein. Section 9 of Rule 23 is the interpreted to apply solely to civil
cases, A recognition of such power in a court of first instance conducting the trial of an accused may be
gleaned from principle that justifies it when satisfied 'by proof or oath, that there is reason to believe that a
material witness for the prosecution will not appear and testify when required,' to order that he 'give bail in
sum as [it] may deem proper for such appearance. Upon refusal to give bail, the court must commit him to
prison until he complies or is legally discharged.' Under the circumstances, in view of the serious
handicap to which the prosecution would thus be subjected in proving its case, the order of respondent
judge denying the motion for an order of arrest or a citation for contempt in the alternative, b on a clear
misapprehension of the Rules of Court, could be viewed as amounting to grave abuse of discretion. It
would follow then that respondent Judge should decide said motion without taking into consideration
Section 9 of Rule 23." 8 What was done by Judge Quitain was, therefore, within his discretion. There was
no grave abuse of authority. Nor can the accusation of conduct unbecoming a judge be taken seriously.
In Bartolome v. De Borja, 9 it was held: "As far as the behavior of a trial judge is concerned, however, it is
not realistic to assume, considering the nature and the burden laid on his shoulders, that he will at all
times personify equanimity."10 Even if his conduct in chambers did not live up fully then to the demands of
politeness and courtesy, disciplinary action does not lie. Moreover, as shown in the memorandum of
Acting Judicial Consultant, the fact that he did not even bother to refute the allegation of respondent
Judge that he behaved as gentleman should during their talk in chambers may justifiably lead to the
inference that complainant, on calmer reflection with his resentment diminishing with the passage of time
may have decided not to press this particular accusation anymore.

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Judge Pedro C. Quitain is

dismissed for lack of merit.