RULE 116 : ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA; HOW MADE

GASPAR BANDOY WON Judge Jacinto Complainant Gaspar Bandoy was charged with Serious Illegal Detention filed by
V. is administratively Romulo De Jesus, Jr. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get
JUDGE JOSE liable for conducting back at him for being instrumental in the filing of an earlier complaint against him for
JACINTO the arraignment of “Ballot Switching.” Meanwhile, because complainant Bandoy was charged with
De Jesus, Jr. inside Serious Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving
MENDOZA,J his chamber -- YES them incarcerated for morethan two years. Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto,
11/19/04 Jr. committed grave abuse of his authority by displaying manifest bias and partiality in
favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several postponements of De Jesus, Jr.’s
arraignment, originally scheduled on April 23, 2008, but was reset for seven times until
De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s chambers
on July 6, 2011. Judge Jacinto denied all allegations.

The OCA found Judge Jacinto GUILTY.

RULING: Judge Jacinto, Jr. is administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) thereof requiring arraignment of
an accused to be made in open court:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. – (a) The accused must be arraigned
before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial.
The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language
or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other then those named in the complaint
or information.

The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that
a judge can take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial
stage in criminal litigation "where the issues are joined x x x and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further."
BRIG. GEN (Ret.) WON the Luwalhati R. Antonino, Congresswoman of South Cotabato, filed in the Ombudsman a
JOSE RAMISCAL, Sandiganbayan complaint-affidavit against petitioner Jose Ramiscal, then President of AFP-
JR commit grave abuse Retirement and Separation Benefits System for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019
V of discretion when it and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
SANDIGAN denied petitioner’s documents in relation to the sale of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General
motion to set aside Santos City for development as housing projects. The Ombudsman found probable
CARPIO, J his arraignment cause as to charges and filed the respective informations. Petitioner was arraigned
9/15/10 pending resolution and for his refusal to enter a plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not
of his second motion guilty. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment pending
for reconsideration resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of
of the Ombudsman’s probable cause against him. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioner’s 2 nd
finding of probable motion for reconsideration
cause against him—
NO RULING: Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration pending with the Ombudsman at the
time of his arraignment, violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended. It provides that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the
corresponding information, and as such, does not bar the arraignment of the accused,
which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the
information.

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493,
provides: Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
1
RULE 116 : ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

Further, the grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner, however, failed to show that any of the
instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this
case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with
petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
MIKE ALVIN WON petitioner’s Petitioner Mike “Kuya Alvin” Pielago was charged with acts of lasciviousness
PIELAGO right to be properly committed against AAA, 4 years old. Prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
V informed of the Pielago voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities and posted a property bail.
PEOPLE nature and cause of During arraignment, Pielago pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.
the accusation
REYES, J against him was RTC: the factual allegations contained in the Information and the provisions of existing
3/13/13 violated—NO laws pertain to the crime of rape by sexual assault – GUILTY
CA: affirmed in toto the RTC decision

RULING: It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this respect, the
designation in the Information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. In the instant case, the designation of the offense in the Information
against Pielago was changed from the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to the crime of rape by sexual assault penalized under
Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. It cannot be
said, however, that his right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated. What controls is not the title of the information
or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In
other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the
information
LETICIA KUMMER WON change in the Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner.
V date of the Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself. Petitioner
PEOPLE commission of the Kummer opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his
crime requires a new left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long. Malana who was
BRION, J arraignment—NO able to run, saw Kummer firing her gun at Mallo. Petitioner was charged with
9/11/13 homicide and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Meanwhile the information
was amended with respect to the date of the commission of the crime.

RTC: found Kummer guilty of homicide. CA, affirmed.

Petitioner then claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for
which she was convicted.

RULING: A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of
time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not
prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter
the nature of the offense.

The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or

complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments
and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense
different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the
theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense;
and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an
amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
PEOPLE WON the appellant The City Fiscal of Basilan City filed an information for murder in the CFI of Zamboanga
V entered a plea of against the accused Moro Sabilul. Before the hearing of the case, counsel for the
MORO SABILUL guilty—NO accused manifested to the court that his client would plead guilty to the charge and
prayed that the defendant be sentenced to destierro because the murder was
2
RULE 116 : ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

PARAS, J committed while the deceased Lario was in the act of committing sexual intercourse
7/31/53 with his (appellant's) wife Mora Mislayan. The CFI found petitioner guilty of murder.
The lower court, having in mind appellant's admission of the killing, his conditional
plea of guilty, and the manifestation of his counsel that the accused need not be
arraigned, asked the defense to present its evidence first reserving to the prosecution
the right to introduce rebuttal evidence. By virtue of such evidence, the trial court
found appellant guilty of murder.

RULING: The lower court in the second trial proceeded on the assumption that the
appellant pleaded guilty to the information for murder and merely ordered that "the
defense will present and adduce evidence to the effect that the accused, in
committing the crime of murder, was compelled by the fact that he surprised his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with the deceased Moro Lario."
This very manifestation in the appealed decision clearly indicates that the plea of guilty
was conditioned upon the allegation that the killing was done when the appellant
surprised his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with the deceased Moro Lario. In our
first decision we already pointed out that "an accused may not enter a conditional
plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty be
imposed upon him." We are therefore constrained to hold that the appellant in this
case must be considered as having entered a plea of not guilty.
PEOPLE Two informations was filed against accused-appellant Magat charging him with Rape
V committed against his daughter, Ann Fideli, 19 years old. Upon arraignment, accused
ANTONIO MAGAT pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother,
Ofelia Magat, and the public prosecutor agreed with the plea bargain. Accordingly,
PER CURIAM accused was sentenced to suffer a jail term of 10 years for each case. After three
5/31/2000 months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground that
the penalty imposed was "too light." As a consequence, accused-appellant was re-
arraigned on both Informations.

RULING: The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-
appellant on his own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-
appellant's plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the
rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the
Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense.

It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but
pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty.
Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial
court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional
plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon
him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial
before judgment may be rendered.

In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be considered to have attained finality for
the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since
the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double
jeopardy will not lie.

3
RULE 116 : ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

PEOPLE WON the dismissal Separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officers were filed before
V of the later the SBN against Respondent Espinosa, then provincial administrator of Masbate and
MARIO ESPINOSA Informations against two others. The cases were being reevaluated upon Espinosa’s motion, and while
private respondent pending, he filed with the SBN a Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad. The SBN required
PANGANIBAN, J on the ground of respondent to be conditionally arraigned before it would act on his Motion to Travel.
8/15/03 double jeopardy had During arraignment, Espinosa plead not guilty to the charges, and as ordered, his
no factual or legal Motion to Travel was granted. Subsequently, the OMB moved to withdraw ex parte
basis, because his the two cases against private respondent and filed in the same court seven
arraignment in the Informations for Malversation of Public Funds against Espinosa.
earlier cases was
only conditional –NO Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that double jeopardy
had already attached. The SBN held that jeopardy had attached.

RULING: Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22, 1999. No

unusual ceremony punctuated his arraignment. The SBN itself found this simple
process inconsistent with its studied manner of conditionally arraigning the accused
pending reinvestigation in other cases. We quote from its assailed Resolution as
follows:
Since it is the accused who wishes to travel even while his case is pending review, and
in order that the Court might not lose jurisdiction over him while he is abroad, the
accused and counsel are advised as part of the arraignment process, that the
arraignment is conditional, i.e., that arraignment is without prejudice to the results of
the reinvestigation or review; that if the prosecution should recommend the filing of
new charges, in lieu of the present charge, which would necessarily include or be
included in the present accusation, the accused would now be understood as having
waived his right against double jeopardy; and that if the prosecution sought to
withdraw the information, the arraignment would be deemed to have been of no
effect. If the accused accepts these conditions for arraignment, then he is arraigned
and allowed to travel. In other words, in this instance, the accused is clearly aware of
what is going on; at the time of his arraignment, there is an explicit waiver against the
protection against double jeopardy as a condition for his travel.
PLEA OF GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE
VIRGILIO WON the plea The sum of P30,000.00 was also offered by accused-appellants Bug-atan to Maramara
BUG-ATAN bargain was validly as part of the considerations for his killing Pastor Papauran, together with a promise
V acted upon despite that accused-appellant Bug-atan would move for the dismissal of a case for murder
PEOPLE the fact that all the filed against Maramara. In April 15, 1993, Maramara shot Pauparan once in the head
proceedings, i.e. causing his death. Bug-atan told Maramara to keep silent about the killing however,
DEL CASTILLO arraignment, plea Maramara was arrested by the police. Maramara was indicted for murder and after
9/15/10 bargaining and pleading not guilty, Maramara moved and was allowed by the trial court to enter into
conviction, occurred a plea bargaining. Accordingly, Maramara, upon re-arraignment, pleaded guilty to a
on a single day—YES lesser offense of homicide. It would appear, however, that before he was indicted or
thereabout, Maramara executed an extrajudicial confession wherein he admitted
shooting the victim to death and implicated as his co-conspirators herein petitioners
Manatad, Bug-atan and Labandero. Based on the account of Maramara, petitioners
were accordingly charged with murder.

RTC: convicted Manatad, Labandero and Bug-atan GUILTY of HOMICIDE. CA affirmed.

Petitioners, on procedural standpoint, point out that after Maramara was arraigned in
the morning of July 19, 1993, the trial court hastily heard and approved a plea bargain
motion in the afternoon leading to his immediate conviction on the same day.

RULING: Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes plea bargain for
a lesser offense in a criminal case, is explicit on how and when a plea bargain may be
allowed. The rule pertinently provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent
of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
4
RULE 116 : ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.

As clearly worded, there is nothing in the law which expressly or impliedly prohibits
the trial court from allowing an accused to change his plea, on a plea bargain,
immediately after a previous plea of not guilty. In approving the plea bargaining
agreement, the trial court undoubtedly took into consideration the timeliness of the
plea bargaining and its compliance with the requirements of the law.
JOSELITO WON Accused Daan and Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of
RANIERO malversation of public funds and three counts of falsification of public document by a
DAAN public officer or employee for falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period.
V In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and
SANDIGANBAYAN substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor.
AUSTRIA- In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to
MARTINEZ substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a
3/28/08 public officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification
of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation
cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of
guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable

recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was
presented to justify its approval. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds:
first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on
the payrolls on a routinary basis, negating any criminal intent; and that the amount
involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.

RULING: Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting

petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and
fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls
for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction and of its power of control
and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, in order to afford equal justice
to petitioner. Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and
Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the
crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds,
respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged. An offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice versa,
an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case
likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.
PEOPLE WON consent of Jaime Manuel was charged with violation of Section 16, RA. 6425 having in possession
V both the Fiscal and and control a sachet of Shabu. The penalty prescribed in the said section is
HON. MARTIN the offended party is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging
VILARAMA indispensable – YES from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. During the arraignment, the accused
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution soon after rested its
MEDIALDEA case. Subsequently, private respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not
6/23/92 guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425,
as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand

5
RULE 116 : ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

pesos. The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense on the ground that, among others, the prosecution already rested its case.

Hence this petition by the Prosecution, arguing that respondent Judge erred in
granting respondent’s request to plead guilty to a lesser offense because the request
was filed out of time and the consent thereto was not obtained. Meanwhile, counsel
for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in
crimes involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended party
to speak of.

RULING: The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal
and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions.
Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or
graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former. It would not
also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as
amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they
are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed
by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant
The state is, therefore, the offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the
people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the
public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the
person directly injured by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended
party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the
government.
PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE; RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE