Cayetano vs.

Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 , September 03, 1991

Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; “Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law means any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on Appointments.—The Commission on the basis of
evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the
COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman,
shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and 2. in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the
required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of
COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.*** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the
requirement of law as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsod’s past work experiences as a
lawyer- economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and a lawyer-legislator
of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases and litigation in court; item braces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
social proceedings and other similar work which involves the determination by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and
conditions.
IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix
the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already
passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the
Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and
effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to
the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and,
therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress
under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar
of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of
admission to the practice of law.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER.
(CASE DIGEST) IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,
PETITIONER. (DIGEST) / B.M. No. 2540 / September 24, 2013

TOPIC: Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS: Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced
the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then
realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
attendance record. He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The
matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten. In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number. About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed
to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based
on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment. The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be
denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case,
said action is not warranted. The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would
have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law
students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to
suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay
a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia v. Office of the President GR 176278

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications
despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’ role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’
confirmation of nominees. However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and
mootness, we dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised,
novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate
President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide)
as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991.

Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’ s age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding
his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and
employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule f or all
DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the
DFA officials and employees. In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioner’s standing to bring this suit
because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to
questionrespondent Davide’ s appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of
a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents
question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a
contender for the office in question. On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s mandated
retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide. The
petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

First . Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to
citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of “transcendental” importance calling for urgent resolution.
Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial
issues raised – the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory
prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. None of petitioner’s
allegations comes close to any of these parameters.

Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel
occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a “clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition”
is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with “more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.” Career
ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and
personal than petitioner’s generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law. The same conclusion holds true for
petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’ contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question
appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. However, the salaries and benefits respondent
Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed bylaw and other executive issuances, the f unding f or which was
included in the appropriations f or the DFA’ s total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since
respondent Davide’s nomination. Having assumed of f ice under color of authority ( appointment) , respondent Davide is at least
a de f acto officer entitled to draw salary, negating petitioner’s claim of “illegal expenditure of scarce public funds.”

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law
bars him from performing “ any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.” Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and
employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157falls within the proscribed conduct.
Third . A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed f or moot. Respondent Davide resigned his
post at the UN on 1 April 2010. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO v. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ

A.C. No. 244March 29, 1963

FACTS:Two years following his admission to the Philippine Bar, lawyer Telesforo A. Diao was charged by private complainant
Severino G. Martinez for allegedly falsifying his application to take the Bar Examinations specifically his scholastic
qualifications. The Solicitor General, having established in the course of its investigation that at the time Diao filed his
application to take the Bar Examinations did not complete the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of
Private Education, recommended the omission of his name from the roll of attorneys. Diao averred that he had entered military
service, took and passed the General Classification Test which is equivalent to a high school diploma, and that he completed his
Associate in Arts degree at the Arellano University in 1949 and due to confusion, was erroneously certified in his school records
as a graduate of Quisumbing College.

ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of law.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of law. His application disclosed that he began his law
studies six months before he obtained his pre-law degree thereby disqualifying him from taking the bar tests under the rules, but
with the aid of false pretenses, was allowed to take it, passed it and thereafter admitted to the bar. The fact that he hurdled the bar
examinations is immaterial. The High Tribunal, through Chief Justice Bengzon, enunciated that passing such examinations isnot
the onlyqualification to become an attorney-at-law.

Taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name,
identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the
Bar Examinations.

In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez

FACTS:

DIAO was admitted to the Bar.

2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for the Bar examination, that he had
the requisite academic qualifications.

Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys

i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:

1. Did not complete his high school training

2. Never attended Quisumbing College

3. Never obtained a diploma.

DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the
U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school
diploma

Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year
high school.

No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious:
 i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.

ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949

1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

ISSUE:

WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing pre-law requirements? NO.

HELD:

STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYER’S
DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.

Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.

Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got
it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining
his Associate in Arts degree.

He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:

i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).

ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations

iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked.

Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of
legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

Ruling caronan v caronan

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he
is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP
records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the
real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his
photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54
and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and
school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission
to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be
admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-
year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the
following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics.
(Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year
later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed
the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a law
degree under his real name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records
renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to
be granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the
Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary
Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good
moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the
name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused
him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential
in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a
lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of
several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one
of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.