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CRUZ V. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371 otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. They also assailed Section 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7,
8, 57, and 58 of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that they amounted to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. In addition, they
questioned Sections 51 to 53 and 59, 52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of the said RA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause
of the Constitution. Finally, petitioners assailed the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998 providing the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination, contending that the said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the IPRA and its IRR are valid.
Held: The petition is dismissed pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that as the
votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after the redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Ancestral Domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement
by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with
government and/or private individuals or corporations. It comprises lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and
other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICC/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except
that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also
utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but
are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
SIMEON T. DAGDAG VS. VICENTE NEPOMUCENO, ET AL.,
Facts: A portion of Lot No. 3786, is covered by Sales Patent No. 251 issued to Margarita Juanson, and also
by lease No. 49 executed by the Bureau of Lands in favor of Andres de Vera. The overlapping was recently
discovered, and their successors in interest now litigate for possession and/or ownership. The Sales Patent
was inscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds on July 11, 1927, and Original Certificate of Title No.
68 was accordingly issued in the name of Margarita Juanson. Juanson sold it to several persons until it
came into the possession of Simeon T. Dagdag. On the other hand, the lease to De Vera signed in June
1916 covered adjoining land of a bigger area. It was transferred by him to Regino Nepomuceno. After
purchasing the land, Simeon T. Dagdag had it relocated and the portion in question turned out to be in
possession of the heirs of Regino Nepomuceno, allegedly by virtue of the lease. The latter refused to
surrender it, even in the face of Dagdag's patent and title, and despite the Director of Lands' administrative
determination holding that their contract of lease did not, could not and should not extend to the area
granted to Dagdag's predecessors.
Issue: WON a registered contract of lease can be considered a "title".
Held: No. The sales patent issued in the name of Margarita Juanson having been registered with the office
of the Register of Deeds, and title having been issued by the Register of Deeds in the name of Margarita
Juanson, Lot 3786 was thereafter brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiffs
herein cannot, therefore, be bound by the fact that Lot 3786 is within the lease of Andres de Vera which
had been transferred to Regino Nepomuceno, the father and predecessor of the defendants. The fact that
the lease in favor of Andres de Vera had been registered, cannot bind and prejudice the plaintiff for Lot
3786 being a registered land, he need not go farther than the title." Public land patents when registered
in the corresponding Register of Deeds Office are regarded as veritable Torrens Titles subject to no
encumbrances except those stated therein, plus those specified by the statute (lease is not one of them).
In addition to that, it should be remembered that when the lease was renewed in 1949, the portion in
question was no longer public land subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands because it had already
been granted to Margarita Juanson and had become private property; therefore, it could not have been
included in the renewal of such lease of public land. The defendants also averred that, since the titles of
the parties have come under the operation of the Land Registration Act, in case of overlapping titles, the
older title should prevail. The title of the defendants was issued and registered on June 14, 1916. The title
of the plaintiff was registered on August 5, 1927. According to them, the title of the defendants should,
therefore prevail, and they should have been declared the owners of the land in question. The flaw in their
argument lies in the assumption that their lease contract constituted a "title", or deed or conveyance within
the meaning of section 122. The documents mentioned, wherein lands are "alienated, granted, or
conveyed", are documents transferring ownership—not documents of lease, transferring mere possession.
REPUBLIC VS. NAGUIAT
Facts: Celestina Naguiat filed for registration of title to four parcels of land
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired
them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession
thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage
or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the
lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the said parcels of land are alienable.
HELD
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. The classification
is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Moreover, the duty of classifying lands rests in the government and unless a positive
act from the government was done through the DENR to reclassify the land into inalienable, a land will still
be part of the public domain.
LA BUGAL- B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. ET. AL. V. SEC. VICTOR RAMOS (DENR) ET. AL.
FACTS:
This case in relation to the Public Land Act discusses the Regalian Doctrine that was embodied in our
present Constitution specifically under Section 2, Article XII.
The petition herein assails the constitutionality of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, along with
its IRR and the FTAA or the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement entered into by the Republic of
the Philippines and WMCP or the Western Mining Corporation Philippines. RA 7942 governs the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. While FTAA is defined as a contract
involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resource
Shortly before the effectivity of RA 7942, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99, 387
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao Del Sur, and North Cotabato. WMCP is a
subsidiary of a major Australian mining and exploration company. Thereafter, DENR Secretary Ramos
issued the IRR for RA 7942. Herein petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus to stop the
implementation of RA 7942 and its IRR.
Petitioners contend that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in signing and
promulgating the IRR, the latter being unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign owned corporations to
explore, develop, utilize, and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary toArt. XII of the Constitution.
They also prayed to declare the FTAA with WMCP as unconstitutional, null and void.
ISSUE:
The issue is WON RA 7942 and its IRR together with the FTAA entered into by the President is constitutional
and valid.
RULING:
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The Court ruled in the negative.
The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian Doctrine which in its simplest meaning, the capacity
of the State to own or acquire property. It was introduced by Spain and was carried over until the present
Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also to allnatural wealth that may be found in the
bowels of the earth. Conspicuously absent in the 1987 Constitution is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration exploitation,
development or utilization of natural resources.
However, Section 2 offers the State an option among others, for the President to enter into an agreement
with foreign- owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
It should be noted though that the FTAA’s based on Section 2 SHOULD BE LIMITED to technical and
financial assistance only. However, contrary to the language of the constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows
WMCP to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to
manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity.
It should be noted that the phrase “management or other form of assistance” which appears in the 1973
constitution was deleted in the 1987 constitution. The management or operation of mining activities by
foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters
of the 1987 constitution sought to eradicate. It was a subterfuge to get around the nationality requirement
of the constitution. The contractual stipulations grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources
that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Jose Y. De La Rosa
Facts:
The case arose when Private Respondent Jose Y. De La Rosa on his own behalf and in behalf of his children
(“De La Rosa” for brevity) applied for the registration of a parcel of land on February 11, 1965. The land
was situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, and was divided into 9 lots. The Lots 1-5 were bought
from Mamaya Balbalio, and Lots 6-9 were purchased from Jaime Alberto. Said lots were acquired by the
sellers by virtue of prescription. However, this application was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., as
to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and the Republic,
through the Bureau of Forestry Development as to Lots 1-9. Benguet Consolidated and Atok Big Wedge
claim that they have acquired said lots from their respective locator who registered the same as mineral
lands. For the Republic, it contended that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217, hence, not subject to alienation.
The trial court denied the application. On appeal by the applicants, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet
and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, CA affirmed the surface rights of the De La Rosas
over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claim.
Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct when it ruled that the applicant, and Benguet and Atok have their rights
on the same land, the former is the owner of the surface rights, while the latter are the owners of the sub-
surface rights.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the CA erred in justifying the respective rights of the parties. The CA was
wrong when it said that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes
simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land whatever the
use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its prerogative. Further, the SC ruled that Benguet and Atok
have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they
validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural land, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and ADRIANO CARPIO, MARTIN AGUILAR and PEDRO AGUILAR, v.
C.A and MARIANO RAYMUNDO.
FACTS:
The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved
in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private
person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public
domain.
Mariano B. Raymundo filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna an application for registration of his
imperfect or incomplete title over five parcels of land (Lots Nos. 461, 462, 463, 480, and 480 and 483,
Mabitac Cadastre) situated in Mabitac, Laguna, allegedly acquired by actual, open, adverse and continuos
occupation of the properties, by himself and by his predecessors-n-interest since time immemorial.
The application for registration was opposed by several parties, specifically, (a) by the Director of Lands,
on the ground of applicant’s lack of registrable title; and (b) by Adriano Carpio, Martin Aguilar and Pedro
Aguilar, as regards the northern portion of Lot No. 463, for the reason that they were the actual possessors
thereof and had filed homestead applications thereof since 1935.
After hearing, the registration court rendered judgement declaring applicant Raymundo to have established
proprietary rights over Lots No. 461, 462, 480, 483 and the southern portion of Lot No. 463; and ruling
oppositors Carpio and Aguilar brothers to have likewise proved their title as regards the northern portion
of Lot No. 463.
Both Raymundo and the Director of lands appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 11 July 1968,
the appellate court modified the judgement of the trial court, by recognizing Raymundo’s registrable title,
not only over Lots. 461, 162, 480, 483 and the southern portion of Lot No. 463 but even over the northern
part of Lot No. 463 adjudicated to oppositors Carpio and Aguilar brothers. Raymundo’s claim over the
whole Lot No. 463 was declared proved by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
The Court of Appeals said that applicant Raymundo satisfactorily explained the presentation of said copy
in lieu of the original by proving that the original document together with other pertinent paper were
entrusted by him to his lawyer, Judge Mariano C. Melendres, sometime before the war in connection with
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registration proceedings over the said parcels of land. Unfortunately, these documents were burned during
the last World War and no official copy could be obtained from the Register of Deeds of Mabitac, Laguna.
ISSUE:
WETHER OR NOT THE APPLICANT HAS RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND.
RULING:
THE APPLICANT DO NOT HAVE RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND
From the enactment of Act No. 190 to the present Rules of the Court, the rule governing the sale of real
property has remained unchanged: It can be proved only by the very instrument reciting the transaction,
duly subscribed by the proper party or his authorized agent, or else by secondary evidence of the contents
of such document. However, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established by secondary
evidence, it is necessary that the due execution and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing
the transaction be proved. For it is due execution, and loss thereafter, of the document that would warrant
or constitute basis for the introduction of the secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
And the due execution of the document should be proved through the testimony of (1) the person or
persons who executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledge; or (3) any person
who was present and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
the execution thereof. Thus, in one case, the admission of the certified copy of the record of a deed in a
public registry as secondary evidence of the terms of the deed of sale, was declared improper and invalid,
the Court pointing to the party’s failure to present the notary and those persons who must have seen the
signing of the document as witnesses to testify on its due execution.
CARIÑO VS INSULAR GOVERNMENT
FACTS:
On, June 22, 1903, Mateo Cariño by his attorney, Metcalf A. Clarke, filed a petition in Court of Land
Registration, asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a tract of land in the municipality of Baguio, in
the Province of Benguet, containing 146 hectares.
The Governmet of the Philippine Islands opposed the petition. The Government of the United States also
appeared and opposed the petition on the ground that the land was part of the military reservation of
Baguio. Court of Land Registration rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner. Respondents appealed
to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet. Judgment was entered dismissing the petition.
The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title, except a possessory information obtained in
1901 by the provisions of the Mortgage Law. The petitioner, however insists that although the statute of
limitations did not run against the Government of Spain in the Philippine Islands, yet a grant is to be
conclusively presumed form immemorial use and occupation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Mateo Cariño is the rightful owner of the tract of land.
HELD:

The possession of the land has not been of such character as to require the presumption of a grant. No
one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except
insignificant portions thereof. And since the insurrection against Spain, it has apparently not been used by
the petitioner for any purpose. The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of
Act No. 926, the Public Land Act, because the act is not applicable to the Province of Benguet.The judgment
of the courts below is AFFIRMED.
………………………………………………………………………………………………….
In the opinion of Justice Kapunan, the Regalian Theory does not negate title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial, adverting to the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government where
the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made
the following pronouncement:
“ Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in
the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. “
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of
land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent
of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS OF PASAY, PASIG AND MAKATI VS JUDGE
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL
FACTS:
Private respondent Domingo Palorames filed a case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 132 of Makati for
declaratory relief, quieting of title, cancellation of TCT No. 192 and cancellation of entries in OCT No. 291.
Prior to the filing of the said case, Mr. Palomares had earlier filed a petition for issuance of owner’s duplicate
copy of OCT No. 291 embracing Hacienda de Maricaban, however the said petition was denied for lack of
merit.
On June 2, 1986, private respondent Palomares filed a motion to admit amended complaint impleading the
Republic of the Philippines and the Registry of Deeds of Pasay, Pasig and Marikina, alleging that the Court
of Land Registration acknowledged or confirmed the title of Dolores Casal which covers the 2,574 hectare-
parcel of land and that the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued OCT No. 291 to Dolores Casal, and that after
her death, the said property was managed by her grandchildren, that there were no record of conveyances
or dispositions of any kind have been allegedly made upon the parcel, he also alleged that the State itself,
by placing 27,213,255 square meters thereof under a military reservation (now Fort Bonifacio), by
Proclamation No. 423, and fifty hectares thereof pursuant to Proclamation No. 192, had been guilty of
landgrabbing and that TCT No. 192 which covers the same landholding is inexistent, and that any titles
coming from TCT No. 192 is null and void.
The petitioners in this case, filed their answer, refuting the claims of private respondents and alleging that
OCT No. 291 which is according to Palomares is the one valid and should be upheld by the court has long
been cancelled and the property covered by the said title had been delivered and conveyed to the
government. They also filed a memorandum alleging that Dolores Casay had conveyed the property to the
government of US and Judge Ostrand even placed or stamped his imprimatur.
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However, the respondent judge on October 12, 1987, issued an order authorizing Mr. Palomares to sell,
lease, dispose any area or portion of the property subject of OCT no. 291. Eleven days after or on October
23, 1987, he issued another order affirming the power of the plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares to execute
and perform the acts authorized in the said first order without the need of Writ of Execution.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration however the same was denied by the respondent judge
as the same was against a interlocutory order. Hence, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari
against Judge Velez for issuing the orders dated October 12 and 23, 1987.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not OCT No 291 is still valid and subsisting
2. Whether or not respondent Judge Velez commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated October 12 and 23, 1987.
RULING
1. The court take judicial notice that the hectarage embraced in OCT No. 291/TCT No. 192 consist of
government property. As mentioned by the court, Proclamation No. 192 and Proc. No. 423 have the
character of official assertions of ownership and a valid exercise of the State’s dominical authority and
right of sovereignty. The same is a valid declaration of regalian right of the government over the
property. The court find hard evidence that indeed OCT No. 291 had been conveyed to the USA and
later surrendered to the Republic of the Philippines and as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled
and the land covered therein has been conveyed to the national government. In absence of any
concrete and convincing evidence on the part of the respondent to prove that indeed the landholding
is still under their ownership, the presumption is that the said property belongs to the state.
2. The court also found Judge Velez guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because what he gave away, by virtue of the Order he issued, was the property that
inalienably belongs to the government. Worse, he gave it away without notice to its present owner.
Aside from that, he denied the SolGen’s notice to appeal. The order he issued was in the nature of a
final judgement thus the proper remedy is to appeal the same. The court also note the improper action
of the respondent Judge when he filed his answer on the petition because according to Rule 65 of the
Rules, such as the present cases, the judge is included only as a nominal party and should have
remained a neutral magistrate. Thus, he was directed by the court to show cause why he should not
be administratively dealt with for giving away the property that inalienably belongs to the Government,
without notice to the registered owner, and for blocking Government efforts to defend what rightfully
belongs to it. The petition in G.R. No. 81564 is GRANTED.
FAUSTINA JAMISOLA VDA. DE CALIBO, and HIPOLITO, ALEJANDRO, AURORA, VlCENTE,
PACIFICO and PAZ, surnamed LIBUTAN, HEIRS OF OLIVA JAMISOLA, petitionersappellants,
vs. TIBURCIO BALLESTEROS, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents-appellees.
The sales application of Tiburcio Ballesteros is in conflict with the sales application No. 10969 of one
Barbara Andoy on which the Director of Lands rendered a decision on April 10, 1930, the dispositive part
of which is as follows:

'Upon investigation it was found that Barbara Andoy entered a portion of the land in dispute with the
knowledge that the premises had already been applied for by Tiburcio Ballesteros. As Andoy's entry was
not made in good faith, her Sales Application No. 10960 is hereby rejected, and that of Ballesteros, given
due course."
The said Barbara Andoy, defeated party in that decision and now dead, was the mother of the petitioner.
In order to determine whether or not to give due course to the sales application of the respondent, an
investigation was ordered of the land applied for. Public Land Inspector held a hearing at which Tiburcio
Ballesteros, on one hand, and the Jamisolas, on the other, presented their respective evidence. Director of
Lands dismissed the claim of the Jamisolas and gave due course to the application of Tiburcio Ballesteros.
The Jamisolas appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who modified the decision
of the Director of Lands, holding that the petitioners herein were entitled to acquire by means of the sales
patent application. The decision of the Department Head would appear to be based on the ground that the
Jamisolas were landless people, and pursuant to the policy of the Government to give land to the landless.
Ballesteros, moved the reconsideration of the said decision on the ground that the Jamisolas were not
landless people because on the contrary, they own and possess considerable landed properties. So the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed his decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the Director acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering his decision.
W/N the Secretary had acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his
orders
The Director, who is the officer charged with carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Law has control
over the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management
of the lands of the public domain, His decision as to questions of fact, when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, is conclusive. He clearly acted within his jurisdiction. If he had erred in
appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable
by writ of certiorari. Likewise the Secretary had not overreached his jurisdiction, nor were his acts
tainted by grave abuse of discretion. Concededly, as head of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, he has the power to review, reverse, modify or affirm the decision of the Director.
ORTUA VS. ENCARNACION
Facts: Petitioner Ortua filed an application to purchase a tract of public land located in Camarines Sur. It
was rejected by the Director of Land on the ground that petitioner is neither a Filipino citizen or an American
citizen. Public Land Law, Act No. 2874, in its sections 23 and 88, provides that the purchaser shall be a
citizen of lawful age of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. It was alleged by the respondent that
petitioner is a Chinese citizen.
Issue: whether or not Ortua is a Chinese citizen and not entitled to purchase the tract of public land.
Ruling: The Court ruled in negative. Circumstances shows that Ortua is a Filipino citizen and thus entitled
to purchase the tract of land. Further, the Court emphasize the powers lodged to the Director of Lands.
He performs his functions pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Law. In accordance with this law,
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the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is made the executive officer charged with carrying out the
provisions of the Public Land Law, and he performs this duty through the Director of Lands (sec. 3). Subject
to the control of the executive head, the Director of Lands is by law vested with direct executive control
over land matters, "and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce." (Sec. 4). quasi-judicial officer. As such officer he makes findings
of fact, even passes upon questions of mixed fact and law, and considers and decides the qualifications of
applicants for the purchase of public lands. A discretion is lodged by law in the Director of Lands which
should not be interfered with. The decisions of the Director of Lands on the construction of the Public Land
Law are entitled to great respect by the courts.
However, his power is not absolute and his decisions can be reviewed by the Courts through a direct
proceeding in showing that such decision is rendered in consequence of fraud, mistake, imposition, other
than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence. Since the Director of Lands erred in
its decision, it can be subjected to review by the Court.
Vicente Villaflor vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS
In 1940, Cirilo Piencenaves, in a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold to Vicente Villafor, a parcel of agricultural land
(planted with Abaca) containing an area of 50 hectares. The deed states that the land was sold to Villaflor
in 1937, but no formal document was then executed, and since then until the present time, Villaflor has
been in possession and occupation of the same. Before the sale of said property, Piencenaves inherited
said property from his parents and was in adverse possession of such without interruption for more than
50 years. On the same day, Claudio Otero, in a Deed of Absolute Sale sold to Villaflor a parcel of agricultural
land (planted with corn), containing an area of 24 hectares. Hermogenes Patete, in a Deed of Absolute
Sale sold to Villaflor, a parcel of agricultural land (planted with abaca and corn), containing an area of 20
has., more or less. Both deed state the same details or circumstances as that of Piencenaves’. In 1940,
Fermin Bocobo, in a Deed of Absolute Sale sold to Villaflor, a parcel of agricultural land (planted with
abaca), containing an area of 18 hectares, more or less. In 1946, Villaflor leased to Nasipit Lumber Co.,
Inc. a parcel of land, containing an area of 2 hectares, together with all the improvements existing thereon,
for a period of 5 years at a rental of P200.00 per annum to cover the annual rental of house and building
sites for 33 houses or buildings. In 1948, in an “Agreement to Sell” Villaflor conveyed to Nasipit Lumber, 2
parcels of land. From said day, the parties agreed that Nasipit Lumber shall continue to occupy the property
not anymore in concept of lessee but as prospective owners.
On 7 December 1948, Villaflor and Nasipit Lumber executed an “Agreement,” confirming an Agreement to
Sell, but with reference to the Sales Application filed with the Bureau of Land. Sales Application of Villaflor
were rejected for having leased the property to another even before he had acquired transmissible rights
thereto. In August 1950, Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a “Deed of Relinquishment of
Rights,” in favor on Nasipit Lumber, in consideration of the amount of P5,000 that was to be reimbursed
to the former representing part of the purchase price of the land, the value of the improvements Villaflor
introduced thereon, and the expenses incurred in the publication of the Notice of Sale; in light of his
difficulty to develop the same as Villaflor has moved to Manila. Pursuant thereto Nasipit Lumber filed a
Sales Application over the 2 parcels of land. “Order of Award” was then issued in favor of Nasipit Lumber.
In 1973, Villafor wrote a letter to Nasipit Lumber, reminding the latter of their verbal agreement in 1955;
but the new set of corporate officers refused to recognize Villaflor’s claim. In a formal protest dated 31
January 1974 which Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the Sales Application of Nasipit

Lumber, claiming that the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed of Relinquishment
of Rights dated 16 August 1950. The Director of Lands found that the payment P5,000.00 in the Deed and
the consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal
of Villaflor’s protest. He also contended that NASIPIT is disqualified to own lands due to the prohibition of
the 1973 Constitution. In 1978, Villaflor filed a complaint in the trial court for “Declaration of Nullity of
Contract (Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land subject of the
contract), and Damages”. In 1983, he died. The trial court ordered his widow, Lourdes D. Villaflor, to be
substituted as petitioner. CFI dismissed the complaint. The heirs of petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, however, rendered judgment against them. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not CA erred in adopting the findings of the Bureau of Lands; and
Whether or not NASIPIT is qualified to acquire title over the disputed land.
HELD:
First Issue: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.—Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Reliance by the trial and the
appellate courts on the factual findings of the Director of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources is
not misplaced. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts. The
findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an
appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence.
Second Issue: Petitioner asserts that private respondent was legally disqualified from acquiring the parcels
of land in question because it was not authorized by its charter to acquire disposable public agricultural
lands under Sections 121, 122 and 123 of the Public Land Act, prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 763.
We disagree. The requirements for a sales application under the Public Land Act are: (1) the possession
of the qualifications required by said Act (under Section 29) and (2) the lack of the disqualifications
mentioned therein (under
Sections 121, 122, and 123). However, the transfer of ownership via the two agreements dated July 7 and
December 7, 1948 and the relinquishment of rights, being private contracts, were binding only between
petitioner and private respondent. The Public Land Act finds no relevance because the disputed land was
covered by said Act only after the issuance of the order of award in favor of private respondent. Thus, the
possession of any disqualification by private respondent under said Act is immaterial to the private contracts
between the parties thereto. (We are not, however, suggesting a departure from the rule that laws are
deemed written in contracts.) Consideration of said provisions of the Act will further show their
inapplicability to these contracts. Section 121 of the Act pertains to acquisition.s of public land by a
corporation from a grantee, but petitioner never became a grantee of the disputed land. On the other
hand, private respondent itself was the direct grantee. Sections 122 and 123 disqualify corporations, which
are not authorized by their charter, from acquiring public land; the records do not show that private
respondent was not so authorized under its charter.
Envi Reviewer (MIDTERMS) Page |6
All told, the only disqualification that can be imputed to private respondent is the prohibition in the 1973
Constitution against the holding of alienable lands of the public domain by corporations.54 However, this
Court earlier settled the matter, ruling that said constitutional prohibition had no retroactive effect and
could not prevail over a vested right to the land. In Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr.,55 this Court declared:
“We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of
Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the
time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding
one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner’s prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested
rights in constitutional law.
PAAT v CA
FACTS: The truck of private respondent (Sps De Guzman) was seized by DENR personnel because it was
transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR which is in manifest contravention
of sec. 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277 (The Revised Forestry Code)
As a result, private respondent filed a suit for replevin for the return of the truck. Petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for
their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Private respondents contend that that their case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon justification
that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard (2)the seizure and
forfeiture was unlawful (a) the secretary of DENR and his representative has no authority to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products (b) that the truck was not used in the
commission of the crime.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ruled in favor of the private respondent. CA likewise affirmed the
RTC.
ISSUE: WoN without violating the Principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, may an action for
replevin prosper.
HELD: NEGATIVE. The contention of the private respondent was without merit. The exhaustion of
Administrative remedies may be disregarded when: 1) there is a violation of due process 2) when the issue
involved is purely question of law 3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack/
excess of jurisdiction 4)when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned 5) when
there is irreparable injury 6) when the respondent is department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter 7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable 8) when it would amount to the nullification of the claim
9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings 10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy 11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.
However, the case at bar does not fall under the aforementioned exceptions for they were given the
opportunity to be heard and the DENR and its representative are authorized to order the confiscation and
forfeiture.

Also, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development, and management of forest lands falls within the primary and special
responsibilities of DENR. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial instruction to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The
assumption by the trial court, therefore, of a replevin suit filed by private respondent constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of administrative agency’s prerogative.
ALBA VS. CA
Facts: An application was filed for title to land by Jose Lachica claiming that the land was purchased by
him and his wife from one Eulalio Raz. An order of general default was issued but opposed by Octabella
de Raz, Spouses Braulio, Jose Rago representing Apolonia Rebeco and the Alba’s.
Spouses Braulio filed their opposition in the registration alleging that they are the owners but the deed of
sale cannot be found in the records and theya have not presented any evidence. Their opposition was
dismissed. Jose rago representing Apolonia Rebeco has not represented evidence and manifested to file a
motion for withdrawal of opposition so their petition was likewise dismissed. The remaining oppositors are
the Alba’s and Octabella De Raz.
Rtc rendered judgement in favor of respondent applicant Lachica on the basis of the testimonial and
documentary evidence and the continuous payment of taxes in the said land. Remanining oppositors are
dissatisfied and interposed an appeal with CA in which the CA affirmed the decision of the same basis; tax
declaration, continuous possession and acquired the land by prescription.
Issue: W/N private respondent applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership?
Ruling: The controlling statute when private respondent applicant filed his application for registration is
Sec 48 of CA 141 but the assailed decisions of CA affirming the ruling of RTC relied on the provisions of
Sec 19 of Act 496 in relation to the Civil Code provisions on prescription on the assumption that the subject
land is private land, while the application of for registration of applicant is for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title considering that the land is presumed part of public domain under Regalian Doctrine.
The land sought to be registered hardly falls under any of the classification of lands referred by ART 496.
Prescription invoked by both lower courts cannot be pleaded to bolster applicants claim because no land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant express or implied from the government. The
possession of public agricultural land however long the period may have extended never confers title upon
the possession. Also Tax Declaration is not a conclusive evidence of ownership unless supported by other
effective proof.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL
Facts :
Ruperto Villareal applied for the registration of a land which consists of 178,113 square meters of
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. He was opposed by several persons,
including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved
by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director
Envi Reviewer (MIDTERMS) Page |7
of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute
was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not Mangrove swamps/manglares form part of public forests and are therefore not alienable.
Held :
Yes. Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so
determined, The judiciary cannot ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of its
own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted
and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged
as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial
intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our
statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty
as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
CENON MATEO, vs. HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS
FACTS:
Sometime in 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto, Bulacan, sent a letter-complaint to the Highway
District Engineer of that province asking that the Sapang Cabay, a public navigable stream, which had
been blocked by means of dikes and dams and converted into fishponds, be ordered reopened and restored
to its original condition.
Secretary rendered his decision on August 10, 1959, finding that the Sapang Cabay was a public navigable
stream and ordering Cenon Mateo, the herein petitioner-appellant, who had in the meantime acquired the
property inside which the said creek is situated, to remove the dikes and dams therein constructed within
thirty days from notice; otherwise they would be removed at his expense. Mateo moved to reconsider but
was turned down, whereupon he filed the basic petition to restrain the respondent Secretary from enforcing
his decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the Secretary is correct in holding that Sapang Cabay is a public navigable steam
HELD:
YES.
In the present case the evidence shows that ocular inspection of the entire length of the creek up to
Guiguinto, shows that portions of the creek are closed by dikes, that traces of the path of the Cabay Creek
within petitioner-appellant's fishpond are still visible by the nature of the mud, that a man-made canal
detours the creek from its original path, that during the flood season the creek is waistdeep and even
more, and surrounding ricelands are overflooded, that the surrounding ricelands are flooded during heavy
rains because the man-made canal is not sufficient to contain the volume of water coming from the creek.

In addition, the documentary evidence shows that as long ago as 1941 there were already complaints
against the closure of the Sapang Cabay by the petitioner-appellant's predecessor-in-interest, Modesto
Pascual; that the municipal council of Guiguinto passed a resolution on November 22 of the same year,
requesting the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to order the removal of the obstruction;
that the administrative proceedings for that purpose were interrupted by the war, but reopened in 1948,
and again in 1952, pursuant to similar resolutions of the same municipal council; and that in 1954 the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications rendered a decision ordering Encarnacion Jacobo, who was
then the owner from whom the petitioner-appellant subsequently bought the property, to remove the dikes
she had constructed. It is true that Encarnacion Jacobo was able to get her free patent application approved
in 1953 and to secure the corresponding certificate of title, but said title did not change the public character
of the Sapang Cabay.
WILSON PO CHAM, Complainant, v. ATTY. EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Canete Elenita Alipio and now deceased Mario Navarro who was then the
Municipal Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to him a parcel of land with an area of approximately
forty (40) hectares, identified as Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262, situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong,
Morong, Bataan (the property).
He having expressed interest in the offer, Canete and Navarro arranged a meeting between him and
respondent at the latter's residence in Balanga, Bataan1 where respondent categorically represented to
him that the property being offered for sale was alienable and disposable. 2 Respondent in fact presented
to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of Payment3 dated July 10, 1995 covering the property signed by Edna
P. Pizarro as Municipal Treasurer and Navarro as Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of Absolute Sale 4 dated
July 25, 1995 purportedly executed by the alleged previous actual occupant of the property, one Jose R.
Monzon (Monzon), transferring all his rights, interest and possession thereover in favor of Virgilio Banzon
(Banzon), Rolando B. Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed consideration of P500,000.00; and 3)
Special Power of Attorney5 dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala authorizing him
(respondent) to:
a) offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land
b) negotiate and enter into a contract for the consumation (sic) of sale of the subject property;
and to sign the same.
On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale11 over the property in his favor.
Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax Declaration No. 5010 13 with Property Index No.
018-08-004-05-126 issued in his (respondent's) name and his alleged co-owners, and Real Property Tax
Receipt No. 02520114 dated August 17, 1995 issued in his (respondent's) name.
He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 representing the purchase price of the rights
over the property, Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA06321015 in the amount of P168,627.00 payable
to respondent, and Asian Bank Manager's Check No. 004639GA16 in the amount of P3,193,906.00 payable
to respondent, Banzon and Zabala. He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed
wire fence at its front portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that
the property could not be fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park.17
Envi Reviewer (MIDTERMS) Page |8
Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land susceptible of
private ownership.
ISSUE:
W/N The land in question was validly subjected to alienation
RULING:
In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications from the DENR that the property
is part of the public domain and not disposable as it is within the Bataan National Park. Indeed, by virtue
of Proclamation No. 2445 issued on December 1, 1945, all properties of the public domain therein
designated as part of the Bataan National Park were withdrawn from sale, settlement or other disposition,
subject to private rights.
On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having irrevocable
rights and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to complainant. E.g., he could have
presented any document issued by the government conferring upon him and his alleged co-owners, or
even upon his alleged predecessors-in-interest, with any such right or interest, but he presented none. He
merely presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by a certain Jose R. Monzon in his,
Banzon's and Zabala's favor on July 25, 1995, a month shy of the execution on August 21, 1995 of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of complainant.
The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help his cause any as neither tax
receipts nor realty tax declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over realty unless
supported by other effective proof.46 The presentation of a tax declaration must indeed have been a
"pretext," as observed by the PENR in its earlier-quoted portion of its letter-directive to the Balanga
Municipal Assessor "that the area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and disposable land." Respondent must
thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase, for P3,372,533.00, non-existent
"irrevocable rights, interest and participation" over an inalienable property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CELESTINA NAGUIAT, respondent.
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired
them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession
thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage
or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since
12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question
have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE:

Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands"
do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
PALOMO V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: William Cameron Forbes, then Governor General of the Philippines, issued Executive Order No. 40
which reserved for provincial park purposes some 440, 530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga,
Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission.
The CFI of Albay ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by EO No. 40 in the name of Diego
Palomo. These parcel of lands allegedly covered by OCT Nos. 513, 169, 176, and 173 were donated to the
herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo. Claiming that these OCTs were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the CFI of Albay on May 30, 1950. The
Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913, and 3914 in October 1953. President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 on July 10, 1954 converting the area embraced by EO No. 40 into
the “Tiwi Hot Spring National Park.” The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain and, therefore, neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land
Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496). However, the Palomos
continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes, and introduced improvements on those
lands. On May 1974, the petitioners filed a civil case against the private respondents who entered the land
covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT No. 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat. On October 1974, the
Republic of the Philippines filed a civil case for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving
the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners. The trial court ruled in favor of the Republic
as they found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have established property rights over the parcels of land
in question. The Palomos obtained no right at all over the properties because these were issued only when
EO No. 40 was already in force. The petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the findings of
the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the alleged OCTs issued pursuant to the order of the CFI and the subsequent TCTs
issued pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.
Held: No proof was presented that the petitioners’ predecessors in interest derived title from an old
Spanish grant. The aforesaid “decisions” of the CFI were not signed by the judge but were merely certified
copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court.
Envi Reviewer (MIDTERMS) Page |9
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As
testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never
declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present.
Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons.
It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
Since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation,
TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. It has been held that where a
certificate of title covers a portion of land within the area reserved for park purposes, the title should be
annulled with respect to said portion.
IGNACIO MESINA, VS. EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL
FACTS:
P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h a t h e i s t h e o w n e r i n f e e s i m p l e o f t h e Lot No. 3259, w i t h
t h e improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and that he has been in actual
possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and that up to
the present time he is the only one who benefits from the pro duce thereof. The said lot is also
the subject of registration proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration Case
No. 372, L. R.C. Cad Record No. 12238. The Director of Lands issued a homestead patent in
favor of the defendants but did not exercise due care, in spite of his knowledge that defendants
had not complied with the requirements set forth in Commonwealth Act 141. Plaintiff claims
that title was procured by defendants through fraud, deception and misrepresentation since
they knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff.
Issue: WON the requirement set forth in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957
amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141 has been complied with.
Held: Yes. Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 amending Section 48-b of
Commonwealth Act 141 provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
In the case of Susi v. Razon, all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical possession openly, continuously and publicly. The possessor is deemed to
have already acquired by operation of law not only a right, but a grant from the government.
Plaintiff is said to have acquired the lot by the grant of the State, it follows that same had ceased to be a
part of the public domain and had become private property and, therefore, is beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently the homestead patent and the original certificate of title covering said land

issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been
issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.
Director of Lands vs. IAC and ACME
Facts:
Respondent Ace Plywood and Veneer Co. INC. ordered registration of fiver parcels of land which it acquired
from members of the Dumagat Tribe on October 29, 1962. It applied for registration on July 17, 1981.
Herein petitioner is contending that the 1973 Constitution is the applicable law in the case at bar which
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease no to exceed 1,000 hectares. This prohibition was not found in the 1935 constitution which is the
applicable law in 1962 when the respondent corporation acquired the land.
Issue:
Whether or not the title acquired by ACME in 1962 could be confirmed in their favor in proceedings instated
in 1982 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect.
Held:
Yes. Land registration is deemed as a judicial confirmation proceeding that should at most be limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time as it is not so
much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested. Applying it to the case, the respondent
corporation already acquired ownership and title to the land in 1962 and that registration is merely to
establish the ownership. Furthermore, the 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights so the prohibition
on private corporations cannot be applicable.
DIR. OF LANDS V. CA AND SPOUSES MANLAPAZ AND PIZARRO
FACTS:
This is a review on certiorari seekig the reversal of the Decision of Court of Appeals affirming the Decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Bataan adjudicating in favor of the herein private respondents the
subject two parcels of land.
The facts are as follows:
On January 1973, herein respondents filed an application before the CFI of Bataan seeking the registration
and confirmation of titles to two parcels of land , designated as Lot No. 2855 and Lot No. 2856
Trial court ordered the Land RegComm. To submit reports whether not the parcels of land in question had
been issued patents or whether the same are subject of pending decrees
are portions of Lot 2749, Cad. 241, Orion Cadastre and that the same have been the subject of registration
proceedings in Court Cadastral Case No. 15, LRC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 1021 wherein a decision
has been rendered although there is no existing record of the same on file because it was among those
records lost or destroyed due to the ravages of the last global war
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 10
The Director of Lands seasonably filed an opposition on the ground that neither the applicants nor their
predecessor-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the parcels of land
applied for; that they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least thirthy (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
present application; and that these parcels of land are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, and therefore, not subject to appropriation
In order to establish thirty (30) years of open and continuous possession over the subject property, private
respondents presented Crisanto Angeles and Monico Balila, Crisanto Angeles claimed that he first took
possession of these two (2) parcels of land in the year 1931 and subsequently sold it to respondents in
1972. Private respondent Silvestre Manlapaz also testified that upon their acquisition of the two (2) parcels
of land designated as Lots 2855 and 2856, they immediately took possession of the same, planted
coconuts, camotes and other vegetables and expanded the portion planted to palay.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the spouses granting the two prcels of lands under their name. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC since the Dir of Lands did not present any evidence
to support his contention. Respondent Court erred in ruling that petitioner failed to raise the defense of res
judicata in the trial court and, hence, waived the same.
ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the Spouses met the requirements to be awarded as the owners of the subject
parcels of land.
RULING:
The Court said NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree
contemplated in Section 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act.
A Judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently
seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions. of
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable
(now section 3 and 4, PD No. 1073,)
Crisanto Angeles He claimed that he was in possession of the land way back in 1930. Yet he declared the
same for taxation purposes only in 1966. Although tax receipts are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property. 24 He stated
that he knew the owners of the adjoining properties, but during the cross-examination, he was unable to
give their names. Nor was he able to explain how he came into possession of the parcel of land and there
is no showing of any title, perfect or imperfect, granted by the state to him or his predecessors.
The documents introduced by the applicants merely evidenced the fact that the parcels of land applied for
were alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,25 but no document has been presented that
would clearly establish the length of time of the possession of their predecessors-in-interest
Undoubtedly, the private respondents have failed to submit convincing proof of their predecessors-in-
interest's actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the lots in question during

the period required, by law. This is of utmost significance in view of the basic presumption that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible
CA reversed and set aside.
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, applicant and appellee, v. The Director of Land,
Gregoria Fajardo, et al., objectors and appellants.
Facts:
On November 30, 1909, counsel for the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, a corporation sole
represented by Mgr. J. J. Harty, applied to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription in conformity
with law of four parcels of land, to wit: one parcel situated in the sitio of Mabolo, barrio of Santa Isabel;
another parcel in the sitio of Daquila of the same barrio of Santa Isabel; another parcel in the sitio of
Gatmuala of the barrio of Ligas; and, finally, another parcel situated in the sitio of Murasan of the barrio
of Ticay, all of which parcels of land being in the district of the pueblo of Malolos, Province of Bulacan.
Against this application adverse claims were filed by Gregoria Fajardo and 32 other objectors who claim
that they have been in quiet and peaceable possession for years of the said land. All the adverse claims
filed by the occupants of these lands were disallowed and the Court of Land Registration on April 29, 1911,
decreed the registration and adjudication of the four parcels of land applied for registration and
adjudication of the four parcels of land applied for. An appeal was taken, and the SC, in a decision rendered
on August 8, 1913, affirmed the judgment of the lower court in so far as it decreed the registration of the
two parcels of land situated in Gatmuala and Murasan, and reversed the said judgment in so far as it
decreed the registration of the two parcels situated in the sitios of Mabolo and Daquila of the barrio of
Santa Isabel. Counsel for the petitioner on March 14, 1914, filed a new application in the same Court of
Land Registration for the registration in conformity with law, of the two parcels of land situated in
the sitios of Mabolo and Daquila - the same two parcels of land whose registration in favor of the petitioner
had been denied by this court in its decision of August 8, 1913. The Director of Lands and the 33 objectors
opposed the said application setting up the plea of res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the applicant is barred from applying for registration again the said two (2) parcels of land
by reason of res judicata.
Held:
The decree of the court, denying the registration sought, means nothing more than the respect
recommended by the law for the possession which the occupant enjoys, inasmuch as the applicant has not
shown a better right or title to the real properties in question; but the said decree, denying the registration,
does not declare the possessors of the lands sought to be registered are the owners and proprietors
thereof, and therefore that order denying the registration does not produce the effects of res judicata on
the new petition filed by the plaintiff for the registration of the two parcels of land in litigation, as the said
decree does not contain any acknowledgment or declaration of ownership which would bar perpetually and
absolutely a third person, who is the applicant, from proving, as it has done, that it is the actual and lawful
owner of the lands in dispute, and that the objectors are no more than tenants and precarious holders of
a major part of the lands in question, a portion of which is not held or occupied by anyone at the present
time except by the applicant itself and no objector came forward to lay claim to it.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 11
Heirs of Marasigan V Intermediate Appellate Court and Maria Marron
Facts:
The case involves a disputed property identified as Lot 2-A owned by Spouses Fe and Felicisimo Bazar
On April 24, 1975 a civil case was filed by Maria Marron which seeks to compel the spouses Bazar to
execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of her. On January 27, 1976, while the case was still
pending, Maria Marron caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the Transfer
Certificate of Title of the spouses Bazar. On February 24, 1976 the Court of First Instance rendered
judgement in favor of Maria Marron
*A notice of lis pendent means that a certain property is involved in litigation and serves as a notice
to the world that one who buys the same does it at his own risk.
Prior to the Civil Case instituted by Maria Marron, on December 18, 1974, a Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot
2-A was executed by Fe Bazar in fav or of Maria Marasigan for the amount of Php. 15,000. However, it
was only on July 5, 1977 that the said deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses were cancelled and a new title was issued in
Marasigan’s name and likewise the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by Marron was carried
over to the new title.
On May 26, 1977, the Bazarz filed a petition for relief from judgement dated February 24, 1976 and while
their petition was pending, the spouses moved to set aside said judgement on June 22, 1979 on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. On September 6, 1979, Marron filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Manila
which seeks to nullify Marasigan’s title over the subject lot.
However, the case was dismissed on the ground that Marron’s complaint was premature since the
judgement rendered by court of First Instance had not yet become final and executory. On appeal,
Intermediate Appellate Court ruled that Marron is entitled to the subject property by virtue of the notice
of lis pendens and that the decision of CFI had become final and executory because the petition for relief
from judgement by the spouses Bazar was filed out of time.
Issue:
Who between Maria Maron and Maria Marasigan has the better right over the subject lot.
Ruling:
The court ruled that Maria Marron has the better right over the subject property
It was shown that Maria Marasigan acquired the subject property 4 months before Maria Marron filed a
civil case. However, the transaction between Marasigan and spouses Bazar became effective only as
against third person on July 5, 1977 when it was registered in the registry of deeds. Thus, there is no
question that when the Registry of Deeds issued the new Certificate of Title to Marasigan, the notice of lis
pendens was carried over to such title Because of the lis pendens, it was a clear notice to Marasigan that
there was a court case affecting her rights to the property she purchased. It is an established rule that the
filing of notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of the particular litigation referred to
therein and therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality

of the suit. In the present case, Maria Marron was granted with the right over Lot 2-A therefore Maria
Marasigan lost her right over the lot.
GONZALES VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) awarded the subject property, Lot 29, Block E-418,
covered by TCT No. 1356 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, to petitioner Venancio Gonzales.
However, it was subsequently cancelled and the lot was "re-awarded" to Esteban Raterta. Petitioner
Gonzales commenced Civil Case No. Q-5550 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, at Quezon City, praying
that PHHC be ordered to execute the corresponding contract of sale in his favor.
The trial court dismissed the case but directed PHHC to reimburse petitioner Gonzales the amount of
P1,576.00 paid on the lot. Petitioner Gonzales elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 31757 R, which on January 31, 1969, rendered a decision in his favor. Ordering PHHC to cancel
or revoke the award made toEsteban Raterta being null and void, And to execute the corresponding
Contract to Sell over the lot in favor of Gonzales.6 During the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-5550, the lot
was sold by Esteban Raterta to Dalmacio Raterta who in turn sold the property to private respondents
Rafael, Mario and Vicente, all surnamed Santos.
Thereafter, petitioner Gonzales sought execution of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
31757-R. The move was opposed by PHHC CFI of Rizal issued an Order stating inter alia:
. . . the plaintiff pointed out that the records of this case have long been forwarded to this court by the
Court of Appeals, however, it is unfortunate and regrettable that said records cannot be found among the
records of cases of this court despite diligent efforts to locate the same . . . Considering that the records
of this case was (sic) lost or misplaced through no fault of the herein plaintiff, in counting the reglementary
period during which the writ could not he served, that is when the record of this case cannot be found,
shall be deducted or subtracted. 10
In the meantime, after securing the legal opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel.The PHHC
voluntarily executed the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 31757-R by cancelling and revoking the award in favor
of Esteban Raterta and executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner Gonzales. On May 26, 1980,
petitioner Gonzales filed in Civil Case No. Q-5530 a motion for writ of possession.Respondent Court set
aside the writ of execution issued by the trial court. Two motion for consideration of Gonzales was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession.
HELD:
The Court ruled that if the delays were through no fault of the prevailing party, the same should not be
included in computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion. The motion for execution was
filed within the period.
Therefore, it is thus clear that petitioner had never slept on his rights as the delay in the execution was
beyond his control. Regarding the contention of private respondents that they are entitled to the property
in question on the ground that they are not parties to said case because they acquired the property in
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 12
good faith is devoid of merit. In the first place, there is nothing in the records tending to show that they
took steps to contest the issuance of TCT No. 268893 in the name of petitioner Gonzales after the
cancellation of TCT No. 83217/T-146 in the name of Esteban Raterta as well as TCT No. 135516 in their
name which emanated from Raterta's certificate of title. Private respondents cannot herein assail the title
of petitioner Gonzales.
As a rule, a Torrens Title is irrevocable and indefeasible, and the duty of the court is to see to it that it is
maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding. By express provision of Sec. 48, P.D.
1529, it is clear that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack. The respondent Santos
brothers and their alleged tenant Julian Aguilar have no more right to remain in the promises. The trial
court is directed to enforce immediately the writ of possession issued in favor of herein petitioner Venancio
Gonzales in Civil Case No Q-5550 against persons in occupancy.
REPUBLIC VS UMALI
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic seek the reversion of a parcel of land as the original sale of the same from the
government was tainted with fraud and done with forgery.
The subject land is located in Tanza, Cavite with an area of 78, 865 sq.m. In the year 1910, Florentina
Bobadilla purchased the said land on installment from the government, and subsequently, OCT No. 180
was issued in her favor. Florentina Bobadilla then transferred her rights in favor of Martina, Maria, Gregorio,
Tomasa and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal. Later on, Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to the remaining
three, Martina, Maria and Gregorio. In the year 1971, the three assignees allegedly signed a Joint Affidavit
which they filed with the Bureau of Lands claiming that they’re entitled to the issuance of Certificate of
Title considering that they had already paid in full for the subject property. The Secretary of Agriculture
executed Deed No. V-10910 in favor of the three assignees. In the same year, TCT No 55044 was issued
replacing OCT No. 180 by the Register of Deeds of Cavite in favor of Maria and Gregorio Cenizal, and
Rosalina, Luz and Enrique, in lieu of Martina Cenizal.
In 1985, a complaint for reversion was filed by the petitioner asking the present owners of the property,
namely, Remedios, Juan, Luz and Enrique, to return the property to the State for forgery and fraud. The
petitioner contended that Gregorio died in 1943 while Maria on 1959, therefore, they could not have signed
the Joint Affidavit on 1971 which Deed No. V-10910 was based.
In their answer, private respondents filed their motion to dismiss and argued that they acquired the
property in good faith and for value and that the government is not the real party in interest as the subject
land was covered by Torrens System.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss, hence this present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the sale should be considered null and void ab initio given such deception
HELD
The court agreed that there was obviously forgery as the two supposed applicants were already dead at
the time the Joint Affidavit was executed and that the 3 signatures were written by one and same hand.

Nonetheless, considering that the status of the private respondents as innocent purchasers were never
raised nor having been disapproved, under the protection of Torrens System, the title is considered
conclusive and indefeasible, and its status will not change despite the flaw in TCT No.55044. Furthermore,
Section 39 provides that if a person acquired or received a Certificate of Title and subsequent purchaser
takes Certificate of Title FOR VALUE IN GOOD FAITH, the same shall hold free from all encumbrances. In
addition to that, the private respondents acquired the land not by direct grant but by several transfers
following the original sale to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910. Considering that the land was registered under
Torrens System, the government has no more control and jurisdiction over it as the same ceases to become
a public land. Petition is denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR., et al., SPOUSES
EDUARDO and ARCELITA MARQUEZ and RURAL BANK OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
FACTS:
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for Free Patent covering two parcels of land identified as Lot Nos.
1341 and 1342, containing an aggregate area of 18.6486 hectares with the Bureau of Lands. On he was
issued Free Patent No. 314450 by the Director of Lands. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija registered
the Free Patent and issued the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4522 in the name of
respondent.
The heirs of Eusebio Perez filed a formal protest with the Bureau of Lands alleging that Lot 1341 of the
covered by Original Certificate of Title No-P4522 is identical to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200 which had
been adjudicated as private property of said protestant. Bureau of Lands, conducted a formal investigation
and ocular inspection of the premises and it was ascertained that Free Patent No. 314450 and its
corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and fraudulently issued.
Upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
with Sale in favor of Joaquin Sangabol for and in consideration of the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos. The
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 166270 was issued in favor of the aforenamed heirs. Said TCT No. 166270
was again cancelled by reason of the concurrent sale to Joaquin Sangabol in whose favor TCT No. NT -
166271 was issued.
The Chief of the Legal Division recommended to the Director of Lands that court action be instituted for
the cancellation of Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in
the name Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., as well as other subsequent transfer certificates of title issued therefrom
based on the foregoing findings. Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed the complaint in this case against several defendants, among whom are the herein
respondents. petitioner Republic alleged that Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4522 were procured by defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., through fraud, deceit
and misrepresentation. The fraudulent acts and misrepresentation of defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. had
misled the then Bureau of Lands in issuing said patent. Since the property in question was no longer a
disposable public land, Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-
4522 issued to defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. are null and void and should be cancelled. Moreover,
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 13
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. has not occupied and cultivated the land in the manner and for the length of time
required by law
The Court of Appeals declared that Agunoy Sr, had validly and properly acquired Free Patent No. 314450
and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522
ISSUE: W/N WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER IS
NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND THAT GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR. HAD VALIDLY
ACQUIRED FREE PATENT NO. 314450 AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-4522.
RULING:
It bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the
public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding Torrens titles in their
favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or
forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been
transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.
The nullification of defendant’s title would not result in the reversion of the land to the state but remains
in private property. Consequently, the government, not being the real party-in-interest, is without
personality to institute the action for reversion.
Sabas H. Homena and Iluminada Juaneza, plaintiffs-appellant, v. Dimas Casa and Maria Castor
and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cotabato, defendants-appellees.
Facts:
Plaintiffs-appellants filed a complaint for alleged unlawful acts of dispossession disturbing plaintiffs’
peaceful, continuous, open, uninterrupted, adverse and public possession against spouses Dimas Casa and
Maria Castor. Likewise, plaintiffs sought to annul the original certificate of title issued by the Register of
Deeds for the province of Cotabato in favour of defendant spouses pursuant to a Homestead Patent on
the ground that said patent was obtained by defendant spouses through fraud and misrepresentation by
stating, among others, in their application that the lot was not claimed and occupied by another person.
Plaintiffs alleged that on June 15, 1967, they purchased from the defendants two (2) hectares of the
aforementioned parcel of land, it being agreed in the deed of sale that the said portion would be reconveyed
to plaintiffs after the five-year prohibitory period, as provided for in the Homestead Patent Law, shall have
elapsed, and that defendants failed to abide by said agreement.
The CFI issued an order dismissing the complaint. Thereafter, the CA certified the case to the SC as it
involved only questions of law.
Issue:
Whether or not the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint filed by plaintiffs-defendants.
Held:

The Court held in the negative. Basically, the plaintiffs' supposed cause of action rests upon the deed of
sale executed by defendants in their favor on June 15, 1962 wherein the latter sold a two-hectare portion
of the homestead which they were applying for to the plaintiffs on the understanding that the actual
conveyance of the said portion to plaintiffs would be made only after the lapse of the five-year period
during which, under the Public Land Act, the homestead owner was prohibited from transferring his rights.
The agreement is clearly illegal and void ab initio; it is intended to circumvent and violate the law. As
parties to a void contract, the plaintiffs have no rights which they can enforce and the court cannot lend
itself to its enforcement. Plaintiffs can neither invoke the doctrine of implied trust based on an illegal
contract. The issue of prescription or laches becomes irrelevant in a case such as this, where plaintiffs
clearly have no cause of action. “What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.”-Judge Sawali
Republic vs. Garcia
Facts:
Isabelo Garcia and his wife Tagumpay Dumaguindin purchased the homestead rights of Lingasa
Bapanialag to a parcel of homestead land situated at Mabay, Kiamba, Cotabato, containing an area of
23.21 hectares. The transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources .Patent
No. V-532 was thus issued in favor of the appellant Isabelo Garcia and his wife.
Three years and three months after the issuance of the homestead patent, or on 14 April 1950, the spouses
sold to Domingo Colorado, Raymundo de Guzman, Inocencio Padama, Ignacio Ramos and Leon de Guzman
19 hectares of the homestead land. The new owners took possession of the property. The deed of sale
was, however, not submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for approval nor
presented to the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Cotabato for registration. Alienation within
5 years from the issuance of the patent is prohibited. Since the sale was made within the prohibitive period
of 5 years, the sale is void and is a cause for reversion of the homestead to the state. The spouses and
buyers contended that it was intended only as a mortgage on the improvements and crops on the 19
hectares and was drawn up as a deed of sale by mistake. They also claimed that since the deed of sale
was not registered, there was no conveyance made of the 19hectares.The CFI ruled in favor of the state.
Issue: Whether the ruled that the land should revert to the state as public domain.
Ruling:
The judgement was affirmed. The land should revert to the state. It is clear that the appelants intended
the mortgage to be a deed of sale. Moreover, the improvements on the land only consist of 50 coconut, 5
mango trees, 1 nangka tree, bananas and other fruit trees. It is unbelievable that the defendants would
grant a loan with such meager collateral. There was also no evidence of installment payments presented
to support the contention that it was a mortgage. It is also not necessary for the encumbrance to be
registered ; it is enough that it be encumbered or alienated within 5 years. To hold otherwise would defeat
the purpose of the prohibition since nobody would have such illegal document registered. The buyers have
also taken possession of the land.Even if only 19 of the 23.21 hectares had been alienated, this is still
sufficient cause for reversion of the land to the state.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 14
Lee Chuy Realty Corporation vs CA and Marc Realty And Development Corporation
GR no. 104114
FACTS:
A valuable piece of land located at Meycauyan, Bulacan, with an area of 24,576 sq. m. and covered by
OCT No. 0-5290 is disputed by Lee Chuy Realty Corporation and Marc Realty and Development Corp. Such
land was originally co-owned by Ruben Jacinto(one-sixth), Dominador, Arsenio, Liwayway all surnamed
Bascara and Ernesto jacinto(collectively owned the remaining five-sixths).
On Feb. 4, 1981, Ruben Jacinto sold his one-sixth pro-indiviso share to LEE CHUY REALTY which was
registered 30 April 1981. On 5 May 1989 the Bascaras and Ernesto Jacinto also sold their share to MARC
REALTY which was registered on 16 October 1989.
Lee Chuy Realty claims that it was never informed of the existence of the sale between Marc Realty and
the Bascaras/Jacinto. Marc Realty insists that Lee Chuy verbally notified of the sale and was given a copy
of the deed of sale. On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed a complaint for legal redemption against
MARC REALTY and consigned in court a manager's check for 614,400. MARC REALTY insisted that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action there being no allegation of prior valid tender
of payment or a prior valid notice of consignation.
On Dec 26, 1990, the trial court ruled in favour of Lee Chuy Realty which stated that there was a valid
tender of payment and consignation. It also stated that neither a separate offer to redeem nor a formal
notice of consignation is necessary for the reason that the filing of the action itself, within the period of
redemption, is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem. On 1 February 1991 MARC REALTY filed a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction which
was referred to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that "a
prior tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of an action for legal
redemption” and that "there must be tender of the redemption price within the required period because
the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day
period.
MARC REALTY contends that prior tender of payment is a condition precedent to the filing of an action in
court in order to validly exercise the right of legal redemption. LEE CHUY REALTY however argues that the
filing of the action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, which is a condition precedent to the
valid exercise of the right of legal redemption. Lee Chuy filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
WON a formal offer to redeem accompanied with tender of payment a condition precedent to the filing of
an action for the valid exercise of the right of legal redemption; is the filing of the action with consignation
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that a prior tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite
or precondition to the filing of the action for legal redemption. To avail of the right of redemption what is
essential is to make an offer to redeem within the prescribed period. There is no prescribed form for an
offer to redeem to be properly effected. It can either be the formal tender with consignation or the filing
of a complaint in court. What is paramount is the availment of the fixed and definite period within which
to exercise the right of legal redemption. The filing of the action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem. What constitutes a condition precedent is either a formal offer to redeem or the filing of an action

in court together with the consignation of the redemption price within the reglementary period. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan is REINSTATED.
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs The Deputy Executive Secretary, et al.
FACTS:
In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquino’s administration, petitioner sent letters to the Office of
the President and to the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) seeking the reinstatement of its timber license
agreement (TLA No. 87), which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine other concessions, during
the Marcos administration. It alleged that after the its TLA was cancelled without being given the
opportunity to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded to other logging concessionaires without a formal
award or license, as these entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Marcos.
The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution,
but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that
petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose
licenses were revoked in 1983. It also emphasized the fact that there was currently a total log ban being
imposed on the subject areas. After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the
President, but the petition was denied on the ground that the appeal was prematurely filed, the matter not
having been terminated in the MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors.
RULING:
The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine in this
jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and
orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by
a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction
More importantly, the assailed orders of the MNR disclose public policy consideration, which effectively
forestall judicial interference. Public respondents, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing
the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous
dispensation. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under their special technical knowledge and training.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 15
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause.
The Court expresses its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license
agreements to a number of logging concessionaires. Should the appropriate case be brought showing a
clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of concerned officials with respect to the implementation of this
public policy, the Court will not hesitate to step in. However, in this case, the Court finds no basis to issue
a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought. Petition is dismissed.
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO
GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992 Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
OCTOBER 18, 2017
FACTS:
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize
timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a
period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992. in 1987, herein private respondents filed a petition
with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the
provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein
private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over
the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought
was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605. Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and
the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the CA, which sustained the trial
court .The CA held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception
and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The
respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial
intervention. The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:
Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance,
approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative
official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with
the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the
Philippines.
This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the
courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
2. Whether the RTC is correct when it declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605.
RULING:
1. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same
may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a
cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.
The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground
for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within
the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better
position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less
important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also
relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily
loaded dockets. 9
As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the
doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately.
Among these exceptional cases are:
1) when the question raised is purely legal;
2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;
3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
5) when the claim involved is small;
6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
8) when strong public interest is involved;
9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and
10) in quo warranto proceedings.
The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry
laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question
they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and
public interest is involved.
We rule for the petitioner. Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort
to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still
require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of
pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function “to regulate the development, disposition,
extraction, exploration and use of the country’s forests” and “to exercise exclusive jurisdiction” in the
“management and disposition of all lands of the public domain,” and in the Forest Management Bureau
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 16
(formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws
aid regulations here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the
very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under
its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.
The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private
respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before
the RTC, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry
laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting
evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized
knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise
their powers of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the
national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these
extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies
and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the
petitioner’s uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in
compliance with the order of the DENR.
2. There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court.
Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful
logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the
forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this
question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of
the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for
the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice. In view of the
above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided
where the case can be decided on some other available ground, as we have done in the case before us.
The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a
judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time
for the Court “to make the hammer fall, and heavily,” in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is
warranted. The petition is GRANTED.
LAGUA VS CUSI, 160 SCRA 69 (1983)
FACTS: A memorandum was issued preventing the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with
logs for the Japanese vessel on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In
compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the use by
plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while the vehicles
and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed and were allowed passess on the same road. It
resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. When Plaintiffs Laguas
were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs towards the Japanese Vessel, again that same
road, only the day before ordered by the BFD to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed
to them by Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order of Defendant Maglana. Even

the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to existing
laws, rules and regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine Coastguard. Given no recourse in
the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the
Defendant East coast through the order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had to depart posthaste to
Mati, Davao Oriental, from Baganga where the shipment and the road closure were made, to seek the
assistance of the PC thereat. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss arguing that petitioner
Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs
in the Bureau of Forestry. The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest
Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to determine whether their
use is in violation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Forest Development has the jurisdiction to determine first the
legality of closure of logging roads before the case be directed to the regular courts
HELD: NO. P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in
the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or
illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.
Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal
closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the
part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately
be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment
of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forest Development.
Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and CRISANTA
SANTOS, vs. FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA OJERIO
Facts:
Respondent Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration wherein they seek
judicial confirmation of their titles to parcels of land located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan. Petitioner
Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo opposed the application for registration, alleging
that they are the co-owners of the lot in question as evidenced by evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the government
through sales patents. The Regional Trial Court Ruled in favor of Respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Arlos complied with the Public Land Act requiring possession of the land subject
to judicial confirmation for a period of 30 years.
Held:
No. A title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable
lands of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable,
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 107314 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.15cräläwvirtualibräry In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 17
military reservation that had been turned over to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared
disposable and alienable only in 1971. Hence there was non-compliance with the 30 year requirement.
SERAFIN B. YNGSON, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES,
ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ
FACTS:
The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares,
more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros
Occidental. On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for
fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and
April 24, 1953.
On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit
with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose
M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953.
When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available
for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The
conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant
and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees. Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez
appealed the order where DANR set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused
the division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the
whole area covered by their respective applications.
Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
First Instance. CFI dismissed. Hence this Petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development of
fishponds gravely abuse their discretion
HELD:
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14,
1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available
for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest
lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases
for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not
released for fishery or other purposes.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, FOREST STATION WARDEN, DISTRICT 13, BUREAU OF FORESTRY,
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY 1 and CHIEF
OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. EMMANUEL M. MUÑOZ, as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, the SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE of BULACAN,
and PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC.
Facts:
Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of Angat,
Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal.
Piadeco's evidence of ownership consists of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25, 1894,4 and a
deed of absolute sale of July 12, 1962, in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration as private woodland
some 10,000 hectares of this land. The Bureau of Forestry, on December 4, 1963, issued in Piadeco's name
Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. PWR 2065-New, covering but a portion of the land an
aggregate area of 4,400 hectares and an average stand of 87.20 cubic meters, situated in the municipalities
of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose del Monte, all of the province of Bulacan, and Montalban, in Rizal. It
was to expire on December 31, 1964. By virtue of the registration certificate, Piadeco conducted logging
operations..
The controversy in the these cases began on April 11, 1964, when Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F.
Rivera issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required Piadeco to surrender the original
certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations
for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded from the said
certificate.5
Issue:
W/N Piadeco owns the woodland in question privately
Ruling:
Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 was the high point of controversy in a land claim involving several hectares of
land. Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO) was claiming to be the owner of
some 72,000 hectares of land located in municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose Del Monte,
province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. PIADECO relied on the
aforementioned title as incontrovertible evidence of its ownership. Justice Sanchez noted the dubious
validity of the title in his opinion, stating “Private ownership of land must be proved not only through the
genuineness of title but also with clear identity of the land claimed xxx no definite area seems to have
been mentioned in the title”
Oposa et al. v. Factoran Jr.
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as
an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-
profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 18
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging
companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a
final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel
the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
Issues:
 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his
opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to
him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and
proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision
Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as future generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their

right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
4. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they
are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.
1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If
he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because
he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to
their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license
must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when
the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 19
TAN V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
Facts: The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain track of
public forest situated in Olongapo, Zambales. The said land was located within the former US Naval
Reservation which was turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Petitioner
Wenceslao Tan and nine other applicants submitted their applications of their offer before the deadline.
President Carlos Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry on June 7, 1961 stating
that the area covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed purposes, and
prepare and submit immediately a draft of proclamation. Also, the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry
for the issuance of timber license be rejected. Out of the ten persons who submitted the bids, the said
area was awarded to the petitioner by the Bureau of Forestry. Against this award, Ravago Commercial
Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Bureau of
Forestry. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin Gozon issued General Memorandum
Order No. 46 on May 30, 1963 delegating the authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber
licenses. Thereafter, Jose Feliciano, being appointed as Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and replaced Secretary Gozon, promulgate immediately upon his assumption of office General
Memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to Bureau of Forestry to grant ordinary timber
licenses. It was also stated under the said memorandum that the issuance of new licenses, including
amendments, shall be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On December 19,
1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-64, in the name of the petitioner, was signed by the Acting Director
of Forestry Estanislao Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
It was released on January 6, 1964 by the Office of the Director of Forestry but it was not signed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by the Memorandum. Ravago Commercial
Company wrote a letter on February 12, 1964 to the Secretary stating that OTL No. 20-64 issued to the
petitioner should be cancelled and revoked on the ground that the grant was irregular, anomalous and
contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations. On March 9, 1964, said timber license was declared
void ab initio by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration
but the motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinary Timber License No. 20-64 is valid.
Held: No. Petitioner-appellant’s timber license was signed and released without authority by then Acting
Director Estanislao Bernal and is therefore void ab initio. The release of the license on January 6, 1964
gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of
the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the release or
issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While the petitioner-appellant’s timber license
might have been signed on December 19, 1953 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release,
no right is acquired by the licensee.
A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare. Thus, the Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights.

PEOPLE V WILSON QUE
Facts: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as
amended by EO No. 277. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal
source. During the trial, he presented the private timber land permits (PLTP) issued by the DENR to Enrica
Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal. The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest
covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber which came from the forest are covered by the
said PLTP’s of Cayosa and Sabal. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Sec. 68 of
PD 705 because EO 277 which amended section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make
the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
Issue: WON appellant is guilty of violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277.
Held: Yes. There are two (2) separate and distinct offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from any alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the
second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting, and removal of the
forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because EO
277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents
as malum prohibitum.
Taopa vs. People
Facts:
A certain Cuison was arrested for driving a truck containing illegally-cut lumber. Upon investigation, Cuison
pointed to petitioner Taopa as owners of the said lumber. So, Taopa was arrested for violation of Section
68 of PD 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Upon conviction by the Court of Appeals, he then seeked
acquittal before the SC contending that he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.
Issue:
Whether or not Taopa is guilty of violating Sec. 68 of PD 705.
Held:
YES. Based on the factual circumstances, Taopa was proven to exercise dominion over the lumber loaded
in the truck. In fact, it was loaded in front of Taopa’s house and that he was accompanying the truck driven
by Cuison. Furthermore, the fact that Taopa ran away at the mere sight of the police is clear indication of
guilt.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 20
However, the penalty imposed by the CA was amended as to that imposed on qualified theft. The law
treats, cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an
offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
DENR VS. DARAMAN
*** DENR HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CONFISCATION OF FOREST PRODUCTS AND CONVEYANCES USED IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. ***
THE private respondents herein named Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged with violation
of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. They were accused to gather, collect and possess seventy
two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber. The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified that
he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. He is the
one responsible in stopping Daraman who is a driver of a vehicle that contains the said assorted lumber.
When he asked the driver daraman for some papers, the latter replied that he had none because they
were not his. Pablo then confiscated the said lumber and the vehicle.
The RTC acquitted both accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and ORDERED THE RETURN
OF THE DISPUTED VEHICLE. On the other hand, the DENR- CENRO of Catbalogan, Samar conducted
administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle. The respondents failed to
present documents SHOWING THE LEGALITY OF THEIR POSSESSION AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE
LUMBER SEIZED. Hence, the CENRO officer recommended the final confiscation of the seized lumber and
conveyance which was approved by the chief of the Legal Division of the DENR.
The DENR Region 8 moved for the reconsideration of the assailed ecision only insofar as it ordered the
return of the said vehicle to the owner. It contended that the vehicle has already been administratively
confiscated by the DENR. The issue is WON the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle.
The SC ruled in the negative.
The Court agreed that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed
vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order
issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under
Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all
conveyances—by land, water or air—used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or
abandoning forest products.
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law. A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections
of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or
forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest
products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
“Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.—Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
“SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to
Order Confiscation.—In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land,
water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent
laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”
The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes “any type or
class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof
or any mode of transport used in the movement of any forest product.
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of “all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same” is vested in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized
representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.
The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed
Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents’
acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR
was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it.
The release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the
implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to
conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future
generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.29 Strong paramount public policy should not be
degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.
Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Ret.), complainant, v. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, respondent.
Facts:
On or about January 30, 2005, the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG)
received an information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans
containing illegal forest products from CDO to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal
and corn grains to avoid inspection of DENR. A team composed of representatives from PNPRMG, DENR
and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected said container vans. The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to
produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest
products. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within reasonable period
of time, the DENR considered them abandoned, and Richard Abella, PENRO OIC issued a seizure receipt
to NMC Container. Then, a complaint was filed before Judge Paderanga by a certain Roger Edma who
prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to
deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him
moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin ordering
Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest products.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 21
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Paderanga erred when it issued the said writ of replevin.
Held:
The Court held in the affirmative. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for
three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In this case, Edma did not resort to the same.
He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin, and damages. Second, under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of
special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The
complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest
products and brought them to the DENR CENRO. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR
had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have commenced, and that the
replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus
cannot be subject of replevin.
Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tuktukan Saingan
Facts:
Applicant Tuktukan Saingan seeks the registration of a parcel of land in Lucnab, Hogon, Benguet. His
evidence shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law, Dongail, when he married his daughter.
At the time of acquisition, it was planted with camotes, casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; He
lived on the land since his marriage up to present, he paid taxes during the Japanese occupation and even
before it; And that he was never disturbed in his possession.
The Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry, represented by the provincial fiscal oppose the application.
The Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company also oppose it claiming that the land in question is within its mineral
claims- Sally, Evelyn, and Ethel. Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company submitted evidence showing that the
annual assessment work of these mineral claims were maintained and that it was recorded in the mining
recorder’s office.
The Director of Lands thru the office of the solicitor General, opposed private respondents application on
the ground that the applicant did not have the title in fee simple over the questioned land and that he had
not exercised continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation over the said land for atleast
30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
The lower court ruled in favor of Atok-Big-Wedge Mining Company. The mining claims were recorded ahead
of time when the applicant declared the land for taxation purposes. And so, the evidence of the applicant
cannot prevail over the evidence of Atok-Big-Wedge Mining Company. Moreover, if applicant was already
in possession and occupation of the land, it is strange that he did not oppose its survey when the mining
company surveyed the area.
The appellate court reversed its decision on the ground that private respond established his right over the
parcel of land. Mere payment of annual assessment fees is only proof of compliance and not a proof of
actual assessment. On the other hand, the applicant constructed various improvements on the land such
as 3 residential houses, fruit trees, rice fields and other permanent improvements. Also, it has been alleged

that Atok-Big-Wedge converted its application on mineral claims in question into mining lease only in
compliance with PD1214 which makes the mining company as a mere lesse of the mining claims.
Issue:
Within the land had been vested on the Petitioner
Ruling: No.
(1) the rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 of a mining claim holder over his claim has been made
subject by the said Bill itself on the strict requirement that he actually performs work or undertakes
improvements on the mine every year and does not merely file his affidavit of annual assessment, which
requirement was correctly identified and declared in E.O No. 141; and (2) that the same rights have been
terminated by P.D No. 1214, a police power enactment, under which non-application for mining lease
amounts to waiver of all rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and application for mining lease amounts
to waiver of the right under said Bill to apply for patent. In the light of these substantial conditions upon
the rights of a mining claim holder under the Philippine Bill of 1902, there should remain no doubt now
that such rights were not, in the first place, absolute or in the nature of ownership, and neither were they
intended to be so.
LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V. RAMOS
FACTS:
La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. is a farmers and indigenous people’s cooperative organized under
Phil.laws representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP
On March 3, 1995, Pres. Fidel V. Ramos approved Philippine Mining Act (R.A 7942) to govern the
exploration, development, utilization & processing of all mineral resources. R.A 7942 defines the modes of
mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedures for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Before its effectivity, however, on March
30,1995 the Pres.entered into a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement with WMCP covering 99,387
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On Aug. 15, 1995, DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23,
otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 7942, this was later repealed by
DAO No. 9640. On Jan. 10, 1997, Petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Sec. demanding that DENR to stop
the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 & DAO No. 9640.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942 and its IRR be declared unconstitutional on the ground that they allow
fully foreign owned corporation to explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner
contrary to Sec. 2, par. 4, Art. 12 of the Constitution. On January 23, 2001, WMC sold all its shares in
WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60 % is owned by Filipinos while the 40 % is owned by Indophil Resources,
an Australian Company.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7942 otherwise known as Philippine Mining Act of 1995, along with its IRR is
unconstitutional.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 22
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine.
The Regalian Doctrine extends not only to land but also to all natural wealth that may be found in the
bowels of the earth. The Court ruled that the phrase “management or other form of assistance” in the
1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only “technical or financial
assistance”. The management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors which is the primary
feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of 1987 Constitution sought to
eradicate.
The constitutional provision allowing the Pres. to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned corporations is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
The Court finds that RA 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although the
statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitution,
it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law. Since FTAA between the WMCP and the Philippine
Government is a service contract, the Court hereby declares it unconstitutional.
Comilang v. Buendia
Facts:
Nicolas Comilang staked a mining claim known as the "Bua Fraction Mineral Claim" over a parcel of land in
Tuding, Benguet, He stopped the exploration but continue to live in the house built on a portion of the
land with his wife and other relatives. In 1918, Macario Comilang and his relatives also settled on a portion
of the land with an area of about one (1) hectare, for residential and agricultural purposes. Surface rights
over the area embraced in the original Bua Fraction Mineral Claim of Nicolas Comilang soon became the
subject of litigation in an action to quiet title filed in RTC of Baguio by the other heirs against Macario
claiming that they bought the rights and interest of Nicolas Comilang in the old mining claim.
The court dismissed both claims of ownership of petitioner and respondent declaring the area as a public
land, but recognized the possession of Macario Comilang over 1½ hectares which was declared for taxation
purposes but later on levied and sold at a public auction to satisfy a money judgment obtained by spouses
Jose Coloma and Eugenia Rumbaoa against Macario filed in the RTC of Baguio. The spouses were the
purchasers in the auction and the certificate of sale was issued in favor of them.
In the meantime, an application for lode patent covering the Bua Fraction Mineral Claim was filed with the
Bureau of Mines by Marcos Comilang. Abdon Delenela and his co-heirs filed their opposition to the
application. Pending application, Delenela filed an action for the determination of their rights on the land
in the RTC of Baguio to which the said court awarded one-half in undivided share in the mineral claim in
favor of Marcos and the other half also in undivided share in favor of Abdon Delenela and co-heirs.
Delenela, with the knowledge and conformity of Marcos Comilang, redeemed and bought from the Coloma
spouses, the latter's rights, title, interest and claim to the 1-1/2 hectares of land acquired under the
certificate of sale. A writ of possession was issued in their favor. Delenela, from acquiring possession of
the share of Comilang from the Coloma spouses, filed a petition for ejectment against Comilang.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of a mineral lode patent over the Bua Mineral Claim by the Director
of Mines (Patent issued on November 7, 1966) whereby full ownership not only of the minerals therein but
also of the surface ground have been conveyed to the patentee
Held: NO. Interest acquired under like certificates of sale alone has been described as more than a lien
on the property, more than an equitable estate, an inchoate legal title to the property. There is no room
for doubt, therefore, that the right to possess or own the surface ground is separate and distinct from the
mineral rights over the same land. And when the application for lode patent to the mineral claim was
prosecuted in the Bureau of Mines, the said application could not have legally included the surface ground
sold to another in the execution sale. Consequently, We have to declare that the patent procured
thereunder, at least with respect to the 1-½ hectares sold in execution pertains only to the mineral right
and does not include the surface ground of the land in question. However, since Delenela acquired the
interest of Comilang from the Coloma spouses, she then owned both the surface rights and mineral rights
over the subject property.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED INCORPORATED vs REPUBLIC
FACTS
In the year 1958, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for expropriation against 10
defendants and among them is petitioner Benguet. Respondent Republic contended that they needed the
property for establishing and maintaining a site for the Philippine Military Academy and that it had occupied
since 1950 these areas covered by mining claims and that they have installed permanent buildings and
improvements with no less than 3 million in the belief that these areas are part of the public domain.
Petitioner Benguet filed their motion to dismiss stating that they have 4 mining claims which were located
and perfected on 1933. They contended that respondent Republic has not occupied the areas covered
neither have made any improvements therein, that expropriation proceeding refers only to privately owned
mineral lands, mining interest and other private interests of private individuals, thus the expropriation of
Benguet’s mineral claim is in violation of law.
CFI heard the motion to dismiss however, further proceedings were held in abeyance pending the result
of the ongoing negotiation between the parties for possible amicable settlement. However, the CFI in 1973
promulgated its decision awarding various sums to defendants excluding petitioner Benguet.
Benguet filed Motion to clarify the decision and a motion for new trial. Acting on these motions, CFI ordered,
fixing just compensation of the surface of 4 mining claims with interests, in the total amount of
P128,051.82. Both Benguet and Reublic appealed the decision of the CFI. IAC reversed and set aside the
decision of the court a quo awarding Benguet the amount of P7,532.46. Benguet filed the present petition
for review.
ISSUE
WON the expropriation of petitioner Benguet’s mineral claims is in violation of law considering that the
claims were already located and perfected since 1933, thus segregated from public domain.
HELD
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 23
Petitioner’s arguments have no merit. The mere filing of the expropriation proceeding means that the
property of the petitioner is no longer part of the public domain. The eminent domain is the power of the
government to take private property for public use. In the present case, the land where mineral claims
were located are needed for the construction of site for PMA.the fact that the location of a mining claim
has been perfected doesn’t bar the government to exercise its power of eminent domain. The right of
eminent domain of the government covers all forms of private property, whether tangible or intangible,
and includes the rights which are attached to these lands.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL
MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO
CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao),
respondents.
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve
known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area." Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted
Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal area.
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a
People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) The statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside
small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-
scale miners under certain conditions. DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open
to small-scale mining. Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a
Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR
Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case. While the RED Mines case was pending,
Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), 8 which
in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit.
The DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-0310 which provided that the DENR shall study
thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal
Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility
of entering into management agreements or operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate
government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of rationalizing
the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area
Petitioner filed a special civil action before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary
and BCPMC, It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum on the ground that the "direct
state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No.
97-03 since the same was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the
government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.
ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the assailed memorandum order did not
adopt the ‘direct state utilization scheme’ in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.

The State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the
same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority
when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the
constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct
takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by
the gold rush. As implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling
for this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.
Apex Mining Corporation vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.
Facts: This case involves "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area", a rick traxt of miner land located at Davao Del Norte.
This has been stormed by conflicts by numerous mininh claimants. On Dec 12, 1983, Apex Mining
Corporation and Balite Commjmal Portal Mining Cooperative entered into an agreement to operate mining
in the said area. On July 1, 1985, the Bureau of Forest Development issued a prospecting permit to
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC), and later, an Exploration Permit 113 (EP 113) was given to MMC.
On December 1991, DENR Secretary issued A.O. No. 66 declaring 729 hectares of the areas covered by
the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non foresr lands and can be open for mining claims.
Also, MMC assigned EP 113 to the respondent SEM, allegedly, a corporation to be 100% owned by MMC.
Several oppositors address rhe assignment of rights. The Panel Arbitrators of DENR ruled that the
assignment was valid. The CA also ruled the same. And it also ruled that the DENR Secretary has no power
to withdraw a forest reserve since such power is lodged to the President. Hence, the petitioner elevated
the case to the SC. During the pendency of the case, Gloria Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297 which
excluded an are located in Compostella Valley and proclaimed the dame as mineral reservations and an
environmentally critical area. The DENR Secretary, acting as an alter ego of the President, issued A.O. no.
2002-18 declaring an emergency situation in Diwalwal and declaring to stop all mining operations.
Isssue:
a. W/n the CA erred in upholding the validity of EP 113 as well as its transfer to SEM. (Yes)
b. W/n the CA erred in declaring that DENR Sec had no authority to issue A.O. no. 66. (No)
c. W/n the subsequent orders of GMA and DENR Secretary outweighs the claim of Apex and Balite over
Diealwal. (Yes)
Ruling:
a. SEM had not acquire any right to Diwalwal because the transfer of EP 113 was made without a prior
approval of the DENR Secretary. Under P.D. No. 463, it explicitly requires that the transfer/assignment
must be made with prior approval of DENR Sec.
b. Commomwealth Act No. 37 vests solely to the President, with the concurrence of the National Assembly,
the power to withdraw forest reserves and convert into non forest reserves. Thus A.O. 66 is null and void.
c. The issue of priority right has been undertaken by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 and DAO No.
2002-18, covering that the mining operations in Diwalwal is within the full control of executive branch and
by declaring that the area as mineral reservation and as an environmentally critical area.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 24
Miners Association of the PH vs. Factoran
Facts:
The controversy occurred when the 1987 constitution was implemented, specifically the change introduced
by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development and utilization
of the country's natural resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through
"license, concession or lease" under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions1 allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
On July 10, 1987, President Corazon Aquino promulgated EO 211 prescribing interim procedures on the
processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals. Here,
existing mining permits, licenses and leases were permitted to continue. Licensing is also governed by PD
463, without prejudice to any alterations the congress may adapt pursuant to Sec. 2 Art XII of the
constitution
EO279 was promulgated on July 25,1987 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization
of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving
technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals
Pursuant to this mandate, the DENR Secreatry issued AO No. 57, the "Guidelines of Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279."6 Under this provision all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources
covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements
within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.
This was followed by Administrative Order No. 82 the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."7Under the AO 82, existing mining lessees
were required to apply for permit. The Administrative orders were contested by the Mners Association of
the Philippines. Petitioner contends that both orders were in excess of the rulemaking power granted by
Eos 211 and 279. Both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision since AO No. 57 unduly
pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing
agreements and AO 87 unduly preterminates existing agreemends, causing the abandonment of mining,
quarry and sand gravel permits.
Issue:
Are AOs 57 and 82 valid and does it not contravene Eos 211 and 279?
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the validity of said AOs. The power of administrative officials to promulgate
rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect
what is provided in the legislative enactment
PD 463 is no longer the governing law. It is the old system of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and is thus deemed repealed. However provisions not inconsistent

with EO 279 shall be retained. As mandated by the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall explicitly be under the full control and supervision of the State.
There is thus no clear showing that the DENR secretary went beyond the authority given by EO 279.
The AOs do not automatically preterminate existing lease agreements since the Constitutional provision
was made to apply prospectively, thus respecting mining licenses or concessions granted before the 1987
constitution. However, it was noted that the non-impairment provision is not absolute. The State, in the
exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-
impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted.
The AOs do not also seek to convert mining lease agreements to production sharing agreements since
production sharing agreements cant be declared/ordered unilaterally by the government; Production
sharing agreement requires a meeting of the minds after subsequent negotiation.
McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia
FACTS
On June 17, 1916, in accordance with the Phil. Act of 1902, McDaniel located 3 petroleum placer mineral
claims in Tayabas. Notices of their location were recorded in the office of the mining recorder. Furthermore,
there was continuous possession and annual assessment work over the said claims.
Act No. 2932 which was approved on August 31, 1920 provided that “all public lands containing petroleum
or other mineral oils and gas, on which no patent, at the date this Act takes effect, has been issued, are
hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location and lease…” On
June 18, 1921, in accordance with Act No. 2932, Cuisia applied with the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land that included McDaniel’s 3 claims.
However, Actd No. 2932 further provided that “parties having heretofore filed claims for any mineral lands
containing said minerals, shall be given preference to lease their respective claims, provided they file a
petition to that effect within 6 months from the date of the approval of this Act.” Therefore, all parties
having mineral claims prior to the approval of Act No. 2932 had until Feb. 28, 1921 to file a petition with
the Government to lease the corresponding public lands. Otherwise, their preference over other applicants
shall be forfeited. McDaniel sought to prohibit the Government from granting Cuisia’s lease application
mainly on the argument that Act No. 2932 is unconstitutional since it deprives him of his property without
due process of law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the non issuance of patent reverts back the valid appropriation of public mineral land into
property of public domain.
HELD
The Supreme Court sustained McDaniel’s argument. It held that a perfected, valid appropriation of public
mineral lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long as
such appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property.
Such perfected, valid and subsisting appropriation shall be deemed to have taken place when all the
requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims have been complied with and
the claims were never abandoned or forfeited. This is notwithstanding the fact that no patent has been
issued since the right to a patent vests full equitable title with all the benefits, immunities, and burdens of
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 25
ownership. Furthermore, the claim and the location is perfected not only against 3rd persons but also
against the Government.
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. v. LEIDO
FACTS: Petitioner Zambales is a mining corporation which is claiming to be the owner and holder of 60
mineral claims which it acquired through purchase in good faith and for value 43 years ago. Said claims
were registered in 1934 under Act of US Congress of July 1, 1902 or the Philippine Bill of 1902.
On June 14, 1977, petitioner actually and duly filed its application for patent for each claim of said 60
mineral claims which was approved and granted the rights under PD 463. Said claims became part of
petitioner’s private property following the doctrinal rules laid down in the cases of McDaniel and Gold Creek
Mining which already been segregated from public domain to which petitioner is entitled to the exclusive
possession and enjoyment against everyone. The issuance of PD 1214 which open to lease subsisting and
valid patentable mining claims, lode or placer located under the provisions of the Act of US Congress of
July 1, 1902, as amended, already segregated from the public domain and held by it for over 43 yrs and
requiring it without fail and against their will to file a mining lease application with the Mines Regional
Office concerned within a period of 1 year is a deprivation of petitioner’s right to ownership without due
process of law nor just compensation and therefore, unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WoN the issuance of PD 1214 deprived the petitioner’s right.
HELD: NEGATIVE. The court upheld the validity of PD 1214 for it is in accord with sec 8, Art 14 of the
1973 Constitution and sec. 2, Art 12 of the 1987 Constitution. The Court also considered it as a valid
exercise of the sovereign power of the State over lands of public domain and the Decree does not cover
all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators failed
to obtain a patent.
Likewise, there is no showing that the petitioner has complied with all the terms and conditions prescribed
by law prior to Nov. 15, 1935 that there should be not only a valid and subsisting location of mineral land
but a continuous compliance with all the requirements of law such as the performance of annual
assessment works and payment of real estate taxes.
MEDRANA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
The controversy, which began in 1979, relates to Mining Lease Contract ("MLC") No. V-754 which the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued to private respondent Supreme Aggregates
Corporation ("Supreme Aggregates") on 30 June 1969. In 1976, within the period prescribed in Section
100 above, Supreme Aggregates filed with the Bureau of Mines an Application to Avail of Rights and
Privileges under P.D. No. 463 which application was required by Sections 100 and 101, above, from all
claim owners and lessees desirous of maintaining their pre-existing rights under the regime inaugurated
by that decree. On February 1979, the Director of the Bureau of Mines issued an order denying Supreme
Aggregates’ Application for the same had failed to submit Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations. On June
1979, the Director of Mines issued Quarry Temporary Permits ("QTPs") to petitioner Teodoro Medrana.
These permits covered areas within the territory leased to Supreme Aggregates. Supreme Aggregates filed
a petition with the Director of Mines praying for reinstatement of its rejected Application to Avail of Rights
and Privileges and for cancellation of Medrana’s QTPs. Medrana filed an answer to this petition. After

investigation, the Director of Mines ordered the reinstatement of Supreme Aggregates’ Application to Avail
of Rights and Privileges and the cancellation of Medrana’s QTPs since these covered areas within Supreme
Aggregates’ valid and subsisting MLC No. V-754. On appeal by Medrana, the Ministry of Natural Resources
reinstated Medrana’s QTPs and declared that Supreme Aggregates’ MLC No. V-754 had lapsed. In so
deciding, former Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Q. Peña reasoned that the order of the Bureau of
Mines which had rejected Supreme Aggregates’ Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges had already
become final when Supreme Aggregates filed its petition for reinstatement of its Application on 29 June
1979, that is, one hundred and twenty (120) days after its receipt of the Bureau of Mines’ order of denial.
Supreme Aggregates then filed an appeal with the Office of the President. The Office of the President, as
already noted in a decision dated 20 September 1988, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural
Resources and in essence held that the failure to submit Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations for two (2)
consecutive years did not, by itself and standing alone, result in the automatic cancellation of MLC No. V-
754.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary (Office of the President) committed grave abuse of
discretion.
HELD: No.
Careful reading of the Section 27 of the said law shows that abandonment of a mining claim or lease results
from failure to comply with the annual work obligations on the area covered by a mining claim or lease for
two (2) consecutive years. The precipitating event of the lapse of a mining claim or lease contemplated in
Section 27 is the failure to carry out actual work on a mining claim or lease, and not simply the failure
to submit in a timely manner the Affidavit of Annual Work Obligations. That Affidavit constitutes
simply proof of compliance with the annual work obligations. Execution and submission of an Affidavit of
Annual Work Obligations creates a presumption that the work obligation was indeed carried out. This
presumption is by no means a conclusive one, but is, on the contrary, merely a prima facie one since
Section 27 expressly prescribes that "if it is found upon field verification that no such work was actually
done on the mining claims, the claim owner/lessee shall likewise lose his rights thereto notwithstanding
submission of the aforesaid documents." It follows that, conversely, failure to submit the Affidavit of Annual
Work Obligations raises the presumption that no work was actually done, but that this presumption too
can be overturned by affirmative proof — e.g., by "field verification" — that the required annual work
obligations had in fact been carried out on the mining claim or leased area. To hold that the mere failure
to submit the Affidavits resulted in automatic abandonment of MLC No. V-754 notwithstanding the actual
performance of work obligations, would not only run counter to the express language of Section 27, but
would also be to exalt form over substance.
Abandonment may be said to result where there is concurrence of two (2) elements: the first being the
intent to abandon a right or claim and the second being the external act by which that
intention is expressed and carried into effect. There must, moreover, be an actual, as
distinguished from a merely projected, relinquishment of a claim or right; otherwise the right
or claim is not vacated or waived so as to be susceptible of being appropriated by the next
owner. These two (2) requirements are clearly lacking in the case at bar. The Director of Mines and public
respondent Office of the President had found that, in point of fact, private respondent Supreme Aggregates
had performed its annual work obligations.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 26
APEX MINING CO. INC. VS HONORABLE CANCIO GARCIA
FACTS: The controversy in this case involves conflicting mining claims between herein petitioners Apex
Mining Co., Inc., et al. (Apex for short) and private respondent Marcopper Mining Corporation (MARCOPPER
for short). The disputed area is inside a timberland area located at Moncayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel,
Davao Oriental, consisting of 4,941.0 hectares.
MARCOPPER was one of the first mining claimants in the disputed area, having registered its 16 claims on
January 19 and 20, 1984 through the filing of declarations of location pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
463, otherwise known as the Mineral Resources Development Decree. MARCOPPER, allegedly, after
registering its mining claim, learned from the central office of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD)
that the disputed area is within an existing forest reservation known as the "Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve" established by Proclamation No. 369 on February 27, 1931 by then Governor General Dwight F.
Davis, and realizing the invalidity of its mining claims for having availed of a wrong procedure, abandoned
its 16 mining claims and applied for a prospecting permit instead with the BFD on April 11, 1984. The area
covered by its application consisted of 4,941.0 hectares overlapping its abandoned mining claims. On July
1, 1985, the BFD issued to it a Permit to Prospect No. 755-123185. Discovering strong evidence of mineral
deposits in the area, it applied for a permit to explore with the then Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences
(BMGS). On March 10, 1986, it was issued Permit to Explore No. 133. However, upon verification from the
records of the BMGS, Davao City Mineral District Office, it found that the area covered by its Permit to
Explore No. 133 is also the subject of several claims/declarations of APEX. Thus, on August 11, 1986,
MARCOPPER filed with the BMGS a "Petition for Cancellation of Mining Claims and/or Small Scale Mining
Permits" against APEX, alleging, among others and in substance, that the area covered by its Permit to
Explore No. 133 and the declarations of locations/mining claims belonging to APEX are within an established
and existing forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) under Proclamation No. 369, dated
February 27, 1931, that the said mining claims/declarations of location of APEX are invalid for being
violative of Presidential Decree No. 463 and its implementing rules and regulations since the acquisition of
mining rights within a forest reserve is through the filing of application for a permit to prospect with the
BFD and not through registration of declarations of location with the BMGS.
APEX filed a Motion to Dismiss Marcopper's petition, alleging, in substance, that their mining claims are
not within any established or proclaimed forest reserve, and as such, the acquisition of mining lights thereto
must be undertaken through the registration of declaration of location with the BMGS and not through the
filing of an application for permit to prospect with the BFD; and that the permit to prospect and permit to
explore issued to MARCOPPER are inoperative and of no legal force and effect.
BMGS issued an order declaring permit to explore 133 null and void. MARCOPPER appealed the said order
and the DENR after due hearing rendered decision reversing the order of BMGS declaring it null and void
and the permit to explore of MArcopper was hereby declared valid and subsisting. APEx appealed the case
to the Office of the President through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Cancio Garcia which
was also dismissed for lack of merit. The Court give due course to the petition.
ISSUE: W/N the disputed area is within an established and existing forest reservation?
Ruling: Affirmative.
Sec 8 of Act No. 2874 empowers Governor General to reclassify lands of the public domain. The then
Governor General Dwight Davis in issuing Proclamation 369 withdrew from disposition the land described

in this case to establish a forest reserve. The disputed area is within an established and exiting forest
reserved.
The disputed areas, being clearly within a forest reserve, are not open to mining location. Sections 8 and
13 of P.D. No. 463, as amended by P.D. No. 1385, provide:
Sec. 8. Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation of Minerals in Reserved Lands.1âwphi1 Prospecting,
exploration and exploitation of minerals in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be
undertaken by the proper Government agencies. In the event that said agencies Cannot undertake the
prospecting, exploration and exploitation of mineral in reserved lands, qualified persons may be permitted
to undertake such prospecting, exploration and exploitation in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary. The right to exploit the minerals found therein shag be awarded by the
President under such terms and conditions as recommended by the Director and approved by the
Secretary: Provided, That the party who undertook prospecting, exploration and exploitation of said area
shall be given priority.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a special permit may be issued by the Director
to the exploration permittee to extract, remove and dispose of minerals in limited quantities as verified by
the Bureau of Mines.
Pursuant to P.D. No. 463, as amended, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves by initially
applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development (BFD) and subsequently for
a permit to explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS). Such procedural requisites were
complied with and undertaken by MARCOPPER after it had ascertained that its mining claims were found
to be within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. On the other hand, the mining claims and SSMPs
of APEX being located within said forest reserve, are in violation of the law and therefore result in a failure
to validly acquire mining rights.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner, versus BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES
CORPORATION and THE MINES ADJUDICATIONBOARD, respondents.
FACTS:
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines
Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation
(Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration,
development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI‟s eighteen (18) mining claims located in
Agusan del Sur.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease
Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining was issued
a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within
its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the
Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Mining‟s mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP‟s logging concession
in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement,
whereby, in mutual recognition of each other‟s right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 27
Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. Banahaw Mining converted its mining
claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its
rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw
Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with
CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the
assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing
private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. On March 10, 1997, private
respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining’s pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of
Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application.
Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and
Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required. On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals‟
amended MPSA applications were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of
1995.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga
Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals‟
application.After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an
Order disapproving private respondent Base Metals‟ MPSA on the reasons that adverse claim was filed
on time, that the granting of the MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is
covered by a Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents thereto,
without the grantee’s consent, the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO
No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or
timberland is not leased by the government to a qualified person or entity and if it is leased the consent
of the lessor is necessary, in addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned
before it is subjected to mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes.
They cannot exist at the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the other operate. Private
respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB, the latter rendered
the assailed decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrator‟s order. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision
of the MAB. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals‟ MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities
Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD:
Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals‟ MPSA is, by law, not closed to
mining activities. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals‟ MPSA has been
proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.

Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve,
such does not necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to
PICOP‟s obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that
mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established under Proclamation 369, the Court
in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights
within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for
a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to
explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.
Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to existing rights
and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the
public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations.
With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe to PICOP‟s argument that the Presidential
Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987
Constitution. An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures
PICOP of the government’s commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license
and guarantees PICOP‟s peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the
basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right
to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of
other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35.
It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP’s rights under its timber license. Since
timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC), Petitioner, vs.
EMILIANO G. VENERACION, JR., Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Veneracion applied for a Declaration of Location (DOL) over Block 159 of the Malangas Coal
Reservation. the DENR informed the respondent that his DOL cannot be registered since Block 159 was
part of the Malangas Coal Reservation, as provided under Proclamation No. 284, issued by the President
on 19 July 1938. With the endorsement of the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) and the DENR Secretary, the
respondent petitioned the Office of the President for the withdrawal of Block 159 from the coal reservation
and its conversion into a mineral reservation. The Block was excluded by the President from the reservation.
Petitioner PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION applied for a mineral prospecting permit over the
same Block 159 but it was denied for the reason that respondent already filed an application therefor.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner acquired a preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.
Held:
No. Petitioner cannot claim any mining rights over Block 159 for failure to comply with the legal
requirements.
The law enumerates the following requirements:
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 28
(1) a prospecting permit from the agency that has jurisdiction over the area, in this case, the OEA;
(2) an exploration permit from the BMGS;
(3) if the exploration reveals the presence of commercial deposit, the permitee applies before the BMGS
for the exclusion of the area from the reservation;
(4) granting by the president of the application to exclude the area from the reservation; and
(5) a mining agreement approved by the DENR Secretary.
In this case, petitioner only obtained a prospecting permit from the OEA. In its correspondence with the
petitioner, the OEA, however, advised the petitioner on two separate occasions to obtain a "prospecting
permit" from the BMGS. The petitioner did not apply for an exploration permit with the BMGS, nor would
the BMGS have granted petitioner an exploration permit because when petitioner wrote to the BMGS
informing the latter of its intention to enter into an MPSA with the DENR over Block 159, the BMGS informed
the petitioner that the respondent’s claim over Block 159 had already preceded that of the petitioner. The
advice given by the BMGS was justified since at that time, the respondent already had a pending application
for the exclusion of Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed his MPSA
application, without complying with the second, third and fourth requisites under . Since it ignored the
sound advice of the OEA and the BMGS, the government agencies concerned, and stubbornly insisted on
its incorrect procedure, petitioner cannot complain now that its MPSA was revoked for failure to comply
with the legal requirements.
BENGUET CORPORATION v HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, and HELEN DIZON-REYES
FACTS:
Private respondent alleged that she is the claimowner of 11 mining claims all located in the province of
Zambales. On January 15, 1967, she executed a Special Power of Attorney constituting her father, Celestino
M. Dizon, as her attorney-in-fact with full powers to "transfer, assign and dispose of her 11 mining claims.
Celestino M. Dizon, acting as such attorney-in-fact for private respondent and other claimowners, entered
into an Agreement, with Dizon Mine whereby the latter was granted the right to explore, develop, exploit
and operate the 57 mining claims owned by the claimowners including the 11 claims of private respondent.
Seven (7) years later, on December 17, 1974, private respondent and the other claimowners executed a
Deed of Ratification of Assignment, confirming the assignment, transfer and conveyance unto Dizon Mines
and its assigns and successors of the rights to possess, occupy, explore, develop and operate all the
aforesaid mining claims. Almost three (3) months after the Deed of Ratification was executed, private
respondent revoked Special Power of Attorney.
However, in spite of said notice, Dizon Mines and Benguet entered into an Operations Agreement (OA)
whereby the former transferred to the latter the possession of the 57 mining claims for the purpose of
exploring, developing and operating them for production and marketing of marketable products under the
terms and conditions specified therein.
Private respondent prayed that the OA be declared null and void and inoperative insofar as it covers her
11 mining claims. Benguet Corp filed a Motion to dismiss raising issue that the court has no jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
W/N RTC has jurisdiction in cancelling mining contracts

HELD:
Negative. Presidential Decree No. 1281 vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and
control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits,
leases and/or operators thereof.
Sec. 7. (c) of PD 1281 provides that Bureu of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction involving
cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide
by the terms and conditions thereof.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the subject agreement is a mining contract and private respondent,
in seeking a judicial declaration of its nullity, does not wish to abide by its terms and conditions. These
elements alone bring the action within the ambit of Section 7 of P.D. 1281.
The reason underlying such refusal is indeed an irrelevant matter insofar as jurisdictional competence is
concerned, for to make jurisdiction dependent thereon would not only be "ratifying two judicial bodies
exercising jurisdiction over an essentially the same subject matter—a situation analogous to split
jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice" but also clearly ignoring the object
of P.D. 1281 to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter.
GREENHILLS MINING COMPANY vs OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GREEN VALLEY
FACTS:
Mining claims were previously located and registered with the office of the Mining recorder at Iba Zambles
under the provision of the Phil. Bill of 1992. However, it were abandoned due to the failure to pursue their
claims and to perform annual assessment works. 1956- President Magsaysay issued a Proclamation no.
245 establishing the Southern Zambales Forest Reserve covering the 37,000 hectares.
Petitioner relocated the previously abandoned mining claims inside the reservation. Petitioner filed with the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) an application for prospecting permit within the reservation which
was granted. Private Respondent applied with BFD for a prospecting permit also within the reservation
which was also granted. Then applied BMGS for an exploration permit over the same area covered by its
prospecting permit.It was referred to the BMGS/MLTSD and upon its verification it found that the area
applied for by Private Respondent were in conflict with Petitioner group of claims, but still it was granted.
Petitioner filed protest with the BFD and BMGS asking for the cancellations of Private Responded
prospecting and exploration permit. The Directors of BFD and BFGS issued an order amending of Private
Respondent prospecting permit. Private Respondent filed an appeal to the MNR which was held that since
the case involved determination of the mining rights of the parties, the investigation and resolution was
within the original jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Science.
Unsatisfied, Private Respondent filed an appeal with the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT which rendered the
decision affirming the order of MNR and that all the mining claims in violation of Section 28(c) of CA No.137
are declared null and void. Private Respondent was given the preferential right to possess, exploit ,explore,
develop and operate the areas. Petitioner filed a MR but was DENIED. Hence , this Petition.
ISSUE: determination of the mining rights of the parties concerned over the disputed area,
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 29
HELD: The court rendered judgment in favor of the Green Valley.
In upholding Green Valley's prior right over the mining areas subject of conflicting claims, the Office of the
President rightly relied on the provisions of Section 28(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 137 (now Section
13(a), Presidential Decree No. 463). Under this provision, and under the regulations implementing it, it is
required that the lessor shall, first, secure a prospecting permit from the BFD and second, obtain an
exploration permit in case of discovery of minerals in the area or when there is strong proof of
mineralization. The records show that the petitioner's mining claims were backed up by no prospecting
permit.
On the other hand, Breen Valley had fully complied with such requirements, for which its claims should be
declared superior.
As a general rule, the findings of government agencies with respect to the construction of statutes the
implementation of which has been reposed in them, are controlling on the Court. The cases of McDaniel v.
Apacible,[4] Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez,[5] and Salacot Mining Company v. Abadilla,[6]
relied upon by the petitioner, and where we held that the appropriation of a mineral land pursuant to a
valid claim segregates it from the public domain, are not in point. The petitioner assumes that the claims
of other claimants recorded in 1933 and 1934 were still valid when the Southern Zambales Forest
Reservation was established in 1956. According to the Office of the President, however, the original
claimowners had failed to perform annual development work on the claims in violation of the provisions of
Section 36 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. As a consequence, the area became "open to relocation... as if no
location of the same had ever been made."[7] Conversely, assuming that the government lost the property
when the petitioner, or the original claimowners staked their claims in 1933 and 1934, it reverted to the
public dominion upon abandonment thereof. Accordingly, when President Magsaysay established the
Southern Zambales Forest Reserve in 1956, the areas covered by the said abandoned claims already
formed part of the public domain. The petitioner cannot, moreover, claim privity of title with the owners
of the prior locations. Such prior locations had been abandoned, or at most, forfeited, and the petitioner's
own location cannot be considered a continuation thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on November 12, 1986
is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs.
REPUBLIC V. ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Facts: After having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-
Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, and succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial
quantities, petitioners Dr. Lourdes Pascual, Dr. Pedro De La Concha, Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De
Guzman applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the
corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits and License No. 33 was issued in favor of the
petitioners. Shortly after respondent Ernesto Maceda was appointed Minister of the DENR, petitioners’
License No. 33 was cancelled by him through a letter to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation.
An original petition was filed because of the aforesaid cancellation and later submitted by the petitioners’
amended petition to assail the same. The trial court ruled on September 27, 1996 that the privilege granted
under respondents’ license had already ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due
process clause of the Constitution. The CA sustained the trial court’s decision that the grant of the quarry
license covering 330.3062 hectares was authorized by law, because the license was embraced by four
separate applications—each for an area of 81 hectares. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of QLP No. 33 is valid.
Held: The license in question is dated August 3, 1982, and it was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining
Development Corporation. The terms of the license allowed the corporation to extract and dispose of
marbleized limestone from a 330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license is, however,
subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, the governing law at the time it was granted; as well as to
the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. By the same token, Proclamation No. 2204—which
awarded to Rosemoor the right of development, exploitation, and utilization of the mineral site—expressly
cautioned that the grant was subject to “existing policies, laws, rules and regulations.”
The license was thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463 providing that: “Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 14 hereof, a quarry license shall cover an area of not more than on hundred (100) hectares in any
one province and not more than one thousand (1,000) hectares in the entire Philippines.” The language of
PD 463 is clear. It states that in categorical and mandatory terms that a quarry license, like that of
respondents, should cover a maximum of 100 hectares in any given province. This law neither provides
any exception nor makes any reference to the number of applications for a license. Section 69 of PD 463
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Clearly, the intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented
by ruling that a license may cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several
applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law.
Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable
right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution,
since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in
accordance with the demands of the general welfare.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. V. WMC RESOURCES INT'L. PTY. LTD.,
Facts: The Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary of WMC
Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA for the purpose of large scale exploration, development,
and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387 hectares
located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in
accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the Columbio FTAA, and on 12
July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings
in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies' exercise of their right of first
refusal to purchase the subject shares. In an Agreement, however, the Tampakan Companies sought to
exercise its right of first refusal. Petitioner assailed the Tampakan Companies' exercise of its right of first
refusal. On 10 January 2001, WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another Sale and
Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle which
would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities. After due consideration and
evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary
approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. Aggrieved by
the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review
of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the President.
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 30
Issue: The propriety of the application to the Columbio FTAA of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40 thereof requiring the approval of the President for the
assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements.
Ruling: Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on 22 March
1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on 14 April 1995. It is undisputed
that said FTAA was granted in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative
Order No. 63, Series of 1991, which does not contain any similar condition on the transfer or assignment
of financial or technical assistance agreements. What petitioner would want the Court to espouse is the
retroactive application of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 to the Columbio FTAA, a valid agreement
concluded prior to the naissance of said piece of legislation. This posture of petitioner would clearly
contradict the established legal doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied from the language used in the law.
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore, any
section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively.
Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 may be applied
retrospectively to the Columbio FTAA, the lack of presidential approval will not be fatal as to render the
transfer illegal, especially since, as in the instant case, the alleged lack of presidential approval has been
remedied when petitioner appealed the matter to the Office of the President which approved the Order of
the DENR Secretary. In the La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos case, involving the same
FTAA subject of the instant case: when the transferee of an FTAA is another foreign corporation, there is
a logical application of the requirement of prior approval by the President of the Republic and notification
to Congress in the event of assignment or transfer of an FTAA. On the other hand, when the transferee
of the FTAA happens to be a Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical.
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President with respect to
assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be
tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under said contract as it would effectively restrict the right
of the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA.
Republic v. Marcopper Mining Corporation
Facts: Respondent Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was issued a temporary permit to operate a
tailings sea disposal system from a period of October 31, 1985 to October 21, 1986. On September 20,
1986, MMC received a telegraphic order from the NPCC directing the former to "(i)mmediately cease and
desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay." The directive was brought about through the
efforts of certain religious groups which had been protesting MMC’s tailings sea disposal system. MMC
requested the NPCC to refrain from implementing the aforesaid directive until its adoption of an alternative
tailings disposal system
Upon appeal before the Office of the President, a restraining order was issued which required respondent-
appelant to undertake a cost of not less than P30,000.00 a day fo the building of artificial reefs and planting
of sea grass, mangroves and vegetation on the causeway of Calancan Bay under the supervision of the
Pollution Adjudication Board and subject to such guidelines as the Board may impose.
In line with the directive from the Office of the President, the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project (CBRP)
was created, and MMC remitted the amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May 13, 1988 to the Ecology

Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay,
hence, it likewise ceased from making further deposits to the ETF.
On February 5, 1993, the Office of the President rendered a decision affirming the cease and desist Order
issued by the PAB; Respondent-appellant argues that the cease and desist orders were issued by the PAB
ex-parte, in violation of its procedural and substantive rights provided for under Section 7 (a) of P.D. No.
984 requiring a public hearing before any order or decision for the discontinuance of discharge of a sewage
or industrial wastes into the water, air or land could be issued by the PAB. Furthermore, it argues that PAB
did not jurisdiction over the said case because RA 7942 repealed the provisions of RA 3931 as amended
by PD 984. Therefore, the Mines regional director has jurisdiction and not the PAB.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7942 repealed RA 3931 as amended by PD 984.
HELD: NO. Implied repeals are not favored and the law must be interpreted as to achieve a uniform
system of jurisprudence. Both laws do not contain irreconcilable conflict and in fact complementary in
nature. RA 7942 did not vest adjudicative powers upon the Mines Regional Director and it only concerns
promoting safety measures in the practice of mining which are administrative and regulatory powers only.
Therefore, MMC was correctly adjudged before the Pollution Adjusication Board.
STANDARD MINERAL PRODUCTS INC VS. CA ET AL
Petitioner SMPI claims that it is the locator of a mining claims containing limestone in Antipolo, Rizal which
were duly registered in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Rizal in April 1959.
The mining claims cover about 15 hectares of 120 hectares of land registered in nthe name of the
respondents Rufino Deeunhong et. al, referred hereinafter as the “Landowners.” After locating the claims,
SMPI applied for a mining lease FROM THE Bureau of Mines. The landowners opposed the application on
the ground that SMPI had entered their land and filed its mining lease application WITHOUT THEIR
PERMISSION. The Bureau of Mines held their application in abeyance pending submission of the permission
of the surface owners.
No agreement was reached between the parties prompting SMPI to file an action against the Landowners
praying that it be granted surface rights for mining purposes over 15 hectares of the Landowners property
and a right of way of 5 hectares. The Landowners traversed the Complaint by averring that SMPI is not
entitles to the relief demanded because the prospecting was accomplished without previously securing the
landowner’s WRITTEN PERMISSION as surface owners as required by Section 27 of the Mining Act.
The Trial Court finding that the mineral claims were not located in accordance with law dismissed the
complaint. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision. Hence, the petition for Review on Certiorari.
The issue is WON SMPI is entitled to surface rights and a right of way to a 15-hecatre portion of the
landowner’s property covered by SMPI’s mining claims for mining purposes.
The SC held in the negative.
SMPI failed to comply with the requisite of PRIOR WRITTEN permission by the landowner before entering
the private land in question.
Sec. 27 of the Mining Act provides that “before entering private lands, the prospector shall first apply
in writing for written permission of the private owner, claimant, or holder thereof…”
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 31
The purpose of the law is to prevent trespass on private property. The importance of the written permission
is also apparent from the forms prescribed by the Bureau of Mines for the declaration of location of a
mining claim which REQUIRE THE LOCATOR TO STATE THAT THE LANDOWNER HAD GRANTED WRITTEN
PERMISSION FOR THE PROSPECTING AND LOCATION OF THE MINING CLAIM if the latter is located on
private property.
SMPI argues that Sec 27 is inapplicable because it never entered the private land in question for the
purpose of prospecting because the limestone deposits were prominently visible and exposed. The Court
said that entering has to precede prospecting; prospecting necessarily precedes discovery; and a valid
discovery is essential for the location OF A MINING CLAIM.
SMPI also averred that its constitutional and statutory rights to use and exploit mineral resources
discovered and located by it are being unduly curtailed. Court said that the prospecting, exploration,
discovery, and location must be done in accordance with the law. SMPI’s right to use and exploit never
matured because of its omission to comply with a condition precedent. To allow SMPI its claim for surface
rights and right of way would be to countenance illegal trespass into private property.
Pyro Copper Mining Corporation v. Mines Adjudication Board-Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, et al.
Facts:
Petitioner’s application for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with Mines and Geo-Science
Bureau (MGB) of the DENR, Regional Office No. 1 in San Fernando City, La Union, for the exploration,
development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-
hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor. Three
(3) years after, Private Respondent Montague Resources Philippine Corporation filed an application for
exploration permit with MGB covering the same land of MPSA No. 153-2000-1. Thus, petitioner filed a
verified protest/opposition (V P/O) to the said application, with the Panel of Arbitrators (POA). Prior to said
filing of V P/O, MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was cancelled per DENR Memorandum Order No. 2005-03 by DENR
Secretary Michael Defensor. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but denied. MGB issued Exploration
Permint No. 05-001 to Private Respondent. POA, then, dismissed motu proprio the said V P/O on the
ground, among others, that it has no jurisdiction over the same. MAB, on appeal, dismissed the appeal.
The CA, dismissed also the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the V P/O was filed out of times
2. Whether or not POA has jurisdiction to cancel exploration permits.
Held:
1. Yes. Under Dao No. 96-40, the 30-day reglementary period for filing any adverse claim, protest, or
opposition is reckoned from the last day of the posting of the announcement for application for exploration
permit. In this case, it was on August 27, 2005. The latter date was a Saturday, hence, the next working
day which is August 30, 2005 (August 29, 2005 is a holiday). Further, the law states that an adverse claim,
protest, or opposition be accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee for the same to be
accepted for filing. However, in this case, the docket fee was only paid on September 6, 2005, which is
beyond the said last day of filing.

2. POA has no jurisdiction to do the same. Under Section 28 of DAO No. 96-40, it is the Director/Concerned
Regional Director who may cancel the exploration permit. The “Director” means the Director of the MGB
Central Office, while “Regional Director” means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office.
FLORO CEMENT CORPORATION VS. GOROSPE
Facts: The Municipality of Lugait filed a complaint against Floro, a corporation engaged in the
manufacturing and selling of cement, for the collection of taxes. The taxes sought to be collected refers to
manufacturers and exporters taxes based on Municipal Ordinance No. 5 and 10. Floro denied liability for
the payment of taxes on the ground that under P.D. No. 463 x a municipality chas no power to levy taxes
on mines, mining operations and mineral products, it also contended that cement is a mineral product and
that the manufacturing of cement is indirectly connected with mininh operations.
Issue: W/n Floro can be validly taxed by the Mun. of Lugait
Ruling: Yes.
Cement is not a mineral product, sinve a cement is already a product/result of a process. It had undergone
chemical changes through manufacturing process. The business of manufacturing and exporting cement
cement does nkt partake of the exploration, development nor exploitation of mineral resources thus outside
the scope of PD 463.
People of the Philippines v. Abad
Facts:
The Director of Mines issued a commercial lease permit to Felix de Castro granting him exclusive right to
quarry, extract and carry away sand and gravel from the Sumigar Quarry at Banawe, Ifugao.
Felix de Castro filed a case charging private respondents with the crime of “Theft of Minerals”
That on or about March 1978 up to September of same year, the accused without any permit of their own
pursuant to law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously extract, gather, remove, take and/or
dispose of the minerals like sand, gravel, stones and boulders by the use of threat, force and intimidation
against the permittee and his laborers to the extent of 40,592.38.
Respondents accused filed a motion to quash claiming that they had paid sand and gravel tax and therefore
it was with the consent of the government. They also invoked LOI No. 243 which allows persons to extract
sand and gravel even leased area if it is to be used in government infrastructure. The petitioner opposed
the quashal, arguing that the taxes paid to the Municipal Government are not the fees required by Bureau
of Mines and that LOI 243 grants the right to extract sand and gravel to be used for government projects
and not on private person or entity.
The respondent judge quashed the information on the ground that P.D No. 463 is limited to an
administrative violation and that the crime of Theft under the RPC was not committed since malice which
is an essential element of a crime is lacking. Petitioner prayed for reconsideration but it was denied thus
this certiorari petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
Issue:
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 32
Whether or not the facts charged in the information constitute an offense.
Ruling:
The elements of the offense, theft of minerals are that; (1) the accused extracted, removed and/ or
disposed of minerals; (2) these minerals belongs to the Government or have been taken from a mining
claim or claims leased, held or owned by other persons; and (3) the accused did not possess a mining
lease or a temporary permit or any other permit to mine granted by the Secretary or the Director under
existing mining decrees, laws and regulations.
Evidently, the information filed in the court includes all the foregoing elements. Thus, it alleged (1) that
the accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, willfully and feloniously extracted, removed
and/or disposed of minerals or material aggregates like sand and gravel; (2) the minerals were taken from
Sumigar Quarry, Banawe, Ifugao, which is covered by a commercial permit issued by the Bureau of Mines,
Baguio City in favor of complaining witness Felix De Castro; and (3) the extracting was done without any
mining lease or permit of their own pursuant to law.
CRUZ VS SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCES
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
HELD:
Justice Puno and Justice Kapunan filed a separate opinion sustaining the challenged provisions of the law.
According to J.Puno, the provisions of the IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute
part of the land of the public domain.
The Congress, may by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and
lagoons. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the State, through the Pres. may enter into technical and financial agreements with foreign-
owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942) and the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (RA
7076), the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing, may apply
to both large-scale and small-scale mining. Small-scale mining refers to mining activities which rely heavily
on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining
equipment.
According to J. Kapunan, No ancestral may be declared as a people’s small-scale mining area without
the prior consent of the cultural communities concerned as declared by Sec. 16 of RA 7942. If Ancestral
lands are declared as people’s small-scale mining area, the members of the cultural communities living

within said area, shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining contracts as expressly provide
in Sec. 7 of RA 7076.
Sec. 17 of RA 7942 states that in the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community give
their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties, shall be paid to them by the parties
to the mining contract.
Lastly, the rights given to the indigenous people regarding the exploitation of natural resources under
Sec.7(b) and 57 of RA 8371 or the “ Indigenous Peoples Right Act of 1997” (IPRA), amplify what has been
granted to them under existing laws, such as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942) and the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (RA 7076).
BACALTOS COAL MINES vs CA and San Miguel Corp.
FACTS
Petitioner seek the reversal of the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC holding petitioner
Bacaltos Coal Mines, German Bacaltos and co-dependant Rene Savellon jointly and severally liable to
private respondent, San Miguel Corporation under a Trip Charter Party. German Bacaltos, the proprietor of
Bacaltos Coal Mines executed an Authorization in favor of Rene Savellon, authorizing the latter to use the
coal operating contract of Bacaltos Coal Mines for any legitimate purpose.
Rene Savellon, through the Authorization granted to him, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corp,
particularly, the Trip Charter Party wherein Savellon claimed that Bacaltos is the owner of the vessel M/V
Premship II and that it is lending the said vessel to the private respondent as cargo carrier for 3 round
trips to Davao. SMC issued a check in the name of Rene Savellon with the amount of P650,000.00 as the
payment they agreed upon. However, the vessel was only used by private respondent for only one trip.
Hence they filed a complaint against Bacaltos Coal Mines and Rene Savellon for specific performance and
damages. Petitioner Bacaltos alleged they are not liable considering that the power granted to Rene
Savellon are only those clearly expressed in the Authorization which do not include any power to enter into
contract with SMC.
RTC rendered the assailed decision in favor of SMC ordering petitioners jointly and severally liable to SMC.
In appeal, CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, hence this present petition.
ISSUE:
WON Rene Savellon was authorized to enter into a Trip Charter Party Contract with SMC although such
authority cannot be found on the four corners of the Authorization.
HELD;
Based on the Authorization executed by German Bacaltos in favor of Rene Savellon, the extent and scope
of his powers is exclusive only to “use the coal operating contract” of Bacaltos Coal Mines. Since the
principal subject of the Authorization is the ‘coal operating contract’, SMC should have required its
presentation to determine what is it and how it may be used by Rene Savellon. The nature of coal operating
contract is found in the provisions of PD No. 972 or the Coal Development Act of 1976 specifically Section
9 thereof which provides the obligations of the contractor, like, to examine, investigate lands supposed to
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 33
contain coals, mapping, core drilling and trenching, sinking, tunneling, extraction and utilization of coal
deposits, among others.
Based on the foregoing provisions, it’s obvious that a scrutiny of the coal operating contract of Bacaltos
Coal Mines would have provided SMC knowledge of the activities which are germane, related and incident
tp the power to use it. However, they did not even required Savellon to produce the same.
SMC was negligent as it failed to verify first if indeed petitioner Bacaltos owned a vessel. It merely satisfied
itself with the claim of Savellon that the vessel it was leasing is owned by Bacaltos and relied on the
presentation of the Authorization. The Authorization does not also state that petitioner owns any vessel
and in fact, petitioner themselves declared that they have not leased any vessel, they do not need it and
they do not even own one. The Court ruled that SMC was the author of its own damage for its failure to
ascertain the extent and limits of the authority granted to Savellon. Petitioners are therefore free from an
y liability. The decision of the CA has been set aside and reversed and the decision of the court a quo was
modified declaring Rene Savellon as solely liable to SMC for the amounts adjudged.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs.CA G.R. No. 125948
Facts:
Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387, as amended, to contract, install
and operate oil pipelines. In January 1995, petitioner applied for a mayor's permit with the Office of the
Mayor of Batangas. However, the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based
on its gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993 pursuant to the Local Government Code .. The assessed tax
amounted to P956,076.04 payable in four installments based on the gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993
which amounted to P181,681,151.00. Petitioner paid the tax under protest in the amount of P239,019.01
for the first quarter of 1993.
Petitioner filed a letter-protest addressed to the City Treasurer claiming that it is a holder of a government
concession under the Petroleum act and is engaged the business of transporting petroleum. As such, it is
exempt from paying tax on gross receipts under Sec. 133 of the LGC of 1991. The protest was denied by
the City Treasurer, who reasoned that the petitioner cant be considered engaged in the transportation
business. Thus a complaint and request for tax refund was filed with the RTC. It ruled that the petitioner
cant be exempted since the exemption only applies to common carriers so as not to overburden the riding
public. Petitioner, it contends, is only a special carrier extending its facilities to a single special customer.
Issues:
Whether FPIC can be considered a common carrier and whether refund should be applied.
Ruling:
FPIC is a common carrier. Art. 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person,
corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods
or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. The law does not
distinguish despite FPIC’s having a limited clientele. A common carrier is engaged in public service. Republic
Act 387 also regards petroleum operation as a public utility. Everything relating to the exploration for and
exploitation of petroleum and everything relating to the manufacture, refining, storage, or transportation
by special methods of petroleum, is hereby declared to be a public utility.

It was also found that the legislative intent in excluding from the taxing power of the local government
unit the imposition of business tax against common carriers is to prevent a duplication of the so-called
"common carrier's tax, which amounts to 3%. The refund is thus granted.
FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE.
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TAÑADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy,
CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation.
Facts: In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It
enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the
deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only
to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry
through E.O. No. 372. The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180
and E.O. No. 372 on the grounds that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF
fund — a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180 and section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow
the formation of a de facto cartel among the three existing oil companies — Petron, Caltex and Shell — in
violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition. Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392.
Issue; W/N RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combination in restraint of
trade and unfair completion.
Ruling: Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A.
No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.
No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed."
The Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in
fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180
will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and
the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight
by the Executive before ordering full deregulation.
the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price
of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of
E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion
of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 34
accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the
early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution is competition for it alone can release the creative forces of the market. But the competition
that can unleash these creative forces is competition that is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this kind of
competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but several players. A market controlled by
one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-
to-goodness competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our careful scrutiny and
laws which barricade the entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion.
In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in
the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and
Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their
immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in
the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend
to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to
spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The
argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of
Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective
new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180
in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this
requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the
cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points
of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil
companies.
PEREZ v. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
FACTS
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 33 as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration,
underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated
petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law imposes a
penalty that is monetary for violators. The respondent association asked the DOE to set aside the circular
for being contrary to law. However, the said department denied the request for lack of merit. The
respondent then filed before the trial court a petition and the trial court nullified the said circular on the
ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Circular issued by DOE is valid
RULING

Yes, For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1)
the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and
(2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading,
adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. These specific acts and
omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices
of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts Aforestated is limited to a
minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for
retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers,
and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless,
does not amount to violation of theaforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the
Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that
B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum
products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular
merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers,
and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC PLANT OWNERS
ASSOCIATION (PEPOA), INC., Respondent.
Facts:
PEPOA filed before the ERB a Complaint8 against the NPC for alleged unauthorized collection of rates in
the guise of penalty for 1) excess consumption, double or triple the existing rates; or 2) unused
consumption, as if fully availed of.9 The penalties were being charged pursuant to the NPC's Rules on the
Sale of Electricity, specifically Nos. 5 (Minimum Charges) and 6 (Penalty for Consumption in Excess of the
Allowable Limit of the Contract Demand/Energy) of the Schedule of Charges. On December 20, 1995, the
ERB issued an Order12 directing the NPC to cease and desist from collecting the penalties, pending
resolution of the case. On May 12, 1998, the ERB rendered its Decision declaring as final the cease and
desist order directed against petitioner. The ERB decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals but it was
affirmed stating the the authorization of the ERB was required for the implementation of the penalties in
question. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of the penalties is an increase in power rates that requires authorization of
the Energy Regulatory Board.
Held:
Yes. The penalties imposed by the NPC in its "Rules on the Sale of Electricity" are covered by the definition
of rate. "Minimum Charges" and "Penalties for Consumption in Excess of Allowable Limit" are exacted from
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 35
customers in relation to the sale of energy. These charges cannot be imposed without the sale of energy.
Indeed, a consideration in fixing rates is the purpose for which the penalties are constituted: the regulation
of the system loads of transmission lines,51 so as to ensure the continuous operation of the public utility or
to cover part of its operating expenses.
The power to determine, fix and prescribe rates being charged customers is vested in the ERB. Therefore,
unless it gives prior approval, the penalties cannot be imposed by the NPC. Without that authority, the
challenged provisions in the "Rules on the Sale of Electricity" cannot be imposed on the electric plant
operators that PEPOA represents. While petitioner may issue rules and regulations consistent with its
corporate objectives, provisions that have a bearing on the impositions of rates must be approved by the
ERB.
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION V ERC
FACTS:
On October 10, 2003, MERALCO filed with the ERC an Application for an increase in rates. National
Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc. (NASECORE), Mr. Genaro Lualhati (Lualhati), and
petitioner Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) expressed their intention to file an opposition to MERALCO’s
Application. NASECORE filed a Motion for Production of Documents to enable it to evaluate MERALCO’s
Application however, November 27, 2003, the ERC, without first resolving the Motions for Production of
Documents of NASECORE and FDC and apparently without considering Lualhati’s Opposition, issued an
Order provisionally approving MERALCO’s ex parte application for rate increases.
FDC argues that the order of ERC is void for having been issued without legal/statutory authority and for
having been issued with grave abuse of dicretion.
ISSUE:
W/N ERC has legal/ statutory authority to grant provisional rate adjustments under RA 9136/ EPIRA
HELD:
YES. ERC authority is found in Secs. 44 and 80 of the EPIRA The ERC is endowed with the statutory
authority to approve provisional rate adjustments under the aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The
sections read, thus:
SEC. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. — The powers and functions of the Energy Regulatory Board
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer
of powers and functions shall include all applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property
and personnel as may be necessary.
What is clear from Sections 80 and 44 is that the legislators saw the superfluity or needlessness of carrying
over in the EPIRA the same provision found in the previous laws. The power to approve provisional rate
increases is included among the powers transferred to the ERC by virtue of Section 44 since the grant of
that authority is not inconsistent with the EPIRA; rather, it is in full harmony with the thrust of the law
which is to strengthen the ERC as the new regulatory body.

KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD v. COMMISSIONER FE B.
BARIN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS CARLOS R. ALINDADA, LETICIA V. IBAY, OLIVER B.
BUTALID, and MARY ANNE B. COLAYCO, of the ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION.
The Facts
RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), was enacted on 8
June 2001 and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB
and the creation of the ERC. The pertinent portions of Section 38 read:
Creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission. ' There is hereby created an independent, quasi-judicial
regulatory board to be named the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). For this purpose, the existing
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) created under Executive Order No. 172, as amended, is hereby abolished.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by the President
of the Philippines. x x x
Within three (3) months from the creation of the ERC, the Chairman shall submit for the approval of the
President of the Philippines the new organizational structure and plantilla positions necessary to carry out
the powers and functions of the ERC. The Chairman and members of the Commission shall assume office
at the beginning of their terms: Provided, That, if upon the effectivity of this Act, the Commission has not
been constituted and the new staffing pattern and plantilla positions have not been approved and filled-
up, the current Board and existing personnel of ERB shall continue to hold office.
The existing personnel of the ERB, if qualified, shall be given preference in the filling up of plantilla positions
created in the ERC, subject to existing civil service rules and regulations. At the time of the filing of this
petition, the ERC was composed of Commissioner Fe B. Barin and Deputy Commissioners Carlos R.
Alindada, Leticia V. Ibay, Oliver B. Butalid, and Mary Anne B. Colayco (collectively, Commissioners). The
Commissioners assumed office on 15 August 2001. Pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9136, the Commissioners
issued the proposed Table of Organization, Staffing Pattern, and Salary Structure on 25 September 2001
which the President of the Philippines approved on 13 November 2001. Meanwhile, KERB submitted to the
Commissioners its Resolution No. 2001-02 on 13 September 2001. Resolution No. 2001-02 requested the
Commissioners for an opportunity to be informed on the proposed plantilla positions with their equivalent
qualification standards.
On 17 October 2001, the Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC
employees. A portion of the guidelines reflects the Commissioners' view on the selection and hiring of the
ERC employees vis-a-vis Civil Service rules, thus:
Since R.A. 9136 has abolished the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), it is the view of the Commission that
the provisions of Republic Act No. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of [Tenure of] Civil Service Officers
and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization) will not directly apply to ERC's
current efforts to establish a new organization. Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, however, will have
suppletory application to the extent possible in regard to the selection and placement of employees in the
ERC. On 5 November 2005, KERB sent a letter to the Commissioners stating the KERB members' objection
to the Commissioners' stand that Civil Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory application in
the selection and placement of the ERC employees. KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB
or change the ERB's character as an economic regulator of the electric power industry. KERB insisted that
RA 9136 merely changed the ERB's name to the ERC and expanded the ERB's functions and objectives.
KERB sent the Commissioners yet another letter on 13 November 2001. KERB made a number of requests:
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 36
(1) the issuance of a formal letter related to the date of filing of job applications, including the use of Civil
Service application form no. 212; (2) the creation of a placement/recruitment committee and setting
guidelines relative to its functions, without prejudice to existing Civil Service rules and regulations; and (3)
copies of the plantilla positions and their corresponding qualification standards duly approved by either the
President of the Philippines or the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Issue:
W/N Sec. 38 of R.A. 9136 abolished ERB and established the ERC, or did it only expand the ERB
RULING:
After comparing the functions of the ERB and the ERC, we find that the ERC indeed assumed the functions
of the ERB. However, the overlap in the functions of the ERB and of the ERC does not mean that there is
no valid abolition of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which are intended to meet
the specific needs of a deregulated power industry. Indeed, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration v. Civil Service Commission stated that:
[I]f the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or powers, so
that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all
or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of
a new or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy
are given to an existing officer or office.13
Throughout the years, the scope of the regulation has gradually narrowed from that of public services in
1902 to the electricity industry and water resources in 1972 to the electric power industry and oil industry
in 1977 to the electric industry alone in 1998. The ERC retains the ERB's traditional rate and service
regulation functions. However, the ERC now also has to promote competitive operations in the electricity
market. RA 9136 expanded the ERC's concerns to encompass both the consumers and the utility investors.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the privatization of
the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the
delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the
division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and
supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and
privatized thereafter.
In tandem with the restructuring of the industry is the establishment of "a strong and purely independent
regulatory body." Thus, the law created the ERC in place of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). To achieve
its aforestated goal, the law has reconfigured the organization of the regulatory body. x x x 15 There is no
question in our minds that, because of the expansion of the ERC's functions and concerns, there was a
valid abolition of the ERB. Thus, there is no merit to KERB's allegation that there is an impairment of the
security of tenure of the ERB's employees.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD petitioner,
vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.
Facts:
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect an average
increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that should
the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all excess amounts collected
from the latter’s customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor. The
COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting
of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision. MRs were denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid.
Ruling: YES.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and
statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When
private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati
only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to
regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is
continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive
rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate
rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility
of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a
fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is
reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a
balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are GRANTED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 46888 is REVERSED. Respondent MERALCO is authorized to adopt a rate
adjustment in the amount of P0.017 per kilowatthour, effective with respect to MERALCO's billing cycles
beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of the ERB dated February 16, 1998,
the excess average amount of P0.167 per kilwatthour starting with the applicant's billing cycles beginning
February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCO's customers or correspondingly credited in their
favor for future consumption.
REPUBLIC V. MEDINA
Facts: Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed an application with the Public Service Commission seeking
approval of revised rate schedules, with increased charges, claiming that the floating exchange rate and
economic conditions resulting therefrom increased its operating and maintenance expenses by more than
40%, and likewise increased the peso cost of servicing its foreign debts, causing it to incur an operational
deficit and net loss of over one million pesos a month. The proposed new rates would give it a reasonable
return of below 12% of the present value of its properties devoted to the public service, and implicated no
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 37
additional burden to small consumers constituting around 52% of petitioner’s customers. On May 18, 1970,
the Republic and other oppositors argued that the increase in rate sought is excessive and unreasonable
and will bring about greater hardship to the people, as well as directly cause increase in the cost of
production which will have to be unduly borne by the consuming public. The respondent Commission,
through Commissioner Enrique Medina, issued an order on May 27, 1970 directing the Auditor General to
conduct an examination of MERALCO’s books of account and to submit a report thereof within 15 days.
The Office of the Auditor General requested the respondent through a letter on June 9, 1970 to allow it
sufficient time until June 30, 1970 to submit its report. However, in view of his impending retirement on
July 2, 1970, the Commissioner replied on June 16, 1970 that the report be submitted on or before June
20, 1970. By return indorsement, the Office of the Auditor General informed the Commissioner on June
19, 1970 that although the examination could be finished that day, yet it would take about a week or so
to prepare and write the report. The Office of the Auditor General submitted its report on June 24, 1970
to the respondent Commission, without the supporting documents and for lack of material time, without
being able to delve “into as much detail as would ordinarily be done in a rate audit, considering the
magnitude of the utility’s operations, so that only the bit items were test-checked.” After hearing on the
merits of the petition, the respondent Commission promulgated a decision on June 30, 1970 finding that
the proposed rates reasonable and justified with minor adjustments. Respondent Commission issued an
order on July 1, 1970 clarifying and supplementing its decision that in case the decision should be appealed
the provisional rates should apply in the meantime. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration on July
20, 1970 of the decision and order with the Commission en banc, requesting the Secretary to include in
the calendar of the Commission en banc on August 6, 1970. The oppositors filed with the respondent
Commission on August 10, 1970 a notice of appeal from the decision dated June 30, 1970 and
supplementary order dated July 1, 1970. For lack of quorum to enable the respondent Commission to sit
en banc, owing to the retirement from service of Commissioner Medina on July 2, 1970, the existence of
a vacancy among the five Associate Commissioners, thereby leaving only four incumbent Associate
Commissioners, and it being the provision in Section 3 of the Public Service Act, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration could not be heard and resolved by the respondent Commission. For this reason, the
Republic filed a petition for review without awaiting the resolution of the respondent Commission on the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the filing of which is not a condition precedent to enable the
petitioner to appeal from said decision of the respondent Commission. MERALCO in turn filed a motion for
reconsideration, being unacted upon, for lack of quorum, resorted to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the order made by the Commission authorizing the provisional rates is valid.
Held: Yes. Considering that when the hearings were begun the notice had already been published six days
in succession, and moreover, Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act expressly prescribes—that the
Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without
necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within 30 days thereafter, upon publication and
notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected. If the Commission is empowered to approve
provisional rates even without a hearing, a fortiori it may act on such rates upon a six-day notice to persons
concerned. In fact, when the provisional rates were approved on May 20, the full 10-day notice had been
published. The Public Service Act makes no distinction; it speaks of rates proposed by public services; and
whether initial or revised, these rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission approves
them. Moreover, the Public Service Commission practice is to hear and approve revised rates without
published notices of hearing. Thea reason is easily discerned: the provisional rates are by their nature
temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved, and in the case at
bar, the Public Service Commission order of May 20, 1970 expressly so provided.

Thus, it is held that a regulatory commission’s field of inquiry, however, is not confined to the computation
of the cost of service or capital nor to a mere prognostication of the future behavior of the money and
capital markets. It must also balance investor and consumer expectations in such a way that broad
requirements of public interest may be meaningfully realized. It would hence appear in keeping with its
public duty if a regulatory body is allowed wide discretion in the choice of methods rationally related to the
achievement of this end.
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO), PETITIONER,V. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
The Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative of SURNECO and of the other
33 rural electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a petition before the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
for the approval of the formula for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) restructured rate adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832.
The ERB granted SURNECO and other rural electric cooperatives provisional authority to use and implement
the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA). In the meantime, the passage of R.A. No. 9136 led to the creation
of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), replacing and succeeding the ERB. All pending cases before
the ERB were transferred to the ERC. Thereafter, the ERC continued its review, verification, and
confirmation of the electric cooperatives implementation of the PPA formula based on the available data
and information submitted by the latter.
The ERC issued its assailed Order, mandating that the discounts earned by SURNECO from its power
supplier should be deducted from the computation of the power cost. SURNECO filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied. Aggrieved, SURNECO filed a petition for review to the CA but the same
was denied. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, SURNECO files the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ERC Decision
E n v i R e v i e w e r ( M I D T E R M S ) P a g e | 38
HELD: No. The State, in its exercise of police power, can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility
such as SURNECO
The ERC was merely implementing the system loss caps in R.A. No. 7832 when it reviewed and confirmed
SURNECOS PPA charges, and ordered the refund of the amount collected in excess of the allowable system
loss caps through its continued use of the multiplier scheme. The Commission deemed it appropriate to
clarify its PPA confirmation process particularly on the treatment of the Prompt Payment Discount (PPD)
granted to distribution utilities (DUs) by their power suppliers. The foregoing clarification was intended to
ensure that only the actual costs of purchased power are recovered by the DUs.
In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA
mechanism remains a purely cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the
electric cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve the rates imposed by
the electric cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public
interest imbued in those rates.
As held in the case of Republic v. Manila Electric Company, the regulation of rates to be charged by public
utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and
regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose
and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation.
The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner
by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public
regulation. Likewise, SURNECO cannot validly assert that the caps set by R.A. No. 7832 are arbitrary, or
that they violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution for allegedly traversing the loan agreement
between NEA and ADB. Striking down a legislative enactment, or any of its provisions, can be done only
by way of a direct action, not through a collateral attack, and more so, not for the first time on appeal in
order to avoid compliance. The challenge to the laws constitutionality should also be raised at the earliest
opportunity. Even assuming, merely for arguments sake, that the ERC issuances violated the NEA and ADB
covenant, the contract had to yield to the greater authority of the States exercise of police power. It has
long been settled that police power legislation, adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people prevail not only over future contracts but
even over those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate
measures taken by the State to promote public welfare