S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, vs.

WILLIAM VAN
BUSKIRK
G.R. No. L-5691
December 27, 1910

FACTS
On the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a
carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the
street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose
of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came
along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and
that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of
the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of
the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but
that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by
said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a
serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse
which was drawing it.

ISSUE:

WON the employer could be held liable for the negligence of his coacher;

HELD:

No, because evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.

It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle
and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses
several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time,
of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had
never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice;
that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the
day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of
that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which
custom was sanctioned by their employers.

In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence.
 CESAR L. ISAAC v. A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,
G.R. No. L-9671
August 23, 1957

FACTS:

One of the buses which defendant was operating is Bus No. 31. On May 31, 1951, plaintiff
boarded said bus as a passenger paying the required fare from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili,
Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a motor vehicle of the
pick-up type coming from the opposite direction, as a result of which plaintiff’s left arm was
completely severed and the severed portion fell inside the bus. Plaintiff was rushed to a hospital
in Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was given blood transfusion to save his life. After four days, he
was transferred to another hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he underwent treatment for three
months. He was moved later to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed
there for another two months. For these services, he incurred expenses amounting to P623.40,
excluding medical fees which were paid by defendant.

As an aftermath, plaintiff brought this action against defendant for damages alleging that the
collision which resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and
recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by defendant and that defendant incurred in culpa
contractual arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff safely to his
destination.

ISSUE:

WON there has been negligence on the part of the common carrier;

HELD:

This matter is one of credibility and evaluation of the evidence. While the position taken by
appellant appeals more to the sense of caution that one should observe in a given situation to
avoid an accident or mishap, such however can not always be expected from one who is placed
suddenly in a predicament where he is not given enough time to take the proper course of action
as he should under ordinary circumstances. One who is placed in such a predicament cannot
exercise such coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of him under ordinary
circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected to observe the same judgment, care and
precaution as in the latter. For this reason, authorities abound where failure to observe the same
degree of care that as ordinary prudent man would exercise under ordinary circumstances when
confronted with a sudden emergency was held to be warranted and a justification to exempt the
carrier from liability. Thus, it was held that "where a carrier’s employee is confronted with a
sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation
must be taken into account, and he is not held to the same degree of care that he would otherwise
be required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as any
ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure
on his part to exercise the best judgment the case renders possible does not establish lack of care
and skill on his part which renders the company, liable.

Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver of the bus has
done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and in our opinion this relieves
appellee from liability under our law. Contributory negligence, on the other hand, does not
absolve Ammen Transportation from liability but merely reduces it.
 LEAH ALESNA REYES vs. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL
G.R. No. 130547
October 3, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. Five days before his death on
January 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. After he failed to
get relief from some home medication he was taking, he decided to see the doctor.

On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his wife. He was attended
to by respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on duty, who gave
Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history. She noted that at the time of his
admission, Jorge was conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and with respiratory
distress.2 Typhoid fever was then prevalent in the locality, as the clinic had been getting from 15
to 20 cases of typhoid per month.3 Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr.
Rico ordered a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge. Blood
count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and malarial smear were also made.4 After about an
hour, the medical technician submitted the results of the test from which Dr. Rico concluded that
Jorge was positive for typhoid fever. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed
Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes.

Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening. She also took Jorge’s history
and gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression was that Jorge had typhoid
fever. Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility
test with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. Said test was administered by nurse
Josephine Pagente who also gave the patient a dose of triglobe. As she did not observe any
adverse reaction by the patient to chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first five hundred
milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered on Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose was
administered on Jorge about three hours later just before midnight.

At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jorge’s temperature rose to
41°C. The patient also experienced chills and exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting,
and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered
hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patient’s convulsions. When he regained consciousness,
the patient was asked by Dr. Blanes whether he had a previous heart ailment or had suffered
from chest pains in the past. Jorge replied he did not.5 After about 15 minutes, however, Jorge
again started to vomit, showed restlessness, and his convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied
the emergency measures taken before and, in addition, valium was administered. Jorge, however,
did not respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or purplish discoloration of
the skin or mucous membrane due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m.,
Jorge died. He was forty years old. The cause of his death was "Ventricular Arrythemia
Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever."

ISSUE:

WON there is medical malpractice;

HELD:

The standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all known
practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the
reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good physicians. Here, Dr. Marlyn Rico did not
depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due
care required under the circumstances. Though the Widal test is not conclusive, it remains a
standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and, in the present case, greater accuracy through
repeated testing was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. The results of the
Widal test and the patient’s history of fever with chills for five days, taken with the fact that
typhoid fever was then prevalent as indicated by the fact that the clinic had been getting about 15
to 20 typhoid cases a month, were sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable skill the
impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever.

Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending the administration of the drug chloromycetin, the
drug of choice for typhoid fever. The burden of proving that Jorge Reyes was suffering from any
other illness rested with the petitioners. As they failed to present expert opinion on this,
preponderant evidence to support their contention is clearly absent.
 FERNANDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 92087
May 8, 1992

FACTS:

On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying
of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa,
Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26,
1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date,
specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely
Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside
the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was
taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the
septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.
In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the
ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and
in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of
oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst,
swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case,
was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank.

ISSUE:

Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar?

HELD:

No. While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the
septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of
the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public
Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such
service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public
respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is
likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank
since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities
but have remained unscathed.

The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance with the sanitary and
plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank. Hence, the toxic gas from
the waste matter could not have leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight. The only
indication that the septic tank in the case at bar was full and needed emptying was when water
came out from it. Yet, even when the septic tank was full, there was no report of any casualty of
gas poisoning despite the presence of people living near it or passing on top of it or using the
public toilet for their personal necessities.

In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the
septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar
occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent
opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially
one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be
aware of the attendant risks.