CASE 1
G.R. No. L-7083 May 19, 1955
JUAN EUGENIO and BASILIA EUGENIO, petitioners,
vs.
SILVINA PERDIDO, ROSITA, JOSE, ROMUALDO, FELIX,
ALEJANDRINO, FRANCISCA, ASUNCION, FLORENCIA and AMADO,
all surnamed Salang, respondents.
Guillermo E. Boñgolan for petitioners.
Padilla, Carlos, and Fernando for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals, wherein the
relevant facts may be stated as follows:
1. On November 1, 1927 Homestead Patent No. 10847 was issued in the
name of Teodoro Eugenio; 2. On March 12, 1932 Teodoro Eugenio in the
presence of his son Juan, and daughter Basilia, (plaintiffs in the case)
sold the homestead and delivered possession thereof, for the sum of
P1,300.00 to the defendant Silvina Perdido and her husband Clemente
Sadang, whose heirs are joined as defendants and respondents; 3. On
May 4, 1949 this action was filed to recover the land, upon the theory that
the contract was mere mortgage of the homestead, which plaintiff
inherited from their father; and that they had attempted unsuccessfully to
repay the debt; 4. The court of first instance held the contract to be a
contract of sale, which was void, because executed within five years from
the issuance of the homestead patent; therefore it ordered to return of the
property upon repayment of P1,300.00 with interest; 5. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the award holding that plaintiffs had no
personality to attack the validity of the sale, and that all they had was the
right to repurchase which they failed to exercise within five years from
March 12, 1932.
Denial of plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, led to the presentation of this
petition for review, which is based upon two legal propositions, to wit: (1)
The action to annul the sale in 1932 had not prescribed; (2) the right to
repurchase within the five-year period has not lapsed, inasmuch as the
sale was never registered.
There is no question that the sale in March 1932 having been made
within five years from "the date of issuance of the patent" was "unlawful
and null void from its execution", by express provision of sections 116
and 122 of Act No. 2874. (Now Com. Act No. 141).
Under the existing classification, such contract would be "inexisting" and
"the action or defense for declaration" of such inexistence" does not
prescribe". (Art. 1410 New Civil Code). While it is true that this is a new
provision of the New Civil Code, it is nevertheless a principle recognized
since Tipton vs. Velasco 6 Phil. 67 that "mere lapse of time cannot give
efficacy to contracts that are null and void"1
The imprescriptibility of plaintiff's action to recover is further strengthened
by Sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) providing that "no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession".
In this connection it should be explained that the patent issued to the
homesteader Teodoro Eugenio was recorded in the registry of deeds of
Nueva Viscaya, and that Original Certificate of Title No. 62 dated
December 5, 1927 Exhibit X was issued in his name. Such being the
case his homestead was considered "registered within the meaning of
the Land Registration Act No. 496"2, and enjoys the same privileges as
Torrens titles issued under said legislations.3
The imprescriptibility of such title has recently been recognized in Acierto
vs. de los Santos, L-5828, Sept. 1954.
We are aware, of course, that title by adverse possession (acquisitive
prescription) is distinct from the statute of limitations (extinctive
prescription)4 and the operations and effects of such distinction has been
explored during the discussions of this petitions for review.
But we have finally agreed that as to lands registered under the Torrens
system, ten years' adverse possession may not be permitted to defeat
the owners' right to possession — which is the necessary incident
ownership. Otherwise loss of the land by prescription would be indirectly
approved, in violation of Sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act. This
statute, being a later enactment, may be said to have partially amended
the Statute of Limitation established in Act No. 190 in so far as registered
lands are concerned.
Nevertheless petitioners' case may not so easily prevail on the foregoing
considerations, for respondents have vigorously pressed several points
needing particular attention.
Admitting arguendo, they say, that the Deeds of Sale violated the
Homestead Law, nevertheless, the petitioners have no personality to
prosecute the instant suit, since it is the Government that is the real party
in interest, and the object of its suit would be reversion of the property to
the state. They cite section 124 of Public Land Law (2874) providing that
sale "shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution; and shall
produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent etc. .
. . and cause the reversion of the property" to the State. The answer to
this is that the reversion is not automatic, (Villacorta vs. Ulanday, 73 Phil.
655) and so long as the Government has not chosen to act, the rights of
the homesteader stand and must be recognized in the courts of law.5
Respondents also content that, having executed the deed of the sale,
petitioners are estopped from denying defendants' ownership and
possession, or that, at least, being in pari delicto they should not be
allowed to recover.
decided February 25, 1954, but they were there overruled, this
Court holding that the pari delicto doctrine may not be invoked in
a case of this kind since it would run counter to an avowed
fundamental policy of the State, that the forfeiture of the
homestead is a matter between the State and the grantee of his
heirs, and that until the State has taken steps to annul the grant
and asserts title to the homestead the purchaser is, as against
the vendor or his heirs, "no more entitled to keep the land than
any intruder." (Acierto vs. De los Santos 95 Phil., 887).
Lastly respondents say, "Granting, without conceding, that petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, Teodoro Eugenio, could not have conveyed his
homestead title on March 12, 1932, yet his subsequent acquisition of a
complete homestead title sufficient for conveyancing under the
Homestead Law on November 1, 1932 validated whatever defect the title
of Clemente Sadang might have had."

As to the first point, it is enough to remember that no estoppel can be
predicted on an illegal act. (19 Am. Jur. p. 804). The principle of estoppel
as contented by respondents would mean something like this: petitioners
having represented and led the respondents to believe, that the sale was
valid, they may not thereafter allege it is invalid. Yet the respondents are
conclusively presumed to know the law, and should not be allowed to
plead estoppel which is founded in ignorance..
A similar consideration was rejected in Sabas vs. Garma 66 Phil. 471,
probably for the reason that a non-existent contract could not be ratified.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing consideration, the decision under
review should be, and is hereby reversed. Plaintiffs are permitted to
recover the homestead upon payment of P1,300.00 to defendants. Costs
shall be paid by the latter. So ordered.

"It is generally considered that as between the parties to a contract,

validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is
against the public policy". (19 Am. Jur. p. 802, citing many cases.)

As to the rule of in pari delicto, homesteaders or their heirs have

heretofore been allowed to maintain actions similar to this.6

In a recent decision annulling a homestead sale, this Court thru Mr.

Justice Alex. Reyes said:

Appellants, however, contend that the voiding provision of the Act

may not be invoked in favor of plaintiffs as their predecessor in
interest was in pari delicto, and that, since the same provision
says the illegal sale shall have the effect of annulling the grant
and cause of reversion of the property and its improvements to
the State, plaintiffs may no longer claim the homestead. Similar
contentions were made in the case of Catalina de los Santos vs.
Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap et al., G.R. No. L-6088,
CASE 2
G.R. No. 111141 March 6, 1998
MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO
LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by
only one, this 20,592 square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio
Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed by two contestants in this petition
for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the property can be
vested in only one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner
Mario Titong. The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch
44 1 ruled in of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio,
adjudging them the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed
on appeal to the Court, of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a favorable
reversal.
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land
with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918,
and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three
separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their
hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of
approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and
averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare
agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-
interest, 2 Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner 3,
asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them for twenty
years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico
Laurio. 4 This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had worked on
the land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between
the land sold to Espinosa and what of petitioner's property was the old
Bugsayon river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant
in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and
direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern of petitioner' s
property, thus converting the old river into a riceland. 5
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following
facts: He denied petitioner's claim of ownership, recounting that the area
and boundaries of the disputed land remained unaltered during the series
of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According to him,
petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 2916, 6 which showed that the land had an area of 5.5
hectares and was bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the
East by property under the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South by
property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by property
owned by Agapito de la Cruz. 7 Private Respondent then alleges that, on
December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano
vda. de Cabug, after which Tax Declaration No. 5339 8 was issued in her
favor. In compliance with their mutual agreement to repurchase the
same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale 9 on August 24,
1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 5720. 10 However, the property remained in petitioner's
hands for only four (4) days because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to
Espinosa 11 who then declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No.
12311. 12 Consequently, the property became a part of the estate of
Pablo Espinosa's wife, the late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10,
1981, her heirs executed an instrument denominated as "Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale" whereby the 5.5-hectare
property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private
respondent 13 in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter,
Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private
respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the
property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax
Declaration No. 2916 under petitioner's name.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys
were made of the disputed property. The first survey 14 was made for
petitioner, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the
lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two
surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner's allegation in his complaint
that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming
5.9789 hectares, the total areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On
the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an
area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to
him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private respondent filed a
protest 15 before the Bureau of Lands against the first survey, likewise
filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the municipal trial court,
the proceedings of which, however, were suspended of the instant
case. 16
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his
mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of
Estate of the deceased Leonida Zaragoza, 17 the heirs adjudicated unto
themselves the 3.6-hectare property of the deceased. The property
involved is described in the instrument as having been declared under
Tax Declaration No. 3301 18 and as bounded on the North by Victor
Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon
River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax
Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding share
in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in
the extrajudicial settlement 19 petitioner's share was bloated to 2.4
hectares. It therefore appeared to private respondent that petitioner
encroached upon his (Laurio's) property and declared it a part of his
inheritance. 20 The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was
bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong,
on the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West by property
owner Adolfo Titong. 21 Private respondent accordingly denied that
petitioner had diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had
repurchased the land from Concepcion Verano vda. de
Cabug 22 because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly
thereafter. 23
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents,
declaring him as the true and absolute owner of the litigated property and
ordering petitioner to respect private respondents' title and ownership
over the property and to pay attorney's fees, litigation expenses, costs
and moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision.
On motion for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the
reason that the lower court should have outrightly dismissed the
complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be
availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet
the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein.
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a
cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in
real property. 24 The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting
of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding." Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius, these
grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of
these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action. 25
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would
have had no other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The
complaint failed to allege that an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title over the property involved.
Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein),
together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly
entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the
same.
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees. He prayed
that, aside from issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private
respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the
court should declare him "the true and absolute owner" thereof. Hence,
through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his
title to the property were private respondents' alleged acts of physical
intrusion into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be
considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely not one
for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint,
it would have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary
dispute. The answer alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, "in bad
faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question
included in the survey of his land which extends to the south only as far
as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common
boundary between the properties." 26 Moreover, during the hearing of the
case, petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by
evidence showing what he considered as the boundary of his property
which private respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their
property. In this regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are
apropos:
. . . (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court)
cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the
determination of the boundaries of the claimed property,
as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some
of the parties the disputed property in an action where the
sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a
cloud upon the petitioners' interest or title in and to said
property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate
in adversarial proceedings where possession or
ownership may properly be considered and where
evidence aliunde, other than the "instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be
introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever
warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for
recovery of possession de facto, also within the
prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in
which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully
threshed out. 27
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a
valid one for quieting of title, still, the instant petition for review
on certiorari must fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed
normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on
record or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of
facts. 28 Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident
reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner "sold, ceded,
transferred and conveyed" the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo
Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession pertaining thereto
ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same manner,
Espinosa's rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred
to private respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in
the Civil Code, as follows:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and
to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real
rights in the thing sold. 29 In the case at bar, petitioner's claim of
ownership must of necessary fail because he has long abdicated his
rights over the land when he sold it to private respondent's predecessor-
in-interest.
Petitioner's claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land
through possession for more than twenty (20) years is likewise
unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
"(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years," this provision
of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This
article states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law."
Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of tea years
unless such possession was acquired con justo tilulo y buena fe (with
color of title and good faith). 30 The good faith of the possessor consists
in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing
was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. 31 For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but
the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. 32
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and
just title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts
of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and
thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation
of the rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad faith." 33 To allow
petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the
maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a
claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription
cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art.
1137 of the Civil Code states that "(o)wnership and other real rights over
immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith." Petitioner's alleged
possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents
entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This
period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art.
1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey
plan prepared upon his request, 34 the tax declaration in his
name, 35 the commissioner's report on the relocation survey, 36 and the
survey plan. 37 Respondent court correctly held that these documents do
not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and
3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained
and so a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and
quantity of
land. 38 A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an
instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in
which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common
estate. 39Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the
survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive
as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession. 40
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of
Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the
Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law
ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes,
computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of
property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. 41 A survey
plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a
private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be
proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any
objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the
courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to
believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court
cannot alter the conclusions of
the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by
the parties. 42
Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even
persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A
tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of
ownership. 43 It is merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership. 44 Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in
proving one's ownership. 45 Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioner's
tax declaration and the commissioner's report as regards the area of his
claimed property is much too glaring to be ignored. Tax Declaration No.
8717 states that petitioner's property has an area of 3.2800 hectares
while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic
engineer's survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a
notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private
respondent's claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No.
12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the 5.2433-
hectare property as shown by the commissioner's report.
There is also nothing in the commissioner's report that substantiates
petitioner's claim that the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner
capitalizes on the lower court's statement in its decision 46 that "as
reflected in the commissioner's report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-
A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants(Exhibit 2)" 47 or
the private respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show
that this statement is found in the summary of defendants' (herein private
respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be
attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state
the defendants' assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5-
hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner
misapprehended the lower court's decision or he is trying to
contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete
the same. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that where
fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral damages
is in order. 48 This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the
Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated
in Art. 21 of the same Code. This article states that "(a)ny person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage." The moral damages are hereby increased to P30,000.00. We
agree with the respondent court in holding that the award of attorney's
fees is justified because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil
action. 49
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
CASE 3
G.R. No. 121157 July 31, 1997
HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING, represented by DELFIN, GIL,
EMMA, MANUEL, RACQUEL, ESTER, REMEDIOS and JESSIE, all
surnamed PARAYNO, MAXIMA PARAYNO, LEONARDO PARAYNO
and FELICISIMA PARAYNO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE BAUZON (deceased), represented
by his heirs and co-defendants Luis and Eriberta Bauzon; LUIS
BAUZON, ERIBERTA BAUZON (deceased), substituted by her
husband PLACIDO ZULUETA, and JOSE PARAYNO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an action for annulment of documents, accounting and partition of
two (2) parcels of land, a riceland and a sugarland, situated in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Petitioners claim that they, together with private
respondents Luis and Eriberta Bauzon, own the disputed lots in common
and pro-indiviso. Luis and Eriberta, the latter represented by her husband
Placido Zulueta, aver that their father Roque Bauzon was the owner of
the subject lots by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias. Roque,
together with Juan Maningding, Maria Maningding and Segunda
Maningding were the surviving children of Ramon Bauzon y Untalan who
died intestate in 1948. According to petitioners, Roque Bauzon
repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated
it to himself,1 and that in 1970 Juan and Maria Maningding renounced
and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favor of Roque Bauzon
by virtue of an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation.2 Subsequently,
Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the
sugarland to his daughter Eriberta Bauzon, both transactions being
evidenced by deeds of sale.
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly
discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children
only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the
properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were
unsuccessful.
On the other hand private respondents aver that the Affidavit of Quitclaim
and Renunciation over the riceland was executed not only by Juan
Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by Segunda Maningding.
With regard to the sugarland, Roque Bauzon denied having executed
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication presented by petitioners. He claimed
that he acquired ownership over both the sugarland and the riceland by
donation propter nuptias from his parents Ramon Bauzon and Sotera
Zulueta on 21 April 1926 in consideration of his marriage to Petra
Loresco. Since the death of Ramon Bauzon in 1948, Roque had been in
open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the
subject properties.
The trial court found that the parcels of land formed part of the estate of
Ramon Bauzon and his wife Sotera Zulueta which, upon their death,
devolved by right of succession to their children Segunda Maningding,
Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon in equal pro-
indiviso shares. The court a quo however awarded both parcels to
Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares
after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already
executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed
of donation for failure to prove its due execution and authenticity and
ruled that the same was negated by the Affidavit of Quitclaim and
Renunciation of Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding in favor of
Roque Bauzon and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Bauzon in favor of
Luis Bauzon as regards the riceland and to Eriberta Bauzon with respect
to the sugarland. It concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have validly
conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each parcel rightfully belonged
to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.
The Court of Appeals however ruled that the properties validly pertained
to Roque Bauzon by virtue of the donationpropter nuptias. Consequently,
the transfers made by Roque Bauzon must be given effect. However,
upon motion for reconsideration, the same deed of donation was
declared null and void by the appellate court for failure to comply with Art.
633 of the old Civil Code, the law then applicable, which required for the
validity of the deed of donation to be in a public instrument. Nevertheless,
the same court maintained that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon
by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership
over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in
general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.3 Acquisitive
prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.4 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten
(10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good
faith.5
The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only
by tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now
transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled
with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations
and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.6
Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to
comply with formal requisites,7 it could still constitute a legal basis for
adverse possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession,
a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of
ownership.8 In Pensader v. Pensader9 we ruled that while the verbal
donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the lands in question is not effective as a
transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse
and exclusive character of the possession. In Espique v. Espique10 we
held —
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid
because it involves an immovable property and the donation was
not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the
old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code
(concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said
donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when
on the strength thereof the done has taken possession of the
property adversely and in the concept of owner, or, as this Court
well said: "While the verbal donation, under which the defendants
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
lands in question, is not effective as a transfer of title, yet it is a
circumstances which may explain the adverse and exclusive
character of the possession' (Pensader v. Pensader, 47 Phil. 673,
680). This also an action for partition. It was shown that the
donation of the property was made not even in a private
document but only verbally. It was also shown that the
defendants, through their predecessors-in-interest, were in
adverse and continuous possession of the lands for a period of
over 30 years. Yet, the court decided the case in favor of
defendants on the ground of acquisitive prescription. There is a
close parallelism between the facts of this case and the present.
xxx xxx xxx
We do not need to stretch our mind to see that under such
allegations plaintiffs intended to convey the idea that defendant
has possessed the lands openly, adversely and without
interruption from 1916 to 1949 for he is the one who has
possessed and reaped the whole benefit thereof. As to the
character of the possession held by defendant during that period
one cannot also deny that it is in the concept of owner
considering that the lands were donated to him by his
predecessors-in-interest on the occasion of his marriage even if
the same was not embodied in a public instrument. The essential
elements constituting acquisitive prescription are therefore
present which negative the right of plaintiffs to ask for partition of
said properties. On this point we find pertinent the following
observation of the trial court; "Any person who claims right of
ownership over immovable properties and does not invoke that
right but instead tolerated others in possession for thirty years is
guilty of laches and negligence and he must suffer the
consequence of his acts."
In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land
in the concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The
possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and
cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were
manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and
public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality
wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known
to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was
never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His
possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-
founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed
and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in
his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the
parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It
was only in 1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded
partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60)
years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon
possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more
than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive
prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
Again, even if we assume the absence of good faith and just title, the
ownership of the two (2) parcels would still appertain to Roque Bauzon.
As testified to by Delfin Parayno, one of petitioners, Roque Bauzon and
his heirs had been in continuous, adverse and public possession of the
property since 1948 up to 1986, or a period of thirty-six (36) years, which
is more than the required thirty-year extraordinary prescription.

Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as

long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.11 Co-
owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may
prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that
he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised
of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive
period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without
specifying the grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice
to the other co-owners of the occupant's claim of title in himself in
repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to the possession,
as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without
any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the
possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed
to the rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition
will lie.12

Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when

the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such
prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of
ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the
other co-owners.13 As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his
heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of
petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the
properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the
produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they
slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse
before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the
consequence of their inaction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution of the Court of

Appeals of 7 July 1995 which modified its Decision of 29 November 1994
and holding that the deceased Roque Bauzon acquired the disputed two
(2) parcels of land by acquisitive prescription is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 4
G.R. No. 122047 October 12, 2000
SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS
ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada,
Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada) respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision1 dated March
25, 1994, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolutions 2 dated March 24, 1995
and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 113,
and nullified the sale of the subject lot by the spouses Crisostomo and
Cresenciana Armada to spouses Serafin and Anita Si. The dispositive portion
of the respondent court's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED, and a new one is rendered:
1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana V.
Alejo in favor of Anita Bonode Si.
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the name of Anita
Bonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada, married to
Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R. Armada Jr., single.
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to reconstitute and
revive Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16007 in the names of Jose,
Crisostomo and Severo, Jr.
4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the share
corresponding to the share of Crisostomo Armada within thirty (30)
days from notice in writing by Crisostomo Armada.
5) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay
the plaintiffs-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages.
6) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to
pay the plaintiff-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses and costs of suit. SO ORDERED."3
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District, Pasay City, the
property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo
Armada, Sr. This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
(17345) 2460. During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was
transferred to their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued
TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows : "DR.
CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34
Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to Remedios Almanzor, 113.33
Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age,
Filipinos."4 Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said title "...
by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979,
executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of
CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the
property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for
the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No. 17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary
Public of Pasay City, Manila, Julian Florentino)."5
On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor,
filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title
with Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado
Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale.
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's share by
making it appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-fact of her husband, is a
Filipino citizen, residing with Isada at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy,
Cubao, Quezon City. By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana had
migrated and were already citizens of the United States of America. It also
stated that when petitioners registered the deed of absolute sale they
inserted the phrase "... and that the co-owners are not interested in buying
the same in spite of notice to them.", and that petitioners knew of the
misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the complaint alleged that the other
owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the sale; and that all
upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, private respondents filed a
complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title with damages,
claiming they had a right of redemption.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954, Escolastica,
with the consent of her husband executed three separate deeds of sale
(Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)6 conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to
Severo, and 113.33 square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three
deeds of sale particularly described the portion conveyed to each son in
metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the property was already
three distinct parcels of land, there was no longer co-ownership among the
brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when
Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si. Petitioners point out that it was
only because the Armada brothers failed to submit the necessary subdivision
plan to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City that separate titles
were not issued and TCT No. 16007 was issued and registered in the names
of Jose, Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
With costs against the plaintiffs."7
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 1994,
the appellate court issued the decision now assailed by petitioners. In
reversing the decision of the trial court and ruling for private respondents, the
Court of Appeals found that:
"A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the portion
sold by virtue of the Deeds of Sale (Exh. 1, 2, & 3) to the Armada brothers do
not appear in the said title, neither does it indicate the particular area sold.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the Register of Deeds
issued TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') on the basis of the said deeds of Sale. In
fact, TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the lot is co-owned by Jose,
Crisostomo and Severo, Jr. in the proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and 113.33
sq. m. respectively.
Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale
(Exh. 'B'), executed by Cresencia Armada in favor of defendants Si, stated
that the portion sold was the 'undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100
(113.34) square meters' of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO. 16007 of
the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, which means that what was sold to
defendants are still undetermined and unidentifiable, as the area sold
remains a portion of the whole.
Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on March 27, 1979,
Crisostomo Armada, thru his attorney-in-fact and co-defendant, Cresenciana
Alejo, sold his undivided 113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), and presented for registration with the
Register of Deeds (Exh. 'B-1') without notifying plaintiffs of the sale (TSN, pp.
6-8, December 20, 1988). Instead, it appears that the phrase 'and that the
co-owners are not interested in buying the same inspite of notice to them',
was inserted in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 'B').
x x x Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in the
undivided property is not invalid, but shall not be recorded in the Registry
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the Vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners."8
On August 29, 1994, petitioners' counsel on record, Atty. Roberto B. Yam
received a copy of the CA decision. On October 14, 1994, he filed a motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals on November
21, 1994, for being filed out of time.
On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new trial under
Section 1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court.9 Petitioners presented new
evidence, TCT No. (17345) 2460, registered in the name of Escolastica de la
Rosa, married to Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back stating that
the cancellation was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor of Escolastica's
sons. On March 24, 1995, respondent court denied the motion, reasoning
that when the motion was filed, the reglementary period had lapsed and the
decision had become final and executory. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was denied.
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
"1. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ruling that a co-ownership still existed.
"2. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision of 25 March
1994 on purely technical grounds.
"3. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
denying the Motion for New Trial.
"4. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ordering petitioners to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and the costs of the suit."10
In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether respondent court
erred in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and/or the Motion for
New Trial; (2) whether private respondents are co-owners who are legally
entitled to redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code;11 and (3)
whether the award of moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit is
correct.
The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim the right of
redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The trial court found that the
disputed land was not part of an undivided estate. It held that the three
deeds of absolute sale12 technically described the portion sold to each son.
The portions belonging to the three sons were separately declared for
taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21,
1970.13 Jose's testimony that the land was undivided was contradicted by his
wife when she said they had been receiving rent from the property
specifically allotted to Jose.14 More significantly, on January 9, 1995, the
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT 24751 and issued three new
titles as follows: (1) TCT 13459415 in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT
13459516 under the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si; and (3)
TCT 13459617 owned by Jose Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor. All
these are on record.
However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the trial court's
findings.18
In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance
with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of
Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion. 19 This
we have done in this case. It is our considered view now, that the trial court is
correct when it found that:
"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been
partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor
of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3),
which documents purports to have been registered with the Register of
Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT
No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and
transferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and
with the corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is what we
call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every portion belonging to the three
sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of
Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the
portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada and
Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and identifiable. The fact
that the three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make
said portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable, one from
the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners
exists."20 (citation omitted)
". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did not have
knowledge about the impending sale of this portion. The truth of the matter is
that they were properly notified. Reacting to such knowledge and notification
they wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on February 22, 1979, a
portion of said letter is revealing: 'Well you are the king of yourselves, and
you can sell your share of Levereza."21 (emphasis omitted)
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community
ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each
brother was no longer available.22
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,23 there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There
is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.24 This situation makes inapplicable the provision on the
right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well informed
of the impending sale of Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated
February 22, 1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king
of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza."25 Co-owners with
actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a
formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the
sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited
period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at
the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to
them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is
unnecessary.26
Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that herein
private respondent could redeem the lot bought by petitioners, the issue of
whether the appellate court erred in denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and new trial need not be delved into.1âwphi1 The same is
true with respect to the questioned award of damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we
cannot put a premium on the right to litigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions dated March 24, 1995
and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated on
August 29, 1989, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 5
G.R. No. 51655 November 29, 1989
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES JULIO BANSIL and JOSEFINA TAMAYO and ALEJANDRA
SANCHEZ, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This case, filed with the Court of Appeals but forwarded to this Court for
disposition since it involves purely questions of law, is an appeal from the
September 5, 1977 decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch VI, presided over by Hon. Mariano Castaneda, Jr.
dismissing the complaint of herein appellant.
Herein appellant Vicente del Rosario and appellee Julio Bansil are uncle
and nephew, and two (2) of the heirs of Pelagia Sanchez. On November
28, 1973, the heirs of Pelagia Sanchez executed an extrajudicial
partition, and pursuant to the same, appellant was given Lot No. 2854-A,
now registered in his name and that of his spouse Emiliana Gonzales
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125739-R of the Register of Deeds
of Pampanga. On the other hand, appellee Julio Bansil received as his
share an adjacent lot, Lot No. 2654-B, which was registered in his name
and that of his spouse Josefina Tamayo under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 125740-R of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. On May 10,
1976, the said share of appellee Julio Bansil was sold to herein other
appellee, Alejandra Sanchez, for P1,500.00 without first being offered to
appellant Vicente del Rosario as an adjoining owner. Said appellant,
claiming the right of preemption, on May 27, 1976, filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VI, a complaint, praying for
the annulment of the sale and for the reconveyance of the said lot in his
favor (Record on Appeal, pp. 4-10). On June 11, 1976, he deposited with
the Clerk of Court the sum of P1,500.00 so that his right of preemption
can be upheld (Record on, pp. 11-12).
On July 13, 1976, the appellees filed their Answer with Counterclaim
(Record on Appeal, pp. 12-16) controverting the material allegations of
the complaint and by way of special and affirmative defenses alleged that
the complaint states no valid cause of action as there is no law that grant
such pre-emptive rights to adjoining owners with respect to the sale of
adjoining properties. Appellees explained that despite the absence of
legal obligation on their part, out of respect to appellant who is their
uncle, they did actually offer to sell said property to appellant and to other
relatives who jointly own another adjoining property of about 86 square
meters, prior to its sale to Alejandra Sanchez, but they refused to buy the
same because of financial incapacity. On the other hand, appellant's
claim that he sincerely wanted to buy the said property is belied by the
fact that appellant, thru his wife Emiliana Gonzales, had consistently
offered and appealed to appellee Alejandra Sanchez, before and after
the latter bought the property, to likewise buy appellant's lot of about 86
square meters. The only reason why appellee Alejandra Sanchez failed
to buy the properties offered was due to disagreement over the price.
Said failure to sell was surmised to have brought great disenchantment
and ill will to appellant which eventually caused the filing of the instant
complaint. At any rate, as additional proof appellees alleged that a
signboard "House and Lot for Sale" was posted in appellant's premises
for several months prior to the filing of the complaint, to which several
prospective buyers responded. Appellees argued further that under
appellant's own unfounded theory that adjoining property owners have
legal pre-emptive rights in the sale of adjoining properties, Alejandra
Sanchez must certainly have as much right and should be preferred,
being an adjoining property owner herself of about 300 square meters, as
compared to only about 86 square meters of the adjoining property
belonging to appellant. (Record on Appeal, p. 32).
On July 28, 1976, appellant filed his Reply with Answer to Counterclaim
(Record on Appeal, pp. 17-21), to which appellees filed their Rejoinder on
September 1, 1976 (Record on Appeal, pp. 21-24).
On October 20, 1976, the parties filed a Joint Petition for Judgment on
the Pleadings (Record on Appeal, p. 25) on the ground that the principal
issue involved therein being a question of law, that is, the application or
non-application of either or both Articles 1622 and 1623 of the New Civil
Code. The same, however, was denied by the trial court in an order
dated November 15, 1976 (Record on Appeal, p. 26).
After the hearing on March 28, 1977, wherein the lawyers of the parties
jointly requested the reconsideration of the order denying the joint motion
for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court, in a decision dated
September 5, 1977 (Record on Appeal, pp. 30-36), dismissed the
complaint—
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint dated May 27, 1976
without pronouncement as to cost.
Not satisfied with the decision, appellant filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 63585-R.
After the parties have submitted their respective briefs, appellant on June
5, 1978 (Rollo, p. 1 5) and appellees on October 19, 1978 (Rollo, p. 23),
the case was considered submitted for decision (Rollo, p. 27); and in a
resolution promulgated on September 25, 1979, the Court of Appeals
*ordered its Clerk of Court to forward to this Court the whole record of the
case for final determination (Rollo, pp. 28-29).
In the resolution dated October 15, 1979 of the First Division of this
Court, this case was ordered docketed and declared submitted for
decision (Rollo, p. 31).
Appellant raised two (2) assignments of error, to wit:
I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN APPLYING ART. 1622 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE INSTEAD OF ART. 1623 OF THE SAME CODE WHICH IS
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.
II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT DECLARING TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 130540-5 ISSUED BY THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT ALEJANDRA
SANCHEZ NULL AND VOID AFTER IT WAS SHOWN THAT THE
REQUIREMENT PROVIDED UNDER THE PROVISION OF ART. 1623
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE WAS NOT COMPLIED,
As correctly found by the trial court, the two requisites as enumerated
above do not obtain in the case at bar as to warrant the exercise of the
right of preemption or redemption by the appellant. As pointed out, the 86
square meters lot in question cannot be considered so small for practical
purposes as a residential house can be constructed thereon in the same
manner as the residential houses built on two equally sized lots situated
on both sides of the litigated property, one of which belongs to petitioner
himself. Likewise, true is the fact that the disputed lot had not been
bought for speculation, the same having been inherited by appellee Julio
Bansil from his grandmother (Record on Appeal, pp. 34-35).
Neither can appellant claim the right of preemption or redemption as co-
owner after the inherited property has been subdivided and distributed
among co-owners, for then the community has terminated and there is no
reason to sustain any right of preemption or redemption (Caro v. Court of
Appeals, 113 SCRA 17 [1982]; Caram et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.,
101 Phil. 315 [1957]).
In the case at bar, not only was the inherited property partitioned but
actually subdivided into several parcels which were assigned by lots to
the heirs and Transfer Certificates of Titles have already been issued in
their respective names.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal (petition) is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

Stripped of bare essentials, the issue in this case is whether or not

petitioner is entitled to the right of preemption or redemption under Article
1622 of the Civil Code as an adjoining owner or under Article 1623 of the
same code as co-owner.

As an adjoining owner, this Court has already ruled that an owner of an

urban land has no right of preemption or redemption over the adjoining
portion of his land where he has not alleged in his complaint and has not
proved that said portion is so small and so situated that a major portion
thereof cannot be used for any practical purpose within a reasonable
time, having been bought merely for speculation (De la Cruz v. Cruz, 32
SCRA 308 [1970]).
CASE 6
G.R. No. L-27759 April 17, 1970
CRESENCIANO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JULIO CRUZ, ZENAIDA MONTES and ALFONSO
MIRANDA, defendants-appellees.
Segundo C. Mastrille for plaintiff-appellant.
E. A. Bernabe for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from a summary judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Pasay City), in its Civil Case No. 2723-P, dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint against the defendants for the pre-emption and legal redemption of
a portion of registered land and granting, in the main, the latter's
counterclaim for damages and attorneys' fees.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The spouses Julio Cruz and Zenaida Montes were once the owners of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10680 of the Office
of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, which parcel of land is more
particularly described therein as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 10) of the subdivision plan Psd-
790, being a portion of the land described on plan Psu-2031-
Amd. 2-A, LRC (G.L.R.O.) Record No. 2484, situated in the
Barrio of Malibay, Municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal.
Bounded on NE., by Lot 9 of the subdivision plan: containing
an area of SIX HUNDRED SIXTY TWO (662) SQUARE
METERS.'" On 16 December 1965, Julio Cruz and Zenaida
Montes sold a portion of the aforesaid parcel of land to the
plaintiff-appellant, Cresenciano de la Cruz. The deed of
absolute sale described the portion sold as —
... a portion with an area of Three Hundred and Thirty-One
Square Meters (331 sq. m.) on the northern part ...
Inserted in the deed was a stipulation, reading as follows:
It is hereby agreed that a plan will be made on the whole
parcel of land above-described showing the portion with
an area of Three Hundred and Thirty-one Square Meters
(331 sq. m), hereby conveyed, and the remaining portion
with an area of Three Hundred Thirty-One Square Meters
(331 sq. m.), together with the technical description of
each portion, that is, the portion hereby conveyed, and
the portion remaining.
On 28 February 1966, Julio Cruz and Zenaida Montes sold the remaining
portion of the land to Alfonso Miranda. The deed of sale described the
portion sold as —
... that unsegregated portion with an area of THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY ONE (331) SQUARE METERS
bordering C. Jose and F. Francisco Streets, Malibay,
Pasay City, which is at the southern part of the parcel of
land covered by T.C.T. No. 10680 above-described.
Under date of 25 April 1966, Cresenciano de la Cruz, filed a complaint
against Julio Cruz, Zenaida Montes and Alfonso Miranda, praying the
court to have himself (plaintiff-appellant Cresenciano de la Cruz)
declared as entitled to purchase, by way of pre-emption and legal
redemption, the one-half (½) portion of the land that was sold to Miranda.
Upon joinder of issues, the parties agreed, during the pre-trial of the
case, to submit the case for decision on the pleadings, and, on the basis
thereof, the court below rendered judgment, as stated at the beginning of
this decision.
Not satisfied with the court's decision, plaintiff-appellant Cresenciano de
la Cruz interposed the present direct appeal to the Supreme Court and
assigns the following errors as having been committed by the lower court;
1. The trial court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant
and defendants-appellees Julio Cruz and Zenaida Montes
are not co-owners of the parcel of land embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10680 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds for Pasay City.
2. The trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff is not
entitled to the right of pre-emption or legal redemption.
3. The trial court erred in awarding damages in the
amount of P2,000.00 in favor of defendants-appellees
Julio Cruz and Zenaida Montes, and another P2,000.00 in
favor of their co-defendant-appellee Alfonso Miranda.
4. The trial court finally erred in ordering plaintiff-appellant
to pay defendants-appellees the sum of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Appellant's theory, under his first two assignments of error, is that after
he bought from the spouses Julio Cruz and Zenaida Montes the northern
half of the parcel of land embraced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
10680, he and the spouses became co-owners of the said parcel of land,
"the plaintiff owning one-half (½) (northern part) and defendants Julio
Cruz and Zenaida Montes owning the remaining one-half (1/2) portion
(southern part)"; or that, "considering the situation or location of the parts
being owned by plaintiff and defendants Julio Cruz and Zenaida Montes,
respectively, ... the parts are adjacent to each other, and consequently,
plaintiff and defendants Julio Cruz and Zenaida Montes are adjacent
owners", such that plaintiff has the right of pre-emption or legal
redemption over the portion that was subsequently sold to Alfonso
Miranda (Quoted portions taken from appellant's brief, pages 3-4).
The foregoing theory is untenable. Tested against the concept of co-
ownership, as authoritatively expressed by the commentators, appellant
is not a co-owner of the registered parcel of land, taken as a unit or
subject of co-ownership, since he and the spouses do not "have a
spiritual part of a thing which is not physically divided" (3 Sanchez
Roman 162), nor is each of them an "owner of the whole, and over the
whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the
owner of a portion which is truly abstract ..." (3 Manresa 405). The
portions of appellant-plaintiff and of the defendant spouses are concretely
determined and identifiable, for to the former belongs the northern half,
and to the latter belongs the remaining southern half, of the land. That
their respective portions are not technically described, or that said
portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title, does
not make said portions less determinable or identifiable or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion
less exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption
among co-owners exists.
Nor is plaintiff-appellant entitled, as an adjoining owner, to the right of
pre-emption or redemption over the southern portion of the parcel of land
because he had not alleged in his complaint and has not proved (since
the case was submitted for decision on the pleadings) that said portion is
so small and so situated that a major portion thereof cannot be used for
any practical purpose within a reasonable time, having been bought
merely for speculation (Article 1622, Civil Code; Soriente vs. CA, L-1734),
31 August 1963, 62 O.G. 7013, 8 SCRA 750).
The third assignment of error is concerned with the defendants'
counterclaim. The court a quo awarded damages of P2,000.00 to the
spouses Cruz and another P2,000.00 to their co-defendant Alfonso
Miranda because the court considered the allegations on two (2) causes of
action in the counterclaim as not specifically denied by the plaintiff-appellant
and, therefore, deemed to have admitted said allegations. The first cause of
action, in brief, alleges that plaintiff had failed to cause the preparation and
subdivision plan that would serve as a basis for the issuance of separate
titles for the northern and southern parts of the land, contrary to their
agreement, and for the inaction and delay on the part of plaintiff had caused
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 to the counterclaimants. The second
cause of action, in turn, alleges that the plaintiff had refused to surrender the
certificate of title, despite demands, to the Register of Deeds, for annotation
of a release of mortgage that said plaintiff had himself executed, thus
preventing the dealing with the land, sans the encumbrance, with third
persons and prejudicing the counterclaimants in the sum of P5,000.00.
Appellant's argument that the court erred in awarding damages without proof
of the amount of actual damage is well-taken, for even though the rule is that
failure to deny specifically the material allegations in the complaint (or
counterclaim) is deemed an admission of the said allegations, an exception
is provided therefor, which is "other than those as to the amount of damage"
(Section 1, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court).
... Under Section 8, Rule 9 [Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Revised
Rules of Court], however, allegations regarding the
amount of damages are not deemed admitted even if not
specifically denied, and so must be duly proved.
Appellants did not offer to present evidence to prove their
damages but merely asked for judgment on the
pleadings. Hence, they must be considered to have
waived or renounced their claim for damages ... (Rili, et
al. vs. Chunaco, et al., L-6630, 29 February 1956, 98 Phil.
505, 507).
On his last assignment of error, appellant contests the award of
attorney's fees on the ground that such fees do not accrue merely
because of an adverse decision. On the other hand, he does not claim
that the court below had abused its discretion in giving the award, which
is a matter that is discretionary with it under Article 2208, Civil Code of
the Philippines, specially since the action was clearly unfounded (Heirs of
Justiva, et al. vs. Gustilo, et al., L-16396, 31 January 1963, 7 SCRA 72;
Lopez, et al. vs. Gonzaga, et al.,
L-18788, 31 January 1964, 10 SCRA 167).
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby
affirmed, except insofar as it awarded damages to the appellees, which is
hereby reversed. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
CASE 7
G.R. No. 124262 October 12, 1999
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALEJANDRO S. MARQUEZ, CRISANTA
DE CASTRO, ELPIDIA DE CASTRO, EFRINA DE CASTRO, IRENEO
DE CASTRO and ARTEMIO DE CASTRO ADRIANO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of
the Court Appeals dated August 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36349, and
its Resolution dated March 15, 1996, which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1âw phi 1.nêt
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition
before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their
predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they
are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their
father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010 located at
Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two
hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters more or less. They further claim
that in 1979, without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by
their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when
Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property. It is the
contention of private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected
only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of the
other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense,
lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches. The trial court, after
hearing the motion, dismissed the complaint in an Order dated August
18, 1984. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court, in an Order dated
October 4, 1994, reconsidered the dismissal of the complaint and set
aside its previous order. Petitioner filed its own motion for reconsideration
but it was denied in an Order dated January 5, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: a) the RTC has no
jurisdiction to try and take cognizance of the case as the causes of
actions have been decided with finality by the Supreme Court, and b) the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority in taking
cognizance of the case.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals,
finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court,
dismissed the petition in a Decision dated August 14, 1995. Petitioner
filed a timely motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution
dated March 15, 1996. Hence this petition.
Petitioner submits the following grounds to support the granting of the
writ of certiorari in the present case:
FIRST GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO
TRY SUBJECT CASE (SP. PROC. NO. 118-M). THE
"CAUSES OF ACTION" HEREIN HAVE BEEN FINALLY
DECIDED BY THE HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF RIZAL (BR. 31) MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND
SUSTAINED IN A FINAL DECISION BY THE HON.
SUPREME COURT.
SECOND GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT
SUSTAINED THE ORDERS OF THE HON. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) DATED OCTOBER 4, 1994,
AND THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 5, 1995, WHEN
SAID RTC (BR. 79) INSISTED IN TRYING THIS CASE
AGAINST TCMC WHEN IT HAS RULED ALREADY IN A
FINAL ORDER THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A "REAL
PARTY" IN INTEREST BY THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BR. 79) IN CIVIL CASE NO. 170,
ENTITLED ELPIDIA A. DE CASTRO, ET. AL. vs. TOMAS
CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, ET . AL., WHICH
CASE INVOLVED THE SAME RELIEF, SAME SUBJECT
MATTER AND THE SAME PARTIES.
THIRD GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT
CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED
THE EXISTENCE OF RES JUDICATA IN THIS CASE.
The pivotal issues to be resolved in this case are: whether or not the
Regional Trial Court and/or the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the
case, and if so, whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
In assailing the Orders of the appellate court, petitioner invokes Rule 65
of the Rules of Court as its mode in obtaining a reversal of the assailed
Decision and Resolution. Before we dwell on the merits of this petition, it
is worth noting, that for a petition for certiorari to be granted, it must be
shown that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction and not mere errors of
judgment, for certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are
correctible by appeal. 1 By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough — it must be
grave. 2
In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the public respondent. As correctly pointed out by the trial
court, when it took cognizance of the action for partition filed by the
private respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. 3 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. 4 Acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does not
necessarily mean that the lower court meant to reverse the decision of
the Supreme Court in the land registration case mentioned by the
petitioner.
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, hence
the court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up
in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. 5 This has to be so, for were the
principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by making the
sufficiency of this kind of action dependent upon the defendant in all
cases.
Worth stressing, as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction any alleged
errors committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
errors of judgment which are revisable by timely appeal and not by a
special civil action of certiorari. 6 Based on the foregoing, even assuming
for the sake of argument that the appellate court erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court, which earlier denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss, such actuation on the part of the appellate court cannot be
considered as grave abuse of discretion, hence not correctible
by certiorari, because certiorari is not available to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.
In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals. It was petitioner who elevated the instant
controversy to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. In effect,
petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by
seeking affirmative relief therefrom. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a
court, he cannot thereafter challenge that court's jurisdiction in the same
case. 7 To do otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of
litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells
the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. 8 Under
Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the
seller's share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds
to his grantor's share in the partition of the property owned in common.
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property. The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of
the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in
common from the third person, but for division or partition of the entire
property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it. 9Such partition should result in
segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the
buyer.1âw phi1.nêt
In the light of the foregoing, petitioner's defense of prescription against an
action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the
Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned." In Budlong
vs. Bondoc, 10 this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean
that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by
prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 8
G.R. No. 125233 March 9, 2000
Spouses ALEXANDER CRUZ and ADELAIDA CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
ELEUTERIO LEIS, RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO,
LORETA L. CAYONDA and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Private respondents, the heirs of spouses Adriano Leis and Gertrudes
Isidro,1 filed an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale over a lot executed by
Gertrudes Isidro in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz, as well as the title
subsequently issued in the name of the latter. Private respondents
claimed that the contracts were vitiated by fraud as Gertrudes was
illiterate and already 80 years old at the time of the execution of the
contracts; that the price for the land was insufficient as it was sold only for
P39,083.00 when the fair market value of the lot should be P1,000.00 per
square meter, instead of P390.00, more or less; and that the property
subject of the sale was conjugal and, consequently, its sale without the
knowledge and consent of private respondents was in derogation of their
rights as heirs.
The facts that gave rise to the complaint:
Adriano and Gertrudes were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955,
Gertrudes acquired from the then Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (DANR) a parcel of land with an area of one hundred (100)
square meters, situated at Bo. Sto. Niño, Marikina, Rizal and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42245. The Deed of Sale described
Gertrudes as a widow. On 2 March 1956, TCT No. 43100 was issued in
the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a
"widow."
On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. It does not appear that he executed
a will before his death.
On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the
spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at
5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was
secured by a mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100.
Gertrudes, however, failed to pay the loan on the due date.
Unable to pay her outstanding obligation after the debt became due and
payable, on 11 March 1986, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of
petitioner Alexander Cruz. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan"
which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes
one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a
"Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the
same property for the price of P39,083.00, the same amount stipulated in
the "Kasunduan."
For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof
was consolidated in the name of Alexander Cruz in whose name TCT No.
130584 was issued on 21 April 1987, canceling TCT No. 43100 in the
name of Gertrudes Isidro.
On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein
private respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from
petitioners, the new owners of the property. Private respondents
responded by filing a complaint as mentioned at the outset.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered a decision in favor
of private respondents. The RTC held that the land was conjugal property
since the evidence presented by private respondents disclosed that the
same was acquired during the marriage of the spouses and that Adriano
contributed money for the purchase of the property. Thus, the court
concluded, Gertrudes could only sell to petitioner spouses her one-half
share in the property.
The trial court also ruled that no fraud attended the execution of the
contracts. Nevertheless, the "Kasunduan," providing for a sale con pacto
de retro, had superseded the "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" the deed
of absolute sale. The trial court did not consider the pacto de retro sale
an equitable mortgage, despite the allegedly insufficient price.
Nonetheless, the trial court found for private respondents. It rationalized
that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the
Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership
in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry of Property.
The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring Exhibit G — "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang
Bilihan" Null and Void and declar[ing] that the title issued
pursuant thereto is likewise Null and Void;
2. Declaring the property in litigation as conjugal property;
3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch to
reinstate the title of Gertrudes Isidro;
4. Ordering the plaintiff[s] [sic] to comply with the
provision[s] of Article 1607 in relation to Article 1616 of
the Civil Code;
5. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] P15,000.00
nominal damages for the violation of plaintiffs' rights;
6. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] the sum of
P8,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
7. Dismissing defendant[s'] counterclaim; and
8. Ordering defendant[s] to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in vain. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, holding that
since the property was acquired during the marriage of Gertrudes to
Adriano, the same was presumed to be conjugal property under Article
160 of the Civil Code. The appellate court, like the trial court, also noted
that petitioner did not comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the
Civil Code.
Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. First, they contend that the subject property is
not conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was described
in the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in TCT
No. 43100 as a widow. Second, assuming the land was conjugal
property, petitioners argue that the same became Gertrudes' exclusively
when, in 1979, she mortgaged the property to the Daily Savings Bank
and Loan Association. The bank later foreclosed on the mortgage in 1981
but Gertrudes redeemed the same in 1983.
The paraphernal or conjugal nature of the property is not determinative of
the ownership of the disputed property. If the property was paraphernal
as contended by petitioners, Gertrudes Isidro would have the absolute
right to dispose of the same, and absolute title and ownership was vested
in petitioners upon the failure of Gertrudes to redeem the property. On
the other hand, if the property was conjugal as private respondents
maintain, upon the death of Adriano Leis, the conjugal partnership was
terminate,3 entitling Gertrudes to one-half of the property.4 Adriano's rights
to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his
heirs,5 which includes his widow Gertrudes, who is entitled to the same
share as that of each of the legitimate children.6 Thus, as a result of the
death of Adriano, a regime of co-ownership arose between Gertrudes
and the other heirs in relation to the property.
Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that Gertrudes'
redemption of the property from the Daily Savings Bank vested in ownership
over the same to the exclusion of her co-owners. We dismissed the same
argument by one of the petitioners in Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals,7 where
one of the petitioners therein claimed ownership of the entire property subject
of the case by virtue of her redemption thereof after the same was forfeited in
favor of the provincial government for non-payment of taxes. We held
however, that the redemption of the land "did not terminate the co-ownership
nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership." We
expounded, quoting our pronouncement in Adille vs. Court of Appeals:8
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire
exclusive ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of
dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him
in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the
provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the
present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand
redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with
respect to his share alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE
(1889), art. 1514.). While the records show that petitioner redeemed
the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that
did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no
doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
Under the Civil Code:
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-
owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or
right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses
 and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-
ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code,
"may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality
does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the
co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607).
But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right
to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.
It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only
dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was
registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro,
widow." Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed
properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a
widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of
title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser
acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased
spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with
registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens
on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the
primary objects of the Torrens system."9
As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals'
finding and conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private respondents
failed to repurchase the property within the period stipulated and has lost
all their rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming the
Regional Trial Court's decision on the premise that there was no
compliance with Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial hearing
before registration of the property in the name of petitioners. This
provision states:
Art. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership
in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with
the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry
of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been
duly heard.
The aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto
de retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers. A judicial order is
1âwphi1
necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to
prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is
being made. 10
It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the
Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is
not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are
the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-
owners redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the
"Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and
ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a
retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a
retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to
perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of
law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already
vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for
the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering
the consolidated title. 11
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that
the petitioners are deemed owners of the property by reason of the
failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase the same within the
period stipulated. However, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 130584, in
the name of Alexander M. Cruz, which was issued without judicial order,
is hereby ordered CANCELLED, and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro is ordered REINSTATED, without
prejudice to compliance by petitioners with the provisions of Article 1607
of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED.
1âwphi1.nêt
CASE 9
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right
[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000.] of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, Respondents. On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-
ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the
DECISION first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.

DE LEON, JR., J.: Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate
the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize
The victory 1 of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay
Municipal Circuit Trial Court 2 in an ejectment suit 3 filed against them by officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest
private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal 4 by the Regional efforts toward that end, failed.
Trial Court 5 on appeal. They elevated their cause 6 to respondent Court of
Appeals 7 which, however, promulgated a Decision 8 on May 20, 1998,
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.clubjuris virtua| |aw |ibrary
Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for
The following facts are undisputed:clubjuris
damages against petitioner spouses.

One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador,
Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a
parcel of land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom,
Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92
square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is
the subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot
No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house
together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of
Pastor’s children, has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-
judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private
document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present
while his other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters,
Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was
represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his
daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is
the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was
allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter,
Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-
Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed
of Donation 9 transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their
respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that
the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated
to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-
judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was
invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed
by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children
who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was
effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in
the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
spouses. It made the following findings:ClubJuris
"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court
finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his ownership
over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic] successfully
proved by preponderance of evidence that said property is still under a
community of ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died
intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has
[sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-described residential property
. . . as their share of the inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial
settlement, how come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the
late Marciano Pada was not transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them
Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the "x x x
present while the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily
transferred in the name of his heirs . . . . ". . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother
of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the case or after
"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the extrajudicial
genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as doubtful partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid
and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and signatories of [sic] the donors, among others, were absolutely bereft of any right in donating
said settlement, and there was lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those the very property in question." 11
who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic] and
signing of the said extra judicial statement. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as
follows:ClubJuris
"Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-
described property long before the sale of said property on November 17, "WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment
1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the plaintiff, earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte,
as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-described [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:ClubJuris
property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto
Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic] "1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the
donated . . . their share of [sic] the above-described property to them, appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;
virtually converting defendants’ standing as co-owners of the land under "2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the
controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners became the undivided owners option of acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent provisions of the
of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . their New Civil Code has to be applied;
possession in the northern portion is being [sic] lawful." 10 "3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their
occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in the sum of
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and
Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It
until the termination of the present case;
held:ClubJuris
"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00
". . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40 "5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit." 12
years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors were
indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At any rate, Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the
granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some foregoing decision of the Regional Trial Court.
interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias, nevertheless,
said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
estoppel. dismissing said petition. It explained: ClubJuris

"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, but
this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the heirs
possessed the property as an owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it
by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that
he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of the community
property, the question then involved is no longer one for partition but of
ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period of 42 long years.
Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long
extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.
"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
possession de facto or physical or material possession and not de jure.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the
court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It
cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being
inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of
possession . . . .
"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the
land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor
by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto
Pada who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of
vendee Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-
judicial partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada,
which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the
subject land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo’s father, and
Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-
judicial partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no
action was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such
partition.
"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent facts
that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally owned
by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to
Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of
Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria
Pavo the vendor for Marciano’s share and Juanita for Ananias’ share . . .
. Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court
that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria
Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of Juanita
Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo
and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary shares.
Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have been
occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any
rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners cannot now
impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in
1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada, and
her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary
division of the estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is
conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the
respective portions assigned to them . . . .
"The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute made
by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer
upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had no interest
nor right to transfer. . . . This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought
to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the
respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of
laches and estoppel come into play due to the donors’ failure to assert
their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40) years . . . .
Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the
vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by
petitioners." 13
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
decision.
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
denying said motion.
Hence this petition raising the following issues: clubjuris
"I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA
DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD
FAITH." 14
There is no merit to the instant petition. clubjuris.c om : law libr ar y
First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada
among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered
private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing
and be registered in order to be valid. 15 The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule
74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public
document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors
and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. 16 The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. 17 Without
creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the
first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is
essential for the partition to be valid. 18 The partition of inherited property
need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as
regards the heirs that participated therein. 19 The requirement of Article
1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for
convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or
enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. 20 And
neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil
Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of
title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir
who accepts and receives the inheritance. 21 The 1951 extrajudicial
partition of Jacinto Pada’s estate being legal and effective as among his
heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights
over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private respondent,
respectively. 22
Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada
executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal
status. 23 When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate
of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their
mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is
shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not
been paid. 24 No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid
charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why
the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs
of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty
four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951
extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and
Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was
allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was a
parcel of residential land in Sto. Niño, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-
half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Niño St., Sabang,
Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe,
Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the
subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At
any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate
the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and
laches have equally set in.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition
executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their
Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960
without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and
tolerance of the Pada family. 25 Their admissions are evidence of a high
order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the
subject property is concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by
sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the
premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. 26 Thus, they cannot be
considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that
both Article 448 27 and Article 546 28 of the New Civil Code which allow
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises
until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e.,
one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. 29
Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of
Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to donate
the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at
the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was
not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or
may not be realized. 30 More importantly, even as that promise was
fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada
were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners
cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they
built on the said lot.
clubjuris.c om.ph : red
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 10
G.R. No. 108228 February 1, 2001
SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO,
SR., respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. V-5369, ordering the dismissal of
the action for repartition, resurvey and reconveyance filed by petitioners.
Pure questions of law are raised in this appeal as the following factual
antecedents are undisputed:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all
surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Capiz under Original Certificate of Title
No. 18047. As appearing therein, the lot, which consisted of a total area
of 27,179 square meters was divided in aliquot shares among the eight
(8) co-owners as follows:
Salome Bornales 4/16
Salome and two other co-owners, Consorcia and Alfredo, the portion of
Lot 162 sold to Soledad was described as having more or less the
following measurements:
63-1/2 meters from point "9" to "10", 35 meters from point "10" to
point "11", 30 meters from point "11" to a certain point parallel to
a line drawn from points "9" to "10"; and then from this "Certain
Point" to point "9" and as shown in the accompanying sketch, and
made an integral part of this deed, to SOLEDAD DAYNOLO, her
heirs and assigns.1
Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land
described above and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad
and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot
162 as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This transaction
was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage2 dated May 1, 1947.
On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically,
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to
Jose Regalado, Sr.
On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had
since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion
of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed
of Discharge of Mortgage3 in favor of Soledad’s heirs, namely: Simplicio
Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the
said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein
petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon. 1âwphi1.nêt

Consorcia Bornales 4/16

Alfredo Bornales 2/16 Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original
Certificate of Title No. 18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541
Maria Bornales 2/16 initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162.
However, title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided
Jose Bornales 1/16 the entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in
his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of
Quirico Bornales 1/16 11,732 square meters which was registered on February 24, 1977 under
TCT No. 14566.
Rosalia Bornales 1/16
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this
Julita Bornales 1/16
complaint for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs
of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which
P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado.
Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential
dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way
back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid
the corresponding taxes.
On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalado’s widow, Josefina
Buenvenida, and two of her children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina
and Rosemarie were declared in default on May 10, 1989 because only
Antonio filed an answer to the complaint.
During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale4 executed
between Soledad Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of
Mortgage5 and Deed of Discharge6 signed by Jose Regalado, Sr. The
Deed of Absolute Sale7 showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the
property from the Distajos was likewise given in evidence.
Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence to
refute the claim of petitioners. Thus, after considering Antonio to have
waived his opportunity to present evidence, the trial court deemed the
case submitted for decision.
On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate her pro-indiviso share
in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part thereof by meters
and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their title. The trial
court also reasoned that petitioners could not have a better right to the
property even if they were in physical possession of the same and
declared the property for taxation purposes, because mere possession
cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had a Torrens title over the
land.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, with
no pronouncement as to costs.8
Petitioners now seek relief from this Court and maintain that:
I.
THE FACT THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PORTION
CONSTITUTES A SALE OF A CONCRETE OR DEFINITE
PORTION OF LAND OWNED IN COMMON DOES NOT
ABSOLUTELY DEPRIVE HEREIN PETITIONERS OF ANY
RIGHT OR TITLE THERETO;
II.
IN ANY EVENT, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ALL
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE RIGHT AND TITLE OF
HEREIN PETITIONERS.9
In resolving petitioners’ appeal, we must answer the following questions:
Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided
property held in common be valid? Is respondent estopped from denying
petitioners’ right and title over the disputed area? Under the facts and
circumstances duly established by the evidence, are petitioners entitled
to ‘repartition, resurvey and reconveyance’ of the property in question?
On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that
petitioners could not have acquired ownership of the subject land which
originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged right
springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad. The
mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-
owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per
se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 49310 of
the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More
particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et. al.11 which we find
relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
…The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell
a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void,
for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do
so. "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest."
(When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force
as it can have.)12
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the
transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally
recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed
the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of
fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated
that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s
4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in
whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners.
Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned
property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its
enjoyment13 Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her
aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made
against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully
dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the
vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated
area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-
owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the
contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of
such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an
ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction.
In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-
owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in
common.A
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940
when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia
and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr.
on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three
co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided
property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad.
Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not
have,"14 Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares
pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his
share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-
owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.15
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the
extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly
convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly
transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect on the second
disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner
of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding
the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977.
Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition had
already been effectively segregated from the ‘mother lot’ even before title
was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted that 26 years had
lapsed from the time petitioners bought and took possession of the
property in 1951 until Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566.
Additionally, the intervening years between the date of petitioners’
purchase of the property and 1987 when petitioners filed the instant
complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no instance during this
time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter, question petitioners’
right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of
Appeals,16 we had occasion to hold that where the transferees of an
undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to
occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a
period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or
right than said transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis). Such
undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-
owner property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which
he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the disputed land,
having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49 years
up to the present.
The lower court’s reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot
defeat the right of a holder of a registered Torrens title over property is
misplaced, considering that petitioners were deprived of their dominical
rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the
part of Regalado. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of
actual physical possession by another person during registration
proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly
omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of
a third person.17 In this case, we are convinced that Regalado knew of
the fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot and could not,
therefore, have validly registered the same in his name alone because he
was aware of petitioners’ possession of the subject portion as well as the
sale between Salome and Soledad.
That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot 162
was under claim of ownership by petitioners and the latter’s predecessor
is beyond question. Records show that the particular area subject of this
case was mortgaged by Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado, Sr.
as early as May 1, 1947 or one year prior to the alienation of the whole
lot in favor of the latter. Regalado never questioned the ownership of the
lot given by Soledad as security for the P400.00 debt and he must have
at least known that Soledad bought the subject portion from Salome
since he could not have reasonably accepted the lot as security for the
mortgage debt if such were not the case. By accepting the said portion of
Lot 162 as security for the mortgage obligation, Regalado had in fact
recognized Soledad’s ownership of this definite portion of Lot 162.
Regalado could not have been ignorant of the fact that the disputed
portion is being claimed by Soledad and subsequently, by petitioners,
since Regalado even executed a Release of Mortgage on May 4, 1951,
three years after the entire property was supposedly sold to him. It would
certainly be illogical for any mortgagee to accept property as security,
purchase the mortgaged property and, thereafter, claim the very same
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30438 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The parties are directed to cause a SURVEY for exact
determination of their respective portions in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14566 is declared CANCELLED and the Register
of Deeds of Capiz is ordered to ISSUE a new title in accordance with said
survey, upon finality of this decision.
Costs against respondents. 1âw phi1.nêt

property as his own while the mortgage was still subsisting.

SO ORDERED.
Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own
the subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of
Mortgage executed between Regalado and petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest. As petitioners correctly contend, respondents are barred from
making this assertion under the equitable principle of estoppel by deed,
whereby a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from asserting
as against the other and his privies any right or title in derogation of the
deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in it.18 A
perusal of the documents evidencing the mortgage would readily reveal
that Soledad, as mortgagor, had declared herself absolute owner of the
piece of land now being litigated. This declaration of fact was accepted
by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his heirs cannot now be
permitted to deny it.

Although Regalado’s certificate of title became indefeasible after the

lapse of one year from the date of the decree of registration, the
attendance of fraud in its issuance created an implied trust in favor of
petitioners and gave them the right to seek reconveyance of the parcel
wrongfully obtained by the former. An action for reconveyance based on
an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. But when the right of
the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as
when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the said action is
imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of title.19 Having
established by clear and convincing evidence that they are the legal
owners of the litigated portion included in TCT NO. 14566, it is only
proper that reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor of
petitioners. The alleged incontrovertibility of Regalado’s title cannot be
successfully invoked by respondents because certificates of title merely
confirm or record title already existing and cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud.20
CASE 11
G.R. No. 142056 April 19, 2001
EVELYN ONG, ELIZABETH QUIAMCO, JOSEPHINE REJOLLO and
ELEONOR ORTEGA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES RICHARD NILDA
CABUCOS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
PEDRO and JOSEFA QUIAMCO, spouses, owned a residential lot and a house
standing thereon situated in Barrio Carreta, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. RT-3781.
They had six (6) children, namely, Trinidad, Avelina, Amelia, Camilo, Pedro and
Darius, all surnamed Quiamco. Pedro died in 1973 and Josefa in 1981.1âwphi1.nêt
On 18 January 1985 the Quiamco children above-named executed an Extra-Judicial
Declaration of Heirs with a Deed of Donation stating that they were the only surviving
heirs of their deceased parents and that they were transferring by way of donation the
house and lot embraced in TCT No. RT-3781 to their sister Trinidad Quiamco who
duly accepted it. Consequently, TCT NO. 93046 was issued in the name of Trinidad
Quiamco. Thereafter, their brother Darius Quiamco died. Nevertheless, Trinidad
allowed his surviving wife Elizabeth Quiamco and their children Evelyn Ong,
Josephine Rejollo and Eleonor Ortega, petitioners herein, to occupy the house and
lot.
On 19 August 1994 respondent-spouses Richard and Nilda Cabucos purchased the
house and lot from Trinidad. Subsequently, TCT No. 130676 was issued in their
names. In 1995 they demanded that petitioners vacate the premises within ten (10)
days from notice. Petitioners refused. The matter had to be referred to the barangay
for amicable settlement but the parties failed to arrive at an agreement.
Consequently, respondents filed four (4) complaints against petitioners for illegal
detainer before the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City. Respondents alleged that they
had already purchased subject property from Trinidad and that petitioners’
possession of the property was by their mere tolerance.
Petitioners contended that in 1972 the spouses Pedro and Josefa Quiamco had
verbally donated the subject property to them on condition that they would take care
of the old couple. Since then petitioners had been in uninterrupted, open, continuous
and peaceful possession of the property and religiously paying the realty taxes
therefor.
The trial court opined that petitioners’ claim of donation could not stand against the
ownership of respondents as evidenced by a certificate of title. On 14 May 1996 it
rendered judgment ordering petitioners and any of their representatives to peacefully
vacate the house and lot; to pay respondents jointly and severally P500.00 a month
as rental beginning 15 May 1995 until possession could be completely turned over to
respondents; and, to pay respondents jointly and severally P5,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and P1,000.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs of suit.1
On 14 May 1997 the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City affirmed the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court.2 On 22 March 1999 the Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.3 On 24 January 2000 reconsideration was
denied.4
Petitioners insist that they had acquired ownership of subject property by acquisitive
prescription as shown by their uninterrupted, open, continuous and peaceful
possession since 1972 up to the present, as well as by donation.
Petitioners now come to us by way of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Court of Appeals. But they have no substantiated their claim. In fact, it is not
unlikely that they merely availed of such remedy because their period within which to
appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals had already expired. They received
copy of the Court of Appeal’s Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on
28 January 2000, thus they had until 12 February within which to appeal to this Court.
They did not do so but opted to come to us on certiorari. Their petition was posted on
21 February 2000.5 But certiorari, this Court emphasizes, is not a substitute for lost
appeal.6
Even on the merits, the petition must fail as it does not provide any reason for this
Court to disagree with the uniform ruling of the three (3) lower courts. Petitioners’
alleged possession of subject property since 1972 cannot render nugatory the right of
respondents as holders of a certificate of title. Prescription does not run against
registered land. A title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open
and notorious possession.7 The subject property was previously titled in the name of
spouses Pedro and Josefa Quiamco, then transferred to Trinidad, and later to
respondents. Moreover, in asserting ownership by donation, petitioners were in effect
assailing the title of respondents. The Court of Appeals correctly brushed aside this
argument of petitioners by invoking our ruling that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked; the issue on its validity can only be raised in an action expressly instituted
for that purpose.8
Having failed to show any right to possess subject property, petitioners must
surrender possession to respondents as the new owners and rightfully entitled
thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, which in turn affirmed that of the Municipal
Trial Court, is AFFIRMED. Petitioners, their relatives, and all persons claiming rights
thereto and title under them are ordered to vacate the house and lot originally
covered by TCT RT-3781, later by TCT No. 93046, now by TCT No. 130676 in the
name of respondent-spouses Richard and Nilda Cabucos, situated in Barrio Carreta,
Cebu City, and presently owned by the same respondent-spouses Richard and Nilda
Cabucos as registered owners thereof; to pay jointly and severally the same
respondent-spouses P500.00 a month as rental beginning 15 May 1995 until
possession thereof is completely turned over to them, to pay jointly and severally the
same respondent-spouses P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and P1,000.00 as litigation
expenses, and to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
CASE 12
G.R. No. 122947 July 22, 1999
TIMOTEO BALUYOT, JAIME BENITO, BENIGNO EUGENIO,
ROLANDO GONZALES, FORTUNATO FULGENCIO and CRUZ-NA-
LIGAS HOMESITE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE QUEZON CITY
GOVERNMENT and UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
November 24, 1995, setting aside an order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89, and dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners
against private respondents University of the Philippines and the Quezon
City government.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioners Timoteo Baluyot, Jaime Benito, Benigno Eugenio, Rolando
Gonzales, and Fortunato Fulgencio are residents of Barangay Cruz-na-
Ligas,1 Diliman, Quezon City. The Cruz-na-Ligas Homesite Association,
Inc. is a non-stock corporation of which petitioners and other residents of
Barangay Cruz-na-Ligas are members. On March 13, 1992, petitioners
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against, private
respondent University of the Philippines before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 4-92-11663. The complaint
was later on amended to include private respondent Quezon City
government as defendant. As amended, the complaint alleges:2
5. That plaintiffs and their ascendants have been in open,
peaceful, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of
an owner since memory can no longer recall of that parcel of
riceland known [as] Sitio Libis, Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, Quezon City
(now Diliman, Quezon City), as delineated in the Plan herein
attached as Annex "B" while the members of the plaintiff
Association and their ascendants have possessed since time
immemorial openly, adversely, continuously and also in the
concept of an owner, the rest of the area embraced by and within
the Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, Quezon City as shown in that
Plan herein attached as Annex "C" in all consisting of at least
forty (42) hectares;
6. That since October 1972, the claims of the plaintiffs and/or
members of plaintiff Association have been the subject of quasi-
judicial proceedings and administrative investigations in the
different branches of the government penultimately resulting in
the issuance of that Indorsement dated May 7, 1975 by the
Bureau of Lands, a copy of which is made an integral pan of
Annex "D", and ultimately, in the issuance of the Indorsement of
February 12, 1985, by the office of the President of the Republic
of the Philippines, a copy of which is herein attached as Annex
"E" confirming the rights of the bonafide residents of Barrio Cruz-
na-Ligas to the parcel of land they have been possessing or
occupying as originally found and recommended in that Brief
dated November 2, 1972 and Recommendation dated November
7, 1972, copies of which are made integral parts hereof as
Annexes "F" and "G";
7. That defendant UP, pursuant to the said Indorsement (Annex
E) from the Office of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, issued that Reply Indorsement dated September 19,
1984, a copy of which is herein attached as Annex "H", pertinent
portion of which is quoted as follows:
2. In 1979, the U.P. Board of Regents approved
the donation of about 9.2 hectares of the site,
directly to the residents of Brgy. Krus Na Ligas.
After several negotiations with the residents, the
area was increased to 15.8 hectares (158,379
square meters); (emphasis supplied). 1âwphi 1.nêt
3. Notwithstanding the willingness of U.P. to
proceed with the donation, Execution of the legal
instrument to formalize it failed because of the
unreasonable demand of the residents for an area
bigger than 15.8 hectares.
8. That upon advise of counsel and close study of the said offer of
defendant UP to Donate 15.8379 hectares, plaintiff Association
proposed to accept and the defendant UP manifested in writing
[its] consent to the intended donation directly to the plaintiff
Association for the benefit of the bonafide residents of Barrio
Cruz-na-Ligas and plaintiffs' Association have agreed to comply
with the terms and conditions of the donation;
9. That, however, defendant UP backed-out from the
arrangement to Donate directly to the plaintiff Association for the
benefit of the qualified residents and high-handedly resumed to
negotiate the donation thru the defendant Quezon City
Government under the terms disadvantageous or contrary to the
rights of the bonafide residents of the Barrio as shown in the Draft
of Deed of Donation herein attached as Annex "I";
10. That plaintiff Association forthwith amended [its] petition in the
pending case LRC No. 3151 before Branch 100 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City by adding the additional cause of
action for specific performance aside from the exclusion from the
technical description of certificate of title of defendant UP the area
embraced in the Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, consisting of at least forty-
two (42) hectares, more or less, and praying in the said Amended
Petition for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain defendant
UP from donating the area to the defendant Quezon City
Government, a copy of the said Amended Petition is herein
attached as Annex "J";
11. That, after due notice and hearing, the application for writ of
injunction as well as the opposition of defendant UP, the Order
dared January 24, 1986 granting the writ of preliminary injunction
was issued, a copy of which is herein attached as Annex "K";
12. That in the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
defendant UP. Reconsideration is herein copy of the said Motion
for attached as Annex "L", plaintiff Association finally agreed to
the lifting of the said Order (Annex K) granting the injunction after
defendant UP made an assurance in their said Motion for
Reconsideration that the donation to the defendant Quezon City
Government will be for the benefit of the residents of Cruz-Na-
Ligas as shown in the following:
6. The execution of the Deed of Donation in favor of the
Quezon City government will not work any injustice to the
petitioners.
As well stated in Respondent's Opposition to the Prayer
for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, it is to the
best interest of the Petitioners that such a deed be
executed.
The plan to Donate said property to the residents of Bgy.
Krus-na-Ligas, that is, throughthe Quezon City
government, is to their best interests. Left alone, the
present land and physical development of the area leaves
much to be desired. Road and drainage networks have to
be constructed, water and electric facilities installed, and
garbage collection provided for. The residents, even
collectively, do not have the means and resources to
provide for themselves such basis facilities which are
necessary if only to upgrade their living condition.
Should the proposed donation push through, the
residents would be the first to benefit.
thus, Branch 100 of this Honorable Court issued that Order dated
April 2, 1986, lifting the injunction, a copy of which is hereby
attached as Annex "M";
13. That, however, defendant UP took exception to the aforesaid
Order lifting the Order of Injunction and insisted [on] the dismissal
of the case; thus, it was stated that:
2. Respondent has consistently taken the position that
efforts to expedite the formalization of a Deed of Donation
for the benefit of the residents of Barangay Kruz-na-Ligas
should not only be pre-conditioned on the lifting of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, but also the dismissal of the
Petition;
in defendant UP's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated April 2, 1986, a copy of the said Motion is herein
attached as Annex "N";
14. That plaintiff Association in [its] "Comment" on the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated April 2, 1986, filed on June 2,
1986, manifested [its] willingness to the dismissal of the case,
aside from [its] previous consent to the lifting of the preliminary
injunction; provided, that the area to be Donated thru the
defendant Quezon City government be subdivided into lots to be
given to the qualified residents together with the certificate of
titles, without cost, a copy of the said Comment is hereby
attached as Annex "O";
15. That, that was why, in the hearing re-scheduled on June 13,
1986 of defendant UP's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated April 2, 1986 (Annex N), the Order dated June 13, 1986,
was issued, the full text of which is quoted as follows:
After hearing the manifestation of Atty. Angeles
for the petitioners and Atty. Raval for the
respondent University of the Philippines, since the
petitioners' counsel was the first to make a
manifestation that this case which is now filed
before this court should be dismissed first without
prejudice but because of the vehement objection
of the University of the Philippines, thru counsel,
that a dismissal without prejudice creates a cloud
on the title of the University of the Philippines and
even with or without this case filed, the University
of the Philippines has already decided to have the
property subject of litigation Donated to the
residents of Cruz-na-ligas with, of course, the
conditions set therein, let this case be
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost.
As to the charging lien filed by Petitioners thru
counsel, it will be a sole litigation between the
petitioners and the oppositors both represented
by counsel, with the University of the Philippines
being neutral in this case.
and a copy of the said Order is herein attached as Annex "P";
xxx
16. That, true to [its] commitment stated in the aforesaid Order of
June 13, 1986, defendant UP executed that Deed of Donation on
August 5, 1986, in favor of the defendant Quezon City
Government for the benefit of the qualified residents of Cruz-na-
Ligas; however, neither the plaintiffs herein nor plaintiff
Association officers had participated in any capacity in the act of
execution of the said deed of donation, a copy of the said
executed Deed of Donation is herein attached as Annex "Q";
17. That under the said deed of donation, the 15.8379 hectares
were ceded, transferred and conveyed and the defendant
Quezon City Government accepted the Donation under the terms
and conditions, pertinent portions of which are quoted as follows:
This donation is subject to the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The DONEE shall, within eighteen (18) months from the
signing hereof, undertake at its expense the following:
a. Cause the removal of structures built on the boundaries
of the Donated lot;
b. Relocate inside the Donated lot all families who are
presently outside of the Donated lot;
c. Relocate all families who cannot be relocated within the
boundaries of the Donated lot to a site outside of the
University of the Philippines campus in Diliman, Quezon
City;
d. Construct a fence on the boundaries adjoining Kruz-na-
Ligas and the University.
In the construction of the fence, the DONEE shall establish a ten-
meter setback in the area adjacent to Pook Amorsolo and the
Peripheral Road (C.P. Garcia Street);
e. Construct a drainage canal within the area Donated
along the boundary line between Kruz- na-ligas and Pook
Amorsolo.
In the construction of the fence and the drainage canal,
the DONEE shall conform to the plans and specifications
prescribed by the DONOR.
xxx xxx
5. The DONEE shall, after the lapse of three (3) years, transfer to
the qualified residents by way of donation the individual lots
occupied by each of them, subject to whatever conditions the
DONEE may wish to impose on said donation;
6. Transfer of the use of any lot in the property Donated during
the period of three (3) years referred to in Item 4 above, shall be
allowed only in these cases where transfer is to be effected to
immediate members of the family in the ascending and
descending line and said Transfer shall be made known to the
DONOR. Transfer shall be affected by the Donee;
7. The costs incidental to this Deed, including the registration of
the property Donated shall be at the expense of the DONEE.
The Donee shall also be responsible for any other legitimate
obligation in favor of any third person arising out of, in connection
with, or by reason of, this donation.
18. That the defendant Quezon City Government immediately
prepared the groundworks in compliance with the afore-quoted
terms and conditions; however, defendant UP under the officer-
in-charge then and even under the incumbent President, Mr. Jose
Abueva, had failed to deliver the certificate of title covering the
property to be Donated to enable the defendant Quezon City
Government to register the said Deed of Donation so that
corresponding certificate of title be issued under its name;
19. That defendant UP had continuously and unlawfully refused,
despite requests and several conferences made, to comply with
their reciprocal duty, to deliver the certificate of title to enable the
Donee, the defendant Quezon City Government, to register the
ownership so that the defendant Quezon City Government can
legally and fully comply with their obligations under the said deed
of donation;
20. That upon expiration of the period of eighteen (18) [months],
for alleged non-compliance of the defendant Quezon City
Government with terms and conditions quoted in par. 16 hereof,
defendant UP thru its President, Mr. Jose Abueva, unilaterally,
capriciously, whimsically and unlawfully issued that Administrative
Order No. 21 declaring the deed of donation revoked and the
Donated property be reverted to defendant UP;
21. That the said revocation and reversion without judicial
declaration is illegal and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiffs
who are the bonafide residents or who represent the bonafide
residents of the Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas because: firstly, they were
not made bound to comply with the terms and conditions of the
said donation allegedly violated by the defendant Quezon City
Government; secondly, defendant UP, as averred in the
preceding paragraphs 9 and 11, was the one who insisted that
the donation be coursed through the defendant Quezon City
Government; and the said revocation or reversion are likewise
pre-judicial to third parties who acquired rights therefrom;
22. That, as it apparently turned out, the plaintiff Association, who
duly represented the qualified or bonafide resident of Barrio Cruz-
na-Ligas, was deceived into consenting to the lifting of the
injunction in said LRC Case No. Q-3151 and in agreeing to the
dismissal of the said LRC Case No. Q-3151 when defendant
unjustifiably revoked the donation which they undertook as a
condition to the dismissal of LRC Case No. 3151;
23. That by reason of the deception, the herein plaintiffs hereby
reiterate their claims and the claims of the bonafide residents and
resident/farmers of Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas [to] the ownership of
forty-two (42) hectares area they and their predecessors-in-
interest have occupied and possessed; parenthetically, the said
42 hectares portion are included in the tax declaration under the
name of defendant UP who is exempted from paying real estate
tax; hence, there is no assessment available;
24. That by reason of bad faith and deceit by defendant UP in the
execution and in compliance with [its] obligations under the said
Deed of Donation (Annex Q hereof) plaintiffs have suffered moral
damages in the amount of at least P300,000.00;
25. That because of wanton and fraudulent acts of defendant UP
in refusing to comply with what is incumbent upon [it] under the
Deed of Donation (Annex Q) and in whimsically and oppressively
declaring the revocation of the said deed of donation and the
reversion of the 15.8 hectares Donated, [it] should be made liable
to pay exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00 to serve as
example in the interest of public good;
26. That because of said defendant UP's unlawful acts, plaintiffs
have been compelled to retain the services of their attorneys to
prosecute this case with whom they agreed to pay the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and by
way of:
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(a) Plaintiffs hereby reallege and reproduce herein by reference
all the material and relevant allegations in the preceding
paragraphs;
(b) Having legally established and duly recognized rights on the
said parcel of lands as shown in the documents marked herein as
Annexes "D"; E; F; G; and M, plaintiffs have the rights to be
protected by an injunctive writ or at least a restraining order to
restrain and to order defendant UP from:
1) Ejecting the plaintiffs-farmers and from demolishing the
improvements in the parcel of riceland or farmlands situated at
Sitio Libis of Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, embraced in the claims of the
plaintiffs as shown in these photographs herein attached as
Annexes "R" to "R-3";
2) Executing another deed of donation with different terms and
conditions in favor of another and for the benefit of additional
occupants who are not bonafide residents of the Barrio or
Barangay Cruz-na-Ligas;
(c) Defendant UP has already started ejecting the plaintiffs and
demolishing their improvements on the said riceland and
farmlands in order to utilize the same for the residential house
project to the irreparable damages and injuries to the plaintiffs-
farmers, unless restrained or enjoined to desist, plaintiffs will
continue to suffer irreparable damages and injuries;
(d) Plaintiffs are ready and willing to file the injunctive bond in
such amount that may be reasonably fixed;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court
that before the conduct of the proper proceedings, a writ of
preliminary injunction or at least a temporary restraining order be
issued, ordering defendant UP to observe status quo; thereafter,
after due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued; (a) to restrain defendant UP or to their representative
from ejecting the plaintiffs from and demolishing their
improvements on the riceland or farmland situated at Sitio Libis;
(b) to order defendant UP to refrain from executing another deed
of donation in favor another person or entity and in favor of non-
bonafide residents of Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas different from the
Deed of Donation (Annex Q hereof), and after trial on the merits,
judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation (Annex Q) as valid and
subsisting and ordering the defendant UP to abide by the
terms and conditions thereof;
2. Adjudging the defendant University of the Philippines to
segregate the riceland or farmlands as additional area
embraced by the Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, pursuant to the
First Indorsement of August 10, 1984 (Annex E) and
pursuant to Findings, Reports and Recommendation
(Annex G) of the Bureau of Lands with an estimated
assessed value of P700,000.00;
3. Ordering defendant UP to pay for plaintiffs' moral
damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of
P50,000.00, and costs of suit;
4. Enjoining defendant UP to pay professional fees of
P50,000.00 of the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiffs;
and
Plaintiffs further respectfully pray for other just and
equitable reliefs.
Earlier, on May 15, 1992, the trial court denied petitioners' application for
preliminary injunction. Its order stated:3
ORDER
Acting on plaintiffs' application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction and the opposition thereto
of the defendant filed on April 3, 1992, as well as plaintiffs' reply
therewith filed on April 23, 1992, considered in the light of the
affidavit executed on April 23, 1992 by Timoteo Baluyot, Sr. and
by Jaime Benito, Benigno Eugenio, Rolando Gonzales and
Fortunato Fulgencio executed on April 21, 1929, for the plaintiffs;
and, the affidavit of merit executed on April 28, 1992, by Atty.
Carmelita Yadao-Guno, for the defendant, it appearing that the
principal action in this case is one for the specific performance,
apparently, of the Deed of Donation executed on August 8, 1986,
by defendant University of the Philippines in favor of the Quezon
City Government, involving the land in question, in virtue of
which, it is clear that the plaintiffs are not parties to the said deed
of donation, by reason of which, consequently, there has not
been established by the plaintiffs a clear legal right to the
enforcement of the said deed of donation, especially as the said
deed was already validly revoked by the University of the
Philippines, thru its president, Jose Abueva, in his Administrative
Order No. 21, for which reason the same could no longer be
enforced, plaintiffs' prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, is DENIED.
 SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the above order. Without
resolving petitioners' motion, the trial court ordered petitioners to amend
their complaint to implead respondent Quezon City government as
defendant.4 Hence, the amended complaint was filed on June 10, 1992,
in which it is alleged:
4. That the Quezon City Government . . . which should be joined
as party plaintiff is instead impleaded herein as party defendant,
because its consent can not be secured within a reasonable time;
On July 27, 1992, respondent city government filed its Answer to the
Amended Complaint with Cross-Claim.5However, on November 29, 1993,
it moved to withdraw its cross-claim against UP6 on the ground that, after
conferring with university officials, the city government had recognized
"the propriety, validity and legality of the revocation of the Deed of
Donation."7
The motion was granted by the trial court in its order, dated December
22, 1994.8 On the same day, a Joint Motion to Dismiss was filed by UP
and the Quezon City government on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action.9 Petitioners opposed the motion.
On April 26, 1995, the trial court denied respondents' motion to dismiss
on the ground that "a perusal of [petitioners'] amended complaint,
specifically paragraph 5 thereof, . . . shows that it necessarily alleges
facts entitling [petitioners] to acquire ownership over the land in question,
by reason of laches, which cannot be disposed of and resolved at this
stage without a trial on the merits." 10 The trial court, however, reiterated
its ruling that petitioners did not have a cause of action for specific
performance on the ground that the deed of donation had already been
revoked as stated in its order denying injunction.
On August 14, 1995, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, charging the trial court with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to dismiss the complaint filed by petitioners. Respondents
contended that —
1. Respondent Judge himself had declared that [petitioners]
clearly are not parties to the deed of donation sought to be
enforced thus they had not shown clear legal right to the
enforcement of said deed of donation which is their principal
cause of action; and
2. Under the factual circumstances obtaining, the respondent
judge gravely erred in denying the joint motion to dismiss and
declaring that [petitioners] are entitled to acquire ownership over
the land in question by reason of laches through a trial on the
merits; such constitutes a collateral attack on [respondent UP's]
title in the same suit for specific performance.
On November 24, 1995, the appellate court rendered a decision setting
aside the trial court's order of April 26, 1995 and ordering the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 4-92-11663. The appellate court ruled that —
1. Petitioners' complaint did not allege any claim for the annulment of
UP's title over the portion of land concerned or the reconveyance thereof
to petitioners;
2. The alleged cause of action based on ownership of the land by
petitioners was tantamount to a collateral attack on the title of UP which
is not allowed under the law; and
3. There is no acquisition of ownership by laches.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari based on the following
grounds:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS WAS IN ERROR IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE JOINT MOTION TO
DISMISS.
II. IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, THE RESPONDENT
APPELLATE COURT HAS ACTED IN EXCESS [OF] JURISDICTION
WHEN IT MADE [THE] FINDING AND CONCLUSION THAT THE
REVOCATION OF THE DONATION IS VALID WHEN THAT IS THE
PRIMARY AND CONTROVERTED ISSUE INVOLVING VARIED
QUESTIONS OF FACTS.
Petitioners argue that, on its face, their amended complaint alleges facts
constituting a cause of action which must be fully explored during trial.
They cite paragraphs 18, 19, and 20 of their complaint questioning the
validity of the revocation of the donation and seek the enforcement of the
donation through specific performance. 11
On the other hand, respondents contend that by seeking specific
performance of the deed of donation as their primary cause of action,
petitioners cannot at the same time claim ownership over the property
subject of the donation by virtue of laches or acquisitive prescription.
Petitioners cannot base their case on inconsistent causes of action.
Moreover, as the trial court already found the deed to have been validly
revoked, the primary cause of action was already thereby declared in
existent. Hence, according to respondents, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the complaint. 12
First. The question is whether the complaint states a cause of action. The
trial court held that inasmuch as the donation made by UP to the Quezon
City government had already been revoked, petitioners, for whose benefit
the donation had been made, had no cause of action for specific
performance. Nevertheless, it denied respondents' joint motion to dismiss
petitioners' action on the ground that respondent UP was barred from
contesting petitioners' right to remain in possession on the ground of
laches.
This is error. While prescription does not run against registered lands,
nonetheless a registered owner's action to recover possession of his land
may be barred by laches. As held in Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia: 13
[W]hile no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in
favor of the defendant and that is, the equitable defense of
laches. No hold that the defense of prescription or adverse
possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner
Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of
laches. Otherwise stated, we hold that while defendant may not
be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his
predecessors' long continued possession for 37 years, the
original owner's right to recover back the possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long
period of 37 years and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been
converted into a stale demand.
Thus, laches is a defense against a registered owner suing to recover
possession of the land registered in its name. But UP is not suing in this
case. It is petitioners who are, and their suit is mainly to seek
enforcement of the deed of donation made by UP in favor of the Quezon
City government. The appellate court therefore correctly overruled the
trial court on this point. Indeed, petitioners do not invoke laches. What
they allege in their complaint is that they have been occupying the land in
question from time immemorial, adversely, and continuously in the
concept of owner, but they are not invoking laches. If at all, they are
claiming ownership by prescription which, as already stated, is untenable
considering that the land in question is a registered land. Nor can
petitioners question the validity of UP's title to the land. For as the Court
of Appeals correctly held, this constitutes a collateral attack on registered
title which is not permitted.
On the other hand, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
petitioners' complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1)
a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 14
We find all the elements of a cause of action contained in the amended
complaint of petitioners. While, admittedly, petitioners were not parties to
the deed of donation, they anchor their right to seek its enforcement upon
their allegation that they are intended beneficiaries of the donation to the
Quezon City government. Art. 1311, second paragraph, of the Civil Code
provides:
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third
person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated
his acceptance to the obliger before its revocation. A mere
incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The
contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a
favor upon a third person.
Under this provision of the Civil Code, the following requisites must be
present in order to have a stipulation pour autrui: 15
(1) there must be a stipulation in favor of a third person;
(2) the stipulation must be a part, not the whole of the contract;
(3) the contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon a third person, not a mere incidental
benefit or interest;
(4) the third person must have communicated his acceptance to
the obliger before its revocation; and
 (5) neither of the contracting parties bears the legal
representation or authorization of the third party.
The allegations in the following paragraphs of the amended complaint are
sufficient to bring petitioners' action within the purview of the second
paragraph of Art. 1311 on stipulations pour autrui:
1. Paragraph 17, that the deed of donation contains a stipulation that the
Quezon City government, as donee, is required to transfer to qualified
residents of Cruz-na-Ligas, by way of donations, the lots occupied by
them;
2. The same paragraph, that this stipulation is part of conditions and
obligations imposed by UP, as donor, upon the Quezon City government,
as donee;
3. Paragraphs 15 and 16, that the intent of the parties to the deed of
donation was to confer a favor upon petitioners by transferring to the
latter the lots occupied by them;
4. Paragraph 19, that conferences were held between the parties to
convince UP to surrender the certificates of title to the city government,
implying that the donation had been accepted by petitioners by
demanding fulfillment thereof 16 and that private respondents were aware
of such acceptance; and
5. All the allegations considered together from which it can be fairly
inferred that neither of private respondents acted in representation of the
other; each of the private respondents had its own obligations, in view of
conferring a favor upon petitioners.
The amended complaint further alleges that respondent UP has an
obligation to transfer the subject parcel of land to the city government so
that the latter can in turn comply with its obligations to make
improvements on the land and thereafter transfer the same to petitioners
but that, in breach of this obligation, UP failed to deliver the title to the
land to the city government and then revoked the deed of donation after
the latter failed to fulfill its obligations within the time allowed in the
contract.
For the purpose of determining the sufficiency of petitioners' cause of
action, these allegations of the amended complaint must be deemed to
be hypothetically true. So assuming the truth of the allegations, we hold
that petitioners have a cause of action against UP. Thus, in Kauffman
v. National Bank, 17 where the facts were —
Stated in bare simplicity the admitted facts show that the
defendant bank for a valuable consideration paid by the
Philippine Fiber and Produce Company agreed on October 9,
1918, to cause a sum of money to be paid to the plaintiff in New
York City; and the question is whether the plaintiff can maintain
an action against the bank for the non performance of said
undertaking. In other words, is the lack of privity with the contract
on the part of the plaintiff fatal to the maintenance of an action by
him? 18
it was held:
In the light of the conclusions thus stated, the right of the plaintiff
to maintain the present action is clear enough; for it is undeniable
that the bank's promise to cause a definite sum of money to be
paid to the plaintiff in New York City is a stipulation in his favor
within the meaning of the paragraph above quoted; and the
circumstances under which that promise was given disclose an
evident intention on the part of the contracting parties that the
plaintiff should have that money upon demand in New York City.
The recognition of this unqualified right in the plaintiff to receive
the money implies in our opinion the right in him to maintain an
action to recover it; and indeed if the provision in question were
not applicable to the facts now before us, it would be difficult to
conceive of a case arising under it.
It will be noted that under the paragraph cited a third person
seeking to enforce compliance with a stipulation in his favor must
signify his acceptance before it has been revoked. In this case
the plaintiff clearly signified his acceptance to the bank by
demanding payment; and although the Philippine National Bank
had already directed its New York agency to withhold payment
when this demand was made, the rights of the plaintiff cannot be
considered to have been prejudiced by that fact. The word
"revoked," as there used, must be understood to imply revocation
by the mutual consent of the contracting parties, or at least by
direction of the party purchasing the exchange. 19
It is hardly necessary to state that our conclusion that petitioners'
complaint states a cause of action against respondents is in no wise a
ruling on the merits. That is for the trial court to determine in light of complaint which contained two or more causes of action where one of
respondent UP's defense that the donation to the Quezon City them clearly states a sufficient cause of action against the defendant. 24
government, upon which petitioners rely, has been validly revoked.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
Respondents contend, however, that the trial court has already found that the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
the donation (on which petitioners base their action) has already been Branch 89, for trial on the merits.
revoked. This contention has no merit. The trial court's ruling on this point
was made in connection with petitioners' application for a writ of SO ORDERED.
preliminary injunction to stop respondent UP from ejecting petitioners.
The trial court denied injunction on the ground that the donation had
already been revoked and therefore petitioners had no clear legal right to
be protected. It is evident that the trial court's ruling on this question was
only tentative, without prejudice to the final resolution of the question
after the presentation by the parties of their
evidence. 20

Second. It is further contended that the amended complaint alleges

inconsistent causes of action for specific performance of the deed of
donation. Respondents make much of the fact that while petitioners claim
to be the beneficiaries-donees of 15.8 hectares subject of the
deed, 21 they at the same time seek recovery/delivery of title to the 42
hectares of land included in UP's certificate of title. 22

These are not inconsistent but, rather, alternative causes of action which
Rule 8, §2 of the Rules of Court allows:

Alternative causes of action or defenses. — A party may set forth

two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or
hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in
separate causes of action or defenses. When two or more
statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements.

Thus, the parties are allowed to plead as many separate claims

as they may have, regardless of consistency, provided that no
rules regarding venue and joinder of parties are violated. 23

Moreover, the subjects of these claims are not exactly and entirely the
same parcel of land; petitioners' causes of action consist of two definite
and distinct claims. The rule is that a trial court judge cannot dismiss a
CASE 13
G.R. No. 132644 November 19, 1999
ERNESTO DAVID, RICARDO DAVID, NELIA DAVID, EMILIA DAVID,
LOLITA DAVID, BASILIO LEMQUE, NICANOR LEMQUE, FELIX
LEMQUE, NORMA LEMQUE, WILFREDO LEMQUE, RODOLFO
LEMQUE, ROGELIO LEMQUE, VICTORIA LEMQUE, ESTATE OF
MARIA ESPIRITU and ANDRES ADONA, MILAGROS DE UBAGO-
UMALI, FELISA GUBALLA DE UBAGO, VANESSA DE UBAGO-
UMALI, ANTONIO DE UBAGO, JR., JOSEPH GUBALLA DE UBAGO,
MARIETTA DE UBAGO-TAN, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ZAMBALES, petitioners,
vs.
CRISTITO MALAY and NORA MALAY, DIONISIO MALAY,
FRANCISCA T. CAPACILLO, PEPITO ALCANTARA, NICOLAS
SORIANO and JUAN MORA, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The instant case is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing that of the Regional Trial Court on an action for reconveyance
of property. The issues submitted by the parties may not really be all that
novel.
The spouses Andres Adona and Leoncia Abad, husband and wife for a
good number of years, were blessed with five children among them being
Carmen Adona. Carmen married Filomeno Malay; three children were
begotten by the marriage, namely, Cristito, Nora and Dionisio (among the
herein private respondents). Following the death of Leoncia Abad in
1923, Andres Adona cohabited with Maria Espiritu, herself a widow,
apparently without the benefit of marriage. Andres and Maria sired two
children, Esperanza, represented herein by her heirs all surnamed David,
and Vicente Adona. Maria Espiritu likewise had a child by her previous
marriage, Fulgencio Lemque, now herein represented also by his own
heirs.
During his lifetime, Andres Adona applied for a homestead patent over a
parcel of agricultural land located at Dirita, Iba, Zambales, containing an
area of 22.5776 hectares. After Andres Adona had died, Maria Espiritu,
predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, succeeded in obtaining
Original Certificate of Title No. 398 over the land in her name. After Maria
Espiritu had died in 1945, the children, as well as descendants, of Andres
Adona by his marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in peaceful
and quiet possession of the subject land.
Sometime in 1989 petitioners executed a deed of "Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale" over the subject property in favor of Mrs. Venancia
Ungson. Private respondents protested the sale claiming that they were
the true owners of the land. Ultimately, in any event, the sale in favor of
Mrs. Ungson was rescinded in view of the latter's failure to pay in full the
consideration agreed upon. Subsequently petitioners executed another
deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale. In this new instrument, dated
15 December 1990, petitioners divided the land equally among
themselves and sold their respective shares to their co-petitioners herein.
Antonio de Ubago, Jr., Milagros de Ubago-Umali, Felisa Guballa de
Ubago, Vanessa de Ubago-Umali and Marietta de Ubago-Tan and
Joseph Guballa de Ubago. On 27 November 1992 Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-42320 was issued in favor of the de Ubagos.
Less than a month later or on 07 December 1992 private respondents
filed a complaint docketed Civil Case No. RTC-905-1 for "Annulment of
Sale with Restraining Order Injunction and Damages" against petitioners
before Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales. In their
complaint private respondents averred that the disputed land sold by the
heirs of Maria Espiritu to the de Ubagos was the subject of a homestead
application by their great grandfather. Andres Adona, but that Original
Certificate of Title No. 398 was instead fraudulently issued to Maria
Espiritu, on 04 December 1933, upon her false representation that she
was the widow of Andres Adona.
In its decision of 25 July 1995 after a hearing on the merits of the case,
the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and on
the ground of prescription. It opined that the action being one for
annulment of sale anchored on a fraudulent titling of the subject property,
the cause of action constituted a collateral attack on the Torrens
Certificate of Title. The court a quo added that even if the action were to
be treated as being one for reconveyance, the suit would still have to fail
since an action for reconveyance could only be brought within ten (10)
years counted from the date of issuance of the certificate of title (in
1933).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its judgment of 11 February
1998,1 set aside the order of dismissal of the case decreed by the trial
court and directed the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
42320 in the name of the de Ubagos and the reconveyance of the
property to the estate of Andres Adona. Petitioners were additionally
ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees to private respondents. The
appellate court, more particularly, ruled.
The evidence on record shows that OCT No. 398 issued in favor of Maria
Espiritu was obtained by her fraudulent concealment of the existence of
Adona's first marriage to Leoncia Abad, as shown by the affidavit she
executed on September 21, 1928 and filed with the Director of Lands.
Consequently, Maria Espiritu's fraudulent concealment of material facts
created an implied or constructive trust in favor of the plaintiffs, the
excluded co-heirs and actual possessors of the subject land. Article 1456
of the Civil Code reads:
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
Although it is true that after the lapse of one year, a decree of
registration is no longer open to review or attack, although its
issuance was tainted with fraud; however, the aggrieved party is
not without a remedy at law. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of
the Torrens Title already issued in favor of Maria Espiritu, she
and her successors-in-interest, although the registered owner
under the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law
to reconvey the subject property to the real owners. The Torrens
system was not designed to shield and protect one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad
faith (Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396, 404 [1987]);
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal
owner, or to one with a better right. (Amerol, supra.)
However, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to existence
prescription. (Amerol, supra.; Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 180
SCRA 401, 405-407 [1989]; Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 112
SCRA 542, 550 [1982]; Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284, 299-
300 [19741])
An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being
the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of
the certificate of title over the property. (Amerol, supra.,
Caro, supra., Casipit vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 684, 694
[1991]). This rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. The
reason for this is one who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps
to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain
the nature of the adverse claim of third party and its effect on his
title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
(Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 108547, February 3,
1997).
Hence, the undisturbed possession by plaintiffs and their
predecessors-in-interest gave them the continuing right to resort
to judicial intervention once their claim to ownership was
challenged. It was therefore the defendant. Heirs act of executing
the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale" which
constituted the express act of repudiation of the constructive trust
which gave rise to plaintiffs cause of action.2
Aggrieved, petitioners have come to this Court and seek to dispute the
judgment of the Court of Appeals ordering the cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title No. 398 issued on 16 November 1933. It is the
contention of petitioners that to allow private respondents to question
Original Certificate of Title No. 398 fifty-nine years after its issuance
would undermine the Torrens system and sanctity of the certificate of
title.
Private respondents, upon the other hand, ask this Court to sustain the
decision of the Court of Appeals on the thesis that the property in
question indubitably belongs to the estate of Andres Adona whose
incontestable right to it is derived from the perfected homestead
application two years prior to his death as so admitted by Maria Espiritu
herself in her affidavit submitted to the Director of Lands.
The Court rules for the affirmance of the challenged decision.
A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to
a homestead patent covering a disposable public land within the
contemplation of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is
as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration
proceeding. Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property covered
by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one
year from the entry of the decree of registration. Such decree of
registration is incontrovertible and becomes binding on all persons
whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the in
rem registration process.3 There is no specific provision in the Public
Land Law or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now Presidential
Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-year period within which a public land
patent can be considered open to review on the ground of actual fraud,
such as that provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, and
now Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529, and clothing a public land
patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has
repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529 to a patent
issued in accordance with the law by the Director of Lands, approved by
the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President
of the Philippines.4 The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds to
the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary cases. Just as the
decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled
to it, so also, the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and
finally grants and conveys the land applied for to the applicant.5
Original Certificate of Title No. 398 was issued in the name of Maria
Espiritu on 04 December 1933 and would have become indefeasible a
year thereafter had not its issuance been attended with fraud. The
attendance of fraud created an implied trust in favor of private
respondents and gave them the right of action to seek the remedy of
reconveyance of the property wrongfully obtained.6 In Javier vs. Court of
Appeals7 this Court ruled:
. . . The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree
of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its
issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean
however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value,
an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes
incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year
from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in court
for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always
available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent
third party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for
damages. 8
The caption of the case before the court a quo while denominated as
being one for "Annulment of Sale with Damages" is in reality an action for
reconveyance since the ultimate relief sought by private respondents
would be for the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 398
to be reconveyed to the estate of Andres Adona. In this jurisdiction,
the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined, more
importantly, by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title
or heading. The Court of Appeals did not err in treating the action brought
by private respondents as one for reconveyance or as one that seeks the
transfer of the property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful
and legal owner. 10 It would seem that Andres Adona did perfect his
homestead application prior to his death, 11 the right to the issuance of the
patent on which vests after complying with all the requirements of the
law. 12
The next crucial issue focuses on the ruling of the Court of Appeals to the
effect that if a person who claims to be the owner of the property is in
actual possession thereof, the right to seek reconveyance does not
prescribe.
There is no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based
on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. 13 This rule assumes,
however, that there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the
right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such
as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of
limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if
nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title,
or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. In Faja vs. Court of
Appeals, 14the Court has held that a person in actual possession of a
piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. In the words of
the Court —
. . . There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being,
that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to
 seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment
for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners
whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated
property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted
with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating
all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold
that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to
seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it,
accrued only from the time the one in possession was made
aware of a claim adverse to his own and it is only then that the
statutory period of prescription commences to run against such
possessor. 15
The same dictum is reiterated in Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of
Appeals; 16 thus —
With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a
number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a
parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of
the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over
the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this
rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. 17
Finally, this Court sees no cogent reasons to disturb the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the de Ubagos may not be considered buyers in
good faith. Said the Appellate Court:
. . . An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the
property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted
in good faith (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283, 296
[1996]).
It is well settled that one who deals with property registered under
the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to
rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens
and claims as are annotated on the title. (Sandoval, supra., at p.
295).
The aforestated principle admits of an unchallenged exception:
that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on
the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has some
knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of
sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into
the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of
anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt
the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title
of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who
falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and hence does
not merit the protection of the law. (Sandoval, supra.) (Emphasis
supplied)
Applying the aforequoted jurisprudence, the defendant buyers
can not be considered as innocent purchasers for value. A
perusal of defendant buyers' TCT No. 42320 reveals that it
contains an entry by the Register of Deeds which provides that
their ownership over the land is subject to prospective claims by
any possible heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of
their lawful participation in the estate. The said entry reads as
follows:
Entry No. 102385 — Section 4 — The property described in this
certificate of title is subject to the provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court for the period of two years in favor of in any other possible
heir or heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of his or their
lawful participations in the said estate.
Date of Instrument — December 15, 1990
Date of Inscription — November 27, 1992 at 2:00 p.m. (Exh. "E"; Rollo, p. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED Costs
137) against petitioners.

Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reads, in part, as follows: SO ORDERED.

Sec. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time

within (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in
accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this
rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided
for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation . . .

The record shows that the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale"
was executed on December 15, 1990. Plaintiffs' complaint for
Reconveyance was filed on December 7, 1992. Hence, the two-year
period has not yet elapsed.

It likewise appears that the subject land was the object of a sale between
the defendant Heirs and one Mrs. Venancia Ungson which was
subsequently aborted due to the intervention of defendant Vicente Adona
and plaintiff Cristito Malay. (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "L") However, defendant
Heirs nevertheless executed another sale in favor of defendant buyers
who are admittedly relatives of Mrs. Venancia Ungson. (TSN, January 23,
1995, p. 14) Plaintiff Cristito Malay's intervention in the previous sale
should have put defendant buyers on their guard.

Moreover, it is unbelievable that the defendant buyers would not have

noticed the plaintiffs who were in possession of the land when the
defendant buyers inspected the same. Had they made further
investigations, they would have discovered that plaintiffs were in
possession of the land under a claim of ownership.

The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the possession
of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer
can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith. The buyer who has
failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in the adverse CASE 14
possession of another buyer in bad faith. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102259 August 25, 2000
233 SCRA 335, 347 [1994]). 18 SALVADOR S. ESQUIVIAS, petitioner,
vs.
Altogether, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of HON. OMBUDSMAN, ROLANDO Q. VERGARA and ELENA G.
Appeals in its assailed decision. DOMALAON, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari assailing
the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing for insufficiency of evidence
the charges of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and Act
496, Section 51 leveled against Rolando G. Vergara, deputy Register of
Deeds of Sorsogon and Elena G. Domalaon.1
We deny the petition for it is patently devoid of merit.
The facts are as follows:
On March 20, 1987, petitioner Salvador S. Esquivias filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman, through the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon, as
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor, an affidavit/ complaint charging
Rolando Q. Vergara, deputy Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, and Elena
G. Domalaon with violation of Republic Act No. 3019,2 Section 3 (e), and
Act No. 496,3 Section 51.
The complaint was based on the ground that on December 28, 1977,
petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-10445 of the Register of Deeds of
Sorsogon, situated in Sta. Barbara, municipality of Bulusan, province of
Sorsogon, for a consideration of P2,000.00, which he sold to Jose G.
Domalaon, Romulo G. Domalaon, Emma G. Domalaon, Margarita
Dematera Domalaon, and Rosario Domalaon-Gapas.
When the vendees failed to pay petitioner the consideration of the sale,
on August 3, 1981, he cancelled and nullified the same.
On February 19, 1985, Elena Domaloan borrowed the original title of the
property from petitioner's wife on the pretext that she had a buyer, and
once in possession of the title, succeeded in registering the cancelled
deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds with the cooperation of deputy
Register of Deeds Vergara. A new title was issued in the names of Jose
G. Domalaon et al., the persons named in the deed. Allegedly, deputy
Registrar Vergara ignored the affidavit of cancellation of the deed of sale,
in violation of Act No. 496, Section 51 and also in violation of Rep. Act
No. 3019, Section 3 (a), (e) and (j), for which he is charged in the
affidavit-complaint together with Elena G. Domaloan.
After preliminary investigation, at which respondents Rolando Vergara
and Elena Domalaon submitted their counter-affidavits, on December 8,
1987, the deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor recommended the dismissal
of the charges finding no prima facie case. On July 26, 1989, the
Ombudsman approved the recommendation of deputized prosecutor
Honesto J. Borromeo for the dismissal of petitioner's complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. He denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.4
At issue in this petition is whether or not respondent Ombudsman acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint against respondents
Rolando Vergara and Elena Domalaon.
We agree with the Ombudsman that that there was no sufficient evidence
to support the charges. To begin with, petitioner avers that he was not
paid the consideration stated in the deed of sale. However, this is
contradicted by the very deed he signed which states that he
acknowledged receipt of the consideration.
On the facts of the case, respondent deputy Register of Deeds
Vergara5 was just exercising the duties of his office in registering the deed
of sale which complied with all the requirements for registration.6
Consequently, the Ombudsman is correct in finding that respondents did
not violate either the Land Registration Act7or the Anti-Graft Act.8 The
Ombudsman did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 15
G.R. No. 126875 August 26, 1999
HEIRS OF MARIANO, JUAN, TARCELA and JOSEFA, all surnamed
BRUSAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF SPOUSES INES BRUSAS and
CLETO REBOSA, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a bitter dispute spanning more than two (2) decades of protracted
legal entanglements and deep-seated enmity among the protagonists,
even descending to their children, each claiming ownership over a 19-
hectare land located in San Francisco, Baao, Camarines Sur. In view of
the prolonged litigation, the original parties have since died and are now
substituted by their heirs.
Petitioners, heirs of Juan, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa, all surnamed
Brusas, claimed that the disputed property, formerly a public land, was
part of the 33-hectare land in the actual physical possession of their
grandfather Sixto Brusas since 1924, having inherited the same from
their great grandfather Pedro Brusas. Sometime in 1946 Sixto Brusas
caused the property to be surveyed in the name of his five (5) children,
namely, Juan, Ines, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa. The survey was
approved as Psu-116520.1 As indicated in the survey plan the property
was traversed by the Barit River, and the eastern portion thereof with an
aggregate area of 19.8992 hectares was denominated as Lots 1 and 2,
while the western portion measuring 13.2439 hectares was designated
as Lots 3 and 4. In the same year, the property was subdivided among
the five (5) children of Sixto Brusas. The partition was made lengthwise
so that each heir would have access to the river and, as was the custom
of the place, the distribution was made according to their age: the
southernmost lot was assigned to Juan being the eldest, followed
successively by Ines, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa.2 All of them
purportedly took immediate possession of their respective shares. 1âwphi 1.nêt
On 17 July 1968 Ines Brusas applied for and was granted a free patent
over Lots 1 and 2 of Psu-116520 with an aggregate area of 19.8992
hectares for which OCT No. 23356 was issued in her name. Thus, when
Mariano Brusas and Josefa Brusas filed their sworn statements of
landholdings in 1973 they supposedly discovered that their properties
were already titled in the name of their sister Ines. The discovery
triggered a controversy among the Brusas siblings and earnest efforts to
settle the conflict before the barangay officials, the local police and the
PC Provincial Commander proved futile.
Private respondents, heirs of Ines Brusas and Cleto Rebosa, denied on
the other hand that Lots 1 and 2 were owned and possessed by their
grandfather Sixto Brusas during his lifetime. They asserted that Ines
Brusas was the absolute owner having entered the property as early as
1924. Since then Ines Brusas and her husband Cleto Rebosa were
clearing the land on their own by cutting down trees and removing their
roots it being a forested area. In 1957 Ines Brusas applied for a free
patent which was approved and the corresponding certificate of title
issued in 1967.
Sometime in 1974 Ines Brusas filed a complaint for recovery of six (6)
hectares of land alleging that her brothers and sisters forcibly entered
and deprived her of that portion of the property.3 Juan, Josefa, Mariano
and Tarcela countered by instituting in the same court an action for
reconveyance imputing fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith to Ines
Brusas in using a forged affidavit to obtain title over Lots 1 and 2 despite
full knowledge that she owned only 1/5 portion thereof.4
After the cases were consolidated trial dragged on for nineteen (19)
years. The lower court finally rendered its decision in 1993 dismissing the
complaint filed by Ines Brusas, declaring Lots 1 and 2 as the pro-
indiviso property of the Brusas siblings, and ordering Ines Brusas to
reconvey to her brothers and sisters their respective shares in the
disputed property.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals in its Decision of 16 July 1996
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court thus —
WHEREFORE . . . . the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Civil Case No. IR-1058, ordering defendants and/or their
successors-in-interest to vacate the land described in paragraph 4 of the
complaint and/or to deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs or their
successors-in-interest;
2. Dismissing the complaint for reconveyance and damages in Civil Case
No. IR-1059.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated —
Apart from the self-serving and bare allegations of appellees, no
competent evidence was adduced to substantiate their claim of
fraud on the part of Ines Brusas in her application for a free
patent over the land in dispute. They submitted specimens of
their signatures to the NBI office at Naga City for examination but
 failed to submit to the court the result thereof. Such failure
indicates either that they did not pursue their request for
examination or that, if they did, the result thereof is adverse to
their cause.
It is significant to note that aside from the supposedly falsified
affidavit, Exhibit 4, another affidavit was executed by Ines,
together with Tarcela, Juan and Josefa, all surnamed Brusas,
renouncing their rights to Lots 3 and 4 in favor of Mariano Brusas
(Exhibit 11). Both appear to have been notarized by the same
Notary Public on April 22, 1960. The existence of the two
affidavits, Exhibits 4 and 11, strongly suggests that the Brusas
recognized Ines Brusas as the sole claimant of Lots 1 and 2 and
Mariano Brusas, the sole claimant of lots 3 and 4.
There is likewise a presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty. There is no showing that the grant of a free patent
in favor of Ines Brusas was predicated solely on the affidavit of
waiver, Exhibit 4, or that without it her application would not have
been given due course.
It must be borne in mind, in this regard, that the land in dispute
was originally a public land. The occupation and cultivation
thereof by Sixto Brusas, the father of Ines, Tarcela, Josefa, Juan
and Mariano Brusas, did not make it a part of his hereditary
estate. If he had complied with all the legal requirements for the
grant of a free patent, he could have filed the corresponding
application therefor. But he did not. Hence, he could not have
transmitted ownership thereof to his heirs upon his death (citing
Naval v. Jonsay, 50 O.G. 4792)
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution of 30 September 1996, petitioners now come to
us through this petition for review.
The pivotal issues to be resolved are: first, who are the rightful owners of
the disputed property — is it the heirs of Mariano, Juan, Josefa and
Tarcela Brusas, whose claim of ownership is evidenced by a survey and
subdivision plan; or, is it the heirs of spouses Ines Brusas and Cleto
Rebosa, whose claim of ownership flows from an original certificate of
title in the name of their parents, and covering the litigated property?
And second, was there fraud on the part of Ines Brusas in causing the
registration of the disputed land under her name thus entitling petitioners
to the reconveyance of their shares therein?
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A title once
registered under the Torrens System cannot be defeated even by
adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by
prescription. It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are
bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.5
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet
title to land and stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador de su casa, to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.6 Indeed, titles over lands under the Torrens
system should be given stability for on it greatly depends the stability of
the country's economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
This does not mean, however, that the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is without
remedy in law. When a person obtains a certificate of title to a land
belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true
owner, he is considered guilty of fraud. He may then be compelled to
transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not
passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.7
In the instant case, the litigated property is still registered in the name of
Ines Brusas, so that insofar as procedure is concerned, petitioners were
correct in availing of the remedy of reconveyance. However, an action for
reconveyance presupposes the existence of a defrauded party who is the
lawful owner of the disputed property. It is thus essential for petitioners to
prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to the property, and the
fact of fraud committed by Ines Brusas in registering their property in her
name, which they miserably failed to do.
Primarily, the survey and subdivision plan submitted in evidence by
petitioners are inferior proofs of ownership and cannot prevail against the
original certificate of title in the name of Ines Brusas who remains and is
recognized as the registered owner of the disputed property.
The survey of the land in the name of the five (5) children of Sixto Brusas
is only an indication that each has an interest over the property, but it
does not define the nature and extent of those interests, nor the particular
portions of the property to which those interests appertain. The
subdivision plan, on the other hand, is of doubtful evidentiary value and
can hardly be the basis of a claim of ownership. A careful examination
thereof shows that it is nothing but a sketch of the land purportedly
prepared by a private land surveyor. It is not apparent therein when and
where the partition was made, or who caused the property to be
subdivided. Worse, this document was not even signed by any of the
parties to the supposed partition to show their conformity thereto, nor
acknowledged in writing by any of them or their heirs.
Even petitioners' tax declarations and tax receipts are unavailing. It is
well-settled that they are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land, in the absence of any other strong evidence to
support them.8The fact that the disputed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the brothers and sisters of
Ines Brusas does not necessarily prove their ownership thereof. The tax
receipts and tax declarations are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
What perhaps militates heavily against petitioners is the Affidavit (of
waiver) marked Exh. "4" executed sometime in 1960 by Mariano, Tarcela,
Juan and Josefa, whereby they relinquished, ceded and transferred to
Ines Brusas their rights and interests over the controversial property, and
recognized her as the absolute owner thereof, thus —
WE, MARIANO BRUSAS, JUAN BRUSAS, TARCELA BRUSAS
and JOSEFA BRUSAS, all of legal age, married except the last
who is a widow, residence (sic) and with postal address at Baao,
Camarines Sur, after having been duly sworn to according to law,
state the following, to wit —
That we are the brothers and sisters of Ines Brusas, applicant of
Free Patent Application No. 10-4375 covering Lots 1 and 2, Psu-
116520, situated in Baao, Camarines Sur;
That by virtue of this instrument, we relinquish, cede and transfer
whatever rights and interests we might have over Lots 1 and 2,
Psu-116520 in favor of our sister, Ines Brusas;
That we do not have any opposition to Ines Brusas acquiring title
to said Lots 1 and 2, Psu-116520 by virtue of her Free Patent
Application No. 10-4375;
That we recognize our sister, Ines Brusas as the legal and
absolute owner of Lots 1 and 2, Psu-116520 as covered by her
Free Patent Application No. 10-4375;
WHEREFORE, we sign this instrument of our own will and
voluntary act and after the same has been translated in our own
native dialect and understood fully its contents, this April 20, 1960
at Naga City.
(SGD) MARIANO BRUSAS (SGD) JUAN
BRUSAS
(SGD) TARCELA BRUSAS (SGD) JOSEFA
BRUSAS
On the basis of the foregoing reasons alone the instant case should
immediately be dismissed. Having failed to show any valid title to the land
involved petitioners are not the proper parties who can rightfully claim to
have been fraudulently deprived thereof. Nonetheless, for the satisfaction
of all and sundry, we shall proceed to refute their accusation of fraud.
First, Ines Brusas allegedly misrepresented in her application for free
patent that she was the only claimant of the disputed property, without
disclosing that her other brothers and sisters were claiming portions that
supposedly belonged to them. It is worthy to emphasize, to the point of
being repetitious, that Juan, Tarcela, Mariano and Josefa executed an
affidavit of waiver recognizing Ines Brusas as the legal and absolute
owner of Lots 1 and 2, and manifesting that they have no opposition to
Ines Brusas' acquiring certificates of title over those lots. It was on the
basis of this affidavit of waiver that Ines stated in her application for free
patent that she was the sole claimant of Lots 1 and 2. Certainly this is not
fraud. At any rate, it appears from the records that Juan, Tarcela,
Mariano and Josefa were notified of the application for free patent of Ines
Brusas and duly afforded the opportunity to object to the registration and
to substantiate their claims, which they failed to do. Hence their
opposition was accordingly disregarded and Ines Brusas' application was
given due course.9 Petitioners cannot thus feign ignorance of the
registration. Moreover, it is significant that petitioners never contested the
order of the Bureau of Lands disregarding their claims, i.e., by filing a
motion for reconsideration, or an appeal, for that purpose. This could only
mean that they either agreed with the order or decided to abandon their
claims.
Petitioners next assailed the genuineness of Exh. "4" asserting that the
signatures therein were forged. However, no evidence was adduced by
them to substantiate their allegation. It appears that they submitted for
examination by the NBI eighteen (18) specimen signatures of Juan,
Tarcela, Mariano and Josefa. Unfortunately, no standard signature could
be found for the year 1960 when Exh. "4" was executed.10 Petitioners
admitted that they were unable to produce what was required by the NBI,
hence, they "just had to give up."11
Furthermore, there was another Affidavit (Exh. "11") signed in the same
year by the Brusases, Ines included, recognizing Mariano Brusas as the
sole claimant of Lots 3 and 4 and waiving their interests therein in his
favor. This fact all the more confirms that the affidavit of waiver in favor of
Ines Brusas was authentic. As correctly observed by the appellate court
— none of these exceptions is present in this case.
Finally, as we are not trier of facts, we generally rely upon and are bound
by the conclusions of the lower courts, which are better equipped and
have better opportunity to assess the evidence first-hand, including the
testimony of witnesses. We have consistently adhered to the rule that
findings of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive, and cannot
ordinarily be reviewed by this Court as long as they are based on
substantial evidence. Among the exceptions to this rule are: (a) when the
conclusion is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings
of facts are conflicting; and, (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and appellee. We emphasize that

It is significant to note that aside from the supposedly falsified
affidavit, Exhibit 4, another affidavit, was executed by Ines,
together with Tarcela, Juan and Josefa, all surnamed Brusas,
renouncing their rights to Lots 3 and 4 in favor of Mariano Brusas
(Exhibit 11). Both appear to have been notarized by the same
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 16 July 1996 Decision of the
Court of Appeals ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed property and
restore respondents in possession thereof, as well as its 30 September
1996 Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
1âwphi1.nêt

Notary Public on April 22, 1960. The existence of the two

affidavits, Exhibits 4 and 11, strongly suggests that the Brusas[es] SO ORDERED.
recognized Ines Brusas as the sole claimant of Lots 1 and 2 and
Mariano Brusas, the sole claimant of Lots 3 and 4.12

It is not for private respondents to deny forgery. The burden of proof that
the affidavit of waiver is indeed spurious rests on petitioners. Yet,
significantly, even as they insist on forgery they never really took serious
efforts in establishing such allegation by preponderant evidence. It must
be stressed that mere allegations of fraud are not enough. Intentional
acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure
him, must be specifically alleged and proved.

The affidavit of waiver in favor of Ines, being a public document duly

acknowledged before a notary public, under his hand and seal, with his
certificate thereto attached, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.13 Petitioners cannot impugn its validity by mere self-serving
allegations. There must be evidence of the clearest and most satisfactory CASE 16
character. Correlatively, in granting the application of Ines Brusas for free
patent, the Bureau of Lands enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the G.R. NO. 118982. February 19, 2001
performance of its official duties. This presumption has not been rebutted LORETA BRAVO CERVANTES, LOIDA CERVANTES, LEAH
by petitioners as there was likewise no evidence of any anomaly or CERVANTES, CHRISTY CERVANTES, CHARME CERVANTES, SPS.
irregularity in the proceedings which led to the registration of the land.
ARMANDO ABAD and ADORACION ORDUNA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO (GIL) FRANCISCO,
VENANCIO FRANCISCO, APOLONIA FRANCISCO and VIRGINIA
FRANCISCO, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated August 25, 1994 affirming the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16211 (for Recovery
of Land with Damages) ordering herein petitioners to vacate the
respective parcel of land which they are occupying and to recognize
private respondents’ ownership thereof. 1âw phi 1.nêt
In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land (Parcel 1, Lot No. 1,
plan Psu-131830) situated in Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, with an
area of seven thousand seven hundred thirty-three (7,733) square
meters, covered and described in TCT No. 2200-Pangasinan and
registered in the name of Antonio G. Francisco. 3 A portion with an area of
3,768 square meters was earlier ceded to the Municipality of Bugallon,
Pangasinan. 4
On July 8, 1985, plaintiffs, herein private respondents, filed an amended
complaint alleging that they were the heirs of the late Antonio G.
Francisco who was the registered owner of the subject property, and that
they recently discovered that the defendants, herein petitioners, were
illegally occupying and had declared in their names portions of said
property as follows:
Antonio Cervantes – 398 square meters, declared under Tax Declaration
No. 316, now Tax Declaration No. 445;
Armando Abad and Adoracion Orduña - 442 square meters, declared
under Tax Declaration No. 473 and assessed at P2,480.00.
Plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the subject premises, but
the latter refused to do so. 5 Hence, this action for recovery of land
wherein the plaintiffs prayed that the defendants be ordered to (1) vacate
immediately the portions of land that they are occupying and to recognize
plaintiffs’ ownership thereof; (2) pay reasonable rentals from the time this
complaint was filed up to the time they vacate the land; (3) pay actual
damages amounting to P4,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees, moral
damages and the costs. 6
In his answer, defendant Antonio Cervantes, herein petitioner, denied the
material allegations of the complaint, and in defense claimed legal
possession over one of the parcels of land in question alleging that he,
together with his brother Claro and sister Macrina-Teresita, inherited the
land from their late father Tranquilino Cervantes who purchased the
same on January 22, 1947 from Juan Abad, now deceased, who in turn
earlier purchased the property from plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-interest.
During his lifetime, Tranquilino Cervantes introduced improvements in the
land without any objection from the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-
interest. By virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by the
heirs of Tranquilino Cervantes, the ownership of the contested premises
were allegedly transmitted to them. In his counterclaim, Cervantes prayed
that judgment be rendered: (1) dismissing the complaint against him for
lack of cause of action; (2) declaring the validity of the Deed of Sale
dated January 22, 1947; (3) ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to
pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees; P5,000.00 as litigating
expenses; P5,000 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages,
plus costs. 7
Defendants spouses Armando and Adoracion Abad, on the other hand,
alleged that their possession, together with that of their predecessors-in-
interest, over the questioned parcel of land was lawful and in the concept
of owner. Their possession was for more than 70 years, even dating back
before the year 1920. The questioned parcel was a portion of the land
jointly purchased by their parent, the late Juan Abad, and Marcelino
Nievera from Estefania Ignacio Vda. De F. Totañez, who purchased the
same from Antonio Fernandez, who in turn purchased the property from
Vicente Espino, whose possession and ownership of the property was
public, exclusive, notorious, open and continuous long before the alleged
registration of the subject property in the name of Antonio Francisco,
under Act No. 496, the latter being known as a mere trustee or overseer.
When Juan Abad died, the defendant spouses acquired the subject
property partly by inheritance and partly by purchase. 8
Defendants Abad alleged that the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of
the Torrens Title do not apply to the case at bar because registration by
the applicant-registrant was done in bad faith and by way of actual
fraudulent acts; that Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529 was
never intended to shield the fraudulent and unlawful acts of the applicant-
registrant in order to divest the actual owner and possessor thereof
before the registration; and that between the actual owners-possessors
before the registration under Act No. 496 and a usurper-trustee who
applied and successfully registered the same land in his name, the
former should prevail over the latter. 9
As counterclaim, defendants Abad prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to
pay them P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; appearance fees computed at
P300.00 per hearing; P20,000.00 as actual and other incidental
expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and costs of suit. 10
Based on the Pre-trial Order dated July 8, 1985, the parties agreed that
the issues are the following:
1. Who are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question?
2. Whether or not the parties are entitled for damages as claimed in their
respective pleadings. 11
On October 28, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, which in part reads:
Thus, this Court hereby declares that the plaintiffs are the owners of the
parcels of land subject of this action having acquired it from their late
father, Antonio Francisco by hereditary succession. Prescription and
laches cannot be raised against the plaintiffs. If there is/are somebody
who is/are guilty of laches in this case, it would be the defendants.
Because for a considerable long period of time, they failed to obtain a title
over the parcels in question.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, to wit:
a) ordering the defendants to vacate immediately the parcel of land they
are occupying, and to recognize the plaintiffs’ ownership thereof; and
b) ordering the defendants to pay actual damages in the amount of
P4,000.00 by way of reasonable attorney’s fees and P10,000.00 by way
of moral damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in its Decision
promulgated on August 25, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed herefrom the
same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 13
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated February 13, 1995.
Petitioners ascribe to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
1. IT IS AN ERROR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS, HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, ARE THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION
BASED ON A DOUBTFUL MUTILATED ENTRY IN TCT NO. 2200.
2. IT IS AN ERROR (NOT) TO CONSIDER SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF THE PARTIES
AFTER THE SALE TO ASCERTAIN THE IDENTITY OF THE LAND SUBJECT OF
THE SALE.
3. IT IS AN ERROR NOT TO RECOGNIZE THE DEFENDANTS, HEREIN
PETITIONERS, AS LAWFUL OWNERS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE RESIDENTIAL
LOTS. 14
Petitioners faulted the Court of Appeals for concluding that private respondents
are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question based on a
doubtful mutilated entry in TCT No. 2200. Contrary to the conclusion of
the Court of Appeals, petitioners asserted that as shown in the pre-trial
order, they did not admit the authenticity of Exhibits D, D-1 and D-2,
which were the photocopy of TCT No. 2200 in the name of Antonio
Francisco. Further, the resolution of the issue of ownership of the subject
premises called for examination of the respective evidence of the parties.
It is in this connection that they questioned the correctness and
authenticity of the mutilated portion on page 3 of TCT No. 2200 (Exhibit
D) showing that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Espino, purchased
parcel 2 of Lot No. 3 instead of parcel 1 of Lot No. 1, where their
respective houses were erected fifty (50) years ago. They argued that
under the entry “compraventa – Vicente Espino” on said page, the true
identity of the land sold was mutilated and it was made to appear in
handwriting that Vicente Espino purchased parcel 2 of Lot No. 3. There
was no evidence adduced to show that the handwritten words were the
correct words before the mutilation, considering that the next entry
showed that one Pablo Zalazar also purchased the same parcel 2 of Lot
No. 3.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners did not raise in issue the authenticity
of the now contested TCT No. 2200 or a portion thereof during the pre-trial and trial
on the merits in the trial court. An issue which was neither raised in the complaint nor
ventilated during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rule of fair play, justice and due
process. 15 Moreover, the determination of issues at the pre-trial conference bars the
consideration of other questions on appeal. 16 Further, petitioners did not object to the
formal offer in evidence of TCT No. 2200 as Exhibit D and Series 17 and Exhibit F and
Series; 18hence, there is a waiver of any objection to its admissibility. 19
Nevertheless, an examination of the evidence on record particularly Exhibits D-2 and
F-2, which contained the encumbrances affecting TCT No. 2200, showed that the
sale to Vicente Espino involved Lot No. 3, while the sale to Pablo Zalazar involved Lot
No. 7. 20 Clearly, the sale to Vicente Espino, the alleged predecessor-in-interest of the
Abad spouses did not involve the parcel of land, subject matter of this case, which is
parcel 1, Lot 1, Plan Psu-131830.
Petitioners further argued that the private respondents’ inaction for 50 years showed
that they were not the owners of the subject parcels of land, and realty taxes were not
paid by them. On the other hand, petitioners, who are in physical possession of the
lots have been paying their obligation as landowners as shown by their respective tax
declarations and tax receipts.
The argument of petitioners is without merit. It is a fundamental principle in land
registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein, 21 in this case the private respondents’ father, Antonio Francisco. A title once
registered under the Torrens System cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and
notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. 22 Petitioners cannot
prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land through tax declarations and
corresponding tax receipts inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. 23
Further, the trial court found that defendant, herein petitioner Cervantes, had no right
to the parcel of land which he and his siblings were occupying, thus:
Taking into consideration the documentary evidence presented by the plaintiffs,
particularly that of TCT No. 2200 (Exhibit “A.”) which the parcel in question is
included, among others, that the sale of the parcel in question was made by Juan
Abad to Tranquilino Cervantes (father of defendant Antonio Cervantes) on January
22, 1947 took place when the said TCT No. 2200 was already existing in the name of
Antonio Francisco, the late father of the herein plaintiffs. Said TCT No. 2200 was
issued on November 8, 1924, or more than twenty-two (22.) years before the
aforesaid sale between Juan Abad and Tranquilino Cervantes. This clearly shows
that what Juan Abad sold to Tranquilino Cervantes on January 22, 1947 was a parcel
of land that did not belong to the former. It is because said parcel of land already
belonged to Antonio Francisco for having obtained a title over said parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 2200. Not being the owner of the parcel in question, Juan Abad
did not transmit any right whatsoever with respect to the parcel in question. Well-
settled is the rule that one cannot sell what he does not own and this rule has much
force when the subject of the sale is a titled land that belongs to another person.
Simply put, the sale of the parcel in question made by Juan Abad to Tranquilino
Cervantes did not affect the title of Antonio Francisco over said parcel. 24
Likewise, the trial court correctly held that defendants Abad had no right to the parcel
of land they were occupying, thus:
The purchases alleged by the defendants-spouses on the questioned parcel of land
beginning from their alleged primitive predecessor-in-interest Vicente Espino to
Estefania Ignacio Vda. De F. Totañez to Juan Abad and Marcelino Nievera were
never proven in court. The documentary evidence they presented before this Court
were not sufficient to establish their right over the parcel in question. The Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition of Real and Personal Property with Sale has no probative
value because it is self-serving. Besides, it sought to partition the parcel of land which
is already covered by TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of Antonio Francisco. Simply
stated, there was no property that they could partition among themselves because
said property subject of the partition did not belong to their late father Juan Abad but
to the late Antonio Francisco, the father of the plaintiffs.
The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit “2.”) entered between Juan Abad and Tranquilino
Cervantes, has no probative value also for being irrelevant. Besides, this is the same
deed wherein this Court has already passed upon concerning its efficacy and ruled in
the early part of this decision that it has no effect whatsoever to TCT No. 2200 issued
in the name of the late Antonio Francisco.1âwphi1.nêt
The Tax Declaration issued in the name of the defendants-spouses and the
corresponding Tax Receipts have no probative value also as against the TCT No.
2200 issued in the name of the late Antonio Francisco. It is because they are not
proofs of ownership. TCT No. 2200, on the other hand, serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein—
Antonio Francisco. Further, after the expiration of the one year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes
incontrovertible (Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558). 25
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, the same being in
accordance with law and the evidence. Hence, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals should be as it is hereby affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
CASE 17
G.R. No. 148180 December 19, 2001
CATALINA VDA. DE RETUERTO AS SURVIVING WIDOW OF THE
LATE PANFILO RETUERTO; LORETO RETUERTO, REPRESENTED
BY HIS SURVIVING HEIRS NAMELY: ROMEO RETUERTO; ANTONIA
RETUERTO, NARCISA RETUERTO, CORAZON RETUERTO, AND
PATROCINIA RETUERTO; GAUDENCIO, FRANCISCA, CRUZ,
FRANCISCO, EFIGENIA AND GUILLERMO, ALL SURNAMED
RETUERTO; AND SPOUSES JOSE AND ROSA
GESALEM, petitioners,
vs.
ANGELO P. BARZ AND MERLINDA BARZ, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 29, 2000 in CA-GR CV No. 59975, affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, of Mandaue City in a
case for quieting of title with damages filed by herein respondents Angelo
and Melinda Barz against petitioners, as surviving heirs of the late Panfilo
Retuerto. The RTC's decision declared respondents as the absolute
owners of the lot subject of the litigation.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals and admitted by herein
petitioners are as follows:
During the period from September to October, 1911, a survey
was made of a parcel of land, located in Mandaue, Cebu,
identified as "Lot No. 896" of Plan No. II-5121, a part of the
"Hacienda de Mandaue" occupied by the Spouses Esteban Perez
and Lorenza Sanchez. The survey was amended during the
period from November, 1926 to March 21, 1927, identified as
Amendment No. 2, Ap-6243, with an area of 20,486 square
meters, bearing the following boundaries:
"Northwest — Lots 1251 and 1252 (Remigio Judilla and Manuel
Judilla);
Southeast — Lot 894 (Gregorio Perez);
Southwest — Lot 895;
Northwest — Lots 897 and 898 (Juan Perez)"
When the Spouses Esteban Perez and Lorenza Sanchez died
intestate, their rights over the property were inherited by their
daughter, Juana Perez, married to Numeriano Barz, who then
declared the properly, for taxation purposes, under her name,
under Tax Declaration No. 21969, but with an area of only 13,160
square meters, more or less, bounded on the north, by a piece of
land, under the name of Pampila (sic) Retuerto, as follows:
North — Pampila Retuerto
South — Vidal Judilla and Catalina Ceniza
East — Paula Perez
West — Felipe Berdijo
On April 16, 1929, Juana Perez, widow of Numeriano Barz,
executed a deed confirming her execution of a "Deed of Absolute
Sale," in favor of Panfilo Retuerto, married to Catalina Ceniza,
over a parcel of land, located in Barrio Pagsabungan, Mandaue,
Cebu, identified as Lot No. 896-A, a portion of the "Hacienda de
Mandaue," Cebu, with an approximate area of 2,505 square
meters, described as follows:
On the North — Remegio Judilla, measuring 29.72 sq.m.
On the East — Paula Perez, measuring 85.35 sq.m.
On the South — Juana Perez, measuring 29.72 sq.m.
On the West — Teofista Perez, measuring 84.32 sq.m.
However, on April 26, 1935, Panfilo Retuerto purchased the
aforementioned parcel of land, this time, from the Archbishop of
Cebu, under a "Deed of Absolute Sale," for the price of P150.00
(Exhibit "4") and declared the same for taxation purposes under
Tax Declaration No. 34652, effective 1937 (Exhibit "2").
In the meantime, the San Carlos Seminary in Cebu filed a Petition
with the then Juzgado de Primera Instancia in Cebu (now the
Regional Trial Court) entitled and docketed "El Seminario de San
Carlos de Cebu," Solicitante, Expediente No. 3, G.L.R.O. Record
4030 for the issuance of titles over several parcels of land in
"Hacienda de Mandaue," including Lot No. 896-A, earlier
purchased by Panfilo Retuerto from Juana Perez and from the
Archbishop of Cebu. In August, 1937, the Court promulgated a
Decision finding and declaring Panfilo Retuerto the owner of the
said lot (Exhibit "9"). On July 22, 1940, the Court issued an Order
directing the General del Registro de Terrenos (later the Land
Registration Commission) for the issuance of the appropriate
Decree in favor of Panfilo Retuerto over the said parcel of land.
However, no such Decree was issued as directed by the Court
because, by December 8, 1941, the Second World War ensued in
the Pacific. However, Panfilo Retuerto failed to secure the
appropriate decree after the war.
Two (2) decades elapsed. In the meantime, Juana Perez Barz
died intestate and was survived by her son, Pedro Barz, who filed
an application, with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
sometime in 1966, for the confirmation of his title over Lot 896 of
Plan No. II-5121, entitled and docketed as "IN THE MATTER OF
THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE, Pedro Barz, Applicant," Land
Registration Case No. N-529, LRC Record No. N24736. The
Spouses Panfilo Retuerto did not file any opposition to the
application. After appropriate proceedings, the Court promulgated
a decision in favor of Pedro Barz declaring him the lawful owner
of the said property. On August 18, 1966, Decree No. N-110287
was issued over the property, in favor of Pedro Barz, on the basis
of which Original Certificate of Title No. 521 was issued, on
November 13, 1968, by the Register of Deeds over the property
(Exhibit "A"). The property was then subdivided into four (4) lots
namely, Lot 896-A, with an area of 507 square meters (Exhibit "B-
5"), Lot 896-B, with an area of 2,142 square meters (Exhibit "B-
6"), Lot 896-C, with an area of 5,580 square meters (Exhibit "B-
7"), and Lot 896-D, with an area of 12,253 square meters (Exhibit
B-8"). On October 18, 1967, Pedro Barz executed a "Deed of
Absolute Sale" over subdivision Lot 896-C in favor of Jose
Gesalem for P7,000.00. On the basis of the said deed, Original
Certificate of Title was partially cancelled and, in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7509 was issued over said lot in
favor of the vendee.
In the interim, Panfilo Retuerto declared the property covered by
Tax Declaration No. 34652, under his name, under Tax
Declaration No. 54960, effective 1974 (Exhibit "3"). Subsequently,
Panfilo Retuerto died intestate, on December 29, 1975, and was
survived by his widow, Catalina Retuerto and their children,
namely Gaudencio Retuerto, Loreto Retuerto, Francisca
Retuerto, Francisco Retuerto, Efigenia Retuerto and Guillerma
Retuerto. The said heirs executed, on January 4, 1976,
"Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of the Estate of Panfilo
Retuerto" adjudicating unto themselves, as owners, the said
property and deeding the same unto Loreto Retuerto a portion
thereof, with an area of 1,703 square meters, and the rest of the
property, with an area of 440 square meters, to Efigenia Retuerto,
as follows:
"FOR OR TO LORETO RETUERTO: 'a portion of the
above described parcel of land containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWO (1,702) SQUARE
METERS and bounded by the following: on the Northeast
by Pagsabungan Road; on the Southeast by Lot 896; on
the Northwest by Lot 897; and on the Southwest by the
portion sold to Efigenia Retuerto;
FOR OR TO EFIGENIA RETUERTO: 'a portion of the
parcel of land described in paragraph no. 7 hereof
containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY (440)
SQUARE METERS and bounded as follows: on the
Northeast by the portion sold to Loreto Retuerto; on the
Southeast by Lot 896; on the Northwest by Lot 897 and
on the Southwest by Lot 896." (at page 38, Records)
Loreto Retuerto and Efigenia Retuerto then declared the property,
for taxation purposes, under their names, under Tax Declaration
No. 69084, effective 1976 (Exhibit "7"). The property covered by
Tax Declaration No. 69084 was subdivided into two (2) lots, one
with an area of 440 square meters, and the other, with an area of
1,702 square meters. Efigenia Retuerto declared the property,
with an area of 440 square meters, under her name, under Tax
Declaration No. 69083, effective 1976 (Exhibit "7-A") while Loreto
Retuerto declared the property, with an area of 1,702 square
meters, for taxation purposes, under his name, under Tax
Declaration No. 01298 effective 1976. (Exhibit "7-B").
In the meantime, Pedro Barz died intestate and was survived by
his heirs, Angelo P. Barz and Merlinda Barz. Loreto Retuerto
likewise, died intestate and was survived by his heirs, namely,
Romeo Retuerto, Antonia Retuerto, Narcisa Retuerto, Corazon
Retuerto and Patrocinia Retuerto.
Ominously, the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto claimed ownership over
subdivision Lot 896-B and a part of subdivision Lot 896-A,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 521 under the name of
Teofilo Barz. As it was, subdivision Lot 896-B was subdivided by
the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto, one of which subdivision lots, with
an area of 440 square meters, was forthwith sold to the Spouses
Jose Gesalem and Rosa Gesalem. When apprised of the
aforementioned events, Angelo Barz and Merlinda Barz, the heirs
of Teofilo Barz, and the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto, including the
Spouses Jose Gesalem had a confrontation during which the
Spouses Jose Gesalem admitted having purchased a portion of
subdivision Lot 896-B with an area of 440 square meters.
On September 5, 1989, Angelo P. Barz and Merlinda Barz filed a
complaint against Catalina Retuerto and the other heirs of Panfilo
Retuerto, including Loreto, who the Plaintiffs believed, was still
alive, and the Spouses Jose Gesalem, with the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue for "Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorney's
Fees." The Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that subdivision Lots 896-
A and 896-B were portions of Lot 896 subject of LRC 529 and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 521 under the name of
Teofilo Barz after whose death, the Plaintiffs inherited the
property, despite which the Defendants claimed ownership over
Lots 896-A and 896-B covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
521. x x x
Romeo Retuerto, Antonia Retuerto, Narcisa Retuerto, Corazon
Retuerto, Patrocinia Retuerto, the heirs of Loreto Retuerto, filed
an Answer to the complaint alleging, inter alia, by way of
affirmative defense, that their father, Loreto Retuerto, was already
dead and was survived, by them as his heirs; what was sold to
the Defendants Spouses Jose Gesalem was a portion of Lot 896,
with an area of 440 square meters, which was conveyed to
Efigenia Retuerto and not that portion of Lot 896-B deeded to
Loreto Retuerto under the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Real
Property of Panfilo Retuerto, who was the lawful owner of the
said property, "that they were not aware of LRC Case No. 529
and/or that the property, sold by Juana Perez to Panfilo Retuerto,
had been included in Original Certificate of Title No. 521 under
the name of Teofilo Barz. x x x
In their Answer to the complaint, the Defendants Spouses Jose
Gesalem averred, inter alia, by way of affirmative defense, that
they purchased a portion of subdivision Lot 896-B, with an area of
440 square meters, more or less; Lot 896-B (formerly Lot 896-A)
which had been sold by Juana Perez Barz to Panfilo Retuerto
had been the subject of LRC Case No. 3 wherein Panfilo
Retuerto was declared the lawful owner of the property; that the
inclusion of the subject property in Original Certificate of Title No.
521 issued to and under the name of Teofilo Barz did not vest
ownership over the title in favor of Pedro Barz but constituted the
latter merely as a trustee under a constructive trust with the
concomitant obligation to convey the said property to the
Defendants Heirs of Panfilo Retuerto and to the Defendants
Spouses, as vendees of the said property; Plaintiffs' action was
barred by laches. x x x
On April 3, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City promulgated
its decision declaring herein respondents as the absolute owners in fee
simple of Lots 896-A and Lot 896-B; declaring the documents adduced
by herein petitioners unenforceable and ineffective against OCT No. 521;
nullifying the deed of sale between herein petitioners and the spouses
Gesalem; and ordering herein petitioners to vacate the premises of Lots
896-A and 896-B.1 The Court of Appeals, on December 29, 2000,
affirmed the decision of the trial court except as to the award of attorney's
fees which was deleted.2
Hence, this appeal by the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto and the spouses
Gesalem, assigning the following errors:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that petitioners had
only ten years from the date of issuance of OCT No. 521, which
erroneously included their Lot No. 896-A, within which to ask for its
reconveyance, in the light of their judicially declared and recognized
possession thereof since time immemorial.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that it was respondents' right
to question petitioners' ownership and possession over the subject
property that has been lost thru laches.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners could not
ventilate their claim of title over the subject property by way of affirmative
defense as this would constitute collateral attack on respondents' original
certificate of title.
We do not find merit in the petition. Both the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court correctly applied the principles of the Torrens system
of land registration to the present case.
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.3 Such
indefeasibility commences after the lapse or expiration of one year from
the date of entry of the decree of registration.4 The act of registration is
considered a constructive notice to all persons5 respecting title to
property; hence, after the lapse of one year, title to the property can no
longer be contested. This system was so effected in order to quiet title to
land.
Records show that in 1966, an application for confirmation of title over
Lot 896 was filed by Pedro Barz, herein respondents' predecessor-in-
interest, with the Court of First Instance of Cebu docketed as LRC Case
No. N-529. Thereafter, a decision declaring Pedro Barz as the lawful
owner of the said property was rendered by the court and consequently,
an original certificate of title, OCT No. 521, was issued in his name on
November 13, 1968. Thus, after the lapse of one year, which was
November 13, 1969, private respondent's title to the property already
became indefeasible and can no longer be controverted.
Petitioners contest such title and claim that as early as 1929, their
predecessor-in-interest, Panfilo Retuerto, bought the property from Juana
Perez Barz and that in 1937, the then Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Cebu adjudicated said property to Panfilo Retuerto in GLRO Record No.
4030. However, nowhere has it been shown that a decree of registration
was ever issued affecting the property
The alleged earlier sale of the subject property by petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest to respondents' predecessor-in-interest was not
registered. Also, despite the alleged decision in 1937 by the Juzgado de
Primero Justancia in favor of Panfilo Retuerto, the latter failed to
intervene and introduce the said decision in the petition for confirmation
of title filed by Pedro Barz in 1966. Also, since the issuance of OCT No.
521 in the name of Pedro Barz in 1968, no action had been taken by
petitioners directly attacking said title and seeking reconveyance of the
property. It was only sometime in 1989 or twenty-one (21) years later,
when they were finally impleaded by private respondents in an action for
quieting of title that petitioners actively asserted ownership of the subject
property in their answer to the complaint.
Petitioners insist that despite the indefeasibility of private respondents'
title, they can still maintain an action for reconveyance of the said
property on the ground of fraud pursuant to Section 32 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529. It is alleged that respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Pedro Barz misrepresented with the land registration court that he
inherited the whole of Lot 896 when in truth and in fact a portion thereof
designated as Lot 896-A had already been disposed of to Panfilo
Retuerto; hence, a constructive trust was created over the property for
and in behalf of Panfilo Retuerto and his heirs.
The contention is bereft of merit. Constructive trusts are created in equity
to prevent unjust enrichment, arising against one who, by fraud, duress
or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which
he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.6 Petitioners failed to
substantiate their allegation that their predecessor-in-interest had
acquired any legal right to the property subject of the present
controversy. Nor had they adduced any evidence to show that the
certificate of title of Pedro Barz was obtained through fraud.
Even assuming arguendo that Pedro Barz acquired title to the property
through mistake or fraud, petitioners are nonetheless barred from filing
their claim of ownership. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
or constructive trust prescribes within ten years from the time of its
creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property.7 Since
registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all
persons, then the ten-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the time
of such registering, filing or entering.8 Thus, petitioners should have filed
an action for reconveyance within ten years from the issuance of OCT
No. 521 in November 16, 1968. This, they failed to do so.
Relying on the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of
Appeals,9 petitioners argue that the ten-year period for filing an action for
reconveyance of property arising from an implied or constructive trust
applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of
the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner is in actual
possession of the property, the action to seek reconveyance or to quiet
title does not prescribe. Petitioners claim that they and their
predecessors-in-interest were the ones in actual possession of the
subject property alleging that in the survey made by Geodetic Engineer
Leopoldo Tuastumban, it was reported that there were "nine houses and
one rattan shop owned by the heirs of Loreto Retuerto constructed
thereon."10
Again, the contention does not persuade us. In the 1966 decision of the
Land Registration Court in LRC No. 529, it was found that Pedro Barz,
private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was the lawful owner of the
subject property as he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
peaceful, continuous and open possession thereof in the concept of
owner since 1915. Said court declared that:

Lot 896: This lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 21969 in the
name of Juana Perez, Exh. "O-Pedro Barz," containing an area of
20,486 sq. meters. It originally belonged to the spouses Esteban
Perez and Lorenza Sanchez. After their death, the same was
inherited by Juana Perez who died in 1942 and was succeeded
by her lone heir son Pedro Barz, Filipino citizen, married to
Teofila Pedroza and resident of Mandaue, Cebu. Juana Perez
owned and possessed this lot since 1915 up to her death in 1942
when Pedro Barz reached the age of consciousness or when he
was around 8 years old; that her possession had been peaceful,
continuous, open and in concept of owner. From 1942 up to the
present, the possession of Pedro Barz over this property had
been likewise peaceful, continuous and in concept of owner as he
was religious in the payment of real estate taxes, as shown in
Exh. "N-2 Pedro Barz."11

As previously stated, no action for reconveyance has been filed by herein

petitioners. They interposed their claim of ownership for the first time in
their Answer and by way of Affirmative Defenses to the complaint for
quieting of title filed by herein respondents in 1989. This cannot be
allowed. Under Section 48 of PD 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree, "a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack; it
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding."12 The issue of the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted
for that purpose.13

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29,

2000 in CA-GR CV No. 59975 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.