[G.R. No. 90878. January 29, 1990.

]
PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region” was enacted into law, and pursuant to it, the City of Baguio and the provinces
comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of the
Organic Act. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the
said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Petitioner filed a petition, assailing the
constitutionality of Section 19 of said resolution because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Section 19 provides that during the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues. COMELEC maintains that the questioned provision of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2167 does not violate the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather, it is a valid
implementation of the power of the COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during election or
plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Held:
The Court held that Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. Article
IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that what was granted to the COMELEC was the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. However, it does not grant the
COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their
right to expression during plebiscite periods. While Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 does not
absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and or from campaigning for or against the
organic act because he may do so through the COMELEC space and/or COMELEC radio/television time,
it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. This form of regulation is
tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Therefore,
Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

T HE DIOC ES E OF B AC OL OD VS C OME LEC (2015 )

26 Nov 2017

[G.R No. 205728, January 21, 2015] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights| Freedom of Speech| Freedom of
Religion| Freedom of Expression

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente Navarra
vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of San Sebastian Cathedral
of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view.

The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law
of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or
“(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.

The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those
who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while
those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis Party List Ang Pamilya
Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise,
COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense against the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.

HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey
any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears to
coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression
within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified
under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie
of expression protected by our fundamental law. There are several theories and schools of thought that
strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political
discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against
majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation and
prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate
dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the
possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority
“gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
Adiong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992

Adiong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992

Keywords: Right to Free Press, COMELEC moved to ban political stickers in cars or in public
places during election and limit the areas to authorised areas only

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers
on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar
as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate,
due to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to
the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

Ratio: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”places

whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:

. . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the
validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary,
is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with
priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three
departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no
choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its
authority, either substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the
laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as
found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical. corollary of this basic principle
that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up
to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. (Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections, supra)

The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local elections call for a more liberal
interpretation of the freedom to speak and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible
dissemination of information on platforms and programs which concern us. Nor are we limiting
ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political change. (Cf.
New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of candidates and elective positions
involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters cannot name half or even
two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who are aspiring to
be elected to public office.

There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and
ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a
candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing
ideas. Our review of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its effects in today's
particular circumstances. We are constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition.

There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the prohibition.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21
hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

CASE DIGEST : ABS- CBN vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts : Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on
Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said
Resolution, the poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop
ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey
and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the
Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to
make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral
body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it
had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9,
1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed
the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were
actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue : WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN in
conducting exit polls during the election

Held : two theoretical test in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:
These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on
the other hand, . . if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated
in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite
persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of
such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous
tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the
time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.33 The evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
restraint of a writing instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants
are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or
reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey
result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of
the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome
of one can only be indicative of the other. With the foregoing premises, The SC conclude that
the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of
disrupting elections, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools for the
holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-
fixing, fraud and other electoral ills

Bangalisan v CA; G.R. No. 124678; 23 Jul 1997; 276 SCRA 619
Published on 29 September 2017 in Legal Chyme by Claudine
FACTS:
The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) placed petitioners
under preventive suspension in connection with a mass action staged by a number of public
school teachers allegedly to dramatize their grievances against public school authorities. Civil
Service Commissionissued a resolution finding the petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and meted them a six-month suspension with automatic
reinstatement in service but without payment of backwages.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not employees in the public service may engage in strikes.
RULING:
NO. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are
prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of
government employees to organize is limited only to the formationof unions or associations,
without including the right to strike. It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and
that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact
that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

Petition is DENIED. Decision of Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

GSIS and GARCIA vs. KMG DIGEST

DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his

capacity as GSIS President & General Manager, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.
FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS
personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
(“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum
directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged
administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina,
sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed
work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for
reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative
charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the petition and
enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges
arising from the same facts and events.
CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available
to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS
employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization, petitioner Garcia
could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations
notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action.
ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid
HELD: NO
The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to
self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in “peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”. It was against the backdrop of
the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of
Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the
right to strike.
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of
Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and
of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the
association, [and] the overriding considerations of national security.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in
accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this
right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the
exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC
circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.
Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members
launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same
thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity” refers to any collective
activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization,
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar
nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a
walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the
GSIS main office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of
the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main
office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving the other employees to
fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second
day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the
third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth
day activity.
In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact
remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had
taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they
assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests,
and even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery
disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government
personnel.
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility,
under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise
discipline GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of
administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely
performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in
when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his
jurisdiction.
 Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against
respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic.
The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil.
Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does
not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an
event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision
on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious
freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people
‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides
the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image
of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of
solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the
image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which also
designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however,
petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused to return custody of the image
to the council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were
used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest
and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an action
for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when
they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the
constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of
public money to favor any sect or church.

ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private
funds in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San
Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image
of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects,
funds for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not
directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money
for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds,
not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The
wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring
the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion or
interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the
mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the
mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having
a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in
the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition
in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses

Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999

Austria v. NLRC

G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999

 KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely
secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the
church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The Labor Code applies to all establishments,
whether religious or not.

Facts:

The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner
was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated.

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications
form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and
responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his
district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.

The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor
Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very
ill to be able to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal
citing:

1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;

2) Willful breach of trust;

3) Serious misconduct;

4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and

5) Commission of an offense against the person of 
employer's duly authorized representative

as grounds for the termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA
for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.

SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and,
as such, involves the separation of church and state.

2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed
by petitioner against the SDA.

Held/Ratio:

1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which
is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.

2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an
employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was
expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu
GR 95770, 29 December 1995; En Banc Resolution, Kapunan [J]

FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated
raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a
band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge.

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory
in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21,
1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional
limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the
explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and
state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious
ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the
flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which
by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious
freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION

Topic: Right to self organization

Extent and Scope of Right

FACTS:

1. Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect

known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.

2. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter
referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing
a closed shop provision which reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees workers covered by this Agreement.

3. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following
day, March 4, 1964.

4. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic
Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act
No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section
4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action
was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in
view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.

6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the
Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for
injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin
the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the
"union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e).
CFI - Manila: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff
from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to
pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law.

ISSUE/S:

WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of

Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization" is
unconstitutional

WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations when it "prohibits
all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits
affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution

RULING:

1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free exercise
of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must,
therefore, yield to the former.

2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements
with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union.

If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up
with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse
to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic
Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
DISPOSITIVE: Benjamin Victoriano Won (Plaintiff)

Appeal is dismissed.

DOCTRINE: The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In
case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.

If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may
the employer or labor union compel them to join.
German v. Barangan Digest
German v. Barangan
G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985
Escolin, J.:

Facts:

1. In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and
office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude
Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow T-shirts, they
started to march down with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. The
marchers were barred by respondent Major Lariosa, upon orders of his superiors and co-respondent
Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located
within the Malacañang security area. Despite plea, they were not allowed in the church.

2. Because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by
petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present
recourse.

3. Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude
church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have
never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said
church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious
worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and
offices of the President of the Republic.

4. Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the
issuance of [1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray
inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjo in
respondents from preventing them from getting into and praying in said church.

ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction to petitioners to attend church is a violation of their
freedom to religious worship

NO.
1. The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was established in the interest of
national security. Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of
their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into
action. This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary
of Education.

2. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious
freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith.
As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties ... observe honesty and good faith."

Soriano vs. La Guardia G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009 Freedom of Speech
JANUARY 26, 2018

FACTS:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister
of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
ISSUE:

Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and
within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty
as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three
months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his
right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given
above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and
the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has
its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

Imbong vs Ochoa

Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection

Clause

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in
the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people
to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment
or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute
had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may
be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid
portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization”
and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those
that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave
the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
 pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to
one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious
beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-
kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may
be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the
State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their
youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several
terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law)
as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution,
which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled,
women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does
not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide
priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for
two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both
the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow
them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident
that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right,
but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned
a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge,
still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by
a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule
on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has
 far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the
various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in
the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to
the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do
any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
CASE DIGEST : Villacicencio Vs Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO
LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their
consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled
on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the
women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence
of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the
shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and
practically admitted by the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave
abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law
expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the
prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of
Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may
make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes
to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty
by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse,
without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely
punished

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)

G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660

FACTS:

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos
is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
having run away from the reservation.

The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The
action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and
was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. —

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the
provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:

Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department
head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro,
to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid
objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the
"necessity" of the case.

In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred
upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department
Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the
provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order”. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection
of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
PASEI VS DRILON (1988)
30 Nov 2017

[163 SCRA 386; G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988] Constitutional Law| Bill of Right| Police Power

FACTS:
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm “engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,” challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor
and Employment, in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS”.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for “discrimination against males or females” that it “does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills”,
that it is violative of the right to travel.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of
the POEA invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

ISSUE:
Whether D.O. No.1 in the nature of a police power measure is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. The concept of police power is it is the authority of the State to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” It may be
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, and (2) in order to foster the
common good.

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself
does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties “Even liberty itself,
the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s will.” It is subject to
the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the sordid tales of maltreatment suffered
by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the
caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In
fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government’s efforts.

Petition is dismissed.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay
with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with
developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D.
1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered
into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed
by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI
entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when
Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously
known as the “mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing
the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an
Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the
(Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture
agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce
of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still,
the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Title : LEO ECHEGARAY vs SECRETARY OF JUSTICECitation : G.R. No. 132601January 19,
1999Ponente : PUNO, J.
Facts :

The Supreme Court issued a TRO On January 4, 1999, staying the execution of petitioner LeoEchegaray
scheduled on that same day.

The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that
the actionof the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached
on the power of theexecutive to grant reprieve

.Issue:Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary

RestrainingOrder on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality
of judgment has already beenrendered .

Held:No. The respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of
power of thePresident to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures
afterconviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power
ofcourts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convictdo not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to
life.

For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right tolife of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal
and coordinate powersof the three branches of our government.

Bantay Republic Act. Vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177271) Digest

FACTS:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for
Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition seeking to disqualify the nominees of
certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to
the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under
date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying
petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. According to COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be
personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections
without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified.

2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and

3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.

Ruling:

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special
civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues
and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is
to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. Also, the petitioner’s posture that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the
qualifications of their nominees is without basis, Nowhere in R .A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that
the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization.

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the partylist groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups
subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted
in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read
into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List"
the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited nondisclosure aspect of
the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation
thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7
of R.A. No. 7941.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are
GRANTED.
 Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.

Facts:

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution,
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:

What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how
may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be
introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required
for a proper submission?

Held:

The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it
reads thus: “The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall
have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as
the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of
such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body its
authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the
resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena
is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the
Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts
from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the
1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are
unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.

Issue:

Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the
limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim
National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?

Held:

Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution
or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an
Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to
the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the
validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced
with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because ‘amendment’ includes the
‘revision’ or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is
ratified by the sovereign people.

Issue:

What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission?

Held:
 The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments.
In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that
the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been
convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement
as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this
case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments.
Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such
extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an
amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own
a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No.
2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a
vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity?
As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the
standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not
plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the
period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to
the applicable provision: “Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision.” The three resolutions were approved by
the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In
the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the
90-day period provided by the Constitution.
PHILRECA vs. DILG G.R. No. 143076, June
10, 2003

Fact: a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other
electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and
registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Accordingly,
petitioners enjoys Assistance; Exemption from Taxes, Imposts, Duties, Fees; Assistance
from the National Power Corporation. Petitioners contend that they are exempt from
payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the passage of the
Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been
invalidly withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code on the ground that the said provisions discriminate against them, in
violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they submit that the said provisions are
unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine
Government and the United States Government.

Issue: Whether the assailed provisions of the Local Government Code violates the
rights of the Petitioners to the Equal Protection clause by unreasonable classifying them
and withdrawing their Tax exemption
 Held: There is No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection clause
under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification. The court hold that there
is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and
electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.

First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in at
least two material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned by R.A.
No. 6938 and which characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative
associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended.

1. Capital Contributions by Members

2. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives

Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is

germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power
by local governments is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government
unit is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its
broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing powers of
local government units consistent with the policy of local autonomy.
Ganzon v Inserto; G.R.
No. L-56450; 25 Jul 1983;
123 SCRA 713
Published on 29 September 2017 in Legal Chyme by Claudine

FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land in favor
of private respondents. Several months later, a deed of real estate mortgage was
executed between the same parties to secure the payment by the private respondents
of a promissory not in favor of petitioner. Private respondents filed a civil action against
petitioners after Ganzon initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage. Respondent judge ordered the
substitution of the mortgage lien with a surety bond.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the order of respondent judge violates the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution.

RULING:
YES. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to ensure the payment of a loan
would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before
trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed
a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency and dispensed with a primary
condition.

Instant petition si GRANTED. Orders of the trial court are SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. L-57424 December 18, 1987

ROBIDANTE L. KABILING, PRUDENCIO C. CARBON, POLICARPIO S.
SEGUI RAFAEL C. CARBON, ANTONIO C. BOLASOC, LOLITA C.
CASTRO, SOTERO S. FERRER, PERFECTO C. MAMAAT, VICENTE M.
MORTERA, et. al., petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION
 Facts:

Petitioners' are among the landowners whose title to their respective lots have already
been transferred to respondent NHA pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 1808.
Wherein said petitioners assailed the constitutionality of P.D . No. 1808. Alleging that
said P.D . No. 1808 deprives them of their property without due process of law and
without just compensation and of their right to protection of the laws. They further
alleged that their properties are not the proper subject of expropriation by the
government.

Issue/s:

1. Is P.D. No. 1808 unconstitutional due to the deprivation of due process and just
compensation?

Ruling:

The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1808 cannot be sustained.
The objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-
Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive development plans for
this depressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of the police power
of the State. The police power of the State has been described as "the most essential,
insistent and illimitable of powers. It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing
the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order and welfare.
Petitioners also cannot complain that they are being deprived of their property without
due process of law and just compensation since Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 1808 provides for
just compensation to lot owners who have fully paid their obligations to the City of
Manila under their respective contracts before the issuance of the decree, and while
including petitioners Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. to those have not yet claimed the
compensation for their respective lots.
The motion for reconsideration was DENIED.
Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted
each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits
in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic
salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the
productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991.
Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-
owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly
prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by
the Office of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several

government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the
year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing
the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum
amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268,
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of
the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies
which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in
excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the
government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the validexercise of

presidential control over the executive departments

Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and
authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the
control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his
power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his
subordinate in the executivedepartments, bureau or offices under him.

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive

benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive
benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over
the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive
benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the
equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his
power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies
who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance
from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of
government resources.

The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of executive departments.