FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 125532. July 10, 1998

SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS JUDE ROMANO, LEAH
ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS, JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS; the NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO ROQUE, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
RODOLFO PINEDA, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the investigation conducted by the government in the last quarter
of 1995, which delved into the alleged participation of national and local officials
in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling. Although the Court of Appeals upheld the
admission into the Witness Protection Program of Potenciano A. Roque, who claimed
personal knowledge of such gambling activities, the secretary of justice nonetheless
challenges the side opinion of the appellate court that the testimony of the witness must, as
a condition precedent to his admission into said Program, be shown to be capable of
substantial corroboration in its material points. The justice secretary claims that such
corroboration need not be demonstrated prior to or simultaneous with the witness admission
into the Program, as long as such requirement can be demonstrated when he actually
testifies in court. However, inasmuch as Roque has already been admitted into the Program
and has actually finished testifying, the issue presented by petitioners has become moot.
Thus, any judgment that this Court may render on the instant petition would be merely an
academic disquisition on a hypothetical problem. Until it can be shown that
an actual controversy exists, courts have no jurisdiction to render a binding decision.
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to partially set aside the June 28, 1996 Decision of the
Court of Appeals,1 which disposed as follows:2cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for want of merit, and the
injunction issued against respondent judges from hearing the criminal actions against
petitioner is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals upheld the justice secretarys denial on January 11, 1996 of private
respondents Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to the
Witness Protection Program.
Although Respondent Court ruled in favor of the government, herein petitioners nonetheless
assail the following portion of the said Decision:
x x x From the explicit terms of the statute, it is at once apparent that the presence of such
corroborative evidence is sine qua non to a witness admission into the Program. Being in the
nature of a condition precedent [to] his admission into the Program, the existence of such
corroborative evidence must be shown at the time his application for admission is being
evaluated.
The Antecedent Facts
Petitioners relate the antecedent facts of this case as follows:3cräläwvirtualibräry
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national and local government
officials in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling.
The case was also the subject of a legislative inquiry/investigation by both the Senate and
the House of Representatives.
In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking
of xxx national and local politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the
Governments Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Allegedly, he gained first-
hand information in his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG) during
the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also revealed
that he and members of his family were in danger of being liquidated, facing as he did the
formidable world of corruption with a well-entrenched hold on Philippine social, political and
economic systems.
After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced of his compliance with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the Witness Protection, Security
and Benefit Act, the Department of Justice admitted Roque to the program, providing him a
monthly allowance, temporary shelter and personal and security protection during witness
duty.
On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI Agents Sixto M.
Burgos, Jr. and Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his stint as Chairman of the Task
Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG), several gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo
Pineda, and certain politicians offered him money and other valuable considerations, which
he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their respective gambling
operations (Annex B).
On the basis of Roques sworn statement, the sworn statement and supplemental affidavit of
one Angelito H. Sanchez, and the sworn statement of Gen. Lorenzo Mateo (Annexes C, D
and E), then NBI Director Mariano M. Mison forwarded the result of their investigation on the
jueteng scam to the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommending the filing of the following
charges against Pineda and other persons x x x.
xxx
The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling (composed of the petitioner-prosecutors), created
by petitioner Secretary Teofisto Guingona on November 24, 1995 (Annex F), conducted a
preliminary investigation of the case and subpoenaed all the respondents in I.S. No. 95-774,
therein requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits by December 22, 1995.
On December 21, 1995, Roque executed a supplemental sworn statement relative to I.S. No.
95-774, clarifying some of his statements in his first affidavit (Annex G). Consequently, the
December 22, 1995 setting was cancelled and reset to January 8, 1996 to give Pineda and
other respondents time to refute the charges contained in the supplemental sworn
statement.
On January 5, 1996, Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano
A. Roque to the Witness Protection Program, which was denied by petitioner Secretary in a
letter-reply dated January 11, 1996 (Annexes H and I). On January 23, 1996, Pineda filed a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of Appeals.
xxx
In the meantime, petitioner-prosecutors proceeded with their preliminary investigation, and
on February 2, 1996, they issued a resolution finding probable cause to charge private
respondent Pineda with several offenses (Annex K). On February 5, 1996, three (3)
Informations for corruption of public officials were filed against him in the Manila and Pasig
City Trial Courts (Annexes L, M and N). He was subsequently arraigned on February 28, 1996
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 of the City of Manila presided by Judge Enrico Lanzanes,
and on March 14, 1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, of Pasig City, presided by
Judge Benjamin Pelayo.
On March 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals came up with a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining both trial courts from hearing the criminal actions in the meantime.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the issue of whether the secretary of
justice acted in excess of his jurisdiction (a) in admitting Petitioner Roque into the Program
and (b) in excluding him from the Informations filed against private respondent. Private
respondent contended that Roques admission was illegal on two grounds: first, his testimony
could not be substantially corroborated in its material points; and second, he appeared to
be the most guilty or at least more guilty than private respondent, insofar as the crimes
charged in the Informations were concerned.
Respondent Court also ruled that RA 6981 contemplates two kinds of witnesses: (a) a witness
who has perceived or has knowledge of, or information on, the commission of a crime under
Section 3; and (b) a particeps criminis or a participant in the crime under Section 10.
Based on his sworn statements, Roque participated in the commission of the crimes imputed
to private respondent (corruption of public officials) by accepting bribe money. Necessarily,
his admission to the Program fell under Section 10, which requires that he should not appear
to be the most guilty of the imputed crimes. Respondent Court found that private respondent
sought to bribe him several times to prevent him from conducting raids on private
respondents gambling operations. Such passive participation in the crimes did not make him
more guilty than private respondent.
On the first issue, Respondent Court initially ruled that, by express provision of Sections 3 and
10, the requirement of corroboration is a condition precedent to admission into the Program.
A contrary interpretation would only sanction the squandering of the various benefits of the
Program on one who might later be adjudged disqualified from admission for lack of
evidence to corroborate his testimony.
However, in the same breath, Respondent Court upheld herein petitioners alternative position
that substantial corroboration was nevertheless actually provided by Angelito Sanchez and
retired Gen. Lorenzo M. Mateos testimonies. Hence, it disposed in favor of the government.
Subsequently, this petition was filed.4
The Issue
The lone issue raised by this petition is worded as follows:
Whether or not a witness testimony requires prior or simultaneous corroboration at the time
he is admitted into the witness protection, security and benefit program.5cräläwvirtualibräry
As noted earlier, this petition is unusual and unique. Despite ruling in their favor, Respondent
Court is assailed by petitioners for opining that admission to the Program requires prior or
simultaneous corroboration of the material points in the witness testimony.
Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA
6981 expressly require that corroboration must already exist at the time of the witness
application as a prerequisite to admission into the Program. RA 6981 pertinently provides:
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and
by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following are present:
xxx
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
xxx.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that said provisions merely require that the testimony
of the state witness seeking admission into the Program can be substantially corroborated or
is capable of corroboration. So long as corroboration can be obtained when he testifies in
court, he satisfies the requirement that his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its
material points.
The Courts Ruling
The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant the
exercise of judicial power.
No Actual Controversy
Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition fundamentally
defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.6 According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist, courts are
mandated to settle disputes between real conflicting parties through the application of the
law.7 Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1)
there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must
be ripe for adjudication;8 and (3) the person challenging must have standing; that is, he has
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury.9cräläwvirtualibräry
The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or
to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems10 or friendly suits collusively arranged between
parties without real adverse interests.11 Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.12 As a condition
precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first
exist.13cräläwvirtualibräry
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of
opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific
relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, no actual controversy was found in Abbas vs. Commission on Elections15 regarding the
provision in the Organic Act, which mandates that should there be any conflict between
national law and Islamic Law, the Shariah courts should apply the former. In that case, the
petitioner maintained that since the Islamic Law (Shariah) was derived from the Koran, which
makes it part of divine law, the Shariah may not be subjected to any man-made national
law. This Court dismissed petitioners argument because, as enshrined in the Constitution,
judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. No actual controversy between real litigants existed,
because no conflicting claims involving the application of national law were presented. This
being so, the Supreme Court refused to rule on a merely perceived potential conflict
between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law.
In contrast, the Court held in Sabello vs. Department of Education, Culture and Sports16 that
there was a justiciable controversy where the issue involved was whether petitioner -- after
he was given an absolute pardon -- merited reappointment to the position he had held prior
to his conviction, that of Elementary Principal I. The Court said that such dispute was not
hypothetical or abstract, for there was a definite and concrete controversy touching on the
legal relations of parties and admitting of specific relief through a court decree that was
conclusive in character. That case did not call for mere opinion or advice, but for affirmative
relief.
Closely related to the requirement of an actual case, Bernas continues, is the second
requirement that the question is ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
Thus, in PACU vs. Secretary of Education,17 the Court declined to pass judgment on the
question of the validity of Section 3 of Act No. 2706, which provided that before a private
school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the secretary of
education, because all the petitioning schools had permits to operate and were actually
operating, and none of them claimed that the secretary had threatened to revoke their
permit.
In Tan vs. Macapagal,18 the Court said that Petitioner Gonzales had the good sense to wait
until after the enactment of the statute [Rep. Act No. 4913 (1967)] requiring the submission to
the electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution [Resolution Nos. 1 and 3
of Congress as a constituent body (1967)] before he could file his suit. It was only when this
condition was met that the matter became ripe for adjudication; prior to that stage, the
judiciary had to keep its hands off.
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to
discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, Justice Laurel
asserted, will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative action] x x x.19 The legislative
and the executive branches are not allowed to seek its advice on what to do or not to do;
thus, judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meantime. Before a court may enter the
picture, a prerequisite is that something has been accomplished or performed by either
branch. Then may it pass on the validity of what has been done but, then again, only when x
x x properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.20cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court
reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of
Respondent Roques testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in
conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed
Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come
out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular
case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.
After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors,
Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had
already testified in court against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roques
admission into the Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not
warrant judicial review.
Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated nor any claims that
conflict. In fact, no affirmative relief is being sought in this case. The Court concurs with the
opinion of counsel for private respondent that this action is a purely academic exercise,
which has no relevance to the criminal cases against Respondent Pineda. After the assailed
Decision had been rendered, trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque testified
in all of them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his academic interest on
how the State machinery will deal with witnesses who are admittedly guilty of the crimes but
are discharged to testify against their co-accused.21cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case ripe for
adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this case would constitute
an attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.22
An Executive Function
In the present petition, the government is in effect asking this Court to render an advisory
opinion on what the government prosecutors should do when, how and whom to grant or to
deny admission into the Program. To accede to it is tantamount to an incursion into the
functions of the executive department. From their arguments stated above, both sides have
obviously missed this crucial point, which is succinctly stated in Webb vs. De
Leon:23cräläwvirtualibräry
It is urged that they [the provisions of RA 6918] constitute xxx an intrusion into judicial
prerogative for it is only the court which has the power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure
to discharge an accused as a state witness. The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119
which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a state
witness. Petitioners argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond
executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that
our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is
the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide
range of discretionthe discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We
thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. 6981 vesting in
the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the
program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does
not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a
state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the
accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a
recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been
interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of
our justice system. [Emphasis ours]
Simply stated, the decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in
character. Only when an information, charging two or more persons with a certain offense,
has already been filed in court will Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, come into
play, viz.:
SEC. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution.When two
or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the competent
court, at any time before they have entered upon their defense, may direct one or more of
them to be discharged with the latters consent that he or they may be witnesses for the
government when in the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
In the present case, Roque was notone of those accused in the Informations filed by the
government prosecutors. Rule 119, Section 9, is therefore clearly not applicable.
A resort to the progenitors of RA 6981 will yield the same result. Although Presidential Decree
1731 and National Emergency Memorandum Order No. 26 state only when immunity from
suit attaches to a witness, they do not specify who are qualified for admission into the
Program. PD 1731, otherwise known as a law Providing for Rewards and Incentives to
Government Witnesses and Informants and for Other Purposes provides:
SEC. 4. Any such informants or witnesses who shall testify, or provide vital information,
regarding the existence or activity of a group involved in the commission of crimes against
national security or public order, or of an organized/syndicated crime or crime group,
and/or the culpability of individual members thereof in accordance with this Decree shall,
upon recommendation of the state prosecutor, fiscal or military lawyer, as approved by the
Secretary of National Defense or the Secretary of Justice, as the case may be, be immune
from criminal prosecution for his participation or involvement in any such criminal activity
which is the subject of the investigation or prosecution, in addition to the benefits under Sec.
2 hereof: Provided, that, immunity from criminal prosecution shall, in the case of a witness
offering to testify, attach only upon his actually testifying in court in accordance with his
undertaking as accepted by the state prosecutor, fiscal, or military lawyer: Provided,
further, that the following conditions are complied with:
xxx
c. That such testimony or information can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
xxx.
The same tenor was adopted in National Emergency Memorandum Order No. 26 signed by
former President Corazon C. Aquino, Section 5(c) of which provides:
c. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution.This applies to the witness participation or involvement
in the criminal case in which his testimony is necessary and may be availed of only upon his
actually testifying in court in accordance with his undertaking, and provided that:
xxx
(3) Such testimony or information can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
xxx.
One may validly infer from the foregoing that the government prosecutor is afforded much
leeway in choosing whom to admit into the Program. Such inference is in harmony with the
basic principle that this is an executive function.
RA 6981 is a much needed penal reform law that could help the government in curbing
crime by providing an antidote, as it were, to the usual reluctance of witnesses to testify. The
Department of Justice has clearly explained the rationale for said law:24
Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify
in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal,
criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For
a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law
protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their
appearance in investigative bodies/courts.
This Court should then leave to the executive branch the decision on how best to administer
the Witness Protection Program. Unless an actual controversy arises, we should not jump the
gun and unnecessarily intervene in this executive function.
Closer Scrutiny of the Assailed Decision
Finally, an accurate reading of the assailed Decision will further enlighten petitioners as to its
true message. Respondent Court did sustain Roques admission into the Program -- even as it
held that the first contention of petitioners was untenable -- based on the latters alternative
argument that Roques testimony was sufficiently corroborated by that of General Mateo.
While Respondent Court insisted that corroboration must exist prior to or simultaneous with
Roques admission into the Program, it sanctioned subsequent compliance to cure this
defect. The reason for this is found in the penultimate paragraph of the Decision, in which
Respondent Court categorically stated that it found no manifest abuse of discretion in the
petitioners action. There is no quarrel with this point. Until a more opportune occasion
involving a concrete violation of RA 6981 arises, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the
issue raised by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. SALVADOR TULAGAN, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 17, 2015 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, which affirmed the Joint Decision[2] dated February 10, 2014 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-
6211, finding accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan (Tulagan) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of sexual assault and statutory rape as defined and penalized under
Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in
relation to Article 266-B.

In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows:

That sometime in the month of September 2011, at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with
abuse of superior strength forcibly laid complainant AAA,[3] a 9-year-old minor in a
cemented pavement, and did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his
finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will and consent.
Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, Tulagan was charged as follows:
That on or about October 8, 2011 at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor against her will and consent to the damage and
prejudice of said AAA, against her will and consent.
Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.
Upon arraignment, Tulagan pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
During the trial, BBB, aunt of the victim AAA, testified that around 10:30 a.m. of October 17,
2011, she noticed a man looking at AAA outside their house. When AAA asked her
permission to go to the bathroom located outside their house, the man suddenly went near
AAA. Out of suspicion, BBB walked to approach AAA. As BBB came close to AAA, the man
left suddenly. After AAA returned from the bathroom, BBB asked what the man was doing to
her. AAA did not reply. She then told AAA to get inside the house. She asked AAA to move
her panties down, and examined her genitalia. She noticed that her genitalia was swollen.
AAA then confessed to her about the wrong done to her by appellant whom AAA referred
to as Badong or Salvador Tulagan. AAA cried hard and embraced BBB tightly. AAA asked
BBB for her help and even told her that she wanted Badong to be put in jail.
AAA, nine (9) years old, testified that sometime in September 2011 while she was peeling
corn with her cousin who lived adjacent to her grandmother's house, Tulagan approached
her, spread her legs, and inserted his finger into her private part. She said that it was painful,
but Tulagan just pretended as if he was just looking for something and went home.

AAA, likewise, testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8, 2011, while she was playing
with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house, he brought her to his house and told her to keep
quiet. He told her to lie down on the floor, and removed her short pants and panties. He also
undressed himself, kissed AAA's cheeks, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She claimed
that it was painful and that she cried because Tulagan held her hands and pinned them
with his. She did not tell anyone about the incident, until her aunt examined her private part.

Upon genital examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder on AAA, she found a healed laceration
at 6 o'clock position in AAA's hymen, and a dilated or enlarged vaginal opening. She said
that it is not normal for a 9-year-old child to have a dilated vaginal opening and laceration
in the hymen.

For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted that he lived
barely five (5) meters away from AAA's grandmother's house where she lived. He added that
the whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried
banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the
banana leaves he gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to
AAA's house and that he had not seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011.
Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a
misunderstanding with AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he
raped her granddaughter.

After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in
two offenses of rape against AAA. It held that all the elements of sexual assault and statutory
rape was duly established. The trial court relied on the credible and positive declaration of
the victim as against the alibi and denial of Tulagan. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt [of] the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in
relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of fifty thousand
(Php50,000.00) pesos; moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos,
and to pay the cost of the suit. Likewise, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of thirty
thousand (Php30,000.00) pesos; and moral damages in the amount of twenty thousand
(Php20,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual assault and
statutory rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated February 10, 2014 is AFFIRMED, subject to the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault), appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The award of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00; and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, are likewise granted.
2. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 (Statutory Rape), the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages are increased to P100,000.00 each. Exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, too, are granted.
3. All damages awarded are subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% [per annum] from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, Tulagan invoked the same arguments he raised before the CA in assailing his
conviction. He alleged that the appellate court erred in giving weight and credence to the
inconsistent testimony of AAA, and in sustaining his conviction despite the prosecution's
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To support his appeal, he argued that the
testimony of AAA was fraught with inconsistencies and lapses which affected her credibility.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 228087, January 24, 2018

H. VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HL VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HRV VILLARICA PAWNSHOP,

INC. AND VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., Petitioners, v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, AMADOR M. MONTEIRO, SANTIAGO DIONISIO R. AGDEPPA, MA. LUZ N.
BARROS-MAGSINO, MILAGROS N. CASUGA AND JOCELYN Q. GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

Condonation statutes—being an act of liberality on the part of the State—are strictly

construed against the applicants unless the laws themselves clearly state a contrary rule of
interpretation.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners
H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., HL Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., HRV Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. and
Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., (petitioners) seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated
February 26, 2016 and Resolution2 dated November 2, 2016, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 140916, which affirmed the Resolution3 dated November 6, 2013, and Order4
dated January 21,2015, of the Social Security Commission (SSC) denying petitioners' claim for
refund.

The Antecedents

Petitioners are private corporations engaged in the pawnshop business and are compulsorily
registered with the Social Security System (SSS) under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8282,5
otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1997.6

In 2009, petitioners paid their delinquent contributions and accrued penalties with the
different branches of the SSS in the following manner:

PETITIONER
DELINQUENCY
PERIOD
AMOUNT PAID
(Contribution and Penalty)
DATE PAID
H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc.
Jan. 2006 - Oct. 2006
P1,461,640.24
Apr. 23, 2009

Jul. 2007 - Dec. 2007

Apr. 2007- Jun. 2007
P710,199.08.
May 1, 2009

Mar. 2008 - Dec. 2008

H.L. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc.
Sept. 2005 - Dec. 2006
P2,544,525.28
Jun. 20, 2009
HRV Villarica Pawnshop, Inc.
Jan. 2009 - May 2009
P132,176.32
May 18, 2009
Villarica Pawnshop, Inc.
Mar. 2000 - Jun. 2000
P68,922.03
Feb. 20, 2009

Jan. 2000 - Jun. 2000

P21,353.70
Feb. 26, 2009

Jan. 2005 - Aug. 2005

P699,850.34
Mar. 2, 2009

Jan. 1997 - Jan. 2009

P2,491,998.08
Apr. 7, 20097
On January 7, 2010, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9903, otherwise known as the Social Security
Condonation Law of 2009, which took effect on February 1, 2010. The said law offered
delinquent employers the opportunity to settle, without penalty, their accountabilities or
overdue contributions within six (6) months from the date of its effectivity.8

Consequently, petitioners thru its President and General Manager Atty. Henry P. Villarica, sent
separate Letters,9 all dated July 26, 2010, to the different branches of the SSS seeking
reimbursement of the accrued penalties, which they have paid in 2009, thus:

Amount Claimed
1. Diliman Branch
P860,452.6210

2. Manila Branch
P1,005,805.2811

3. Caloocan Branch
P5,376.3212
4. San Francisco Del Monte Branch
P3,119,400.1513

Invoking Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 and Section 2 (f) of the SSC Circular No. 2010-004 or the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9903 (IRR), petitioners claimed that the
benefits of the condonation program extend to all employers who have settled their arrears
or unpaid contributions even prior to the effectivity of the law.14

In a Letter15 dated August 16, 2010, the SSS - San Francisco Del Monte Branch denied
petitioner Villarica Pawnshop, Inc.'s request for refund amounting to P3,119,400.15 stating
that there was no provision under R.A. No. 9903 allowing reimbursement of penalties paid
before its effectivity.16

In another Letter17 dated September 16, 2010, petitioner HRV Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. was
likewise informed that its application for the refund of the accrued penalty had been denied
because R.A. No. 9903 does not cover accountabilities settled prior to its effectivity.18

In like manner, the applications for refund filed by petitioners H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. and
HL Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. were both denied in separate letters dated October 4, 201019
and October 15, 2010,20 respectively, for the same reason of being filed outside the
coverage of R.A. No. 9903.21

As a result, petitioners filed their respective Petitions22 before the SSC seeking reimbursement
of the 3% per month penalties they paid in 2009 essentially claiming that they were entitled
to avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 9903 by reason of equity because "one of the
purposes of the law is to favor employers, regardless of the reason for the non-payment of
the arrears in contribution;" and that the interpretation of the SSS "is manifestly contrary to the
principle that, in enacting a statute, the legislature intended right and justice to prevail."

In its Answer23 dated March 14, 2012, the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the petitions for utter
lack of merit. It maintained that petitioners were not entitled to avail of the condonation
program under R.A. No. 9903 because they were not considered delinquent at the time the
law took effect in 2010; and that there was nothing more to condone on the part of
petitioners for they have settled their obligations even before the enactment of the law. The
SSS explained that the term "accrued penalties" had been properly defined as unpaid
penalties under the IRR and, considering that laws granting condonation constitute acts of
benevolence on the part of the State, they should be strictly construed against the
applicant.24

The SSC Ruling

In its Resolution25 dated November 6, 2013, the SSC denied all the petitions for lack of merit.
It ruled that petitioners were not entitled to the benefits of the condonation program under
R.A. No. 9903 in view of the full payment of their unpaid obligations prior to the effectivity of
the law on February 1, 2010. As petitioners did not have unpaid contributions at the time the
law took effect, the SSC held that there could be no remission or refund in their favor. The
dispositive portion of the said resolution states:
WHEREFORE, all four (4) petitions filed by petitioners against the SSS are hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.26

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the SSC in an Order27
dated January 21, 2015.

Undeterred, petitioners appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its decision dated February 26, 2016, the CA affirmed the ruling of the SSC. It held that the
intent of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9903 was the remission of the three percent (3%)
per month penalty imposed upon delinquent contributions of employers as a necessary
consequence of the late payment or non-remittance of SSS contributions. The CA found that
the IRR of R.A. No. 9903 used the word "unpaid" to emphasize the accrued penalty that may
be waived therein, thus, it presupposes that there was still an outstanding obligation at the
time of the effectivity of the law, which may be extinguished through remission. It highlighted
that lawmakers did not include within the sphere of R.A. No. 9903 those employers whose
penalties have already been paid prior to its effectivity. The CA added that it would be
absurd for obligations that have already been extinguished to be subjected to condonation.

Citing Mendoza v. People28(Mendoza), the CA further ruled that there was no violation of
the equal protection clause because there was a substantial distinction between those
delinquent employers who paid within the six (6) month period from the effectivity of the law
and those who paid outside of the said availment period. It underscored that only the former
class was expressly covered by R.A. No. 9903. The CA concluded that petitioners' stand, that
those who paid prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903 can avail of the condonation and
refund, would open the floodgates to numerous claims for reimbursement before the SSS,
which could lead to a depletion of its resources to the detriment of the public's best interest.
The fallo of the CA ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution
dated November 6, 2013 and the Order dated January 21, 2015 of the Social Security
Commission in SSC Case Nos. 11-19521-11, 11-19522-11, 11-19523-11 and 11-19524-11 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.29

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its resolution dated
November 2, 2016.30

Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RA NO. 9903 DOES
NOT INCLUDE PETITIONERS IN ITS COVERAGE, CONSIDERING THAT:
SECTION 4 OF RA NO. 9903 EXPRESSLY INCLUDES EMPLOYERS, SUCH AS PETITIONERS, WHO
SETTLED (THEIR) ARREARS IN CONTRIBUTIONS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAW AND THUS,
ARE ENTITLED TO A WAIVER OF THEIR ACCRUED PENALTIES.

PRIOR TO RA NO. 9903, EMPLOYERS ARE REQUIRED TO SETTLE THEIR ARREARS IN

CONTRIBUTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH PAYMENT OF THE PENALTY, THUS RENDERING IT
IMPOSSIBLE FOR PETITIONERS TO PAY THEIR ARREARS WITHOUT PAYING THE PENALTY

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT SSC
CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE TERM 'ACCRUED' UNDER THE SSS CONDONATION LAW OF 2009
TO MEAN UNPAID. IF THIS INTERPRETATION WERE TO BE UPHELD, THOSE WHO HAVE UNPAID
ACCRUED PENALTIES WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION THAN THOSE WHO DECIDED TO SETTLE
BOTH THE ARREARS IN CONTRIBUTION AND THE ACCRUED PENALTIES. CERTAINLY, THE LAW
NEVER INTENDED INJUSTICE.31
Petitioners argue that the last proviso of Section 4 of R. A. No. 9903 "clearly extends the
benefit of the waiver" to employers who have settled their arrears before the effectivity of
the law, hence, to allow the refund of the corresponding penalties paid;32 that the "equity
provision" in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 should be interpreted to include a refund of penalties
already paid if such law is to be given any effect;33 and that a refund should be allowed
because there is no substantial distinction between employers who paid their accrued
penalties before and after the effectivity of the R.A. No. 9903.34

In its Comment,35 the SSC counters that since petitioners have already paid their unremitted
contributions and accrued penalties before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, there is nothing
left to be condoned or waived; that, at the time of their payment, there was no remission of
accrued penalty yet; that R.A. No. 9903 does not contain a provision allowing the
reimbursement of accrued penalty which was paid prior to its effectivity; that the CA
correctly interpreted the term "accrued penalty" to mean "unpaid" by using the definition
provided in Section 1 (d) of the IRR; and that the ruling in Mendoza had already recognized
that Congress refused to allow a sweeping, non-discriminatory condonation to all delinquent
employers when it provided a fixed period for the availment of the condonation program
under R.A. No. 9903. 36

In its Comment,37 the SSS avers that the payments made by petitioners before the effectivity
of R.A. No. 9903 are valid payments which cannot be the subject of reimbursement; that
petitioners are no longer considered delinquent employers when R.A. No. 9903 took effect;
that petitioners erroneously interpreted the "equity provision" to include a right to a refund of
penalties paid; and that laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence and
should be strictly construed against the applicant.38

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Sections 2 and 4 of the R.A. No. 9903 specifically provide:

Section 2. Condonation of Penalty. — Any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all
contributions due and payable to the Social Security System (SSS), including those with
pending cases either before the Social Security Commission, courts or Office of the
Prosecutor involving collection of contributions and/or penalties, may within six (6) months
from the effectivity of this Act:

(a) remit said contributions; or

(b) submit a proposal to pay the same in installments, subject to the implementing rules and
regulations which the Social Security Commission may prescribe: Provided, That the
delinquent employer submits the corresponding collection lists together with the remittance
or proposal to pay installments: Provided, further, That upon approval and payment in full or
in installments of contributions due and payable to the SSS, all such pending cases filed
against the employer shall be withdrawn without prejudice to the refiling of the case in the
event the employer fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions or defaults in the
payment of any installment under the approved proposal.

xxxx

Section 4. Effectivity of Condonation. — The penalty provided under Section 22 (a) of

Republic Act No. 8282 shall be condoned by virtue of this Act when and until all the
delinquent contributions are remitted by the employer to the SSS: Provided, That, in case the
employer fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions, or defaults in the payment
of any installment under the approved proposal, within the availment period provided in this
Act, the penalties are deemed reimposed from the time the contributions first become due,
to accrue until the delinquent account is paid in full: Provided, further, That for reason of
equity, employers who settled arrears in contributions before the effectivity of this Act shall
likewise have their accrued penalties waived. [emphases supplied]

On the other hand, Sections 1 and 2 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9903 state:

Section 1. Definition of Terms. — Unless the context of a certain provision of this Circular
clearly indicates otherwise, the term:

xxx

(d) "Accrued penalty" refers to the unpaid three percent (3%) penalty imposed upon any
delayed remittance of contribution m accordance with Section 22 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as
amended.

Section 2. Who may avail of the Program. — Any employer who is delinquent or has not
remitted all contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of the Program, including
the following:

(a) Those not yet registered with the SSS

(b) Those with pending or approved proposal under the Installment Payment Scheme of the
SSS (Circular No. 9-P) pursuant to SSC Resolution No. 380 dated 10 June 2002;
(c) Those with pending or approved application under the Program for Acceptance of
Properties Offered Through Dacion En Pago of the SSS (Circular No. 6-P) pursuant to SSC
Resolution No. 29 dated 16 January 2002;

(d) Those with cases pending before the SSC, Courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving
collection of contributions and/or penalties;

(e) Those against whom judgment had been rendered involving collection of contributions
and/or penalties but have not complied with the judgment, and;

(f) Those who, before the effectivity of the Act, have settled all contributions but with
accrued penalty. [emphasis supplied]

Under R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR, an employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all
contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of the condonation program provided
that the delinquent employer will remit the full amount of the unpaid contributions or would
submit a proposal to pay the delinquent contributions in installment within the six (6)-month
period set by law.

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903, once an employer pays all its delinquent contributions
within the six month period, the accrued penalties due thereon shall be deemed waived. In
the last proviso thereof, those employers who have settled their delinquent contributions
before the effectivity of the law but still have existing accrued penalties shall also benefit
from the condonation program. In that situation, there is still something to condone because
there are existing accrued penalties at the time of the effectivity of the law. Section 1 (d) of
the IRR defines accrued penalties as those that refer to the unpaid three percent (3%)
penalty imposed upon any delayed remittance of contribution.

Accordingly, R.A. No. 9903 covers those employers who (1) have existing delinquent
contributions and/or (2) have accrued penalties at the time of its effectivity.

Evidently, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9903, particularly Section 4 thereof, that benefits an
employer who has settled their delinquent contributions and/or their accrued penalties prior
to the effectivity of the law. Once an employer pays all his delinquent contributions and
accrued penalties before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, it cannot avail of the condonation
program because there is no existing obligation anymore. It is the clear intent of the law to
limit the benefit of the condonation program to the delinquent employers.39

Also, the provisions of R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR state that employers may be accorded the
benefit of having their accrued penalties waived provided that they either remit their
delinquent contributions or submit a proposal to pay their delinquencies in installments (on
the condition that there will be no default in subsequent payments) within the "availment
period" spanning six (6) months from R.A. No. 9903's effectivity.

The Court finds that employers who have paid their unremitted contributions and already
settled their delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties before R.A. No.
9903's effectivity do not have a right to be refunded of the penalties already paid, which
shall be discussed in seriatim.

Verba legis interpretation of R.A. No. 9903

It is the duty of the Court to apply the law the way it is worded.40 Basic is the rule of statutory
construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative
but to apply the same according to its clear language.41 The courts can only pronounce
what the law is and what the rights of the parties thereunder are.42 Fidelity to such a task
precludes construction or interpretation, unless application is impossible or inadequate
without it.43 Thus, it is only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court
interpret or construe its true intent.44

Parenthetically, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction enjoins that if
the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation.45 This rule of interpretation is in deference to the plenary
power of Congress to make, alter and repeal laws as this power is an embodiment of the
People's sovereign will.46 Accordingly, when the words of a statute are clear and
unambiguous, courts cannot deviate from the text of the law and resort to interpretation lest
they end up betraying their solemn duty to uphold the law and worse, violating the
constitutional principle of separation of powers.

Concomitantly, condonation or remission of debt is an act of liberality, by virtue of which,

without receiving any equivalent, the creditor renounces the enforcement of the obligation,
which is extinguished in its entirety or in that part or aspect of the same to which the
remission refers.47 It is essentially gratuitous for no equivalent is received for the benefit
given.48 Relatedly, waiver is defined as a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which
except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such
right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act
inconsistent with claiming it.49 On the other hand, refund is an act of giving back or returning
what was received.50 In cases of monetary obligations, a claim for refund exists only after
the payment has been made and, in the act of doing so, the debtor either delivered excess
funds or there exists no obligation to pay in the first place. This right arises either by virtue of
solutio indebiti as provided for in Articles 2154 to 2163 of the Civil Code or by provision of
another positive law, such as tax laws or amnesty laws.51

A plain reading of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 shows that it does not give employers who have
already settled their delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties the
right to a refund of the penalties paid. What was waived here was the amount of accrued
penalties that have not been paid prior to the law's effectivity—it does not include those that
have already been settled.

The words "condoned", "waived" and "accrued" are unambiguous enough to be understood
and directly applied without any resulting confusion. As discussed earlier, the word
''condonation" is the creditor's act of extinguishing an obligation by renunciation and the
word "waive" is an abandonment or relinquishment of an existing legal right. On the other
hand, the term "accrue" in legal parlance means "to come into existence as an enforceable
claim."52 Thus, the phrases "shall be condoned" and "shall likewise have their accrued
penalties waived" under Section 4 of the R.A. No. 9903 can only mean that, at the time of its
effectivity, only existing penalties may be extinguished or relinquished. No further
interpretation is necessary to clarify the law's applicability.

Prospective application of R.A. No. 9903

Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a retroactive
application. It is a basic principle that laws should only be applied prospectively unless the
legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used.53 Absent a clear contrary language in the text and, that in every
case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.54

Here, R.A. No. 9903 does not provide that, prior to its effectivity, penalties already paid are
deemed condoned or waived. What Section 2 of the law provides instead is an availment
period of six (6) months after its effectivity within which to pay the delinquent contributions
for the existing and corresponding penalties to be waived or condoned. This only means that
Congress intends R.A. No. 9903 to apply prospectively only after its effectivity and until its
expiration.

Interpretation in favor of social justice

Even if there is doubt as to the import of the term "accrued penalties," condonation laws—
especially those relating to social security funds—are construed strictly against the
applicants.

Social justice in the case of the laborers means compassionate justice or an implementation
of the policy that those who have less in life should have more in law.55 And since it is the
State's policy to "promote social justice and provide meaningful protection to [SSS] members
and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death,
and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden,"56 Court should
adopt a rule of statutory interpretation which ensures the financial viability of the SSS.

Here, the State stands to lose its resources in the form of receivables whenever it condones
or forgoes the collection of its receivables or unpaid penalties. Since a loss of funds ultimately
results in the Government being deprived of its means to pursue its objectives, all monetary
claims based on condonation should be construed strictly against the applicants. In the
case of SSS funds, the Court in Social Security System v. Commission on Audit57 had
emphatically explained in this wise:

THE FUNDS contributed to the Social Security System (SSS) are not only imbued with public
interest, they are part and parcel of the fruits of the workers' labors pooled into one
enormous trust fund under the administration of the System designed to insure against the
vicissitudes and hazards of their working lives. In a very real sense, the trust funds are the
workers' property which they could turn to when necessity beckons and are thus more
personal to them than the taxes they pay. It is therefore only fair and proper that charges
against the trust fund be strictly scrutinized for every lawful and judicious opportunity to keep
it intact and viable in the interest of enhancing the welfare of their true and ultimate
beneficiaries. [emphasis supplied]

To this end, the Court upholds and abides by this canon of interpretation against applicants
of the benefits of R.A. No. 9903 as a recognition to the constitutional policies of freeing the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services58 and affording
full protection to labor.59 It is consistent with the congressional intent of placing a primary
importance in helping the SSS increase its funds through stimulating cash inflows by
encouraging delinquent employers to settle their accountabilities.60 Thus, R.A. No. 9903 shall
be understood as not to include a refund of penalties paid before its effectivity.

It is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of
injustice.61 Simply put, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequences.62 This is to preserve the intention of Congress—the branch
which possesses the plenary power for all purposes of civil government.63

Logically, only existing obligations can be extinguished either by payment, loss of the thing
due, remission or condonation, confusion or merger or rights, compensation, novation,
annulment of contract, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, or prescription.
Interpreting R.A. No. 9903 in such a way that it extinguishes an obligation which is already
extinguished is simply absurd and unreasonable.

Rule-making power of the SSS

The SSS (through the SSC)64 is empowered to issue the necessary rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of R.A. No. 9903.65 Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the
separation of the branches of the government.66

Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity
of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by
permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount
of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws,
but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public
interest.67 Stated differently, administrative agencies are necessarily authorized to fill in the
gaps of a statute for its proper and effective implementation. Hence, the need to delegate
to administrative bodies—the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized
fields—the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and
effectuate its policies.68

In the instant case, Section 30 of the R.A. No. 8282 and Section 5 of R.A. No. 9903 gave the
SSS the power to promulgate rules and regulations to define the terms of social security-
related laws that may have a likelihood of being subjected to several interpretations. This is
exactly what the SSS did when it defined the term "accrued penalties'' to mean "unpaid
penalties" so as to make it unequivocal and prevent confusion as to the applicability of R.A.
No. 9903. More importantly, since the ascription of the meaning of "unpaid penalties" to
"accrued penalties" bear a reasonable semblance and justifiable connection, it should not
be disturbed and altered by the courts.

Delinquent contributions and penalties may be paid separately

There is no existing statutory or regulatory provision which requires the simultaneous or joint
payment of corresponding penalties along with the payment of delinquent contributions.
Consequently, it is possible that a class of employers who have settled their delinquent
contributions but have not paid the corresponding penalties before the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9903, may exist. As adequately pointed out by the SSC:69

It is worthy to note that there is no provision in RA 8282, as amended, nor in any SSS Circular
or Office Order that requires employers to settle their arrears in contributions simultaneously
with payment of the penalty. On the contrary, in its sincere effort to be a partner in nation[-
]building, along with the State's declared policy to establish, develop, promote and perfect
a sound and viable tax-exempt social security system suitable to the needs of the Philippines,
the SSS is empowered to accept, process and approve applications for installment proposal
evincing that employers are not required to settle their arrears in contributions simultaneously
with the payment of the penalty. [emphasis supplied]

The Court finds that the aforementioned assertion of the SSC is not without any legal basis as
Section 4 (c) of the R.A. No. 8282 provides:

Section 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. -

xxxx

(6) To compromise or release, in whole or in part, any interest, penalty or any civil liability
to SSS in connection with the investments authorized under Section 26 hereof, under such
terms and conditions as it may prescribe and approved by the President of the Philippines;
and xxx (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the SSS—through the SSC—is authorized to address any act that
may undermine the collection of penalties due from delinquent employers subject only to
the condition in Section 26 of the same law that the potential revenues being compromised
"are not needed to meet the current administrative and operational expenses." Thus,
petitioners' claim that "a class of employers who simply paid the arrears in contribution but
did not settle their penalties due does not exist"70 is erroneous.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause

There is a substantial distinction between employers who paid prior and subsequent to R.A.
No. 9903's effectivity. The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons
or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.71 However, the concept of
equal protection does not require a universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction; what it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification.72
In other words, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.73It does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different.74 Neither is it necessary that the
classification be made with mathematical nicety.75 Congress is given a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification;76 especially when social or economic legislation is at
issue.77 Hence, legislative classification may properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the
equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil
or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.78

Correspondingly, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way
that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms.79 In enacting a law, it is the sole prerogative of
Congress—not the Judiciary—to determine what subjects or activities it intends to govern
limited only by the provisions set forth in the Constitution.

Significantly, petitioners have already paid not only their delinquent contributions but also
their corresponding penalties before the enactment and effectivity of R.A. No. 9903.
Because of this observation, petitioners cannot anymore be considered as "delinquent"
under the purview of R.A. No. 9903 and are not within the class of "delinquent employers."80
Simply put, they are not similarly situated with other employers who are delinquent at the
time of the law's effectivity. Accordingly, Congress may treat petitioners differently from all
other employers who may have been delinquent.

Verily, this Court cannot—in the guise of interpretation—modify the explicit language of R.A.
No. 9903 in waiving the collection of accrued penalties to also include claims for refund. It
obviously violates the Trias Politica Principle entrenched in the very fabric of democracy
itself. While violation of the equal protection clause may be a compelling ground for this
Court to nullify an arbitrary or unreasonable legislative classification, it may not be used as a
basis to extend the scope of a law to classes not intended to be covered.81 Therefore, R.A.
No. 9903, which waived outstanding penalties, cannot be expanded to allow a refund of
those which were already settled before the law's effectivity.

Final note

Settling the contributions in arrears within the availment period only entitles delinquent
employers to a remission of their corresponding accrued and outstanding penalties—not a
refund of the penalties which have already been paid. There is nothing in R.A. No. 9903
which explicitly imposes or even implicitly recognizes a positive or natural obligation on the
part of the SSS to return the penalties which have already been settled before its effectivity.

It is absurd to revive obligations that have already been extinguished by payment or

performance just to be re-extinguished by condonation or remission so that it may create a
resulting obligation on the basis of solutio indebiti. More importantly, there is no violation of
the equal protection clause because there is a substantial distinction in the classes of
employers. Therefore, the Court deems it fitting to deny petitioners' claim for refund for lack
of substantial and legal basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 26, 2016 Decision and November 2, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 140916 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin (Acting Chairperson), Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.

Martires, J., on official leave.

March 1, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on January 24, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on March 1, 2018 at 9:18 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 229861, July 02, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO EJERCITO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated October 28, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR. HC. No. 01656, which affirmed the Decision3 dated April 8,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court of xxxxxxxxxxx,4 Branch 60 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CEB-BRL-
1300 finding accused-appellant Francisco Ejercito (Ejercito) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B,
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,5 otherwise
known as "The Anti--Rape Law of 1997."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information6 filed before the RTC charging Ejercito of the
aforesaid crime, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 10th day of October, 2001 at past 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
and succeed in having carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor, who is only fifteen (15) years
old at the time of the commission of the offense against her will and consent and which act
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around six (6) o'clock in the evening of October 10, 2001,
AAA, then a fifteen (15) year old high school student, was cleaning the chicken cage at the
back of their house located in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx when suddenly, she saw Ejercito pointing a
gun at her saying, "Ato ato lang ni. Sabta lang ko. Ayaw gyud saba para dili madamay imo
pamilya." AAA pleaded, "Tang, don't do this to me" but the latter replied, "Do you want me
to kill you? I will even include your mother and father." Thereafter, Ejercito dragged AAA to a
nearby barn, removed her shorts and underwear, while he undressed and placed himself on
top of her. He covered her mouth with his right hand and used his left hand to point the gun
at her, as he inserted his penis into her vagina and made back and forth movements. When
he finished the sexual act, Ejercito casually walked away and warned AAA not to tell
anybody or else, her parents will get killed. Upon returning to her house, AAA hurriedly went
to the bathroom where she saw a bloody discharge from her vagina. The following day,
AAA absented herself from school and headed to the house of her aunt, CCC, who asked if
she was okay. At that point, AAA tearfully narrated the incident and requested CCC to
remain silent, to which the latter reluctantly obliged.8
Haunted by her harrowing experience, AAA was unable to focus on her studies. Wanting to
start her life anew, AAA moved to the city to continue her schooling there. However, Ejercito
was able to track AAA down, and made the latter his sex slave. From 2002 to 2005, Ejercito
persistently contacted AAA, threatened and compelled her to meet him, and thereafter,
forced her to take shabu and then sexually abused her. Eventually, AAA got hooked on
drugs, portrayed herself as Ejercito's paramour, and decided to live together. When Ejercito's
wife discovered her husband's relationship with AAA, the former filed a complaint against
AAA before the barangay. By this time, even AAA's mother, BBB, found out the illicit
relationship and exerted efforts to separate them from each other. Finally, after undergoing
rehabilitation, AAA finally disclosed to her parents that she was raped by Ejercito back in
2001 and reported the same to the authorities on September 3, 2005.9

In his defense, Ejercito pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, and maintained that he
had an illicit relationship with AAA. He averred that during the existence of their affair from
2002 to 2004, he and AAA frequently had consensual sex and the latter even abandoned
her family in order to live with him in various places in xxxxxxxxxxx. He even insisted that he
and AAA were vocal about their choice to live together despite vehement objections from
his own wife and AAA's mother. Finally, he pointed out that when AAA was forcibly taken
from him by her mother, as well as police authorities, no charges were filed against him. Thus,
he was shocked and dismayed when he was charged with the crime of Rape which
purportedly happened when they were lovers.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision11 dated April 8, 2013, the RTC found Ejercito guilty beyond reasonable. doubt
of the crime charged and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered him to separately pay AAA and her parents P50,000.00 each as
moral damages.12

Aggrieved, Ejercito appealed13 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated October 28, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification,
convicting Ejercito of Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the RPC, and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to
pay the offended party, AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest of
six percent (6%) per annum to be imposed on all monetary awards from finality of the ruling
until fully paid.15

Agreeing with the RTC's findings, the CA held that through AAA's clear and straightforward
testimony, the prosecution had established that Ejercito raped her in 2001. On the other
hand, it did not give credence to Ejercito's sweetheart defense, pointing out that assuming
arguendo that he indeed eventually had a relationship with AAA, their first sexual encounter
in 2001 was without the latter's consent and was attended with force and intimidation as he
pointed a gun at her while satisfying his lustful desires.16
Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Ejercito's conviction for the crime of Rape
must be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

Time and again, it has been held that in criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."17

Based on this doctrine, the Court, upon careful review of this case, deems it proper to
correct the attribution of the crime for which Ejercito should be convicted and,
consequently, the corresponding penalty to be imposed against him, as will be explained
hereunder.

At the onset, the Court observes that the CA, in modifying the RTC ruling, erroneously applied
the old Rape Law, or Article 335 of the RPC, since the same was already repealed upon the
enactment of RA 8353 in 1997. To recount, the Information alleges "[t]hat on or about the
10th day of October 2001 x x x [Ejercito], with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in having
carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor who is only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the
commission of the offense against her will and consent x x x"; hence, in convicting Ejercito of
Rape, the CA should have applied the provisions of RA 8353, which enactment has resulted
in the new rape provisions of the RPC under Articles 266-A in relation to 266-B, viz.:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

xxxx

Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
For a charge of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as amended
by RA 8353, to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act under the circumstances
mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of Rape
is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.18

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of all
the elements of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as amended
by RA 8353. Through AAA's positive testimony, it was indeed established that in the evening
of October 10, 2001, AAA, then just a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was cleaning chicken
cages at the back of her house when suddenly, Ejercito threatened her, removed her lower
garments, covered her mouth, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her without her
consent. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found AAA's testimony to be credible, noting
further that Ejercito failed to establish any ill motive on her part which could have compelled
her to falsely accuse him of the aforesaid act. In this relation, case law states that the trial
court is in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented
by both parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same.19 As there is
no indication that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the Court therefore finds no reason to
deviate from its factual findings.

The Court remains mindful that Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,20 which, to note, was passed prior
to RA 8353 on June 17, 1992, equally penalizes those who commit sexual abuse, by means of
either (a) sexual intercourse or (b) lascivious conduct, against "a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse," viz.:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period; x x x

xxxx
In Quimvel v. People (Quimvel),21 the Court set important parameters in the application of
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, to wit:
(1) A child is considered as one "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse"
when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct "under the coercion or
influence of any adult":
To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one "exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the
phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.

Correlatively, Sec. 5 (a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse against children. x x x.22 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
(2) A violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed
sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront:
[T]he very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3 (b) of RA 7610 does not require that the
victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of.
For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec.
5 (b) of RA 7610. occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the child
victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront.23 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
(3) For purposes of determining the proper charge, the term "coercion and influence" as
appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation" as used in the
Information; in fact, as these terms are almost used synonymously, it is then "of no moment
that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different":
The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force
and intimidation" as used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines
"coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress" while "[undue] influence" is defined as "persuasion
carried to the point of overpowering the will." On the other hand, "force" refers to
"constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end" while jurisprudence defines
"intimidation" as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear." As can be gleaned, the
terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the terminologies
employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different. And to dispel any remaining
lingering doubt as to their interchangeability, the Court enunciated in Caballo v. People
[(710 Phil. 792, 805-806[2013])] that:
x x x sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult
exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2 (g) of the Rules on
Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which
manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage
in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that
deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is
the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who
wields it."24 (emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the Court, in Quimvel, observed that although the Information therein did not contain
the words "coercion or influence" (as it instead, used the phrase "through force and
intimidation"), the accused may still be convicted under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Further,
following the rules on the sufficiency of an Information, the Court held that the Information
need not even mention the exact phrase "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
abuse" for the accused to be convicted under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610; it was enough for
the Information to have alleged that the offense was committed by means of "force and
intimidation" for the prosecution of an accused for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 to
prosper.25

In this case, it has been established that Ejercito committed the act of sexual intercourse
against and without the consent of AAA, who was only fifteen (15) years old at that time. As
such, she is considered under the law as a child who is "exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse;" hence, Ejercito's act may as well be classified as a violation of
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.

Between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, as afore-discussed and Section 5
(b) of RA 7610, the Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be convicted under the
former. Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts, and when two (2)
penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more
special in nature, regardless of the time of enactment, should prevail. In Teves v.
Sandiganbayan:26
It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general
terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two
should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless
of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. Or where two statutes are of contrary
tenor or of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the
one designed therefor specially should prevail over the other.27 (Emphases supplied)
After much deliberation, the Court herein observes that RA 8353 amending the RPC should
now be uniformly applied in cases involving sexual intercourse committed against minors,
and not Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Indeed, w}file RA 7610 has been considered as a special
law that covers the sexual abuse of minors, RA 8353 has expanded the reach of our already
existing rape laws. These existing rape laws should not only pertain to the old Article 33528 of
the RPC but also to the provision on sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b)29 of RA 7610
which, applying Quimvel's characterization of a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other abuse," virtually punishes the rape of a minor.

It bears to emphasize that not only did RA 8353 re-classify the crime of Rape from being a
crime against chastity to a crime against persons,30 it also provided for more particularized
instances of rape and conjunctively, a new set of penalties therefor. Under RA 8353, Rape is
considered committed not only through the traditional means of having carnal knowledge
of a woman (or penile penetration) but also through certain lascivious acts now classified as
rape by sexual assault:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, RA 8353 provides for new penalties for Rape that may be qualified under the
following circumstances:
Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall become reclusion perpetua to death.

When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or afinnity within the third civil
degree, or the common--law spouse of the parent of the victim;

2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law
enforcement or penal institution;

3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is
personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the
crime;

5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;

6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
(HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible
disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;

7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-military
units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal
institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of
the crime;

8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation or disability;

9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime; and

10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Significant to this case, the above-highlighted provisions of RA 8353 already accounted for
the circumstance of minority under certain peculiar instances. The consequence therefore is
a clear overlap' with minority as an element of the crime of sexual intercourse against a
minor under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. However, as it was earlier intimated, RA 8353 is not only
the more recent statutory enactment but more importantly, the more comprehensive law on
rape; therefore, the Court herein clarifies that in cases where a minor is raped through sexual
intercourse, the provisions of RA 8353 amending the RPC ought to prevail over Section 5 (b)
of RA 7610 although the latter also penalizes the act of sexual intercourse against a minor.

The Court is not unaware of its previous pronouncements in People v. Tubillo,31 citing the
cases of People v. Abay32 and People v. Pangilinan33 (Tubillo, et al.), wherein the potential
conflict in the application of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, on the one hand, vis-a-vis RA 8353
amending the RPC, on the other, was resolved by examining whether or not the
prosecution's evidence focused on the element of "coercion and influence" or "force and
intimidation." In Tubillo:
To reiterate, the elements of rape under Section 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the
victim is under twelve years of age.

On the other hand, the elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, are: (1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether
male or female, is below 18 years of age. It is also stated there that children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse are those children, whether male or female, who, for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

In the recent case of Quimvel v. People, the Court ruled that the term "coercion and
influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation." Black's
Law Dictionary defines coercion as compulsion; force; duress, while undue influence is
defined as persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will. On the other hand, force
refers to constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end; while jurisprudence
defines intimidation as unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. As can be
gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. Thus, it is not improbable that an act of
committing carnal knowledge against a child, twelve (12) years old or older, constitutes both
rape under Section 266-A of the RPC and child abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

In People v. Abay, the Court was faced with the same predicament. In that case, both the
elements of Section 266-A of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 were alleged in the
information. Nevertheless, these provisions were harmonized, to wit:
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is
below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should
be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under At1icle
266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot
be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will
be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal
act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal
Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Abay, the offended party was thirteen (13) years old at the time of the rape incident.
Again, the information therein contained all the elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. Nevertheless, the Court observed that the prosecution's
evidence only focused on the specific fact that accused therein sexually violated the
offended party through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument
and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus, accused therein was convicted of the
crime of rape under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC. Notably, the prosecution did not tackle the
broader scope of "influence or coercion" under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

Similarly, in People v. Pangilinan, the Court was faced with the same dilemma because all
the elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 were present.
It was ruled therein that the accused can be charged with either rape or child abuse and
be convicted therefor. The Court observed, however, that the prosecution's evidence
proved that accused had carnal knowledge with the victim through force and intimidation
by threatening her with a samurai sword. Thus, rape was established. Again, the evidence in
that case did not refer to the broader scope of "influence or coercion" under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610.
In the present case, the RTC convicted Tubillo for the crime of rape because the prosecution
proved that there was carnal knowledge against by means of force or intimidation,
particularly, with a bladed weapon. On the other hand, the CA convicted Tubillo with
violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 because the charge of rape under the information
was in relation to R.A. No. 7610.

After a judicious study of the records, the Court rules that Tubillo should be convicted of rape
under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC.

A reading of the information would show that the case at bench involves both the elements
of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. As elucidated in People v.
Abay and People v. Pangilinan, in such instance, the court must examine the evidence of
the prosecution, whether it focused on the specific force or intimidation employed by the
offender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with
the victim.

Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the force or intimidation
employed by Tubillo against HGE under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC. The prosecution
presented the testimony HGE who narrated that Tubillo unlawfully entered the house where
she was sleeping by breaking the padlock. Once inside, he forced himself upon her, pointed
a knife at her neck, and inserted his penis in her vagina. She could not resist the sexual.
attack against her because. Tubillo poked a bladed weapon at her neck. Verily, Tubillo
employed brash force or intimidation to carry out his dastardly deeds.

In fine, Tubillo should be found guilty of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC with a
prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.34
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As may be gleaned therefrom, the Court examined the evidence of the prosecution to
determine "whether it focused on the specific force or intimidation employed by the
offender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with
the victim."35 The premise in Tubillo that "coercion or influence" is the broader concept in
contrast to "force or intimidation" appears to have been rooted from that statement in
Quimvel wherein it was mentioned that "[t]he term 'coercion and influence' as appearing in
the law is broad enough to cover 'force and intimidation' as used in the Information."36
However, Quimvel did not intend to provide any distinction on the meanings of these terms
so as to determine whether an accused's case should fall under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or
RA 8353 amending the RPC, much more foist any distinction depending on what the
prosecution's e vidence "focused" on. In fact, the Court in Quimvel stated "the terms
['coercion and influence' and 'force and intimidation'] are used almost synonymously";37 as
such, the Court in Quimvel held that "[i]t is then of no moment that the terminologies
employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different";38 and that "the words 'coercion
or influence' need not specifically appear"39 in order for the accused to be prosecuted
under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. As such, the Court misconstrued the aforesaid statement in
Quimvel and misapplied the same to somehow come up with Tubillo, et al.'s "focus of
evidence" approach.

However, the mistaken interpretation of Quimvel in Tubillo, et al. only compounds the
fundamental error of the "focus of evidence" approach, which is 'to rely on evidence
appreciation, instead of legal interpretation. Ultimately, there is no cogent legal basis to
resolve the possible conflict between two (2) laws by ascertaining what was the focus of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. Presentation of evidence leads to determining
what act was committed. Resolving the application of either RA 8353 amending the RPC or
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 already presupposes that evidentiary concerns regarding what act
has been committed (i.e., the act of sexual intercourse against a minor) have already been
settled. Hence, the Court is only tasked to determine what law should apply based on legal
interpretation using the principles of statutory construction. In other words, the Court need
not unearth evidentiary concerns as what remains is a pure question of law - that is: in cases
when the act of sexual intercourse against a minor has been committed, do we apply RA
8353 amending the RPC or Section 5 (b) of RA 7610? Herein lies the critical flaw of the "focus
of evidence" approach, which was only compounded by the mistaken reading of Quimvel
in the cases of Tubillo, et al. as above-explained.

Neither should the conflict between the application of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 and RA 8353
be resolved based on which law provides a higher penalty against the accused. The
superseding scope of RA 8353 should be the sole reason of its prevalence over Section 5 (b)
of RA 7610. The higher penalty provided under RA 8353 should not be the moving
consideration, given that penalties are merely accessory to the act being punished by a
particular law. The term "'[p]enalty' is defined as '[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer
usually in the form of imprisonment or fine'; '[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a
person who commits a deliberate or negligent act.'"40 Given its accessory nature, once the
proper application of a penal law is determined over another, then the imposition of the
penalty attached to that act punished in the prevailing penal law only follows as a matter of
course. In the final analysis, it is the determination of the act being punished together with its
attending circumstances - and not the gravity of the penalty ancillary to that punished act -
which is the key consideration in resolving the conflicting applications of two penal laws.

Notably, in the more recent case of People v. Caoili (Caoili),41 the Court encountered a
situation wherein the punishable act committed by therein accused, i.e., lascivious conduct,
may be prosecuted either under "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in
relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610" or "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610." In
resolving the matter, the Court did not consider the "focus" of the evidence for the
prosecution nor the gravity of the penalty imposed. Rather, it is evident that the determining
factor in designating or charging the proper offense, and consequently, the imposable
penalty therefor, is the nature of the act committed, i.e., lascivious conduct, taken together
with the attending circumstance of the age of the victim:
Accordingly, for the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court takes this
opportunity to prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper
offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in
determining the imposable penalty:

1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the offense,
and in determining the imposable penalty.

2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be
"Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5
(b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.

3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below
eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully take
care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be
designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.42
Thus, being the more recent case, it may be concluded that Caoili implicitly abandoned the
"focus of evidence" approach used in the Tubillo, et al. rulings. Likewise, it is apt to clarify that
if there appears to be any rational dissonance or perceived unfairness in the imposable
penalties between two applicable laws (say for instance, that a person who commits rape
by sexual assault under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC,43 as amended by
RA 8353 is punished less than a person who commits lascivious conduct against a minor
under Section 5 (b) of RA 761044), then the solution is through remedial legislation and not
through judicial interpretation. It is well-settled that the determination of penalties is a policy
matter that belongs to the legislative branch of government.45 Thus, however compelling
the dictates of reason might be, our constitutional order proscribes the Judiciary from
adjusting the gradations of the penalties which are fixed by Congress through its legislative
function. As Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta had instructively observed in his opinion in
Caoli:
Curiously, despite the clear intent of R.A. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, the penalty [reclusion temporal medium] when the victim is
under 12 years old is lower compared to the penalty [reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua] when the victim is 12 years old and below 18. The same holds true if the
crime of acts of lasciviousness is attended by an aggravating circumstance or committed by
persons under Section 31, Article XII of R.A. 7610, in which case, the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. In contrast, when no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended
the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when committed against a child
under 12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty when the child is 12 years old and below
18. This is because, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term in the case
of the younger victims shall be taken from reclusion temporal minimum, whereas as [sic] the
minimum term in the case of the older victims shall be taken from prision mayor medium to
reclusion temporal minimum. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that what courts may
correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of the legislature are only those which are
clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints, but not those due to
oversight, as shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is clear, and to
correct it would be to change the meaning of the law. To my mind, a corrective legislation is
the proper remedy to address the noted incongruent penalties for acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child.46 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds that in instances where an
accused is charged and eventually convicted of having sexual intercourse with a minor, the
provisions on rape under RA 8353 amending the RPC should prevail over Section 5 (b) of RA
7610. Further, to reiterate, the "focus of evidence" approach used in the Tubillo, et al. rulings
had already been abandoned.
In this case, it has been established that Ejercito had carnal knowledge of AAA through
force, threat, or intimidation. Hence, he should be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 (a),
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. To note, although AAA was only fifteen
(15) years old and hence, a minor at that time, it was neither alleged nor proven that Ejercito
was her "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" so as to
qualify the crime and impose a higher penalty. As such, pursuant to the first paragraph of
Article 266-B of the same law, Ejercito should be meted with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, as ruled by both the RTC and the CA. Further, the Court affirms the monetary
awards in AAA's favor in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid, since the same are in
accord. with prevailing jurisprudence.47

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR. HC. No. 01656 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Francisco Ejercito is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, he is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
April 24, 2018
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO.
2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of
divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and
the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit
of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of
the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its
behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of
the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a
petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese
Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living
separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage
was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married
to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of
the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the
aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry
of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be
sufficient in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of

the Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file
for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country"
and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall
have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al.
V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is
no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo,
Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the
latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of
two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it
was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to
remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under
the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it
would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still
considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly
divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married
again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and
obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became
naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court
therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
xxx

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has
the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad
and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced
decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in
the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her;
[and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree
that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the
issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of
their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce
the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child.
The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that
the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The
husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife
is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu
not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois
court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and
rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid
in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed
by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to
manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but
the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce
decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of
the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before
said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse
can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in
Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able
to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her
and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because
the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives
from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances)
his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage
included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's
right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a
divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et
al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate
action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual
issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse
and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as
both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is
subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which
she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not
only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in
the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature
deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and
to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean
that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will
not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but
to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v.
COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a
statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice.
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the
law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her
countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended
as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are
severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under
Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may
be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45
When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class
strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It
includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to
travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest
is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by
history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties
must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general
welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the
provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is
based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities
as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national
who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce
decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce
decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of
his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to
their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one
and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in

treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds
similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these
grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount
to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray
for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now
existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench
and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these
"mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are
similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the
same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages

Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos
marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this
jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted
from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or
she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial
unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust
or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing
and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed
marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to
marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited
or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange
reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of
a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature
cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage
divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to
discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of
the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by
the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the
approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an
E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground
for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the
other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's
incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New
Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no
longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine
society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress,
House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute
Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018
was submitted by the House Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third
Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a
judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or
amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or

political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a

petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's
spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a
child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after
being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a
petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1)
year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years,
either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said
judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as
follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18)
years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without
the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the
party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and
wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and
such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage
or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the
petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or
later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one
sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the
transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown
of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to
any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs,
morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their
nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause
the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and
the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is
sincerely believes that they are good for country.77 While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It
is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right
and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must
be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of
the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these
obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost
always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the
notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No.
9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The
Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended
by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting
and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must
not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We

disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms"
under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born
out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely,
these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the
child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the
principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to
be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed
according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement
of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world,
mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all
marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten
quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws
that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with,
that the law be dispensed with justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting
Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first
be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his
office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the
Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3)
Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these
documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained
to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce
decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must
be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice