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Persons and Family Relations

[10/01/19] X. Paternity and Filiation

Uy v Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009 - Abad 2

Angeles vs Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005 - Awisan 4

Arbolario v CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003 - Griarte 7

Continental Steel v Montano, Oct. 13, 2009 - 9

SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006 - De Venecia 11

Suntay v Suntay, GR 132524, Dec. 29, 1998 - Razonable 14

Moore v. Republic, 8 SCRA 282 - Lee 14

Naldoza v. Republic, 112 SCRA 658 - Del Rosario 16

Rep. vs CA, 300 SCRA 138 - 17

Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014 - Flores 18

Osmeña de Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil 222 - Floreza 21

Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455, October 18, 2004 - Lopez 22

Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009 - Del Rosario 24

De la Cruz vs Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 - 26

Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012 - Hernando 27

Grande v Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 - Cruz 29

Barcelote v Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017 - Yabut 31

Masbate v Relucio, GR 235498, July 30, 2018 - Cuntapay-Vitin 34

Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010 - Yupangco 35

Andal v. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165 - Laydia 37

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73 - Calo 39

Concepcion vs. CA, G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005 - Lopez 41

Agustin vs. CA, G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005 - Fonacier 43

Herrera vs. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005 - 44

Estate v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007 - Villanueva 47

Lucas v Lucas, GR No. 190710, June 6, 2011 - Abad 49

Benitez-Badua v. CA, 229 SCRA 468 - Yabut 51

Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002 - Estrada 54

Republic v Magpayo, GR 189476, Feb. 2, 2011 - 55

Geronimo v Santos, G.R. No. 197099, Sept. 25, 2015 - De Venecia 58

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Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 621, June 22, 1984 - Razonable 60

Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582, July 31, 1997 - Lee 61

Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998 - Griarte 62

Heirs of Conti v CA, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998 - 64

De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA 499 - Flores 66

Aguilar v Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, Jan. 28, 2015 - Floreza 67

Calimag vs. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R.191936, June 27, 2016 - Awisan 69

Tabuada v Tabuada, GR 196510, Sept. 12, 2018 - Del Rosario 2

Gaspay v. CA, 238 SCRA 163 - Cuntapay-Vitin 73

Ong vs CA, G.R. No. 95386. May 29, 1997 - 74

Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495 - Hernando 76

Heirs of Gabatan vs CA, GR 150206, March 13, 2009 - Cruz 77

Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012 - Awisan 81

San Agustin vs. Sales, G.R. N0. 189289, August 31, 2016 - Yupangco 83

Calma v Turla, GR 221684, July 30, 2018 - 85

Abadilla vs Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 447 - Laydia 87

Uy v Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009 - Abad

Concepts of paternity, filiation and legitimacy


JOANIE SURPOSA UY, petitioner, vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, respondent.

September 18, 2009 G.R. No. 183965 Chico-Nazario, J.


Recit Ready Synopsis

In a petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation, the Supreme Court reiterated that the status and filiation
of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status of filiation of a child.
Paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court
to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FC 163 - The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.

NCC Art. 2035 - No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;


(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)

The Compromise Agreement entered into between the respondent and the petitioner to establish the illegitimacy of the

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petitioner and her brother is against public policy. Thus, the same is void ab initio and vests no rights. Paternity and
filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its
existence or absence.

FACTS
● Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene
Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan.

● Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that
petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names: “ALFREDO F. SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE
DUCAY” as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden
surname of Irene’s mother.

● Respondent financially supported petitioner until she got married, and even helped her be employed.

● Petitioner and her brother were known to the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children.

● In his Answer to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship
with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.

● Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he took
care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on special family
occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.

● Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision dated
21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res judicata
in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.

● It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner had
already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually
entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, Which was approved by RTC-
Branch 9 in a Decision dated 21 February 2000.

● The Court approved the compromise agreement.

ISSUE
Can the parties enter into a compromise agreement in determining the affiliation of petitioner?

RULING
The Court rules in the negative.

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s
status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan
acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan Php2,000,000.00

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each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also
waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under
Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public
policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void
agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties’ alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective
prestations.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Angeles vs Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005 - Awisan

Legitimate children
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, petitioner, vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES MAGLAYA, respondent.
September 2, 2005 G.R. No. 153798 Garcia, J
Recit Ready Synopsis

When Francisco Angeles died, Corazon Maglaya filed a petition for her to be declared as administratrix of the intestate
estates of Francisco. She claims to be the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, who were
married sometime in 1938. She presented birth certificate and scholastic and governmental service records where
Francisco was named to be her father. She also showed wedding pictures where Francisco attended. Belen Angeles
opposed the petition and prayed she be made the administratrix since she married Francisco in 1948. The issue in this
case is that whether or not Corazon is the legitimate child of the decedent, and therefore be declared as the administrator
of the intestate estate. The court ruled in the contrary. A child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock.
There is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s mother. No marriage certificate or contract was
presented. No witnesses to affirm the cohabitation of Genoveva and Francisco. And the Birth Certificate, as well as the
pictures and other documents, unsigned by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient
evidence of filiation or recognition.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the
factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during
the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.

FC 164: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result to artificial insemination of the with with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both

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are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

FC Art. 172:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:


1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
FACTS

1. January 21, 1998: Francisco Angeles, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan, died leaving behind
four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties.
2. March 25, 1998: Corazon Maglaya filed a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Francisco.
She claims to be the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, who were married sometime
in 1938
3. Belen Angeles opposed the petition and prayed she be made the administratix since she married Francisco on
August 7, 1948, who represented himself as single at that time. She and Francisco had, during their marriage,
legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Her contentions against the petitioner:
○ Respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s
legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him
○ Corazon has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any
acceptable document to prove such union.
4. Corazon, in her reply to opposition:
○ Per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the
Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place,
were destroyed
○ Respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed
with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.
Respondent alleged that as legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have been notified of the
adoption proceedings
5. Corazon also offered in evidence:
○ her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital,
Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes”
appears on the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”;
○ pictures taken during respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her
marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records.

Trial's court decision: “WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the [respondent]
to state a cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of Procedure.”

CA's decision: “WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to
appoint petitionerappellant Aleli “Corazon” Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. SO

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ORDERED.”

● A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of
lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.”
● Following is an excerpt from Tison:
○ ‘The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock,
and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally
○ ‘Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status
of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early action to settle
any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to the matter . . . may still be
easily available.’
○ ‘Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . .’

ISSUE
Is Corazon a legitimate child of the decedent, and therefore should be declared as the administrator of the intestate
estate? --> NO.

RULING
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

● The correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that:
○ (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and
○ (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked collaterally.
● There is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s mother, Genoveva Mercado:
○ No marriage certificate or marriage contract
○ No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he
solemnized the marriage between the two.
○ None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that
supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco’s daughter.
○ In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva
Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the
solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details.
○ Respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves
out to the public as man-and-wife
○ As to the wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving respondent’s hands in marriage, these papers
or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are not
sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in 1938, respondent
never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous marriage. Ironical as it may seem,
respondent herself undermined her very own case

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Arbolario v CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003 - Griarte

Who are considered legitimate children — (a) Conceived during marriage — Valid Marriage
VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION ARBOLARIO, CARLOS
ARBOLARIO, and Spouses ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO SALHAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH COLINCO, ORPHA COLINCO and GOLDELINA COLINCO,
respondents
G.R. No. 129163 April 22, 2003 PANGANIBAN, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, had 5 children. The second
child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario and their union was blessed with the birth of only one child,
Purificacion Arbolario, who died in 1985, died a spinster. Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of
Francisca Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario,
Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as ‘Arbolarios’) were born. Respondents Irene, Ruth,
Orpha, and Goldelina (Colincos) believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition.

Colincos filed against Spouses Salhay a case seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by
the latter since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion
Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978. And that they purchased the disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the deceased lessor in
1978. Before the abovementioned case was heard and tried on the merits, the Arbolarios and Spouses Salhay filed for
Cancellation of Title with Damages, against Colincos. Petitioners contend that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as the Arbolarios were excluded therein.

The supreme court held when Juan Arbolario cohabited with another woman, the union was extramarital. Consequently,
their children (respondent Arbolarios) are illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion and thus barred by
Article 992 from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. It does not follow
that just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A
marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Civil Code

Article 261. There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the
dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of such
child must prove his allegation. (n)

Article 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
FACTS
1. Macaria Lirazan (Spouses Baloyo) had 5 children: Agueda, Catalina, Eduardo, Gaudencia, and Julian. (All are
dead)
2. Agueda Colinco (1st child) was survived by her 2 children: Antonio and respondent Irene Colinco. Antonio
Colinco predeceased his three daughters, herein respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina.
3. Catalina Baloyo (2nd child) was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was blessed with the birth of one child,
Purificacion Arbolario (died in 1985)

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4. Juan Arbolario consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born
the petitioners Voltaire, Lucena, Fe, Exaltacion, and Carlos (Arbolarios). All the petitioners were born well before
the year 1951.
5. In 1946, it appears that Eduardo Baloyo (3rd child) sold his entire interest in Lot 323 to his sister, Agueda Colinco,
by virtue of a notarized document.
6. In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and
their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late
Spouses Baloyo.
7. Gaudencia (4th child) conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to 1/2 and
Purificacion Arbolario to the other half.
8. Respondents Irene, Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina (Colincos) believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition (Irene Colinco, ½ while
the surviving daughters of her late brother Antonio namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, to share in equal, ideal
proportions to the remaining ½).
9. Colincos filed against Spouses Salhay a case seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot
occupied by the latter since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of
the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978. And that they purchased the disputed portion of Lot No. 323
from the deceased lessor in 1978.
10. Before the abovementioned case was heard and tried on the merits, the Arbolarios and Spouses Salhay filed for
Cancellation of Title with Damages, against Colincos. Petitioners contend that the Declaration of Heirship and
Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as the Arbolarios were excluded
therein.
11. RTC: Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were
her cousins and nieces. The Colincos could not inherit from her, because she had half-brothers and half-sisters
(CC, Article 1009). Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because
they knew all along the existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand,
had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of a portion of the disputed lot.
12. CA: Arbolarios are illegitimate. Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting
intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late
Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot conveniently undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were
treated as half-brothers and half-sisters by the deceased.

ISSUE
Whether or not Arbolarios are legitimate children and can inherit from their half-sister (Purificacion Arbolario)

RULING
Petitioners’ maintain that Catalina Baloyo had long been dead before the notarized declaration of heirship was ever
executed, thus conclude that the Arbolarios are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion.

The court held that the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalina’s death was intercalated. The first two numbers
(1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it look like a 0. The paragraph
(in the declaration) quoted by petitioners should show a chronological progression in the heirs years of death. If Catalina
had indeed died in 1903, then her name should be written after Aguedas and not before it. Moreover, it does not follow
that just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his
children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an
undisputable fact.

Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established. It stands to reason that children
born within wedlock are legitimate. Petitioners failed to prove the fact of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario

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and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

- Petitioners contend that the CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide
the disputed lot since respondents did not raise the issue of partition on appeal. The CA (as agreed by the SC)
held that the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the parties, because respondents merely
sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners sought the annulment of the
Deed of Partition respondents had entered into. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It
seeks a severance of the individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific
property and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference

Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to establish that
they were legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion

- The SC in agreement with the CA ruled that the acquisition of the property by the Salhay’s was improper as there
was no clear and reliable evidence introduced to prove such allegation. Also, no favorable supporting evidence
was cited by petitioners in their Memorandum.

Continental Steel v Montano, Oct. 13, 2009 -

[TOPIC FROM OUTLINE]


[Complete Title]
[Date] [Case Number] [Ponente]
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for
Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in
the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and

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other Death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death
could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2)
status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one with
civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased
is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding
from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not
a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she
was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this petition.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent

RULING

1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines
when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil
personality is not relevant in this case.

The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.

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Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with
the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality.
Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in
the mother’s womb.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006 - De Venecia

SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006


SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET, H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H.
AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, respondents.
February 27, 2016 G.R. 165546 CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Recit Ready Synopsis
Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with
the SSS for death benefits on indicating in her claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for
monthly pension was settled. SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s
claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than 6 years before,
and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal
children with Rosanna. The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary. CA reversed the SSC
deicision and favored the respondents. Issue: WON Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo

Held: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived
or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate
which bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing
that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4,
1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born
during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his
lifetime. The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature,
which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity.
For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2 qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate
spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. A wife who is already separated de facto from her

11
husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. If it is
proved that they were still living together at the time of his death, it is presumed that she was dependent on the husband
for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits
as it was established that she is his legitimate child. Records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but
there are no legal papers to prove it. Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary
beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for
support even if they were already living separately. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be extended to other siblings.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
FC 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both
are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

FACTS

● Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died.
● Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits.
● Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn
● SSS received a sworn letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for death
benefits.
● She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with
another man on whom she has been dependent for support.
● She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a
certain Romeo dela Peña.
● In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original birth certificate of one Jefren H. dela
Peña, showing that the latter was born to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the two
were married.
● As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension
● On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was
infertile, the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their pensions.
● This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the
Social Security Commission
● Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant.
● The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the following: (1) Pablo and Rosanna’s
marriage certificate; (2) Janet’s certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablo’s
certificate of death.
● The claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing
Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father.
● They asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as husband and wife under one roof.
● In support thereof, they attached a Joint Affidavit executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and Carmelita
Yangu, where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until the latter’s death.
● In Janet’s birth certificate, which was registered in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her father
was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna.
● The SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit
● The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that she had contracted
marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo.
● The SSC based its conclusion on the birth certificate of Jefren dela Peña stating that his mother, Rosanna, and
father, Romeo dela Peña, were married on November 1, 1990.
● The SSC declared that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Peña while she was still married to Pablo as

12
evidenced by the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Peña showing that she was the child of Rosanna
Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña
● The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his death because of her
act of adultery.
● As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there was more
compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child.
● As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.
● CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.
● CA relied on the birth certificates of
ISSUE

Whether or not Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.

RULING
YES (Jeylynn); NO (Janet). Jeylynn‘s claim is justified by her birth cert w/c bears Pablo‘s signature (showing she was
born 10/29/91; Rosanna and Pablo were married 12/4/77 and marriage subsisted until latter‘s death on 12/8/96). Under
A164, FC, children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate.
Presumption of legitimacy can‘t extend to Janet because her date of birth wasn‘t substantially proven. Under RA1161,
only ―legally adopted children are considered dependent children.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

1. It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.
2. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
3. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife
are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
4. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171 of the
Family Code, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred
by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
5. Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs.
6. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence,
Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
7. The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature,
which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity.
8. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, cannot extend to Janet because her date of birth was
not substantially proven.
9. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s
parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.
10. It should be noted that respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate. However,
the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way
by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by
the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the certificate.

13
11. In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing
from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child.
12. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal
papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary.
13. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary
since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even
if they were already living separately.

Suntay v Suntay, GR 132524, Dec. 29, 1998 - Razonable

[TOPIC FROM OUTLINE]


[Complete Title]
[Date] [Case Number] [Ponente]
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Moore v. Republic, 8 SCRA 282 - Lee

14
Rights of legitimate children
Elaine A. Moore, petitioner-appellant, vs. Republic of the Philippines, oppositor-appellee
June 26, 1963 GR No. L-18407 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS
1. Elaine A. Moore is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an American citizen, out of
whose wedlock a child by the name William Michael Velarde was born who at that time of this case was already
14 years old.
2. The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of divorce issued by the Superior
Court of the State of California.
3. After the said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore at Los Angeles,
California.
4. Elaine thereafter filed a petition before CFI of Instance of Rizal praying that her child from a former marriage, be
permitted to change his name so as to read William Michael Velarde Moore
ISSUE

Whether or not under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his
mother. NO

RULING

NO. Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child o use the surname of a person who is not his father.

Article 364 of the Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.

Mention is also made on Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case of annulment of a voidable marriage
the children conceived before the annulment shall principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy
the effect of a decree of divorce, it is concluded that the children who are conceived before such decree should also be
understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.
Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom
what would be his feeling when he comes to a mature age. Anyway, if that time comes, he may decide the matter for
himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the present, the Supreme Court deem the action taken by the
petitioner premature.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

15
Naldoza v. Republic, 112 SCRA 658 - Del Rosario

Rights of legitimate children

In the Matter of the Change of Names of DIONESIO DIVINAGRACIA, JR., and BOMBI ROBERTO DIVINAGRACIA to
DIONESIO NALDOZA and BOMBI ROBERTO NALDOZA, respectively. ZOSIMA NALDOZA, as natural guardian
and guardian ad litem of said minors, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE
FERNANDO S. RUIZ of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, respondents-appellees.

March 15, 1982 GR No. L-55538 Aquino, J.


Recit Ready Synopsis
Petitioner in this case is praying that the surname of her two legitimate children with Dionesio Divinagracia be changed
from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname since the two children were allegedly teased about their father’s criminal
activities.

The Court ruled that the legitimate minors are supposed to bear principally their father’s surname, removing this would
cause confusion as to minor’s parentage and might create the impression that the minor’s are illegitimate since they
would carry the maternal surname only.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS
● Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia were married. They begot two children.
● After a quarrel between the spouses, Dionesio left the conjugal home and never returned. He allegedly swindled
Congressman Maglana and other persons.
● The classmates of the two children were allegedly teased about their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases
for estafa were filed in court against the father.
● Zosima, on August 10, 1978, filed in the CFI of Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two
children be changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname. The trial court dismissed the petition.

ISSUE
WON the children should be allowed to drop the surname of their father and be allowed to use the mother’s surname?

RULING
No. Legitimate minors are supposed to bear principally their father’s surname, and cannot, at their mother’s behest, bear
only their mother’s surname, thereby removing the prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry. To
allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to minor’s parentage and might create the impression that the
minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only.

16
As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage.
" If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his
mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of
surname.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Rep. vs CA, 300 SCRA 138 -

Rights of Legitimate Children


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CYNTHIA VICENCIO, respondents
Dec. 14, 1998 G.R. No. 88202 QUISUMBING, J
Recit Ready Synopsis
Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition to change her surname to “Yu.” Cynthia is the legitimate child of Pablo Vicencio and Fe
Leabres. After her father left the conjugal abode, her parents’ marriage was dissolved. Fe married Ernesto Yu. Ernesto
raised Cynthia from childhood. Confusion arose as to her parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries as to why
she is using Vicencio as her family name. This caused her extreme embarrassment. The issue is whether Cynthia should
be allowed to adopt the surname of his step-father. The Court ruled no because the general rule on the use of surnames
requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Cynthia is the legitimate offspring of Fe
Leabres and Pablo Vicencio.By adopting the surname of her step-father, confusion and legal complications may arise.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS
1. Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition for change of surname, from “Vicencio” to “Yu”.
2. She alleged that she was born to Spouses Pablo Vicencio and Fe Leabres.
3. After a marital spat, Pablo left the conjugal abode and never returned.
4. The marriage of her parents was later dissolved.
5. Fe thereafter married Ernesto Yu, and adopted his surname.
6. Since her childhood, Cynthia had not known, much less remembered, her real father Pablo. Her known father had
been and still is Ernesto Yu.
7. But she had been using the family name “Vicencio” in her school and other activities and the surname”Yu” in
activities such beauty pageants.
8. Confusion arose as to her parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as
her family name. This caused her extreme embarrassment.

17
ISSUE
W/N Cynthia should be allowed to adopt the surname of his step-father?

RULING
No. The general rule on the use of surnames requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their
father. Cynthia is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio.Confusion indeed might arise with regard to
private respondents parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could
arise if she was allowed to bear her step-fathers surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. Such change might
even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that her step-father has two (2) children with her
mother. In the event of her step-father’s death, it is possible that Cynthia may even claim inheritance rights as a
“legitimate” daughter. The Solicitor General opines that Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because
the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, but Ernesto has not opted for such a remedy.

Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a
stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014 - Flores

Rights of Legitimate Children; special proceedings for declaration of heirship; when not required
HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS, ANSELMA B. ENDRINAL, GERTRUDES BASBAS, RUFINA BASBAS, CEFERINA B.
CARTECIANO, ANACLETO BASBAS, ARSENIA BASBAS, ANASTACIO BASBAS, BEDACIO BASBAS, TEODOCIA
B. OCAMPO, SEGUNDO C. BASBAS, MARIA B. RAMOS AND EUGENIO BASBAS IN REPRESENTATION OF
PEDRO BASBAS; HERINO T. BASBAS AND NESTOR T. BASBAS IN REPRESENTATION OF LUCAS BASBAS;
ADELAIDA B. FLORENTINO, RODRIGO BASBAS, FELIX BASBAS, JR., TEODULO BASBAS, ANDRESITO
BASBAS, LARRY BASBAS AND JOEY BASBAS IN REPRESENTATION OF FELIX BASBAS, SR., VICTOR BEATO,
ALIPIO BEATO, EUTIQUIO BEATO, JULIANA B. DIAZ, PABLO BEATO AND ALEJANDRO BEATO IN
REPRESENTATION OF REMIGIA B. BEATO, AS REPRESENTED BY RODRIGO BASBAS, petitioners, vs .
RICARDO BASBAS as represented by EUGENIO BASBAS, respondents.
September 10, 2014 G.R. No. 188773 PEREZ, J
Recit Ready Synopsis
The Court struck down arguments relating to the legitimacy of an heir, ruling that since Valentin, grandfather of
petitioners, had long possessed the status as a legitimate child and thus an heir of Severo whose estate was an issue.
The fact of legitimacy need no longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship. There is no need
to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in

18
which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
FACTS
1. Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo . . . died on July 14, 1911. They had a child named Valentin
(Basbas). During Severo's lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in Santa Rosa, Laguna otherwise known as Lot
No. 39. Lot No. 39 is adjacent to Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate which lot was acquired, by
purchase, by Valentin Basbas.
2. Sometime in 1987, [respondents], through Crispiniano Basbas, filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title before
the Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna, covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Subsequently
thereafter, or on June 1, 1989, an Order was issued by the RTC granting the aforesaid petition. On the basis of
said Order, the title covering Lot No. 39 was ordered reconstituted in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas.
3. In 1993, defendants Crispiniano Basbas y Talampas and [respondent] Ricardo Basbas y Talampas executed an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of deceased Severo Basbas . . . stating among others that the only heirs of
Severo Basbas are Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha.. (this act is fraudulent according to SC, see notes)
4. On the basis of said Extra-Judicial Settlement . . . the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna issued a new
Transfer Certificate Title in the names of [therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas and [respondent] Ricardo
Basbas
5. Sometime in 1995, [herein petitioners Heirs of Valentin Basbas] discovered that [respondents] Crispiniano and
Ricardo Basbas were able to secure for themselves Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot No. 39 of the Santa
Rosa Detached Estate. Therefore, they filed a case against Crispiniano and Ricardo in order to recover the land
as they were claiming over the ownership of the land.
6. They executed the following stipulation of facts:
a. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.
b. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle name Talampas.
c. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of [Severo] Basbas.
d. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo's] name.
7. Defendant contentions: They denied petitioners' ownership over Lot No. 39 and contended that upon Severo's
death, he was survived by two heirs, Valentin (grandfather of petitioners) and Nicolas Basbas (Nicolas) (paternal
grandfather of Crispiniano and Ricardo) who evenly divided Severo's estate, comprising of two lots, herein
subject property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, and Lot No. 40, adjacent thereto, among them.
Lot No. 40 was inherited by Valentin, while Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas. When Nicolas died, Felomino, the father of
the defendants, inherited the said land, (Illustration: Severo -> Nicolas -> Felomino -> Crispiniano and Ricardo)

MTC and RTC: Ruled in favor of the Petitioners.


a. The trial courts found that petitioners fully established their filiation with the decedent Severo, the original
titleholder of Lot No. 39 and from whom all parties trace their claim of ownership over the subject property.
b. According to the trial courts, the defendants are lacking documentary evidence to base their claims. Assuming,
for the sake of argument, that Nicolas Basbas, predecessor of these defendants [including herein respondent
Ricardo], was the son of Severo Basbas, then Nicolas Basbas must have been an illegitimate child of Severo
Basbas, in which case his filiation should be first established before he can claim to be an heir. But this cannot be
done anymore, simply because an action for recognition should have been made or brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parents (see Article 285 of NCC above)

CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court applied the SC’s ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del
Rosario.

19
a. In the said case, the SC ruled that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as it involves the establishment of a status or right.
b. The CA, in applying this rule, stated that the case at bar is an action for annulment of title, reconveyance with
damages, a civil action, whereas matters which involve the settlement and distribution of the estate of a deceased
person as well as filiation and heirship partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
c. Therefore, it is proper to thresh out this issue in a special proceeding, since [Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo]
seeks to establish his status as one of the heirs entitled to the property in dispute.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the case of Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario applies to this case.
2. Whether or not Crispiniano and Ricardo are heirs of Severo.
RULING
1. No, it does not apply to this case.
a. In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed
for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been declared the
legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay.
b. But in this case, when the petitioners claim that Valentin was a legitimate child of Severo and Ana Rivera, it was
not even controverted by the defendants. In addition, the status of Valentin as a compulsory heir of Severo and of
petitioners' status as heirs of Valentin and Severo are stipulated facts agreed to by Crispiniano and respondent
Ricardo.
c. In all, Valentin's long-possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no longer be the
subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court of Appeals. There is no
need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo.

2. No, they are not heirs of Severo. Hence they are not entitled to the said parcel land.
a. Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo miserably fail to establish the status of their ascendant and purported
predecessor-in-interest, Nicolas. In fact, the testimony of respondent Ricardo tells about the status of Valentin,
not about Nicolas' status, as a compulsory heir of Severo:
b. Mauro Basbas (Mauro), one of the defendants before the trial court, while testifying, also failed to shed light on
the status of Nicolas as an heir of Severo, insisting only that Nicolas is Severo's son as told to him by his
grandfather, Felomino Basbas. Mauro even categorically answered that the wife of Severo is Ana Rivera, further
establishing the legitimacy of Valentin as the son of Severo and Ana Rivera.
c. And, contraposed to the fact that Valentin's status as a legitimate child of Severo is already established, Nicolas'
status as a purported heir of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas' right thereto expiring upon his death.
Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondent's end that Nicolas was born of a valid marriage, only that he is
Severo's son. Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded to establish the status of Nicolas, whether he is a
legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done. (see Art. 173 FC above)

One final note. Severo, as well as Valentin, have been long dead. It is well-nigh thattitle to the subject property, Lot No. 39
of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, appear in the names of the petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, herein declared heirs of
Severo, or their successors-in-interest, to �nally settle title thereto and prevent occurrences of fraudulent titling thereof.
Hence, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin and their successors-in-interest, are directed to take the appropriate action for titling
of the subject property.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Some property law rulings:


a. Based on the evidence on hand, defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] acquired the property in
question through fraud and, therefore, an implied trust was created in favor of [petitioners] under Article 1456 of
the New Civil Code, which provides, thus:

20
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
b. Frauds committed:
i. According to defendants, Severo gave Lot 40 to Valentin and Lot 39 to Nicolas. But, this was not true as
Valentin bought the land from the government during that time.
ii. They claim to be the only heirs of Felomino Basbas (their father), and that Felomino Basbas and
Melencio Casubha are the only heirs of the late Severo Basbas, Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas.
Then executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severo Basbas. This was found
baseless as it was earlier discussed that Valentin and his heirs are heirs of Severo.
c. The fact that the subject lot was already registered in the defendants' [including herein respondent Ricardo] name
and indeed a Tax Declaration was issued in their favor for taxation purposes, and they have paid the taxes due
thereon, are not conclusive evidence of ownership.

Osmeña de Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil 222 - Floreza

Rights of illegitimate children


CATALINA OSMEÑA DE VALENCIA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EMILIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
August 2, 1949 G.R. No. L-1261 PARAS, J.:
Recit Ready Synopsis
The plaintiffs (legitimate children) prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants (illegitimate children), from using the
surname "Valencia." The Court ruled for the illegitimate children using the father’s surname. The Court concede that the
plaintiffs may use the surname of their father “Valencia’’ as a matter of right by reason of the mere fact that they are
legitimate children, but the law DOES NOT grant monopolistic propriety control to the legitimate children over the
surname of their father. In other words, legitimate children have a marked right over their surname, but it cannot be
interpreted to mean that they can prohibit others from using their father’s surname. Furthermore, the father acquiesced in
the use of the surname by the illegitimate children, but even had there been an objection, the illegitimate children can still
use the disputed surname in the absence of any law granting exclusive ownership over a surname.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Before the NCC, if a father has illegitimate children, the legitimate children cannot prevent said illegitimate children from
using the father’s surname because there was no specific legal provision regulating the use of surnames (such was the
ruling in this case); even if the father objects, the defendants can still use the father’s surname, in the absence of any law
granting exclusive ownership over a surname.

Note: However, under the present law (FC), there are such provisions, and thus a natural child may use the father’s
surname only if there has been acknowledgment.

FACTS

1. The plaintiffs (legitimate children) prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants (illegitimate children), from
using the surname "Valencia."
2. The defendants IC filed a motion to dismiss, and this was sustained by the lower court. Hence this appeal by the
plaintiffs LC.
3. The plaintiffs LC allege that they alone have the right to bear the surname "Valencia," in accordance with article
114 of the Civil Code which provides that legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the father. To

21
complete their argument, the plaintiffs point out that, under articles 139 and 845 of the Civil Code, illegitimate
children (who are not natural) are entitled only to support.

ISSUE
Can legitimate children prohibit illegitimate children from using their father’s surname?

RULING
No. The Court ruled for the illegitimate children using the father’s surname. If a father has illegitimate children, the
legitimate children cannot prevent said illegitimate children from using the father’s surname because there was no specific
legal provision regulating the use of surnames (such was the ruling in this case); even if the father objects, the defendants
can still use the father’s surname, in the absence of any law granting exclusive ownership over a surname.

The Court concede that the plaintiffs may use the surname of their father “Valencia’’ as a matter of right by reason of the
mere fact that they are legitimate children, but the law DOE NOT grant monopolistic propriety control to the legitimate
children over the surname of their father. In other words, legitimate children have a marked right over their surname, but it
cannot be interpreted to mean that they can prohibit others from using their father’s surname. Furthermore, the father
acquiesced in the use of the surname by the illegitimate children, but even had there been an objection, the illegitimate
children can still use the disputed surname in the absence of any law granting exclusive ownership over a surname.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455, October 18, 2004 - Lopez

WHO EXERCISES PATERNAL AUTHORITY


JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL,
respondents
October 18, 2004 G.R. No. 156343 PANGANIBAN
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.

David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the
latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over
an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of
course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate
child of the adoptive parent.

22
FACTS
● Petition for review seeking to reverse RTC decision and CA resolution granting custody of the child to the mother.
● On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda
Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
● On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as
one of the respondents.
● A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to produce before
this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002.
● The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel.
He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P.
Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
● According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted him in taking
care of the child.
● On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the petitioner in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the
said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they would bring him back in the
afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them.
● He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to bring him back
to him, but all his efforts were futile.
● The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and
[as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.

ISSUE
Can the natural father be denied of the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is
away?
RULING

The Court held that having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and
Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. Also, not to be ignored in Article 213 of the
Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except
when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were generally classified into two groups: (1)

23
natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit. A natural child is one
born outside a lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other. On the other hand, a spurious child is one born of parents who, at the time of
conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.

Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the father or the
mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was
awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter
case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there
are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status.

Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or
absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, without any
distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of "natural child" is important only for purposes of legitimation.
Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.

Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009 - Del Rosario

Illegitimate Children - Rights of illegitimate children


HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA PANGILINAN MARAMAG,
petitioners, vs. EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE
GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
June 5, 2009 GR 181132 Nachura, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
This is a case on whether the legitimate heirs are entitled to the insurance proceeds of the deceased although were not
designated as beneficiaries in the insurance contract.

Petitioners in this case are the legitimate heirs of deceased Loreto. The petitioners were not named as beneficiaries in the
insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. Petitioners claim that Eva, the concubine of Loreto and a suspect in
his murder, is disqualified from being designated of the insurance policies. They further add that Eva’s children with
Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies

WON the illegitimate children are entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy?

Yes, since the illegitimate children are the designated beneficiaries in the insurance contract. Their status as illegitimate
children does not invalidate this designation. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or
when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

24
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Art. 739, NCC - The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee;
and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 2011, NCC - The contract of insurance is governed by special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such
special laws shall be regulated by this Code.

Article 2012, NCC - Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named
beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make any donation to him, according to said article.

Sec. 12, Insurance Code - The interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy shall be forfeited when the beneficiary is
the principal, accomplice, or accessory in willfully bringing about the death of the insured; in which event, the nearest
relative of the insured shall receive the proceeds of said insurance if not otherwise disqualified.

Sec. 53, Insurance Code - The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in
whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.

FACTS

● Petitioners in this case are the legitimate heirs of deceased Loreto


● The petitioners were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife.
● Petitioners claim that Eva, the concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being
designated of the insurance policies
● They further add that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the
proceeds of the policies
● Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the share of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be
awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.

ISSUE
WON the illegitimate children are entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy?

RULING
Yes.

Under Sec. 53 of the Insurance Code, the insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the
person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. As such, only the parties
designated as beneficiaries are entitled to receive the insurance proceeds.

In this case, the illegitimate children are entitled to the insurance proceeds being the designated beneficiaries of Loreto
Maramag. The shares of the concubine in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition
on donations under Article 739 of the NCC or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts
must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of the wife and legitimate

25
children.

It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is
disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of
the insured.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

De la Cruz vs Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 -

Rights of Illegitimate Children


JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO", represented by JENIE SAN JUAN
DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
respondent.
July 31, 2009 GR No. 177728 CARPIO MORALES, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
The issue in the case at bar is WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can
be considered as a recognition of paternity.

Yes, the Court then adopted the ff. rules:


1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent
2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices
that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it
is merely corroborative of such other evidence

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if
their Filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has
the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the child's paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in
conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his
signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate ?liation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. xxx xxx xxx

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate ?liation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

26
FACTS
● Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but unfortunately,
Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth.
● Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino.
● When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
○ Certificate of Live Birth
○ AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography
○ Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and brother
● Respondent denied the registration because the child was born out of wedlock.
● Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document (autobiography) was unsigned and as per IRR
of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father) which states that:
○ “Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity”
● Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE
WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition
of paternity

RULING
YES. Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must be signed by putative father.
It must be read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172. It is therefore implied.
Special circumstances to the case:
● Died 2 months prior to child’s birth
● Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
● Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who stand to be affected by their hereditary
rights
The Court then adopted the ff. rules:
3. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent
4. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices
that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it
is merely corroborative of such other evidence

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012 - Hernando

Rights of Illegitimate Children


CHARLES GOTARDO, petitioner, v. DIVINA BULING, respondent.
August 15, 2012 G.R. No. 165166 Brion, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

27
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

FACTS
On September 6, 1995, Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte, for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the Charles Gotardo is the father of her child Gliffze. Petitioner denied
the paternity.

Evidence for Divina showed that she met Charles on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
Maasin, Southern Leyte branch. Charles courted Divina in the third week of December 1992 and they became
sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Charles gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, and she
reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill.

In September 1993, Charles started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented room in the
boarding house. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, she
got pregnant. Charles was happy and made plans to marry Divina. BUT, Charles backed out of the wedding plan.

Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When Charles did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze,
Divina sent him a demand letter on July 24, 1995 for recognition and support of their son. Due to unanswered demand,
Divina took her demands in Court, where Charles denied being Gliffzes father.

RTC approved monthly child support. RTC And the CA ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze as his son and give monthly
child support.
ISSUE
W/N Gliffze is entitled to receive child support and to be recognized as Charles son?

RULING

YES. One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies]
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual
relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.

We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are:

(1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo
(Divina’s uncle who owned her rented room) corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had

28
intimate relationship.

On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on
a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been
three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner
failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be
given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and
categorical assertions.

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support
is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Grande v Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 - Cruz

Rights of illegitimate children


GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.

February 18, 2014 G.R. No. 206248 VELASCO, JR., J.:


Recit Ready Synopsis

Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer
for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged
before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children.

Respondent’s petition was granted by RTC and modified by the CA. In CA’s decision, it reversed the granting of custody
of the two children to the respondent but affirmed the surname change to of the same to Antonio. Aggrieved, wife filed a
petition for certiorari in SC.

Has the father the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation?
NO.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the
father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.

The use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of
"may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are
given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.

29
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Rights of the Illegitimate Child to use surname of the illegitimate father is within their discretion. Generally, they shall use
their mother’s surname, but should they choose to use their father’s it is allowed under Art 176 or RA 9255. (see Art 176
in notes section)

FACTS
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two
sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent
as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned
sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for
Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.

The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the name of Antonio as
the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change
and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the
right of parental authority over the minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering
Grande to immediately surrender the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live
birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall
have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that
he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause,
compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly
assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was
denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.
ISSUE

Has the father the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation?
NO.

RULING

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA
9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words.
The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion
to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children.

30
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the
father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.

To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Art. 176 as amended by RA 9255. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

Barcelote v Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017 - Yabut

Rights of Illegitimate Children


IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF LIVE BIRTH OF YUHARES JAN
BARCELOTE TINITIGAN AND AVEE KYNNA NOELLE BARCELOTE TINITIGAN.
JONNA KARLA BAGUIO BARCELOTE vs. RP, RICKY O TINITIGAN AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, DAVAO CITY

August 5, 2017 GR 222095 Puno


Recit Ready Synopsis
Petitioner Jonna Barcelote has two children born out of wedlock, hence illegitimate, both born via non-instiitutional vaginal
delivery at home. Neither of them had their births registered. However, as part of the school admission requirements for
her first child, petitioner now needed a certificate of birth, and attempted to register both children. Upon submission fo the
copies of the late registration of births to NSO, it was found out that there there were two certificates of live birth already
existing with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of her two children. The subject birth certificates are
registered in the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City, containing the following info (see facts) hence Barcelote filed a
petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and
participation, and for containing erroneous entries. RTC ruled for Barcelote, CA reversed the decision. There are two
issues in this caser: 1.W/N children born illegitimate shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother 2. W/N children born illegitimate shall have their birth certificates signed and sworn to by their mother.
Please see ruling below para hindi saying sa space. I think those are short and concise enough.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

Article 176, FC As Amended


Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father
if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his
lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

31
Act No. 3753- the Civil Registry Law

Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth- The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth ion the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b)
sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of
the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; ( e) place where the infants was born; (f) and such other data may be
required in the regulation to be issued.

In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report to the local civil registrar the place,
date and hour of finding and the attendant circumstances.

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.

FACTS
· June 24, 2008 Jonna bore a child out of wedlock with Ricky in her relative’s residence in Santa Cruz, Davao
del Sur via non-institutional vaginal delivery, thereby not being able to register the birth of her child, whom
she named Yohan Grace Barcelote.
· To hide her relationship with Ricky, she remained in Davao del Sur.Tinitigan remained with his Legitimate
family in Davao City.
· August 24, 2011- Jonna bore another child with Ricky and again, she did not register his birth to avoid
humiliation and criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Ricky.
· As part of school requirements, Yohan, their first born needed a certificate of birth for admission. Jonna
finally attempted to register the births of both children. Local Civil registrar of Santa Cruz approved said
petition for delayed registration of births
· Upon submission of the copies of the late registration of births to NSO, it was found out that there were two
certificates of live birth already existing with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of her two
children. The subject birth certificates are registered in the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City, containing the
following info:

1. Name: Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan. DOB: June 4, 2008, Place of Birth: EUP Family Care
Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao, Davao City Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan
2. Name: Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan DOB: August 14, 2011 Place of Birth: EUP Family Care Clinic,
Holy Cross Agdao, Davao City Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan

· Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by
Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for containing erroneous entries.

· After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, Barcelote was allowed to present evidence ex parte. In
her testimony, Barcelote reiterated her allegations in the petition and emphasized that the subject birth
certificates were registered by her children's biological father, Tinitigan, without her knowledge. She also

32
testified that the subject birth certificates reflected wrong entries, but she did not present any other evidence.

RTC Ruled in favor of Barcelote, ordered cancellation of the subject birth certificates.
CA Reversed the decision.

ISSUE
1.W/N children born illegitimate shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother
2. W/N children born illegitimate shall have their birth certificates signed and sworn to by their mother.

RULING

1. Yes. Upon the effectivity of RA 9255, the provision that illegitimate children shall uhse the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of hteir mother was retained, with an added provision that they may use the
surname of their father if their filitation is expressly recognized by their father. (See Article 176, Family Code)

Citing jurisprudence in Grande v. Antonio, the court held that the use of the word “may” in Article 176 readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word “may” is permissive and operates to offer discretion upon the illegitimate children. The law is
clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The
use of the word “shall” underscores its mandatory character. Since the facts show that the children were born
outside a valid marriage, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The Children then, shall
use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the assailed birth certificate as to the surname of the
children is therefore incorrect.

2. Yes. The court disagrees with the CA that the subject birth certificates assailed in this case is the express
recognition of the children’s filiation by Tinitigan because they were not duly registered in accordance with the
law. Citing jurisprudence in Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz, where it held that :

ON LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: Under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the legitimate
child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of birth of an
illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.

On ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN: Fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an illegitimate children, and
underscores its mandatory character with the use of the word “shall”. Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an
illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes
the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the act of illegitimacy, is
the mother of the child. thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents.

Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law on registration of
birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of
the children is incorrect since it should have been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also
incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public of private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

33
Masbate v Relucio, GR 235498, July 30, 2018 - Cuntapay-Vitin

Rights of Illegitimate Children


RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN MASBATE, Petitioners, v. RICKY
JAMES RELUCIO, Respondent.
July 30, 2018 G.R. No. 235498 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
This is a case of habeas corpus in which the father seeks to have custody of his illegitimate child because she was taken
away from him by his mother in order to have the child be taken care of her parents. The court said that the custody of a
child below 7 yrs of age shall be under the custody of the mother unless the father could prove the unfitness and
unsuitability of the mother since she is studying in Manila and is unemployed.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
FAMILY CODE
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.

Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional
rights shall remain in force.

Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.

A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors,"

34
FACTS
1. Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with Renalyn's
parents without the benefit of marriage.

2. Three (3) years later, or in April 2015, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving
Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James.

3. Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015, Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's parents) took
Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents
refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Renalyn granting full
parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for
habeas corpus and child custody docketed as SP No. FC-15-239 before the RTC (petition a quo).

4. A hearing was conducted on December 3, 2015, where Renalyn brought Queenie and expressed the desire for
her daughter to remain in her custody.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie

- PARTIALLY YES because the RTC failed to conduct a trial in determining whether the mother is unfit or unsuitable
because of her unemployment. The lower court shall determine, by trial, the best interests of the child.
-PARTIALLY NO because the father should have been given temporary visitation rights and not temporary custody which
shall only be granted after the trial
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 12, 2017 and the Omnibus Resolution
dated October 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144406 are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION deleting the grant of limited and temporary custody for lack of legal and factual basis. The grant of
visitation rights of two (2) days per week shall be maintained. Respondent Ricky James Relucio may take his daughter,
Queenie Angel M. Relucio, out but only with the written consent of petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate in accordance with this
Decision.

The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch 8 is DIRECTED to immediately proceed with hearing Special
Proceeding No. FC-15-239 upon notice of this Decision.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

In custody cases involving minors, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child. The grant of the writ depends on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner
has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by
the respondents; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that
of the respondents.

According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest away custody from a
mother over her child although under seven (7) years of age: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.

In determining the amount of support, the court may consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the
custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the minor; (2) the physical and emotional health, special needs, and
aptitude of the minor; (3) the standard of living the minor has been accustomed to; and (4) the non-monetary contributions
that the parents would make toward the care and well-being of the minor

Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010 - Yupangco

Action to impugn legitimacy

35
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M.
REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.
MAURICIO, respondents.
November 24, 2010 636 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 175080 Perez, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
This is a case dispute over a certain parcel of land. The petitioners contend that those living in the said land have been
illegally occupying the same for a number of years. In an attempt to recover the said land, the petitioners attempted to
nullify the lease contract through the following arguments:

1. The leasehold contract is void because it did not conform to certain requirements, and hence, the respondents
should evacuate the land. (Property Law)
2. The respondents are not valid descendants / heirs of their Father, with whom the petitioners contracted with.
Hence, they should evacuate the land since the right to occupy the property never passed on to them. (Family
law)

On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. The legitimacy of the child
cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of
an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
provides: “The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before
the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.” This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Civil Law; Filiation; Filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.

FACTS
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of
four thousand five hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and
Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial
settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.

Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s
occupation of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied
signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada,
accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents
of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the
Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is the
annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts.

Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit. Leonida’s legal standing as a party
was assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada,
Godo­fredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not
a legal heir.
ISSUE
Can the petitioner compel respondents to evacuate the land on the ground that she is just a ward and not a compulsory
heir?

36
RULING
No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book
“Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence,” noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained that the legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides:

“The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.”

This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to
“the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,
482 SCRA 520 (2006), this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of a decedent’s estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, 31 SCRA 754 (1970), the Court declared that the
legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be
subject to collateral attack.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Andal v. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165 - Laydia

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY; Grounds - Physical Impossibility of Access


MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEÑAS, plaintiffs vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
May 30, 1951 G.R. No. L-2474 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
In January 1941, Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his
house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak
that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas
gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. The issue is whether Mariano Andal can be considered
the legitimate child of Emiliano Andal. The Court held that since Mariano was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal
died on January 1, 1943, he is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within
300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Although Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his
condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were swollen and his voice
hoarse, experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano
was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

37
[FAMILY CODE]
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband,
except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)

FACTS
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem, filed a complaint alleging that he is
the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas, for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of
land. Said land was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias.

Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his
house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak
that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Dueñas, his wife, eloped with Felix,
and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his
wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name
of Mariano Andal.

ISSUE
Can Mariano be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was
so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed sufficient to overcome the presumption that it was physically
impossible for Emiliano to have access to his wife? - NO.

RULING
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the
legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage.
This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to
his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.

There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception, specially during
the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300
next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that
initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the
same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation
between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then
was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But
experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was
suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The
presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome. The fact that Maria
Dueñas has committed adultery can not also overcome this presumption.

38
ADDITIONAL NOTES

"Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include


(1) absence during the initial period of conception;
(2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable; and
(3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations."
(Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code,
Vol. 1, p. 90)."

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73 - Calo

Action to impugn legitimacy


Physical impossibility of access
[Complete Title]

September 12, 1980 G.R. No. L-49542 Makaisar


Recit Ready Synopsis
Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated
in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was
named Rolando Macadangdang

Elizabeth then filed a complaint for recognition and support against Antonio, who countered that the baby is not his
illegitimate child.

The SC ruled that the child is a legitimate child of Elizabeth and Crispin.
- during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the renamed child, no
concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between
respondent and her spouse.
- since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, the fact remains that there was always
the possibility of access to each other
- The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage
and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses.
- The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact between petitioner and
respondent is another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a
normal full-term baby.
- As to who may institute an action to impugn legitimacy, only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's

39
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;


(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.

Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical
impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be
illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of
this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy —

(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed legitimate.

Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access
to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:


[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;

(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.

(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical
impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth above, the child is presumed legitimate, unless it
appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purpose of the rule, the wife's
adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court).
FACTS
Mejias (respondent), married to Anahaw, had sex (for the first time) with Macadangdang. Anahaw left Mejias when he
discovered his wife’s affairs. 7 months after the first sexual incident, Mejias gave birth to Rolando. Rolando had no birth
certificate or baptismal records. Mejias then filed for action for recognition and support for Rolando against
Macadangdang. Macadangdang opposed to the allegations and prayed for its dismissal. RTC dismissed the case, citing
NCC 255 (FC 166: physical impossibility to have sex) and NCC 256 (FC 167: still legitimate even if mother declared
against its legitimacy). CA reversed it and held that Rolando is the illegitimate son of Macadangdang. Macadangdang
filed for certiorari.
ISSUE

40
1. WON Rolando is the illegitimate son of Macadangdang. NO
2. WON Mejias may institute an action to bastardize her son without giving the legally presumed father an
opportunity to be heard. NO
RULING
Rolando was born within 300 days after Mejias and Anahaw separated. (The 180 days is already out of the question since
Anahaw and Mejias already had 4 kids.) Based on Art 255, Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate child of Anahaw.
This presumption became conclusive when Mejias failed to prove that there was physical impossibility for her and
Anahaw to have sex during the initial 120 days of the 300 hundred which preceded the birth of Rolando. In fact, Mejias
even went to Anahaw’s home to visit her children. Also, given the 7-month period from the first sexual intercourse to the
birth of Rolando, he could have been born prematurely.

This is not the case. The birth was normal. Rolando was born healthy and did not need special medical attention during
his infancy. The Court ruled that Mejias underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. That Rolando was conceived before
the first encounter of Macadangdang and Mejias.

As to who may institute an action to impugn legitimacy, only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he
should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved. The right
to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only to the alleged father, who is the husband of
the mother and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit
brought for the purpose
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Concepcion vs. CA, G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005 - Lopez

D. Action to impugn legitimacy; 1. Grounds, FC 166; (a) Physical impossibility of access


GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent
August 31, 2005 G.R. No. 123450 CORONA
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit: "In all questions regarding the
care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration."

Article 167 of the Family Code mandates: "The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress."

The law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the
information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law
says and not what a parent says it is.

41
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals: The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but
is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
FACTS
● Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma.
Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
● Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed
a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before
he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City
● Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage
was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.
● The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and
annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a
result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
ISSUE

Is Jose Gerardo the legitimate son of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa?


RULING
No. The Court held that as a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surname of his father Mario
and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A person’s surname or family
name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to
a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural rights of both parent and
child to each other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally
demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.

In the case at hand, not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma.
Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in
the marital act.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him
who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo,
as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

ADDITIONAL NOTES
A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by
law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.

For reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband
and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It
also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.

Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the
mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.

42
Agustin vs. CA, G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005 - Fonacier

Action to impugn legitimacy


Biological or other scientific grounds - DNA testing as evidence
[Complete Title]
[Date] [Case Number] [Ponente]
Recit Ready Synopsis
Can a DNA testing be considered as a reliable source of proving paternity and filiation? - YES.

DNA is a valid means of determining paternity. The case at bar came at a time where DNA testing is considered to be a
reliable source of proving filiation. It is also not a violation against self incrimination because the principle only refers to
verbal statements and not acts that would reveal the truth.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS
· Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.

· In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

· On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the
police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

· Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

· The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

ISSUE
1 Whether the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD- NO

2 Whether the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search-

43
NO

RULING
1. NO. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private respondents’ complaint on its
face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the
plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of
the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the
prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.

2.No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification system
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common
good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common
good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of
communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and,
as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Herrera vs. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005 -

D. Action to impugn legitimacy


(b) Biological or other scientific grounds
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor,
represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA
CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, respondents.
June 15, 2005 G.R. No. 148220 CARPIO, J p:
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following
data:
1. How the samples were collected,
2. How they were handled,

44
3. The possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. The procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5. Whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and
6. The qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on
the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to
DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

Tijing v. Court of Appeals:


Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. . . . For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned
in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

Frye v. U.S:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.

FACTS
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother Armi Alba, Aled before
the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner
filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied
physical contact with respondent's mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the
motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate
Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines
Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught
Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test
had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that
DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE
a. Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine affiliation

b. Whether DNA paternity testing violates the right against self-incrimination.

45
RULING
a. YES. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the
Rules of Court. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to
possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on
collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the
fact in issue."

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as
evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.

We also repeat the trial court's explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases: In [a] paternity test, the forensic
scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child's DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father's profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man's DNA types
do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.

B. NO. Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

Filiation proceedings are usually Aled not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

It is not enough to state that the child's DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match between the
DNA proAle of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this
reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a
minimum value of the Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the
likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An
appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for W.
Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates
is higher when the putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between

46
the putative father and child alone. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive
proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

Estate v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007 - Villanueva

Action to impugn legitimacy/Grounds: Biological or other grounds (DNA)

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,


vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.

December 17, 2007 G.R. No. 171713 Justice Chico-Nazario


Recit Ready Synopsis

Joanne married a Japanese Hasegawa sometime on February 1993. While married, she cohabited with Rogelio and
conceived a child in 1998. Rogelio paid all the expenses for the needs of Joanne during the earlier life of the latter.
However, after months of support, Rogelio stopped and refused to give support, falsely alleging that he is not the father of
Joanne. Jinky filed a complaint before the Court for the recognition of Rogelio to Joanne as his child and give
support until she reach the majority age. The RTC ruled in favor of Jinky.

Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA. However, while on the pendency of case, Rogelio died on
2005, hence a substitution for the case to Estate of Rogelio Ong. The CA ruled that the parties should take DNA analysis,
with the advancement of genetics and technology, as a way to prove the filiation. The SC affirmed the decision of CA.
DNA collection to a deceased person is still possible.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) xxx

(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband,
except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or

(3) xxx

In this case, Jinky, who is already married to a Japanese, cohabited with Rogelio and their relationship conceived Joanne.
Rogelio gave support initially to Joanne during the early stages of Joanne’s life but later stopped support. Rogelio also
denied that he is the father of Joanne. The RTC found Rogelio the father of Joanne due to admission of evidence such as
giving support initially and admission of having sexual intercourse with Jinky. The CA and SC also ruled that DNA testing
should be taken as the best way to prove the filiation between Joanne and Rogelio, even though the latter died.

FACTS

47
Jinky Diaz was married to a Japanese Hasegawa on February 1993. On November 1993, Jinky and Rogelio got
acquainted. They cohabited in Tarlac from January 1994 up to September 1998. From their relationship, Joanne Diaz
was conceived on February 25, 1998.

Rogelio assisted Jinky to the hospital and took home Jinky and Joanne. He also paid all the hospital and baptismal
expenses and provided for all Joanne’s need, thereby recognizing the child as his.

On September 1998, Rogelio stopped giving support to Jinky and Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of
Joanne. Rogelio, despite Jinky’s effort, fails and continues to refuse give support to Joanne. Hence, Joanne filed a
complaint before the RTC for the recognition of Rogelio to Joanne as his child and the subsequent support of Rogelio to
Joanne as well. The RTC ruled that Joanne is the illegitimate children of Jinky and defendant Rogelio, and the latter
should give mandatory support until Joanne reach her majority age.

Rogelio filed Motion for Reconsideration in CA. However, while on the pendency of case, Rogelio died on Feb. 21, 2005,
and notice of substitution was filed now in the name of Estate of Ong. The CA held that parties should make arrangement
on DNA testing for the purposes of determining the paternity of Joanne.

ISSUE

Whether or not the collection of DNA Sample to Rogelio, who is already deceased, is possible, to prove whether or not he
has a filiation with Joanne.

RULING

YES, DNA collection is still possible even if the person is deceased.

Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor
Joanne, hence the first two issues raised before the Court on proving the legitimacy of Joanne by conventional
evidence and presumption of legitimacy, will be moot by the result of DNA.

With the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.

New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. In this case,
petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for
the conduct of DNA testing.

Although the RTC already found Rogelio the father of Joanne, the former admitted having been the one who shouldered
the hospital bills representing the expenses in connection with the birth of Joanne and it is an evidence of admission that
he is the real father of plaintiff, the DNA testing would be the best option to determine the filiation.

Hence, DNA testing to Rogelio, even if deceased, is still possible.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

48
Lucas v Lucas, GR No. 190710, June 6, 2011 - Abad

Action to impugn legitimacy >> Grounds >>> Biological or other scientific grounds
JESSE U. LUCAS, petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS,
respondent.

June 6, 2011 G.R.No. 190710 Nachura, J.


Recit Ready Synopsis
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by the petitioner to establish his filiation to the respondent. It
states the cause of action or (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant in violation of saud legal right.

The Supreme Court declared that as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity.

When a party contests paternity and refuses to undergo a blood test, the court may conduct a show-cause hearing to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants the issuance of a court
order for blood testing.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FC 166 - Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:

(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;

(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband,
except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)

A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (2 October 2007)

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and Members of the Subcommittee on Evidence submitting for the
Court’s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on DNA Evidence, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

This Resolution shall take effect on October 15, 2007 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

FACTS

Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy
(Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot

49
in Manila. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen's workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant with Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner's
father was not stated in petitioner's certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is
respondent.

Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish
filiation.

Unaware of the issuance of the Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment.He manifested inter alia
that:(1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was
waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the
hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter.

After learning of the Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondent averred that the petition was
not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged
therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as
petitioner's father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.

RTC decision: issued an Order dismissing the case respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba, there are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first
establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include
incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results.

The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons had been served on
him. Respondent's special appearance could not be considered as voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the
purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.

The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order
to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE
Is the petition to establish illegitimate filiation proper?

RULING
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which
requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases
his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A
complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent.
Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioner's personal
knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial

50
when petitioner presents his evidence.

Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-a -vis the motion for DNA
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether,
under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial
court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.

At any rate, the CA's view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and
deserves the Court's attention. In light of this observation, the Court finds that there is a need to supplement the Rule
on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation
cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
"good cause" for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the
court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court
may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

Petition was GRANTED. Court of Appeals decision and resolution are reversed and set aside. RTC orders are affirmed.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Benitez-Badua v. CA, 229 SCRA 468 - Yabut

Topic: Action to impugn legitimacy: Who may Impugn?

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA VS. CA, VICTOR BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR

January 24, 1994 105625 [Ponente]


Recit Ready Synopsis
Vicente and Isabel died and left a considerably large estate in Laguna without an administrator. This is a case wherein
there are two opposing claims to the properties of the late Vicente and Isabel. The petitioner Marissa claims that she is
the only legal heir of the late spouses, while Victoria and Feodor, herein private respondents argues that Vicente and
Isabel died without any lawful heir, having been rid of an offspring. The Issue in this case is whether or not the CA
committed an error in failing to apply Article 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code.

51
The court rulef No.,The reliance of the petitioner on the aforementioned provisions of the Family code on impugning the
legitimacy of the child is misplaced. The provisions cited govern a situation where a husband or his heirs denies as his
own a child of his wife (Article 166) While Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. The case
at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that the petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. In citing a previous jurisdiction, the court
states: The legal provision In Article 170 refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to cases where an
action is on regarding claims to inheritance as legal heirs of the childless deceased aunt, where the question is whether or
not a child is legitimate or illegitimate, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Hence, being neither legally
adopted child nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction, She is not a legal heir of the deceased.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS
· Vicente and Isabel died and left a considerably large estate in Laguna without an administrator. Isabel died
April 25, 1982, Vicente on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
· September 1990, Victoria Benitez-Lario and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente’s Sister and Nephew) instituted
a motion, praying for the issuance of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of Feodor Aguilar, as there are
no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally
adopted, and that petitioner Marissa, who was raised and cared for by them since childhood is in fact, not
related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir.
· November 1990 Petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua opposed the petition, claiming that she is the only
surviving heir of the late Vicente and Isabel. In doing so, she provided the following documents as proof:
Certificate of Live birth, Baptismal Certificate, Income Tax Returns and Info sheet for GSIS membership of
the late Vicente naming her as his daughter, School Records.
· Respondents countered, mostly thru testimonial evidence that the said spouses failed to beget a child during
marriage. That the late Isabel was even referred to a prominent OB-GYNE for treatment. Victoria Benitez-
Lario, elder sister of Vicente, was also called to stand, categorically declaring that the petitioner was not the
biological child of the said spouses.

Trial court decided in favor of petitioner. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE
W/N CA Committed an error in failing to apply Article 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code.
Can Victoria and Feodor impugn the validity of the presumption that Marissa is the child of Vicente and Isabel?

RULING
No.,The reliance of the petitioner on the aforementioned provisions of the Family code on impugning the legitimacy of the
child is misplaced. The provisions cited govern a situation where a husband or his heirs denies as his own a child of his
wife (Article 166) While Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.

The case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that the petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. In citing a previous jurisdiction, the

52
court states: The legal provision In Article 170 refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to cases where
an action is on regarding claims to inheritance as legal heirs of the childless deceased aunt, where the question is
whether or not a child is legitimate or illegitimate, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Hence, being neither
legally adopted child nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction, She is not a legal heir of the
deceased.

The court further cites factual findings of the CA that Marissa’s evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological
and blood kinship. First- The evidence is cogent and clear that Isabel enver became pregnant, and never delivered a
child. Her own brother Sibling Dr. Lino Chipongian admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years and at
36, still had not begotten or still could not bear a child, prompting him to refer the patient to Dr. Manahan, a well-known
OBGYNE. Likewise, there is testimony of the elder sister of Vicente that Vicente and Isabel being childless wanted to
adopt her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere. That Vicente found two
baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl, and that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister that he
would register the baby as his and his wife’s child. Several neighbors also testified that they used to see Isabel almost
everyday but they never saw her to be pregnant. The facts of a woman’s becoming pregnant and growing big with child,
as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman
never became pregnant and could not have, therefore deliver a baby at all.

Second,appellee’s birth certificate with the late Vicente as informant is highly questionable and suspicious, for if Isabel, at
age 36 was truly the mother, should the child not have been born in a hospital under experienced care, at that late age by
Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and her life. how come then, that as appearing in appellee’s
birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home with no Physician or even a midwife?

The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is nota. Valid adoption,
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to
stimulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

Third, if appellee is the real, biological daughter of the late Vicente, why did he and Isabel’s brother, after Isabel’s death
state in the extrajudicial settlement that we are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel because she died without
descendants or ascendants

Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange that if appellee is indeed the daughter and only elgal heir of the spouses, Isabel,
before her death wrote a note to the husband and Marissa stating that, even without any legal papers, I wish that my
husband and my child or only daughter will inherit what is legally my own property, in case I die without a will, and
imploring her husband that any inheritance due him from my property- when he dies- to make our own daughter his sole
heir. The court finds it odd and strange for if Marissa was really the only legal heir, this is not even necessary.

Fifth, Vicente’s older sister testified that her brother gave the date December 8 as Marissa’s birthday for it also the
birthdate of their mother.

The court concludes: The most telling evidence is that of the Execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Isabel made by Vicente with Dr. Chipongian, brother of Isabel, which effectively repudiated the Certificate of
Live Birth of the petitioner.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

53
Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002 - Estrada

Topic: Action to impugn legitimacy: Who may Impugn?


WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, Petitioner, v. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL
MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, Respondents.
De Leon, Jr.
March 7, 2002 G.R. No. 138961
Recit Ready Synopsis

Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate son of
the late William Liyao. Allegedly, Corazon is legally married to but living separately from Ramon Yulo, that Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao where a child, herein petitioner, was then conceived and born. The issue is may
petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao? The Court
ruled in the negative. The fact that Corazon had been living separately from her husband at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. Physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife, as a
ground for impugning the legitimacy of the child, may only be invoked by the husband or in proper cases, his heirs. The
petition initiated by Corazon Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr., as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao, cannot prosper. The settled
rule is that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Petition was denied.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Art. 171, FC

FACTS

• On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed before the RTC of
Pasig an action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein
respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint
was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of
the child of said William Liyao,"petitioner having been "recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime."
• The Petitioner argues that Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao
from 1965 up to the time of William's untimely demise on December 2, 1975. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to
William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao
visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). Petitioner presented several witness to bolster his
claims.
• The Respondents on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story. The contend that their parents,
William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and
that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father (William
Liyao) lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. They also presented witnesses to support
their counter-arguments.
• The RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner saying that it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the
deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia
cohabited with the deceased and that that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the

54
status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter.
• The CA, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the
illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital
intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of
the Civil Code."
ISSUE
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

RULING
No. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. 22 The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence
to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases,
his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a
strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Republic v Magpayo, GR 189476, Feb. 2, 2011 -

Action to impugn legitimacy > Who may impugn


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), respondent.

55
Feb 2, 2011 GR No. 189476 CARPIO MORALES, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
A petition for change of name was filed by Julian Edward Cosetenf Magpayo who was born in Makati. He wanted to use
his mother's surname as his surname, considering that his parents were never legally married. According to SC, the
change that Julian is seeking will affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to
illegitimacy. The case should have been filed in Makati City where his birth certificate was registered and his parents
should have been notified.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition foes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks
to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication, and
Rule 108 should be made to apply.

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the
entry is south to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and “all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby” should be made parties to the proceeding.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. In this case Respondent Julian denies his legitimacy
in his petition to change his last name “Magpayo” to “Coseteng”.

FACTS
1. Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) a. son of Fulvio M.
Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted
marriage on March 26, 1972. b. His parents were never legally married

2. Julian filed a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition
he submitted the following: a. a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique
"does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." b. He also his academic records from elementary up to college3
showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and c. the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his
surname

3. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using
the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."

4. On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with
the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court a. notice setting the petition for hearing
on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside b. No opposition to the petition having been filed, an
order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte

5. TC granted the petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to: 1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item
24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth]; 2. Correct the
entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG"; 3. Delete the entry "COSETENG"
in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and 4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for
FATHER of the [respondent]

6. Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of

56
July 2, 2009

ISSUE
WON petition filed by Julian Coseteng involves a change in his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate; thus it should be
in an adversarial proceeding.

RULING
Rule 108 applies, substantial change involved. Civil status of Julian would be affected; the proceeding should be
adversarial.
1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds
including: a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce b. when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; c. when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; d. a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody e.
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

2. The reason of Julian was not one of the grounds considered. In his case he denies his legitimacy.
a. Rule 108 applies. SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. x x x x
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court
shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

3. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic: changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial
and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."

4. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the
entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding. a. The procedure recited in Rule
103] regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are
separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold
otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction
of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds

5. The petition would still fail if he use Rule 108 due to improper venue
a. Republic v. Labrador: a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest
ADDITIONAL NOTES

57
Geronimo v Santos, G.R. No. 197099, Sept. 25, 2015 - De Venecia

Geronimo v Santos
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, petitioner, vs. KAREN SANTOS, respondent.
Sept. 25, 2015 G.R. No. 197099 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Recit Ready Synopsis
1) Plaintiff Santos claimed to be the only child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. She filed a
complaint for annulment of document ( Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman) and recovery of a parcel of land against the
defendants who were the brothers of Rufino.
2) She alleged that the said document declared the defendants as the sole heirs of spouses. Also, upon the death of
her parents, all their propertied should be passed down to her and not to the defendants.
3) The defendants denied the allegations and said that Santos was an adopted child of the spouses and was a
daughter of caridad’s sister. They also presented the birth certificate of the plaintiff and contended the irregularity of the
document due to tampered markings.
RTC: Ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court declared the document null and void and ordered the return of the land to
Santos, who was declared as legitimate child of the spouses based on the birth certificate presented and the open and
continuous possession of the status as legitimate child which established her filiation.
CA: AFFIRMED RTC’s Decision

The issue in this case with regards to who may impugn the filiation of Karen.

The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and
within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to
“the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles. Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no
longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a
state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so
that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of
the child, may still be easily available. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It
also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the
matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily
available. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to
contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to
an insult to his memory.”

58
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
TOPIC: ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY SUBTOPIC: WHO MAY IMPUGN
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth
or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where
it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth
of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a)

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
FACTS
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a
complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano
Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of
one-half of the parcel of land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and
belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants
executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses
Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that consequently they took possession
and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit
C be annulled and the tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay
her damages.

In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother.
They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who
was in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document.
It was allegedly impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they
had never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any
maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963 until October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio
and Emiliano were the half-brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of Rufino's father Marciano Geronimo with
another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot 1716 with the defendants' mother Carmen, and upon his death
in 1980, when the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years
later, Caridad and she executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino's estate entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng
Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan, whereby the plaintiffs mother Caridad waived all her rights to Rufino's share
and in the land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it may, in 1985, guardianship proceedings appeared to
have been instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it was established that the plaintiff was
the minor child of Caridad with her late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person and estate of
the plaintiff.
The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the real estate taxes on the property, but in 2000,
the defendants took possession of the land and had the tax declaration transferred to them. This compelled her to file the
present case.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is the only child and legal heir of his brother

59
Rufino. He disclosed that when Rufino's wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was
Caridad's niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive
parents' household. Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he should succeed to the
estate of their brother, they executed in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called PagmamanasaLabas ng Hukuman.

Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was
written in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the
name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the informant's signature.
ISSUE

Did the CA gravely erred and abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that petitioners have no
personality to impugn respondent’s legitimate filiation.

RULING
While petitioner admits that the CA “did not directly rule on this particular issue,” he nonetheless raises the said issue as
an error since the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that in so affirming, the CA also
adopted the ruling of the trial court that the filiation of respondent is strictly personal to respondent’s alleged father and his
heirs under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, thereby denying petitioner the “right to impugn or question the
filiation and status of the plaintiff.
“The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that
civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to
“the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles. Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no
longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a
state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so
that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of
the child, may still be easily available. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.”
The case was not about filiation of the respondent but the petitioner argues that the respondent is not the child of the
couple and that she should not inherit from the estate.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 621, June 22, 1984 - Razonable

[TOPIC FROM OUTLINE]


[Complete Title]

60
[Date] [Case Number] [Ponente]
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582, July 31, 1997 - Lee

Proof of Filiation of Legitimate Children


CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
July 31, 1997 GR No. 121027 REGALADO, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

61
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

“Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it,
in view of the moral and economic interests involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest
such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to
his memory.”

FACTS

● Mar 5, 83‘Teodora Dezoller Guerero dies w/ no children leaving the property in question to her husband and the
heirs of her brother (who died in 73‘)
● Jan 2, 88‘ After her death, her husband Martin Guerero adjudicates the house to him and sells it to я Teodora
Domingo.
● Martin dies on Oct 25, 88‘ and ℗s Tison and Dezoller file for reconveyance Nov. 2, 88 for 1/2share of the prop.
● During the hearing the ℗ birth cert.s marriage cert.s w/c prove the filiation to the decedent Teodora through their
common link to their father Teodora‘s brother Hermogenes Dezoller. More importantly they present the testimony
of one of the ℗ Corazon Dezoller Tison attesting that some time in 1946 the decedent had actually acknowledged
her as her niece (declaration of filiation).
● Я files a demurrer to the evidence citing that they fall short of the requirements set by Art 172 of the Family Code
and that the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison was self serving and uncorroborated. 6) Dec 3, 92‘ TC rules for
я granting the demurrer and dismissing the action for reconveyance. 7) CA affirms citing the evidence presented
was inadmissible

ISSUE
WON the ℗ satisfy of the quantum of proof mandated by Art 172 of the FC

RULING
YES, the court held that legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally in an action for reconveyance, as such the court held
that there being a presumption of legitimacy in relation to the status of the petitioners the я‘s failure to adduce evidence
disproving such a fact renders the presumption effective. Thus his choice to file a demurrer rather than adduce evidence
to controvert the ℗ assertions comes as a implied admission of the fact of legitimacy. More importantly the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison fell within the definition of a declaration about pedigree that is exempt form the rule on hearsay
based on the following conditions: 1) that the declarant is either dead or unable to testify; 2) that the declarant be related
to the person whose pedigree is subject of inquiry, 3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration 4) that the declaration was made ante litem motum (before the commencement of the suit).
Moreover the declaration may stand only if it pertains to the claimant‘s right over the declarant‘s own estate (as in this
case). If however the declaration is to claim a right from another family member other than the declarant‘s estate the
declaration may not be deemed credible. Judgment reversed and set aside

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998 - Griarte

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PROOF OF FILIATION - OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
April 20, 1998 G.R. No. 118904 PANGANIBAN, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance and action for partition of four (4) parcels
of land. He was claiming that he was the son of the deceased Inocentes Trinidad. The refusal of the defendants, Lourdes
and Felix, to the demand of Arturo to the partition of the land into three (3) equal parts caused Arturio to file a case.

The supreme court ruled in favor of Arturio Trinidad, they found the evidence provided by Arturio to be sufficient to prove
that he is a legitimate child of Innocentes. To prove that he was born during the marriage of his parents, he presented a
witness who was present during the wedding of his parents and witness prove that the couple deported themselves as
husband and wife. He also presented his baptismal certificate where the name of Innocentes indicated as his father, a
certificate from the civil registrar that documents were destroyed during the war or burned when the old town hall was
razed to the ground. He also presented family pictures along with his aunt and uncle (Lourdes and Felix), and a witness
who was present when he was born and during his baptismal party.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be


proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
FACTS
1. Patricio Trinidad, owned four (4) parcels of land,which he left to his three children namely: Inocentes Trinidad,
Lourdes Trinidad, and Felix Trinidad.
2. On August 10, 1978, plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance and action for partition of four (4)
parcels of land. He was claiming that he was the son of the deceased Inocentes Trinidad.
3. The refusal of the defendants, Lourdes and Felix, to the demand of Arturo to the partition of the land into three (3)
equal parts caused Arturo to file a case.
4. Arturio Trinidad presented the following evidence:
a.Testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. Testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.

5. Lourdes, the sister of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturio’s claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply a neighbor.
c. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the baby of Arturio,
together with Arturio and his wife.
ISSUE

63
Whether or not the the above evidences are enough to prove that Arturio is the legitimate child of Innocentes

RULING
While it is true that a marriage contract is the primary evidence of a marriage, the failure to present it does not prove that
no marriage took place because there are other evidences that could have the same bearing as a marriage contract. He
failed to present the marriage contract due to the destruction of such records. His act of presenting witnesses who were
present during the nuptial of his parents, his baptismal certificate and the affirmation of the cohabitation of his parents is
enough evidence to prove the marriage of his parents.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Heirs of Conti v CA, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998 -

[TOPIC FROM OUTLINE]


HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI AND ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LYDIA S. REYES
as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A.
SAMPAYO, ILLUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A. SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C.
SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO,
CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-
Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO, respondents.

December 21, 1998 G.R. No. 118464 BELLOSILLO J;


Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a
public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
FACTS
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of the property in litigation
consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City with a house erected
thereon.On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue.Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private
respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S. Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo,
Enrico A. Sampayo, Carlos A. Sampayo, Generoso C. Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C.
Sampayo, Delia A. Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo acting also in her own behalf and as

64
Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an
action for partition and damages before RTC branch 54 Lucena City. The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario
refused the partition on the ground that private respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were the
rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida
Sampayo to prove that they were the collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her
rights as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the original copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her
father was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Sampayo, Lydia Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one of
the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also
testified that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios J. Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers, Manuel J.
Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and
Manuel were siblings of Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel
Sampayo were offered in evidence. These documents showed that their father and mother, like Lourdes Sampayo, were
Antonio Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza. The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia Sampayo
Reyes were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all data therein written were in accordance with
the church records, hence, the lower left portion of the documents bearing the seal of the church with the notation as to
where the documents were logged in particular.The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the birth certificates
because the repository of those documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lucena City, had been razed by fire on two
separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, thus all civil registration records were totally burned. To
rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti,
Rosa Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares
by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject
property since 1937. The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals,
the same affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents were not able to prove by competent evidence their relationship with the deceased.

RULING
YES.

Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a
public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.40 By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.

Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The baptismal certificates presented in
evidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish
records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

65
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA 499 - Flores

Proof of filiation; strong presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock


JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA
A. DE JESUS , petitioners, vs . THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS
MEDIACORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION &
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
October 2, 2001 G.R. No. 142877 VITUG, J
Recit Ready Synopsis
In this case, the Court did not allow written acknowledgement of the decedent, recognizing the petitioners as his
illegitimate children, to impugn the legitimacy of the children. It was established in the record that the petitioners were
born during the marriage of their parents and that the birth certificates indicate that their father is Danilo de Jesus, not
Juan G. Dizon. Apart from this, an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of
paternity and filiation. The declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
ARTICLE 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
FACTS
1. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. They bore two children, namely,
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus.
2. In notarized document, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property
3. Petitioners then filed for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial
Court, relying on the strength of the notarized acknowledgement.
4. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be
the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
5. Petitioners Contention: they maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a
separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.
ISSUE
Can a notarized document acknowledging the petitioners as illegitimate children dispense with the requirement of a
separate action for judicial approval, even though they are legitimate children in another marriage? Or can such document
impugn their legitimacy?
RULING

66
No, it cannot be used to impugn their legitimacy.
a. Generally, the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required. (see additional notes)
b. But there is a strong presumption in law that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. (Art. 166 of the Family Code). Upon the expiration of the periods set forth
in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
c. The Divinagracia case does not apply to the case at bar. In that case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings the action for partition led by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an
acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document, signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing
such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children.
d. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
e. The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioner's alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue,
i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment.

A child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.

Aguilar v Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, Jan. 28, 2015 - Floreza

Proof of filiation
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner.
vs.
EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondent.
January 28, 2015 G.R. No. 200169 DEK CASTILLO, J.:
Recit Ready Synopsis
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died intestate leaving 2 parcels of land. The land was being
claimed by both Edna (Candelaria’s niece) and the spouse’s son, Rodolfo. To prove his filiation, Rodolfo presented,
among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957, a public instrument subscribed and made under
oath by Alfredo, which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5,
1945, is his son and dependent. Can the SSS form satisfy the requirement for proof of filiation? — Yes, the Court granted
the Petition. The SSS form by itself, constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

67
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.” Since he is the legitimate child of the Spouses, then he is
as well the heir to their estate.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it
is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

FACTS

1. Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died intestate leaving 2 parcels of land.
2. The land was being claimed by Candelaria’s niece, Respondent Edna Siasat; claiming that Rodolfo, the son and
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, was but a mere stranger who was raised by the deceased spouses.
3. Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar filed a case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Siasat alleging
that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Thus, he was entitled to the said parcels of
land. Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering the
period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction
of other documentary evidence. To prove his filiation, he presented, among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-
1 dated October 10, 1957, a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo, which bears his
signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and
dependent.
4. RTC ruled that petitioner failed to hurdle the “high standard of proof” required to establish one’s legitimate filiation
when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.

ISSUE
Can the SSS form satisfy the requirement for proof of filiation?

RULING
Yes, the Court granted the Petition. The SSS form by itself, constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.” Since he is the legitimate child of the
Spouses, then he is as well the heir to their estate.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a

68
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, judicial action within the applicable statute
of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of
live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more
firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988),
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Calimag vs. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R.191936, June 27, 2016 - Awisan

Proof of filiation of legitimate chilren


Virginia D. Calimag v. Heirs of Silvestra N. Macapaz, Represented by Anatacio P. Macapaz, Jr.

June 1, 2016 G.R. No. 191936 Reyes, J.


Recit Ready Synopsis

Virginia Calimag and Silvestra Macapaz, co-owned a property in Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City. When Silvestra died,
Virginia allegedly forged a Deed of Sale so that the entire property is named under her alone. The children of the brother
of Silvestra are now claiming to be the heir of their Aunt's portion to the property. For them to be declared as heirs,
however, they must establish that they are legitimate children. They presented photocopy of their parent's marriage
contract, canonical certificate of marriage, and birth certificates. Based on the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of
Court, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. On the other hand, the canonical
certificate of marriage, being a private document, it's authenticity must be proved in accordance with the rules of evidence
before it can be admitted as evidence. The respondents’ certificates of live birth proved, however, that Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children — the
second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible
proof to establish the validity of marriage. A man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed
to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The court ruled that they respondents are legal heirs to the property.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage.”

The respondents’ certificates of live birth proved that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife
for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children — the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than

69
three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage. A man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.

FACTS

1. Virginia D. Calimag and Silvestra N. Macapaz co-owned a 299 square meter property, the subject matter of this
case, in Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City
2. Respondents are children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete
Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela)
3. The subject property was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 1830. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse
Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq. m.
4. November 11, 2002: Silvestra died.
5. July 7, 2005: TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the
name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her
99-sq.-m. portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00.
6. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit dated
July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of
adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same
legally ineffective.
7. September 16, 2005: Fidela passed away.
8. Respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale
and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati
City.
9. In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal capacity
to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have
no right over Silvestra’s estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from
inheriting intestate from the legitimate children.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra --> YES

RULING

● Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
● Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live
Birth issued by the NSO where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
● A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents — their
father’s name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother’s maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no.
24 thereof where it asks: “24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)” it was
stated therein that respondents’ parents were married on “May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte.”
● The respondents’ certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as
husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children — the second child,
Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to
establish the validity of marriage.

70
● Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a
solemnized marriage, viz.:
○ In Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented: a)
testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and
wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during such union;
and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
● Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, “[p]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.”

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Tabuada v Tabuada, GR 196510, Sept. 12, 2018 - Del Rosario

Proof of Filiation - Of legitimate children


SOFIA TABUADA, NOVEE YAP, MA. LORETA NADAL, AND GLADYS EVIDENTE, petitioners v. ELEANOR
TABUADA, JULIETA TRABUCO, LAURETA REDONDO, AND SPS. BERNAN CERTEZA & ELEANOR D. CERTEZA,
respondents
September 12, 2018 GR No. 196510 Bersamin, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
Petitioner, Sofia Tabuada, in this case are contending nullity of the mortgage of a lot lot inherited from her mother-in-law.
Respondent Eleanor Tabuada, sister-in-law of Sofia Tabuada’s husband Simeon, mortgaged said lot to Spouses Certeza.
Eleanor Tabuada misrepresented herself as the deceased Loreta Tabuado, their common mother-in-law and signed the
mortgage as Loreta.

RTC: Declared the mortgage null and void since Eleanor Tabuada does not have legal authority and absolute ownership
to mortgage the lot.
CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC since Sofia Tabuada failed to prove her legal relationship with deceased Lorta
Tabuada. The death certificate the petitioners presented was not an authenticated copy on security paper issued by the
National Statistics Office (now Philippine Statistics Authority); and that the name of the deceased on the death certificate
(Loreta Yulo Tabuada) did not match the name of the registered title holder (Loreta H. Tabuada).

The Court reversed the CA decision and reinstated the RTC decision. It ruled that to establish filiation, the courts like the
RTC herein should consider and analyze not only the relevant testimonies of witnesses who are competent but other
relevant evidence as well.

There was on record herein Sofia Tabuada's unchallenged declaration of her being the daughter-in-law of the registered
titleholder. Also on record was the petitioners' being in the actual possession of Lot No. 4272-B-2, which they had been
using as the site for their family residence. Such established circumstances indicated that the deceased Loreta Yulo
Tabuada and titleholder Loreta H. Tabuada could only be one and the same person. Moreover, even the Spouses

71
Certeza were aware that respondents Eleanor Tabuada and Tabuco were the relatives of Sofia Tabuada; and that the
respective families of Eleanor Tabuada, Tabuco and Sofia Tabuada actually resided on the same lot. Verily, the facts and
circumstances sufficiently and competently affirmed the legal relationship between Sofia Tabuada and the late titleholder
Loreta H. Tabuada.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS

On January 27, 2005, the petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 05- 28420 in the RTC against respondents Spouses
Bernan and Eleanor Certeza (Spouses Certeza), Eleanor Tabuada, Julieta Trabuco and Laureta Redondo. Respondents
were declared in default.

At the ex parte hearing held on September 9, 2005 to receive their evidence, the petitioners presented Sofia Tabuada,
who testified:

● that her late husband was Simeon Tabuada, the son of Loreta Tabuada and the brother-in law of defendant
Eleanor Tabuada; that her co-plaintiffs were her daughters;
● that defendant Julieta Trabuco was the daughter of Eleanor Tabuada while Laureta Redondo was the latter's
neighbor;
● that Loreta Tabuada had died on April 16, 1990 while her husband had died on July 18, 1997; that she received
the notice sent by the Spouses Certeza regarding their land, known as Lot 4272-B-2, located at Barangay Tacas,
Jaro, Iloilo City that her husband had inherited from his mother, Loreta Tabuada, and where they were residing,
informing them that the land had been mortgaged to them (Spouses Certeza);
● that she immediately inquired from Eleanor Tabuada and Trabuco about the mortgage, and both admitted that
they had mortgaged the property to the Spouses Certeza;
● that she was puzzled to see the signature purportedly of Loreta Tabuada on top of the name Loreta Tabuada
printed on the Mortgage of Real Rights dated July 1, 1994 and the Promissory Note dated July 4, 1994 despite
Loreta Tabuada having died on April 16, 1990;
● that the property under mortgage was the where she and her daughters were residing; that the notice caused her
to lose her appetite and sleepless nights, and she suffered hypertension, which entitled her to moral damages of
P100,000.00;
● that she engaged her counsel to pursue the case against the defendants, paying counsel P40,000.00; and that
she further incurred litigation expenses of P5,000.00.

RTC: Declared the mortgage null and void for not complying with the essential requisites of a real estate mortgage.
Eleanor Tabuada, who was not the absolute owner and without having the legal authority to mortgage said property, had
misrepresented herself as the deceased Loreta Tabuada and mortgaged the property without the knowledge of herein
plaintiffs, and benefited from said mortgage to the detriment of the rights and interests of plaintiffs.

CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that they were
the legal heirs of the late Loreta Tabuada, the registered holder of the title over the mortgaged real property. The death
certificate the petitioners presented was not an authenticated copy on security paper issued by the National Statistics
Office (now Philippine Statistics Authority); and that the name of the deceased on the death certificate (Loreta Yulo
Tabuada) did not match the name of the registered title holder (Loreta H. Tabuada).
ISSUE

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WON the legal relationship of Sofia Tabuada with deceased Loreta Tabuada was established?

RULING
YES. The mere discrepancy – as perceived by the CA – between the name of the deceased entered in the death
certificate (Loreta Yulo Tabuada) and the name of the titleholder (Loreta H. Tabuada) did not necessarily belie or disprove
the legal relationship between Sofia Tabuada and the late Loreta Tabuada. To establish filiation, the courts like the RTC
herein should consider and analyze not only the relevant testimonies of witnesses who are competent but other relevant
evidence as well.

There was on record herein Sofia Tabuada's unchallenged declaration of her being the daughter-in-law of the registered
titleholder. Also on record was the petitioners' being in the actual possession of Lot No. 4272-B-2, which they had been
using as the site for their family residence. Such established circumstances indicated that the deceased Loreta Yulo
Tabuada and titleholder Loreta H. Tabuada could only be one and the same person. Moreover, even the Spouses
Certeza were aware that respondents Eleanor Tabuada and Tabuco were the relatives of Sofia Tabuada; and that the
respective families of Eleanor Tabuada, Tabuco and Sofia Tabuada actually resided on the same lot. Verily, the facts and
circumstances sufficiently and competently affirmed the legal relationship between Sofia Tabuada and the late titleholder
Loreta H. Tabuada.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Gaspay v. CA, 238 SCRA 163 - Cuntapay-Vitin

Proof of Filiation of an Illegitimate Child


FLAVIANO S. GASPAY, JR., AND ERIBERTA S. GASPAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND GUADALUPE GASPAY ALFARO, respondents.
November 15, 1994 G.R. No. 102372 PUNO, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
This is for the issuance of letters of administration which the SC granted in favor of the illegitimate child because the
adopted child failed to apply for administration 30 days after the death of their father.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

73
FACTS
1. The facts reveal that Flaviano Gaspay died without a last will and testament on October 14, 1983 in Tacloban
City. He was then married to Agueda Denoso. They were childless.
1
2. On July 6, 1988, private respondent Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro files a petition in the trial court alleging, among
others, that she is the acknowledged illegitimate daughter of the deceased Flaviano Gaspay, who died without a
will and left certain real and personal properties. She identified her mother as Claudia Pason with whom decedent
allegedly had an illicit relationship. She prayed for issuance of letters of administration of the decedent's estate.
3. Petitioners Flaviano S. Gaspay, Jr., and Eriberta Salvatieva Gaspay opposed the petition with motion to dismiss.
Flaviano, Jr., is an adopted son of the decedent while Eriberta is also not a next of kin. They alleged that private
respondent is a stranger and even assuming her illegitimate status, there is no proof of her recognition or
acknowledgment.
ISSUE
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH
REGARDS TO THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS MARTIN GARIN WHICH WAS NOT EVEN MADE AN ASSIGNED
ERROR IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF (IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7, RULE 51 OF THE RULES OF COURT).
-NO. In fact the CA gave credit to Garin’s testimony.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF
GUADALUPE OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD CAN STILL BE BROUGHT AFTER THE DEATH OF THE
ALLEGED PARENT (WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO SECOND
PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE).
-YES. She is an illegitimate child but she way acknowledged by her father and she has been using her father’s surname
from birth until the filing of this case.
-Settled is the rule that "actions based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought even after the father's death."

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GUADALUPE IS ENTITLED TO LETTERS OF


ADMINISTRATION.
-she has proved her entitlement to be administrator of the estate of Flaviano Gaspay, Sr., her father. Section 6 of Rule 78
is in her favor, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refused the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If much surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent
or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.
For a fact, petitioners neglected to apply for letters of administration thirty (30) days after the death of Gaspay, Sr.
RULING
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is dismissed there being no reversible error in the Decision of the
respondent court dated September 30, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 25872. Costs against petitioner.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Ong vs CA, G.R. No. 95386. May 29, 1997 -

74
Proof of Filiation of Illegitimate Children
MIGUELA CAMPOS ONG, Surviving Spouse of MANUEL ONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO ONG and ROBERT ONG respondents.
May 29, 1997 G.R. No. 95386 Mendoza,J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
Alfredo and Robert claim to be the illegitimate children of Manuel and Saturnina, and thus entitled to financial support
from Manuel Ong. Although Manuel gave money to Alfredo on four instances when the latter demanded for it, Manuel
denies paternity. The issue is W/N Alfredo and Robert are the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong. The Court ruled yes,
the testimony of Saturnina’s affair with Manuel, although secretly done and cannot be considered as cohabitation, is still
enough proof that Alfredo and Robert were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of
Ong’s paternity.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS
1. Saturnina and Manuel had an illicit relationship which bore two children –Alfredo and Robert.
2. Manuel, initially, gave financial support but it started to dwindle, until Manuel stopped seeing Saturnina altogether.
3. Alfredo and Robert claim to be the illegitimate children of Manuel and Saturnina, and thus entitled to financial
support from Manuel
4. Although Manuel gave money to Alfredo on four instances when the latter demanded for it, Manuel denies
paternity.
5. Two circumstances were mentioned which allegedly make it improbable that Manuel was the father of Alfredo
and Robert:

(1) that Saturnina admitted having cohabited with another man before meeting Manuel
(2) that Manuel was allegedly sterile

ISSUE
W/N Alfredo and Robert are the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong?

RULING
Yes. One of the proofs of filiation is “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.” This is a blanket
provision covering all cases, even though insufficient to constitute proof, but may be enough to qualify the case. In this
case, the testimony of Saturnina’s affair with Manuel, although secretly done and cannot be considered as cohabitation, is
still enough proof that Alfredo and Robert were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of
Ong’s paternity.

Records show that Saturnina’s cohabitation with another man ended a year before her affair with Manuel and two years
before Alfredo was born. As for the issue of his sterility, there was no competent medical testimony to prove his claim and
that he has acknowledge another natural child.

75
ADDITIONAL NOTES

The four instances during with Manuel met Alfredo and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof of continuous
possession of the status of a child. The father’s conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this
ground to exist.

Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495 - Hernando

Proof of Filiation of Illegitimate Children


FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondent.
February 24, 1998 G.R. No. 124853 J. Davide Jr.
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


Under Art. 175 of the FC, illegitimate filiation, such as Monina’s, may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children. Art. 172 provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
FACTS
Monina, in a complaint filed with the RTC, alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Jison since 1940. At
the end of 1945, however, Francisco had impregnated Esperanza Almolar, his daughter’s nanny. As a result, Monina was
born and, since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as Francisco’s illegitimate child by Francisco’s
acts and that of his family’s.

Francisco refuses to recognize her, so she prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status so that Francisco may
support and treat her as such.
ISSUE

W/N Monina is Francisco’s legitimate child?

RULING
YES. Carefully evaluating Monina’s evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an illegitimate daughter of Francisco
compared to Francisco’s denial thereof, the Court found more weight in the former.

Monina’s positive testimonies and her witnesses all bearing on Francisco’s acts or conduct indubitably show that he had
continuously acknowledged her as his illegitimate daughter, and these have not been refuted.

76
In fact, Francisco himself, in his deposition, only casually dismissed Monina’s exhaustive and detailed testimony as
untrue, and with respect to the testimonies given by Monina’s witnesses, he merely explained that he fired them from
employment. Needless to say, Francisco’s vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of
Monina’s testimonial evidence.

Under Art. 175 of the FC, illegitimate filiation, such as Monina’s, may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children. Art. 172 provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or


2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or


2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Heirs of Gabatan vs CA, GR 150206, March 13, 2009 - Cruz

Proof of Filiation of Illegitimate Children


Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN,
REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA
GABATAN, Petitioners, vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.
March 13, 2009 G.R. No. 150206 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Recit Ready Synopsis
This case is an action for the recovery of ownership and possession of property owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan,
during his lifetime filed by the respondent against herein petitioners.

Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. Respondent claims to be legal
heirs of Juan Gabatan through her mother Hermogena Gabata, sole heir of Juan. Petitioner claims Juan died single and
succeeded by his brother (Teofilo) and sisters.

Issue: Can the respondent claim ownership to the subject property being legal heirs of Hermogena Gabatan, sole heir to
Juan Gabatan? NO.

It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan
Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best
evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous

77
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent
allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogena’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic
document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimonies of witness claiming to personally know Hermogena and Juan, however they were
not present during Juan’s wedding and on Hermogena’s birth. Their testimonies are hearsay.

Also presented is a Deed of Sale claiming that the petitioners’ father Teofilo, recognized Hermogena as the heir of Juan
Gabatan. SC Held, Deed of Sale presented was inadmissible because it is a mere photocopy. Under the best evidence
rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself.

Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still
nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H
does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan.

Lastly, SC held that the respondent’s cause of action iis barred by laches.

All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation.

Petition is GRANTED. CA ruling REVERSED.


Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
1. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.
2. To prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such
familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In
the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the
respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to
Juan Gabatan.

FACTS
This case is an action for the recovery of ownership and possession of property owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan,
during his lifetime filed by the respondent against herein petitioners.

Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

Respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother,
Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of
Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5
was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also
claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death,
respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property.

78
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan
Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely:
Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject
land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements
thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent.

RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.


ISSUE

Can the respondent claim ownership to the subject property being legal heirs of Hermogena Gabatan, sole heir to Juan
Gabatan? NO.

RULING
NO.

1. Error in proper action.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be
made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.13

2. No substantive proof of filiation of Hermogena to Juan Gabatan.


a. Birth Certificate presented by the respondent is without probative value.. Even assuming that it was
credible and authentic, it does not establish filiation of Hermogena and Juan.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim
entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present
preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates19 of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during
her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth
certificate which indicated that her mother’s maiden name was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners,
on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate which
differed from the copy presented by respondent.

We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1
was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of
respondent (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely,
Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan
de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta.
Mesa, Manila.

79
It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her
mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan,
our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have
presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof
admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best
evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC.
Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimonies of witness claiming to personally know Hermogena and Juan,
however they were not present during Juan’s wedding and on Hermogena’s birth. THeir testimonies are
hearsay.

b. Deed of Sale presented was inadmissible because it is a mere photocopy. Even if we are to overlook the
lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless would
have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H
does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan.

Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a
photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be
signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of
a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan" was
indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition
by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan
Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same statement as a declaration against interest on the part of
Teofilo Gabatan.34

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein,
as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’ counsel for being a
mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.35 After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself.36 Although the best evidence rule admits of
exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed,
such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of
secondary evidence must still be established.

3. Cause of action is barred by laches.

All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation.
Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for
she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably
delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self
to blame.

80
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous
possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012 - Awisan

Proof of filiation of illegitimate children


ANTONIO PERLA, petitioner, vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, respondents.

November 12, 2012 G.R. No. 172471 Del Castillo, J.


Recit Ready Synopsis

Mirasol and Randy filed a Complaint for support against Antonio, alleging that Randy is the illegitimate child of Antonio.
They presented Certification of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate stating that Mirasol and Antonio are the parents of
Randy. Antonio, though admitting to had sexual encounter with Mirasol, denied being Randy's father and the Supreme
Court agreed with Antonio. The Birth Certificate, as well as the Baptismal Certificate, presented wasn't signed by him and
he had no participation in it's preparation. Antonio admitted to had sexual encounter to Mirasol in 1981 only, and Randy
was born in 1983, two years after, hence, it is not possible he fathered Randy. To prove open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child, as prescribed by Article 175 of the Family Code, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FC Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

FC Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.

FACTS

1. Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy, filed before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio.
○ Mirasol's allegations: Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As a
result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November 11, 1983
○ Randy's testimony: Recounted having met him for the first time in 1994 in the house of his Aunt Lelita,
Antonio’s sister, where he was vacationing. During their encounter, Randy called Antonio “Papa” and

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kissed his hand while the latter hugged him. When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised that
he would support him
○ The presented evidence: Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her an Antonio as
parent of the child
○ Antonio, as an adverse witness: admitted having sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and August
of 1981
2. Antonio denied having courted Mirasol on January 5, 1981 because during that time, he was studying in Iloilo
City.
○ Antonio's testimony: He claimed that he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol only once which happened in
the month of September or October of 1981. The Certificate of Live Birth has several inaccuracies.
○ Daisy, daughter of the "hilot" when Mirasol gave birth: Her mother asked Mirasol the details to be entered
in the child’s Certificate of Live Birth such as the names of the parents, date and place of marriage, and
the intended name of the child. Her mother also told her that Mirasol’s son has no acknowledged father

ISSUE
: Is Randy an illegitimate child of Antonio? --> NO

RULING

As to the Certificate of Live Birth:

● Said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the
same. It is settled that “[a] certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate.”
● The several unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth
certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who
signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand.

As to the Baptismal Certificate:

● The lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document
incompetent to prove paternity
● It can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of
the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.

As to the Randy's Testimony:

● To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and
clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be
of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.

As to the admission of sexual encounters:

● As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she had sexual
intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth of Randy. This
crucial period therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983.
● Nothing from Mirasol’s testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time.

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● Assuming that he indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol on the dates mentioned, still, none of these sexual
congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later in 1983.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

“Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court.” However, this rule admits
of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the
judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts.

San Agustin vs. Sales, G.R. N0. 189289, August 31, 2016 - Yupangco

Proof of filiation
GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. ERNESTO SALES, respondent. Zoleta-San Agustin vs. Sales, 801
SCRA 683, G.R. No. 189289 August 31, 2016
31 August 2016 G.R. 189289 Reyes, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
The Petitioner in this case assails the following issues with regard to the Courts granting illegitimate status to the
Sales brothers: (1) The documents pertaining to the recognition of the Father of his illegitimate children are invalid
because thumbmark is not a sufficient way of providing a ‘signature’; and (2) the use of the houseboy’s name
(‘Corpus’) as the son’s last name instead of his dad’s during his lifetime.

1. The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

2. The use of Louis’ surname by his children during the lifetime of Marie Louise would run counter to his intention to
cover such relationship. It is no less than the putative father who voluntary recognized that Teodoro and Ernesto
are his illegitimate children. It is emphatically underscored that it is the law and only the law that determines who
are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Proof of Filiation

FACTS
On March 14, 1994, brothers Teodoro Sales (Teodoro) (now deceased) and Ernesto Sales (Ernesto) (collectively, the
plaintiffs) filed an action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate children of the late Louis C.
Fernandez (Louis) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Subsequently, an Amended Complaint was filed
on March 13, 1996, before the RTC of Quezon City where it was alleged that Ernesto and Teodoro were born in Pasay
City on March 20, 1948 and October 22, 1943, respectively. They are the illegitimate children of Louis and his common-
law wife named Epitacia Sales (Epitacia) who was a house helper in the Fernandez household. Louis and his legal wife,
Marie Louise Fernandez (Marie Louise) (Spouses Fernandez), a French national, did not have any child. According to the
plaintiffs, Louis formally recognized them as his children by Epitacia in two public documents bearing his thumb marks,

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viz: (1) a notarized document dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis and Epitacia formally recognizing the
plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a document solely executed by Louis on December 2, 1980, dominated as
Acknowledgement of Children.

The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez, directed the action against unknown
defendants. However, on May 30, 1994, the petitioner raised her opposition. She alleged in her Amended Answer filed on
July 26, 1994 that she is the niece of Louis and that the Spouses Fernandez informally adopted her as their child when
she was only 2 years old. She insisted that the father of the plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus), the former houseboy
of the Fernandez household. To invalidate the claim for illegitimacy of the Sales brothers, the petitioner raised the
following that the documents of legitimacy presented by the brothers to sustain the complaint were spurious.

The RTC and the Ca denied the petition of Gloria who assails that the brothers’ claim to illegitimacy is invalid.

ISSUE
I. THE CA GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS AND MANIFESTLY IGNORED THE UNDISPUTED AND
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

A. The CA gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the two "notarized" documents submitted by Ernesto
despite the petitioner's overwhelming contrary documentary evidence.

B. The CA gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of Ernesto's so-called expert witness.

II. THE CA ARBITRARILY REFUSED AND/OR FAILED TO RULE ON THE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR
DNA TESTING DESPITE ITS EARLIER PRONOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL RESOLVE THE SAME AS AN
ASSIGNED ERROR.

A. The CA's failure to act on the petitioner's Application for DNA Testing is a substantial departure from this
Honorable Court's decisions favoring DNA Testing. Moreover, it is contrary to the CA's very own Resolution dated
February 10, 2009 wherein it undertook to resolve the petitioner's application in the resolution of the main appeal.
The exercise of the Court's power of review and supervision is, thus, proper and necessary under the
circumstances.

RULING
1. All told, the authenticity of the documents of recognition executed by Louis which is the core of the present
controversy, as well as the credibility of the expert witness in the person of Palad, are questions of fact for they
involve the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. There exists a question
of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts while a question of fact
concerns itself with the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. To reiterate, a petition for review on certiorari covers
only questions of law.

2. The petitioner maintained that the real father of Teodoro and Ernesto is Corpus (Houseboy). She presented
various evidence like school report card and death certificate wherein Teodoro's surname followed that of Corpus.
The use of Corpus' surname by Teodoro does not in itself negate the illegitimate filiation of Teodoro and Ernesto.
As correctly observed by the CA, Louis' existing marriage to Marie Louise must have prevented him from making
any declaration that would have exposed his relationship with Epitacia. The use of Louis' surname by his children
during the lifetime of Marie Louise would run counter to his intention to cover such relationship. It is no less than
the putative father who voluntary recognized that Teodoro and Ernesto are his illegitimate children. It is
emphatically underscored that it is the law and only the law that determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate

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children for one's legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Calma v Turla, GR 221684, July 30, 2018 -

E. Proof of Filiation
2. Of illegitimate children, FC 175, 176
MARIA T. CALMA, petitioner, vs. MARILU C. TURLA, respondent.
July 30, 2018 G.R. No. 221684 PERALTA, J
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC “RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE”

FACTS
On March 12, 2009, respondent Marilu C. Turla filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Quezon City a
Petition 2 for Letters of Administration alleging, among others, that her father, Mariano C. Turla, died intestate on
February 5, 2009, leaving real properties located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, bank deposits and other personal
properties, all with an estimated value of P3,000,000.00; that she is the sole legal heir entitled to inherit and succeed to
the estate of her deceased father who did not leave any other descendant or other heir entitled to the estate as his wife,
Rufina de Castro, had predeceased him; and that she is entitled to be issued letters of administration. She presented her
Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed and registered by the deceased himself with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

As the petition was sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to it and set the petition for hearing. On
April 21, 2009, the Letter of Special Administration was issued to respondent.

Petitioner Maria Turla Calma, claiming to be the surviving youngest half-sister of Mariano as he was her mother's
illegitimate son before her marriage to her father, filed an Opposition to the petition for administration and alleged that
respondent is not a daughter of Mariano; that the information recited in her two birth certificates are false, the truth being
that Mariano and his wife Rufina did not have any child. She argued that she is entitled to the administration of the estate
of her half-brother and nominated Norma Bernardino, who has been managing the business and other financial affairs of
the decedent, to take charge of the management and preservation of the estate pending its distribution to the heirs.

On June 29, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion to Order DNA Testing as respondent's blood relation to Mariano is in issue.
Respondent opposed the same on the ground that petitioner lacked the legal right or personality to request for a DNA test
as she has no legal interest in the matter in litigation.

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In an Order dated June 25, 2010, the RTC granted petitioner's motion for an order for DNA testing.

On August 28, 2012, the RTC received the Report of Dr. Maria Corazon A. de Ungria, Head of the DNA Analysis
Laboratory, UP Natural Sciences Research Institute (NSRI), on the DNA test on the blood samples from Rufina's alleged
siblings and respondent, with the following conclusion:

Based on the results of mitochondrial DNA analysis there is no possibility that Mr. Ireneo S. de Castro and Ms. Basilia de
Castro Maningas are maternal relatives of Ms. Marilu de Castro Turla.

RTC removed Marilu Turla as the Special Administratrix of the intestate properties of Mariano.

CA annulled and set aside the RTC decision.

Thus, petitioner filed a review for certiorari.


ISSUE
Whether the DNA test results is a ground to remove Marilu Turla as the special administratrix?

RULING
NO. Clearly, the DNA test was ordered to prove Marilu's paternity, but surprisingly, the test was conducted with the
alleged siblings of Rufina, which showed that Marilu is not related to Rufina.While Marilu was shown to be not blood
related to Rufina, however, the DNA result did not at all prove that she is not a daughter of Mariano, as Maria claims and
which the RTC's order of DNA testing wanted to establish. Notably, Maria alleges that she is Mariano's half-sister, but it
baffles the SC why she was not the one who underwent the DNA testing when such procedure could satisfactorily prove
her contention that Marilu is not Mariano's daughter.

Moreover, Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Rule on DNA evidence, provides that the grant of DNA testing application
shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be
obtained as a result thereof. Here, the DNA result was not offered in accordance with the Rules on Evidence. Therefore,
we do not find the DNAtest results as a valid ground for the revocation of Marilu's appointment as Special Administratrix
and her removal as such. Marilu's removal was not grounded on reason, justice and legal principle

Mariano's execution of an affidavit of adjudication in 1994 for the extrajudicial settlement of the intestate estate of his late
wife Rufina stating among others, "that she did not leave any descendant", would not also prove that Marilu is not a
daughter of Mariano whose estate is under consideration.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

The estate to be administered is that of decedent Mariano Turla, hence, it is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Respondent Judge to remove petitioner on the ground that she is not related to Rufina Turla. True, that she claims to be
the daughter of the Spouses Mariano Turla and Rufina Turla. However, a finding that she is not the daughter of Rufina
Turla does not automatically mean that she is not the daughter of Mariano Turla as well, especially since in the two
versions of her birth certificate, it was Mariano Turla who reported her birth and who signed the same as the father of the
child.

x x x the DNA Test results used as a basis by the Respondent Judge in removing petitioner was not, at the very least,
presented and offered as evidence. The rule is that after the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the
parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC, in evaluating
the DNA results upon presentation shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rule on

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DNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC). At that point when the RTC used it as basis for the removal of petitioner, the DNA
Test Result is not yet considered evidence, depriving petitioner the opportunity to contest the same. In its Order dated
May 9, 2013, the RTC backtracked a little and stated that the DNA Test Result was merely persuasively considered in the
resolution of the issue. A perusal of the Order dated September 11, 2012 shows otherwise because it was evidently the
only basis considered by the RTC in its ruling. As we already determined, the DNA Test Result is not even material and
relevant evidence in this case. Petitioner's filiation with Rufina Turla is not material in the resolution of the right of
petitioner to the estate of Mariano Turla and/or to administer the same, whether as a regular or as a special administratrix.

Abadilla vs Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 447 - Laydia

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN; Who may be Legitimated


MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC,
Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent.
October 25, 1995 A.M.No. MTJ-92-716 PER CURIAM
Recit Ready Synopsis
A complaint was filed against respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. with charges for “gross immorality, deceitful
conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.” In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that
respondent caused to be registered as “legitimate,” his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or
oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The
Court held the respondent culpable of deceitful conduct since as a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that,
despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, the three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered
legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife,
Teresita B. Tabiliran. The Court cited Article 269 of the Civil Code, which was reiterated in Article 177 of the Family Code.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case


[FAMILY CODE]
Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were
below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated. (As amended by R.A. No. 9858, December 20, 2009)

FACTS
This is an administrative case which arose from a complaint filed against respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. with
charges for “gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.”

In respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of the respondent, complainant Abadilla contends that Judge
Tabiliran had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his
legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. In addition to this, he allegedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla
Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent
was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela.

Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as “single” in the marriage contract and dispensed with the
requirements of a marriage license by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.

Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier, respondent’s wife filed a complaint in the case

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entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein for
abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son.

In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as “legitimate,”
his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970
Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971
Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975

by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable
negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as
legitimate.

Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and
was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already
left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and
respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.

ISSUE
Can Judge Tabiliran’s children with Priscilla Baybayan be legitimated? - NO.

RULING
As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, the three children
cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing
valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at
bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The Family Code
(Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus:

Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:


1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of
marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.

It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the
respondent.

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ADDITIONAL NOTES

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