PUBLICATION AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

TAÑADA v. TUVERA
G.R. NO. L-63915 24 APRIL 1985
ESCOLIN, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that all laws
be published in the Official Gazette before they may take effect.

FACTS: Petitioners Tañada, et al. sought a writ of mandamus to compel

respondents, including Executive Assistant to the President Tuvera, to publish
several various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders. Petitioners invoked the people’s right to be informed on matters of
public concern, as enshrined in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Respondents argued that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
requirement for the effectivity of laws that specify their own date of effectivity,
as stated in Article 2 of the National Civil Code.

ISSUE: Is publication in the Official Gazette a requisite for the effectivity of

the presidential issuances in question, even if such statutes provide their own
date of effectivity?

RULING: Yes, publication in the Official Gazette is required for presidential

issuances to take effect.
The Court ruled that the “unless it is otherwise provided” clause found in
Article 2 of the Civil Code refers to the date of effectivity and not the
requirement of publication per se.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Hence, the petition is granted, and the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
 CLARIFICATIONS ON THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT
FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
TAÑADA v. TUVERA
G.R. NO. L-63915 29 DECEMBER 1986
CRUZ, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 2 of the Civil Code contemplates the need to inform the
public of the content of the laws before it shall take effect.
FACTS: In its April 24, 1985 decision, the Court ordered the respondents
to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, before they may be considered effective and binding.
Petitioners are now seeking clarifications to said decision, in effect suggesting
that (1) there must not be a distinction between laws that are of “general
application” and those which are not, (2) that only publication of statutes in
their full text is recognized as “publication,” and (3) that publication must be
made in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Must all laws, regardless of applicability, be published in full in the
Official Gazette before they take effect?
RULING: Yes. All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws.
Finally, the Court pronounced that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as
a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or
after a different period provided by the legislature.

WHERE IMPLIEDREPEALS ARE NOT FAVORED

THORNTON v. THORNTON
G.R. NO. 154598 16 AUGUST 2004
CORONA, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 7 of the National Civil Code expressly states that laws may
only be repealed by subsequent ones.
FACTS: American petitioner Brian Thornton and Filipino respondent Adelfa
Thornton are married. After 3 years, the marriage turned sour. On October
2001, respondent left their family home, bringing with her their infant
daughter, who was 2 years old at the time. Their house help told petitioner that
respondent brought their daughter to Basilan.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in a Makati Family Court, but it
was dismissed due to the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner
then traveled to Basilan but still could not find his wife and child. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time before the Court of
Appeals, which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire
country.
Said petition was denied, by reason of the Court of Appeals lacking jurisdiction
on the case. CA ruled that since R.A. 8369 provided family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed R.A. 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA)

ISSUE: Does the Court of Appeal hold jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors in light of R.A. 8369 relegating exclusive
jurisdiction over such petitions to family courts?

RULING: Yes, the Court of Appeals hold jurisdiction over this case because
nothing in R.A. 8369 revoked the Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the
custody of minors is involved. Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory
construction that implied repeals are not favored.
Hence. CA took cognizance of the case, and hereby granted the petition.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE LAND

PESCA v. PESCA
G.R. NO. 136921 17 APRIL 2001
VITUG, J:
DOCTRINE: The “doctrine of stare decisis,” established in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.

FACTS: Petitioner Lorna Pesca and respondent Zosimo Pesca got married in
1975. The union bore four children.
In 1988, petitioner first noticed that respondent showcased signs of “psychological
incapacity” to perform his marital covenant. He has reportedly become cruel and
violent towards his wife and children.
On March 22, 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in
front of her children. Medical examinations show that she sustained contusions
and abrasions.
Petitioner sued respondent for nullity of their marriage, invoking psychological
incapacity, and the RTC declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio.
Respondent appealed this ruling before the CA, which reversed the decision, citing
jurisprudence and stating that the petitioner failed to prove the alleged
“psychological incapacity” of respondent, as the term was so defined in Santos vs.
Court of Appeals and Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina.

ISSUE: Are the guidelines for proving “psychological incapacity” as set in the
cases of Santos and Molina mandatory in the CA decision?
RULING: Yes, the “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Thus, the term “psychological incapacity” was given legal life by the Court in the
case of Santos and in the case of Molina. Both judicial decisions in Santos and
Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina
are mandatory in nature.
The petition was denied, and the Court ruled that the appellate court did not err in
its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence showed and proved by
petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.