FILED

Gary Harrison
CLERK, SUPERIOR COURT
10/24/2019 12:26:08 AM
BY: ALAN WALKER /S/
1 Dennis P. McLaughlin (#009197) (PAN 37748) DEPUTY

Principal Assistant City Attorney for Case No. C20195033

2 HON. BRENDEN J GRIFFIN
Jennifer Stash (#029848) (PAN 124942)
3 Senior Assistant City Attorney for
MICHAEL G. RANKIN
4 City Attorney
P.O. Box 27210
5 Tucson, Arizona 85726-7210
6 Dennis.McLaughlin@tucsonaz.gov
Jennifer.Stash@tucsonaz.gov
7 Telephone: (520) 791-4221
Fax: (520) 623-9803
8

9
10
4801 East Broadway Boulevard, Suite 311
11 Tucson, Arizona 85711
T: 520.214.2000
12 F: 520.214.2001
Ali J. Farhang (#019456) (PAN 65507)
13 afarhang@farhangmedcoff.com
14 Robert A. Bernheim (#024664) (PAN 66050)
rbernheim@farhangmedcoff.com
15 Attorneys for Defendants City of Tucson, et al.
16
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
17
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA
18

19
People’s Defense Initiative, Inc.; et al., Case No. C20195033
20
Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS’ SEPARATE
21 STATEMENT OF FACTS IN
v. SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
22
Mike Rankin, et al. DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
23
Defendants. MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
24
Assigned to the Honorable Brenden J.
25 Griffin
26

27

28
00622947.1
 1 Defendants the City of Tucson (the “City”), Mike Rankin, Michael Ortega, Chris
2 Magnus, and Steve Kozachik (collectively, “Defendants”) submit the following
3 Defendants’ Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Motion to Dismiss Under Rule
4 12(b)(6) or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”).
5 DEFENDANTS’ SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS
6 1. Proposition 205 is a 2019 City of Tucson ballot initiative officially entitled
7 “Tucson Families Free and Together.” It was originally filed as initiative petition 2018-
8 I001 in December 2018 and later certified for placement on the ballot at the 2019 general
9 election. It is sometimes referred to as a “sanctuary” city initiative. Declaration of Mike
10 Rankin (“Rankin Decl.”), attached as Exhibit A, at ¶ 4; City of Tucson, The Choice … Is
11 Yours: Official Voter Information (“Voter Pamphlet”), attached as Exhibit B, at pp.8-13.1
12 2. Plaintiff People’s Defense Initiative, Inc.’s (“PDI”) attorney, Billy Peard,
13 acknowledged receipt of the January 16 Memorandum and stated, “Thanks, Mike. I
14 appreciate the thorough treatment of it.” Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶¶ 5-6; 1/16/2019 Email
15 from B. Peard to M. Rankin, attached as Exhibit F.
16 3. Plaintiffs admit that the January 16 Memorandum does not expressly request
17 voters take any particular position on Proposition 205. October 21, 2019 Deposition of
18 Zaira Livier (“Livier Dep.”), attached as Exhibit C, at 18:11-16.
19 4. Plaintiffs admit that most of the January 16 Memorandum’s analysis is
20 factually and legally correct. Plaintiffs’ Answers to Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories
21 (“Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Responses”), attached as Exhibit D, at Answer to Interrogatory
22 No. 1.
23 5. Plaintiffs only dispute the January 16 Memorandum’s substantive analysis of
24 Sections 17-83(h)-(k), 17-85, and 17-88, concerning the following issues: (1) the factors
25 that may be considered to form reasonable suspicion for a stop or other detention,
26 (2) whether it is practicable to investigate a detainee’s immigration status during a traffic
27 stop, (3) whether Proposition 205 extends special protection to detainees suspected of
28 1
https://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/clerks/Choice_Is_yours_Final_2019_General.pdf
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 1 various sex crimes and domestic violence offenses, (4) whether federal agencies would still
2 work with the Tucson Police Department subject to prospective memoranda of
3 understanding (“MOUs”) limiting their powers, (5) whether the city courts can have
4 jurisdiction over private civil actions, (6) whether Proposition 205 creates the risk of losing
5 state-shared revenues, and (7) whether Proposition 205 creates the risk of losing federal
6 grant funds. See Complaint at ¶¶ 58-59, 94-95; Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Responses, Exh. D,
7 at Answer to Interrogatory No. 1; People’s Defense Initiative’s Memorandum Responding
8 to January 16 Memorandum (“PDI Memorandum”), attached as Exhibit E, at pp.1-9;
9 Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 7 & Exhs. 1-2 thereto. Moreover, Livier explicitly admitted that
10 Mr. Rankin’s opinions were correct for many portions of Proposition 205. Livier Dep.,
11 Exh. C, at 26:16-19 (Section 17-82), 28:6-9 (Section 17-83(g)), 38:1-9 (Section 17-83(g)),
12 48:1-19 (Section 17-83(j)), 58:11-59:1 (Section 17-83(k)), 60:4-6 (Section 17-83(k)), 80:5-
13 21 (legal effects of Section 17-85(c)), 82:16-18 (how SB1487 operates), 84:3-7 (passing
14 Proposition 205 will likely result in litigation with the State of Arizona), 84:20-25 (same),
15 101:12-21 (Section 17-83(k)); 111:3-13 (Attorney General’s ability to withhold state-
16 shared revenue).
17 In discussing possible future litigation, Livier seemed unperturbed: “Do you disagree
18 with Mr. Rankin that it [passage of Proposition 205] wouldn’t be a harbinger for potential
19 legal actions? … No. I mean, we’ve already been threatened by one legislator with a
20 lawsuit, so ….” Id. at 84:3-7.
21 6. The January 16 Memorandum states that Section 17-83(h)-(i) imposes limits
22 on the factors officers can otherwise consider to develop reasonable suspicion that a person
23 is unlawfully present in the United States, as expressed in current Fourth Amendment case
24 law. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 8 & Exh. 1, pp.3-4.
25 7. If passed, Proposition 205 would require TPD officers to identify “at least two
26 distinct factors” to support reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence in the United States
27 and would prohibit TPD officers from considering the following as factors to support
28 reasonable suspicion that a detainee is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United
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 1 States:
2 - A detainee’s race, color, or ethnicity;
3 - A detainee’s mode of dress;
4 - A detainee’s ability to speak English;
5 - A detainee’s speech pattern, including a perceived accent;
6 - A detainee’s inability to provide a permanent or local residential address;
7 - A detainee’s presence where aliens who are unlawfully present are known to
8 gather;
9 - A detainee’s presence in a vehicle that is or appears to be overcrowded;
10 - A detainee’s physical proximity to aliens who are unlawfully present in the
11 United States; or
12 - A detainee’s name.
13 Voter Pamphlet, Exh. B, at p.10. Livier admitted that the scenario that “under Proposition
14 205, a minivan on a known alien smuggling corridor and containing 12 passengers crammed
15 inside, all lacking identification,” none of those factors could be used to support reasonable
16 suspicion. Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 45:6-12.
17 8. PDI attorney Peard acknowledged his purpose in drafting this Section was to
18 make it impossible for officers’ to develop reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence.
19 Secret Recording of January 11, 2019 Meeting (“Recording”), Exh. G, at 74:7-14.
20 9. The January 16 Memorandum states that Section 17-83(j)’s establishment of
21 a “policy” that it is “not practicable” to determine a detainee’s immigration status during a
22 traffic stop along a roadway conflicts with SB1070/A.R.S. § 22-1051(b) because whether
23 the investigation of immigration status is “practicable” is a question of fact and not a matter
24 of policy. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 9 & Exh. 1.
25 10. Livier and PDI attorney Peard admitted on January 11, 2019 that these kinds
26 of immigration inquiries during traffic stops would in fact be “practicable” in various
27 situations, including when the stop is made by a “Baker” (i.e., 2 officer) unit. Recording,
28 Exh. G, at 85:14-87:6.
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 1 11. The January 16 Memorandum states that Section 17-83(k) “protects
2 detainees” of certain sex crimes and domestic violence offenses by prohibiting any inquiry
3 about their immigration status by declaring such investigation would always hinder the
4 investigation. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 10 & Exh. 1.
5 12. SB1070 allows an exception for officers to not inquire about immigration
6 status if doing so would hinder the investigation, otherwise officers must make an
7 immigration status inquiry. A.R.S. § 22-1051(b). Section 17-83(k) would exempt all
8 detainees accused of the specified crimes from immigration status inquiries that are
9 otherwise mandated by Arizona law. The specified crimes include the following:
10 - Offenses involving sexual exploitation of children under A.R.S. §§ 13-3551
11 through 13-3556;
12 - Offenses qualifying as domestic violence offenses under A.R.S. § 13-3601;
13 - Offenses qualifying as aggravated domestic violence offenses under A.R.S. § 13-
14 3601.02;
15 - Sexual abuse, sexual conduct with a minor; and sexual assault under A.R.S.
16 §§ 13-1404 to 13-1406;
17 - Molestation of a child under A.R.S. § 13-1410; and
18 - Continuous sexual abuse of a child and sexual misconduct by a behavioral health
19 professional under A.R.S. §§ 13-1417 and 13-1418.
20 Voter Pamphlet, Exh. B, at p.10.
21 13. Plaintiffs’ newly contrived description of the intent of this Section is entirely
22 different than the description Livier and PDI attorney Peard offered during the January 11
23 meeting with Mr. Rankin. At that time, they stated that this Section was only intended to
24 apply to domestic violence cases, where the “detainee” may also be a victim; and they
25 admitted that in adding in the various sex crimes, “maybe we went too far” and “we may
26 have gone overbroad.” Recording, Exh. G, at 11:5-15:7:
27 MR. RANKIN: .. SO I GET IT. SO THAT’S MY CONCERN ABOUT THAT AND
28 THEN ONE OF THE SECTIONS I’M JUST GONNA HAVE TO ASK YOU “WHAT
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 1 THE HECK ARE YOU THINKING?”
2 MR. PEARD: SURE
3 MR. RANKIN: I THINK ….
4 MR. PEARD: I THINK I KNOW WHICH ONE YOU’RE GONNA SAY BUT GO
5 AHEAD
6 MR. RANKIN: YES IT’S THE – I’LL CHARACTERIZE IT IN THE MOST
7 ATTACKING WAY POSSIBLE….
8 [FEMALE LAUGHING]
9 MR. RANKIN: ….BUT IT’S THE IMMIGRATION AMNESTY FOR CHILD
10 MOLESTERS OKAY?
11 MR. PEARD: OH THAT WASN’T THE ONE I WAS THINKING OF….
12 MR. RANKIN: OH OKAY GOOD.
13 MS. LIVIER OH [LAUGHING]
14 ****
15 MR. PEARD: SO I’LL CONCEDE MAYBE WE WENT A LITTLE BIT
16 TOO BROAD ON THE ARS SECTIONS – I THINK THE ORIG – THE PRIMARY
17 INTENT WAS MORE SPECIFICALLY SEX – SORRY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
18 SCENARIOS. WHERE YOU HAVE WHAT’S A HE SAID SHE SAID STORY -- THE
19 COP ARRIVES TO THE SCENE SO HE SAID SHE SAID THE COP IS ASKING
20 BOTH PARTIES – SOMETIMES – IN SOME INSTANCES – CORRECT ME IF I’M
21 WRONG BOTH PARTIES ARE ARRESTED…
22 ****
23 MR. PEARD: WE HAVE GONE OVER BROAD ON THE RANGE OF
24 ARS SECTIONS IN THAT PROVISION…
25 Continuing later at 64:3-65:10:
26 MS. LIVIER: THANKS FOR MEETING WITH US.
27 MR. RANKIN: OH, YEAH.
28 MS. LIVIER: I WASN’T GOING TO COME. BUT I FIGURED I
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 1 SHOULD -- HE SAID IT WAS GOING TO BE A BIG LEGAL NERD FEST. BUT I
2 THINK --
3 MR. RANKIN: OH, YEAH --
4 MS. LIVIER: -- IT’S REALLY GOOD FOR ME TO --
5 MR. RANKIN: -- IT ALWAYS IS WHEN BILLY AND I GET
6 TOGETHER.
7 MS. LIVIER: YEAH, I KNOW. I LOVE LISTENING TO -- TO --
8 TO YOU GUYS. BUT IT’S VERY HELPFUL FOR ME TO HEAR ALL OF THIS
9 AND --
10 MR. RANKIN: YEAH.
11 MS. LIVIER: -- TO GET MORE, YOU KNOW --
12 MR. RANKIN: AND I’M TRYING TO --
13 MS. LIVIER: -- FAMILIAR WITH THIS.
14 MR. RANKIN: -- STAY OUT OF THE POLITICAL --
15 MS. LIVIER: MM-HMM.
16 MR. RANKIN: -- BUT I -- YOU KNOW, I KNOW THAT -- LIKE,
17 THE MAYORAL CANDIDATES ARE, YOU KNOW, ARE WORRIED ABOUT THIS
18 --
19 MS. LIVIER: RIGHT.
20 MR. RANKIN: -- YOU KNOW. ON THE ONE HAND THEIR
21 BASE IS PROBABLY, “HEY, YOU SUPPORT THIS, RIGHT? YOU’RE FOR
22 SANCTUARY POLICIES?” BLAH, BLAH, BLAH. AND THEN, YOU KNOW, I
23 JUST WANT TO UNDERSTAND THESE BECAUSE THEN THEY COULD BE
24 EXPOSED TO THE CANDIDATE ON THE OTHER SIDE SAYING, “SO YOU
25 SUPPORT A MEASURE THAT GIVES AMNESTY TO A CHILD MOLESTER?”
26 GREAT --
27 MS. LIVIER: RIGHT.
28 MR. RANKIN: -- YOU KNOW?
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 1 MS. LIVIER: RIGHT.
2 14. PDI now asserts that it intended Section 17-83(k) to protect victims and
3 encourage their cooperation. PDI contends that victims are more likely to cooperate with a
4 criminal investigation if there is no risk that the detainee will risk an investigation of
5 immigration status. PDI Memorandum, Exh. E, at p.6. However, Section 17-83(k) does
6 not mention victims at all. Voter Pamphlet, Exh. B, at p.10. Livier separately claims that
7 victims qualify as “detainees” under Proposition 205, but the definition of “detainee” does
8 not include victims unless they are also detainees in their own right. Voter Pamphlet,
9 Exh. B, at p.8; Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 50-52; Recording, Exh. G, at 88:13-90:5:
10 MR. RANKIN: K DOESN’T SAY -- IT’S THE POLICY THAT IT
11 DOES HINDER AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE A DETAINEE’S
12 IMMIGRATION STATUS IN THESE CONTACTS. IT SAYS “MAY.” SO I DON’T
13 KNOW THAT IT ACTUALLY HAS ANY REAL EFFECT BECAUSE AN OFFICER
14 MAY SAY IT’S NOT HINDERING THIS INVESTIGATION IN THIS PARTICULAR
15 INSTANCE. SO, YOU KNOW, I DON’T KNOW IF THAT WAS INTENTIONAL TO
16 MAY THIS A “MAY” VERSUS A “DOES.”
17 MY THOUGHT WAS THAT THE IDEA WAS TO DEFINE
18 SITUATIONS WHERE IT -- IT’S DEEMED TO HINDER OR OBSTRUCT SO THAT
19 YOU’RE USING THAT EXCEPTION. AND I THINK IF IT DOES MEAN THAT,
20 THEN IT IS A LIMIT ON -- BECAUSE THESE ARE NOT EXCEPTIONS THAT ARE
21 DEFINED IN THE STATUTE.
22 MR. PEARD: RIGHT.
23 MR. RANKIN: WHETHER IT CONFLICTS, I DON’T KNOW,
24 BUT IT DOES LIMIT. AND THEN MY -- AND I DON’T -- I JUST HAVE TROUBLE
25 SEEING WHY WOULD YOU PICK THESE AS THE ONES TO GIVE THE MOST
26 PROTECTION TO (UNINTELLIGIBLE; VOICES OVERLAP).
27 MR. PEARD: THAT’S FAIR. THAT’S FAIR. MAYBE WE
28 SHOULD’VE JUST KEPT THE ONE -- THE ONE --
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 1 BONES: THE 13-3601 --
2 MR. PEARD: RIGHT.
3 BONES: -- THE MISDEMEANOR ONE.
4 MR. PEARD: THE -- THAT’S DOMESTIC -- THE 3601 IS THE
5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ONE?
6 BONES: YEAH, I BELIEVE --
7 MR. RANKIN: YEAH. YEAH, 3601 IS THE SORT OF
8 GENERAL DV THAT -- THE ONES THAT CAN BE CHARGED AS CLASS 1
9 MISDEMEANORS, AND THEN 3601.02 IS THE AGGRAVATED --
10 BONES: WHICH USUALLY MEANS --
11 MR. PEARD: OKAY.
12 BONES: -- THEY HAVE TO HAVE LIKE CHOKING OR A
13 BROKEN ORBITAL BONES OR --
14 MR. RANKIN: YEAH.
15 BONES: -- IT’S -- IT’S NOT MULTIPLE BRUISES, IT’S --
16 MR. PEARD: THANK YOU FOR MAKING ME FEEL --
17 BONES: YEAH --
18 MR. PEARD: -- TERRIBLE.
19 15. With respect to Section 17-85, entitled “Collaboration with federal law
20 enforcement,” the January 16 Memo concludes that Proposition 205 requires the Tucson
21 Police Department (“TPD”) to secure MOUs before participating in joint law enforcement
22 taskforces, operations “or similar endeavors” with federal agencies; that the required MOU
23 language restricts the arrest authority of the federal agencies’ officers within Tucson city
24 limits; and that Mr. Rankin believes “it is extremely unlikely that any of these federal
25 agencies would consent to such an agreement,” the result being an end to all joint law
26 enforcement collaboration with any federal agency. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 11 & Exh. 1;
27 Recording, Exh. G, at 88:13-90:5:
28
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 1 MR. RANKIN: YEAH. ALL RIGHT. SO IT’S ACHIEVED BY
2 CONTRACT TO TAKE AWAY THE AUTHORITIES THAT ARE GIVEN [to federal
3 agencies] UNDER 3871 AND 75?
4 MR. PEARD: PRECISELY.
5 16. Section 17-85(c) prohibits any TPD officer from participating “in a joint law
6 enforcement task force, joint enforcement operation, or similar endeavor” with a “federal
7 officer” absent an MOU with that officer’s agency. The required MOUs must include
8 agreements from each respective federal agency to limit their officers’ authority to conduct
9 warrantless arrests with the City of Tucson except as permitted for private persons under
10 Arizona’s citizen’s arrest statute; and to preclude them from exercising their arrest authority
11 as peace officers under other specific provisions of Arizona law (A.R.S. §§ 13-3871 and -
12 3875). In other words, the federal agency (e.g., the FBI, DEA, ATF, etc.) would have to
13 agree that when its officers are engaged in law enforcement activity in Tucson, they would
14 only have the same arrest authority as a private person. Voter Pamphlet, Exh. B, at p.11.
15 17. Nothing in Section 17-85(c) permits an exception for federal officers making
16 warrantless stops or arrests under federal criminal laws. Voter Pamphlet, Exh. B, at p.11.
17 18. To the extent Mr. Rankin opined about the likelihood of federal agencies to
18 enter into a Proposition 205 MOU, that opinion is based on his office’s collective experience
19 in negotiating MOUs and IGAs with federal government agencies. Rankin Decl., Exh. A,
20 at ¶ 12 & Exh. 1. It is also based on Livier’s and PDI Attorney Peard’s own
21 acknowledgement that the MOU requirement would apply to all manner of joint law
22 enforcement operations, and not just Border Patrol or immigration matters; and that the
23 purpose of the MOU would be to limit the authority that federal officers already have under
24 the law. Recording, Exh. G, at 34:11-21:
25 MR. RANKIN: OKAY. FEDERAL OFFICER, WE THINK THIS
26 MIGHT BE A PROBLEM BECAUSE --
27 MR. PEARD: OKAY.
28 MR. RANKIN: -- THIS -- THIS IS NOT LIMITED TO FEDERAL
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 1 IMMIGRATION OFFICERS --
2 MR. PEARD: TRUE.
3 MR. RANKIN: -- IT’S ALL SWORN FEDERAL LAW
4 ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. AND, AS WE GO THROUGH THIS, WE’RE GOING
5 TO RUN INTO SECTIONS ABOUT TPD’S COOPERATION OR JOINT
6 OPERATIONS WITH OTHER FEDERAL OFFICERS.
7 MR. PEARD: TRUE.
8 Continuing at 108:13-22:
9 BUT C WAS MY BIG ONE. IT’S ABOUT THE JOINT LAW
10 ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS, OTHERS WITH A FEDERAL
11 OFFICERS BECAUSE THAT’S ANY FEDERAL OFFICER, UNLESS WE HAVE AN
12 MOU WITH THE U.S.
13 MR. PEARD: OKAY. SO LET’S GO THROUGH 1, 2, 3, 4. OH,
14 SO YOUR CONCERN IS THEY’RE NOT GOING TO SIGN ANYTHING EVEN IF
15 JUST SAYS --
16 BONES: RIGHT, THEY WON’T.
17 MR. PEARD: -- UNICORNS?
18 BONES: YES.
19 MR. RANKIN: RIGHT. THEY’RE GOING SAY -- SAY, OH,
20 GREAT, WE WANT TO DO THIS JOINT OPERATION TO, YOU KNOW, DEAL
21 WITH WHATEVER, LEGITIMATE PROBLEM. AND WE SAY THAT’S GREAT.
22 WE NEED AN IGA OR AN MOU, YOU KNOW. AND THEY’RE GOING TO LOOK
23 AT IT AND GO, WAIT, WHAT IS THIS ABOUT WARRANTLESS ARRESTS AND
24 A.R.S. STATUTES AND BLAH, BLAH, BLAH. LET’S RUN IT BY THE DOJ == OR
25 UNKNOWN MALE: YEAH.
26 MR. RANKIN: -- OR LET’S RUN IT BY, YOU KNOW, THE U.S.
27 ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, WHATEVER. AND THEY’RE GOING TO SAY WE’RE
28 NOT -- WE’RE NOT GOING TO SIGN SOMETHING THAT PROHIBITS --
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 1 BONES: I KNOW BECAUSE WE WERE JUST TRYING TO GET
2 A TRESPASS LETTER FROM ‘EM BASICALLY SAYING, LIKE, HEY, IF
3 SOMEONE -- ‘CAUSE WHEN WE HAD THAT -- THE PROTEST OUTSIDE
4 IMMIGRATION, WE WERE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT, OKAY, HOW DO WE
5 KEEP THE PEACE? WHAT HAPPENS IF SOMEONE GETS ON THE PROPERTY,
6 YOU KNOW, WE NEED A TRESPASS LETTER TO ARREST SOMEBODY THAT
7 WAS UNRULY OR DANGEROUS THAT WENT ONTO THEIR PROPERTY. AND
8 WE HAD TO GO TO WASHINGTON, D.C., TO GET IT. AND I DON’T KNOW IF
9 WE EVER GOT IT OR IF IT CAME LATE. BUT WE HAD MONTHS AND MONTHS
10 WORKING ON IT AND THEY WERE GOING BACK AND FORTH AND TRYING --
11 MR. PEARD: OH, MY GOSH!
12 BONES: -- TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD.
13 SO -- SO I’M SAYING THAT THEY WILL SIGN THIS BECAUSE OF
14 JUST -- JUST SOMETHING THAT SIMPLE DID NOT GO THROUGH BECAUSE IT
15 HAS TO GO ALL THE WAY BACK TO WASHINGTON, D.C. SO –
16 Continuing at 117:7-13:
17 MR. RANKIN: SO -- YEAH, AND IF I’M FINCHEM OR
18 SOMETHING, I SAY, “LOOK AT THIS -- WHAT TUCSON’S TRYING TO DO IS
19 SAY WE DON’T LIKE THE AUTHORITY THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE HAS
20 GIVEN TO FEDERAL OFFICERS AND SO TUCSON’S TAKING IT AWAY; THAT
21 IF YOU WANT TO --”
22 MR. PEARD: THAT WOULD BE A FAIR ASSESSMENT IF
23 YOU WANT TO SAY THAT.
24 Livier asserts that the purpose of Proposition 205 is to end all collaboration with ICE
25 and Border Patrol. Livier Dep., Exh. C, 69:9-12. “Collaboration will end. Full stop.” Id.
26 at 68:11. But she admits the MOU requirement applies to all federal agencies. Id. at 80:5-
27 21.
28 19. For several months, Mr. Rankin has requested PDI representatives identify
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 1 any other situations where any federal agency has agreed to these kinds of limits on their
2 arrest authority. Mr. Rankin’s inquiries were intended to aid the City in crafting MOUs that
3 federal agencies would approve in the event that Proposition 205 passes. Plaintiffs have
4 never provided any exemplar MOUs or identified any situation where a federal agency
5 agreed to this type of MOU, and now they finally acknowledge that they’ve never seen one.
6 Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 13.
7 20. The January 16 Memorandum asserts that Proposition 205 cannot confer
8 jurisdiction to the city court over a private cause of action. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 14.
9 21. PDI’s attorney Peard effectively acknowledged there is no private cause of
10 action in city courts in his email responding to Mr. Rankin’s statement that a private cause
11 of action in City Court was a problem, saying, “Agreed. The private cause of action in city
12 court does not appear to have too much precedent from what I can find.” 12/17/18 Email
13 from B. Peard to M. Rankin, attached as Exhibit H.
14 22. Both the January 16 Memorandum and the October 8 Memorandum discuss
15 the potential consequences arising from violations of A.R.S. § 11-1051(b)/SB1070’s
16 remaining requirements, including the prohibition against “limit[ing] or restrict[ing] the
17 enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by law,” and
18 the requirement for TPD officers to make a reasonable attempt to determine a detainee’s or
19 arrestee’s immigration status “when practicable,” unless “the determination may hinder or
20 obstruct an investigation.” Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 15 & Exh. 1-2. See also A.R.S. § 11-
21 1051(b); Recording, Exh. G, at 59:15-20:
22 MR. PEARD: SO THIS IS SIMILAR TO, BUT IT GOES A STEP
23 BEYOND --
24 MR. RANKIN: YEAH, IT DOES.
25 MR. PEARD: -- WHAT WAS -- WHAT WAS UPHELD UNDER
26 4.48, PHOENIX --
27 MR. RANKIN: YEAH.
28 MR. PEARD: -- YEAH.
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 1 Continuing at 74:7-14:
2 MR. RANKIN: SO THEN IN H AND I, YOU KNOW, THESE
3 ARE THE SECTIONS THAT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO EVER DEVELOP
4 REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT SOMEONE IS HERE -- IS UNLAWFULLY
5 PRESENT --
6 MR. PEARD: YEP.
7 MR. RANKIN: -- I MEAN, BASICALLY --
8 MR. PEARD: THIS IS -- THIS IS -- I -- I IS -- IN MY VIEW IS
9 PROBABLY THE ONE -- THE SINGLE BIGGEST AREA WHERE THIS GOES
10 BEYOND 2300.
11 Continuing at 85:14-87:6:
12 MR. RANKIN: SO, MY ISSUE WITH J IS A LITTLE
13 DIFFERENT THAN THE K ISSUE -- IS THAT I DON’T KNOW THAT YOU CAN
14 DEFINE WHAT IS AND IS NOT PRACTICABLE BEYOND SAYING -- WHAT’S
15 PRACTICABLE OR NOT IS BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN
16 TERMS OF -- YOU KNOW, WHAT YOU CALL-- WHAT’S YOUR RESOURCES,
17 YOU KNOW? WHAT CAN YOU DO? WHAT CAN’T YOU DO? AS OPPOSED TO
18 SAYING IT’S JUST A POLICY TO SAY IT’S NOT PRACTICABLE.
19 BONES: YEAH, ‘CAUSE IF YOU’RE IN A BAKER UNIT,
20 RIGHT, WITH TWO OFFICERS IN IT YOU --
21 MR. PEARD: NO (UNINTELLIGIBLE) UNIT?
22 BONES: A BAKER UNIT WOULD BE TWO OFFICERS IN A
23 VEHICLE --
24 MR. PEARD: OKAY.
25 BONES: -- AND THEN THEY WOULD BE PRACTICAL AT
26 THAT POINT WITHOUT ANY KIND OF DELAY.
27 MR. PEARD: TRUE. I THINK IT WAS -- I THINK WHAT J IS
28 TRYING TO GET AT IF YOU’RE AT -- ON THE SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY YOU
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 1 SHOULD TRY TO CONDUCT THE STOP AS -- AS JUDICIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE
2 FOR --
3 BONES: YEAH, AND YOU COULD --
4 MR. PEARD: -- SAFETY REASONS.
5 BONES: -- IT WOULDN’T SLOW IT DOWN ANY IF YOU HAD
6 THE BAKER UNIT BECAUSE THE OTHER PERSON WOULD BE SITTING IN
7 THERE.
8 MR. PEARD: TRUE. OKAY.
9 BONES: SO, LIKE, I MEAN, THAT’S A PERFECT EXAMPLE
10 OF WHERE THAT JUST DOESN’T APPLY.
11 MR. PEARD: TRUE. BUT 1070 DOESN’T -- I AGREE THAT IT
12 MIGHT BE --
13 BONES: IT DOESN’T --
14 MR. PEARD: -- IT MIGHT BE --
15 BONES: -- CONFINE IT.
16 MR. PEARD: -- IT MIGHT BE GRATUITOUS SLIGHTLY,
17 SOMEWHAT, BUT I THINK IT -- BUT I THINK IT, IN TERMS OF STRICT
18 CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW, YEAH, FROM THAT LENS, I DON’T THINK IT
19 STRICTLY CONFLICTS WITH STATE LAW BECAUSE STATE LAW DOESN’T
20 TELL CITIES WHAT THEY CAN AND CANNOT FIND PRACTICABLE. BUT I DO
21 AGREE THAT IT -- IT COULD RAISE THE HACKLES OF PEOPLE LIKE
22 FINCHEM.
23 23. State-shared revenues currently account for approximately 23% of the City of
24 Tucson’s entire budget. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 16.
25 24. The January 16 Memorandum concluded that it was Mr. Rankin’s opinion
26 that several aspects of Proposition 205 either violate, or likely violate, SB1070 by limiting
27 or restricting the enforcement of federal immigration laws and/or conflicting with the
28 requirement to investigate immigration status of detainees. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 17
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 1 & Exh. 1. Livier admits that Proposition 205 may violate SB1070 and that, at a minimum,
2 it is a fairly debatable issue. Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 27:10-13, 29:16-30:12; 38:1-6, 44:6-
3 15, 46:20-21, 48:13-15; Recording, Exh. G, at 48:15-49:20:
4 MR. RANKIN: “AN OFFICER SHALL NOT PARTICIPATE IN
5 ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO
6 DETERMINE A PERSON’S IMMIGRATION STATUS.”
7 SO 1070 SAYS, YOU KNOW, YOU HAVE TO DO AN INQUIRY OF --
8 TO DETERMINE A PERSON’S IMMIGRATION STATUS, YOU KNOW, WITH
9 THESE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS, BLAH, BLAH, BLAH, AND THAT’S PART OF
10 THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY. SO I DON’T KNOW HOW -- THAT’S
11 JUST SO BROAD --
12 MR. PEARD: BUT I THINK -- BUT I THINK --
13 MR. RANKIN: -- THAT I THINK IT -- IT’S --
14 MR. PEARD: WELL, WHAT ABOUT THE CLAUSE, “THE
15 PURPOSE OF WHICH?” SO, FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU ARE CONDUCTING A
16 TRAFFIC STOP AND THAT THAT -- THAT ULTIMATELY RESULTS IN -- IN A
17 PERSON BEING DETERMINED TO BE UNDOCUMENTED? THE PURPOSE OF
18 THAT TRAFFIC STOP WAS NOT TO DETERMINE THEIR IMMIGRATION
19 STATUS; THE PURPOSE WAS TO INVESTIGATE A SPEEDING VIOLATION.
20 MR. RANKIN: SURE. BUT 1070 ITSELF, THAT REASONABLE
21 -- THAT MANDATE, THAT’S STILL PART OF THE LAW TO MAKE A
22 REASONABLE ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IMMIGRATION STATUS. THE
23 PURPOSE OF THAT IS TO DETERMINE A PERSON’S IMMIGRATION STATUS --
24 MR. PEARD: MM-HMM. OH --
25 MR. RANKIN: -- AND THIS IS SAYING --
26 MR. PEARD: -- MEANING -- MEANING THAT --
27 MR. RANKIN: -- ESSENTIALLY --
28 MR. PEARD: RIGHT.
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 1 MR. RANKIN: -- THAT YOU CAN’T DO THAT AS PART OF
2 ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY --
3 MR. PEARD: I SEE WHAT YOU’RE SAYING.
4 Continuing at 69:8-70:6:
5 MR. RANKIN: YEP, WE DID THE HOSPITAL. SO WE DID
6 THE HOSPITAL, YOU KNOW, CHURCH AND -- AND -- WELL, STATE OR LOCAL
7 COURT BUILDING IS AN INTERESTING ONE, OBVIOUSLY, AND I DON’T
8 KNOW CURRENTLY WHAT’S HAPPENING IN TERMS OF LIKE AT CITY COURT
9 OR AT JUSTICE COURT, YOU KNOW. ONE OF THE -- I THINK ONE OF THE
10 CONDITIONS THE FEDS WERE TRYING TO ATTACH TO THE GRANTS WAS,
11 YOU KNOW, THAT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WOULD HAVE
12 ACCESS.
13 BONES: YEAH, THEY DO BENEFIT.
14 MR. RANKIN: SO --
15 MR. PEARD: RIGHT. AND THIS DOESN’T PURPORT TO
16 LIMIT THEIR ACCESS FOR FEDERAL --
17 MR. RANKIN: RIGHT. THIS IS JUST ABOUT OUR OWN
18 FOLKS --
19 MR. PEARD: RIGHT. BUT --
20 MR. RANKIN: -- BUT -- SO MY FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN
21 JUST WOULD BE THAT THESE ARE EXCEPTIONS THAT ARE NOT INCLUDED
22 IN 1070. SO --
23 MR. PEARD: CORRECT.
24 MR. RANKIN: -- THE ARGUMENT IS THAT THIS IS A LIMIT -
25 -
26 MR. PEARD: IT PUSHES THE ENVELOPE –
27 Continuing at 72:11-19:
28 MR. RANKIN: -- THEY’RE PROHIBITED FROM ASKING
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 1 ABOUT IT UNLESS IT’S PART OF A WORK --
2 MR. PEARD: THAT’S TRUE.
3 MR. RANKIN: -- SO --
4 (UNINTELLIGIBLE; MULTIPLE SPEAKERS.)
5 MR. RANKIN: YOU’RE RIGHT. BUT, YEAH, IT COULD -- I
6 THINK IT’S -- IT’S A LIMIT THAT DOESN’T EXIST IN THE STATE LAW SO
7 THAT COULD BE A PROBLEM.
8 MR. PEARD: IT’S TRUE.
9 Continuing at 92:7-8:
10 MR. PEARD: YEAH, AND I AGREE THAT 1070'S THE BIGGER
11 ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM.
12 25. The January 16 Memorandum also provided the counterargument that a
13 defense to a SB1487 claim is plausible—i.e., the fact that a voter-approved initiative might
14 not qualify as a law passed by a “governing body” of the City, although this defense is
15 uncertain because implementation of Proposition 205 could only occur based upon certain
16 specific official actions taken by the City Council. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 18 & Exh. 1.
17 26. Both the January 16 Memorandum and the October 8 Memorandum discuss
18 the possibility of the Tucson Police Department losing federal grant funding in conjunction
19 with federal government efforts to punish “sanctuary” cities and make “sanctuary” status a
20 factor that can be considered when awarding grants. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 19 &
21 Exhs. 1-2.
22 27. At the time of the January 16 Memo, there had been many lawsuits where
23 local jurisdictions had lost grant funds or were at risk of losing funds and sued to block
24 federal efforts to use sanctuary status as a factor. Mr. Rankin, in his capacity as the Tucson
25 City Attorney, participated in several of these actions to protect the City’s grant funding.
26 Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 20.
27 28. In July 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision that permitted this practice.
28 City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2019). The current law of the Ninth
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 1 Circuit is that the federal government can use a city’s immigration policies and priorities as
2 a scoring factor in awarding funding. Id. at 1181.
3 29. Plaintiffs never made a pre-litigation demand of any of the Defendants to
4 perform any specific act. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 21.
5 30. Representatives for PDI communicated with Tucson City Attorney Mike
6 Rankin beginning in December 2018 about the legal effects of the then-petition and his
7 related concerns. PDI itself self-identified several provisions that it assumed Mr. Rankin
8 might be concerned about. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 22; Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 11:2-12:4.
9 31. Mr. Rankin remained in communication with PDI representatives about
10 Proposition 205 throughout the time period of December 2018 to October 2019. Rankin
11 Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 23.
12 32. On January 11, 2019, Livier and other PDI representatives met with Mr.
13 Rankin and Tucson Police Department legal advisor Antonio Sabato to discuss their
14 concerns and initial analysis of future Proposition 205. The meeting lasted approximately
15 two hours. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 24.
16 33. Livier secretly recorded the meeting. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 25; Livier
17 Dep. Exh C, at 14:19-15:6, 88:25-89:6. PDI was interested in paying for a possible legal
18 defense of Proposition 205. Recording, Exh. G, at 127:4-13:
19 MR. PEARD: CAN I -- CAN I ASK YOU IF THIS WERE TO
20 PASS, IS THERE A WAY THAT PRIVATE -- KIND OF STEPPING AWAY FROM
21 THE CONTENT OF THIS --
22 MR. RANKIN: YEAH.
23 MR. PEARD: -- IS THERE A WAY THAT PRIVATE DONORS
24 CAN DONATE TO THE CITY COFFERS FOR A SPECIFIC LINE ITEM PURPOSE?
25 FOR EXAMPLE, HYPOTHETICALLY, COULD -- COULD PRIVATE DONORS
26 DONATE TO THE CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE -- OR DONATE TO THE CITY
27 AND DESIGNATE THAT DONATION TO THE CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR
28 THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF DEFENDING A SPECIFIC LAWSUIT? WOULD
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 1 THAT VIOLATE --
2 MR. RANKIN: OH, THEY PROBABLY COULD --
3 MR. PEARD: -- ANYTHING?
4 MR. RANKIN: -- THEY PROBABLY COULD. WE HAVE A --
5 SO THAT’S A NEW QUESTION FOR ME. I -- I’VE NEVER THOUGHT OF --
6 MR. PEARD: IT’S A NEW QUESTION FOR ME TOO.
7 MR. RANKIN: BUT --
8 MR. PEARD: SO, HYPOTHETICALLY --
9 MR. RANKIN: -- I’M JUST THINKING OF THE CONFLICTS
10 HERE, OKAY?
11 MR. PEARD: -- HYPO- -- HYPOTHET- --
12 MR. RANKIN: I MEAN, I HAVE A FINANCIAL INTEREST --
13 MR. PEARD: YEAH.
14 MR. RANKIN: -- IN -- NOW --
15 MR. PEARD: HYPOTHETICALLY, COULD WE TAKE AWAY -
16 -
17 MR. RANKIN: -- I KNOW THAT --
18 MR. PEARD: -- THE --
19 MR. RANKIN: -- LIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOLKS CAN AND
20 HAVE DONATED TO -- WE MAINTAIN A CIVIC FUND OR A GENERAL FUND
21 AND THEY SAY, YOU KNOW -- AND THEY EVEN PUT ‘EM THEIR WILLS,
22 RIGHT? DONATE $10,000 SO LONG AS IT’S USED FOR THE ZEBRAS AT THE
23 ZOO OR WHATEVER. SO, YEAH, THAT -- THAT COULD BE DONE. IT’D BE AN
24 INTERESTING THING IN TERMS OF ULTIMATELY -- LIKE, WHEN -- WHEN WE
25 CHOOSE OUTSIDE COUNSELOR -- WELL, THAT WHOLE THING TOO ABOUT --
26 MR. PEARD: AND THIS’LL BE --
27 MR. RANKIN: -- WHO’S PAYING FOR OUTSIDE --
28 MR. PEARD: WELL, THIS WOULD -- THIS WOULD BE THE --
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 1 MR. RANKIN: -- COUNSEL --
2 34. At the time of the January 11 meeting, Livier and PDI understood that Mr.
3 Rankin would be releasing a public statement concerning the City Attorney’s Office’s
4 analysis of Proposition 205’s terms and potential effects. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 26;
5 Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 10:25-13:8, 14:1-11 (PDI was aware the City was preparing an
6 assessment in late 2018); Recording, Exh. G, at 127:4-13:
7 MR. RANKIN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE; VOICES OVERLAP)
8 WORKING ON A STORY, THE STAR IS ON A STORY AND EVERYBODY RIGHT
9 NOW IS JUST SAYING --
10 MR. PEARD: YEAH.
11 MR. RANKIN: -- WE’RE WAITING FOR RANKIN TO TELL US
12 WHAT THE IMPACTS OF THIS ARE, SO --
13 MR. PEARD: OKAY.
14 MR. RANKIN: -- GREAT.
15 MR. PEARD: WELL, I MEAN, I -- IF I CAN MAKE IT EASIER
16 FOR -- I CAN WRITE IT FOR YOU.
17 35. At the January 11 meeting, PDI’s representatives acknowledged that many of
18 Mr. Rankin’s concerns were valid or at least fairly debatable. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 24;
19 Recording, Exh. G, at 136:16-137:7:
20 MR. PEARD: WELL, I’M REALLY GLAD WE GOT THE
21 OPPORTUNITY TO TALK. YEAH, YOU RAISED SOME VALID CONCERNS. I’M
22 NOT SURE WHAT WE CAN DO AT THIS POINT.
23 MR. RANKIN: ONE THING I’VE BEEN ASKED IS -- SO I
24 GUESS THERE’S SOMETHING COMING UP WHERE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
25 IS GOING TO BE ASKED TO TAKE A POSITION ON IT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER
26 -- OR IT’S GOING TO BE REPRESENTED TO THE PARTY -- I DON’T -- AND --
27 AND THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER OR NOT I WOULD BE ASKED TO GO
28 AND TALK AND SAY WHETHER THE ISSUES -- I’M NOT, “NAH, NO, NO, NO,
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 1 NOT --”
2 MR. PEARD: YEAH.
3 MR. RANKIN: -- MY ROLE AT ALL.”
4 MR. PEARD: YEAH.
5 MR. RANKIN: BUT I SUSPECT THAT BY THEN, YOU KNOW,
6 MY MEMO WILL BE SOMETHING THAT SOMEONE WILL USE.
7 MR. PEARD: RIGHT.
8 MR. RANKIN: SO --
9 MR. PEARD: RIGHT. THAT’S FAIR.
10 MR. RANKIN: BUT THAT’S NOT WHY I’M WRITING IT.
11 MR. PEARD: RIGHT. YOU’RE WRITING IT AT THE
12 INSTRUCTION OF YOUR BOSS’ --
13 MR. RANKIN: YEAH.
14 MR. PEARD: YOUR SEVEN BOSSES?
15 MR. RANKIN: RIGHT.
16 MR. PEARD: YEAH.
17 36. As of the January 11 meeting, PDI knew of Mr. Rankin’s general legal
18 analysis of every provision of Proposition 205 and his intent to make his written analysis of
19 Proposition 205 available in the coming days. Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 11-12.
20 37. Mr. Rankin’s analysis resulted in the January 16 Memorandum. Rankin
21 Decl., Exh. A, at Exh. 1. Livier admits that all of the issues it raises were discussed at the
22 January 11, 2019 meeting. Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 15:9-17:19.
23 38. Plaintiffs received the January 16, 2019 Memo on the date of its release.
24 Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 15:9-17:19.
25 39. Livier was aware of various media coverage of the January 16 Memorandum
26 around the time of its public release, and PDI and Livier claim that, between January and
27 August 2019, Tucson voters told them the January 16 Memorandum or the subsequent
28 analysis of it influenced their likely votes. Complaint at ¶ 62; Livier Dep., Exh. C, at
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 1 101:24-103:6.
2 40. During this same period of time, PDI and Livier knew that Councilmember
3 Kozachik issued weekly electronic newsletters and that some of those newsletters discussed
4 the potential effects of Proposition 205. Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 92:25-93:14. Livier admits
5 that the newsletters never explicitly requested voters to vote in a particular manner. Livier
6 Dep., Exh. C, at 93:15-18.
7 41. Plaintiffs admit that they made a tactical decision not to file a legal challenge
8 until after the release of the October 8, 2019 memorandum (the “October 8 Memorandum”).
9 Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 101:24-103:6.
10 42. Plaintiffs filed this action on October 9, 2019, which they knew was the day
11 before the City mailed out ballots in the all-mail election that includes Proposition 205.
12 Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 27; Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 102:5-19.
13 43. Voters are permitted to cast their ballots upon receipt and return them to the
14 City Clerk’s Office by mail. 45,000 voters, more than half of the eligible voters, have
15 already returned ballots by mail. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 28.
16 44. October 30, 2019 is the last day for voters to mail back ballots, although they
17 may return ballots in person through November 5, 2019. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 29.
18 45. The City of Tucson’s 2019 general election is an all-mail election. Ballots in
19 were mailed out to voters on October 10, 2019. See Vote By Mail Dates,
20 https://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/clerks/Vote_by_mail_dates_for_web.pdf.
21 46. Voters are permitted to mail their ballots back to the City of Tucson Clerk’s
22 Office at any time after filling out their ballots. Voter Pamphlet, Exh. B, at p.2.
23 47. October 30, 2019 is the last day for voters to return ballots by mail, although
24 they can drop off their ballots in person or vote a replacement or provisional ballot through
25 November 5, 2019. Voter Pamphlet, Exh. B, at pp.2-3.
26 48. The City has no means to determine which voters, if any, were influenced by
27 either of the two memoranda or statements based on the memoranda. Rankin Decl., Exh. A,
28 at 30.
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 1 49. There is no procedure that would allow voters who have already voted and
2 mailed their ballots back a chance to change their votes. Rankin Decl., Exh. A, at ¶ 31.
3 50. Plaintiffs assert one reason for filing this action is because they intend to be
4 involved in other, future initiatives and want to block Defendants from future electioneering
5 with a permanent injunction. Livier Dep., Exh. C, at 110:1-13; Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory
6 Responses, Exh. D, at Answer to Interrogatory No. 3 (“Plaintiffs believe that appropriate
7 injunctive relief could including the following: . . . . . In addition to the current election,
8 Plaintiffs expect to put forward citizen-led initiatives in the future. To that end, Plaintiffs
9 believe it is appropriate to put in place a permanent injunction that provides guidelines for
10 future public statements issued by city officials relating to pending citywide ballot
11 proposition (ie, [sic] guidelines pertaining to publicly-issued legal memoranda discussing
12 ballot propositions).”).
13 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of October 2019.
14 FARHANG & MEDCOFF
15 By /s/ Ali J. Farhang
Ali J. Farhang
16 Robert A. Bernheim
17 Attorneys for Defendants
18

19 ORIGINAL of the foregoing filed via TurboCourt

this 23rd day of October, 2019 with:
20

21 Clerk of the Court

Pima County Superior Court
22

23 COPIES of the foregoing served via

TurboCourt and email this 23rd day
24 of October 2019 upon:
25
Paul Gattone
26 Law Office of Paul Gattone
301 S. Convent
27 Tucson, Arizona 85701
28 (520) 623-1922
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 gattonecivilrightslaw@gmail.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
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3 /s/ Deanna L. Thompson

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