Thenamaris Philippines Inc. v.

CA

X, the widow of Y who was employed by ABC company as an oiler and eventually, as second engineer,
filed for a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries, sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses,
damages and attorney’s fees against ABV company with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter decided in
favor of X. However, the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision. X filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA,
which declared that even though it was filed 15 days late, in the interest of substantial justice, it will
entertain the petition and directed X to cure the technical flaws in her petition. ABC company filed for a
motion for reconsideration strongly opposing such extension.

Was the CA correct in allowing X to file a petition for certiorari even though it was 15 days late from the
60-day period requirement?

No, the CA was not correct.

Sec 4. of Rule 65 states that the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.

In Labo v. Flores, the Supreme Court laid down some of the exceptions which are, 1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5)
the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant
to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved;
and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.

In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8,
2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as
September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed
only on September 8, 2009.30 It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time
must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no
effect since there would no longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have
become final and executory.

Hence, the motion for extension should be denied.

Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Philtranco Workers Union-Association of Genuine Labor
Organization

XYZ Inc. retrenched 21 of its employees on the ground that it was suffering business losses. Consequently,
the company union, herein private respondent XYZ-Union, filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE claiming that
petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices. Unable to settle their differences before the NCMB, the case
was thereafter referred to the DOLE Secretary, who issued a Decision in favor of the XYZ-Union. XYZ filed
a Motion for Reconsideration while XYZ-Union, on the other hand, submitted a “Partial Appeal.” The
Secretary of Labor declined to rule on XYZ Motion for Reconsideration XYZ-Union“Partial Appeal”, citing
a DOLE regulation which provided that voluntary arbitrators’ decisions, orders, resolutions or awards shall
not be the subject of motions for reconsideration. XYZ filed before the CA an original Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition, and sought injunctive relief. The CA dismissed the said petition and held that, in assailing
the Decision of the DOLE voluntary arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 thereof, which properly
covers decisions of voluntary labor arbitrators.

Is a petition for certiorari under rule 65 instead of under rule 43 of the rules of court the proper remedy
to assail the decision of the Secretary of Labor?

Yes, Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing the decision of the Secretary of Labor. It has long been
settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to
timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then
seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corporation

X was employed by A Coproration. However, while he was working, he suddenly felt ill. When he went to
the doctor, he was diagnosed with hypertension. X filed before the NLRC a complaint for the payment of
permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages
and attorneys fees against A Corporation. X alleged that his hypertension was aggravated by the
conditions of his employment and A assumed the risk of liability arising from his weakened condition. The
Labor Arbiter decided in favor of X. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision. A Corporation filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC, prompting them to file a petition for certiorari
to the CA. The CA granted the petition. Was the CA correct in granting the petition for certiorari?

Yes. To justify the grant of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfy that the court or quasi- judicial body
gravely abused its discretion conferred unto them. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when,inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported
by substantial evidence.

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly granted respondents
certiorari petition since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it held that A was entitled to disability
benefits notwithstanding the latters failure to establish his claim through substantial evidence.
Specifically, A was not able to demonstrate, under the parameters of the abovementioned evidentiary
threshold, that his Diabetes Mellitus was related to his work as Chief Engineer during the course of his
employment.
Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation

X and Y were the plaintiffs in two collection cases before the RTC Branch 15 of Davao City against A and
B. EEE Corporation was the succession -in-interest of S, who was the plaintiff in another collection case
before the RTC, Branch 8, Davao City. RTC branch 8 of Davao City rendered its decision where it transferred
the subject properties in favor of S who transferred it to O and then to EEE corporation. ON the otherhand,
the case in RTC Branch 15 of Davao City ruled in favor of X and Y. The branch sheriff issued a notice of
sale, which included the subject properties now in the name of EEE corporation. To protect its interest,
EEE corporation filed a separate action of issuance of a preliminary injuction before RTC Branch 14, which
was questioned by X and Y. RTC branch 14 decided in favor of EEE corporation. X and Y filed with the CA
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the order of RTC branch 14, which was later on denied by
the CA for the writ of preliminary injunction subject of the petition was already fait accompli, and thus
the issue became moot and academic. Was the CA correct in holding that the issues raised by X and Y had
been mooted?

No. The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or any plain
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, no adequate recourse, at that
time, was available to Spouses X and Y, except resorting to Rule 65. Although Intervention under Rule 19
could have been availed of, failing to use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses X and Y. It is the duty
of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of indispensable parties, to simply recognize them, with or
without any motion to intervene. Through a cursory reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed
the adverse rights of Spouses X and Y over the cancellation of any annotations in the subject TCTs. Neither
will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the original parties to an action can appeal.25 Here,
Spouses X and Y were never impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized appeal as they never
possessed the required legal standing in the first place. And even if the Court assumes the existence of
the legal standing to appeal, it must be remembered that the questioned orders were interlocutory in
character and, as such, Spouses X and Y would have to wait, for the review by appeal, until the rendition
of the judgment on the merits, which at that time may not be coming as speedy as practicable. While
waiting, Spouses X and Y would have to endure the denial of their right, as indispensable parties, to
participate in a proceeding in which their indispensability was obvious. Indeed, appeal cannot constitute
an adequate, speedy and plain remedy.
Tesoro v. Metro Manila Retreaders Et Al.

X worked as salesmen for XYZ by entering into a Service Franchise Agreements with them. However, XYZ
terminated their respective SFA for they began to default on their obligations. Aggrieved, X filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal against XYZ with the NLRC. The LA dismissed the complaint because
there was no employer- employee relationship between the two, which was affirmed by the NLRC. X filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA stating grave abuse of discretion, which was dismissed
by the CA. Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition?

Yes.

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The rule in labor cases is that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are to be accorded
with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. This is particularly true when passed upon
and upheld by the CA.

In this case, there was no finding that the CA abused in discretion for the decision was supported with
substantial evidence presented in the LA.
Lanier v. People

X and Y were arrested for engaging in selling of illegal drugs in Boracay Islands through a search warrant.
They then filed a motion to quash attaching to their motion the affidavits of their witnesses. It was denied
by the trial court. They then filed a petition for review before the DOJ assailing the March 8 2004 decision
of the provincial prosecutor which upheld the Information and directed the return of the records to the
trial court for disposition. The Secretary of Justice granted the petition. The OSG filed a petition for
certiorari seeking to annul the DOJ resolution, which was granted by the CA. Was the CA correct?

Yes. In Verzano, Jr. v. Paro,11 we had the occasion to rule that while generally it is the Secretary of Justice
who has the authority to review the decisions of the prosecutors, the Court Appeals has the authority to
correct the acts of the prosecutorial officers tainted with grave abuse of discretion notwithstanding the
filing of the informations before the trial court. The authority of the Court of Appeals is bolstered by the
fact that the petition filed before it was one under Rule 65, such that it has the jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the prosecutor and/or the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.12 The filing or withdrawal, as in this case, of an Information
before the RTC does not foreclose the review on the basis of grave abuse of discretion the resolution of a
prosecutor, or the Secretary of Justice on the issue of probable cause.

It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and
the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal
informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers,
dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an
executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby
the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of whether there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that
of the executive branch; it may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made
in grave abuse of discretion.