THE REGIONAL FACTION AND CHINESE NATIONALISM:

A CASE STUDY OF LI ZONGREN AND THE GUANGXI

CLIQUE DURING THE NANJING DECADE

Su Mingxian

A Thesis Submitted For The

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

To The

Faculty of Asian and International Studies

Griffith University

March 1996
 CANDIDATE’S STATEMENT

This dissertation has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any
university. To the best of my knowledge the dissertation contains no material previously
published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the
dissertation itself.

____________________
Su Mingxian
March 1996

1
 ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the theory and practice of Li Zongren and the Guangxi
Clique in relation to the achievements of internal unity of the Guomindang and the Anti-
Japanese National United Front (AJNUF) during the Nanjing decade. It also analyzes and
accounts for the theory and strategies followed by the Clique to achieve political goals for
itself and the nation, and attempts to ascertain the extent to which the Clique transferred
regionalism of the Guangxi-type into mainstream nationalism in the attempt to resist Japan
and save the Chinese nation.
Some scholars have suggested of that regionalism had a negative impact on Chinese
politics in the 1930s. Contrary to this view, this dissertation argues as follows. After the
accomplishment of the Northern Expedition by the GMD, two main tasks faced China.
One was to achieve internal unity both in the party and the country; the other was national
salvation to resist Japanese aggression. To achieve these purposes, it was necessary to
awaken the political consciousness of the masses and to transfer their regional identity into
the national level. In so doing, mass mobilization of rural society was the path used to
destroy the traditional Chinese social structure and to establish a new one, and to reach
internal unity of the entire country to carry out nationwide resistance against Japanese
aggression for national independence. Under these circumstances, the Guangxi Clique
carried out a series of policies in the region in an attempt to search for a solution for China.
It was also a struggle for power with Jiang Jieshi in both central and regional structures
before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.
By analyzing Li Zongren’s practice in the Nanjing era, this dissertation addresses
the following issues. First, it seeks to explore how the people in rural society were
mobilized to serve the promotion of regionalist and nationalist political consciousness by
the efforts of Li and the Clique in Guangxi. This dissertation examines whether Guangxi’s

2
regionalism played a positive role in waking the political consciousness of nationalism
among the masses. Secondly, an attempt in this dissertation is made to appraise the roles of
Li and the Clique in dealing with the relations between regionalism and nationalism from
two perspectives: 1) the political and social conditions facing them and their rivals at that
time; and 2) whether their response helped the course of the War of Resistance.
Furthermore, this dissertation also demonstrates that what China really needed was a wide
political form of the united front when the national crisis was at its most desperate, a form
in which the internal political unity of the GMD was a prerequisite.
In order to pursue the discussion of the interaction between regionalism and
nationalism and the roles played by the Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique, the first
chapter of this dissertation discusses the framework and explains the notion of the relations
between regionalism and nationalism as well as that between mass mobilization and
political integration. It also explores the role of the formation of the AJNUF in the
approach to political unity, both in the GMD and the nation. Chapter Two focuses on the
background to Guangxi and the rise of Li and the Clique, and accounts for the reasons for
the conflict between the Clique and the Jiang group in both domestic and external affairs.
Chapter Three addresses the Clique’s internal structure and issues of how regional identity
served the needs of the Clique’s struggle with Jiang and the policy-making of both the
Guangxi group and Jiang. Guangxi’s policies and achievements in both mass mobilization
and provincial reconstruction were mostly based on Li’s and the Clique’s perception of
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution. This perception had an impact not only on
Guangxi, but also on the southwest region and the nation as well. It also laid the
foundation for the Clique’s position of resistance against Japan and the promotion of the
AJNUF. All of these are the subject of the fourth chapter. Chapter Five analyzes the
relations of Li and the Clique with the southwest regional factions and the role of these
relationships in the approach to the political unity of the GMD. The following three
chapters discuss the anti-Japanese ideas and the strategy of Li and his group, as well as the
practice of carrying out their advocacy of resistance, as they pursued the national political
objectives and their own political interests during the formation of the AJNUF. The impact
of Li’s and the Clique’s anti-Japanese position and practice on both the CCP’s policy
change and the outbreak of the “Xi’an Incident” is also examined in the three chapters. The
final chapter concludes that the Guangxi Clique was a faction capable of national ideology
and policies within the GMD during the Nanjing decade, and gave rise to ideology and

3
policies which transcended regionalism. While struggling with Jiang for power in regional
and central structures, the Clique readjusted its domestic and external policies in
accordance with the changing internal and external situation to meet the needs of national
salvation and to promote the eventual nationwide war to fight the Japanese invader.
In short, this dissertation affirms the Guangxi Clique as nationalist and regionalist at
the same time. It challenges Professor Diana Lary’s view that the Clique’s regionalism
undercut nationalism. The Clique’s efforts to achieve internal political unity, both in the
GMD and in the nation, should, I argue, be recognised. This dissertation also complements
the studies of Guangxi’s mass mobilization and provincial reconstruction by Chu
Hongyuan and Eugene Levich, through discussion of the Guangxi Clique’s role in the
promotion to achieve national political unity and the formation of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front during the 1930s.

4
 CONTENTS

Pages
Acknowledgements iv
Notes on Romanization of Chinese Names and Terms xiii
Abbreviations xiv
Chapter One Introduction 1
I. The Main Aim of the Study
II. Political Integration and Imperialism
III. Regionalism and Mass Mobilization as An
Approach to Political Integration
IV. The Anti-Japanese National United Front and the
National Political Unity
V. Summary
Chapter Two The Rise of Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique 29
I. A Brief Historical Background of Guangxi
II. The Rise of Li Zongren and the Formation of
the Guangxi Clique
III. Heading for the Northern Expedition
IV. Reasons for the Clique’s Conflict with Jiang
Jieshi and Its Return to Guangxi
V. Conclusion
Chapter Three The Internal Structure of the Guangxi Clique 61
I. The Graduates of Baoding Military Academy
(BMA) Group
The Hubei Faction

5
 II. Leadership
III. The Secret Political Organization
IV. Brains Trust
V. Regional identity and Its Relations with the Clique
VI. Conclusion
Chapter Four The Theoretical Foundation of the Guangxi Clique’s Mass 106
Mobilization and the Integrated Relationship
Between Regionalism and Nationalism
I. The Guangxi Reconstruction Program
II. The Clique’s Analysis of Chinese Society and
Perception of the Chinese Revolution
1. Nature of Chinese Society
2. Objectives of the Chinese Revolution
3. Mission of the Chinese Revolution
4. Motive Force of the Chinese Revolution
5. Nature of the Chinese Revolution
6. Prospects of the Chinese Revolution
7. Leadership of the Chinese Revolution
III. The Pearl River Valley Revolution Theory - A
Motive Force of Mass Mobilization
IV. Achievements of Guangxi Mass Mobilization and
Reconstruction: A Brief Account
V. Conclusions
Chapter Five Relations Between Li and the Southwest Regional Factions 144
I. The Role of Relations Between Li Zongren and the
Southwest Regional Factions in the Process of
Internal Political Unity of the GMD
1. Definition of the Southwest Regional Faction
2. The Role of the Southwest Regional Factions
in the Internal Political Unity of the GMD
3. The Impact of Relations Between Regional
Relations on the Li-Jiang Conflict
II. Factors Affecting Relationships Between the

6
 Southwest Regional Factions
III. Li Zongren’s Relationships with the Southwest
Regional Factions
1. Li Zongren’s Relations with Yunnan
2. Li Zongren’s Relations with Guizhou
3. Li Zongren’s Relations with the Guangdong
Faction (Yuexi)
4. Li Zongren’s Relations with Sichuan
IV. Conclusion
Chapter Six “Resisting Japan Is the Only Way”: Li Zongren’s “Scorched
Earth Resistance” (Jiaotu kangzhan) Idea 185
I. The Background and Origin of “Jiaotu kangzhan”
II. Li Zongren’s Idea of “Jiaotu kangzhan”
1. The National Policy towards Japan -
the Scorched Earth Resistance
1.1 The Significance of the Scorched
Earth Resistance
1.2 Criticism of Non-resistance Policy
1.3 Analysis of the Harmfulness of
Non-resistance
1.4 The Prospect of the Scorched Earth
Resistance
2. Strategy and Tactics of the Scorched Earth
Resistance
2.1 Full-scale Warfare
2.2 Offensive Warfare
2.3 Protracted Warfare
III. Other Theories for Resistance: Yan Xishan’s
“Shoutu kangzhan” (Defence and Resistance)
IV. Conclusion
Chapter Seven Background to the “June 1 Movement” 239
I. Origin of the “June 1 Movement” and Its Relations
with the Japanese

7
 II. Reasons for Launching the June 1 Movement
III. The Motive Forces Behind the Launching of the
June 1 Movement
IV. Conclusion: The Nature of the June 1 Movement
Chapter Eight The June 1 Movement: Compelling Jiang to Resist
Japan and the Clique’s Role in the AJNUF 268
I. “Forcing Jiang to Resist Japan”
II. National United Front
III. Relationship Between the June 1 Movement and
the Xi’an Incident
IV. Conclusion
Chapter Nine Conclusion 315
Appendix 327
1.1 Names of Senior Officers of Li Zongren’s Troops
in Yulin in 1922-1923
1.2 Commanders of the 7th Army in 1936
1.3 (1) Commanders of the Guangxi
Militia Zones (1934)
(2) Senior Commanders of the Guangxi Army
in the First Half of the 1930s
1.4 Names of Guangxi’s Senior Officers Graduated
from the Baoding Military Academy
2.0 The Hubei Faction within the Guangxi Clique
(1927-1929)
3.0 Names of Guangxi’s Students Returned
from Soviet Russia before and after the
Northern Expedition
4.0 Expansion of the Guangxi Troops during
the June 1 Movement in 1936
Glossary 339
Bibliography Chinese Sources 360
I. Original Official and Private Documents and Materials
1. Archives

8
 2. Important Journals and Periodicals published
in the 1920s-1930s
3. The Collections of Official and Private
Documents
4. Other Important Data and Materials
(A) Books
(B) Speeches and Articles
II. Memoirs and Historical Materials
1. Books
2. Writing Historical Materials
3. Records of Interviews
III. Relevant Academic Publications and Other Materials
1. Books
2. Articles
English Sources
I. Books
II. Articles
III. Archives

9
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I was born in Guilin, Guangxi, the People’s Republic of China. Certainly, I am a

native of the province according to the Chinese way. However, as the circumstances at that
time all primary and middle schools did not teach any history of Republican China, I did
not know any history of the Guangxi Clique until I left Guilin for Zhongshan (Sun Yatsen)
University in Guangzhou, capital city of Guangdong, for my tertiary education in 1978. As
my major was history, I had studied and worked in the areas of Southeast Asian history and
the overseas Chinese community studies since I received my M.A. degree from Zhongshan
University. Although I learnt some history about Guangxi during my university study, and
the achievements of the Guangxi Clique in the 1930s in mass mobilization and in the
preparation for resistance against Japanese aggression also left a deep impression on my
earlier study, I did not turn my interest in the history of the Guangxi Clique until I came to
Australia and studied at the University of New South Wales in Sydney for a PhD in 1991.
During this time I gained a great deal of support and help from Dr K. K. Shum, my first
supervisor, who encouraged me to enter this area. One year later, I transferred to Griffith
University in Brisbane to continue my PhD studies, I was given a lot of help by Professor
Edmund Fung, Associate Professor Nick Knight and Professor Colin Mackerras, my three
supervisors. I am very grateful for their kind help and support. They meticulously read the
entire draft. Their criticisms, suggestions, encouragement, and questions enabled me to
sharpen and strengthen the analyses and arguments in this study and to eliminate errors.
For financial aid, I wish to thank Griffith University for offering a postgraduate
research scholarship to me. This scholarship made it possible for me to travel to Hong
Kong and mainland China in the second half of 1992 to conduct my field work. Without
this support, my research would have been impossible.

10
 I also wish to express my gratitude to several scholars and friends who read the
draft either in whole or in part, and who provided many fresh views when discussing issues
related to my study with them. Dr Leong Liew of Griffith University read several chapters
and gave valuable suggestions and criticisms, although he supervised me only for few
months when my supervisors were absent. Dr Changfan Gao of Griffith University also
read several chapters and contributed constructive comments and suggestions before he left
Brisbane for the University of Tasmania in Hobart to take up a position there. Mr Luo
Yongxian in the Southeast Asian Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra
read the whole draft and corrected a number of errors. Other friends who contributed time,
energy, and expertise to improve this dissertation are Dr He Xingfei and Dr Wei
Changjiang at the Australian National University, Mr Dong Zunqi, Mr Chen Fan and Mr
Liu Xi’an in the Faculty of Asia and International Studies of Griffith University. Dr Pan Si
and Mr Stephen Chen in the Faculty of Science and Technology of Griffith University also
gave me great help in using Chinese software and printing the Chinese part of the
bibliography. Needless to say, I alone bear the responsibility for errors of fact and
interpretation.
I wish specially to thank Mr Vic Lloyd, a writer and a retired teacher of the
University of Queensland, who patiently and meticulously read the whole manuscript and
expended much energy improving the writing and organization of this dissertation. I was
deeply moved by his meticulously reading and promptly feeding back each time after I gave
my draft to him. Each time I went to his house in north Brisbane, he always spent several
hours to discuss the draft with me patiently and gave a lots of valuable criticisms,
comments and suggestions. His selfless help was invaluable, and his great support inspired
me to improve and advance the writing and preparation of this dissertation. I also wish to
thank Mrs Mary Lloyd for her kind treatment each time I called on her and Mr Lloyd and
discussed with the latter in their house.
This study also gained great support and help from institutions and organizations as
well as other scholars and friends in Hong Kong and mainland China when I conducted my
field work in 1992. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Dr A. Y. C. Lui, Head of
History Department of the University of Hong Kong; the Library of the University of Hong
Kong; the Zhongshan Library of Guangdong Province in Guangzhou and Mr Ni Junming in
that Library; the Library of Zhongshan University, Guangzhou; Dr Mo Shixiang, Professor
and Head of History Department of Jinan University, Guangzhou; the First Library of

11
Guangxi in Nanning; the Second Library of Guangxi in Guilin and Mrs Tang Guoying in
that Library; Guilin Archives of Guangxi; Guangxi Archives in Nanning; the Committee on
Written Historical Materials of Guangxi Committee of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference, Nanning, and Mr Chen Junyi of that Committee; Mr Huang
Zongyan, Associate Professor of the Guangxi Social Science Association, Nanning; Mr
Cao Guangzhe, Lecturer of the Guangxi Normal University in Guilin; Professor Yang
Tianshi in the Institute of Modern History, Chinese Social Science Academy, Beijing, and
the Library of that Institute; the Library of Nankai University in Tianjin, and Professor Wei
Hongyun of Nankai University and his postgraduate students Mr Wen Rui, Mr Zhu Dexin,
Mr Tuo Ping, Mr Li Zhenhua, Mr Wang Yanmin and Mr Yang Yuejin; the Library of
Beijing; Professor Zhang Tongxin and Mr Liu Xiao of the Chinese People’s University at
Beijing; Professor Zhang Xianwen, Mr Chen Hongmin and Mrs Shen Xiaoyun of Nanjing
University; and the Library of Department of History at that University; The Second
Historical Archives of China at Nanjing; the Committee on Written Historical Materials of
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Beijing,
and Mrs Han Shufang of Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe (China’s Written Historical
Materials Press) in Beijing, who was my classmate at Zhongshan University during the late
1970s and the early 1980s. Many thanks also give to Mr Feng Huang, Mr Wei Ruilin, Mr
Lai Huipeng, Mr Xie Hegeng, and Mr Huang Qihan, who were subordinates of both Li
Zongren and Bai Chongxi and middle and senior ranking members of the Guangxi Clique
during the 1930s and 1940s, for their kind acceptance of my interviews with them
respectively in Nanning, Beijing and Shanghai in 1992.
I also wish to thank the Australian National Library in Canberra and the Menzies
Library of the Australian National University for their rich collections in modern Chinese
history which benefited this study very much, and for the staff of the two libraries who
provided me with helpful advice and assistance. My thank also gives to Ms Elsie Liow,
Liaison Librarian for Asian Studies in the Library of Griffith University, for her patience
and help in collection and purchase of research materials from overseas. Staff at the
libraries of University of New South Wales, University of Sydney, and the State Library of
New South Wales also provided a lot of convenience to my research.
No one, however, helped more directly and continuously in writing this dissertation
than my wife Yang Hong. Through each stage of preparation, she shared the burdens,
anxieties and pleasures of this study. She also worked hard to support me financially so

12
that I could complete this study according to schedule. Without the love of Hong and my
son Lee this dissertation could not have been written. To Hong and Lee I owe an
immeasurable debt and deep affection.

Su Mingxian
March 1996 in Brisbane

13
 NOTES ON ROMANIZATION OF CHINESE
NAMES, TERMS, WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

The romanization of Chinese names and terms as well as traditional Chinese

weights and measures in this thesis follows the Pinyin system. The exception is the
spelling of Sun Yatsen, whose name is too well known in this form to change. Where I
have quoted from texts using different spellings, the original spellings has been retained.

14
 Abbreviation for Publishers and Journals

Chaoye gonglun (CYGL) 朝朝朝朝 (Tribune of the Government and the Public
Opinion), Hong Kong香香
Chenbao 晨晨 (The Morning Post), Shanghai上上
Chuangjin yuekan (CJYK) 创创创创 (Pioneer Monthly), Nanning南南
Dangsheng zhoukan (DSZK) 党党党创 (Voice of the Party Weekly), Nanning南南
Dongfang zazhi (DFZZ) 东东东东 (Eastern Miscellaneous), Shanghai上上
Duli pinglun (DLPL) 独独独朝 (Independent Critique), Beiping北北
Fanri zhoukan (FRZK) 反反党创 (Anti-Japanese Weekly), Nanning: Guangxi sheng
dangbu 南南：广广广党广
Giu Guo Sh Bao (Au Secours de la Patrie) - Jiuguo shibao 救救救晨 (The National
Salvation Post), edited and published by the CCP's Branch in the Comintern, Paris,
France法救法法
Ganxiao xiaokan (GXXK) 干干干创 (Journal of the Guangxi Militia Cadres Academy),
Nanning 南南
Guangxi daxue zhoukan (GXDXZK) 广广广广党创 (The Guangxi University Weekly),
Wuzhou 梧梧
Guangxi gemingjun banyuekan (GXGMJBYK) 广广广广广广创创 (Guangxi
Revolutionary Army Semi-Monthly), Nanniig 南南
Guangxi Wuzhou qu mintuan qikan (GXWZQMTQK) 广广梧梧广广广广创 (Journal of
Wuzhou Militia District, Guangxi), Wuzhou 梧梧
Guangxi xuesheng banyuekan (GXXSBYK) 广广广广广创创 (The Guangxi Student
Semi-Monthly), Guilin 桂桂
Guangzhou minguo ribao (GZMGRB) 广梧广救反晨 (Guangzhou Republican Daily),
Guangzhou广梧
Guowen zhoubao (GWZB) 救国党晨 (National News Weekly, or Guowen Weekly),
Tianjin 天天
Hangkong xuexiao tekan (HKXXTK) 航航广干航创 (The Special Issue of the Aviation
Academy), Liuzhou 柳梧
Jianshe yanjiu (JSYJ) 建建建建 (The Journal of Reconstruction Studies), Guilin 桂桂
Junxiao xunkan (JXXK) 广干军创 (Triple Monthly of the Military Academy), Nanning
南南
Kangri jiuguo xunkan (KRJGXK) 抗反救救军创 (Triple Monthly of Resistance against
Japan for National Salvation), edited and published by Guangxi minzhong kangri
jiuguohui 广广广广抗反救救广广广, Nanning 南南
Nanning minguo ribao (NNMGRB) 南南广救反晨 (Nanning Republican Daily),
Nanning 南南
Nuli zhoubao (NLZB) 努努党晨 (Endeavour Weekly), Beijing 北北
Qunyan 群群 (Your Say), edited and pbblished by Guangxi Students Association in
Guangzhou, Guangzhou 广梧, 1920s-1930s
Qijun niankan (QJNK) 七广七创 (Annual Issue of the Seventh Army), Liuzhou 柳梧
Sanmin zhuyi yuekan (SMZYYK) 三广广三创创 (The Three Principles of the People
Monthly), Guangzhou 广梧
Shehui xinwen (SHXW) 社广社国 (The Social News), Nanjing 南北
Shenbao 申晨 (Shenbao Daily), Shanghai 上上, 1920s and 1930s

15
Shenbao yuekan (SBYK) 申晨创创 (Shenbao Monthly), Shanghai 上上, 1930s
Shenglu 广生 (The Journal of the Road of Life), edited and published by the Party
Branch of the 7th Army, Nanning 南南
Shijie shuguang zhi zhonghua wenhua (SJSGZZHWH) 世世世世世世世世世 (Journal
of the Chinese Culture within the Dawn of the World), No. 1. Changsha 长长, October
1928
Shiwujun niankan (SWJNK) 十十广七创 (The Annual Issue of the Fifteenth Army),
Nanning 南南
Tianwentai (banzhou pinglun) 天世天 [广党独朝] (Astronomical Observatory, Semi-
Weekly Review), Hong Kong,香香 1930s-1940s
Wuhan minguo ribao (WHMGRB) 武武广救反晨 (Wuhan Republican Daily),
Wuhan武武
Xiangdao zhoubao (XDZB) 向向党晨 (Guidance Weekly), Guangzhou 广梧
Zhenglu yuekan (ZLYK) 正生创创 (The Right Way Monthly), Nanning 南南
Zhinanzhen 指南指 (Compass Weekly), Yulin 玉桂, 1931-1934
Zhongyang zhengzhi huiyi Wuhan fenhui yuebao (ZYZZHYWHFHYB)
世中中中广中武武中广创晨 (Wuhan Branch of the Central Political Conference
Monthly), Wuhan 武武
Zhujiang ribao (ZJRB) 珠珠反晨 (The Pearl River Daily), Hong Kong 香香

AHSWDXXB
AHSX
CQ 春春
DBSFDXXB
DSYJ
DSYJTX
FDXB
GDWSZLXJ
GMHYL
GXRB
GXSFDXXB
GXSHKX
GXWSZL
GXDXXB
GXWSZLXJ
GXWX
GZWSZLXJ (Guizhou),
GZWSZLXJ (Guangzhou),
GXSFDXXB
HBWSZL
HBSHKX
HCSZXB
HNWSZLXJ
HNSDXB
HZSYXB
JDSZL
JOCCPGXPC
JXDXXB

16
JHLT
JDSYJ
Keji zhenghe xuebao 科科科科广晨 (The Journal of the Science Integration), Taipei,
KRZZYJ
LSDA《历历历历》
LSYJ
LSJX
MGDA《广救历历》.

NJDXXB
NNWSZL
NNSYXB
QNYDXK
RMRB
SHSFDXXB
SHKXJ
SHKXTS
Shilin 历桂
SXYK
SZDXXB
Tansuo 探探
WHWSZL
WSZLXJ.
Xiandai Zhongguo junshi shi pinglun 现现世救广现历独朝 (Military History Review
on Modern China), Taipei
XSLT
XSYJ
XMDXXB
XNJFSYJCK
XSLT
YLSZXB
YNLSDA《云南历历历历》
YNSFDXXB
ZGDSYJ
Zongheng 纵纵
ZJWX
Zhengming 争争
Zhejiang wenshi ziliao xuanji 浙珠世历浙浙浙浙
Zhongguo xiandaishi shuping xuanji 世救现现历中独浙浙, Taipei
Zhengzhi kexue luncong 中中科广朝政 (Bulletin of Political Science), Taipei:
Department of Politics, Taiwan University,
Zhongguo junshi shi pinglun 世救广现历独朝 (Review on Chinese Military History),
Taipei,
Beijing: DACBS北北：历历档档社
Beijing: ZHSJ北北：世世中中.
Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 北北：人广档档社.
Beijing: The Chinese People University Press北北：世救人广广广档档社.
Beijing: KXCBS 北北：科广档档社.
Beijing: SLSD 北北：三三中三.

17
Beijing: ZGDSZLCBS 北北世共党历浙浙档档社.
Beijing: DACBS 北北：党历档档社
Beijing: WSZLCBS
Beijing: ZGSHKXCBS.
Beiping: Yanshanshe 北北：燕燕社
Beijing: JFJWYCBS北北：解解广世解档档社
Beijing: Qiushi chubanshe 北北：求求档档社
Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe 北北：解解广档档社
Beijing: Zhongguo huajiao chuban gongsi 北北：世救世中档档朝中
Beijing: HXCBS北北：世华档档社
Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe 北北人广档档社
Beijing: ZGWSCBS北北：世救世历档档社
Beijing: ZGQNCBS北北：世救中七档档社
Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 北北：世共世中党干档档社
Beijing: TJCBS北北：广团档档社
Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe 北北：经经反晨档档社
Chengdu: SCRMCBS.
Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe 长春：吉桂世历档档社
Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe 重重：重重档档社
Chongqing: Dushu shenghuo chubanshe 重重：读中广读档档社
Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe 福梧：福建人广档档社
Guangzhou: Lianyou shuju 广梧：良良中中
Guangzhou: GDRMCBS广梧：广东人广档档社
Harbin: HLJRMCBS哈哈哈：黑黑珠人广档档社
Guangzhou: Pingshe广梧：北社.
Guangzhou: Huaiyuan wenhua shiye fuwushe广梧：怀怀世世现怀怀怀社.
Guangzhou: Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe 广梧：世救中七广人社.
Guangzhou: Guangzhou Jidujiao qingnianhui 广梧：广梧广广广中七广
Guilin: The Guangxi Normal University Press桂桂；广广广广广广档档社
Guilin: Guangxi ribaoshe 桂桂：广广反晨社.
Guilin: GXSZFBYWYH 桂桂：广广广中广广广广广广.
Guilin: GXJSYJH桂桂：广广建建建建广
桂桂：全全全党创社.
Guilin: Guangxi Branch of the Central Committee of the
GMD,桂桂：救广党世中广广广广广广党广.
Guilin: Wenhua gongyinshe 桂桂：世世文文社.
Guilin: Lijiang chubanshe 漓珠档档社.
Guiyang: Yugao shudian 贵贵：羽羽中三
Guiyang: GZRMCBS贵贵：贵梧人广档档社
Hankou: Jianguo shudian 武汉：建救中三
Hankou: Zhandou chubanshe 武汉：全战档档社.
Hankou: Dashidai shudian 武汉：广救现中三.
Hankou: Xinsheng chubanshe 武汉：社广档档社
Hankou: Qunli shudian 武汉；群努中三.
Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe 风云档档社.
Harbin: HLJRMCBS.
Hong Kong: Longmen shudian 香香：黑龙中三
Hong Kong: Tianwentai banzhou pinglunshe 香香：天世天广党独朝社
Hong Kong: Lianyi yinshua gongsi 香香：三解联联朝中.

18
Hong Kong: Chongwen shudian 香香：崇世中三
Hong Kong: Yuzhou shuwu 香香：宇宇中宇
香香：珠珠反晨社.
Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe 南南档档社.
Hong Kong: Dadong tushu gongsi 广东大中朝中.
Hong Kong: Dadi chubanshe广大档档社
Hong Kong: Wenhua gongyingshe 世世文文社
Hong Kong: Qishi niandai zazhishe 七十七现东东社.
Hong Kong: Nanfang chubanshe 南东档档社.
Hong Kong: Jingbao chuban gongsi 镜晨档档朝中.
Hong Kong: Minbao yuekan chubanshe 明晨创创档档社.
Hong Kong: Zuyu chubanshe 祖祖档档社.
Hong Kong: Xinghui tushu gongsi 香香：星星大中朝中
Hong Kong: Zhanggu yuekan chubanshe 香香：掌掌创创档档社
Hong Kong: Zhenhua chubanshe 香香：振世档档社
Hong Kong: Yuzhou chubanshe 香香：宇宇档档社
Hong Kong: ZCCBS香香：东志档档社
Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press香香：世世广广档档社
Hong Kong: SLSD香香：三三中三.
Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe 香香：亚亚档档社
Hong Kong: Union Asia Press香香：亚三档档社
Liuzhou: Liuzhou minguo ribaoshe 柳梧：柳梧广救反晨社
Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe 南南：珠广人广档档社.
Nanjing: Junshi xinwenshe 南北：广现社国社.
Nanjing: JSGJCBS南北：珠江江江档档社
Nanjing: The Nanjing University Press, 南北，南北广广档档社.
Nanning Gengsheng baoshe 南南南广晨社.
Nanning: MTZKS南南：广广党创社.
Nanning: Propaganda Department of Guangxi Provincial GMD Party Reconstruction
Committee世救救广党广广广党广中中广
Nanning, Jianshe shudian南南：建建中三.
Nanning, QMZZKS南南：全全全党创社
Nanning: GXRMCBS南南：广广人广档档社
Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB南南：救广广广广国国国广广国中国广.
Nanning: Nanning minguo ribaoshe 南南：南南广救反晨社
Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe 南南：广广广广档档社
Shanghai: ZHSJ上上：世世中中.
Shanghai: SWYSG上上：商怀联中商
Shanghai: Shidai wenxianshe 上上：救现世时社.
Shanghai: Huiwentang shuju 上上：汇世汇中中
Shanghai: SHSHKXYCBS 上上：上上社广科广上档档社.
Shanghai: Liangyou shuju 上上：良良中中
Shanghai: Haitian chubanshe, 上上：上天档档社
Shanghai: Zhengzhi yanjiushe 上上：中中建建社
Shanghai: Yiban shudian 上上：一一中三.
Shanghai: Housheng shudian 上上：吼党中三
Shanghai: Shenghuo shudian 上上：广读中三.

19
Shanghai: Yuzhoufeng chubanshe 上上：宇宇风档档社.
Shanghai: Tongyi chubanshe 上上：统一档档社
Shanghai: Dashidai shuju 上上：广救现中中.
Shanghai: Xinxin chubanshe 上上：社社档档社
Shanghai: Zhongguo luxingshe 上上：世救中中社
Shanghai: Qingnian zazhishe 上上：中七东东社.
Shanghai: Dashidai chubanshe 上上：广救现档档社
Shanghai: Qixing shuwu 上上：七星中宇
Shanghai: SHRMCBS上上：上上人广档档社
Shenyang: LNDXCBS沈贵：辽南广广档档社
Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chuban she 沈贵：辽南人广档档社
Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiu weiyuanhui (The
Committee of the Party History of the Central Committee of the GMD),天北.
世救救广党世中广广广党历建建广广广
Taipei: Dingwen shuju 天北：鼎世中中
Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua daxue zhonghua xueshuyuan
天北：世世世世广广世世广中上
天北，ZZSJ正世中中, 1977.
Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gongsi 法明世世现怀朝中.
Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 天北：世上档档社.
Taipei: Zhongwai tushu gongsi 世中大中朝中
Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 天北：世上档档社
Taipei, Xuesheng shuju天北：广广中中
天北：世中反晨社中广档档
Taipei: Tianyuan chubanshe 天北：天天档档社
Taipei: Chongwu chubanshe 天北：崇武档档社
Taipei: War History Bureau, Ministry of National Defence 天北：救国广历中中,
Taipei: Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica, 天北：世中建建上中现历建建中
Taibei: ZJWXS天北：中传世广社
Taipei: Huadong chubanshe 天北：世东档档社
Taipei: Wenhai shudian 天北：世上中三
Taipei: Zonghe yuekanshe 天北：综科创创社
Taiyuan: SXRMCBS太太：燕广人广档档社
Wuxi, Jiangsu 珠江,无无: Zhongguo shehui jiaoyushe 世救社广广中社.
Zhejiang: Zhedong, Renshijianshe 浙珠：浙东,人世人社.
Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS郑梧：河南人广档档社.
Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries, Washington,
D.C..

20
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the period from the second half of the 1920s to 1949, especially the decade
before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Guangxi Clique, with Li
Zongren as head, was one of the main factions within the Nationalist Party (Guomindang),
and the most powerful rival to Jiang Jieshi. As Jiang and his faction dominated the central
government and the Guomindang (GMD) leadership, they considered themselves the
representative of the Centre (zhongyang), and other GMD factions based on the different
regions (difang) were regarded as the regional party, headed by the Guangxi Clique, and in
opposition to the centre and to nationalism.1 The two groups opposed each other over a
series of domestic and external policies, a conflict which had an important impact on the
political development of China in the 1930s. Jiang used all his ingenuity to attempt to
eliminate the Guangxi Clique during the period before the Sino-Japanese War. However,
Li and the Clique managed to survive and recover from each defeat, and it remained
persistent in opposition to Jiang, particularly to his external policy. The reason why the
regional forces, with the Clique as head, were so active at that time can be explained by
looking at their historical background. Li and the Clique had vied with Jiang for nearly ten
years before they finally reached reconciliation and acted in unity to resist foreign
aggression. In other words, Li and the Clique’s policy were both anti-Japan and anti-Jiang.
Under this policy, the Guangxi Clique carried out provincial reconstruction and mass

1
See, for example, Pan Gongzhan, “Shinian lai de Zhongguo tongyi yundong”, in
Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo, Shanghai:
Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui, 1937; reprinted Hong Kong: Longmen shudian, 1965,
pp. 1-20.

21
mobilization according to their experience of local conditions; this demonstrated a strong
trend towards regional development, and the Clique strove for regional cooperation with
the neighbouring provinces in the common pursuit of regional power. Meanwhile, the
Clique also promoted nationalist consciousness among the masses in response to national
political demands for national salvation. Thus, the interaction of the above factors led the
Guangxi Clique to readjust their policies and strategies to meet the needs of the
establishment of the national united front, for which a precondition was to conciliate Jiang
Jieshi within the GMD, when China faced Japanese aggression after the “September 18
Incident” in 1931.

The Main Aim of this Study

The main aim of this study is to evaluate the roles and status of the policies pursued
by Li Zongren and his Guangxi Clique in relation to the achievement of internal unity of the
GMD and the Anti-Japanese National United Front (AJNUF) during the Nanjing decade. It
also analyzes and accounts for the theory and strategies followed by Li Zongren to achieve
political goals for himself and his Clique. Furthermore, it attempts to ascertain the extent to
which the Guangxi Clique transferred regionalism of the Guangxi-type into mainstream
nationalism, in the attempt to resist Japan and save the Chinese nation.
It is necessary to examine briefly the implications of Chinese nationalism and the
relevance of regionalism first. Chinese nationalism was an inevitable outcome of modern
China's social and historical development, the main political agenda in China's
modernization. The agenda was determined by the historical conditions of modern China.
Since the Opium War in 1840, China had been invaded and humiliated by the Western
powers both economically and culturally, and portions of China's territory were divided and
controlled by the powers. Furthermore, the Qing Dynasty was on decline owing to
domestic troubles, such as a series of rebellions aimed at overthrowing the dynasty, and
foreign invasion, particularly Japan's aggression since the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894.
As a result, China faced a gradually mounting national crisis, during which the imperialist
nations established their respective spheres of influence in China. The conflict between the
Chinese nation and foreign imperialism became more and more critical with each passing
day, and the crisis raised Chinese political awareness and demands for national salvation, a
theme which was to become central to the Chinese revolution. At the end of the nineteenth

22
century and in the early twentieth century, the aims of the Chinese national revolution were:
(i) to break away from the control of imperialism, and (ii) to achieve national independence
and to maintain China's territorial integrity. This is the content of what is usually called
Chinese nationalism. Put differently, in the course of modern China's national revolution,
nationalism was the “motive force”, and a conviction widely held by intellectuals and
young soldiers with modern military education which contributed to the destruction of the
Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the beginning of a new era - Republican China.2
Parallel to the rise of Chinese nationalism in the late Qing dynasty was regionalism
founded on political consciousness of regional autonomy and identity. What is
regionalism? According to Raymond Breton, theoretically,
Regionalism as a strong sense of local identity and local integration is founded on a
sense of common regional identity. It is partly a frame of mind that leads to the
identification of circumstances and events related to the condition of a territorial
entity, and partly a process whereby these circumstances and events become a
political issue. Regionalism is a socio-psychological and political phenomenon. In
the socio-psychological dimension, regionalism refers to a set of attitudes and
feelings: an identification with an area; a sense of a certain distinctiveness from
other areas; an attachment to a territory, its people, and institutions. It is the result
of the process that leads to the transformation from a particular geographic space
into a social space - that is, a space imbued with meanings and emotional
connotations not attributed to other space. In the political dimension, regionalism

2
For a thorough discussion of Chinese nationalism, its origins and its impact on the
Chinese revolution, see: Mary Clabaugh Wright (ed.), China in Revolution: The First
Phase, 1900-1913, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; James Townsend, “Chinese
Nationalism”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 27 (January 1992), pp. 97-
130; Lucian W. Pye, “How China's Nationalism Was Shanghaied?” The Australian Journal
of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (January 1993), pp. 107-133; Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen
and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of
California Press, 1970; Gillert F. Chan and Thomas H. Etzold (eds.), China in the 1920s:
Nationalism and Revolution, New York & London: Newview Points, 1976; James
Harrison, Modern Chinese Nationalism, New York: Research Institute on Modern Asia,
Hunter College of City of New York, 1969; John E. Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese
Nationalism: Germany in Shantung, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971;
Jack Gray (ed.), Modern China’s Searching for A Political Form, London: Oxford
University Press, 1969; Roger Pelissien, Awakening of China, 1793-1949, London: Secker
and Warburg, 1967; Edmund S. K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese
Revolution: The New Army and Its Role in the Revolution of 1911, Canberra: Australian
National University Press, 1981; and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London:
Verso, 1991.

23
 refers to collective behaviour to defend to a certain extent traditions and gains
which may affect political interest in a certain region or territory.3
In a sense, regionalism is a step towards nationalism, it exists prior to nationalism.
But nationalism may develop from regionalism or may be formed by several kinds of
regionalism. In other words, nationalism is the positive culmination of regionalism, or the
highest expression of regionalism. If nationalism is the mainstream of a country,
regionalism is its tributaries.
In socio-psychological terms, the existence of distinctions of regionalism in a nation
adds to its variety of cultures and historical traditions. It is able to coexist with nationalism.
To a certain extent, however, a strong sense of political regionalism may threaten the
cohesiveness of the nation, if it has reached a point where it amounts to local nationalism,
to a desire to separate from the larger nation as a whole, such as in current political changes
in the former Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. Enormous distinctions between different
regions have existed since China was established over two thousand years ago.4 However,
because of the absence of major historical experiences of regional independence which
preceded incorporation into the Chinese state, and because of the long existence of
Confucian culture as a common tie of Han Chinese, regionalism in China has seldom been
a political problem, since it is not totally antagonistic to the state, except in the Inner Asian
frontier regions.5 That is to say, as a political force arising in the first half of the twentieth
century, regionalism in China was to some extent an alternative to nationalism when the
central authority was weakened.6 But it could easily be forged into nationalism once the

3
R. Breton, “Regionalism in Canada”, in David Cameron (ed.), Regionalism and
Supranationalism, Quebec and London: The Institute for Research on Public Policy and
Policy Studies Institute, 1981, pp. 58-9.
4
For a thorough discussion of Chinese regional distinctions, see He Bingdi (Ping-ti Ho),
Zhongguo Huiguan Shilun, Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1966; and Ping-ti Ho, “The
Geographical Distribution of Hui-Kuan in Central and Upper Yantze Provinces - with
Special Reference to Inter-regional Migrations”, Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies,
New Series V, No. 2 (December 1966), Singapore, pp. 120-152. Also see Li Jifeng,
Shengqu zhuyi yu minguo shengzhi de sanbian, unpublished PhD thesis, Nanjing
University, China, 1992, pp. 12-31; and Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi
Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 2-
9.
5
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 2.
6
Even in the Beiyang warlord period, according to Pye, the expansion of regionalism as a
political force was a phenomenon of the open and competitive politics when an old order

24
central authority was strengthened, such as was the case with the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) regime in mainland China after 1949. In short, regionalism and nationalism were
not necessarily antagonistic, and could coexist. In the circumstances that most of the
Chinese masses had not yet gone through the process of the mobilization of nationalism,
political regionalism was a local nationalism with regional sentiments, and an indispensable
alternative for the political mobilization of the masses. It played a positive role in the
development of Chinese nationalism.7 Also, Chinese society had been based on the
patriarchal clan system (zongfa zhidu). In this system the political consciousness of the
masses towards the nation had never been a strong factor.8 The political consciousness of
the masses which was awakened through the identification of each individual with his or
her region or province, however, gave a strong impetus to the rise of nationalism once a
sense of larger patriotism was aroused,9 of which Guangxi was an example.10 In other
words, regionalism contributed to the growth of nationalism since it promoted China’s
transformation into a modern nation-state. However, there were problems. After the
establishment of the Republic, regionalism was believed to be a major source of

had been destroyed but the new one has not been built up. The failure of the open and
competitive politics led China to the reunification under the GMD. See Lucian W. Pye,
Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China, New
York: Praeger, 1971, especially “Introduction”.
7
A Chinese historian has discussed the origins and evolution of modern regionalism (or
provincialism). See Li Jifeng, Shengqu zhuyi yu minguo shengzhi de sanbian, p. 25.
8
For a thorough discussion of the rural society of China under the patriarchal clan
system, see Wang Zhaoshi, Zhongguo wenti de fenxi, Shanghai: SWYSG, 1935; and Fei
Xiaotong, Xiangtu Zhongguo, Shanghai: Zhongguo guanchashe, 1947; and Fei Hsiao Tung,
“An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes”, in Fei Hsiao Tung (Fei
Xiaotong), Chinese Village Close-Up, Beijing: New World Press, 1983, pp. 124-157.
9
Yun Yiqun provides good examples how peasants moved outside their small and
limited circles such as clan, village and town and participated in the war of resistance
against Japan after they were mobilized through political propaganda. See Yun Yiqun,
Kangzhan yu nongmin, Shanghai: Da shidai chubanshe, November 1937.
10
For example, see Zhen Hua (comp.), Guangxi ge jiaoluo de jiuwang yundong,
Nanning: MTZKS, 1938.

25
warlordism and social turmoil leading China to “regional disintegration” and “national
disunity”, according to some scholars.11
The GMD commenced the course of reunifying China in the 1920s, with the
Northern Expedition (1926-1928) - the Nationalist Revolution - which had two missions: to
remove warlordism and to free China from the control of foreign imperialism. The
Expedition ended in triumph two years after it was launched in Guangzhou in 1926, and
established Nationalist rule in Nanjing under Jiang Jieshi.12 However, in the following
decade (1928-1937) - the so-called Nanjing decade - the internal struggle within the GMD
became one of ideology and of military strength, as well as one over internal and external
issues, besides the struggle among different factions and groups for power in both regional
and central structures. The outcome of these struggles was a series of military conflicts
within the GMD, such as the conflict between Jiang Jieshi and the GMD’s other civilian
and powerful military leaders such as Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Li Zongren, Feng
Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and others.13 Li Zongren was the first of these leading military
figures within the GMD to be brought down by Jiang Jieshi. The outbreak of military
conflict between Jiang and Li was a prelude to a series of civil wars between 1929 and
1931 among the factions of the GMD. Following this, Li kept Guangxi semi-independent
from Nanjing in the years until 1936, for which he was condemned by the Jiang group as a

11
For a thorough discussion of regional disintegration and national disunity in the
Beiyang warlord period, see Chen Zhirang (Joreme Ch’en), Junshen zhengquan, Hong
Kong: SLSD, 1979; and James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era
in Chinese History, 1912-1949, New York: The Free Press, 1975. For discussion of the
Beiyang Warlord period in details, see Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-
1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976; and L. W. Pye, Warlord Politics.
12
For a thorough discussion and description of the Northern Expedition and the
Nationalist Revolution, see C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China: From
Canton to Nanking, 1923-1928, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; and
Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China’s National Revolution of 1926-1928,
Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976.
13
For conflicts and civil wars among the GMD factions, see Zhang Tongxin,
Guomindang xin junfa hunzhan shilue, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1982; Lei Xiaocen, Sanshi
nian dongluan Zhongguo, Vol. 1, Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe, 1954; Zhongguo
qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe,
1934, pp. 96-251; Li Taifen and Song Zheyuan (eds.), Xibeijun jishi 1924-1930, Hong
Kong: Dadong tushu gongsi, 1978; Chen Shaoxiao, Heiwang lu, Hong Kong, ZCCBS,
1966; and Hallett E. Abend, Tortured China, New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1930.

26
representative of regionalism, regional militarism and regional separatism.14 Thus, within
the GMD, Li, who headed the big and small militarists and civilians at provincial level, and
who challenged Jiang’s domination in the central government, was considered to be the
most important rival to Jiang. For some scholars, the Nanjing decade was an era of
disintegration, and they suggest that regionalism contributed to it.15 In other words,
regionalism headed by Li was considered unhelpful to national unity and the kind of
centralization on which Jiang expended much of his energy. As Martin Wilbur points out,
The success of the Northern Expedition appeared to open the door to an era in
which China's new political leadership could tackle the three major problems
confronting the modern Chinese nation - regional separatism, foreign domination,
and socioeconomic maladjustment.16

14
That Li was officially attacked as a selfish regionalist and remnant warlord came from
Jiang’s declaration in the GMD’s 3rd national congress in March 1929 when Jiang issued
an order to wipe out the former’s troops in both Hubei and Guangxi provinces. Since then
Jiang’s attack on Li almost became a central tenet for Jiang's followers, even of scholars of
the GMD’s history. See Luo Jialun (ed.), Geming wenxian (hereafter as GMWX), No. 79,
p. 117; Guowen zhoubao (hereafter as GWZB), Vol. 6, No. 12 (March 30, 1929); and Pan
Gongzhan, “Shinian lai de Zhongguo tongyi yundong”, in Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui
(ed.), Kangzhan shinian qian zhi Zhongguo, pp. 1-20. Also see “Taofa Guixi junfa
wengao”, 1929, and “Taofa Guixi junfa xuanchuan dagang”, 1929, Archives of Editorial
Committee for War History, the Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing.
15
The details see, for example, James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The
Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912-1949, New York: The Free Press, 1975; Jiu-hwa
Lo Upshur, China Under the Kuomintang: The Problem of Unification, 1928-1937,
unpublished PhD thesis, the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1972; Robert
A. Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and the Central
Power, 1911-1938, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973; Lloyd E.
Eastman, China Under Nationalist Rule: Two Essays: The Nanking Decade, 1927-1937,
and The War Years, 1937-1945, Urbana, Illinois: Center for Asian Studies, University of
Illinois, 1982; and the same author, Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule,
1927-1937, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974; Zhang Xianwen (ed.),
Zhonghua minguo shigang, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1985; Zhang Tongxin, Guomindang
xin junfa hunzhan shilue; and the same author, Jiang Wang hezuo de guomin zhengfu,
Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1988.
16
C. Martin Wilbur, “Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the
Nationalist Regime, 1922-1937”, in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis:
Volume 1, China’s Heritage and the Communist Political System, Book One, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 258. Also see Jiu-hwa Lo Upshur, China Under the
Kuomintang, p. 11.

27
From then on, according to some scholars, regionalism in the Nanjing decade seemed to
play the same role as militarists did in the Beiyang warlord period. It disrupted the
development of Chinese nationalism.17
However, Professor Diana Lary has argued through her case study of the Guangxi
Clique’s political role in the Republican period between 1925 and 1937 that regionalism
provided the sinews that held China together. She suggests that regionalism for the Clique
was not an end in itself but a stepping-stone on the way to nationalism. In the case of the
Clique between 1925 and 1937, the regionalists headed by Li Zongren set out on their
course of regionalism with the aim of serving the nation in such a way that regionalism and
nationalism could coexist. Moreover, the Clique linked its regionalism to militarism as the
most efficient means of achieving regional reconstruction. By an extension of the process
of justification, nationalism came not only to justify regionalism but also militarism.18 Lary
therefore provides a new explanation of the relations between regionalism and nationalism.
More importantly, she has conducted a comprehensive and painstaking investigation of the
political behaviour of the Clique as a political group, which was persistently attacked by
both Jiang’s followers and the Communists. In the field of studying China’s provincial
history, and in particular, the history of the Clique, Lary’s work is of great significance.
Her voice, moreover, has been echoed in recent works on the Clique published in mainland
China.19
Although Lary’s theoretical assumptions have inspired a reevaluation of the
Guangxi Clique's role in Chinese politics and revising some previous views on the Clique,
she does, however, overlook the following issues: 1) What were the factors affecting the
Clique’s political behaviour which could be seen to serve the nation? 2) To what extent
was regionalism transformed into nationalism? 3) What was the motive force that impelled

17
Particularly, some scholars studying modern Chinese history or the GMD’s history
have insisted on such a standpoint. See, for example, Furuga Keiji, Jiang zongtong milu,
Vol. 7, Taipei: Zhongyang ribaoshe, 1976, p. 122; Pan Gongzhan, “Shinian lai Zhongguo
de tongyi yundong”, in Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan shinian qian zhi
Zhongguo, pp. 1-20; Guo tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese
University Press, 1982, chapter 16; and Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei:
Huadong chubanshe, 1977, pp. 229-36.
18
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 8-19.
19
See Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990; and
Shen Xiaoyun, Li Zongren de yisheng, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1992.

28
the internal political unity of the GMD, particularly the reconciliation between Li Zongren
and Jiang Jieshi? And 4) Did Li and the Clique play a positive or negative role in the
GMD’s internal political unity? Furthermore, although the period on which Lary focuses
was coincidental with the process of the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United
Front (AJNUF), she does not pay sufficient attention to the important role of the AJNUF in
influencing the political behaviour of most factions and individuals inside and outside the
GMD at that time. In fact, with respect to political unity throughout the country, the
Clique, regardless of whether it is categorized as a representative of regionalism or
nationalism, contributed much to the formation of the AJNUF. Both regionalism and
nationalism had at this time the same aim - to oppose Japanese aggression, an urgent task
facing the Chinese nation in the 1930s.
Based on Lary’s theoretical framework and by taking Li Zongren’s political
behaviour as a case study, the main objectives of this study are: (i) to focus on the
relationship between regionalism and nationalism; (ii) to discuss regionalism's roles in both
the process of the internal political unity of the GMD and the formation of the AJNUF; and
(iii) to deal with the issues mentioned above that Lary has failed to address. In so doing,
the scope of this study will be limited to the Nanjing decade, mostly to the first half of the
1930s, i.e. before the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan on July 7, 1937.
By analyzing Li Zongren’s practice in the Nanjing era, this study attempts to
address the following issues. First, it seeks to explore how the people in rural society were
mobilized to serve the promotion of regionalist and nationalist political consciousness by
Li’s efforts in Guangxi. Here, his advocacy of regionalism as a path to mass nationalism
became a means of changing their loyalties from the smaller social units of the family at the
basic level such as that of village and district, to that of the nation. In short, I will examine
whether Guangxi’s regionalism played a positive role in waking the political consciousness
of nationalism among the masses, a task the Clique had been undertaking in Guangxi for
years, as Eugene Levich has emphasized.20 Secondly, an attempt in this study is made to
appraise Li’s role in dealing with the relations between regionalism and nationalism from
two perspectives: i) the political and social conditions facing Li and his rivals at that time;
and ii) whether Li’s response helped the course of the War of Resistance. Furthermore, it

20
For discussion of Guangxi’s mass mobilization for waking nationalist consciousness in
response to national crisis, see Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang
China, 1931-1939, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993.

29
will demonstrate that what China really needed then was a wider political form of the
united front when the national crisis was in a desperate situation, in which the internal
political unity of the GMD was a prerequisite to that form. There was a desperate need to
arouse a strong sense of nationalism in the masses to inspire them to defend the country.
The rural revolution carried out by the CCP in Jiangxi and other areas in the 1930s had
already proved to be unsuccessful because it failed to meet the demands of the current
political situation.21 To survive themselves, and to retain hope of achieving their goals, the
CCP was also seeking a new political form, which was the AJNUF. No studies of modern
Chinese history can afford to neglect these issues. Political unity nationwide had to be the
first priority in the steps towards political integration, if any mobilization of the whole
nation to carry out a struggle against imperialism was to be successful. It will be argued
that the internal political unity of the GMD was prior to political integration of the whole
nation for the common purpose of resistance to foreign aggression and that the mark of the
achievement of such national political unity was the AJNUF. Contrary to Lary’s view that
“the persistence of regionalism undercut nationalism, the nationalism of national unity”,22
this study attempts to show the extent to what the Guangxi Clique and Li Zongren had
helped, not undercut, national unity. Through analysis and discussion of the above issues
this study also attempts to implement Lary’s approach to the interaction between
regionalism and nationalism by focusing on Li’s activity in Guangxi and his response to the
political situation of the 1930s.
Political Integration and Imperialism

The concept of political integration should be further defined here. “Integration”

refers to the condition of making whole or complete and to the process of bringing together
the parts of the whole into a coherent entity. Political integration refers to the process of
uniting all groups, communities and regions into a political organization striving for their
common goals in a nation-state. In a sense, according to Ronald L. Watts, the concept of

21
For a thorough study of the failure of the Chinese Communists’ experiment of the rural
revolution before the War of Resistance against Japan, see Conrad Brandt, Stalin’s Failure
in China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1958; and Ilpyong J. Kim, The Politics of
Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviet, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
University of California Press, 1973.
22
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 212.

30
political integration is to be distinguished from national integration. The latter refers to the
process or condition of uniting the parts of a nation, that community living within a
territory that shares a common history, set of symbols, and subjective feeling that bind its
members to one another. Furthermore, Watts emphasizes,
Political integration is distinguished from the concepts of economic integration and
social integration, each of which may contribute to political integration but is itself
distinct. Economic integration refers to the closer linking together of economies in
a free trade area, a common market, or an economic union, but the degree to which
economic integration involves the creation of integrative political organs may vary.
Social integration refers to the process or condition of interrelating social
institutions, such as family and kinship systems, the systems of voluntary
associations, and all the other aspects of a society including its economic and
political institutions so that they operate in a cohesive and interdependent fashion.
In other words, political integration is the uniting of distinct groups, communities,
or regions into a workable and viable political organization. Political integration
may be coterminous with national integration in the case of the nation-state, but it
may be limited to a smaller sub-national unit or take the form of a wider,
multinational political organization, for political integration refers to the process of
unifying political institution into a cohesive whole over time or a condition of
political cohesion.23
What China needed during the Nanjing decade was just this kind of political integration.
The outcome of the Northern Expedition brought all provinces under the GMD’s
flag, which at least gave the appearance of national unification. To what extent such
unification was genuine is another question. It is true, as mentioned above, that the central
authority was so weak that China was considered not really “unified” because of the
existence of warlord remnants and other factors.24 But the question here is how to define
the meaning of unification and unity. The so-called “disunity” of China was attributed to
the struggles between the GMD and CCP in the ideological field, as well as the debates on
explaining the aspects and implications of unification between different factions and
groups, inside and outside the GMD. Since entering the twentieth century, China was
greatly affected by a variety of western ideas and ideologies which mixed with traditional
Confucianism, and there were many contradictory views. For example, after the Northern

23
Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Regionalism, and Political Integration”, in David
Cameron (ed.), Regionalism and Supranationalism, p. 5.
24
See Lloyd E. Eastman, Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937;
and Martin. Wilbur, “Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the
Nationalist Regime, 1922-1937”, in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, p.
258.

31
Expedition, did unification mean centralization, or to be more exact, dictatorship under
Jiang Jieshi? To what extent was localism or regionalism to be tolerated? There was no
agreement on these and other questions. Since the limits of authority at the centre, the
region and district had been unclear, each faction and individual, in the debates and
conflicts within the GMD, could borrow theoretical support from Sun Yatsen’s doctrines
such as the Three Principles of the People (sanmin zhuyi) and the Fundamentals of
National Reconstruction (jianguo dagang) as their weapons against others. Sun Yatsen’s
doctrines were only an ideal that had not been put into practice before his death in Beijing
in 1925; but they remained a powerful influence on the Party's ideology of political
leadership and organization. Furthermore, there was disagreement on the methods to be
used to attain unification and the priorities in achieving different goals such as those
affecting national reconstruction. Some ideas and aspirations of unification conflicted with
others and, given the external factor which was beyond China’s control, and relative
domestic conditions, some aspirations clearly conflicted with actual political
circumstances.25 There was ideological conflict not only between the GMD and the CCP,
but also among factions of the GMD themselves. All of them contributed to the
phenomenon of “disunity” in the Nanjing decade. Consequently, political unity within the
GMD became the main problem that the Nationalists had to solve. To Jiang Jieshi, who
dominated the central government during this era, political unity was closely identified with
his personal leadership in the GMD party structure, in the government and the army, i.e.
centralization under his control.26 Since Jiang’s position within the GMD was by no means
supreme at the beginning of the Nanjing Government, his attempt to use military means to
wipe out his rivals at both the central government and provincial level in order to achieve
this sort of political unity was immediately challenged by his allies and colleagues, both
military and civilian. This was the historical background to the civil wars in 1929-1931
among the GMD factions and the holding of the Enlarged Congress of the GMD (kuoda
huiyi) in Beiping in 1930 as the opposition to Nanjing.
Such “disunity” emphasized the necessity for political reconciliation within the
GMD and in the country because political integration was the prerequisite of a reborn

25
For a thorough analysis and discussion of these different problems of unification, see J.
Lo Upshur, China under the Kuomintang.
26
Ibid, p. 3.

32
China. In short, China’s “disunity”, particularly from the completion of the Northern
Expedition until 1931, was reflected in political conflicts both within and outside the GMD,
apart from territorial conflicts. China’s territorial disintegration after 1931 was due to the
external factor of Japanese imperialist aggression, not to internal territorial separation. This
followed from the fact that Chinese political consciousness had not yet been unified to the
point of understanding the urgent need for political integration. Logically, political
integration was the premier task after the nation was unified even though this unification
was nominal.
To achieve political integration, certain conditions require to be satisfied, and these
have been identified by Ronald Watts. According to Watts, an understanding of the factors
which contributed to political integration would require an examination of the following
aspects:
(1) the background conditions, including (a) the degree of spill-over from pre-
existing national, economic, and social links or integration among the
components, (b) the proximity of the components, (c) the relative size and
bargaining power of the component units, and (d) the complementarity of
their elites;

(2) the strength of the integrative motives present, including (a) the desires for
security from external or internal threats, (b) the desires for utilitarian or
economic benefits, and (c) the desires for a common identity; and

(3) the character of the integrative process itself in terms of (a) the character of
the bargaining process, (b) the role of the leading elites, and (c) the timing
and sequence of steps in the process of negotiation and unification.27
China’s historical development in the 1920s and 1930s showed that, with respect to the
above factors of political integration, the second factor was the most important one. The
motive force of political integration was decisive, for the others were to a great extent
affected by it. In terms of motivation for action, this was the desire for security from
external or internal threats.
Fear of impending disaster and desire for security from external threats are strong
emotions which need to be channelled into a form of a practical and effective action. Only
political integration can give shape and direction to these emotions. What then was the
motive force of China's political integration?

27
Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Regionalism, and Political Integration”, in David
Cameron (ed.), Regionalism and Supranationalism, p. 6.

33
 To answer this question, a brief review of the objectives of the Chinese national
revolution is in order. As mentioned earlier, the Northern Expedition was the most
important component of the Chinese national revolution, and also the concrete expression
of Chinese nationalism, one which had two missions. The outcome of the Northern
Expedition raised hopes that the mission of ending warlordism had at least, superficially,
been achieved. That is to say, it is true that a series of new problems were left over or
created during the campaign to end warlordism launched by the GMD. But these problems
belonged only to the internal conflicts or internal contradictions within China that needed
time to be resolved step by step. However, the mission of emancipating China from the
imperialist yoke and achieving national independence had failed. Moreover, the Nanjing
Government under Jiang resorted to making concessions to the Western powers and
Japanese imperialism, particularly in dealing with the “Nanjing Incident”, which was
launched by the British Navy in March 1927, and the “Jinan Massacre”, which was
engineered by the Japanese in May 1928. The GMD’s policy of compromise towards
imperialism added to the feeling of failure. In a sense, how to understand and how to
approach the task of anti-imperialism became the focus for the various factions of the GMD
which were involved in internal conflicts. It is not surprising that the left-wing GMD
attacked the Nanjing Government even in the process of the Northern Expedition.28 This
attack was motivated by strong feelings of patriotism, which was the core of Chinese
nationalism. Chinese patriotism had been fostered in the Han people's long resistance to
the aggression from other nationalities along its frontiers. After the Opium War in the
1840s, the Chinese were gradually awakened to the development of nationalism. In other
words, modern Chinese nationalism had sprung from humiliations and aggression inflicted
by foreign imperialism. This aroused a sense of Chinese patriotism gradually accompanied
by a desire for democracy, freedom, independence, and equality by the May Fourth
Movement in 1919. The accomplishment of the Northern Expedition was the inevitable
outcome of this widespread desire for national unification. More importantly, the goal to
enrich the state and strengthen the military (fuguo qiangbing) and to ward off the foreign

28
For a thorough discussion of the left GMD's anti-imperialism and their criticism of the
Nanjing Government’s foreign policy, see Edmund S. K. Fung, “Anti-Imperialism and the
Left Guomintang”, Modern China, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 39-76. For details of the criticism
from the Left-wing GMD, see the periodical of Geming pinglun, edited by Chen Gongbo
and published in Shanghai in 1928.

34
threat attracted a number of intellectuals and ardent youths to join in the Northern
Expedition - the Nationalist Revolution. However, the GMD did not continue to pursue the
goal after the Expedition, but fell into intense internal struggles for power. To some extent
its loss of support from young intellectuals was due to its failure to carry on its struggle
against imperialism. Chen Gongbo, leader of the left-wing GMD at that time, had already
pointed out this mistake of the GMD.29
After the “Jinan Massacre” in 1928, Japanese aggression was further intensified and
this sparked off the “September 18 Incident” in 1931 when the Northeast provinces were
occupied by the Japanese army. Japanese imperialism became the principal enemy of the
Chinese nation. In this situation, the main task of the Chinese revolution - anti-imperialism
- was provided both viable substance and a direct target. Resistance against Japanese
aggression became the most concrete expression of the Chinese revolution in the struggle
against imperialism. As the national crisis deepened, resistance against Japan became a
mark of national identification over which no party, nor individual or any factions within
and outside the GMD disagreed, however much they still struggled for different ideologies
and for a share in the political power both in the central government and the provinces.
Each of them exploited the need for resistance against Japan as their political slogan or as a
justification in their struggle against others. For example, the Red Army found it
convenient to borrow the slogan of “beishang kangri” (march northwards to resist Japan)
when it was forced to withdraw from its base in Jiangxi province in 1934. When Jiang
Jieshi attempted to establish centralization under his control, he condemned all of his rivals
in the GMD for delaying and obstructing the plan of national resistance against Japan for
which he had formulated his policy of “domestic pacification before external war”. On the
contrary, the opposition within the GMD attacked Jiang’s compromise policy and alleged
surrender to Japanese imperialism for which they upheld the slogan of “down with Jiang to
clear the way for resisting Japan”. The nature of these struggles and debates among
different parties and factions is difficult to evaluate.30 However, it is clear that resistance

29
Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1979, Chapter 8.
30
For details of these views, see James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The
Republican Era in Chinese History, 1921-1949, New York: The Free Press, 1975; Ke-wen
Wang, The Kuomintang in Transition: Ideology and Factionalism in the “National
Revolution”, 1924-1932, unpublished PhD thesis, Stanford University, 1985; and Hung-
mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1972.

35
against Japan had become a central political concern, affecting the identity of the whole
nation. In this respect, such struggles and debates appeared to a certain extent to follow the
tide of history; all parties and factions within and outside the GMD, except for pro-
Japanese elements, moved voluntarily or involuntarily in a similar direction; that is, they
were all compelled to seek national political unity, which was a prerequisite to political
integration.
This new unity increasingly influenced the political behaviour of different parties
and factions and impelled them all to move closely together as they followed the direction
of resistance against Japan. Resistance against Japan was therefore the prime motive force
which promoted the quest for political unity of the Chinese nation prior to 1937. After
1937 China entered the nationwide War of Resistance, which initially gave the appearance
of political unity throughout the nation. This was a turning point in the history of China
because, except for pro-Japanese elements, all parties and groups throughout the country
came under one leader for the common aim - to resist Japan and to thwart her continental
ambitions. The historical situation at that time indicated that China had at least set foot on
the path to political integration. Whether or not the opportunity for political integration was
seized by those parties and groups is another question, and beyond the scope of this
thesis.31

Regionalism and Mass Nationalism as An Approach to Political Integration

What path could achieve political unity within both the GMD and the country? To
answer this question, it is necessary to briefly review the China's social structure, which to a
great extent affected political behaviours and interrelations of the people and factions or
parties.
China was largely a rural society, with the peasantry as the majority of the
population. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat grew in numbers in the treaty
ports, they were not strong enough to change the structure of the nation during the
Nationalist era. Chinese nationalism first rose in the treaty ports as a response to foreign

31
For a thorough discussion of political integration in China and of the unity between the
Nationalists and Communists existing in 1937 and the period of the War of Resistance, see
Yang Kuisong, Shiqu de jihui? - Zhanshi guogong tanpan shilu, Guilin: The Guangxi
Teachers University Press, 1992.

36
imperialism. In the first phase of the Chinese revolution, intellectuals were the main force,
while peasants in rural areas retained their traditional life style; the peasantry still had not
been awakened by nationalism, for imperialism had less impact on rural society. The
effects of economic, social and other consequences of imperialism occurred mainly in the
treaty ports.32 The essential character of Chinese society was the “zongfa zhidu”
(patriarchal clan system) that had based itself on the family or clan hierarchy for several
thousand years. Under this system political loyalty lay first to the family head, then to the
emperor, the greatest head of the family - the great Chinese imperial family. This is the
Confucianism of “sangang wuchang” (the three cardinal guides - ruler guides subject,
father guides son, and husband guides wife - and the five constant virtues - benevolence,
righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity). If China was to become a modern sovereign
nation-state in which people could have rights of freedom of speech, assembly and
association, and be responsible for national reconstruction and national defence, the
prerequisite was the mobilization of the whole nation. The peasantry, naturally, were
central to this objective; in any plan for political integration, the peasantry had to be the
main consideration. Fully mobilized, nationalism could lead Chinese to unite together to
expel invaders and enable China to be a genuinely independent and self-determined
sovereign nation, as Sun Yatsen had envisioned. This was the fundamental factor
necessary for successful political integration. This mobilization of the masses was
premised on mass nationalism.33 This mass nationalism had showed its strength in the
course of the Chinese revolution, throughout the War of Resistance in 1937-1945 to the
victory of the CCP in 1949. As Mao Zedong pointed out in 1938,
The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast
sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our
inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming
every difficulty in the war.34

32
Andrew Nathan, “Imperialism’s Effects on China”, Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1972), pp. 3-8.
33
For a detailed discussion of Peasant or Mass Nationalism, see Chalmers A. Johnson,
Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergency of Revolutionary China,
1937-1945, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, Chapter One.
34
Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War”, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. 2, Beijing:
Foreign Language Press, 1975, p. 154.

37
 Political integration is, to some extent, both a means to reestablish a political system
in a nation, particularly in a society in which the traditional order has broken down but in
which the new one has not been established. It requires all sub-national political systems to
serve the political system of the nation, which becomes a political organization uniting all
groups and parties. The mobilization of the masses is a fundamental condition for this
political organization, and hence the achievement of political integration. In other words,
the success of promoting political consciousness at levels below that of the national
political system is a prerequisite to encouraging political organization and the political
integration of the nation. For this reason, mass mobilization had to start from the region,
and be built on the basic level of Chinese social structure - the village. Li Zongren’s
practice in Guangxi offers an example of the mass mobilization of the 1930s, which
seemed to promise that regionalism could be combined with nationalism, when the cause of
anti-imperialism was exploited. As to what extent imperialism actually impacted harmfully
on the peasants, this was never fully defined by the Guangxi Clique. The important thing
was that Li and the Clique could use this to justify themselves in their struggle for power
with the Jiang group, and for meeting the needs of mobilizing the masses to achieve
political unity first within the GMD, and then the nation.
Meanwhile, in pursuing this theme, the Guangxi Clique could link the economic
suffering of the peasants from the taxation and other policies of the central and regional
governments to the impact of imperialism, in the course of which they successfully
transformed and re-directed the resentment of the peasants, caused by economic
exploitation, to one external cause - imperialist invasion. The peasants were mobilized in
this way. As a result, the mobilization of the masses, which commenced from the most
basic level of rural society, meant that regionalism could be combined with nationalism for
the special needs of national political unity - anti-imperialism, or to be more exact,
resistance against Japanese aggression at that time.
Furthermore, the goal of China’s national independence called for political
integration, for which the awakening and the mobilization of the masses was a first priority.
Jiang Jieshi may have realized this, but he only attempted to arouse political consciousness
of the masses through propaganda, through the New Life Movement.35 However, the

35
For a detailed discussion of the New Life Movement, see Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological
Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution”, The Journal of
Asian Studies, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (August 1975), pp. 955-980.

38
Movement was mainly limited to towns and cities and based on dictatorship and
centralization, and Jiang’s policy of “Domestic pacification before external war”. In the
circumstances of increasing national crisis, the failure of Jiang’s policy was doomed
because he failed to carry out the most important task at that time: immediately fighting the
Japanese and mobilizing the masses in rural society. The internal conflict within the GMD,
particularly that between Jiang Jieshi and Li Zongren, should be considered in this context.
This indicated that where struggles for power occurred in the GMD, the success or failure
of the policy of the factions involved was determined by whether they pursued this political
imperative of resistance and mobilization. It must be remembered, however, that China is a
vast country; social, economic, and political development in each province or region was
different. A policy which met both the special circumstances of the region and the political
needs of the nation would be the successful one. What the Guangxi Clique carried out in
its province should be considered in this light.
Under the circumstances prevailing during the 1930s, Chinese nationalism rose to
an unprecedented height and there was intense political disunity within the GMD. Elite
unity was the key to political integration in which the internal unity of the faction and
political cooperation between the factions were essential. Li’s achievement in this respect
enabled the Clique to constitute a strong opposition force to Jiang Jieshi for the entire
decade, to reestablish a sound political structure in Guangxi, to mobilize the whole
province, and to cooperate with other factions in the southwestern region. The major
method of mobilizing the masses was to create mass organizations. For example, the
militia system created by Li and the Clique had its own distinctive features but was
embraced by the masses as a familiar and welcome part of everyday life.
In addition to the successful formation of mass organizations, indoctrination also
played a major role in the mobilization of the masses by Li and the Clique. One of the
approaches to the mobilization of the masses was to employ Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles
of the People combined with a theory of regional identity and loyalty, the theory of the
Pearl River Valley Revolution which was used to encourage the masses, especially in
Guangxi, to divert their attention from domestic problems to the external crisis. In other
words, the nationalism of anti-imperialism served as a tool used by Li and the Clique both
to challenge Jiang’s domination of power in the Nanjing Government and to consolidate
their base - Guangxi province.

39
 Other approaches used were the methods of arming and educating the masses.36 In
this sense, the ideal of Li and the Clique of “reconstructing Guangxi to serve the end of
restoring China” (jiangshe Guangxi fuxing Zhongguo) did have real substance.
Regionalism served nationalism as a political force, through its combination with
militarism, as Lary has pointed out. Once the conditions matured, regionalism would
readily fuse with nationalism to serve political integration. As Tang Tsou points out,
Political development in China can be understood as a process in which a small
group of men accepted a modern ideology, adapted it to Chinese conditions,
perfected a system of organizations, developed a set of practices to the whole
nation.37
This appropriate comment must incorporate the work of Li and his Clique. When the
conditions matured, as discussed below, Li’s regional political system was available to be
combined into the national political system to achieve something approaching political
unity and political integration. In this sense, regionalism coexisted with and made a
considerable contribution to nationalism.

The Anti-Japanese National United Front and National Political Unity

Achievement of national political unity required a political organization that could

tolerate within it different forces which were willing to set their differences aside in order to
serve the higher goal. It demanded a form capable of bringing all political forces together.
In the 1930s, that form was the Anti-Japanese National United Front (AJNUF). The
formation of the AJNUF was the foundation of resistance to imperialism and a reborn

36
For a thorough discussion and evaluation of mobilization in Guangxi, see Eugene
Levich, Mobilization and Reconstruction in Kwangsi Province, 1931-1939, PhD
dissertation, Chicago University, 1984; and the same author, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939. Levich’s research focuses on the mobilization and
reconstruction done by the Clique and points to the Clique’s reform within the GMD and
its contribution to nation building, this seen as an alternative to the Communist success in
Yan’an. In his thesis entitled “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian” (in
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b [December 1988], pp. 307-53), Chu Hongyuan also suggests
that the Clique was the reformer within the GMD and its mass mobilization and
reconstruction in the province to some extent contributed to the GMD’s nation building
efforts. The research achievements of Levich and Chu will be employed in this study.
37
Tang Tsou, “Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China: A Framework
for Analysis”, in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, p. 285.

40
China. It was the highest expression of Chinese nationalism, as well as a key prerequisite
to any political integration.
The AJNUF was an outcome of Chinese nationalism and a common aspiration of
many parties, groups and individuals opposed to Japanese aggression. The final formation
of the AJNUF resulted from the reconciliation between the GMD and the CCP.38
However, an important question arises: how did the GMD reconcile with the CCP before
Jiang settled his conflicts with his rivals within the GMD? It will be shown that the
achievement of internal political unity of the GMD was a precondition for national political
unity. It will be argued in that to achieve the internal unity of the GMD, particularly the
reconciliation between Jiang and Li, his most powerful rival in the 1930s, was a critical
step in this process. Until this point had been reached, the AJNUF was impossible of
achievement. Guangxi’s “June 1 Movement”, which occurred in June and September
1936, appealed for an immediate war of resistance against Japan and virtually forced Jiang
to promise to lead the national resistance. This was the high point of reconciliation within
the GMD.
The arguments stated above lead this study to challenge the traditional view that the
“Xi’an Incident” which occurred in December 1936 marked the formation of the AJNUF.
Instead, this study will suggest that the “Xi’an Incident” was but a continuation of the “June
1 Movement”. In short, the latter was the prelude to the former. We argue further that Li’s
and the Clique’s contribution to the AJNUF should be judged on the following issues. Li
had insisted on an anti-Japanese policy, calling for much more active resistance against
Japanese aggression. Li’s stand partly forced Jiang finally to abandon his policies of
“rangwai bixian annei” (domestic pacification before external war) and to conciliate with
both his rivals within the GMD and the CCP. On the other hand, Li made Guangxi a base
of anti-Jiang activity and mobilized the whole province for self-defence as well as
resistance against Japan. Li not only established alliances with military groups or factions
in neighbouring provinces, but also formed a united front with many groups and factions
within and outside the GMD, particularly during the “June 1 Movement”. These factors
forced Jiang to settle internal conflicts within the GMD peacefully, and laid the foundation
for Li’s transformation of his anti-Jiang policy into one supporting Jiang to resist Japan.

38
For a thorough discussion of the CCP’s approach to the AJNUF, see Kui-kwong Shum,
Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-
1945, Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

41
Moreover, Li’s military alliance with Sichuan militarists and the Red Army in 1936-37
suggests that their cooperation had gone beyond the scope of mere military defence for their
territories and added a political meaning. That was, in a sense, a means of applying
political pressure to Jiang and the GMD, and a positive action after the “Xi’an Incident” to
ensure the official formation of the AJNUF.

In order to pursue this discussion of the interaction between regionalism and

nationalism, the second and third chapters of this study will discuss the rise of Li Zongren
and the Guangxi Clique, and analyze the internal structure of the Clique. The tradition and
development of Guangxi’s regionalist characteristics, as well as relationship between
regional identity and the Clique’s internal structure, will also be addressed in the two
chapters. The perception of Chinese society and Chinese revolution which affected the
Clique’s mobilization of the masses and its methods, including theoretical framework, and
its impact on reconstruction and mass mobilization in the province, will be the subject of
the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter will analyze the relationship of Li and the Clique with
the Southwest regional factions, and the role of these relationships in the approach to the
internal political unity of the GMD. The following three chapters will focus on the anti-
Japanese ideas and the strategy of Li and his group, as well as the practice of carrying out
their advocacy of resistance, as they pursued the national political objectives and their own
political interests during the formation of the AJNUF. These three chapters also account
for the reactions of Li and the Clique to the political situation during the Nanjing era,
during which the Li and Jiang groups moved from confrontation to reconciliation. Through
analysis and discussion of these issues, this study attempts to provide a better understanding
of Chinese political conflicts within the GMD, the political attitudes and ideals of certain
outstanding political figures, such as Li and other leaders of the Clique, as well as the
relationship between nationalism and regionalism.
Before we address these issues, it is necessary to briefly explain two issues. The
first one is the term “Guangxi Clique”. The term has two meanings. One refers to the
Guangxi military group under the leadership of General Lu Rongting. As this group was
only active in the Constitution Protection Movement between 1917 to 1920, the
Nationalists at that time preferred to call it “Guixi” (the Guangxi Clique) as Lu Rongting
vied with Sun Yatsen for power in the period of the Guangzhou Military Government from

42
1917 to 1920.39 The other refers to a new political and military group which emerged from
the womb of the Lu Rongting group and from the same place - Guangxi province - with Li
Zongren as its head; this group emerged after the fall of the Lu group in 1921 and was
active throughout the Nationalist era and exerted a great impact on Chinese political
development. To distinguish both Lu’s and Li’s groups, Chinese historians usually call the
former “jiu Guixi” (the old Guangxi Clique), the latter “xin Guixi” (the new Guangxi
Clique). In fact, the term “Guangxi Clique”, which refers in particular to the group under
Li Zongren and other Guangxi leaders, was first used by some factions of the Nationalists
to attack the expanding influence of Li and his group in both the GMD and the Nationalist
Government during the period before and after Jiang Jieshi was first forced to announce his
retirement in August 1927. According to Chen Gongbo, the term “Guixi” which refers in
particular to Li Zongren and his group was first invented by General Zhang Fakui, who
attempted to replace General Li Jishen as leader of the Guangdong armies. At that time Li
Jishen was Commander of the 4th Army (before the Northern Expedition), Chairman of
Guangdong province, Chairman of the Guangzhou Political Branch of the GMD, and Chief
of General Staff of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army, as well as the ex-superior of Zhang
Fakui. As Li Jishen was a native of Guangxi, he was a powerful supporter of Li Zongren
and his Guangxi group, though not formally a leader of this group. Meanwhile, Li Zongren
and Guangxi leaders played an important role in the Nanjing regime after Jiang’s short
retirement in the second half of 1927. Capitalizing on the situation in which regional
militarists came to be despised, and exploiting the desire of the people of the province to
govern themselves and their own provincial affairs, Zhang Fakui employed the term to
serve his purpose.40 It should be noted, however, that Guangxi leaders never called
themselves by this name before 1949 because they regarded the term as highly pejorative
and never indeed thought of their group as a “clique”. From the time Li Zongren and other
Guangxi leaders emerged on the Chinese political and military stages, they referred to
themselves as “tuanti” (group), which they regarded as an organization with certain

39
For the conflict between Lu’s group and Sun Yatsen and other southern leaders in the
Guangzhou Military Government during the Constitution Protection Movement and Lu’s
defeat, see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo, Guangzhou, 1921; Mo
Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990; and Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan,
Lu Rongting zhuan, Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 1987.
40
Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 156. Also see Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi yu
liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 6 (1964), p. 1.

43
political ideals and policies.41 For convenience, the term “Guangxi Clique” in this study
refers to Li Zongren and his group because they were usually referred to by the collective
noun “Guixi” after the Northern Expedition. However, the term is politically neutral in this
thesis, except where it quotes from works on this Guangxi group. Similarly, as Li Zongren
was the supreme leader of the Guangxi Clique, his activities and responses to the Chinese
political situation were inseparable from the Clique. For this reason, the terms “Li
Zongren” and “the Guangxi Clique” or “the Clique” in the text are largely interchangeable.
The other issue is the difficulty in obtaining reliable sources for the study of the
Guangxi Clique. Indeed, this is a problem which confronts all scholars of modern Chinese
history. On the one hand, collections of official and private sources that are available pay
little attention to Guangxi and the Clique; and some sources are also frankly tendentious,
having been compiled and published by individuals and organizations sympathetic to either
Jiang Jieshi or the Communists regimes. Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique were
regarded by these regimes as an opposition by Jiang and a reactionary force by the
Communists;42 consequently, it is important to understand that these sources are unable to
reflect completely and truthfully the events in which the Clique was involved at that time.
If we do not know the above backgrounds and do not use these sources carefully, we can
easily, willingly or unwillingly, be misled by the sources. Moreover, there is still no one
detailed collection of sources relating to Guangxi history in the Republican era available.
This also adds to the difficulty in studying this area. The scholar of the Guangxi Clique
thus has to confront problems of bias and incompleteness in his sources.
To overcome these difficulties, this study follows three principles. The first is to
use original archives and official records, particularly those relating to Guangxi and the
Clique, as much as possible. Of course, these original archives and documents are not
easily accessed, for reading and borrowing them are restricted by the authorities of the
archives in China, at both national and provincial levels. The archives are also not easy to
search. Another factor is that most of Guangxi's records were destroyed by Japanese

41
See Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 31, No. 6, p. 116; and Diana Lary,
Region and Nation, p. 34.
42
See, for example, Huai Xiang, Li Zongren he zhongmei fandongpai, Hong Kong:
Yuzhou shuwu, 1948; Zhou Quan, Guixi jiepou, Shanghai: Qixing shuwu, 1949;
Zhonggong Guilin diwei (ed.), Hongjun changzheng guo Guangxi, Nanning: GXRMCBS,
1986; and Yi Ming (Anonymous), Liangguang panluan neimu: Tezhong zhengzhi tongxun,
n.p., 1936.

44
bombing during the War, as I was informed in Nanning when I conducted my field work
there for this study. This may be the reason that scholars, including Diana Lary and Eugene
Levich, have not employed these original records in their studies on Guangxi.43
Nevertheless, the documents, especially in the archives of the editorial committee for war
history and of the Nationalist Government that I unearthed in the Second Historical
Archives of China at Nanjing, are extremely valuable. The second principle is to refer as
widely as possible to publications of both Guangxi and other places from the 1920s and
1930s, including newspapers and periodicals. I will use these materials, which originate
from different political and ideological orientations to avoid the bias of relying too heavily
on one particular source of information. The third principle is to use oral historical sources,
including published personal memoirs, collections of written historical materials and
interviews. Oral historical sources might reflect the author's personality and attitudes, some
might provide one-side views, and even make mistakes on dates and places as well as
figures of the events recalled;44 but they are very important sources as they provide us with
many untold inside stories of the important events of that time, especially those relating to
the secret political organization of the Guangxi Clique. Chapter Two is mainly based on
such sources. Unfortunately, both Lary and Levich did not use these valuable sources in
their studies. If we use these sources very carefully and check the reliability and the
truthfulness of the facts they mention against other sources, they, to a certain extent, are

43
It is understood that Diana Lary’s study of the Guangxi Clique was conducted in the
1960s when China had not opened her door to western countries, during which she did not
have any chance to search archives in China. For the same reason, although Eugene Levich
has collected numbers of Guangxi official publications for his work in the second half of
the 1970s and the early 1980s, he was still unable to employ archives in his study.
44
For example, Zhou Dai, Yan Xishan’s Artillery Commander in the 1920s, recalled that
he and Bai Chongxi, one of three top leaders of the Guangxi Clique, took part in the
Disarmament and Rehabilitation Conference (bianqian huiyi) in Nanjing at the end of 1928
and in the early 1929, and even that there was a discussion of the disarmament proposals
between them during the conference. In fact, Bai Chongxi had stayed at Beiping from June
1928 when the Northern Expedition Army occupied the city until he was forced to leave
there in March 1929. Only Li Zongren, on behalf of the Guangxi Clique (the Fourth Army
Group of the NRA at that time), took part in the conference. Therefore, the person whom
Zhou Dai met and talked with should be Li Zongren, not Bai Chongxi. See Zhou Dai,
“Huiyi bianqian huiyi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52. Also see Zhang Guangwei, “Xin Guixi de di
shisan jun”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 28-34; and Li Renren, “Bai Chongxi zai Beiping,
Tangshan huodong de pianduan huiyi”, GXWSZL, No. 21, pp. 84-87.

45
able to function as an alternative to the records destroyed in the War or to gaps in the
official documents.
Based on these sources, this study attempts to provide a balanced and
comprehensive account of Guangxi's actions in the complicated circumstances of Chinese
politics at that time. In short, this study intends to explain and analyze the actual situation
of Guangxi under the Clique by drawing on a whole range of historical sources, especially
those relating to the province and the Clique.

Summary

This study mainly focuses on the interaction of regionalism and nationalism during
the Nanjing decade through a case study of the Guangxi Clique’s response to the
complicated political situation in the 1930s. In particular, it deals with the following issues.
Did Li Zongren and his Clique undercut nationalism through carrying out a series of
policies in their region in the context of the complicated internal conflicts of the GMD and
under the threat of Japanese aggression? How did the Clique, through its perception of
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution, form its political framework and tactics to
mobilize the masses? Why and how did the situation and conditions at that time lead Li
and the Clique to compromise with Jiang for internal unity of the GMD? And, to what
extent did the Clique contribute to the political unity of the nation in the formation of the
AJNUF, which was a prerequisite of political integration?
The above issues come from rethinking and reevaluating the history of Guangxi and
its role in national affairs during the 1930s. Historians of Guangxi, such as Diana Lary and
Eugene Levich, have not fully discussed these questions or have not responded to them at
all. They have, however, made a valuable contribution to this area through focusing on the
political behaviour, provincial reconstruction and mass mobilization of the province. Their
studies have, nevertheless, not explained, with sufficient depth and clarity, the interrelations
between regionalism, headed by the Clique, and nationalism. The interaction between
Guangxi's mass mobilization and its perception of Chinese society and the Chinese
revolution is an issue which needs further analysis. In fact, to fully understand the roles and
status of the Clique in the changeable and complicated Chinese politics of the Republic, it
is necessary to pose these questions. This study contributes to a comprehensive
understanding of Guangxi history through analysis and examination of the above issues,

46
based as it is on newly unearthed documents and relevant materials relating to the Clique
and its reactions to the political trends in the nation during the 1930s.
In so doing, the main arguments of this study are as follows. First, the Clique’s
conception of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution guided the formation of its
policies of mobilization throughout the province. From this, a Pearl River Valley
Revolution theory was formed to arouse the masses’ sense of their own regional history and
to establish pride in regional identity. These emotions were then transferred to the level of
nationalism. Secondly, Li and the Clique successfully established a regional political
system in both the province and the southwest area through the efforts of reconstruction and
mass mobilization in Guangxi and the close relations and cooperation with the southwest
regional factions. Those actions became part of their campaign to achieve the political
unity of the nation for the common aim of resistance against Japan. Furthermore, in
dealing with the national crisis caused by Japanese aggression, Li and his Clique put
forward anti-Japanese ideas and practised them through the June 1 Movement, which was
the prelude to the Xi’an Incident. Thus the Clique made a considerable contribution to both
the internal political unity of the GMD and the formation of the AJNUF. The following
chapters will pursue these arguments in considerable detail.

47
CHAPTER TWO

THE RISE OF LI ZONGREN AND THE GUANGXI CLIQUE

Previous studies relating to the Guangxi Clique in Republican China have discussed
to some degree the origins and intensity of the conflict between this group and Jiang Jieshi,
leader of the Nationalist Government.45 However, the conflict, in our view, not only
reflected the bitter power struggle between them, but also the differences in internal and
external policies between the two parties, something which these studies do not fully
discuss. The conflict had a great impact on the policies and practices of both parties in the
Nanjing decade. If the conflict was concerned with power struggle and policy-making, how
did the Clique come into conflict with the Jiang group? What was the background to the
conflict between them? And what was the impact of this conflict between Li and Jiang on

45
For details of these studies, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in
Chinese Politics, 1925-1937, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, chapters 6-8;
Shen Xiaoyun, Li Zongren de yisheng, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1992, chapters 5-9; Mo
Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990, Vol. 1, chapters 6-
8; Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992, chapter
9; Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shilipai, Zhengzhou:
HNRMCBS, 1990, chapters 5 and 10; Shi Quansheng, Gao Weiliang and Zhu Jian (eds.),
Nanjing guomin zhengfu de jianli, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1987, chapters 6-8; Gao
Weiliang, “1927 nian Guomindang zhongyang tebie weiyuanhui pouxi”, JDSYJ, No. 3,
1988; Lu Jiaxiang, “Lun Jiang-Gui zhanzheng zhong Li Mingrui de fange dao-Gui”,
HCSZXB, No. 2, 1988; Lu Yangyuan, “Luelun diyici Jiang-Gui zhanzheng”, MGDA, No. 1,
1986; Peng Jie, “1927 nian de Wang-Gui zhizheng: cong Guomindang Hankou tebieshi
dangbu de gengdie tankai qu”, JHLT, No. 1, 1991; Wang Xutian, “Luelun kangzhan shiqi
Jiang-Gui zhijian de maodun douzheng”, XSLT, No. 1, 1990; Xue Moucheng, “Lun Jiang-
Gui zhanzheng”, XMDXXB, No. 4, 1982, and “Li Zongren Tang Shengzhi zhizhan”, DSYJ,
No. 5, 1985; Yuan Jingxiong and Li Qixian, “Lun Jiang-Gui maodun de chansheng he
fazhan”, GXSFDXXB, No. 2, 1990; and Zheng Derong and Tian Keqin, “Guomindang
paixi de jiaozhu yu Nanjing zhengfu zai quanguo tongzhi de jianli”, ZGDSYJ, No. 5, 1988.

48
the policies and practice of the Clique in the 1930s? To answer these questions, we need to
trace the origins of the Clique, and examine the conflict with the Jiang group in some
detail. The purpose of this chapter is to pursue these issues. I will argue that the conflict
between Li and Jiang was based on their differences over political unity in both the GMD
and the nation, and over domestic and external affairs as well. This conflict led the Clique
to carry out its own policies of reconstruction and mass mobilization in Guangxi, and to
create a foundation of regional political unity before the Sino-Japanese War.

Historical Background of Guangxi

Guangxi is a province in southwest China, with Guangdong to its southeast, Hunan

its northeast, Guizhou its north, Yunnan its west, and Vietnam (the French Indochina
before the 1950s) its southwest. Historically, it was notoriously poverty stricken. A key
factor in that has been the geographic conditions in Guangxi: it is covered with vast areas of
barren mountains. As a result, the difficulty of communication isolated the province from
the political centre of China before the Republican era, which also caused its low
agricultural production. In the 1930s, Guangxi’s agricultural production capacity was
lower than the national average both in terms of yield per unit area (125kg per mu as
against the national average of 175kg per mu) and cultivable land (9.1% as against the
national average of 10.3%).46 The poverty was worsened by heavier land taxes. In the
Qing era, the tax levies on the province were higher than those of its neighbours such as
Guangdong.47 By the time of the Republic, land taxes were by no means reduced, but had
in fact increased. Consequently, farmers suffered cruel exploitation. “Various abuses, of
having land but without taxes, paying taxes but without land, less land but more taxes, and
more land but less taxes, permeated throughout Guangxi”.48 In addition, exploitation by
the practice of usury in Guangxi was worse than in other provinces. For example, it was

46
See Zhang Peigang, Guangxi liangshi wenti, Changsha: SWYSG, 1938, pp. 134-135.
mu, a unit of area = 0.0667 hectares.
47
”Tianfu”, No. 4, “Kao”, No. 7536, in Liu Jingzao (ed.), Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao,
Shanghai, n.d.
48
Xingzhengyuan nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui (ed.), Guangxi sheng nongcun diaocha,
Shanghai: SWYSG, 1935, p. 280.

49
reported in the late Qing period that the monthly rate of interest on loans was 16.6% in
Guilin fu (prefecture), but its annual rate in Liuzhou fu reached 300%.49
Poverty was always accompanied by chaotic social conditions in Chinese society.
Along with the various imperialist influences penetrating China after the 1850s and the
collapsing rural economy, the already large numbers of the unemployed vagrants (wuye
youmin) began to increase. As Guangxi had virtually no modern industry, the vagrants,
with no legal means of earning a livelihood, joined forces with the secret society (huidang),
banditry (lulin), and disbanded soldiers (youyong), who grew to large numbers in the late
Qing period. They fought the authorities and savagely harassed the people. They also
attacked foreign invaders from Vietnam (Annam, or French Indochina).50 Thus, public
order became a major problem in Guangxi. The saying “no mountain without caves and no
cave without bandits” was a true portrayal of the situation in that province at that time.
Guangxi is also inhabited by various minority groups apart from Han Chinese. The
long conflict between minorities and Han Chinese was aggravated by the large number of
Hakka migrants who had entered Guangxi since the Ming dynasty.51 They fought against
each other very often over land, water and other matters.52 This made the Guangxi people
well known for their militant character. This identity was also strengthened by continuing
rebellions of the Guangxi people, which had a far-reaching impact on the political
development of China from the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s onwards, as the province
was the birthplace of the Taiping.53 Moreover, the significant achievement of the province

49
Zhang Youyi (ed.), Zhongguo jindai nongye shi ziliao, Beijing: SLSD, 1957, pp. 350-
351.
50
See Lin Baohang, “Guangxi de ‘youyong’”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 170-200. For more
details, see Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan, Nanning: GXMZCBS, 1987.
51
For detailed discussion of the immigration of Hakka moving from north to south
China, see Luo Xianglin, Kejia yuanliu kao, Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chuban gongsi,
1989.
52
Xu Qiming, a senior commander of the Clique, as well a descendant of Guangxi Hakka
in Yongfu county, recalled that the fighting between Hakka and natives occurred very often
during his childhood. See Xu Qiming, Xu Qiming xiansheng fangwen jilu, Taipei:
ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1983, pp. 1-2.
53
For discussion of the Taiping Rebellion, see Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion,
Seattle, 1966; Ssu-yu Teng, New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950. Also see Deng Zhicheng and Xie Xingyao (et al
eds.), Taiping tianguo shiliao, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1976.

50
in resistance against foreign aggression since the Sino-French War in the 1880s further
reinforced the identity of the Guangxi people. The Guangxi soldiers were well known for
defeating the French invaders on the border between Guangxi and Vietnam in 1884. This
victory earned the reputation for the Guangxi people for being unconquerable.54 As Leng
Guan (Hu Lin) has pointed out, “the Guangxi people have the character that they would
rather become bandits in the mountains than surrender to others”.55
Poverty and backwardness, chaos, constant rebellions, and personal courage and
militancy all combined to form the character of modern Guangxi, which took the form of a
regional characteristic. Once these characteristics were combined with a political
consciousness of regional self-government following the introduction of various popular
“isms” and ideas which spread in the late Qing and the early Republic, political
regionalism, or provincialism, emerged and developed.56 This reflected a growing political
and cultural cohesion of regional identity, which in turn provided a motive force for
regional cohesion. And this in turn became a component of modern nationalism, which
was emerging to become the main motive force in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty and
establishing a republic. This was further strengthened by the rising military force of the
regions. Political regionalism thus became a common phenomenon throughout China, this
was an indication of the weakening of central authority; but it was the first step towards the
ultimate political integration of the modern Chinese nation-state. It seems to have been a
necessary process, as the old society had broken down without any sign of its revival in the
new world of domestic trouble and external invasion of the early twentieth century.57

54
For details of the victory of the Qing army over the French army in 1884, see Lu
Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan; and Yang Jialuo (ed.), Zhongfa zhanzheng
wenxian huibian, Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1973; as well as Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi
nian wenxian bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian,
diyi bian diwuce: lieqiang qinlue [2], Taipei: ZZSJ, 1970.
55
Leng Guan, “Yue-Gui xieying”, in Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning,
1935, p. 10.
56
For detailed discussion of the rise of the political regionalism, see Li Jifeng, Shengqu
zhuyi yu minguo shengzhi de sanbian, unpublished PhD dissertation, Nanjing University,
1992.
57
For details of discussion related to regionalism, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation,
“Introduction”.

51
 The rebellious and unlikely traits of the bulk of its citizens did not undermine
Guangxi’s interest and participation in significant political events and movements in China
before 1911 and after. On the contrary, Guangxi had a considerable role to play in
Republican China’s political development,58 and it had a close connection with the course
of modern Chinese history, despite the fact, as Lary says, that it “felt itself to be only on the
edge of the Chinese world”.59 Indeed, Guangxi was as backward economically and isolated
politically as were its unfavourable geographical circumstances.60 The backwardness and
isolation were further worsened by unequal development in the social and economic realms
in different regions of China after the 1840s. However, the military achievements of
Guangxi in the late Qing and the early Republic, and the active participation and
involvement in the political development of modern China, inspired its people and
influenced later generations,61 particularly the new military and political group in the
Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang), the so-called Guangxi Clique (Guixi) with Li
Zongren as its head. Because of the appalling poverty and backwardness as well chaos in
the province, these leaders were anxious to change Guangxi’s conditions, and sought to use
military force to achieve this, to advance regionalism, and to promote their role in national
affairs - a goal they pursued in Chinese politics and military affairs. The Guangxi Clique,
in order to unite the people behind them, attributed Guangxi's poverty to imperialist
aggression, against which they mobilized, organized, educated, trained and armed the
masses to awaken them to a new political consciousness. In this way, the militant character
of the Guangxi people was successfully combined with the Clique's policy of militarism, a
tool for its existence and development, and for reunification of the province. The anti-
imperialist tradition which had developed from the Taiping became a driving force to take
Guangxi to a strong position from which it could play an important role in Chinese politics.

58
For details of Guangxi’s role playing in Chinese politics before 1920, see Lu Juntian
and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan.
59
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 26-27.
60
For detailed discussion of the circumstances, see Ibid, pp. 21-33.
61
All memoirs and recollections written by members of the Guangxi Clique claim that
they had more or less been influenced by the achievements of their older generation from
the Taiping, the Sino-French War and the Black Flag Army (heiqi jun) under the command
of Liu Yongfu and so on. Whatever the reason, it reflects the fact that the people of
Guangxi possessed an identity reflecting their history and their geographical location.

52
The Rise of Li Zongren and the Formation of the Guangxi Clique

Li Zongren was born on 13 August 1891 into a straitened peasant family in Lingui
county, near Guilin, the then capital of Guangxi. In his childhood his ambition was only to
be a duck-keeper.62 However, China's political and social changes brought him out of the
rural lifestyle and into a new world. With a series of national crises taking place at the end
of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, one of the policies adopted by the
Qing government was to set up a modern military school in each province in order to help
maintain its rule. Ironically, the establishment of the military schools changed not only the
fate of China itself, i.e. destruction of the Qing Dynasty, but also the life and career of many
individuals, including Li Zongren. Like other militarists of the Republic, Li was attracted
by the new and dynamic atmosphere of the outside world created by this modern facility
and left the village for ever. He became a cadet of the Guangxi lujun xiaoxue, the Guangxi
Military Elementary School (GMES), in Guilin in 1909. As he worked hard and did very
well in military training, Li enjoyed a high reputation among his schoolmates, who gave
him a nickname “Fierce Kid Li”.63 He joined the Tongmenghui (the Revolutionary
Coalition, which was established by Sun Yatsen in Tokyo in 1905) in about 1910,64 and
completed his studies in this school in 1913.65
Inspired by patriotism, Li began his long military career in 1916 when he was
recruited into the National Protection Army (huguo jun) which was initiated by Generals
Cai E and Tang Jiyao - the so-called National Protection Movement (huguo yundong) - to
fight President Yuan Shikai who attempted to restore the monarchical system with himself
as emperor. As an officer of the Constitution Protection Army (hufa jun), Li then

62
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1979, p. 13.
63
Ibid, p. 21. Also see Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7,
p. 104 (Hereafter as “Jingguo”).
64
Te-kong Tang and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 23.
65
In 1912 the school was renamed the Guangxi lujun sucheng xuetang, i.e. the Guangxi
Intensive Military Training School (GIMTS). For details of this school, see Li Shucheng,
“Xinhai geming shiqi Guangxi de lujun ganbu xuetang he lujun xiaoxuetang”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 10, pp. 38-42.

53
participated in the Constitution Protection War (hufa zhanzheng) in the following year,
which was launched by the Southern Military Government in Guangzhou. With his
distinguished performance in both the National Protection War (huguo zhanzheng) and
hufa zhanzheng he was soon promoted to a battalion commander in 1918, and a deputy
regimental commander in 1921. For his bravery and military ability he also was highly
praised by the young middle and lower ranking officers in the Guangxi armies; these
officers had mostly been his schoolmates at the military schools.66 This reputation placed
him in a favourable position to unite these young officers around him when he himself
became a provincial militarist and reunified Guangxi several years later.
The year 1921 gave Li an opportunity to rise as a provincial militarist during the
Guangdong army's invasion of Guangxi. Lu Rongting, then ruler of Guangxi, was defeated
and reluctantly announced his retirement, leaving the province in turmoil. Li resolutely
broke away from the old Guangxi army set up by Lu Rongting. In this complicated and
uncertain situation, Li carried out a policy of “examining the situation carefully and then
waiting for change” (jingguan daibian),67 and led his troops into the Sixty Thousand
Mountains (liuwan dashan) to maintain and develop his own strength. This action had a
great impact on the course of Guangxi's history. With his reputation as a middle-ranking
commander in the Guangxi armies, Li attracted a large number of military school graduates
to his side, and soon had a small but effective force of 2,000 men. In the fall of 1921, by
seizing an opportunity in the chaotic situation prevailing in the province, he occupied Yulin
fu, including seven counties in the West River Valley of Guangxi, the richest area of the
province.68 With this base secured and his troops well-trained and disciplined, Li rose
rapidly to embark on his political and military career in modern Chinese history.
The rise of new provincial militarists was an outcome of the time, and a common
phenomenon in the Republic.69 Guangxi was no exception. The provincial turmoil and

66
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, p. 52; and Yin
Chenggang, “Jingguo”, pp. 111-2.
67
Yin Chenggang, “Jingguo”, pp. 120-5.
68
For the details of Li's occupation of Yulin, see Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10, pp. 1-50.
69
Tao Juyin and Tian Buyi provide plenty of examples of the rise of this sort of militarist
after the 1911 Revolution. For further details, see works by Tao Juyin and Tian Buyi in the
Bibliography of this thesis.

54
civil war of Guangxi caused its economic and financial collapse. In these circumstances,
ending the chaos and reunifying the province became a common cause.70 However, there
could be no help from the central authority. The Beijing government and Sun Yatsen’s
Guangzhou government were involved in their own internal struggles for power and even
for their very survival,71 and had neither time nor strength to pay attention to regional
affairs, particularly Guangxi, a province remote from Beijing and a hostile neighbour of
Guangdong between the years 1920-1922.72 Under the circumstances, the chaos of
Guangxi was left to be solved by its own internal forces. In this situation, any faction
within the province which carried out an appropriate and determined policy could become
the new ruler of the entire province.
The rise of Li Zongren in Guangxi in the early 1920s depended to a great extent on
the unity of the young Guangxi army officers who graduated from military schools. This
unity led to the formation of what is commonly known as the Guangxi Clique, though its
members did not use that name, regarding it as an insulting term, which is the sense in
which it was used to refer to them by outsiders, particularly those rivals of the Guangxi
group, from about 1927. The turmoil in Guangxi after 1921 created a great chance for the
rapid rise of young army officers. By establishing his sphere of influence in Yulin and
pursuing a firm policy of “uniting graduates of military schools to strengthen his own
force”,73 Li soon built up his power base. Guangxi’s graduates of the military schools,
such as Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi and Huang Xuchu, together with some ambitious
military graduates from other provinces, such as Hu Zongduo and Tao Jun, natives of
Hubei province, all joined his troops. When Li made himself Commander-in-Chief of the
Guangxi 2nd Route Self-Governing Army (zizhijun) in 1922, for example, his subordinates

70
Li Jiaxian, “Zizhijun zhanling Nanning he Guangxi de jumian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, p.
154.
71
For details of the internal struggles of the two regimes in the North and South, see
Andrew J. Nathan, Beijing Politics: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism,
1918-1923, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974; and Mo Shixiang, Hufa
yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992.
72
For details of the hostility between Guangdong and Guangxi and the wars between the
two provinces, see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo, Guangzhou, 1921; and
Mo Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992.
73
Yin Chenggang, “Jingguo”, p. 130.

55
(above the rank of major) were nearly all these graduates. Even when his troops were
reorganized as the 7th Army of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) early in 1926,
thirty-two high-ranking officers of the army were of the same background.74 With his
successful political, military and financial practices in Yulin,75 Li expanded his troops to
number about 10,000 by early 1924, and extended his sphere of influence into Wuzhou and
Xunzhou (Guiping) - the other rich areas in the West River Valley of Guangxi. With his
highly qualified officers and well trained soldiers, Li was able to keep his own areas free of
turmoil, and he managed to maintain social stability in these areas during Guangxi's
chaos.76
Li's actions after 1921 made him a regional militarist. However, like many other
well-trained soldiers, neither he nor his colleagues were satisfied with the role they played.
They desired also to pursue a political objective and be motivated by political ideals. An
important decision was made to join the Guangzhou government under the leadership of
Sun Yatsen in 1923. Apart from geographic and cultural connections between the two
provinces of Guangxi and Guangdong, two factors were crucial. First, after the
establishment of his sphere of influence in Yulin and Wuzhou areas, Li and his colleagues
had an ambition to reunify Guangxi. To reach this goal, outside military and political
support was necessary. At the same time, the Guangzhou government was also seeking a
pro-Guangzhou force from Guangxi to free western Guangdong from the threat of other
military groups such as Shen Hongying and Tang Jiyao, two major militarists in Guangxi
and Yunnan who had attempted to take over Guangzhou. If they accepted the leadership of
Guangzhou, Li and his colleagues would in turn receive material support to complete the
reunification of Guangxi and then to work towards transforming the province.77

74
Materials from the memoirs and reminiscences of Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai
Chongxi, Yin Chenggang and other senior members of the Guangxi Clique. See Appendix
1.1 and Appendix 1.2.
75
For details of these practices, see Wen Guan, “Guangxi geju xia zhi caizheng
zhuangkuang”, NLZB, No. 40 (4 February 1923); Yin Chenggang, “Jingguo”, pp. 125-30;
and Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10, pp. 1-50.
76
Yin Chenggang, “Jingguo”, pp. 129-30; and Wen Gongzhi, Zuijin sanshi nian
Zhongguo junshi shi, reprinted Taipei, 1962, Vol. 1, p. 345.
77
Yang Yitang, Deng Yanda, Guangzhou: GDRMCBS, 1986, pp. 5-6. Also see Li
Jiezhi, “Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 14,
pp. 33-43.

56
Meanwhile, Guangxi public opinion expressed the view that "the figures with the
revolutionary spirit who were trusted by the [Guangzhou] Revolutionary Government
would rise to rule the province".78 Li and his group were thus in the right place at the right
time. This is because this group was a new force with revolutionary ideas,79 and also
because it was regarded as a force that could be trusted by both the Guangxi people and the
Guangzhou government too.80
Secondly, Sun Yatsen and his colleagues had earned a reputation in their struggle to
overthrow the Qing Dynasty and to promote the Republic in the past decades. Sun’s ideal,
which was expressed in his “Three Principles of the People” (sanmin zhuyi), also met the
needs of the current political climate which sought to enrich the state and strengthen the
military (fuguo qiangbing). This also affected the ideology and actions of many Chinese,
including these young army officers. As he needed wide support during the Guangzhou
Military Revolutionary Government in the early 1920s, Sun Yatsen opened the door of his
party (i.e. the Guomindang) to anyone and any faction promising this, whether that support
was substantial or just lip service. Joining the Guangzhou Military Revolutionary
Government would not only meet the ideal Li Zongren and his group pursued, but also
allow them to have a role in the party under Sun Yatsen, which might well have control
over the whole country in the future. Furthermore, Sun had future plans to launch the
Northern Expedition to reunify China under his leadership. Although at this time his
military strength was too weak to control the whole of Guangdong, Sun's ideas and
revolutionary banner would be useful weapons for Li and his colleagues to use in their own
plans to reunify Guangxi. Moreover, the Guangzhou government on its own initiative tried
to build a close cooperative relationship with the new and rising Guangxi Clique.81 In these
circumstances, Li Zongren and Huang Shaohong, another leader of the Guangxi group,

78
Qunyan (Your Say), Vol. 4, No. 1 (1925).
79
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, pp. 95-102; Huang
Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 56-7; and Huang Xuchu,
“Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, Nos. 170-173 (hereafter as “BGYWL”).
80
Yang Yitang, Deng Yanda, pp. 5-7; and Qunyan, Vol. 4, No. 1.
81
Li’s relations with the Guangzhou government (or Guangdong province) will be
discussed in Chapter Five.

57
joined the Guangzhou government first and then the Guomindang (GMD), the Chinese
Nationalist Party reorganized by Sun in 1924.82
In the summer of 1924, Li and Huang dispatched their troops - “dinggui jun” and
“taozei jun” - separately from Yulin and Wuzhou to attack Nanning, capital of Guangxi.
They soon defeated the remnants of Lu Rongting, who then had 20,000 troops and
controlled south and west Guangxi, and captured Nanning in July. This victory led to the
formation of the Guangxi Pacification and Bandit Suppression Joint Army (dinggui taozei
lianjun), with Li as Commander-in-Chief and Huang as Deputy Commander-in-Chief in the
same month,83 marking the official establishment of the Guangxi Clique. Sun Yatsen on
behalf of the Guangzhou Military Revolutionary Government appointed Li Commissioner
of the Guangxi Provincial Pacification Office (Guangxi quansheng shuijinchu duban) and
Huang Deputy Commissioner (huiban) on 24 November 1924, which officially confirmed
the two men’s leadership in the Clique. By the end of the year, the Guangxi Clique had
expanded its strength to over 20,000 men. However, the north and northeast areas of
Guangxi were still under the control of Shen Hongying, the biggest militarist of the
province who had an army of 30,000. To reunify the whole province, the Clique launched
a campaign and wiped out Shen’s troops in the first half of 1925.84 At the same time, the
Clique also annihilated the invasion force of Tang Jiyao, the biggest Yunnan-based
militarist in southwest China. An opportunity came for Tang when Sun Yatsen was
critically ill in Beijing at the end of 1924. Tang attempted to take over the Guangzhou
government to replace the leadership of Sun.85 To clear a way for occupation of

82
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 79-80. According to a report, Li Zongren “had
decided to ally with Guangdong and he had sent a delegation to Guangzhou for discussion”.
See Shenbao, 17/10/1923. This indicates that Li's statement about his contact with Li
Jishen at the end of 1923 is reliable. See Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of
Li Tsung-jen, p. 104.
83
For details of the reunification of Guangxi by Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique, see
memoirs of Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Xu Qiming, Huang Xuchu, Zhang
Renmin and other members of the Clique in the Bibliography of this thesis. Also see
GXWSZLXJ, No. 29.
84
Yu Shixi, “Xin Guixi xiaomie Shen Hongying jituan jingguo”, GXWSZL, No. 29, pp.
119-24. Yu was then a subordinate commander of Shen Hongying.
85
Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, pp. 86-8; XDZB, No. 107 (1925), p. 898;
Shenbao, March 24, 1925. Sun Yatsen died in Beijing on March 12, 1925.

58
Guangdong, Tang attacked Guangxi with a crack force of 60,000, but his powerful troops
were fiercely resisted and finally defeated by the Clique in July 1925.86 The victory over
both Shen and Tang brought an end to Guangxi's chaos which had existed since 1921 and
signalled the arrival of a powerful new force under the Nationalist government which was
just established in Guangzhou in the same month.
The rise of the Clique and the reunification of Guangxi were of great significance to
the political development of both the province and its neighbour - Guangdong. It helped
consolidate the Guangzhou government87 and supported the complete reunification of the
Guangdong province in the fall of 1925.88 However, it should be pointed out that, in
dealing with the reunification of Guangdong, many contemporary Chinese historians have
neglected the support and help from the Clique, and have usually attributed the event to the
contribution of the Huangpu Military Academy (Huangpu junxiao) under the leadership of
Jiang Jieshi and of the other forces in Guangdong, such as the united front between the
Nationalists and Communists.89 In fact, Guangdong was not successfully reunified until

86
For details of the campaign, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li
Tsung-Jen, pp. 112-3; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 94-104; Bai Chongxi, Bai
Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1984, pp. 29-32; Zhang Renmin,
Huiyi lu, Hong Kong: printed by the author, 1988, pp. 43-9; and Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi
yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 103 (16 October 1961), pp. 2-5
(hereafter as “Guangxi”).
87
The Clique’s extermination campaigns against Shen Hongying and Tang Jiyao, in the
first half of 1925, enabled the Guangzhou government to launch the Eastern Expedition
(dongzheng) against Chen Jiongming, a former subordinate of Sun Yatsen and a
Guangdong militarist, in Dong (East) River Valley of Guangdong, and to suppress
separately the troops under Liu Zhenhuan and Yang Ximin who were affiliated to the
Guangzhou government and were thought to be scheming to take over Guangzhou in the
same period. At the same time, Shen and Tang attempted to take over Guangzhou. The
Clique resisted Tang's offensives and eliminated Shen’s influence. This ensured the
consolidation of the Guangzhou government, and then the establishment of the Nationalist
Government in Guangzhou in July 1925. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.),
Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Nanjing: JSGJCBS, 1986, Vol. 4, pp. 887-
912. Hereafter as Huibian.
88
For the contribution of the Guangxi Clique to the reunification of Guangdong in detail,
see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, pp. 124-6; Huang
Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 107; Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 103, pp. 2-5; Bai
Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, p. 32; and Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, pp. 51-
2.
89
See, for example, Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, Taipei: Xueshu zhuzuo
jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966; Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong

59
the formation of the Guangxi Clique and the subsequent reunification of the province.
When the Nationalist government was set up in Guangzhou in July 1925, Guangxi was the
first province to come under its administration and to offer powerful support to reunify
Guangdong. The military and organizational skills of the Guangxi Clique were clearly
sought after by that body.90 The Clique also became one of the main forces behind the
Northern Expedition, playing a very important role in the military dimensions of the
Expedition.

Heading for the Northern Expedition

China was fragmented in the 1920s. Two national governments existed at the same
time, each demanding the loyalty of politicians, militarists and the common people.
Meanwhile, the imperialist powers, particularly Japan, speeded up their steps to exploit
China and conquer the Chinese people by taking advantage of China’s internal turmoil.
Hence, territorial reunification, i.e. the establishment of a united Chinese national
government and political unity of the country became an urgent need of the time. For the
Guangzhou government, the Northern Expedition to reunify the nation under the leadership
of the GMD was a firm policy, a goal Sun Yatsen had dreamed of since the Constitution
Protection Movement. Even members of the Beijing government such as Duan Qirui
wanted to reunify China by force. A war to reunify the country to create one national
government would naturally also provide opportunities for those militarists with advanced
military training and great ambitions to pursue their careers and serve the country at the
same times. When Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique decided to come under the
Guangzhou government, they became involved in the Northern Expedition, motivated by
several factors.

chubanshe, 1977; and Zhang Xianwen (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shigang, Zhengzhou:
HNRMCBS, 1985.
90
On 6 August 1925, the Nationalist government placed Li and Huang in charge of
Guangxi’s military and political affairs. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, Huibian, p.
908.

60
 First, Guangxi was completely unified under the Nationalist government in early
1926.91 Although the Clique showed a strong regionalist feeling before 1925, as many
other militarists did at that time,92 this unification indicated that Li and his group had
already shifted their focus to beyond the province. They had an strong desire to participate
in national political and military affairs. Li and his colleagues supported the aim of the
Northern Expedition to reunify China, which, if successful, would give them an opportunity
to serve the national government.93
Secondly, as every member of the Clique was aware, Guangxi was the birthplace of
the Taiping Rebellion. Taiping heroism and military achievements had inspired the
younger generations of the province to strive for a higher political and military goal.94
Since its foundation, the Clique considered itself to be the successor of the so-called Hong-
Yang (Taiping) Revolution. For them, the Northern Expedition was the continuation of the
Taiping.95 They were uneasy about the fact that, although Guangxi was now part of the
Nationalist government, it was belittled and discriminated against by some major factions

91
For details of the process by which Guangxi was completely unified under the
Nationalist Government in politics, military, and finance, see Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi
xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 33-6; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 117-21; Te-kong
Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 138-42; and Zhongguo dier lishi
dangan guan, Huibian, pp. 910-2.
92
Before the reunification of Guangxi, for example, Li and Huang had implied a strong
regionalist colour with the chosen title of their troops, “Guangxi Pacification and Bandit
Suppression Army”, even though the appointment from the Nationalist government in 1925
placed them in charge of military and political affairs of the province only. It was, on the
one hand, a common process towards national affairs when regionalists were just rising to
power in their provinces. On the other hand, this showed an attempt by the Nationalist
government to secure power in the Centre and to limit the interests and power of the
regions. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, Huibian, pp. 906-8; and Diana Lary, Region
and Nation, pp. 43-63.
93
Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, p. 54; and Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu,
p. 34.
94
In their memoirs, leaders of Guangxi always claim the impact of the Taiping on their
actions. See, for example, Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen,
p. 3; and Xu Qiming, Xu Qiming xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 1-2.
95
See Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, compiled and published by the Department of
General Political Training of the 4th Group Army, Nanning, 1936.

61
of the GMD, especially in terms of the army reorganization and financial support.96 The
Clique attempted to promote its position in both the GMD and the rest of the nation
through its performance in the Northern Expedition.97
Thirdly, there was a more pragmatic consideration. During the reunification of the
province, the Clique’s strength expanded rapidly. Its forces had grown to about 40,000
men by 1925. Li and other leaders of the Clique were concerned with maintaining the
internal unity they had achieved in their group. By joining the Expedition, Li could provide
opportunities for members of his group not only to get promotions but also to keep the
morale and fighting capacity of the troops at a high level, to maintain the internal cohesion
of his group and to enable the Clique to play its role in the achievement of the Nationalist
government as well.98
These factors drove Li and the Clique to play an important role in promoting the
Expedition. Li advocated an immediate launching. He first persuaded Tang Shengzhi, a
powerful militarist and Commander of the 4th Division of the Hunan Army stationed at
south Hunan, to join the Nationalist government. An ambitious man, Tang had good
relations with Wu Peifu, a bigger militarist in central and north China with an ambition to
reunify the country by force. He also wanted to get support from the Clique.99 Li and the
Guangxi leaders had kept close connections with Tang and his subordinates through

96
For example, in early 1926, leaders of the Nationalist government urgently needed
large numbers of troops, and they were rapidly expanding their own troops also, for the
coming Expedition. However, they limited the army reorganization of the Guangxi Clique
to one army (jun) only, even though the military strength of the Clique, with 40,000 men,
was enough to be reorganized into two armies. At the same time, these leaders of the
Nationalist Government offered the title of the army (jun) to other militarists who had a
small number of troops and even allowed them to expand their troops from a division (shi)
into an army. Financially, they used large amounts of money to buy over the militarists
who were then loyal to the Beiyang Government and to pay the salaries of their own
armies, but left the Clique to resolve its own financial problems in armament expenditures.
See Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, pp. 487-8; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi,
pp. 118-21; Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, p. 52; Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen
jilu, p. 34; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, Huibian, pp. 1048-1051.
97
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi yu liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, pp. 74-80 (hereafter as “The Clique”).
98
See Yin Chenggang, “Diqijun tiqian ru-Xiang jiqi zai beifa zhong de jige zhongda
zhanyi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3 (hereafter as “7th Army”), p. 1.
99
Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, pp. 51-4; and Shenbao, 7 February 1926.

62
General Ye Qi, a Brigadier of the Hunan army and a native of Guangxi as well as a
graduate of both GMES and BMA.100 During the winter of 1925-26, Ye visited his home
province as Tang’s representative. Li initiated a move to cooperate with Tang,101 thus
causing the split between Tang and Wu and having Tang on the side of the Clique and the
Guangzhou Government. This action freed Guangxi from the direct threat of Wu’s
102
influence. On the one hand, it also created for the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou
favourable conditions to launch the Expedition, for Tang’s actions brought about the
downfall of Zhao Hengti (governor of the Hunan Province and a supporter of Wu Peifu) in
the province in the spring of 1926; and, on the other, it weakened Wu’s influence in Hunan
to some extent.
When Tang conspired to expel Zhao from Hunan and prepared to join Guangzhou
early in 1926, Li promised to reinforce him by sending troops to Hunan.103 In March 1926
Tang successfully compelled Zhao to retire by force and soon occupied Changsha, capital
of Hunan. Wu Peifu launched an offensive against Tang and forced the latter to withdraw
to south Hunan. Li immediately sent a brigade of troops to Hunan in late April as Tang
requested before the action of the latter in Hunan, which was one month earlier than that of
the 4th Army of the NRA from Guangdong, followed by the entire 7th Army under his own
command. This action saved Tang from the verge of defeat.104 Meanwhile, Li also sent an
emergency telegram to Guangzhou reporting the latest developments in Hunan and the
Clique’s military reactions, which he intended to present to the Expedition as an

100
Shenbao, 7 February 1926; and Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li
Tsung-jen, p. 133.
101
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 133-8; and Zhang
Renmin, Huiyi lu, pp. 51-5.
102
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 133-6.
103
Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 796-8; and Te-kong Tang and
Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 143-4.
104
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 145-6; and Yin
Chenggang, “7th Army”, pp. 3-4.

63
accomplished fact.105 The contribution of Li and the Clique to the launching of the
Expedition at the right moment should therefore be fully recognized.106
Furthermore, after the mobilization of the Guangxi armies to reinforce Tang’s
action in Hunan, Li went to Guangzhou personally for a discussion of the Northern
Expedition with Nationalist leaders. Li’s stay in Guangzhou from May 10 to June 18 to a
considerable extent promoted the launching of the Expedition. According to the media
reports, “after Li’s arrival at Guangzhou, the appeal of the Northern Expedition or for
moving troops into Hunan to reinforce Tang (Shengzhi) and to send a punitive expedition
against Wu (Peifu) suddenly ran high”.107 Meanwhile, some Guangzhou leaders, such as
Tan Yankai and Cheng Qian, who were not prepared to send reinforcements to Tang
because of their previous resentment with the latter, did not change their mind until Li's
arrival and his discussions with them.108 Thus, the GMD Central Military Affairs
Committee (CMAC) authorized on May 29 the appropriation of a sum for armament
expenditures for the Guangxi army to finance the dispatch of their reinforcements to
Hunan.109 The GMD Centre adopted formally the motion of dispatching troops for the

105
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 144-5; and Huang
Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 104 (01/11/1961), p. 5.
106
In his telegram to the Central Military Affairs Committee of the Nationalist
Government on June 3, 1926, Tang Shengzhi praised the fact that “the great battle against
the army under Ye (Kaixin) had been fiercely fought for over three days since starting on 29
May”, “in which Zhong (Zupei) Brigade of the 7th Army participated. Zhong Brigade’s
officers and soldiers all were very brave, and made great contribution to the victory over
Ye’s army. According to this fact, I would like to ask the Government to cite them for their
meritorious service”. See Shenbao, June 15, 1926. The same newspaper also made a
comment on 12 June 1926 that the Guangxi Army’s advanced force “was quite efficient in
reinforcing Tang (Shengzhi) in Hunan”. This indicates the foresight and determination as
well as courage of the Guangxi Clique before the official launching of the Northern
Expedition.
107
Guangzhou minguo ribao, May 13, 1926.
108
Shenbao, May 25, 1926.
109
Mao Sicheng, Minguo shiwu nian yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, Shanghai, 1936;
reprinted by Longmen shudian, Hong Kong, 1965, Vol. 15. p. 76. This is the only record I
know of that the Guangxi Clique received financial assistance from the Nationalist
Government before the establishment of the Wuhan regime early in 1927.

64
Northern Expedition on 4 June.110 Even more crucially, Li also played an important role in
supporting the appointment of Jiang Jieshi as Commander-in-Chief of the NRA for the
Expedition at the Central Military Affairs Committee meeting held on the same day.111
The above actions reflected an urgent desire of Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique
to participate in national affairs. Li and his troops, the famous 7th Army, a powerful main
force of the NRA, participated in all significant campaigns in the Northern Expedition.
With its strong fighting capability, the 7th Army won titles of “feijun” (the flying army) and
“gangjun” (the steel army).112 Following the expansion of military strength and the
promotion of reputation, Li became more and more involved in the internal struggle of the
GMD, particularly with Jiang Jieshi, and played a more important role in both the GMD
and the Nationalist government. However, Li’s strength in the central government did not
last long after the accomplishment of the Expedition. Soon after the capture of Beijing in
June 1928 Li was under the pressure of the Jiang group from many sides. Even in the
summer of the year, rumours of a civil war fermenting in the middle Yangzi River Valley
swept over the country, in which it was suggested that Li’s troops, its main forces then
concentrating in Hubei, were in preparation for a war against Jiang’s troops in both Anhui
and Jiangsu provinces.113 Although the rumours proved to be without foundation, the tense
relationship between Li and Jiang never relaxed after that. Along with a series of debates
on the nation’s reconstruction and troop disbandment within the GMD, Li and the Clique
became the major target which Jiang intended to eliminate. In March 1929 the conflict
between Li and Jiang broke out into an internal war within the GMD, i.e. the so-called

110
Archives of the Central Executive Committee of GMD, in The Second Historical
Archives of China, Nanjing. Also see Zhang Xianwen (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shigang, p.
256.
111
Shenbao, June 18, 1926.
112
For details of the performance of the 7th Army in the Northern Expedition, see Wen
Gongzhi, Zuijin sanshi nian zhongguo junshi shi, reprinted Taipei, 1962, Vol. 2; and
Shanghai minguo ribao (Shanghai Republican Daily), 13/6/1928. Also see Hu Puyu (ed.),
Beifa zhanshi, Taipei: Congwu chubanshe, 1974; and Luo Jialun (ed.), Geming wenxian,
Taipei, 1953-, Vol. 16 (hereafter as GMWX).
113
Guo Tingyi (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shishi rizhi, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1979, Vol.
2. p. 380 (hereafter as ZHMGSSRZ).

65
Jiang-Gui War,114 followed by a series of civil wars throughout the country during the next
two years, in which nearly all factions of the GMD were involved.115 As a result of the
war, the Clique was soon defeated by Jiang in central China and was forced to return to its
base in Guangxi, and to become a rival to Jiang for many years thereafter.

Reasons for the Clique’s Conflict with Jiang and Its Return to Guangxi

Although the Guangxi Clique was credited with outstanding achievements in the
Northern Expedition, it was accused of aiming at territorial expansion. Was one of the
Clique’s aims in joining the Expedition to control a much larger region, or was it “a desire
for the expansion of the Kwangsi empire”?116 Judging from the complicated political
situation in the Expedition, the image of the Clique as a territorial expansionist to a great
extent seems to be a product of the widespread propaganda of its political opponents.
However, the Clique did have legitimate differences, in policies of national reconstruction
and in response to imperialist aggression, with other factions, particularly the Jiang group.
These have usually been ignored by previous studies. To respond to the issue of
expansionist ambition, it is necessary to discuss the background at the time.
Li Zongren’s return to Guangxi after the Expedition was in fact the outcome of the
GMD’s internal struggle for power. Because of their short history in the GMD, Li and his
colleagues were at a political disadvantage in this struggle in comparison with those long-
term GMD members originating from the Guangzhou government. The Clique had some
difficulties to claim power in both the party and government though it had shown its
military strength during the reunification of both Guangxi and Guangdong. In a sense, the
Northern Expedition was a process of the distribution of power and territorial interests
among the GMD factions in the party and later in the country along with the continuing

114
Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), Zhonghua minguo shi shiliao changbian,
Nanjing: The Nanjing University Press, 1993, Vol. 27 (hereafter as ZHMGSSLCB). Also
see Archives of War History Compiled Committee, the Nationalist Government. The
Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing.
115
For details of civil wars in 1929-30, see Zhang Tongxin, Guomindang xin junfa
hunzhan shilue, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1981; Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.),
ZHMGSSLCB, Vols. 28-30; and Jiang Kefu, Minguo junshi shi luegao, Beijing: ZHSJ,
1991, Vol. 2. pp. 1-63.
116
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 64, and pp. 115-28, specifically p. 121.

66
victories of the campaign against the militarists who were loyal to the Beijing government.
The principal competitors for power within the GMD were the factions under the
leaderships of Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and Jiang Jieshi respectively before the
Expedition, while the Guangxi Clique, having recently joined the GMD, had none of its
leaders holding a significant position in the GMD and its government until a year after the
launching of the Expedition. After this, Li and the Clique were rapidly promoted to the
GMD’s top leadership and played an important role in both the Party and the Government,
simply because of their military accomplishments in the campaign. However, the GMD
was a group which emphasized its members’ qualifications and record of service in the
party. In the eyes of some GMD leaders, particularly that of Jiang Jieshi, the Guangxi
Clique was only an opportunist group to be exploited by more experienced politicians.117
In other words, Jiang was convinced that the Clique joined the Expedition in an obvious
attempt to seize the top leadership of the GMD and its government by force.118 In Jiang’s
view, anyone who opposed him was considered to be acting against the best interests of the
nation.119 During the confrontation between Wuhan and Nanjing regimes under Wang
Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi separately in the second half of 1926 and the first half of 1927, the
Guangxi Clique played a strong role as a mediator to bring the two regimes together.120
The problem was that the Clique’s independent actions hurt the interests of both Wang and

117
Jiang zongtong yanlun bubian (Supplement of President Jiang’s Speeches and
Writings), 10:50 (quoted in J. K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983, Vol. 12, pp. 133-4).
118
See Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), ZHMGSSLCB, Vols. 29-30; GMWX,
Vols. 17-18. Also see Jiang Jieshi’s speech, in Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Xian zongtong
Jianggong quanji, Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua daxue zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1984, pp. 577-
80. And see “Taofa Guixi xuanchuan dagang”, 1929 and “Taofa Guixi junfa wengao”,
1929, Archives of the Editorial Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government,
Nanjing.
119
Zheng Houan (et al) trans, Zhongguo dageming Wuhan shiqi jianwen lu, Beijing:
ZGSHKXCBS, 1985, p. 90.
120
For details of the roles of Li Zongren and other Guangxi leaders in acting as mediator
between Wuhan and Nanjing, see Zou Lu, Huigu lu, Chongqing, 1943, pp. 199-214; Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 1979, Chapter 8;
Guangzhou pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou: Pingshe,
1928; and GWZB, Vol. 4, from July to September 1927.

67
Jiang, and frightened both.121 Wang instigated a debate on “Party Legitimism or
Orthodoxy” (dangtong) to arouse the fears of other factions against the Clique, which was
supposed to have controlled the Nanjing Government, i.e. the so-called Nanjing Special
Committee (NSC), after the Wuhan regime was merged into the Nationalist Government at
Nanjing in September 1927.122 In order to return to the top leadership of both the party and
the government, Jiang created obstacles to the NSC in many ways to embarrass that body,
on the one hand,123 and used large amounts of money to bribe the Clique’s rivals to oppose
it and to split that group, on the other.124 By these means Jiang successfully isolated the
Guangxi leaders as a prelude to the outbreak of the Jiang-Gui War in 1929.
Moreover, Wang Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi joined forces to destroy the Guangxi
Clique’s influence even though at the time both were locked in a bitter struggle against each
other for the GMD leadership. From the moment of their promotion to the GMD
leadership the Clique was under hostile pressure from the left and right wing Nationalists
because of its supposed direct threat to their positions in the GMD. There is evidence that
Wang and Jiang joined together to subvert the efforts of the Clique in both the “Zhang-
Huang Incident” in November 1927 and the Western Expedition (xizheng) which occurred
in the autumn of the same year by using money and their personal potential influence

121
As a compromise, Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei retired before and after the
combination of the two regimes in August and September 1927. For details of the
retirement of Jiang and Wang before and after the combination of Wuhan and Nanjing, and
conjectures of the Clique’s compelling Jiang to retire, see GWZB, August to October 1927;
and Mi Xi, “Wo zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian de shihou”, Zhejiang wenshi ziliao, No. 23
(1985), pp. 1-41.
122
For details see Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, pp. 141-73; Guangzhou Pingshe,
Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928; and Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao
qingdang, pp. 756-806.
123
For example, when Jiang left Nanjing for his retirement in August 1927, he brought all
moneys, which were provided for military expenditures of the NRA, with him. On the
other hand, he engineered incidents in Nanjing to excuse attacks on the NSC. See GWZB,
Vol. 4, No. 33; and Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai:
SHRMCBS, 1992, pp. 29-32.
124
Liu Xing, “Huiyi guomin gemingjun dibajun”, HNWSZLXJ, No. 6, pp. 92-97; Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Chapter six; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, “1927 nian Jiang
Jieshi deng lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan”, LSDA, No. 1, 1984.

68
among both the party and the troops.125 Even before the 3rd GMD National Congress was
held in Nanjing in March 1929, Wang, assisting Jiang, colluded with Tang Shengzhi, who
retired after he was defeated by the Clique in the Western Expedition, and Yu Zuobai, a
Guangxi general who aspired to leadership of the Clique, and finally engineered a large-
scale defection of Li’s troops both in Hebei province under Bai Chongxi, and those in
Hubei province under the command of Generals Hu Zongduo and Xia Wei, two of Li’s
senior subordinates.126 The result was that the hard fighting Guangxi troops were impotent
to defend themselves when Jiang suddenly launched a campaign against them with both
military action and large amounts of money in March and April 1929.
The GMD’s propaganda (mass media) organs, including the Propaganda (Public
Affairs) Department of the GMD Central Committee and its branches, newspapers and
periodicals, were overwhelmingly controlled by either the Wang or Jiang groups. This
proved to be an extremely powerful weapon in action against other factions within the
GMD. For example, the Western Hill Clique, the key member of the NSC, was forced to
resign from Nanjing under the propaganda attack of the Jiang and Wang groups.127 In
dealing with the Guangxi Clique, Jiang and Wang employed the term “xin Guixi” (the New
Guangxi Clique) to attack. The term “xin Guixi” meant that the Clique was constantly
described as the remnant of the “jiu Guixi” (the old Guangxi Clique) under Lu Rongting.
Because Lu’s group occupied Guangdong and was the rival of Sun Yatsen in the
Constitution Protection Movement, the term “Guixi” labelled Lu both as a regionalist who
intended to expand territory beyond Guangxi and as a leader in opposition to Sun. In the
views of the GMD, and in the popular belief, anyone who opposed Sun was thereby a
counter-revolutionary, and a warlord if he controlled troops at the same time.128 Such an

125
Ibid. Also see Tang Shengzhi, “Guanyu beifa qianhou jijianshi de huiyi”,
HNWSZLXJ, No. 6, pp. 108-10.
126
For details of the defection of the Guangxi Clique’s troops in both Hebei and Hubei
provinces, see LSDA, No. 2, 1984; HBWSZLXJ, No. 18; WHWSZLXJ, No. 11; and Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, chapter six.
127
For details see Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, pp. 29-31; Zou Lu,
Huigu lu, pp. 198-214; and Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi,
1928.
128
For details of Lu Rongting’s struggle with Sun Yatsen, see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue
zhi youlai jiqi jingguo; and Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan.

69
attack by ideological propaganda had already created an unfavourable image for the Clique
in its struggle with Jiang and Wang.
As a result of this propaganda the Clique was widely seen to be expansionist, and a
target to be attacked by many factions.129 This view is also shared by Western and Chinese
scholars in their studies of contemporary Guangxi. The widespread assumption that the
Clique was primarily occupied with territorial expansion was based on the fact that after the
Northern Expedition Li Zongren controlled Hunan and Hubei, while Bai Chongxi, another
leader of the Clique, was stationed at Hebei after 1928, and Huang Shaohong governed
Guangxi, their base. Li Jishen, leader of Guangdong and a native of Guangxi as well, was
also included in this Guangxi group.130 In fact, Li Zongren’s troops had not stayed in
Hunan except while participating in the campaign in the province. Li Jishen was not a
leader of the Clique but a supporter.131 The Guangxi troops (i.e. the 15th Army, which was
reorganized by the rest of the 7th Army in 1927 which did not participate in the Expedition
and was stationed at the province as the garrison force of Guangxi) had not been retained in
strength at Guangdong except when Li Jishen ordered them to reinforce the province
against the threat of the ally of Generals Ye Ting and He Long, military leaders of the
Communists in the Nanchang Uprising in the autumn of 1927. After this they only
obtained financial support from Li Jishen in return. As Guangxi was under the rule of the
Guangzhou Branch of the GMD Central Political Conference during the Northern
Expedition, the order from Li Jishen, Chairman of the Branch, was reasonable and
understandable since he could not gain any assistance and support from any other provinces
and factions except the Clique, a military and political group from his native province.
Bai’s stay in Hebei was in response to an order by Jiang Jieshi. With the completion of the

129
See “Taofa Guixi xuanchuan dagang”, 1929, The Second Historical Archives of
China, Nanjing.
130
For example, Zhang Xianwen (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shigang, p. 341; J. K. Fairbank,
The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, p. 125; Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 117;
and Guo Tingyi, Jindai zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press,
1982, p. 595.
131
Huang Shaohong repeatedly emphasizes that Li Jishen was not member of the New
Guangxi Clique. See Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52 (1964), p.
1.

70
last battle of the Expedition, Bai asked Jiang for permission to return to south China,132 but
was refused, presumably because Jiang had already resolved to wipe out the Clique by
military and financial blockades.133
The focus was on the occupation of Hubei. It is true that Li Zongren occupied
Hubei late in 1927, but this action occurred after the NSC decided to launch the Western
Expedition against Tang Shengzhi, a powerful militarist supporter of the former Wuhan
regime. Some were of the view that the Guangxi Clique as a powerful key member of the
NSC could use that body to reach its goal of acquiring more territories. Those who held
that view must explain why Li and the Clique gave up the rich lower Yangzi River Valley,
mainly Jiangsu, in which annual tax incomes were higher than other provinces, and
Shanghai, the financial and commercial centre of China - just to take the province of Hubei.
Guangxi troops were stationed right around Nanjing, capital of the Nationalist government,
and in Shanghai, both of which Tang Shengzhi attempted to take over before the Western
Expedition.134 To be leader of the Nationalists, to control the capital of the Nationalist
government and Shanghai with a powerful force should have been the ideal opportunity the
Clique sought, yet these prizes were all foregone after the cooperation of both the Wuhan
and Nanjing regimes. The prizes must have been tempting, because Wang and Jiang, the
two rival leaders of the Nationalists, were absent from the GMD leadership at that time.
Jiang’s safe return to the leadership of the GMD and the NRA at the end of 1927 and in the
early 1928 also relied on the loyalty of the troops which were stationed around the above
region by taking over the position which the Clique left after the Western Expedition.135 If
we ignore this obvious demonstration of honest purpose on the part of the Clique, the only

132
See GMWX, Vol. 18; and Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan, Hong Kong: Nanyue
chubanshe, 1989, p. 116.
133
Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, pp. 182-4.
134
Zheng Houan et al (trans.), Zhongguo dageming Wuhan shiqi jianwen lu, p. 111. In
1926, the annual incomes of the provinces the Nationalist Revolutionary Army’s
occupation were as follows: Guangdong, 100,000,000 yuan (Chinese dollars) approx;
Guangxi, 11,000,000 yuan; Jiangxi, 18,000,000 yuan; Hunan, 12,000,000 yuan; Hubei,
24,000,000 yuan; Jiangsu, 4-60,000,000 yuan; Zhejiang, 30,000,000 yuan approx; and
Fujian, 12,000,000 yuan. Also see Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 129.
135
After the Western Expedition (xizheng), Nanjing was garrisoned by the troops under
He Yingqin’s direct control. See Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), ZHMGSSLCB,
Vol. 25.

71
explanation is that the Clique was too stupid to exploit the advantage they held at the time.
Such a conclusion is fallacious. It must therefore be concluded that the ambition of the
Clique was to achieve a more important political role in both the GMD and the Nationalist
government, but not to occupy more territory.
In addition, it may be said that the Western Expedition and the occupation of Hubei
by Li Zongren’s troops reflected the plans of the Guangxi Clique for territorial expansion.
However, there is no evidence that the decision to launch the Western Expedition was
made under pressure from the Clique only. Even according to memoirs of relevant persons
in opposition to the Clique at that time, the Western Expedition was actually initiated by
Tan Yankai and Cheng Qian, both natives of Hunan and former leaders of the Wuhan
regime. In fact, when Wuhan leaders decided to cooperate with Nanjing in late August,
Tan and other leaders had already conspired to launch a campaign against Tang Shengzhi
as the latter wanted to control not only Wuhan but also Nanjing.136 Cheng Qian was also
more determined than others to destroy Tang’s strength because of the former’s attempt to
return to Hunan with himself as provincial ruler.137 In the light of the above factors, even
Li Yunhan, an expert on GMD history, has also pointed out that the most important reason
for the NSC to launch the campaign against Tang was the ambition of the latter to take over
Nanjing and his collusion with Sun Chuanfang, Commander in Chief of ally of five
provinces (wusheng lianjun zongsiling), the most dangerous enemy directly threatening the
safety of Nanjing at that time.138 It seems that the so-called territorial expansion plans of
the Clique for the Western Expedition were to a great extent the result of intense
propaganda by its political rivals during the internal conflict of the GMD in an attempt to
discredit Li’s influence and reputation and that of his fellow Clique members in both the
Nanjing government and the GMD centre. Therefore, the territorial expansion of the
Clique in the Northern Expedition was at least exaggerated.

136
Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 157; T’ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese
Revolution, London, 1930, p. 307; Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, p. 779; and
Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei: Zhongwai tushu gongsi, 1975, p. 97.
137
Tang Shengzhi, “Guanyu beifa qianhou jijianshi de huiyi”, p. 108; Liu Xing, “Huiyi
guomin gemingjun dibajun”, p. 95; Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, p. 97; and Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 140.
138
Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, pp. 778-9.

72
 The problem was complicated by the stationing of Guangxi troops at Hubei, a
product of the Western Expedition, because the Guangxi Clique’s strength was expanded at
this time. More important was the fact that Li Zongren supported the demand of “Hubei for
the Hubei people”. The demand by provincial people for a share in the affairs of their
native province was not uncommon throughout China at that time. In general, except when
the region on the Asian frontier attempted to separate from China, this emotion did not hurt
nationalism but stressed the native people's newly aroused political interest and reflected
the struggle for power in their own province. The problem was that Sun Yatsen in his
sanmin zhuyi (the Three Principles of the People) also emphasized regional self-
government (difang zizhi), an idea which could be explained in many ways by his followers
as well as his enemies. In other words, this was a political ideal which had not been tested
before in China. Anyone could endorse it to serve his or her purpose. Perhaps Li picked up
this idea as an excuse both to benefit the natives of Hubei and to maintain his power in the
province for the purpose of opposing the centralization of Jiang Jieshi.139 Whatever the
reason, this proposition was further practised by Li in Guangxi during the first half of the
1930s when he led the province to become a semi-independent body from Nanjing in his
struggle against Jiang. However, the emotion of self-government, such as that in Hubei,
sometimes went beyond control. Hu Zongduo, a native of Hubei and Commander of the
19th Army which was affiliated to the Guangxi Clique, made himself master of Hubei after
the Western Expedition and appointed provincial government members at his own
direction. Relying on support from Li, Hu disarmed all of the "zapai jun" (inferior brand
armies) in the province and strengthened his own force. Most of these appointees, both in
the government and in charge of troops, were natives of Hubei, graduates of the BMA and
supporters of Hu. These actions threatened the power and interests of other factions inside
and outside the province. As Hu and his followers were all under the wing of the Clique,140
the latter became a target of other factions in the GMD. This is the source of accusations of
the Clique’s “territorial expansion” in Hubei. In other words, this was a result of Li's troops
being stationed at Hubei at a time when regionalist sentiment ran high, particularly in that

139
Li Zongren, “Duiyu difang zizhi jige yidian de poushi”, DSZK, No. 3 (1 December
1931), pp. 7-14.
140
A detailed discussion of the origins of Hu Zongduo from the Guangxi Clique and his
actions in Hubei will appear in the next chapter.

73
province. However, it was not a case of Li and the Clique conspiring to occupy territory,
because such a province was too small to meet the needs of the Clique, as stated earlier.
The defeat of the Guangxi Clique in central China also was a result of conflict
between Li and Jiang in different policies towards domestic and external affairs after the
Northern Expedition. In domestic affairs, except for regional self-government, Li
advocated the policies of transformation of soldiers into workers to settle national army
disbandment, and unity within the GMD party to solve internal struggles for power. In
other words, each faction of the GMD should have the rights to share power in both the
party and central government.141 This reflected the policy of the Clique within the national
structure, in contrast to Jiang’s desire to centralize his power within the whole nation. It is
not surprising that all proposals for national reconstruction that Li Zongren and Bai
Chongxi presented were refused by the Central Government under Jiang’s control. In
responding to imperialist aggression, particularly after the “Jinan Massacre” engineered by
the Japanese on May 3, 1928, Li advocated a firm policy for mass mobilization and
education and training of the masses.142 For this purpose, Li even favoured restoration of
Confucian worship as a national ideology in order to achieve national political unity in this
way,143 because China needed to rebuild its social values and ideology against national
ideological confusion with various “isms” imported from the western countries at that
time.144 Of course, he was unable to carry out his policies in the national structure because
of opposition from Jiang. But Li practised them, not that of Confucian worship, but the

141
See Zhongyang zhengzhi huiyi Wuhan fenhui yuebao, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July 1928), pp.
117.
142
See Li’s proposal for training the masses and party members in 1928, in Wu Chuming
et al (eds.), Dangguo mingren zhongyao shudu, Shanghai: Huiwentang shuju, 1929, pp.
191-211.
143
See the proposal of Li Zongren in 1928, in Shijie shuguang zhi zhonghua wenhua, No.
1 (October 1928), pp. 68-81.
144
See Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Kaifang zhong de bianqian: zailun Zhongguo
shehui chao wending jiegou, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993, pp. 269-74.
In this work, Mr and Mrs Jin point out a new ideology was a great force in the
transformation of the nation. But, the sanmin zhuyi (the Three Principles of the People),
the new ideology of the GMD, could be explained in any way by different parties and
groups because of its excessive mixture of the many popular “isms” at that time. It is
against this background that Li favoured restoration of Confucian worship.

74
political ideology for the masses developed by the Clique itself, in Guangxi later in the
1930s.
The Clique’s defeat had been a top priority in Jiang Jieshi’s agenda from the first
differences between the GMD factions in internal and external affairs after the unification
of China in 1928. The capture of Beijing by the NRA in June 1928 marked the beginning
of national reconstruction. This was a period of transition towards nationhood in a new era
under the leadership of the GMD, and Jiang meant to direct its policies, ie. political tutelage
(xunzheng) by the GMD. Of a series of domestic problems which the Nationalists faced,
the most important one was that the country had five agglomerations of military groups -
Jiang Jieshi's group proclaiming itself the orthodox representative of the Nationalist
government itself, the Guangxi Clique, Feng Yuxiang’s “National People’s Army or the
Northwest Army” (Guominjun), the Yan Xishan Faction in Shanxi province, and Zhang
Xueliang’s “Northeast Army” (Dongbeijun). How the power at national and regional levels
was to be redistributed between these groups became an urgent problem to be settled.
Troop disbandment seemed to be a key factor in settling the problem and a precondition for
all efforts at national reconstruction. However, the leaders of these groups did not trust
each other. Each wanted to seize more power in the nation and the regions. Among them,
anyone who put forward a proposal for disbandment (such as that of Bai Chongxi and Li
Zongren) was opposed by others.145 Differences were further complicated by the power
struggle of the Nationalists themselves. The GMD, which was actually a loose alliance,
was riven by factionalism. Each faction wished to use the potential influence of those
liberal-minded and conservative leaders who were earlier driven out of the party and who
now were asked to return to guide and advise in the party and government. It made the
internal struggle of the GMD more complicated than ever before.
Externally, according to Martin Wilbur, “although Great Britain and the United
States were moving towards negotiating the return of China’s ‘lost rights’ step by step, a
more determined imperialist power, Japan, was acting forcefully to protect and enhance its
economic dominance of Manchuria.”146 Furthermore, Japan speeded up invasion of China

145
For the proposals of both Bai and Li, see Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan, pp. 109-
13; Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 253-61; GWZB,
Vol. 5, No. 25; and Wu Chuming et al (eds.), Dangguo mingren zhongyao shudu, pp. 60-
63, and pp. 110-112.
146
J. K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, p. 719.

75
following the “May 3 Jinan Massacre” in Shandong province in 1928.147 How should
China deal with this foreign aggression, and how should it accomplish the Nationalist
Revolution with its anti-imperialist purpose? This fueled the debate both inside and outside
the GMD on whether the Nationalist Revolution was successful or had failed.148 Other
factions of the GMD also demonstrated their differences with the dominant faction in
response to the Jinan Massacre.149 Such differences were deepened by the “September 18
Incident” three years later.150 In these circumstances, seizing his advantage in ruling the
faction which enjoyed domination of the GMD, Jiang intended to suppress all of his
political rivals by using his superior military forces to centralize the government of the
country under his own control, before he went on to deal with Japanese aggression. It was
not surprising that the Clique became the first target which Jiang attempted to wipe out as it
was his major rival in the GMD.
Although the Guangxi Clique became more and more involved in a struggle for
power with Jiang and argued over differences on policy with him in the GMD, Li Zongren
and his followers did not prepare for war against Jiang’s forces. Even Li wanted a peaceful
compromise with Jiang, but his efforts failed.151 This might explain why none of the
leaders, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Huang Shaohong, were in Wuhan when Jiang led his
forces personally in a surprise attack to wipe out the Clique’s troops in Hubei. This
surprise defeat by Jiang humiliated Li and his colleagues who from that moment always
looked for a chance to seek revenge. This power struggle with Jiang, combined with policy

147
This Massacre was engineered by the Japanese army in order to protect its interests
and influence in Shandong and to obstruct the victory of the Northern Expedition. The
Japanese army committed an atrocity of unparalleled savagery and large numbers of the
Chinese people in Jinan were massacred. For details of the Incident, see GMWX, Vol. 18.
148
For details of the debate, see Edmund S. K. Fung, “Anti-Imperialism and the Left
Guomintang”, Modern China, Vol. 11 (1985), No. 1, pp. 39-76.
149
For example, the Reorganization Faction. For details of its criticism of, and
statements on the Incident, see Geming Pinglun (The Revolutionary Review) edited by
Chen Gongbo, leader of the Faction, and published in Shanghai in 1928.
150
For details of the Incident and the ambitions of the Japanese invasion of China, see Li
Yunhan (ed.), Jiuyiba shibian shiliao, Taipei: ZZSJ, 1977, 1977; and Zhongyang Dangan
guan, Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, and Jilin sheng shehui kexueyuan (eds.), Riben
diguo zhuyi qinhua dangan xuanbian -”jiuyiba” shibian, Beijing: ZHSJ, 1988.
151
Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan, pp. 118-9.

76
differences over mass mobilization and Japanese aggression, caused Li to develop his own
strong policies in Guangxi after his return to that province in the 1930s.

Conclusion

Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique rose to power in a province characterizedly

political regionalism, a product of geography and history, when the country was in a state of
chaos and instability in the 1920s. In general, such regionalism was never intended to
separate the province from national Chinese politics, but was a reflection of the desire to
strengthen the country. When Li and his colleagues established a Guangxi with a strong
regionalist flavour, they believed that provincial reunification and strengthening could be
the first step towards the rebuilding of the nation. Such a perception led them to participate
in the campaign for national reunification.
However, Li and his group were involved in the GMD’s factional struggles after the
confrontation of the two Nationalist regimes in Wuhan and Nanjing - a situation entirely
familiar in the Chinese setting - which combined with their differences over domestic and
external affairs, besides power in both regional and central structures. The subsequent
conflict between Li and Jiang finally led to a civil war in 1929-1930. The Nationalist
Revolution was an ideal pursued by all GMD factions, but each viewed the ideal differently
and adopted its own method to reach it. Once the goal of national reunification was
reached, all factions of the GMD soon split and fought for their own interests. Therefore,
the political unity of the country, particularly in relation to policies on internal and external
affairs, presented greater difficulties than territorial unification; the conflict between these
factions was transformed into civil war, and was manifested in their separate policies of
how to commence national reconstruction and complete political unification.
As a result of the conflict, Li and the Clique were forced to return to their home
province, Guangxi, in 1929, and to commence a process of regional reconstruction and
cooperation, a process which lasted until their compromise with Jiang in the face of a
common need for internal unity to save the country from Japanese aggression. This was a
key element in achieving political unity for the country.
In the next chapter, I will analyse the internal structure of the Clique and its
relations with regional identity. I argue that the consolidated internal structure contributed

77
to the Clique’s survival and restrengthening itself in the province after its defeat by Jiang in
central China, and allowed the Guangxi group to carry out provincial reconstruction and
mass mobilization at every level of society. I also argue that regional identity was
employed by the Clique to arouse the nationalism of the people, for this would serve its
power struggle with Jiang and as well meet the national common demands of that time for
resistance against Japanese aggression.

78
CHAPTER THREE

THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE GUANGXI CLIQUE

After his defeat in the struggle for the central power of the GMD, Li Zongren with
the Guangxi Clique were forced to return to the province in April 1929. Jiang Jieshi could
not, however, tolerate the idea of Li and the Clique holding a province in opposition to him.
Jiang employed a policy of “replacing one Clique with another” (yi-Gui zhi-Gui), sending
the main force of the 7th Army of NRA, which had defected from the Clique in Hubei and
was currently under the command of Generals Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui, back to their
home province in order to use Guangxi natives to fight each other. Meanwhile, Jiang used
“silver bullets” to try to bribe Li Zongren’s subordinates who had remained in the province
during the Northern Expedition and encouraged them to defect from the Clique.152 Under
Jiang’s pressure, Li and other Guangxi leaders were finally forced into exile and left their
home province for Hong Kong and Vietnam two months later. However, Jiang
underestimated his rivals. In fact, they still had potential influence in Guangxi. Seizing the
opportunity in the complicated situation of the anti-Jiang wars initiated by the
Reorganization Faction under Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo, particularly that of the

152
For details of the defection of Guangxi native generals headed by both Yu Zuobai and
Li Mingrui from the Clique in 1929, see Zhang Renmin, “Jiang-Li zuida lieheng
zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai”, CQ, No. 112 (01/03/1962), and the same author, “Yin Liang
Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, ibid, No. 308 (16/05/1970); Lai Gang, “Jiang Jieshi
liyong Yu-Li dao-Gui wowen”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 10, pp. 123-9; Lin Tinghua, “Jiang-Wang
mimou dao-Gui de qianyin houguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 8, pp. 43-9; Zhang Wenhong, “Li
Mingrui dao-Gui tou-Jiang he dao-Jiang shibai jingguo”, GXWSZL, No. 13, pp. 142-54;
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Zhongguo qingnian
junrenshe, 1934; and Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: The University of Hong
Kong, 1979, Chapter 6.

79
anti-Jiang mutiny launched by General Zhang Fakui in September 1929,153 Li, Huang and
Bai returned to Guangxi in the fall of the year. They joined forces with the 4th Army of the
NRA, the famous “Ironside” under the command of Zhang, which entered Guangxi at the
end of 1929, and restored the Clique’s force. Through the anti-Jiang wars in 1929-1931,
Li’s group revived,154 becoming a powerful rival to Jiang in the struggles for both power
and policies in the 1930s, the latter mainly over the issue of how to deal with resistance
against Japanese aggression. How could the Clique have revived and developed political
ideals and formidable military strength within the GMD in the 1930s before the Sino-
Japanese War? There are indications that, aside from the reasons that Li successfully
carried out mass mobilization in Guangxi and strove for regional cooperation with other
provinces, a possible answer is that he also relied on political and military support from his
group. Unfortunately, previous studies of contemporary Guangxi history did not deal with
this issue. For this reason, before we deal with the political ideas and policies of Li and the
Clique in response to imperialist aggression, it is necessary to analyze and account for its
internal structure, and the impact of this on the political development of the Guangxi group
in the 1930s.

The Graduates of Baoding Military Academy (BMA) Group

The officers of the Clique were mainly military school graduates, as mentioned
earlier, but the nucleus actually came from the Baoding Military Academy (BMA). The
phenomenon of the BMA group in domination over the Clique can be attributed to the
historical background of its formation.

153
For details of the civil wars in 1929-30 - also called “Hudang jiuguo zhanzheng” (the
War of the Party Protection and National Salvation) - and the anti-Jiang war in Guangxi
during 1929-1931, see Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 75-95;
Disijun jishi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Disijun jishi, Guangzhou: Huaiyuan wenhua shiye
fuwushe, 1949; and Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Chapter 6.
154
For details of the survival and revival of Li Zongren and his Clique in Guangxi and
Zhang Fakui’s anti-Jiang mutiny organized by the Reorganization Faction, see Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, chapter 6; and memoirs of Li Zongren, Li Pinxian, Wei Yongcheng,
Cheng Siyuan, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, Bai Chongxi, Zhang Renmin, Xu Qiming,
Yu Shixi, and Chen Xiong in the Bibliography of this thesis. Also see “Archives of the
War History Compiled Committee, the Nationalist Government”, The Second Historical
Archives of China, Nanjing.

80
 The Clique was initially composed of two major parts: Li’s own troops from Yulin,
and the Guangxi Model Battalion (GMB) where most Guangxi native BMA graduates
started their military careers. For example, when the GMB was established in 1917, its
main officers were BMA graduates, such as Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Xia Wei, Xu
Qiming, Chen Xiong and so on; while Li built his own force in Yulin, BMA graduates,
such as Yin Chenggang, Yu Zuobai and others, who acted as senior commanders of Li’s
troops at that time, also played an important role.155 When it was reorganized in 1926,
most middle and high ranking officers of the 7th Army of the NRA were BMA
graduates.156 In fact, this phenomenon also occurred in other armies of the NRA, such as
the 1st, 4th, and 8th armies at that time.157 Even the revival of Li's force in Guangxi after
1929 was dependent on this group, because elements of the group actually controlled the
remnant troops of the Clique when Li was forced into exile in Hong Kong and Vietnam.158
Before the War of Resistance, HMA (Huangpu Military Academy) graduates had already
become the leading officers at all levels of Jiang’s “zhongyang jun” (the Central Army).
On the contrary, the BMA Group in the Clique still occupied the most important positions
in the provincial government, the army, and the militia organizations as well.159
Another reason for the BMA Group’s domination in the Clique was that there were
no Guangxi native graduates from the Japanese Military School before the Expedition,
except Ma Xiaojun, founder of the GMB. However, Ma left the GMB for the Guangzhou
government one year after the war between Guangdong and Guangxi broke out in 1921.160
As a result, Huang Shaohong and Bai Chongxi replaced Ma as leaders of the GMB, which
had been expanded to a regiment during the war, and then joined Li in 1922. We know

155
See Appendix 1.1.
156
See Appendix 1.2.
157
For a discussion of the role played by the BMA graduates in the 1910s and 1920s, see
Lin Dezheng, “Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu (1912-1924)”, M. A. thesis, National
Political University, Taipei, 1980.
158
See Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, No. 308-
9 (1-16/05/1970).
159
See Appendix 1.3 and 1.4.
160
See Ma Xiaojun, “Guangxi gemingjun fayuan zhilue”, GXWX, No. 63 (1994), pp. 8-
10.

81
that, at the end of the late Qing Dynasty and in the early Republic, there were four
categories of the military school in ascending order: 1) the elementary military school; 2)
the army preparatory school; 3) the middle military school; and 4) the BMA. That is to say,
among them the BMA was on the top level with its current modern military education
system.161 In general, BMA graduates had longer and more systemized military training
(about six to seven years from the beginning until the highest level) than those from other
levels. Thus, not surprisingly, these BMA graduates from Guangxi provided the source of
officers for the new Guangxi armies after Lu Rongting was defeated by the Guangdong
armies in 1921, and became the main commanders of the Guangxi armies.162 Among them
were Huang and Bai. After the occupation of Wuzhou in 1923, Huang and Bai became
provincial militarists. They attracted numerous Guangxi BMA graduates to their troops to
strengthen the force. Their attitude towards BMA graduates also won the support of some
of these from other provinces who came to join them.163 For example, Wang Yinyu, a
BMA graduate of the 1st term (qi) and a native of Guangdong, became Chief of Staff of the
7th Army during the Northern Expedition; Hu Zongduo, a BMA graduate of the 4th term
and a native of Hubei province, with his fellow provincial, formed a sub-faction in the
Clique, which we will discuss later; and Zhang Dingfan, a native of Jiangxi province and a
BMA graduate of the 3rd term, was Mayor of Shanghai in 1927-28 and one of Bai’s trusted
subordinates. Through the efforts of both Huang and Bai, the BMA group dominated the
most important positions amongst middle and senior commanders in the new Guangxi
army under the command of Li. No doubt, this large number of BMA graduates helped to
ensure the Clique’s control over the province.
As for HMA graduates, they joined the Clique too late to occupy important
positions in both the Guangxi government and the army. When the HMA was set up in

161
For details of curriculums in the Baoding Military Academy, see Lin Dezheng,
“Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu (1912-1924)”.
162
The old Guangxi armies under Lu Rongting belittled these younger well-trained
officers and limited their promotions in the army. This was the main reason for them
coming under the command of Li Zongren soon after the defeat of Lu Rongting by the
Guangdong army. See Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7;
and Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei: Zhongwai tushu chuban gongsi, 1975, pp. 25-
30.
163
Lu Weiqian, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Guixi zhong de qiluo”, WSZLXJ, No. 52
(1964), p. 64.

82
1924, the BMA group was already entrenched in the principal positions in the Clique.
Even when some HMA graduates joined the Clique after 1925, their ranks and positions
were so minor that they could not play important roles before the Sino-Japanese War.
More importantly, after the reunification of Guangxi, the Clique set up its own military
school in Nanning as a branch of the HMA, with BMA graduates as instructors or teachers.
With this background, the graduates of this branch regarded themselves as coming from the
Guangxi Military School rather than from the HMA.164
The Guangxi army under the Clique had shown high combat effectiveness in wars
of the reunification of Guangxi and the Northern Expedition. Even in the War of
Resistance, “the Guangxi troops”, according to a Western observer, “are the best of the
provincial forces. These troops were organized and trained by Generals Li Tsung-jen and
Pai Chung-hsi, two of the best soldiers in China. The men receive excellent care, their
morale is high, and they have given a good account of themselves in battle”.165 Therefore,
they “have won high praise for their gallantry”.166 As John S. Service, an American
diplomat, pointed out early in 1945, the Guangxi army “had proved in earlier days that they
were good fighters - against the Northern warlords, against Chiang and against the
Communists. So they were given the honour of an important place in the front lines - but
north of the Yangtze and far from their home province. they fought well - and lost heavily -
at Taierchuang and Hsuchow”.167 The reason for its excellent performance is that, it to a
great extent, depended on the domination of the BMA group in the Guangxi troops. With
excellent military knowledge and fighting skills as well as experience of the BMA group
and other commanders who originated from other military schools, the Guangxi army
defeated the enemy in one battle after another. This army was in addition well-trained and
it always was conscious of its reputation as it carried forward the militant tradition of the

164
Liang Xueqian, “Guijun ganbu de yaolan - Nanning junxiao”, GXWX, No. 57 (1992),
pp. 13-8; and Liu Qianyi, “Guilin Lijiacun junxiao huiyi”, GXWX, No. 11 (1981), pp. 48-
50.
165
Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency,
New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31.
166
Li Po-Sheng, “How Kwangsi Trains Its Troops”, People’s Tribune, Vol. XXV, No. 3
(May 1938), p. 141.
167
Joseph W. Esherick (ed.), Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of
John Service, New York: Random House, 1974, p. 43.

83
Guangxi people, the source from which its soldiers were recruited. There is no doubt that
the defeat of the Clique after the Expedition was the result of divisions in the BMA group
caused by Jiang, as mentioned in Chapter Two. However, the fighting skills of this group
and the militant tradition of the Guangxi people were once more to become a vital factor in
the revival of Li’s force in Guangxi from 1929 to 1931 and in building its reputation as a
courageous army in the Sino-Japanese War.
The most important element in the political cohesion between the BMA group and
the Clique was the shared aim of regional self-government (difang zizhi), which drove them
to acknowledge Li Zongren as their leader. First, they came mainly from rural families and
had the same educational background. Secondly, they were pushed into oblivion because
they failed to obtain the chance to be promoted to higher positions in the central
government and the army, though they had on their record significant military
achievements in the Expedition. Even those natives of Guangxi who served other
provinces or armies were not trusted by Jiang and other factions. As a result, those men,
such as Li Pinxian, Ye Qi, and Liao Lei, former senior commanders of Tang Shengzhi’s
troops, were forced to return to their native province - Guangxi. In this situation, the
ambitions of Li and the Clique to transform and reconstruct the province in the earlier stage
of the Clique’s rise were to be realized by these officers. Moreover, after the Expedition,
the GMD proclaimed that China had begun the political tutelage (xunzheng) period. How
could the policy be carried out? Different factions and groups had different ideas. For
example, in 1928 Feng Yuxiang proposed to settle problems of the livelihood of the people
as the first agenda of the Nationalist Government, but he failed to have the proposal passed
in both the party and the government.168 The fact that Li and the Clique were excluded
from Nanjing led them to the belief that Jiang aimed at building his own dictatorship over
the country, and would not implement democratic practice in politics. Here democracy was
an ideal which they believed demanded national power-sharing by all factions of the GMD
and the people including, of course, the Clique itself. More importantly, Guangxi had
experienced two years of the chaos of war because Jiang had commanded the Nanjing and
non-Nanjing troops to attack the province in order to eliminate the Clique from 1929 to
1931. Li and the Clique attributed this to Jiang’s attempt to establish his dictatorship and

168
For details see Cao Hongxin, Feng zai Nanjing, Shanghai: Zhengzhi yanjiushe, 1932.

84
they were forced to arouse political regionalism to defend their homeland.169 They
advocated regional self-government in order to consolidate their base and to emphasize
how their ideal differed from that of Jiang's policy which aimed to consolidate his rule first.
Furthermore, they insisted on regional self-government, which they considered an effective
weapon against the influence of the Communists on the rural society of Guangxi, even the
whole country.170 This mixture of political regionalism and regional self-government
provided a favourable foundation on which to build the BMA group's support for Li to
carry out the policies of the Clique in Guangxi.
That is not to say, however, that the BMA graduates were an absolutely
consolidated group and always made a great contribution to the Clique expanding its
influence in Chinese politics at all times. Actually, the defeat of the Clique in central China
by Jiang after the Expedition in 1929 was to a great extent caused by divisions within the
BMA group itself.
The first one who split from the Clique was Yu Zuobai. A native of Beiliu county
and a BMA graduate of the 3rd term, Yu had been one of the senior commanders of the
Clique since its rise in Yulin under the aegis of Li Zongren. With his brilliant military
achievements during the reunification of Guangxi, Yu became one of the secondary leaders
of the Clique. However, he was not satisfied with his position. He attempted to replace Li,
Huang and Bai as leader of this group. For this purpose he joined both Jiang Jieshi and
Wang Jingwei. In March 1929 Yu used the enmity between both Guangxi and Hubei
natives in the Clique and bought over the main force of the 7th Army, which was under the
direct command of General Li Mingrui, his former subordinate as well as his cousin - this
family relationship is important in understanding how this could happen. Yu’s action
directly led the Clique’s forces quickly to collapse in Hubei. However, he was unable to
control the Guangxi troops effectively because of his obstinate and unruly reputation and
soured relations with other Guangxi native BMA graduates. The troops in the province,
who were mostly under the control of the elements of the BMA group, came back to Li

169
For details of propaganda of Li Zongren and the other Guangxi leaders for defending
the province and opposing Jiang’s dictatorship over the country, see Hudang jiuguo ji, n.p.,
1931.
170
See DSZK, Nanning, No. 3 (1931), p. 13.

85
Zongren when he and other Guangxi leaders returned to the province in the fall of 1929.171
As a result, Yu followed in the previous footsteps of Li, Huang and Bai, and left Guangxi
for Hong Kong where he remained in exile until 1957, during which his former colleagues
refused to allow him to return to his home province. He died in Guangzhou in 1958 after
his return to the mainland.172
Following Yu was Lu Huanyan, a native of Rong county as well as a BMA graduate
of the 3rd term. Lu joined the Clique in 1923 when Huang Shaohong was expanding his
strength in Wuzhou. Lu’s defection from the Clique occurred in early 1930, when Guangxi
was under Jiang’s siege from the three provinces of Guangdong, Hunan and Yunnan and Li
was struggling to revive his shaky force. As a Divisional Commander in the Guangxi
armies at that time, Lu had low prestige in the Clique. Most elements of the BMA group
who were at present under his command soon abandoned him and went back to their
former leaders - Li, Huang, and Bai when they returned to the province. His split did not
cause serious trouble for the Clique but strengthened the impression that the defection
could not destroy this group which was of strong cohesion and regional identity. Lu was
assassinated by his bodyguard several months later.173
Another man who disengaged from the Guangxi group was Huang Shaohong, the
number two leader of the Clique. The departure of Huang was a mystery, but his departure
from the province for Nanjing occurred after discussion with both Li and Bai. In other
words, he separated from the Clique peacefully, which I will discuss later. Apart from Yu,
Lu and Huang, the most important blow to the cohesion of the Clique was that of a sub-
faction in this group - the so-called Hubei Faction (Hubei pai, or Hubei bang) under the
leadership of Hu Zongduo. The rise and fall of this faction in the Clique provided the
Guangxi leaders with an experience which eventually strengthened internal unity and the
regional identity of the group.

171
For details of the BMA group of the Clique, and their welcome of the return of their
former leaders Li, Huang and Bai to continue leading them and their abandonment of Yu
and Li Mingrui, see Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe
yishu”, CQ, No. 119, p. 12. Also see Zhang Renmin, Huiyi Lu, Hong Kong, 1987, pp. 95-
100.
172
For details of Yu Zuobai’s defection from the Guangxi Clique and his last years, see
Zhang Renmin, “Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai”, CQ, No. 112 (1/3/1962).
173
See Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, Nos. 308-
9 (1, 16/05/1970).

86
The Hubei Faction
As the term suggests, it was composed of natives of Hubei province. This faction
once played an important role in the rapidly expanding influence of the Guangxi Clique
during the Northern Expedition. Hu Zongduo, leader of the faction, joined the Clique
around 1923 when Huang Shaohong occupied Wuzhou and was appointed Chief Adviser
(zong canyi) for Huang’s troops. Hu was rapidly promoted to secondary leadership of the
Clique, as a Brigadier of the 7th Army on the eve of the Expedition. During the
Expedition, Hu, who was promoted later to Commander of the 19th Army, had been one of
Li’s two senior subordinate commanders (the other was Xia Wei) commanding the
Guangxi troops advancing from the south to the Yangzi River Valley. Surprisingly, as a
native from a province outside Guangxi, his rise in the Clique was quicker than those of
Guangxi native BMA graduates. A reason was that Hu was favoured by both Huang and
Bai because they were all graduates of the BMA and were at that time advocating the
greater unity of BMA graduates within and outside the province. Hu served the old
Guangxi army under Lu Rongting for years before the formation of the Clique under Li.
His career in the Guangxi armies gave him a higher prestige than his fellow provincials,
particularly those who were Hubei native BMA graduates. By using Hu’s prestige, Huang
and Bai were able to attract numerous other Hubei native BMA graduates into the Clique,
strengthening its force.174 Hu’s achievements in the reunification of Guangxi were
considerable and the leaders of the Clique intended to let him play more important roles
when the Expedition was launched. Because one of the destinations of the Expedition was
the middle Yangzi River valley, in Hubei, Hu’s home province, he was more familiar with
this region, its personnel and geography, than anyone of the Clique.175
As BMA graduates of the 4th term were nearly all natives of Hubei, Hu brought
many of his classmates and fellow provincials into the Clique as middle and lower ranking
officers, among these Tao Jun and Li Yixuan, who served in the reunification of Guangxi.
As his rank was higher than any of his fellow provincials, Hu promoted and appointed them

174
Lu Weiqian, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei de qingkuang”, HBWSZL, No. 18
(1987), p. 2.
175
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi yu liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, p. 95.

87
in his own unit in order to enhance his own position.176 In this way, he was naturally
accepted as leader of the Hubei natives in the Clique.
A good opportunity for Hu to form his own faction within the Clique came in
March 1927 when Li Zongren was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Route Army
of the NRA marching to the east of China. The Wuhan Nationalist regime moved one
division and one brigade from the 15th Army, a Hubei body of troops which defected from
Wu Peifu’s armies and claimed loyalty to the NRA recently, to join Li’s action. To use
these troops more conveniently, Li put them under Hu’s command as the latter was a native
of Hubei. Seizing the opportunity, Hu put his friends among the Hubei natives, particularly
BMA graduates, into commands in these formations and a division of the 7th Army, which
was under his direct command. Both units later formed the 19th Army with Hu as
Commander, a subsidiary unit of the Clique.177 This was the starting point of direct control
of his own forces. At the end of 1927 Hu led the 19th Army, following with other Li’s
troops, i.e. the 7th Army, back to Hubei after the victory of the punitive expedition against
Tang Shengzhi, a militarist who was a mainstay of the Wuhan regime and opposed
Nanjing. Early in 1928, Li disarmed the old Hubei “zapai jun” (armies of inferior brands),
which was reorganized as a new army, i.e. the 18th Army, a subsidiary force of the Clique.
By taking advantage of Li’s advocacy of the policy “Hubei for the Hubei people”, Hu,
under the support of Bai Chongxi, persuaded Li to appoint Tao Jun, his classmate at the
BMA and an acting Divisional Commander of the 7th Army, as Commander of the 18th
Army. Thus, by creating both the 19th and 18th armies with Hubei natives, or to be more
exact, Hubei native BMA graduates in commands from low to high ranks, Hu actually
made himself leader of the Hubei Faction (Hubei pai) within the BMA group of the Clique
in 1927-1929. Not surprisingly, Hubei native BMA graduates were the nucleus of the
Faction.178
There were two aspects of this development. First, the Hubei Faction expanded
considerably the influence of the Clique into Hubei, secondly, it also planted the seeds of a

176
Li Chunchu, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Hubei de tongzhi yu bengkui”, WHWSZL, No.
11 (1983), p. 17.
177
Yan Jing, “Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji qingxiang jingguo”, HBWSZL, No. 18, p.
44-7.
178
See Lu Weiqian, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei de qingkuang”, HBWSZL, No.
18, p. 18; and Appendix 2.

88
split within the Clique - an internal enmity between both Guangxi and Hubei natives, which
was cleverly exploited by Jiang to defeat Li in 1929. As Hu was eager to build up his own
influence by putting all his fellow provincials into influential positions at each level of
government and party organizations as well as controlling the army in Hubei, he and his
followers rapidly became masters of the province.179 In so doing, they hurt the interests and
power of other factions in the province. On the other hand, as one of the secondary leaders
of the Clique, and, in the view of the outsiders, any of Hu’s actions was regarded as part of
the Clique’s. Hu’s actions made the Clique an objective to be attacked by other groups and
factions. These actions also hurt internal interests of the Clique, for Hu and his followers
discriminated against the other Guangxi troops in Hubei which they once served,
particularly in personnel, distribution of financial resources and promotions in the army.180
Although there is no evidence that Hu had already taken a firm decision to immediately “fly
his own colours” and to form his own independent influence,181 disunity did arise within
the Clique. Hu and his followers had come back to their home province with many
distinctions in war. They had earned the right to take a hand in any domestic issue of the
province that they desired, but began to exclude outsiders, including Guangxi natives who
were their colleagues in the Clique, from the political and military operation of the
province. The practice began to assume a strong regionalist colour. The officers and
soldiers of the 7th Army not only distrusted Hu but bitterly resented the actions of the
Hubei natives in dropping their benefactor as soon as their help was no longer required.
Many commanders were jealous of the strength of Hu and his followers, their swift
expansion of influence, and of the unfair speedy promotions through the army ranks. A
wave of discontent and enmity spread between them. This resentment was deepened by the

179
For details of the Hubei Faction’s policies in handling provincial affairs, see HBWSZL,
No. 18, pp. 1-43; and WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 2-38.
180
See Yan Jing, “Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji qingxiang jingguo”, HBWSZL, No.
18, pp. 4-7; Lan Tengjiao, “Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui zhanzheng”,
HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 29-43; Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi
neimu”, CQ, Nos. 308-9; and Tu Yuntan, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu
xin Guixi neibu maodun”, WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 28-38; Peng Boxun, “Zhang Zhiben shi
zenyang dangshang Hubei sheng zhuxi de”, HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 52-4.
181
According to Tu Yuntan, one of Hu’s trusted followers, soon after the defeat of the
Clique in Hubei, Hu told Tu that he had a mind to fly his own colours in the future, but not
at the present. See Tu Yuntan, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi
neibu maodun”, WHWSZL, No. 11, p. 36.

89
scramble for possession of opium taxes.182 The income from opium taxes was an
important financial resource of the army at the time, particularly where it lacked normal
financial support from the Central government at Nanjing, for example in the 7th Army.183
The defeat of Li’s troops in Hubei was, to a great extent, due to the resentment of
Guangxi officers, headed by Li Mingrui, a Divisional Commander who became
Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Red Army in Guangxi later, against Hu Zongduo
and the Hubei Faction. At least all members of the Clique thought so.184 In their memoirs,
even some of Hu’s followers emphasized that the defeat of the Clique had resulted from
damage caused by the Hubei Faction which severely hurt Guangxi natives’ interests.185 Hu,
himself also recognized and acknowledged, several years later, after the defeat of Li’s
troops in Hubei, that his actions in the province, to some extent, had been disastrous to the
Clique, in which he once rapidly rose as a provincial militarist.186 This resentment seems
to explain why Li Mingrui joined Jiang Jieshi when the Jiang-Gui War broke out in March
1929. For its negative impact on the Clique, this Hubei Faction was not again revived after
Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were driven back to their home province by Jiang in that same
month.

182
See Lan Tengjiao, “Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui zhanzheng”, HBWSZL,
No. 18, pp. 29-43.
183
During the Expedition, financial support of the 7th Army, except that from the Central
government for a short time in the first half of 1928, came mainly from the Guangxi
government, totalling 17,000,000 Yuan (Chinese dollars). See Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang
Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, Nos. 307-9 and “Guanyu Guangxi de jingbu”,
CYGL, Vol. 2, No. 6 (20/03/1937), p. 3; Lu Weiqian, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei
de qingkuang”, HBWSZL, No. 18, p. 10; Yan Jing, “Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji
qingxiang jingguo”, HBWSZL, No. 18, p. 46; Li Chunchu, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Hubei
de tongzhi yu bengkui”, WHWSZL, No. 11, p. 11.
184
See the memoirs of middle and high ranking officers of the Guangxi Clique, such as
Zhang Renmin, Zhang Wenhong, Yin Chenggang, even of the senior leaders of the Clique -
Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, and Bai Chongxi in the Bibliography of this
thesis.
185
For details see memoirs and collections of Yan Jing, Lan Tengjiao, Tu Yuntan, Lu
Weiqian, Lu Zhibing, Liu Minggao, and Huang Sufu in the Bibliography of this thesis.
186
Tu Yuntan, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi neibu
maodun”, WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 36-7; and Lan Tengjiao, “Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao
Jiang-Gui zhanzheng”, HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 42-3.

90
 In general, the BMA group was not an organized faction in Guangxi. They were
gathered together for the military purposes of reunifying Guangxi and making a career of
serving in the war of national unification; also, they enthusiastically shared Li’s idea of
regional self-government and other policies. They provided the main source of senior
officers for Li and the Clique and formed the secondary and lower-level leadership of this
group. Although some of its members left to follow Jiang, the elements of this group still
were the military mainstay of this body because they had already realized that their careers
were firmly linked with the fate of the Clique and nowhere else. The criticism and attacks
from other factions as well as outside temptation had not broken down the group, but
strengthened their regional identity. Furthermore, although the action of some elements of
the group such as the Hubei Faction caused the defeat of the Clique in central China, it
provided the Guangxi group with a lesson to prevent further internal division. To that end,
the Guangxi leaders strengthened the unity of the group and the formation of its political
aim, which were closely related to the structure of the Clique’s leadership and the discipline
of a secret political organization.

Leadership

Revival of the Clique after 1929 also depended on its leadership. Unlike other
factions of the GMD which all had only one leader, the Clique had a governing body of
three people. In other words, it was like a triumvirate, a unique characteristic of the Clique.
This might explain to some extent why the Clique retained the capacity for survival after
each defeat by Jiang, and why it was always regarded as a powerful political and military
rival by the latter.
In this triumvirate, also known as the Li (Zongren) - Huang (Shaohong) - Bai
(Chongxi) leadership, Li was always acknowledged to be the number one leader of the
Clique. This arrangement of the leadership can be traced back to the Clique’s initial
formation, as described in Chapter Two. As Huang and Bai were leaders of the Guangxi
Model Battalion (GMB), one of the two main component parts of the Clique, they of course
became its number two and number three leaders. Huang seized an opportunity to leave
Yulin for Wuzhou to expand his own strength independently in 1923, but he had

91
maintained a good relationship with Yulin and obtained support from Li.187 As the
expansion of his own strength at that time was made possible by support from Li, Huang, in
appearance at least, regarded the former as his superior. When the troops of both Li and
Huang, respectively from Yulin and Wuzhou, joined forces to form the Guangxi
Pacification and Bandit Suppression Joint Army (dinggui taozei lianjun) in Nanning in
1924 in order to reunify Guangxi, logically, Li became Commander-in-Chief, and Huang
Deputy Commander-in-Chief. By this arrangement, Huang voluntarily placed himself as
the second leader of the new rising Guangxi group.188
Apart from the fact that he was founder of the Clique in Yulin, the main reason for
Li to proclaim himself as the number one leader was his good personal moral character,
according to memoirs and recollections of most senior members of the Clique who trusted
him throughout his career, as well as some outside observers, both Chinese and foreign.189
A British intelligence report in 1934 stated that Li:
Gives an impression of great mental and physical vigour, and of being possessed of
moral and physical courage to an unusual degree. Wide views on the exterior and
interior problems of China. Very ambitious and visualizes himself as capable of
replacing Chiang Kai-shek at the helm of state. A fighter.190
Huang Shaohong’s memoirs several decades later also confirmed the importance of Li’s
character in the recognition of his right to the top leadership of the Clique.191 In addition,
the Clique had already realized that the Taiping Rebellion’s failure in the 1860s had
originated in its internal split. As the Clique considered itself to be the successor of the
Taiping, it always emphasized the importance of avoiding internal dissension of the
Taiping, the mistake that led to its final failure. It became an axiom to make secure the

187
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1979, p. 99; and Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 16.
188
Huang Shaohong, Wushi Huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 84-5.
189
Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 104-45; also see
Yuan Qingping, “Li Zongren”, in Yuan Qingping (ed.), Dangdai dangguo mingren zhuan,
Nanjing: Junshi xinwenshe, 1936.
190
Great Britain, Foreign Office 371 (General Correspondence) /18153 /1783, “Report on
Kwangsi Province”, by Captain A. T. Wilson-Brand, Intelligence Section, General Staff,
June 1, 1934, p. 147 (quoted in Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang
China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 7).
191
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 109.

92
leadership of Li and other persons in this Guangxi group.192 With the support from all his
followers and through political propaganda, Li’s leadership in the Clique was further
strengthened and undisputed.
As for Bai Chongxi, he had two favourable advantages which made him an ideal
candidate for the position of the number three leader in the Clique. First, he shared the
leadership of the GMB with Huang Shaohong. Secondly, he was a fellow townsman of Li
Zongren; both were natives of Lingui county. Culturally, they all belonged to the Guilin
guanhua dialect system (i.e. Guilin dialect, a dialect of “xi’nan guanhua” or Southwest
Mandarin, which includes Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces and north Guangxi), one
of the two main dialect systems in Guangxi (the other being the baihua, i.e. Cantonese).
More importantly, they shared and pursued the same ideals in both the province and the
nation. This made their relations closer than with any others.193 When the troops from
Yulin and Wuzhou were combined in one force, Bai’s previous position in the GMB and
his close relationship with Li ensured that he would play a very important role in promoting
consolidation of this new and rising military group. For this reason, Bai was, after the
formation of the Clique, usually authorized to command its troops. This position advanced
him naturally into the triumvirate.
This triumvirate contributed to the expansion of the Clique’s influence outside
Guangxi and its capacity to revive its forces in the province during and after the Expedition,
even during a series of civil wars between the GMD factions. During the Expedition, Li
and Bai were in the battlefield commanding the Guangxi troops in all battles against
Beiyang militarists in the northern sector. At the same time Huang firmly controlled
Guangxi. Relying on this base of the Clique, Huang was able to provide Guangxi troops
with manpower and armament expenditure when they fought in both central and south
China. This was necessary because the Nationalist Government virtually did not provide
any financial assistance to the 7th Army at the beginning stages of the Expedition.194 The

192
See Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, compiled and published by General Political
Training Department of Headquarters of the 4th Group Army of the NRA, Nanning, 1935.
Also see Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36.
193
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 100.
194
Except that he appropriated for the 7th Army a sum of money totalling 200,000 Yuan
for its reinforcement to Tang Shengzhi which was the prelude to the Expedition in May
1926 (See Mao Sicheng, Minguo shiwu nian zhiqian de Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, reprinted
Hong Kong, 1962, Vol. 15, p. 76), Jiang and the Guangzhou Nationalist Government did

93
actions of Huang during these struggles for power of both the Nationalist government and
the GMD always coincided with those of Li and Bai in political and military matters. For
example, in the autumn of 1927 Huang supported the Nanjing Special Committee and the
Western Expedition against Tang Shengzhi, in which both Li and Bai played very
important roles.195 Even after Li and Bai were defeated in both Hubei and Hebei provinces
respectively and driven back to Guangxi, Huang still gave great support to both of his
colleagues. The three powerful men of Guangxi used the forces that Huang had kept in the
province to struggle for the fortunes of the Clique. In other words, this triumvirate
provided them with a foundation on which to base any struggle for expansion or revival of
the forces of the Clique.
Behind their cooperation was their common desire to expand the Clique’s influence
outside the province and to reconstruct Guangxi. They regarded Guangxi as an area for
experiment and testing of their policies in mass mobilization and regional self-government,
and for the achievement of their goal to modernize Guangxi.196 The achievements of
Guangxi during the Expedition demonstrated the correctness of the Clique’s aspirations in
provincial reconstruction and mass education.197 After being excluded from Nanjing, they
were anxious to regain control of Guangxi, to prepare for revenge, and to resume the
implementation of their own policies in the province. However, at a critical point, when
they were striving to revive their force in Guangxi, Huang Shaohong suddenly left his
colleagues and the Clique for Nanjing at the end of 1930, where he joined the Political
Studies Faction (zhengxue xi), an influential and potentially powerful group in the
Nationalists and a powerful support of Jiang. Huang soon became Minister of Interior of
the Nanjing Government and later Chairman of Zhejiang, Jiang’s home province; he also

not give any financial support to the 7th Army before early in 1927. See Huang Shaohong,
Wushi huiyi, p. 127; and Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi
neimu”, CQ, No. 307.
195
For details of Huang’s activities in response to that of Li and Bai during the NSC
period, see Guangzhou Pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou:
Pingshe, 1929; and Huang Shaohong, “1928 nian Yue-Gui zhanzheng”, WSZLXJ, No. 3.
196
See DSZK, No. 3, pp. 12-13.
197
For details of Guangxi's achievements under Huang Shaohong, see serial articles of
Zhu (Chu) Hongyuan and Huang Zongyan in the Bibliography of this thesis.

94
continued to enjoy his high position in the government. Thus, the triumvirate seemed to
have disintegrated. The Clique was in crisis.
The real reason for the departure of Huang is still unknown. Perhaps Huang felt
himself responsible for the military reverses of the Clique within and outside Guangxi as
the forces under his command made serious mistakes in several decisive campaigns against
Jiang. For these reverses, his reputation among members of Guangxi fell to a point he
could no longer tolerate.198 Perhaps he had realized that his chances for a future career in a
strong military atmosphere were irreparably ruined. Also, in a typically Chinese way, the
existence of a tougher political and military group in opposition to Jiang, in which he once
was a leader, was a weapon that Huang could use to bargain with the former to obtain a
high position in the central government under the leadership of Jiang.199 It has even been
suggested that his departure was a tactic of the Clique to ease Jiang’s siege of Guangxi.200
It also was, according to Huang himself, due to the fact that he gave up the anti-Jiang
attitude held by Li and Bai, who would continue opposing Jiang.201 Whatever the reason,
Huang’s departure did not irreparably harm the Clique. In short, he left peacefully on his
own, without taking any force of the Clique with him. It is safe to say that he left not
because of pressure from his colleagues but for a multiplicity of reasons, perhaps even
some which were purely personal.
Although Huang did not take any forces with him at the time of his departure, the
action effected the army’s morale; in particular, those officers of the Clique in military and
civic administration of the province, who had remained at Guangxi with Huang while Li
and Bai were expanding the Clique’s influence outside the province, were shocked. To
strengthen and reconstruct the leadership, Li successfully developed a secret organization to

198
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, pp. 25-47;
Chen Liangzuo, “Xin Guixi cong qingchao ru-Xiang dao huishi quzhu dianjun chujing”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 45-50; Zhang Dihai, “Zhang-Guijun fan-Jiang zhong de Beiliu ji
Hengyang zhanyi”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 19, pp. 157-62; Huang Mengnian, “Xin Guixi
qingchao ru-Xiang ceying Feng-Yan fan-Jiang zhanzheng”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 35-44;
Disijun jishi; and Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 197-212.
199
Huang Shaohong, “Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi”, WSZLXJ, No. 7, p. 75.
200
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 214.
201
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 212-3, and the same author, “Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he
Guixi de guanxi”, WSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 75-6.

95
establish and monitor the common political goal of the Clique, which was to consolidate
the Guangxi group internally. Also, early in 1931, after Bai moved up to take the previous
position of Huang Shaohong, Li promoted Huang Xuchu into the triumvirate, as number
three leader of the Clique. The new Li-Bai-Huang (Xuchu) leadership replaced that of Li-
Huang (Shaohong)-Bai. The formation of the new leadership retained the power balance of
the Clique and sought to carry on as usual.
A classmate of Li at the GMITS and a graduate of Military Staff College (MSC) in
Beijing, Huang Xuchu was once Ma Xiaojun’s aide in the Guangxi Model Battalion and
later Li’s Chief of Staff in Yulin. During the formation of the Guangxi Clique, he had
already seemed to be the most important aide to Li in Yulin.202 As assistant to Huang
Shaohong during the Expedition, the position of Huang Xuchu in the province was only
slightly less important than that of the former. An important reason was that both men
were fellow townsmen of Rong county, an area within the baihua dialect system of the
province. In this circumstance, the officers from the baihua system held a nearly complete
sway on all fronts of the province at this time. At the crucial moment that Huang Shaohong
left Guangxi, Huang Xuchu demonstrated his continuing loyalty to Li and Bai even though
he still maintained a good relationship with the former.203 This was very important because
his remaining in the Clique helped to reassure and retain the loyalty of the officers from the
baihua system. More importantly, as a practitioner of policies and a good civic
administrator rather than a policy-maker, he had a strong capability for handling provincial
administration. By promoting Huang Xuchu, Li and Bai were able to restore the
confidence of the province in the Clique’s revival, after it had been shaken by Huang
Shaohong’s departure, and to strengthen control over the province in both the military and
civil administrations. On the other hand, the promotion of Huang Xuchu enabled the
Clique to retain the status of the triumvirate. The three men worked well together after that
and the Clique finally took control of the province again, because, as Joseph Stilwell
pointed out, “the friendship that exists between these men, and their common antipathy
towards Nanking augurs well for the success of their plans”.204 Guangxi enjoyed a

202
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, Nos. 168-70. Also see Te-kong Tong and Li
Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 92-3.
203
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, p. 118.
204
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).

96
reputation as the “model province” under their leadership for its achievements in
reconstruction and mass mobilization.
Once the new triumvirate was re-formed in 1931, it was never again broken.
Certainly the senior leaders of the Clique themselves did not want to alter the current
structure of leadership, because they needed each other. During the period of 1931-1936,
except when he shared the work with Bai in determining policies for Guangxi, Li paid great
attention to cooperation with other factions of the GMD, particularly those of Guangxi’s
neighbourhood, such as Guangdong, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan. Bai concentrated on
provincial mobilization with the dual purpose of defending Guangxi and preparing for
resistance against Japan, a process in which the masses' political consciousness in the
regional and national identity was aroused to join the mainstream consciousness of
nationalism. At the same time, Huang devoted himself to the reconstruction of Guangxi.
Perhaps, as has been suggested, they did not attempt to overthrow Li or others, because they
feared senior subordinates of the Clique who might follow. In so doing, they would be the
victims of a “domino” effect.205 On the other hand, some senior officers, such as Yu
Zuobai, Li Mingrui and Lu Huanyan, defected from the Clique and attempted to replace Li,
Huang and Bai and to make themselves leaders of this group, but they all failed to shake the
triumvirate for they were utterly isolated by their colleagues of the Clique and distrusted by
this Guangxi group’s rivals - Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei, or even executed by the CCP
though they joined this party, such as Li Mingrui.206 The fate of these defectors of course
was a warning to other senior officers of the Clique.

205
Su Mingde, “Bai Jiangong wannian yishi”, GXWX, No. 60 (1993), p. 53.
206
Li Mingrui later joined the CCP and became Commander of the 7th Army of the Red
Army. But he was executed by the CCP in October 1931 after the remnants of the 7th Red
Army from Guangxi under his command joined forces with the Central Red Army under
the leadership of Zhu De and Mao Zedong in Jiangxi. See Gong Chu, Wo yu hongjun,
Hong Kong: Nanfang chubanshe, 1954; Zhonggong Guangxi quwei dangshi ziliao zhengji
weiyuanhui (ed.), Zuo-You jiang geming gengjudi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, pp. 492-7;
Lu Qunhe and Li Yingfen, Li Mingrui, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992; and articles and
memoirs of Wu Xi, Huang Songjian, Lu Xiuxuan, Lin Qing in the Bibliography of this
thesis. Also see Zhang Renmin, “Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai”, CQ, No.
112 (1 March 1962), and “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, Nos. 308-
9 (1-16 May 1970); Diana Lary, “Communism and Ethnic Revolt: Notes on the Chuang
Peasant Movement in Kwangsi, 1921-31”, China Quarterly, No. 49 (1972); and Graham
Hutchings, “The Troubled Life and After-life of a Guangxi Communist: Some Notes on Li
Mingrui and the Communists in Guangxi Province Before 1949”, China Quarterly, No.
104 (December 1985), pp. 700-708.

97
 This Li-Bai-Huang leadership coincided with the needs of the Clique of the 1930s
in domestic reconstruction and mobilization of the province and in external relations with
other factions, including the Jiang group. As Leng Guan (Hu Lin), editor of Dagong Bao
(Ta Kung Pao, or Ta Kung Daily) in Tianjin, pointed out in 1935, Li had won the position
of top leader and was able to control the whole Clique because of his superior moral
characteristics and his charismatic ability; Bai had distinguished himself in military strategy
and tactics; and Huang was the best possible civil administrator to implement the Clique’s
policies which were made by both of the former. In other words, to draw a parallel with
ranks in the army, Li was Commander-in-Chief, Bai Frontline Commander-in-Chief and
Chief of Staff, and Huang served as Commander of the rear base.207 In a sense, this
triumvirate was seen as a whole, particularly within the Clique. Li and Bai were, in the
view of those observing from the outside, even treated as one person, named Li-Bai. Li
also recognized this without reservation in his memoirs.208 The adjustment to the
leadership plus the common political goal designed by the secret organization, along with
changes in the political situation, made the Clique more secure than all others, and lasted
until the fall of the GMD on the mainland in 1949.

The Secret Political Organization

Of course, the stabilization of the Li-Bai-Huang leadership after 1931 was also
benefited by the work of an efficient secret political organization within the Guangxi
Clique.
As stated above, military school graduates were able to achieve spectacular
successes for the Clique militarily. But the Clique had clearly been out-manoeuvred
politically by Jiang. The reverses of Guangxi troops in Hubei and departure of Huang
Shaohong indicated the necessity for strengthening political unity within the Clique. A
possible measure to meet the necessity was that after 1930 the Clique set up a secret
organization as a politically cohesive force by setting a political goal which they would all
strive for. This was a common political consciousness which emerged in the senior ranks

207
Leng Guan, “Yue-Gui xieying”, in Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning,
1935, p. 7. Also see Lu Yi, “Guangxi san jutou yinxiang ji”, Nanning minguo ribao, 23
February 1936.
208
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 100.

98
of the Clique, first, after their failure in the struggle with Jiang to achieve power sharing
and for freedom in carrying out different domestic and external policies, and second, after
the shock of the departure of several senior members from this Guangxi group. The Clique
believed that the departure of these members was the result of failing to provide them with
a clear and firm political goal. Of course, the fact of a secret organization in a faction
working to tie their internal relations to the leaders and to unite policies and define goal was
also a common phenomenon in the GMD.209 It worked to deflect the different political
demands and discordant policies within the Nationalists, and also, to some extent
reconciled the different consciousness of the factions within the GMD to achieve political
unity of the party and nation. The GMD under Jiang’s control had successfully subverted
the forces of the Clique in subduing Guangxi, but the Clique leaders learned fast and
formed their own organization in their revival.
The secret organization of the Clique, named “Zhongguo Guomindang hudang
jiuguo qingnian juntuan” (the Party Protection and National Salvation Young Army Corp
of the Chinese Nationalist Party),210 was formed in September 1930. Because of its internal
division, to which Jiang partly contributed, this was a critical time for Li Zongren and the
Guangxi Clique. At the same time, Jiang also ordered the neighbouring provincial troops
of Guangxi to invade the Clique’s base in an attempt to destroy its strength completely in
the province. These all brought crisis to the Clique. These events also provided two urgent

209
For example, Jiang Jieshi had a secret organization - the Blue Shirts. See Lloyd E.
Eastman, Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule 1927-1937, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 31-84. For details of Jiang Jieshi's secret
organization in the GMD, see Chai Fu (ed.), C. C. neimu, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1988.
210
For details of this organization, see Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi
zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 136-50. But, according to the memoirs of Yu Shixi, a
member of the secret body and a senior commander of the 7th Army at that time, the name
of this secret body was “Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan” (The
Revolutionary Young Army Corp of the Chinese Nationalist Party). See Yu Shixi, “Xin
Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi - Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 47-58. It should be noted here, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japan
War in 1937 when Li and Bai left Guangxi leading the Guangxi troops to the battlefront in
east and central China, they dismissed this secret body and destroyed all confidential
documents relating to the body obeying the orders of Li and Bai in order to demonstrate
their sincere intention of cooperation with Jiang and upholding internal unity of the GMD
(see Feng Huang, “Gengzheng”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, p. 202). For this reason, this secret
body in the Clique was not known by the public. Of course, details on this body rely only
on the memoirs of the relevant persons who were once its members as its original
documents are all not available at this time.

99
reasons for Li to set up the secret organization. First, to survive in the province and to
prevent further internal wavering, Li had realized the necessity for building up a political
organization to transform the Clique from a single military group into one with a dual
nature, both military and political. A firm political standpoint and a united political group
would bring strength to Li in his continuing struggle with Jiang, to back up a tough army
which he had always had. Another reason for a secret political body was that Li wanted to
maintain the Zhang Fakui group (i.e. the “Ironside”) in Guangxi for continuing anti-Jiang
activity, because the latter and the Clique had fought together against Jiang after it followed
the Reorganization Faction in opposing Nanjing and entered Guangxi to join forces with
the Guangxi group at the end of 1929.211 Thus, the aim of the “Young Army Corp” was to
oppose Jiang and eventually to overthrow his dictatorship in the cause of national salvation.
This central aim was based on the assumption that China was coming under Jiang’s
dictatorship, and the perceived need for democratic politics throughout the country, by
which it meant power sharing of the nation and regional self-government, according to the
political program of this body.212 To achieve these ends, it claimed Sun Yatsen’s the Three
Principles of the People as its guiding ideology even though this was never more concrete
than a mere outline of ideas. This is understandable because all of the factions within the
GMD claimed to be faithful followers of the Three Principles of the People in the
Nationalist era. Li and his colleagues were no exception. Of course, this body had to be a
secret one because Li and other Guangxi leaders still waved the GMD flag and attempted to
avoid both attack from the Nationalists and adverse public opinion. Through a secret
organization, they also expected to promote and strengthen the prestige of the
triumvirate.213 For this reason, the body was well-organized in its organizational structure,
with Li, Bai, and Zhang Fakui as the top leaders. They then established branches in both
the Guangxi armies and the “Ironside” under the command of Zhang which joined forces

211
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 70.
212
See Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 139-
41, and the same author, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 42-3; and Yi Shixi, “Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de
mimi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 48-51.
213
Song Houren, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Yu
Shixi, “Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 47-58.

100
with the Clique and fought in Guangxi against Jiang, with middle and high ranking officers
(i.e. military school graduates) as members.214
Through a two year struggle, Li revived his forces in Guangxi, to which this secret
body made a considerable contribution. There was additional assistance also from the
Guangdong Faction, which had once supported Jiang Jieshi in his attempts to eliminate the
Clique. This faction abandoned its hostilities and resumed the cooperation between the two
parties after the “Hu Hanmin Incident” which occurred in March 1931.215 With two years’
experience, Li had already realized important results from his secret organization because it
played an extremely important role in helping the Clique to overcome its crisis. During that
time, it had consolidated internal unity, formed the ideal of the anti-Jiang and regional self-
government that the Clique would pursue, and strengthened the union with the “Ironside”.
Furthermore, a semi-independent organization from Nanjing was set up in Guangzhou,
with Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as its mainstay, after the “Hu Hanmin Incident”.
With this new political situation appearing in the GMD, and with Guangxi freed from the
military pressure of encirclement by the neighbouring provincial troops, particularly that of
Guangdong, the whole situation was clearly changed. The “Ironside” then left Guangxi in
early 1932 for Nanjing because Wang Jingwei, its spiritual leader, joined Jiang and formed
a cooperative government between the two groups under their leadership. “The Young
Army Corp”, which was formed with the “Ironside”, was to be reorganized as part of the
latter. Meanwhile, after the “September 18 Incident” in 1931, along with the further
Japanese invasion of China, resistance to imperialism, or to be more exact, resistance
against Japan, which was the mission of the Nationalist Revolution, became an urgent
political demand throughout the country. To strengthen control of the province and to
synchronize the activities of the Clique with the needs of this new political development in
internal and external situations, Li now reorganized this secret body and renamed it
“sanmin zhuyi geming tongzhihui” (the Revolutionary Association of Comrades of the
Three Principles of the People) early in 1932 instead of “the Young Army Corp” in order to

214
Yu Shixi, “Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 49-50.
215
For details of the “Hu Hanmin Incident”, see Lau-cheung Yee, Hu Han-min: A
Scholar-Revolutionary in Contemporary China, unpublished PhD dissertation, University
of California, Santa Barbara, 1986. Also see Hu Hanmin, “Hu Hanmin zizhuan”, JDSZL,
No. 2, 1981, and No. 2, 1983.

101
make it really become a nucleus body of the Clique to strengthen its internal unity in the
province.216
The political program of “the Revolutionary Association of Comrades” after its
reorganization was as follows: 1) It affirmed sanmin zhuyi as the leading ideology of the
Chinese revolution and would fight with others to reach this goal. 2) It stated that the
nature of the Chinese revolution at the present was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal
Nationalist Revolution, while the central mission of the revolution was to struggle for
national liberation. The national struggle for independence was the prerequisite for
carrying out measures for developing people's rights and enriching people's livelihood. 3) It
stated Jiang Jieshi as the primary enemy of the Chinese revolution, while all patriotic
parties and groups were in alliance with this organization. 4) It would unite all forces
which could be united (to achieve its goal) and avoid making enemies as much as possible
while pointing others towards the real enemy.217
This political program indicated the political attitude of the Clique in the first half
of the 1930s. The main theme of the program was its anti-Jiang sentiment and anti-
Japanese attitude. It is true that the anti-Jiang bias was based on the resentment of the
Clique against Jiang himself. However, the anti-Jiang policy of the Clique had a dual
purpose: revenge for Jiang’s attempts to eliminate other factions with which he had
differences; and opposition to Jiang’s dictatorship throughout the country resulting from his
policy of “rangwai bixian annei” (domestic pacification before an external war). After
1931, although the Clique had escaped the fate of total destruction by Jiang, it was still
excluded from the central power structure. In other words, the gap between Li and Jiang
had not been eliminated but actually enlarged, because the latter still wanted to wipe out all
his rivals, among whom the Clique was the principal one, before starting a war of national
resistance against Japanese aggression. Li and his group remained opposed to Jiang,
waiting for a chance to restore their previous force, and to consolidate their base - Guangxi.
They also wanted to reestablish their reputation because Li and the Clique had been
regarded by Jiang and his followers as the representative of feudal regionalism since

216
See Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 144-
5. The name of this body, according to Wei Yongcheng, was “Kangri geming tongzhihui”
(The Revolutionary Comrade Association of Resistance against Japan). See Wei
Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116.
217
Chen Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 71.

102
1929.218 Such resentment against Jiang also had a wider social basis within the GMD.
Sharp internal factional struggles had divided that body after the launching of the Northern
Expedition and this provided fertile soil for the Clique to continue holding up its anti-Jiang
banner, as it could derive a lot of allies and sympathy as a result. This is because all of
those factions of the GMD, which were either defeated or were being threatened by Jiang,
were seeking to restore their own forces and to overthrow his rule.219
There also was a political basis. The two political organizations of the Southwest
existed as a semi-independent organization from Nanjing, the Clique being one of the two
mainstays in these organizations. Both the organizations and the Clique aimed to share
power in the Nanjing government and the party. Their aim was, according to Hu Hanmin, a
GMD veteran and spiritual leader of the organizations, to reach the “minquan tongzhi” (the
rule by civic rights) instead of Jiang’s “junquan tongzhi” (the rule by military force).220 To
some extent, this minquan tongzhi was the idea of regional self-government held by the
Clique. It emphasized power sharing by all factions and groups, of course, mainly
including the Clique and others, as against Jiang’s dictatorship. Both social and political
bases were linked by the above political program of the secret body under the Clique.
The Revolutionary Association of Comrades was further renamed “Zhongguo
Guomindang geming tongzhihui” (The Revolutionary Association of Comrades of the
Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1934.221 The further reorganization of this body was
correlated with the current situation. To draw more people into the Clique and strengthen

218
See “Taofa Guixi junfa wengao”, 1929, Nationalist Government Archives, The
Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing. Also see Pan Gongzhan, “Shinian lai de
Zhongguo tongyi yundong”, in Zhongguo jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan qian shinian zhi
Zhongguo, first printed in 1937; reprinted Hong Kong, 1965, pp. 1-20.
219
For example, Hu Hanmin had contacts on all sides, with influential and potential
figures in the Nationalists such as Cheng Qian, Zhang Xueliang, Song Zheyuan, Feng
Yuxiang, Han Fuju and militarists in the Southwest in order to form a wide united front
designed to overthrow Jiang Jieshi and carry out their policy towards the Japanese invasion.
See Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou yu Hu-Jiang hejie”, KRZZYJ,
First Issue (September 1991), pp. 101-40.
220
Ibid, p. 133.
221
Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 146-9;
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and He
Zuobai, “Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui neimu”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 35-
46.

103
it, a firm political group with discipline and the capacity for the pursuit of political aims
was necessary. Moreover, Hu Hanmin was secretly reorganizing a political party, i.e. the
new Guomindang, in an attempt to replace that of Nanjing. Hu attempted to use both
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as the base of this new Guomindang. However, Chen
Jitang, ruler of Guangdong, refused to cooperate with Hu in his plan. Hu then turned to
Guangxi. He sent Huang Jilu, one of his trusted followers and a GMD veteran, into the
province in 1934, with many details of his organization’s plans for a new Guomindang. Li
had not fully adopted this plan, but used the idea in reorganizing his secret political body
and renamed it with the above title.222 This perhaps was the first step taken by Li and Bai
in their attempt to form their own political party instead of supporting the GMD under
Jiang’s control. According to Song Houreng, a member of the secret body, during that
period, Li and the Clique still nursed the humiliation of their earlier defeat and planned for
another day. But this was only part of their motivation. They firmly believed it was
necessary to form a new political party to replace Jiang for both political and military
reasons in order to lead the nation to resist Japan and save the country, because they were
convinced that Jiang’s policy of “rangwai bixian annei” would not lead to national
salvation but would destroy China. At least their aim was to restore the GMD, a good
reason which denied any suggestion of self-aggrandizement.223 If so, they naturally
claimed themselves to be national leaders.
During this period, Li and Bai had always held that Jiang betrayed the Revolution,
and had used the GMD as a tool for advancing his own interests, breaking all of Sun
Yatsen's promises to the peasants and common people. Jiang and his followers had done
their best to represent the Clique as the chief criminal element, destroying the reunification
of the nation, and forming an obstacle to prosecution of the external war at this time in
order to make easier Japan's absorption of China.224 In order to rebut this claim and to
preserve its existence and expansion, the secret body of the Clique linked its purposes
firmly with those of Chinese nationalism. The leaders of the Clique used the resentment

222
Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, p. 147.
223
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 138-31.
224
See, for example, “Taofa Guixi junfa wengao, 1929”, Archives of the Editorial
Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government, The Second Historical Archives
of China, Nanjing; Anonymous, Dui Liangguang yidong zhi renshi, n.p., 1936; and
Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, n.p., 1936.

104
against Jiang which existed among the Guangxi people as they suffered in straitened
circumstances in 1929-1931. They attributed the chaos of 1929-1931 to the invasion of
Guangxi by the neighbouring provincial troops in order to impose Jiang's dictatorship. Li
and the Clique gained willing support when they encouraged the Guangxi people to fight
together with them against the invasion. At the same time, the existence and expansion of
the Clique were largely enhanced by the national political situation, in which the most
important event was the “September 18 Incident” in 1931 engineered by the Japanese in an
offensive designed to conquer the whole of China. In response to this event, Jiang merely
continued to concentrate his troops for the purpose of eliminating domestic adversaries,
both the CCP and rivals within the GMD, including the Guangxi Clique, instead of
immediately resisting the latest burst of Japanese aggression. Seizing this opportunity, the
political program of the secret body put forward anti-Japanism, national independence,
together with the anti-Jiang movement. In China, it was customary to emphasize “shichu
youming” (dispatch troops with just cause) when a campaign or a movement was initiated.
So “anti-Jiang and anti-Japan” slogan became the foundation for the existence and
expansion of the Clique within and outside Guangxi. The secret body served those
purposes well. In other words, Li and the Clique used propaganda against Jiang's weak
policy towards the Japanese invasion of China to serve their own ends. However, there
could be no question of the genuineness of the anti-Japanese spirit of both the leaders and
the people of Guangxi. As Hallett Abend pointed out in the 1930s, Guangxi was sincere in
their anti-Japanism and in their belief that if Jiang continued to be in power, China would
be “given away to Japan, bit by bit”, while Jiang husbanded his military and cash reserves
to sustain his own domestic position against domestic adversaries. Guangxi sincerely
wanted to reorganize the central government, and then to arouse the national patriotism of
all the Chinese people in order to make an effort to regain North China and Manchuria,
which were occupied and threatened by the Japanese army.225
Why did the secret body claim itself to belong to the GMD and operate publicly
under the GMD banner? First, the Clique opposed Jiang and his group, but not the GMD
itself. Secondly, the current ideology of the GMD provided the most useful tool for the
secret body. All people within the GMD had claimed themselves to be the followers of

225
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943, p.
223.

105
Sun’s sanmin zhuyi, regardless of whether or not ordinary people could be said to be clear
about the implications of those principles. Li and his followers were of course no
exception. Once the secret body of the Clique affirmed sanmin zhuyi as the guiding
ideology, it could clear the doubt from the minds of its members on the one hand, and could
easily obtain the political belief of its members on the other, as well as inviting people
opposed to Jiang to join. Furthermore, with the banner of the GMD, it had a justifiable
excuse to defend itself from any attack under a flag well known to the Chinese people and
the rest of the country, and could also easily avoid public criticisms.
All policies and activities of the Clique had always centred on a theme - linking its
own existence and expansion to the tide of the time - by insisting on resistance against
Japan during the 1930s. The secret body of the Clique embodied the theme of carrying out
mass mobilization and reconstruction in the province. This was well-organized with
rigorous discipline and clear anti-Jiang and anti-Japanese political goals, and played a very
important role in the reconstruction and mobilization of Guangxi. The internal unity of
Guangxi during the June 1 Movement in 1936, when Jiang encircled the province from
three provinces with superior forces, showed the success of the secret body in political
organization and discipline. Because none of the Clique’s members defected from the
Guangxi group, except several pilots who were natives of Guangdong and who left
Guangxi for their native province, Jiang failed to buy over Guangxi members as he
successfully did in Guangdong. Li’s secret body continued its work until the outbreak of
the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 when Jiang officially called for national resistance. To
show the determination of political unity within the GMD and to offer resistance to the
Japanese in full force, Li and the Clique officially disbanded “the Revolutionary
Association of Comrades” and destroyed all relevant documents in September 1937.226

226
According to Huang Qihan, Bai’s confidential secretary in the late 1930s, after the
outbreak of nationwide resistance against Japan occurred in August 1937, the Clique and
Jiang reached an agreement to dismiss all secret political organizations. The Clique did so.
But Jiang had, in fact, not kept his word. Both Li and Bai privately swore to Jiang’s
betrayal. For the organization of the so-called “Guangxi jianshe yanjiuhui” (Guangxi
Reconstruction Studies Association) which was openly established by Li in Guilin in
October 1937, someone might claim that it was the reproduction or continuation of the
“Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui” (see Chen Shaoxian, “Guangxi jianshe
yanjiuhui de chengli he jieshu”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 73-846). In fact, the association
was not a secret political organization but was a liaison unit of the Clique with the aim of
maintaining and enlarging its contact with all forces the Clique could influence. Of course,
this association also had a dual mission to provide the Clique with the political organization

106
After that, Bai left Guangxi for Nanjing to become Jiang’s Deputy Chief of Staff, and Li
went to the Fifth War Zone as Commander-in-Chief and led several hundred thousand
Guangxi soldiers to resist Japan in central and east China.

Brains Trust

The formation and development of a secret political body in the Clique depended
on its Brains Trust, a group of political advisers. This group was composed of two parts:
figures from other provinces and factions who had opposed Jiang, and the Guangxi students
returned from Russia. The willingness of the former to join Guangxi showed that the
Clique’s anti-Jiang policy had a certain support and sympathy. These people included Pan
Yizhi, Qiu Changwei, Zhu Foding, Liu Shiheng, the former elements of the Reorganization
Faction and the Third Party under Deng Yanda as well as elements who gave up the
Communist memberships, and so on, a mixture of politicians and political scholars.
However, the important contribution came from the latter, who made great contributions to
the consolidation of the “Revolutionary Association of Comrades” and provided a
theoretical basis for its political program. These returned students from Russia became an
important force in the Clique during the 1930s.
Wang Gongdu was head of the returned students. A native of Yongfu county (in
the guanhua dialect system), Wang was sent by Li to Russia in 1926 to study at Sun Yatsen
University, Moscow, an institution set up for the benefit of both Chinese Nationalists and
Communists.227 According to Wei Yongcheng, a senior officer of the Clique and Wang’s
classmate in Russia, this background provided Wang with an opportunity to learn the
Russian leader Stalin’s methods of organization in the party. Wang had realized the
enormous possibilities of political organization, particularly a secret one, and viewed this as
a prerequisite to defeat domestic adversaries in internal struggles in the party. The fact that
Stalin successfully defeated Trotsky, another leader of Russian Communists, was one good

and officers once Jiang could not continue to resist Japan. But such a proposal never had a
chance to be put into practice. For details of the association, see recollections of Li Wei,
Chen Shaoxian, Li Renren, Wan Zhongwen and Cheng Siyuan in the Bibliography. In the
Autumn of 1947, Bai, then Minister of Defence in Nanjing, once proposed restoring the
previous secret political body. The exact result of this proposal is unknown. See Huang
Qihan, “Guixi jiqi fandong de zhengzhi zuzhi”, WSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 128-129.
227
Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 97.

107
example. This perception of Russian political organization had strongly influenced Wang’s
subsequent actions in Guangxi.228 He came back to China in 1928 to serve as secretary to
Li in Wuhan.
Li’s defeat in the following year provided Wang with an opportunity to play an
important role in the revival and consolidation of the Clique’s internal unity. Owing to
military defeat, Li had already been conscious that it was not sufficient to rely solely on the
power of a single military group. What his rival Jiang possessed was not only a central
government but also a national party with a political ideal, even if the ideal was only given
in lip service and without real substance. Wang became Li’s political adviser in this critical
circumstance. He suggested Li to form a secret political organization within the Clique in
accordance with that of Russia as a preparation for forming a political party. This would
make the Clique a main force in the Chinese Revolution. “The Young Army Corp”, and
then “the Revolutionary Association of Comrades”, were established in accordance with
what Wang suggested.229 Since 1931, Wang had been Chief of the propaganda and
organization field of the Clique. Meanwhile, Wang drew numerous returned students from
Russia into the Clique. They held all important positions of propaganda work in Guangxi,
and became an influential Brains Trust.
This group set all propaganda machines in motion serving the needs of the Clique,
particularly that of the secret organization. They loudly advocated the political program of
“the Revolutionary Association of Comrades”, the theoretical foundation of the Clique
which will be discussed in the next chapter. Once the appropriate political policy (i.e. that
of anti-Jiang and anti-Japan, for the Clique) was determined, officers were a decisive factor
for a political organization. When the secret body was formed, Wang and his colleagues
devoted their major efforts to training political and military officers. On the one hand, they
imbued the officers with the ideas that the Clique was the leading force of the Chinese
Revolution and Li and Bai were its real leaders.230 On the other hand, they set up many

228
Ibid, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116.
229
See Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36;
and Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 115-6.
230
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-8; He
Zuobai, “Wang Gongdu de mimi zuzhi huodong”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 137-49;, and
the same author, “Zhongguo Guomindang Guangxi dangzheng yanjiusuo”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 15, pp. 40-4.

108
small-size secret clubs or societies in the army and schools as well as the provincial
government, which became peripheral organizations of the secret political body.231
Through their efforts, the low and middle ranking officers of the Clique fostered belief in
their group and leaders. Although Wang was executed by Li and Bai in September 1937,232
his ideals still influenced the activities of these people. For example, during the Sino-
Japanese War, Jiang’s trusted followers failed to draw these low and middle ranking
officers of the Clique over to Jiang’s side, even though they tried in many ways.233
The success of the Brains Trust in propaganda work was correlated with their
perception of the nature of Chinese society. Their perception was based on their similar
political backgrounds. Members of the Brains Trust, including those students returned
from Russia and other politicians and scholars who had joined the CCP before such as Zhu
Foding,234 were mostly influenced by Marxism-Leninism. They realized that the nature of
Chinese society was semi-feudal and semi-colonial, and as stated above, influenced by
borrowing from the theory of imperialism. Against the CCP’s theory that the working class

231
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and
Ni Zhongtao, “Wang Gongdu zai junxiao de mimi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 13, pp. 178-82;
and He Zuobai, “Wang Gongdu de mimi zuzhi huodong”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 137-49.
232
The execution of Wang in September 1937 remains a mystery to this day. There are
several theories about Wang’s death. One is that Wang was the victim of an internal
struggle of the Clique. As Wang had influence on the lower and middle ranking officers of
the Clique, those veterans and senior officers of Guangxi were jealous of the promotion of
his power so quickly. They concocted a false charge against him. As a result, Li and Bai
had to put Wang to death in accordance with the excuse that he attempted to overthrow the
rule of the Clique in Guangxi. See Chen Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 111-5; Song
Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Jian Mo,
“Guanyu chujue Wang Gongdu an”, GXSHKX, No. 2, 1982, pp. 68-73, and p. 28. Some
argue that the execution of Wang resulted from his small-size secret societies. These
activities had not coincided with the needs of the Clique in the new political situation of
national resistance against Japan. See Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 32,
No. 1, p. 116; and Hou Kuangshi, “Li-Bai junfa jituan neibu paixi andou ji Wang Gongdu
zhi beisha”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 150-60. However, according to the writer’s interview
with Feng Huang (Nanning, Guangxi, 15/10/ 1992), the execution of Wang was a an unjust
verdict, because Li and Bai had fallen for the stratagem of sowing distrust or discord among
the Clique designed by the Jiang Group. Also see Xie Fengnian, “Wo suo zhidao de
youguan Wang Gongdu si de jijianshi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 13, pp. 174-7.
233
Yuan Yansha, “Jiang-Gui zai wuzhanqu zhenggong fangmian de mingzheng andou”,
HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 98-101.
234
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 128.

109
was the leading force of the Chinese revolution, they emphasized that the productive
masses were the basis and main force of the Chinese revolution linked with reconstruction
and mobilization.235 Their perception contributed to the formation of a firm political goal
by the Clique on the one hand, and coincided with the needs of awakening the masses to
the political consciousness of the current situation that China faced on the other. With their
perception of the nature of Chinese society, the Clique created a theory of the Pearl River
Valley Revolution, which will be discussed in the next chapter. This theory became a
motive force to imbue the Guangxi people with nationalism, to facilitate the purpose of
cooperation with other factions of the GMD, and to compromise with Jiang to facilitate
vigorous resistance against Japan.

Regional Identity and Its Relations with the Guangxi Clique

A motive driving the Clique to be a powerful rival of Jiang in the GMD during the
Nanjing decade to a great extent correlated with its strong “xiangtu yishi”, or “xiangtu
guannian” (provincialism, or, regional identity).
Regional identity, or provincialism, refers to the individual’s attachment to his or
her region or province and its customs, rather than his or her country. As province in China
traditionally has been not only the administrative unit but also the cultural one, here the
region usually refers to province. The emergence of provincialism or regional identity
closely correlated with “xiangtu wenhua” (provincial, or regional culture), which refers to
the forms of substance and spirit emerging and existing in a certain region or area with the
regional or district characteristics created by the people who live there. It includes regional
or provincial product, cultural consciousness, and cultural spirit, etc. In this sense,
provincialism or regional identity means that the individual in a certain region or province
identifies strongly with and accepts the provincial or regional culture. It includes the
individual’s identity, affirmation and acceptance of the economic life of the region, spiritual
value, sense of consciousness, and standard of ethics within the limits of the region or

235
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 126-30. The
details of the Clique’s perception of the Chinese Revolution will be discussed next chapter.

110
province where he or she lives or belongs. It also includes the regional dialect, customs and
psychological patterns of inherent thought that the individual has cultivated. The form of
expression of provincialism or regional identity is regional feeling. Such an identity with
region or province is also called regionalism, in the sense of culture, as discussed in the
"Introduction".
Provincialism or regional identity has four special features as follows.
1) Each provincialism has a particularity of standard of value. In other words, each
provincialism is an independent ideology, and it is easy to be recognised by signs such as
the Cantonese and Shanghai dialects.
2) The identity’s structure is ordered on different levels which is the same as that of
“chaxu geju” (Chinese social structure), a theory of Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong (Fei
Hsiao Tung).236 Such an identity successively expands from native or regional emotion
(jiaxiang guan, or xiangtu qing), consciousness of return to his or her homeland (guigeng),
consciousness of being attached to his or her native land and unwilling to leave it (antu
zhongqian), to dialect, customs, etc, according to its importance. The degrees and feelings
of the individual’s identity of region to some extent are the same as the function of the
Doppler Effect.
3) It has a closed or semi-closed nature. After the individual in a certain regional
culture has created his or her own provincialism or regional identity, such consciousness
exists and develops as an independent system with strongly closed or semi-closed nature in
his or her mind. Once the consciousness is invaded or harassed by outside cultures, its
outer elements such as customs are first affected or destroyed, but its inner elements such as
the feeling attaching to the region still resist tenaciously; and finally, it might accept these

236
This theory refers to a social structure of traditional China. According to Fei
Xiaotong, each individual in rural society of China lives in a certain circle of “regional
culture” in which the family is the basic unit. As the individual is tightly bound to earth,
his or her connection with the society and the outside world is limited to a certain circle or
district, usually defined through family or clan and village. Naturally, the progressive
decrease in the individual’s loyalty, identity and responsibility to family or clan, village,
district, region, province, until state is accompanied by a decrease in his or her connection
with the society in order from the strong to the weak. This structure is just the same as the
response after a stone is thrown into the water, or, the Doppler Effect. For details of “chaxu
geju” theory, see Fei Xiaotong, Xiangtu Zhongguo (Earth Bound China), Shanghai:
Zhongguo guanchashe, 1947; and Fei Hsiao Tung (Fei Xiaotong), “An Interpretation of
Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes”, in Fei Hsiao Tung, Chinese Village Close-up.
Beijing: New World Press, 1983, pp. 124-57.

111
outside cultures, or allow them to coexist with its original regional identity. The emergence
of the Chinese consciousness of “the second homeland” (dier guxiang), whether in other
provinces or overseas, is the best example for this nature.
4) Those individuals who possess the same kind of regional identity can attract each
other. In China, there are big or small different circles of regional culture which are usually
divided by provinces. As they all have the same identity, those individuals who come from
the same regional culture with the same provincialism can easily be on intimate terms with
each other, but repel one another with other circles of regional culture. In the same way, if
we follow the model of Fei Xiaotong’s “chaxu geju” and extend its meanings a little bit
further, even individuals who come from the neighbouring or similar circles of regional
culture (here it means province), although different from their native one, can more easily
become friends than those from others. For example, people from Yunnan, Guizhou and
Sichuan provinces can easily be on intimate terms with each more readily than they can
make friends with people from the provinces of Henan and Shanxi.
The combination of the above features forms the general characteristic of
provincialism or regional identity - stronger stabilization and cohesion.237 In other words,
provincialism or regional identity has a function to cohere the individuals from the same
circle of regional culture, a motive force to unite people, and a link between those people
with the same cultural background. In the case of the Guangxi Clique, provincialism or
regional identity had a great influence on its rise and development.
Diana Lary has pointed out in her studies of the Clique that the Guangxi
reconstruction movement in the 1930s depended for much of its popular support on the
highly-developed provincial particularism of the province. In fact, such a provincial
particularism was the regional identity of Guangxi, for which her comments are very much
to the point. She writes,
The moving force of the Movement was “Greater Kwangsi-ism” (Ta Kuang-hsi
chu-i) or “local patriotism” (l’amour de la petite patrie). This was a force which

237
For concept of “provincialism or regional identity” and its features, see Hu Fengqing,
“‘Xiangtu yishi’ yu xin Guixi”, JXDXXB, No. 3, 1990, pp. 53-7. It should be pointed out
here that the discussion of this section employs some views of Hu Fengqing and is to some
extent inspired by Hu Fengqing’s study in this field.

112
 the Kwangsi leaders did not have to create; it existed already, an intangible but
potentially powerful force for mobilisation.238
From my point of view, such a “local patriotism”, i.e. regionalism, in fact, also was
a source which the Clique employed to organize and educate the masses by taking the ideas
of both resistance against Japanese aggression and opposition to Jiang. In this way, the
Clique drove the people of the province to promote their regionalism to the level of
nationalism. Here, the function of provincialism which was guided by the Clique was the
same as that of the “chaxu geju” theory. That is to say, the Clique employed regional
cohesion of the province and its peculiar virtues - militancy, discipline, energy, adaptability
- to reconstruct their homeland and defend it from any attack by Jiang. It was also the base
of the Guangxi leaders advocating regional self-government and carrying out the semi-
independent policy from Nanjing at that time.239 On the other hand, such regional identity,
particularly consciousness of heroes and the glorious history which had already existed in
the province since the Taiping Rebellion, was easily guided by the Clique to transfer into a
sense of responsibility to the nation - to defend the nation.240 In short, it provided the
Guangxi leaders with the base on which to carry out their anti-Japanese and Anti-Jiang
policy. Moreover, it was the source of the so-called “Pearl River Valley Revolutionary
Theory”, which was created in order to claim for themselves the leadership of the Chinese
revolution and to inspire feelings more akin to nationalism than regionalism.241
Provincialism also provided the leadership of the Clique with stability and
solidarity. We have pointed out earlier that the leadership of the Clique was a group rather
than an individual like most other factions. The top leadership in the Clique was the Li -
Huang - Bai system, later the Li-Bai-Huang (Xuchu), then in proper order the BMA group,
and level by level down to the bottom. This was the so-called “tuanti” (the group) of the

238
Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 167.
239
See Li Zongren, “Duiyu difang zizhi jige yinan wenti de poushi”, DSZK, No. 3, 1931.
240
See Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Guangxi
yu Zhongguo geming, Nanning, 1936; and Li Zongren, “Huifu women de huangjin shidai”,
Li-Bai liang zhongyang weiyuan zuijin yanlun sanji, Guilin, 1937, pp. 5-9. Also see Li
Zongren, “Fahui women minzu duli de jingshen”, Zhinanzhen (Yulin), Nos. 47-9 (1934).
241
A further discussion of the “Pearl River Valley Revolutionary Theory” is in Chapter
Five.

113
Clique. In this group, the individual interests were usually concealed by the whole. For
example, the three powerful leaders, although Li was dominant, always conferred together
before they made decisions for the Clique. Li always trusted his colleagues; in return, other
leaders supported and consolidated his top leadership in the Clique. As someone
suggested, it was as if their different personalities were mutually supplementary.242 But the
driving force behind the mutual trust between them was, to a great extent, a remarkable
unanimity towards consistent local and national interests.243 Even when individual
interests prevailed over the whole, as in the case of the departure of Huang Shaohong in
1930, he still retained his feeling toward the “tuanti” - the Clique. Before he left Guangxi,
Huang openly explained the two principles which would guide his actions in the future.
The first was that he would not continue to harass national unification by Jiang, who was
trying to bring the nation by force into the unification under his direct control. The second
was that Huang would never betray the Clique even after he left Guangxi.244 This is a
typical dual interest view. But it precisely reflects the cohesion of regional identity which
still influenced Huang in his actions. Indeed, regional identity provided the Guangxi group
with a stable and harmonious atmosphere which could not be destroyed by outside forces.
As the Clique originated from the circle of Guangxi native culture, it had done its best to
draw all individuals who belonged to the circle of the province into the group.245 It
naturally provided all members with interests which they should have. But, the actions by
each member in achieving his or her interests had to coincide with certain principles. The
most important principle was that the individual must not harm and interfere with the
interests of others which might cause internal conflict to destroy the entity of the Clique. If
this principle was breached, the individual involved in the case would be abandoned by
other members of the group. Yu Zuobai, Li Mingrui, and Lu Huanyan were examples.
Even the execution of Wang Gongdu was also based on the principle of maintaining

242
Lu Yi, “Guangxi sanjutou yinxiang ji”, Nanning minguo ribao, 23/02/1936.
243
See reminiscences of Chen Liangzuo, Chen Xiong, Yin Chenggang and other senior
members of the Guangxi Clique in the Bibliography of this thesis.
244
Huang Shaohong, “Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi”, WSZLXJ, No. 7.
245
Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 104-35. Also see
Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10.

114
internal unity of the Clique.246 That is to say, regional identity contributed to consolidation
of the Clique’s leadership and its internal hierarchical structure was easily understood and
accepted by all classes.
The regional identity to a great extent provided the Clique with a motive force for
its rise and even for its revival after the group was broken. As stated earlier, the formation
of the Clique depended basically on these young soldiers who had similar education
background and shared the common aim of uniting and reconstructing Guangxi during the
chaos of the province in the early of the 1920s.247 The rise of the Guangxi “zizhi jun” (Self-
Governing Army) throughout the province against the invaded Guangdong Army and other
“kejun” (the guest troops) from neighbouring provinces during 1921-1924 was a reflection
of this consciousness.248 Li wisely used this situation and the local interests on which he
depended in Yulin, the place where he rose to the top in the province.249 Here we can see
the influence of regional identity on the Clique from the titles of the two armies under the
command of Li and Huang separately in 1923-1924.250 The circle telegraphy against Lu
Rongting issued by Li and Huang in 1924 also speaks in strong regional tones.251 Even the
revival of the Clique after its defeat by Jiang in 1929, to a great extent, relied on the force of
regional identity. The fact that senior officers of Guangxi willingly accepted and welcomed

246
For details of discussion of this problem, see Hu Fengqing, “‘Xiangtu yishi’ yu xin
Guixi”, JXDXXB, No. 3, 1990, pp. 53-7.
247
Qunyan (Your Say), Vol. 4, No. 1 (1925).
248
For details of the Guangxi Self-Governing Army, see Li Jiaxian, “Zizhijun zhanling
Nanning he Guangxi de jumian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3; and Yu Shixi, “Guidong diqu
zizhijun huodong zhuangkuang ji difang fenluan qingxing”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 161-
168.
249
See Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10; and Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 7; Chen Xiong, “Xin Guixi junfa xingcheng shiqi qinli yishu”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 11-68; and Chen Xiong, Yin Chenggang and Lai Huipeng, “Xin
Guixi de jueqi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 1-34.
250
For detailed discussion of this regional colour, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation,
Chapter 3. Also see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 107.
251
See Tang Degang and Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyi lu (The Memoirs of Li Tsung-
jen), Chinese version. Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, p. 137.

115
their former leaders back to the leadership during the period of the Clique’s revival in the
province might explain such an influence.252
The regional identity also contributed to the stability and unity of the Guangxi
troops. Such consciousness depended on the historical glory of heroes created in the
province and used in frequent propaganda by the Clique, which strengthened their identity
of Guangxi and the group. Even the defection of both Li Mingrui and Yu Zuobai in Hubei
arose from regional consciousness. As Li Zongren advocated “Hubei for the Hubei
people”, Hu Zongduo and his followers used the slogan to discriminate against their
colleagues - Guangxi natives in Hubei. A resentment rising between the people from the
two provinces - two different native cultures led to the conflict of the two different cultures
and regional identities. There is evidence that Li Mingrui defected from the Clique because
of that.253 Ironically, Li Mingrui and his cousin Yu Zuobai were abandoned by his native
fellows for their disloyalty to the group.254 That is to say, the Clique itself was also harmed
by regional identity. Naturally, as the action of the Hubei Faction under Hu had damaged
the interests of the Clique, it could not expect any further favours in the Clique after 1929
although some members of this sub-faction of the group such as Generals Cheng Shufen
and Lan Tengjiao still worked in Guangxi. Furthermore, during the two year struggle for
survival, this regional identity even was a motive force to support the Clique for its struggle
with Jiang and for its consolidation of the base in Guangxi to a great extent. There is
evidence that Li Zongren frequently claimed to have freed Guangxi from the suppression
from Jiang.255 As Bai emphasized when Huang Shaohong decided to depart Guangxi for
Nanjing, the Guangxi people never surrendered to Jiang, not only then but also in the future
when they faced more difficult circumstances. Bai said, “the so-called striving for the

252
See Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 201-4; Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang
nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 119 (16/6/1962), pp. 13-6; and Zhang
Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, Nos. 307-9 (April-May
1970).
253
See Zhang Wenhong, “Li Mingrui dao-Gui tou-Jiang he dao-Jiang shibai jingguo”,
WSZLXJ, No. 52.
254
Ibid.
255
See Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang junshi zhengzhi xuexiao diyi fenxiao
zhengxunchu (ed.), Li zongsiling zai-Liu xunhua ji, Liuzhou: Liuzhou minguo ribaoshe,
1931; and Tao-Jiang wendian ji chubian, Guangzhou, 1931; and Tao-Jiang yanlun ji
chubian, Guangzhou, 1931.

116
group that took place under the principle of non-surrender increased its strength, made it
more powerful, and more consolidated than ever”.256 Such strong regional consciousness
exerted its influence of stability so that the Clique possessed the force to struggle for its
existence and expansion. Even in the War of Resistance, the Clique strengthened its force
in Anhui, consolidating its group consciousness and consciousness of its interests.
The fact that the Clique developed and strengthened the cooperation with other
factions in the Southwest such as Guangdong and Guizhou worked in the same way. This
issue will be further discussed in Chapter Five.
Given that regional identity had such a great influence on the Clique, one wonders
whether it contributed to or undermine nationalism or unity of the nation?257 Regional
identity is not a phenomenon peculiar to the Chinese Republic. It has existed in ancient and
modern times and in all countries. Only when regional identity develops into a political
consciousness, i.e. political regionalism, can it influence nationalism, positively or
negatively. A positive regional identity promotes nationalism; and a negative regional
identity harms nationalism and even goes too far to control, so that it separates from the
nation when such a form of regionalism is developed and expands strongly enough to
confront nationalism. Although China had a problem of unification, as Chen Gongbo
pointed out at that time,258 we believe that it applied to internal and external policies rather
than to territory,259 because, as we know, after the GMD’s 4th National Congress at the end
of 1931 China was on the surface reunited under the Nanjing Government with Jiang Jieshi
and Wang Jingwei as heads, apart from the territory occupied by the Japanese in the
Northeast. However, such a national government neither positively dealt with Japanese
aggression nor implemented efficient policies and plans to carry out reconstruction in the
nation,260 the nation-building process, as Paul K. T. Sih suggested.261 In circumstances

256
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 45.
257
Diana Lary suggests that the Guangxi Clique’ persistence with regionalism undercut
nationalism, the nationalism of national unity. See Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 212.
258
Chen Gongbo, Sinian congzheng lu, Shanghai: SWYSG, 1936, p. 7.
259
The question of China’s unification in the 1930s, including the view of the Clique
itself, will be further discussed in Chapter Six.
260
Based on his experience of four years as Minister of Industry of the Nanjing
Government in 1932-1935, Chen Gongbo records a lot of difficulties facing China which
made Nanjing impotent to carry out reconstruction, the only basis for real unification of

117
where the authorities of the central government at Nanjing were so weak, it is not surprising
that some factions, particularly those possessed of certain strength in the region such as the
Clique, carried out its own policies and plans for the reconstruction and strengthening of
military forces at the level of the province in response to the issues of the time, an issue
which I will discuss further in Chapter Five. In this sense, these policies and practices were
tinged with provincialism, but this was a form of regionalism which did not undercut
nationalism. It was a time “for interesting experimentation”262 within the GMD, as the
interests of region and nation frequently coalesced.
On the other hand, the Clique’s practice of using regional identity to serve mass
mobilization for national salvation provides us with another angle from which to explain
the positive relationship between regionalism and nationalism. As we know, peasants have
been and continue to be the main body of the masses in China. They were very much
affected by the patriarchal clan system for a long time. As they were tightly bound to the
earth, their connection with society and the nation in fact was a “chaxu geju”, as Fei
Xiaotong suggests; therefore, their loyalty and responsibility to family, clan and village
were more than that to the society and the nation. Such a social structure was of course not
compatible with the needs of modern nation-building. Since the western influences
invaded China in the 1840s, one of the themes of national salvation was to awaken the
masses’ political consciousness of modern nationalism. According to Li Hsiao-t’i,
enlightenment started in the first two decades of this century amongst the lower levels of
society.263 Naturally the peasantry was the main component of this. In a sense, the
enlightenment of peasants meant education designed to transfer their regional identity and
loyalty to family and traditional society into modern nationalism, which was the basis of
modern nation-building. Both the Communists and Nationalists were aware of this. The
experiments of rural revolution by the CCP in Jiangxi province during the Nanjing decade

China, he believed. For details of these difficulties, see Chen Gongbo, Sinian congzheng
lu, 1936, p. 2.
261
For discussion of China’s nation-building efforts in the Nanjing decade, see Paul K. T.
Sih (ed.), The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927-1937, New York:
St. John's University Press, 1970.
262
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 213.
263
Li Hsiao-t’i, Qingmo xiaceng shehui qimeng yundong, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1992,
p. 5.

118
can be perceived in this light. The political propaganda of the Nationalists in Guangdong
before the Expedition, as discussed by John Fitzgerald in his Guangdong studies, also had a
similar objective.264 From this point of view, the fact that the Clique used the regional
identity of the province, which existed amongst the masses, to educate and train them, was
in fact a work of enlightenment, whether undertaken willingly or unwillingly. To achieve
the purpose of awakening and mobilizing the masses, the Clique used provincial
particularism in full to strengthen or create a sense of identity towards the region and then
moved this on to the nation, for example, by using the propaganda of Guangxi’s relations
with the Chinese revolution and the Pearl River Valley Revolutionary Theory. At the same
time, the Clique trained and sent a large number of young intellectuals and officers to the
countryside to organize, educate, and train the masses. For example, in only two years
1933-1935, the Clique trained about 10,000 heads of villages and towns, who aged between
20-40.265 Under the Three-in-One policy, these officers played very important roles in
management, education and training of the masses.266 Through these measures and their
efforts, the authorities effectively controlled the message passed on to the masses of the
province. In return, the peasants strengthened their connections with the authorities at all
levels.267 Although the Guangxi leaders were never precise about what they meant by
nationalism, as Diana Lary suggests,268 without doubt, the achievements of Guangxi

264
See John Fitzgerald, Hollow Words: Guomindang Propaganda and the Formation of
Popular Attitudes Toward the National Revolution in Guangdong Province, 1919 to 1926,
unpublished PhD dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra, 1983.
265
Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b (1988), p. 326.
266
This policy referred to that in which each officer of Guangxi in the basic unit of rural
society was head of village or town, captain of militia, and master of primary school at the
same time. For details of this policy and its relations with mass mobilization of Guangxi,
see booklets written by Liang Shangyan, Kang Zhenhua, Feng Huang, Xi Ming, Ren
Shaoxi, Zhen Hua, Pan Jingjia, Huang Xuchu, Chen Liangzuo, Qiu Changwei, Jiang Hui
and Sun Zhigong and published by Mintuan zhoukanshe (Militia Weekly Press) and
Jianshe shudian (Reconstruction Bookshop) in Nanning about 1938-1939, in the
Bibliography of this thesis.
267
For detailed discussion of practice and achievements of the Clique’s mass
mobilization, see Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b; and Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way, 1993.
268
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 212.

119
reconstruction and mass mobilization indicated that they were trying to change the structure
of “chaxu geju”, and to transfer the masses' loyalty from the traditional society to the level
of a modern nation.269 In other words, the regional culture of Guangxi provided the Clique
with the thought motives to awaken the masses and to organize and train militia in the
province. The Clique was overwhelmingly supported by the people of the province during
the June 1 Movement and might well claim its success was due to the earlier transformation
of regionalism, which was based on regional identity, into nationalism, which I will discuss
further in the last two chapters. In this way, we cannot deny the progressive significance of
regional identity, at least in the case of Guangxi during the 1930s.

Conclusion

Before 1929, the Guangxi Clique was basically a military group. Military
achievements brought it onto the stage of the national political struggle and it played a very
important role in national affairs. During the period from the rise of the Clique to the
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, a group of military school graduates, particularly that
of the BMA, were the mainstay of this group, even though it was shocked by the departure
of several senior members and serious internal divisions caused by Jiang in the Jiang-Gui
War. Of course, expansion and survival of the Clique depended on its triumvirate
leadership which retained a fine balance in the power structure of this group. The three
leaders of the Clique shared the work and cooperated with one another. This was an
important factor in finally ensuring that the leadership and the rank and file in Guangxi
were generally in complete unity. However, the most important factor eventually became
the existence of a secret political body in the Clique. With its political goals and policies
concentrating on anti-Jiang and anti-Japanese attitudes, the Clique devoted itself to great
efforts in domestic reconstruction and mobilization in the province on the one hand, and on
the other hand became a major rival to Jiang in national affairs, particularly in that of
resistance against Japan. In other words, the Clique became a group with a dual political

269
For details of Guangxi’s achievements in reconstruction and mass mobilization in the
years before the war of resistance against Japan, see speeches of Sherwood Eddy, Jiang
Kanghu and Liang Shuming, in Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong zhengxunchu (ed.),
Li-Gui zhongwai mingren yanjiang ji, Nanning, 1936. Also see U. S. Military Intelligence
Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936); Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe
jiping, 1935; and Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning, 1935.

120
and military nature within the GMD during the 1930s. The Brains Trust played a very
important role in providing the theoretical basis of the policies of the Clique, and in
conducting the propaganda for those policies (for which the details of theoretical
foundations and perception of the Chinese revolution by the Clique will be discussed in the
following chapter). Both the BMA group and the secret political organization became
mainstays of the Clique with the Brains Trust as the spirit and heart of the latter.
Distribution of the resources of the Clique, i.e. benefits and promotions, began to depend
more and more on loyalty to the secret organization which set political goals for the
Guangxi people to strive towards. The Brains Trust afforded the Clique the basic
conditions on which to form a political party in political program, organization, leadership,
officers and so on. According to Wang Gongdu, “a well-organized political party should be
an advanced political party. It should lead revolution to victory, and wield national
power.”270 The policies of the Clique in the first half of the 1930s had departed from this
point, and had both achieved much and suffered heavily as a result.
The rise and development of the Clique correlated with regional identity. The
achievements of Guangxi in reconstruction and mass mobilization during the 1930s and the
title of “model province” that they won further strengthened this identity of the people in
the province. In some sense, this strong regionalism which the group created in Chinese
politics might affect Jiang’s efforts of national unification by force. However, the conflict
between the Clique and Jiang was the reflection of their different perceptions of the
Chinese revolution and different internal and external policies, and later centred on the
issue of how and when China would resist Japan after the “September 18 Incident”. This
was the departure point of the Clique in the years before the War of Resistance to take
different policies from Nanjing and finally to reach reconciliation with Jiang for the
common aim of resisting Japan.

270
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, p. 127.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE GUANGXI CLIQUE’S MASS

MOBILIZATION AND THE INTEGRATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
REGIONALISM AND NATIONALISM

The most successful achievement of the 1930s by the Guangxi Clique was mass
mobilization throughout the entire province. This achievement not only contributed to
consolidation of the Clique’s base but also awakened a national political consciousness
among the Guangxi people. In this sense, Li Zongren and the Clique successfully
transformed the political regionalism of the Guangxi people into nationalism at a time of
national crisis. What is more important, with the achievement of mass mobilization in
Guangxi, Li and the Clique gained powerful backing from which to play an important role
in the promotion of the anti-Japanese national united front and also the application of their
political, economic, cultural and military policies within the province. In other words, mass
mobilization provided Li and the Clique with a solid basis for revival and its
implementation of new and important public policies.
Previous studies of modern Guangxi history have neglected the role of the Clique’s
theoretical background in the mass mobilization of the 1930s - the further analysis of
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution, in favour of an exclusive focus on actual
policies and practices carried out by the Clique in the province.271 The Clique's analysis of

271
Diana Lary, Eugene Levich and Chu Hongyuan have in detail discussed the process
and achievements of mass mobilization in their studies of Guangxi. See Diana Lary,
Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937, London:
Cambridge University Press, 1974, chapter 9; Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, part I; and
Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No.
17b.

122
Chinese society and perception of the Chinese revolution contributed to its pursuit of the
national revolution and the promotion of the anti-Japanese national united front. Also, the
analysis provided the Clique with a foundation on which to form the theory behind all
policies and programs to be carried out in the province - an ideology behind the
mobilization of the masses.
This chapter focuses on the theoretical foundation of mass mobilization in the
province, particularly the Clique’s perception of the Chinese revolution and of the current
political situation facing China in the Nanjing era. In this connection this chapter will try to
explain further the connection between regionalism and nationalism in an attempt to
provide a profile of the GMD’s internal struggle and the perceptions of Chinese society
held by different factions on which that struggle was based.

The Guangxi Reconstruction Program

Mass mobilization during the 1930s involved all adults and students in Guangxi.
The guiding theory for the mobilization was Guangxi jianshe gangling (the Guangxi
Reconstruction Program), first published by the Guangxi Party, Political and Military Joint
Conference (the paramount authority of the province under the leadership of Li and Bai) in
March 1934 and amended in August of the following year.272 The Program proclaimed
Sun Yatsenism to be the guiding principle for political, economic, cultural and military
reconstruction of Guangxi province, with awakening, organizing, training, educating and
arming the masses as its purposes. According to Li, the Program was drawn for the most
part from the Three Principles of the People. He said,
For example, article 3 of the program stipulates: “The masses are to be
organized and trained on the basis of the existing system of min-tuan (people’s
militia) so as to cultivate the capacity for self-defense, self-government, and self-
support among the people. This will establish the foundation for real democracy.”
This three-self policy was in keeping with the principle of “local self-government”
proposed in Dr. Sun’s “principles of the people’s sovereignty”.

272
For the whole text of the Guangxi Reconstruction Program (for the first version of
1934), see Li Zongren, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, Nanning, 1935, pp. 321-9; and
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, part 38, CQ, No. 190 (1 June 1965), pp. 10-1, for the
amended version of 1935. Levich has also translated the whole text of the amended version
of the Guangxi Reconstruction Program into English. See Eugene W. Levich, The
Kwangsi Way, pp. 261-4.

123
 Article 9 states: “There will be enforced a social policy that protects the
interests of peasants and workers according to law and eliminates class struggle.”
Article 12 specifies “Financial policies will be employed to foster medium and
small industry and commerce.” Article 13 says, “To meet the needs of the
livelihood of the people, important industrial and commercial enterprises will be
operated by the government.” All these were drawn up in accordance with the
principles of the “equal distribution of land right and the regulation of capital" as
laid down by Dr. Sun in his "principles of the people's livelihood”.
Finally, article 21 provides, “we shall raise national consciousness,
eliminate class struggle, and create an advanced national culture.” This provision
clearly promotes the “principle of nationalism”.273
This Program basically reflected the Clique’s political attitude and policies in the
1930s. In the Program, mass mobilization (i.e. awakening, organizing, training, educating
and arming the masses) was strongly emphasized as a means of serving its overall goal of
gradual rehabilitation of all of China. It is safe to say that the Program was, in a sense,
drawn up as a model for the ultimate purpose of mass mobilization on a national scale of
which Guangxi’s policies in the 1930s were part. This Program was so important for the
Clique that it was even regarded as the “basic law” throughout Guangxi in the 1930s.274
This seems to be a reasonable explanation. Diana Lary and Eugene Levich in their studies
of modern Guangxi province have provided a detailed discussion of this Program.275
Although Lary recognizes that the Guangxi Reconstruction Program and its
dependent policy, the sanzi zhengce (Three-Self Policy), were an amalgam of Sun Yatsen’s
ideas and the Clique leaders’ own ideas,276 she does not offer an account of the origin of the
latter’s own ideas. There are two issues here that Lary, Levich and others have not
discussed in detail in their studies, and require further investigation. One is the goal of

273
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1979, pp. 288-9.
274
Ibid, p. 288.
275
Under the Program, the main policy was sanzi zhengce (Three-Self Policy). The
concrete practice of this policy was sanyu zhengce (Policy of Three Incorporation). The
motive force to carry out this policy was militia training, a sufficient means of mass
mobilization in Guangxi. For details of the above issues, see Diana Lary, Region and
Nation, Chapter 9, pp. 163-93; and Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way, Chapter 2, pp.
35-53. Also see Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17B, pp. 307-353. As Lary, Chu and Levich have in detail
discussed theory and practice of the Guangxi reconstruction and mass mobilization, it is not
necessary to cover that ground in this chapter.
276
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 168.

124
mass mobilization pursued by the Clique; the other is the theoretical foundation of the
Guangxi Reconstruction Program. The two issues are vital to a full understanding of the
policies and practice of the Clique.
Lary suggests that the Guangxi Reconstruction Program was cast within the general
framework of Sun Yatsen’s sanmin zhuyi and jianguo dagang (the Fundamentals of
National Reconstruction). She also points out that Guangxi had willingly absorbed other
ideological frameworks in the creation of its own. For example, communism and fascism,
as well as other popular “isms”, were all adopted by the Clique in constructing its main
theoretical framework. Also, the Clique adopted some ideas for the education of the
common people which had been carried out by Yan Yangchu in Hebei province in the
1920s-1930s, the Rural Reconstruction Movement initiated by Liang Shuming in Shandong
province, and militia organization built up by Bie Tingfang in western Henan province
during the same period.277 As Lary points out,
This was a great age of ‘isms’ in China. Any idea which seemed remotely relevant
to China's situation was taken up somewhere; it was essential for anyone with
pretensions to political or intellectual sophistication to have a stock of foreign
names to quote.278
It seems reasonable to suggest that, in searching for a theoretical base for its
Program, the intellectual energies of the Clique were directed at many social theories
current in the world at that time. All of these practices were in fact genuine attempts on the
part of some Chinese leaders in search of a way to awaken the masses and save the nation.
Lary has provided a useful insight into the Guangxi Reconstruction Program.

277
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p.164. For details of the Rural Reconstruction
Movement of the 1930s initiated by Liang Shuming and others, see Lyman P. Van Slyke,
“Liang Sou-ming and the Rural Reconstruction Movement”, The Journal of Asian Studies,
Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 1959. Also see Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Kaifang zhong de
bianqian: zailun Zhongguo shehui chao wending jiegou, Hong Kong: The Chinese
University Press, 1993, pp. 262-3; and Liang Shuming, Zhongguo minzu zijiu yundong
zuihou juewu, Shanghai, 1936. For details of Bie Tingfang and his militia organization in
western Henan province, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-
Jen, pp. 403-5; and Zhang Xin, “Elite Activism in the Periphery: The Case of Southwest
Henan”, Republican China, Vol. XIX, Issue 2, April 1994, pp. 67-103. However,
according to the writer’s interview with those members of the Guangxi Clique who are still
alive, such as Feng Huang and Wei Ruilin, Bie Tingfang had little influence on Guangxi's
militia organization and training, because none of the Clique members knew him well until
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.
278
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 165.

125
 However, Lary has failed to account for the practical and immediate significance of
the Clique's theory at that time. There is evidence that the Clique’s Program had great
vitality and its practice of mass mobilization was quite successful,279 partly because it met
the needs of the time and awakened a politically nationalist consciousness of the masses in
Guangxi province. A member of the Clique recalled a slogan they loudly shouted every
morning: “down with Japanese imperialism and resist Japan to save the nation!” when the
Guangxi people were conscripted for military training in the 1930s.280 Other militia
political training courses included among other things, a history of the Chinese revolution
and of imperialist aggression against China, and a code of the Chinese citizen’s
responsibility to the nation, etc.281 These showed how the Clique was increasingly
concerned with the future of the nation and with preparations for resistance against Japan.
Without a detailed study of the cumulative effect of these ideas, we would not be able to
understand Guangxi’s historical background or make a full assessment of the Clique’s
policies and practices of the 1930s.
Unfortunately, those scholars who have studied modern Guangxi history have not
paid sufficient attention to the mechanisms of the Program, although they have detailed the
Clique’s struggle with the Jiang group for the power in regional and central structures and
rightly pointed out that the Clique tried to link regionalism to nationalism. As a result of
ignoring the day-to-day details of the Clique’s response to imperialism, i.e. the Japanese
invader, Lary, for one, formed a negative view of the Clique’s purpose and its role in the
dichotomy between regionalism and nationalism. She concluded that the Clique, after it
regained control over the province in 1931
was essentially a conservative administration, conserving its position against the
population directly under its control, against internal enemies, both militarist and

279
For praise and comments on the success of Guangxi reconstruction and mass
mobilization, see Leng Guan (Hu Lin) et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning, 1935; Liang
Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning, 1935; Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi
de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b; and Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi
Way.
280
The writer’s interview with Mr Huang Qihan (former Secretary to General Bai
Chongxi in the second half of the 1930s), Shanghai, China, 5 December 1992.
281
See, for example, Wang Kuiyi et al, Yinian lai zhi Guangxi, Nanning: Minguo
ribaoshe, 1933, pp. 3-5; and Li Wenxiong, “Tianbao qu tuan ganxundui siyuefen zhengxun
gongzuo gaikuang”, CJYK, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May 1935).

126
 Communist, and against alien invaders. It lost its thrust towards the future, it
ceased to have any sense of historical progress.282
It seems to me that Lary’s view underestimates the role of the Clique in the
promotion of Chinese nationalism and internal unity of the GMD. Subsequent events such
as the “June 1 Movement” that occurred at Guangxi in 1936 showed how single-mindedly
the Clique focused on its chosen goals: the immediate resistance against Japan and the
national united front. That is to say, the Clique continued to pursue this goal and tried their
best to achieve it. It goes without saying that both Li and Bai and the Clique still wanted a
share of the power of the central government with Jiang, but the dual character of its
purpose demanded the policy of anti-imperialism and its strong aspiration to return to the
central power.
In a recent work, Eugene Levich emphasizes the demands of the Clique for forceful
moves against Japan, as a central core of its theory or policies, a view different from that of
Lary. This view is very important because other writers have also suggested that the Clique
used the Japanese threat primarily as a lever against the central government. According to
them, the anti-Japanese stance of the Clique was a transparent attempt to topple Jiang.283
Through a detailed discussion of the theory and practice by the Clique in the 1930s, Levich
has revised this view.284
It is true that strong anti-Japanese consciousness was an important element of the
Clique’s theory, at least it seemed to be so. Levich agrees that the Clique was progressive
in anti-imperialism, but he underestimates the parallel issue of the Clique’s opposition to
Jiang, an action which was basically an outcome of the Clique's theory. This is a denial of
the dual character of the theoretical base of the Clique, because Levich fails to discuss the
evolution of the Guangxi Reconstruction Program mentioned above, through his neglect of
the long conflict existing between the Clique and Jiang.

282
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 202.
283
See, for example, Zhou Quan, Guixi jiepou, Shanghai: Qixing shuwu, 1949, pp. 2-3;
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 19-20; Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution:
China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1974, p. 256; Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong chubanshe, 1985, p.
236; and Pang Dunzhi, Qingsuan guixi, Guangzhou, 1950, p. 7.
284
Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way, particularly chapter 2 and conclusion.

127
 There is ample evidence that the Clique had followed both anti-Jiang and anti-
Japanese policies during those years. For example, the Guangxi Reconstruction Program
had actually originated in 1929-31 from the moves of the Clique against its internal
political rival Jiang (but not against the central government as a whole), and then against
Japanese imperialism.285 Also, there is clear evidence of a gradual process of change in the
Clique’s theory and policy. The Clique’s actions in the 1930s were eventually readjusted to
the point of support for the GMD’s internal unity in turn for a guarantee of immediate
resistance against Japanese aggression.286 The reconciliation between the Clique and Jiang
in 1936 showed that both sides had modified their viewpoints to accommodate the needs of
the current political situation in China at that time. In other words, this result did not mean
a defeat for the Clique as Lary suggested,287 but a step in the direction of the Clique’s
achievement of its purposes. This reconciliation had immense significance for the course
of modern Chinese history, and was a turning point at which the GMD factions abandoned
their differences from Jiang in appearance, or at least postponed the settlement of old
scores, in order to effectively resist the external invader, a point to be discussed further in
chapters seven and eight. Levich does not refer to the negative view of the Clique held by
Lary; and he also ignores the role of the Clique in the promotion of internal unity within the
GMD, and its attempts to foster a national united front of resistance against Japan on its
own initiative.
What was the foundation of the Program? What was the Clique’s perception of the
nature of Chinese society, the Chinese revolution and its mission? In the 1930s, the Clique
had its own explanation.

The Clique’s Analysis of Chinese Society and Perception of the Chinese Revolution

1. Nature of Chinese Society

285
Li Zongren, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 53-94; and Li Zongren, Li zongsiling
zai-Liu xunhua ji, Liuzhou: Liuzhou minguo ribaoshe, May 1931.
286
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No.
124 (September 1, 1962), pp. 4-7, and p. 29; and No. 126 (October 1, 1962), pp. 13-16.
287
See Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 194-210.

128
 This was an essential question to answer before any attempt to create the theory and
policies of the Guangxi Clique. The Guangxi leaders and their Brains Trust believed that
China had been a feudal society before it was affected by foreign influences. After the
Western powers invaded in the 1840s, imperialism not only monopolized the finance and
the economy of the country, but also affected modern China’s political development.
According to their view, the great Powers even tried gradually to conquer its whole territory
and to expand their sphere of influence over all fields of China. Consequently, the
historical course of China’s own social development was constantly shattered by external
invaders. But the feudal remnants, which linked with the previous “evil forces” (e shili) - a
term frequently used by the Clique - on the one hand and collaborated with imperialism on
the other, still existed and had a great impact in many areas. This force also disturbed the
development of Chinese society. All these influences turned China into a semi-colonial
and semi-feudal society. In other words, China was a society in the transition period from
the destruction of the feudal era to that of capitalism. Although it was heading for the
capitalist era, this historical course was disturbed by imperialist aggression. To be more
exact, it was on the eve of capitalism.288
This analysis of Chinese society basically reflected the reality of China at that time,
particularly in the moment of mobilizing the masses to resist Japanese aggression. It was
also similar to that of the Chinese Communists.289 The reason was, as stated in the
previous chapter, that Li and the Clique had an intellectually powerful Brains Trust, a group
of intellects composed predominantly of students who had once studied in Soviet Russia.
With their background, the students were a very important political force in the Clique and
made considerable contributions to the Guangxi group in political propaganda with their
knowledge of communism and general understanding of Marxism-Leninism. Although
they considered communism unsuited to the social conditions of China, Marxist-Leninist
methodology, such as class analysis and the study of imperialism as a cause of revolution in

288
For detailed discussion of the nature of Chinese society by the Clique, see Junxiao
xunkan (hereafter as JXXK), compiled by the Military Academy under the 4th Army Group
(i.e., the Guangxi Army) of the NRA and published in Nanning, Guangxi, No. 13
(1/1/1934), p. 51.
289
For details of analyses of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution by the Chinese
Communists, see Mao Zedong (Tse-Tung), “Chinese Revolution and the Chinese
Communist Party”, and “Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society”, Selected Works of Mao
Tse-tung. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967, Vol. II, pp. 305-34; and Vol. I, pp. 13-22.

129
colonies, was still employed by them in the study and analysis of Chinese society. This
analytical discussion of Chinese society during the first half of the 1930s was helpful to the
Clique in creating its theoretical framework and ideology through political propaganda.290
Through their perception, they concluded that Chinese society was characterized by
poverty, foolishness (backwardness), turmoil and weakness.291 These characteristics were
attributed to the following factors.292
1) The imperialist Powers attempted to colonize China. They worked hard to
expand their spheres of influence in the world, including China, and competed with one
another for more resources and interests.293
2) The collapse of China's current economic structure, particularly the rural
economy, was a result of imperialist aggression. This perception provided the Clique with
a theoretical foundation to arouse the patriotic and nationalist consciousness of the
peasantry. In theory, the Clique could transform the angry feelings of the masses caused by
suffering from a domestic economic crisis and high taxes into hostility against imperialism
through propaganda all over the province.294
3) China suffered dual oppression from the feudal “evil forces” and agents of the
so-called “red” and “white” imperialisms. “Red” imperialism emphasized class struggle in
an attempt to incite the Chinese people to struggle against each other for the purpose of
controlling China, while “white” imperialism, which referred to the Western Powers and
the Japanese imperialism, focused on robbing resources and territory of China. Both “red”

290
See Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12 (1982), pp.
115-36.
291
See the Guangxi Reconstruction Program (1934 version), in Li Zongren, Li zongsiling
zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 321-29. This expression of the characteristics was similar to that
used by leaders of the Rural Reconstruction Movement in analysis of Chinese peasants. It
indicates that the Clique had consciously or unconsciously focused on rural society as a
basic integrated force in the Chinese revolution. See Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng,
Kaifang zhong de bianqian, p. 362.
292
See JXXK, No. 13, pp. 49-55.
293
Ibid, pp. 51-53.
294
Both Li and Bai themselves also used this perception to convince the masses. See Li
Zongren, “Nuli zengjia shengchan chongshi minzhong liliang”, in Li Zongren, Li zongsiling
zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 165-6; and Bai Chongxi, “Wei dangguo xisheng de juexin”, Nanning
minguo ribao, July 30-31, 1931.

130
and "white" imperialisms searched for and fostered their agents to help them reach their
goals in this country. The feudal remnant "evil forces" could thus become their agents.
Collaboration of these internal and external forces further ruined Chinese society.295
4) One individual (i.e. Jiang Jieshi) monopolized the central government and built a
dictatorship for himself in China. This led to the Clique’s discontent with Jiang's
discrimination against those who held different views from him. It also motivated the
Clique's attempt to return to the central government to be leaders of the nation, which had
been an automatic entitlement in 1927, if any opportunity was available to them.296
Using this perception of Chinese society, the Clique believed that, in response to
domestic crisis and the threat of external aggression, China had started her modern national
revolution. Although this perception was still not radically beyond that of both the
Nationalists and the Communists, intensive discussion among the intellectuals and officers
and a broad and energetic propaganda in the rural society, successfully aroused the political
consciousness of the masses, particularly the peasants, transforming their concerns from the
small and limited scope bounded by clan, village and town to the levels of the province and
the nation. As a result, the Clique effectively implemented policies of mobilization and
reconstruction in the province, on the one hand, and, on the other, consolidated the Clique’s
power in its base to oppose Jiang’s centralization by widely condemning his policy of
“domestic pacification before external war”, thus convincing the masses that the Clique
was the main force of the Chinese revolution. Achieving all this laid a strong foundation
on which the Clique could proceed to further discussion of objectives, mission, motive
force, nature, prospects and eventually leadership of the Chinese revolution.

2. Objectives of the Chinese Revolution

What were the main objectives of the Chinese revolution? The answer of the
Clique was to destroy imperialism and the feudal evil forces.297 Imperialist incursions had
begun with the use of British naval and military power in 1839 to force China to accept

295
See JXXK, No. 13, pp. 49-55; No. 18 (February 20, 1934), pp. 7-10; and No. 19
(March 1, 1934), pp. 8-12, and pp. 21-25.
296
Ibid. Also see JXXK, No. 13, pp. 51-55.
297
Li Zongren, “Nuli zengjia shengchan chongshi minzhong liliang”, Li zongsiling zuijin
yanjiang ji, p. 166.

131
Opium from India as payments for tea, silk, and porcelain products desired by Europeans.
Under the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 China ceded Hong Kong to Britain and opened five
ports to foreign trade. The United States of America and France followed to force other
trading concessions. These foreign powers extracted from the Chinese the principle of
“extra-territorial rights”, which meant that in specified trading areas, foreigners were
exempt from obeying Chinese law. There followed a series of wars and unequal treaties,
and by 1900, five Western powers had marked off their own “spheres of influence” in
China. However, in the view of Li and the Clique, Japan was considered the biggest enemy
of China. After destroying the remnants of the Chinese army and navy in the first Sino-
Japanese War in 1895, Japan not only annexed Taiwan and occupied Korea, but also
formulated a plan to conquer continent East Asia and China. Now Japan was moving
towards complete conquest of China as its first step towards the attainment of this goal.298
For this reason, the prime object of the Chinese revolution was imperialism, and this meant,
first of all, the Japanese who had accelerated their aggression against China after the
“September 18 Incident”. The Japanese not only occupied four provinces in northeast
China by force in the following two years, but also planned to control north China and then
moved to subdue the whole country. Japan was the biggest and most dangerous enemy of
the Chinese nation at the time and, naturally, the most urgent objective of the Chinese
revolution. This objective had been clearly defined and was openly and constantly declared
by leaders and members of the Clique during the 1930s.299

298
In many publications and journals published by the Clique in 1930s, we can find
numerous articles and speeches as well as propaganda regarding the perception of
Japanese expansion of its influence to continent East Asia and complete conquest of
China that leaders and members of the Guangxi group possessed. For details see JXXK,
1933-1934; Chuangjin yuekan (hereafter as CJYK), 1934-1936; and speeches of Li Zongren
and Bai Chongxi, in Li Zongren, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji; and Bai Chongxi, Bai
fuzongsiling yanlun ji, Nanning, 1935. Also see Nanning minguo ribao, July 19, 1931;
September 23, 26, 27, 1931; and October 2, 1931. For a brief review and scholarly
discussion of Japanese expansion to continent East Asia and China after the first Sino-
Japanese War, see Fu Honglin, Zhang Xueliang de zhengzhi shengya, Shenyang: Liaoning
University Press, 1988, “Introduction”.
299
See JXXK, 1933-1934; CJYK, 1934-1936; and speeches of Li Zongren and Bai
Chongxi, in Li Zongren, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji; and Bai Chongxi, Bai fuzongsiling
yanlun ji, Nanning, 1935. Also see Nanning minguo ribao, July 19, 1931; September 23,
26, 27, 1931; and October 2, 1931.

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 For China to win her independence and sovereignty, in the view of the Clique, the
first step was to get rid of all imperialist influences. As long as the unequal treaties still
existed and imperialism still controlled China’s economy and finance, imperialism
remained an objective of the Chinese revolution.300 This basically meant the continuation
of the Nationalist Revolution in the 1920s.301 This conception of imperialism was still not
beyond the scope of the Nationalist ideology, a basic theory of the Nationalist Revolution
when it moved to conduct the launching of the Northern Expedition in 1926.
For the Clique, the feudal “evil forces” in the country, generally speaking, meant the
remnant feudal influence, including the existence of local tyrants and evil gentry as well as
other conservative forces, and these forces frustrated the anti-imperialist movement. The
Clique believed that Jiang and his group were representatives of the “evil forces”. In the
view of the Clique, Jiang was condemned for betraying the Chinese revolution when he
implemented a dictatorship over the country and did not oppose, but surrendered himself to,
imperialism by carrying out the policy of non-resistance against Japanese aggression.302 In
this sense, Jiang and his group were an obstacle to anti-imperialism, and the opponent of
the Chinese revolution. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists seized every
opportunity to gain credit for the achievements of the Chinese revolution.303 They did not
resist imperialism, but carried out the policies of Soviet Russia, which the Clique regarded
as “red” imperialism in an attempt to control China in the same manner as other imperialist

300
See Li Zongren, “Fuxing zhonghua minzu shi women weiyi de renwu”, Li zongsiling
zuijin yanjiang ji, p. 210.
301
For details of the GMD’s perception of China and the Chinese national revolution, see
Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (The Second Historical Archives of China) ed., Zhonghua
minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Vol. 2, Nanjing: JSGJCBS, 1986.
302
Nanning minguo ribao, September 1, and 5, 1931.
303
Ibid, September 24, 1931, p. 2; September 19 and 22, 1931, p. 4. Also see Hudang
jiuguo ji, Nanning, 1931, pp. 55-62.

133
countries.304 In this sense, the Chinese Communists were regarded by the Clique as the
agent of “red” imperialism. The Clique did not like the theory of class struggle.305
According to the above analysis, in the approach to the Chinese revolution, the
Clique believed that the Guangxi people as well as the Chinese nation faced powerful
enemies. These perceptions imbued the Clique with a strong “youhuan yishi”
(consciousness of concerning adversity) and “shiming gan” (a sense of mission), which
drove this group to struggle for national liberation. For the needs of anti-imperialism and
the anti-feudal “evil forces”, the Clique was required to set up a stable base from which to
mobilize the masses.306 The first task of mass mobilization was to organize regional self-
government in order to encourage the people to be involved in local affairs.307 Through
this, the Clique attempted to foster political “regional identity” of the Guangxi people, as
mentioned earlier, and to achieve the purpose of suppressing communism and overthrowing
Jiang's dictatorship.308 This was a way to establish the “democratic politics” - a term the
Clique used to explain its attempt to share the power of central government - and a means
to achieve the national revolution.309 This was to a great extent to meet the needs of
national salvation for resistance against Japanese aggression and of the Clique’s existence
when it was engaged in the power struggle with Jiang. However, based on this perception,
the Clique could mobilize the masses in the province to follow its policies of both

304
See Nanning minguo ribao, September 27, 1931, p. 4. After the “September 18
Incident” in 1931, Soviet Russia carried out a non-intervention policy towards the Japanese
aggression in China and betrayed China by selling its interests in China to Japan. For
details of Soviet Russia’s non-intervention policy, see Wang Zhen, “Jiuyiba shibian hou
Sulian dui zhongri chongtu de buganshe zhengce”, KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1994, pp. 26-37.
305
See Guangxi Reconstruction Program, article 10 (1934 version). Also see Li Zongren
Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji; Bai Chongxi, Bai fuzongsiling yanlun ji; and Hudang
jiuguo ji, pp. 39-40, and pp. 55-62.
306
Li Zongren, “Fuxing zhonghua minzu shi women weiyi de renwu”, Li zongsiling
zuijin yanjiang ji, p. 207.
307
See “Difang zizhi xuanchuan dagang” (Propaganda Outline of Regional Self-
government), compiled by the Department of Propaganda of the Guomindang Guangxi
Branch, Nanning minguo ribao, September 19, 1931, p. 4, and September 22, 1931, p. 4.
308
Ibid.
309
Hudang jiuguo ji, pp. 39-40; pp. 55-62; and pp. 73-77. Also see the Guangxi
Reconstruction Program (version of 1934).

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“resisting Japan and opposing Jiang” (fan-Jiang kangri) and “forcing Jiang to resist Japan”
(bi-Jiang kangri).

3. Mission of the Chinese Revolution

Undoubtedly, the Clique believed that elimination of the above two enemies was
the mission of the Chinese revolution. Following the “September 18 Incident”, the central
mission of the Chinese revolution was to strive for national liberation. Carrying out a
national struggle for the independence of China was the precondition of all common rights
for the people and the development of the people's livelihood.310 Mass mobilization of the
province was aimed at “reconstructing Guangxi and restoring China”, a central mission of
the Chinese revolution, according to the Clique. The Clique also argued that those capable
of fighting, and who refused to resist Japan and neglected the movement towards national
independence and liberation, must have their minds changed.
It can be seen that this was a subtle change of policy. The Clique had once firmly
demanded the removal of the dictator (i.e. Jiang Jieshi) as the precondition of national
salvation just after the “September 18 Incident”,311 on the ground of Li and his groups
ambitions to return to the central power, and of Jiang’s non-resistance policy.312 But, this
policy had been transformed into one of resisting Japan by mobilizing the masses in the
province and thereby compelling Jiang to resist Japan by strengthening regional
cooperation and internal unity within the GMD after the outbreak of the Shanghai
resistance in 1932.313 From this change we can see that anti-imperialism had now become
the most important precondition of national revolution. In other words, the Clique insisted
that resistance against Japan must have priority over all disputes within the GMD. The

310
See the Guangxi Reconstruction Program (amended version 1935), Huang Xuchu,
“Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 190 (1 June 1965), pp. 10-11.
311
Nanning minguo ribao, September 27, 1931, p. 4.
312
See Li Zongren, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 53-94; Li Zongren, Li zongsiling
zai-Liu xunhua ji, Liuzhou: Liuzhou minguo ribaoshe, 1931; and Hudang jiuguo ji, pp. 33-
98.
313
The details of Li and the Clique’s cooperation with southwest regional factions (i.e.
neighbouring provinces of Guangxi) in the 1930s will appear in next chapter; and the
discussion of the Clique’s change of its policy of “resisting Japan and opposing Jiang” into
one of “forcing Jiang to resist Japan” will appear in chapters six and seven.

135
policy of Jiang’s central government was, to the contrary, “domestic pacification before
external war” (rangwai bixian annei).
As the Clique had seen, Jiang’s action indicated that he did not wish to resist Japan
immediately, but suppressed any calls for immediate resistance by other parties and groups.
This convinced the Clique that Jiang was a representative of the evil forces. According to
the Clique, “rangwai” (resist foreign aggression) meant all-out resistance in the face of
Japanese aggression of China. To them resistance against external aggression must be the
primary concern of the current Chinese revolution. Anyone who attempted to block this
resistance should be eliminated. Whatever other purpose he had, Jiang’s non-resistance
policy had already convinced them that he ignored the national enemy and national crisis
but focused on internal “unification”, a form in which China was put under his direct
control and in which no one could have a dissenting voice.314 For this he was regarded by
the Clique as an enemy who betrayed national interests and rights and favoured the foreign
invaders in pursuit of his own position and rule.
Here, we should further clarify the difference between the Clique’s two enemies
(i.e. imperialism and feudal remnant evil force) policy and Jiang’s “rangwai bixian annei”
policy. The former realized the importance of internal unity; at the same time it
emphasized that the anti-Japanese action had priority over all internal disputes. This
showed that the Clique knew how to use the national crisis as a weapon in its struggle with
Jiang. Apart from the Clique’s natural political consideration of its own interests and
powers in both central and regional structures, their demand for resistance against Japan
met the needs of the current political situation. Jiang reversed the order of importance.
What he emphasized was to achieve “unification” as the first step to resist Japan.
However, what was the content of Jiang’s “unification” policy? Different people
and groups had different definitions. This sort of “unification”, it seems to me, is still an
open question, a point to which I will return in Chapter Six. The question here was
essentially how to resist external enemies. This was the point of departure in the dispute
among the GMD factions, particularly between the Clique and Jiang. Generally speaking,
China needed the national revolution; a new China would come into being through
revolution. This was agreed upon by each party and group. The difference was the way to
approach this goal. Here the Clique was to place the colonial and semi-colonial country's

314
Li Zongren, “Pi dadao ducai de huaiyizhe”, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 65-6.

136
national revolutionary movement and Chinese national revolution on a par.315 It indicated
that the Clique put anti-imperialism as the first mission of the Chinese revolution. The
situation of China after the “September 18 Incident” also proved that it needed to resist
foreign aggression before resolving all internal disputes among the GMD factions and other
parties, i.e. “brothers quarrelling at home join forces against attacks from without” (xiongdi
xiyuqiang, waiyu qiwu), as the Chinese saying goes. This difference led the two parties to a
point of mutual opposition.

4. Motive Force of the Chinese Revolution

The modern Chinese national revolution required a revolutionary motive force to
achieve the above mission. What, then, was this force? To answer this question, the
Guangxi Clique first analyzed different social classes which existed in Chinese society and
judged their attitude towards the revolution.316
1) Comprador bourgeoisie
The comprador was born in the treaty ports where China’s door had been opened by
the Western Powers. This class developed as the agent of imperialist influences in their
penetration into China’s economy and politics. As a product of western imperialist
aggression of China, the comprador bourgeoisie had close relations with imperialism.
Their interests and powers were so deeply dependent on imperialism that they could not
exist without its existence and support. Consequently, it could not become a revolutionary
motive force. On the contrary, its elimination was an objective of the Chinese
317
revolution.
2) National bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie
The national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie were welcomed to the revolution
because they too were oppressed by imperialism, but were afraid to risk their interests and
rights once the revolution was further developed. They were never firmly to join in the
revolution as they had a certain wavering character.318

315
JXXK, No. 13, pp. 51-55.
316
JXXK, No. 13, pp. 51-55.
317
Ibid, p. 53.
318
Ibid.

137
 3) Proletariat
The proletariat was to head up the revolution as it suffered dual oppression from
imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. However, its numbers were too small to have
great influence on the revolution. The proletariat could be a part of the motive force if it
joined other classes large enough to provide a motive force for the revolution.319
4) Peasantry
The peasantry was the class with the largest population who suffered dual
oppression from both imperialism and feudalism. As the mission of the Chinese revolution
was to eliminate both imperialism and feudalism (the feudal remnant “evil forces”), only
the peasantry, according to the Clique, could ensure success through their participation.
Therefore, this class was destined to provide the motive force of the Chinese revolution.320
Basically, the Clique’s analysis of the classes in the Chinese revolution was similar
to that of the CCP.321 But there was a difference between them over which was to be the
leading class in the revolution. To be more exact, the difference was in the perception of
the roles of the proletariat and peasantry. In the view of the CCP, the proletariat was the
leading class and the vanguard of the revolution. As a result, it should be acknowledged as
such, while the peasantry was its most powerful supporter and firm ally. By contrast, the
Clique suggested the peasantry as the motive force of the revolution, with the proletariat as
its firmest ally, though they did recognize the latter’s important role in the Chinese
revolution, for this class was potentially a resolute revolutionary power. The Clique
criticized the CCP’s perception of the proletariat which, to them, misread the actual
situation of China. As a class, the proletariat of China was too weak to lead the revolution.
It had to unite with the peasantry in order to be effective in the revolution. This alliance
was called “shengchan dazhong” (the productive masses), a new term adopted by the
Clique in political propaganda and used quite often.322 According to Eugene Levich, the

319
JXXK, No. 13, pp. 53-4.
320
Ibid.
321
Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I, pp. 13-22; and Vol. II, pp. 305-
34.
322
See JXXK, No. 13, pp. 49-55; and Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 121-35.

138
perception emerged because leaders of the Clique came mainly from peasant families.323 In
a sense, that is correct. But it seems that a further reason lies in Guangxi’s background.
As described in Chapter Two, Guangxi did not have modern industry until the
1920s. After it gained control over the province, the Clique established several small-size
manufactures, but this primary industrialization was never strong enough to change the
basic economic structure of the province.324 The peasantry was still the main force of
Guangxi’s production and all social activities. The Clique’s perception of the peasantry
was based on the social and economic structure of the province. Meanwhile, the Brains
Trust, the propagandist and philosophical elements of the Clique, had received some
Marxist-Leninist education in Russia.325 This background helped them to have a better
understanding of the basic nature of Chinese society, particularly the rural society of
Guangxi. Their analysis differed from that of the CCP and proved to be far more accurate
an assessment of the local social conditions. Furthermore, it was far more acceptable to the
rural masses. The Third Party, which had been formed under the leadership of Deng
Yanda, had also emphasized that the peasantry was the motive force of the Chinese
revolution. It had also opposed class struggle and Jiang’s dictatorship over China.326 The
Third Party had been suppressed by Jiang in 1931, and Deng had been executed by Jiang
before the latter was forced to relinquish power at the end of 1931 as the result of the
Nanjing-Guangdong split (Ning-Yue duili).327 Members of the Third Party who still

323
Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, p. 44.
324
For details of Guangxi’s modern industry, see Zhongguo shehui jiaoyushe Guangxi
kaochatuan (ed.), Guangxi de jiaoyu jiqi jingji. Suzhou, Jiangsu: Zhongguo shehui
jiaoyushe, 1937, pp. 89-95; Hou Yayun, “Xin Guixi guanliao ziben de xingcheng he
fazhan”, XSLT, No. 2, 1983; and Cen Jinkai, “Xin Guixi junfa guanliao ziben de
xingcheng”, YLSZXB, No. 1, 1984. Also see Qian Jiaju, Han Dezhang and Wu Bannong,
Guangxi jingji gaikuang, Shanghai: SWYSG, 1936.
325
Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 98. Wei was one of
Guangxi students who studied in Russia.
326
For details of Deng ’s views, see Yang Yitang, Deng Yanda, Guangzhou:
GDRMCBS, 1984; and Yang Yitang (ed.), Den Yanda xiansheng yizhu, Hong Kong, 1949.
Also see J. Olenik, Left Wing Radicalism in the Kuomintang: Teng Yin-Ta and the Genesis
of the Third Party Movement in China, 1924-1931, unpublished PhD dissertation, Cornell
University, 1975, 330 pp.
327
The term “Ning-Yue duili” refers to the split in the GMD caused by the Hu Hanmin
Incident in 1931, which I will explain in Chapter Five. After the Incident occurred, all of

139
insisted on their views were forced to join other factions, including the Clique.328 Their
perception of the peasantry probably influenced the Clique’s perception of China, because
the Clique's theory and ideology were formed in the early 1930s, which coincided with the
fall of the Third Party. Whatever the reason, this perception indicates that the Clique
emphasized the rural masses as against the CCP’s emphasis on the proletariat. This
basically reflected the reality of the social situation in Guangxi in the 1930s.

5. Nature of the ChineseRevolution

The Clique believed that the nature of the Chinese revolution was a national one
with a dual mission against imperialism and feudalism.329 This perception did not go
beyond the scope of GMD ideology. At this time history saw a sharp conflict between
imperialism and the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies throughout the world; while
the national revolution was limited in scope to the national struggle against imperialism, it
was linked to similar struggles which were occurring in other countries.330 In this way, the
Chinese revolution was linked with the concept of the world revolution for national
liberation. It also required the overthrow of domestic warlords, bureaucrats, compradors
and evil gentry and other evil forces, for its internal mission. They concluded that this was

the GMD factions which opposed Jiang, including Yuanlao pai (Party elders faction), the
Wang Jingwei faction, the Hu Hanmin faction, the Guangxi Clique, the Guangdong Faction
under Chen Jitang, together with those who had been defeated by Jiang in 1930, came to
Guangzhou and established a national government there in opposition to Nanjing under
Jiang. These factions convened a “Special Congress of the GMD” (feichang huiyi) at
Guangzhou. This was a great reunion of all anti-Jiang factions after the civil war among
the GMD in 1929-1930. After Jiang was forced to relinquish power in both the Party and
the Government at the end of the year, these factions joined Nanjing for the purpose of
resistance against Japanese aggression as they claimed. For details of the Hu Hanmin
Incident and the events after, see Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi,
Guangzhou, 1934, pp. 252-554; Zhang Tongxin, Guomindang xin junfa hunzhan shilue,
Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1982; Lei Xiaocen, Sanshinian dongluan Zhongguo, Vol.1, Hong
Kong: Yazhou chubanshe, 1955; Chen Mingshu, “Ning-Yue hezuo qinli ji”, GZWSZLXJ
(Guangzhou), No. 37, pp. 100-122; Cheng Cangbo, “Ning-Yue heping huiyi buji”, ZJWX,
Vol. 35, No. 4; and Luo Yiquan, “Xi’nan fan-Jiang de huiyi”, GZWSZLXJ (Guangzhou),
No. 37, pp. 80-99.
328
Hou Kuangshi, “Li-Bai junfa jituan neibu paixi andou ji Wang Gongdu zhi beisha”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 150-60.
329
Li Zongren et al, Guangxi zhi jianshe, Guilin: GXJSYJH, 1938, p. 1.
330
See JXXK, No. 13, pp. 53-55.

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a combination of a bourgeois revolution and “nonggong geming” (the peasant-proletarian
revolution).331 The aims of this combined revolutionary movement were as follows:
1) To limit personal capital and develop national capital, and to foster national
capital by excluding foreign capital and imperialism in order to protect China from going
the way of the current imperialist economic crisis;
2) To achieve the goal that land was first possessed by peasantry and finally by the
nation through the power of a government which prevented land concentration in the hands
of feudal landlords and all other feudal remnant forces; and
3) To develop peasantry’s cooperation with proletariat and national bourgeoisie and
petty bourgeoisie, and then to achieve national revolution and transform it into a means for
construction of a socialist society332 in order to avoid capitalist exploitation and oppression.
Here, the term “nonggong geming” (the peasant-proletarian revolution) is different
from that of “gongnong geming” (the proletarian-peasant revolution), a term that the CCP
used in the 1920s and 1930s. As stated above, the CCP claimed that the Chinese revolution
was a proletarian-peasant revolution. That is to say, the Chinese revolution was bourgeois
in character, but was led by the proletariat.333 The Clique recognized the nature of the
bourgeoisie, but believed the peasantry was the motive force in the revolution. On the one
hand, the Chinese proletariat came from the country and still depended on land cultivation.
On the other hand, the peasantry and land problems were the most important issues to be
resolved by the revolution. In this situation, the problem of the peasantry had to be
considered before all others.334 Different perceptions of the roles of the peasantry and
proletariat in the Chinese revolution naturally led to different explanations of the nature of
the revolution; and while both the Clique and the CCP focused on the problem of both

331
Ibid, pp. 51-55.
332
Here the term “socialist” or “socialism” refers to Sun Yatsen’s people’s livelihood
(minsheng zhuyi). Sun once pointed out “minsheng zhuyi” was similar to the “socialism”
that the CCP usually explained. For detailed discussion of Sun’s minsheng zhuyi, see Jin
Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Kaifang zhong de bianqian, pp. 237-9, pp. 311-5. As the
Clique claimed Sun Yatsenism as the guideline of the Guangxi Reconstruction Program, it
is not surprising that the Clique employed the term “socialist” or “socialism” to serve its
own purpose.
333
See Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist”, Selected
Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II, pp. 305-34.
334
JXXK, No. 13, pp. 51-55; and Hudang jiuguo ji, pp. 55-62.

141
peasantry and proletariat they took different measures to reach the goal of the Chinese
revolution.335

6. Prospects of the Chinese Revolution

The Clique had its views of the nature of the Chinese revolution, but, what was the
projected scope of the revolution? The answer was to overthrow the rule of imperialism
over China and to achieve a socialist (people’s livelihood) society. Why did the prospect
not envisage capitalism nor communism? According to its analysis, the former was not
suitable because China did not have sufficient conditions for the development of capitalism
and would have no major manufacturing bases for a long time. The latter was also
unsuitable because China did not have the numbers of oppressive super landlords and
capitalists which usually led to a socialist revolution which had the aim of overthrowing the
rule of those specific classes.336
However, what kind of socialist society did they want to build? The Clique did not
explain this clearly, so that their ultimate objective was always tentative. They believed
only that the Nationalist Revolution should be achieved. But at which point would there be
recognizable signs of success? No answer was given. As a result, their conclusion was
confined to the scope of Sun Yatsenism. To that question, even Sun himself did not have
an answer. Perhaps the Clique focused mainly on preparation for resistance war against
Japan and the struggle for power with Jiang so that it need not draw a full picture of the
prospects of the Chinese revolution. Or perhaps the Clique had no clear ideas of what these
prospects might be. Whatever the reason, the Clique’s lack of a definite stand on this
question affected its policy even after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937.
Although it mobilized all forces to join in the War of Resistance, the Guangxi leaders failed
to articulate the prospects of the national liberation movement and the steps that the Clique
should adopt in the movement. Furthermore, it even gradually lost its previous critical

335
See Hudang jiuguo ji, pp. 55-62; Zhongguo shehui jiaoyushe kaochatuan (ed.),
Guangxi de jiaoyu jiqi jingji, pp. 39-76. Also see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way,
“Conclusion”; and Edmund Clubb, Communism in China: As Reported from Hankow in
1932, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
336
JXXK, No. 13, pp. 53-5.

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attitude towards the central government.337 This rendered it too weak a force to influence
other factions in the GMD, and to achieve the final goal of saving and reconstructing
China.

7. Leadership of the Chinese Revolution

All of the Clique’s analyses above were to serve one ultimate purpose: the
achievement of leadership of the Chinese revolution by the Clique itself. According to the
Clique, a successful revolution must have reliable and correct leadership. Looking back to
the 1920s, the Nationalist Revolution that was launched in 1926 was unsuccessful due to its
failure to free China from imperialist control. The most important reason for the failure
was that the revolution did not have a correct leadership. Judging from Li’s speeches and
the Clique’s propaganda of the early 1930s, they believed Jiang and his group were
responsible for the failure. This is understandable if one considers the extraordinary
situation at that time, because all parties and factions, within or outside the GMD, wanted
to enter or seize central power in China. A good way to advance claims for leadership was
to condemn the group or party which controlled the government and caused the failure of
the Nationalist revolution. The Clique was, of course, no exception to those who used
these tactics.
For Guangxi propagandists, the correct leadership should satisfy four conditions.338
1) It must be wise with foresight. 2) It must have the spirit to keep on fighting in spite of all
setbacks. 3) It must have the will power to shoulder the heavy responsibilities (of the
nation). 4) It must have the breadth of vision to serve the interests of the vast majority.
Undoubtedly, they were convinced that the group which satisfied the above conditions most
in the 1920s and early 1930s was the Clique, which was called “Guangxi tuanti” (i.e. the
Guangxi group) or the Fourth Group Army under the leadership of Li Zongren and Bai
Chongxi.339

337
According to recollections of Cheng Siyuan, Li told senior officers of the Clique in
1942 that the situation of China’s resistance against Japan did not allow them to struggle
for power with Jiang and that they should maintain the alliance with the latter to fight
Japan. See Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987. p. 156.
338
See JXXK, No. 19, pp. 22-24.
339
Song Houreng, “Sannian lai Guangxi de huigu”, CJYK, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May 1935).

143
 To support their claim, the military achievements of Li and Bai as well as the
Guangxi army (i.e. the 7th Army of the NRA) in the Northern Expedition were widely
known and clearly in their favour.340 Indeed, they shared the contribution with other GMD
factions and groups of the Nationalist Revolution to the Expedition. However, they
attributed their failure in the internal struggle for power in 1929 to their differences with
Jiang over his approach to the mission of the revolution - to defeat imperialism. Such an
explanation gave them a good reason to oppose Jiang, and in theory to put all of their
actions into the cause of anti-imperialism. Certainly it was not unreasonable for the Clique
to claim the right to leadership of the Chinese revolution. Moreover, the Clique provided a
new profile for the nation for its successful reconstruction and mass mobilization of the
province after regaining control in 1931. People who visited the province, whether
foreigners or Chinese, all praised the new Guangxi as a “model province” for its mass
mobilization and the high nationalist consciousness of the masses. They hoped that the
Guangxi example might lead to a revival of the Chinese nation.341 Those comments were
eagerly seized upon, and used by the Clique to support its claim to leadership.
Another source for good propaganda was that Guangxi had developed a successful
method to awaken and unite the masses, through its outstanding militia organization, which
was even regarded as a model sufficient in itself to ensure national unity and national
salvation.342 In addition, Guangxi’s achievements depended on the talents of its leaders.
According to their propaganda, Li and Bai possessed the vision and foresight needed for
national affairs; they had contributed much to the nation already and they were indomitable.

340
See, for example, Guangxi yu Zhongguo geming, compiled and published by the
General Department of Political Training of the 4th Group Army, Nanning, 1936.
341
See, for example, Hu Lin et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping; and Liang Wenwei et al,
Guangxi yinxiang ji. Also see Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China?
Shanghai, 7 January 1935; and speeches of Jiang Kanghu and Sherwood Eddy, in Guomin
gemingjun disi jituanjun zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Li-Gui zhongwai mingren yanjiang ji,
Shanghai: ZHSJ, 1936.
342
For a detailed discussion of Guangxi militia organization and training, see Diana Lary,
Region and Nation, pp. 163-93; Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, pp. 109-88; Chu
Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No.
17B, pp. 307-53; and Li Po, “Guangxi de mintuan”, GXWX, No. 9 (April 1980), pp. 24-9.
Also see Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu (ed.), Guangxi mintuan gaiyao,
Nanning, 1935, and Guangxi mintuan tiaoli zhangze, Nanning, 1934.

144
In a word, they met the four conditions given above. It was beyond doubt that they should,
according to the propagandists of the Clique, be leaders of the Chinese revolution.343
These analyses indicated that the Clique clearly tried to seize the leadership of the
Nationalist Revolution at the beginning of the 1930s. Their political ambition was obvious,
and fully reflected a vital element of the dual character of the Clique’s theory and practice.
It also, in propaganda, coincided with the needs of the formation and the development of
the Clique’s secret political organization at that time.

In summary, the Clique’s theory and methods of awakening and mobilizing the
masses in the early years of the 1930s were based on an analysis of Chinese society. They
described their theory as Sun Yatsenism rather than communism because they disagreed
with the principles of communism yet could not find a satisfactory alternative to it.
However, the sanmin zhuyi, to which the Clique claimed to adhere, was a mixed product of
the time comprising many ideas of both communism and capitalism. Of course, as
Nationalists, Li and Bai did not want to change their political beliefs, and this was why Li
refused to join other parties such as the Chinese Youth Party even when he was defeated by
Jiang and exiled to Hong Kong in 1929.344 As Bai claimed, they would like to reform the
GMD, but not to destroy it, because Sun Yatsenism had been and continued to be a
powerful weapon to unite groups around them.345 The Clique actually never went beyond
Sun Yatsenism to form its own political theory, and only one attempt was made. Wang
Gongdu, philosopher of the Clique, once created a “weili” (power alone) philosophy which
rejected materialism.346 Such a philosophy emphasized “shengchan dazhong” (the
productive masses) as the main force of the Chinese revolution. But it was not completed
before Wang Gongdu was executed in 1937. As an incomplete framework, it could not be
an alternative to that of Sun Yatsenism.347

343
JXXK, No. 19, pp. 22-4; and Mintuan Qikan, compiled and published by Headquarters
of Wuzhou Militia District, Guangxi, No. 1 (1934).
344
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 273-4.
345
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 121-35.
346
Ibid.
347
Ibid. For the execution of Wang Gongdu, see Section “Brains Trust” of Chapter
Three.

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 In essence, except for its criticism of class struggle theory and its greater emphasis
on the leadership of the peasantry, the Clique’s view of Chinese society was virtually the
same as that of the CCP, particularly in the area of mass mobilization.348 But, based on the
vision, the Clique carried out a peaceful and positive policy different from that of the CCP
in rural society, which will be discussed later, and guided the peasantry to the political goal
of “reconstructing Guangxi with the end of restoring China” (jianshe Guangxi fuxing
Zhongguo), through arousing their nationalist consciousness and mass mobilization
throughout the province.
After a theoretical framework of mass mobilization was constructed, how to
awaken the masses became an urgent task. In this respect, the Clique developed a Pearl
River Valley Revolution theory (Zhujiang liuyu geming) and applied it to their own local
conditions. In so doing, the theory became a powerful weapon in awakening political
consciousness and patriotic enthusiasm of the masses, on the one hand, and combined a
sense of regional pride and identification with a national sense of honour, on the other.
This constituted a pathway for the transformation of regionalism into nationalism.

The Pearl River Valley Revolution Theory - A Motive Force of Mass Mobilization

As stated earlier, the Guangxi people had a reputation for militancy. During the
three years from 1929 to 1931, the militant character of the Guangxi people contributed
much to the Clique for its revival in the province. The Clique did not misuse this tradition,
but carefully explored and systematized it into a theory that was called “the Pearl River
Valley Revolution” to provide a motive force to achieve the awakening of the masses.

348
See Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, “Conclusion”.

146
 The Pearl River Valley, in general, includes Guangdong and Guangxi provinces.349
Besides the geographical link, there were two reasons for the Clique to seek close relations
between the two provinces politically. First, during the period 1931-1936, the two
provinces were the mainstay of the two semi-independent organizations (i.e. the Southwest
Political Council of the Nationalist Government and the Southwest Executive Branch of the
Central Executive Committee) located at Guangzhou. In other words, they formed an
alliance naturally, and chose a common destiny and a logical interdependence. Secondly,
there was a significant historical link. From the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s to the 1911
Revolution, leaders of these modern Chinese national revolution and reformation
movements, such as Hong Xiuquan, leader of the Taipings, Kang Youwei and Liang
Qichao, leaders of the reformation movement, and Sun Zhongshan (Yatsen), founder of the
Republic, were all natives of Guangdong. In the minds of the leaders of the Clique, the two
revolutions under the leadership of Hong and Sun separately combined as two parts of a
single revolutionary movement. Due to the fact that Guangxi was the birthplace of the
Taiping Rebellion, it was convenient for the Clique to identify the roles of the two
provinces, particularly Guangxi, in the modern Chinese national revolution.350 The
propagandists of the Clique could align their political activities to link with the continuity
of the modern revolution which began with the Taipings. In addition, Guangdong was
usually regarded as the cradle of the Nationalist Revolution. So, through praise of the

349
In fact, the origins of the Pearl River (Zhujiang) can be traced to Yunnan, Guizhou and
Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian. However, the Pearl River Valley basically refers to the
provinces of Guangxi and Guangdong, and is basically composed of three main tributaries.
Generally, in Guangxi and west Guangdong (Zhaoqing Guangzhou districts) Zhujiang is
called the West River (xijiang) originating from Yunnan, Guizhou and Hunan, which is the
longest and main tributary of the Pearl River covering the whole of Guangxi; in east
Guangdong (Shantou or Chaozhou, Meixian, Huiyang and Guangzhou districts) it is called
the East River (dongjiang) originating from Jiangxi and Fujian; and in north Guangdong
(Shaoguan, Qingyuan and Guangzhou districts) it is called the North River originating from
Hunan. The Guangxi Clique used this geographical link with Guangdong to strengthen its
force and internal cohesion by propagandizing the glorious history in and contributions to
modern China by the people of the two provinces, and to maintain and promote its relations
with the Guangdong faction; and to draw outside attention to the two Guangs in their
policies on both internal and external affairs.
350
For detailed discussion of this issue, see Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun
zongsilingbu zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Guangxi Yu Zhongguo Geming.

147
Clique’s contribution to the unification of Guangdong in 1925,351 the Clique was able to
share its neighbour’s reputation in the Chinese revolution to boost its own claim to
leadership and successorship of the modern Chinese national revolution.
The central point of the “Pearl River Valley Revolution Theory” was that
Guangdong and Guangxi were the birthplace of the modern national revolution. According
to the Theory, the modern Chinese revolution was divided into three phases, the first one
referred to the Taiping Rebellion, the second to the 1911 Revolution, and the third to the
Nationalist Revolution. Modern revolution was called by the Clique the national revolution
with characteristics of anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism.352 These three phases all
originated from the Pearl River Valley and then spread throughout the country. Even the
tide of the current resistance against Japan began in the two provinces, according to the
Clique, from where it expanded into central and north China. Judged from the current
sources, this idea was first put forward by Li Zongren in 1932. According to Li, within the
three great river valleys of China (i.e. the Yellow River, the Yangzi River, and the Pearl
River) from the north to the south, there were different responses to Japanese aggression.
In the Yellow River Valley of North China, the heart of military affairs was carrying out the
policy of non-resistance. Leaders in this area were intent on holding their armies intact,
reserving their forces for defending themselves politically. As they did not know what
politics was, how could they shoulder the responsibility for saving and restoring the nation?
In other words, they were not reliable. In the Yangzi River Valley of Central China,
people’s disposition was usually delicate; politics in this area was more and more corrupt
and incompetent, and so the Chinese Communists were able to spread their influence
throughout this area very quickly. Rulers of this area were striving to secure their own
positions and defend their own interests, so they would not undertake the task of national
salvation. However, the people of the Pearl River Valley of South China possessed a
glorious revolutionary tradition, and were full of revolutionary zeal. Naturally they should

351
For details of the Clique’s contribution to the unification of Guangdong in 1925, see
Chapter Two. Also see Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu zong zhengxunchu
(ed.), Guangxi yu Zhongguo geming.
352
See JXXK, No. 13, pp. 51-53.

148
take on the task of restoring the Chinese nation and national salvation.353 This idea was
propagandized by the Clique in the following years.354
Indeed, it proved an excellent idea on the part of the Clique to inculcate a sense of
honour and patriotism among the people of the Pearl River Valley, particularly Guangxi.
Tracing the modern national revolution back to the Taiping Rebellion could put the
Clique’s actions in a good light; it could claim successorship of the Taiping Revolution, on
the one hand, and direct the Guangxi people’s militant tradition towards fighting
imperialism, on the other. In a number of published memoirs of leaders and members of
the Clique, they all asserted that they had been deeply affected by the Taipings.355 This
might explain why the Clique and the natives of Guangxi always maintained a sense of
pride in their province and its armies. In other words, the Clique put the Guangxi people’s
fighting spirit in the mood of modern national revolution. It praised the Guangxi people for
their contribution to the revolution in each phase, particularly the Taiping and Northern
Expedition, and attempted to arouse the anti-imperialist spirit of the Guangxi people.356
The following poem which was popular in the 1920s and 1930s is a good illustration of this
mood.
The Kwangsi scenery is beautiful,
Revolution is rooted there.
First there was Shih Ta-k’ai,
Then there was Li Hsiu-ch’eng.
Talking of the heroes of today,
We put forward first Li Tsungjen.
We throw the silken ball, waiting for

353
Li Zongren, “Yue-Gui hezuo kangri jiaogong”, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, p. 195.
354
For details of the Clique’s propaganda of this idea through numerous publications and
journals, see Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu zong zhengxunchu (ed.),
Guangxi yu Zhongguo geming; Song Houreng, “Sannian lai Guangxi de huigu”, CJYK,
Vol. 2, No. 3 (1935); Mo Ji, “Zhujiang liuyu minzu guangrong shi”, CYGL, No. 4, 1936,
pp. 4-8; and Zhenglu yuekan (The Right Way Monthly), Chuangjin yuekan, Mintuan qikan,
and Junxiao xunkan in the 1930s.
355
For example, Tang Degang and Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyi, Hong Kong: Nanyue
chubanshe, 1987 (Chinese version), pp. 4-5; Chen Sanjing and Chen Cungong et al (eds.),
Lei Yin yu minchu neizheng: Lei Yin xiansheng fangwen jilu, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS,
1989, p. 110; and Pan Zongwu, Pan Zongwu xiansheng fangwen jilu, interviewed by
Huang Jiamo and Chu Hongyuan, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1992, “Introduction”.
356
For details see Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu zong zhengxunchu
(ed.), Guangxi yu Zhongguo geming.

149
 a catcher, to the Kwangsi men.357
Poems such as these sought to demonstrate that the Clique itself was truly the leading force
of the Nationalist Revolution; they suggested that the Guangxi people were the main force,
on the one hand, and aroused the patriotic consciousness of the Guangxi people by praising
heroes of the province during the revolution, on the other. Such a patriotic spirit was, in
fact, nationalism. As Lary points out,
Regionalism was thus elevated from a faute-de-mieux to a positive policy, justified
by the high nationalist cause which it served. The idea of levels of loyalty was
spelled out, in such a way that regionalism and nationalism could co-exist, as
different, but inter-dependent levels in a pyramid of loyalties.358
Those writers who visited Guangxi in the 1930s usually had the impression that the
province was driven by a “da Guangxi zhuyi” (the greater Guangxi-ism).359 Lary also
suggests that “local patriotism” was the motive force behind Guangxi reconstruction and
mobilization.360 In my opinion, this feeling for “greater Guangxi-ism” was of a political
nature. Moreover, in a period of a national crisis, it was fully justified to employ a local
patriotic spirit to imbue the people with a higher consciousness which transformed their
regional loyalty into patriotic action at the national level. This was a foundation for
nationalism. It also was the main reason why the “Pearl River Valley Revolution” theory
was created.

Achievements of Guangxi Mass Mobilization and Reconstruction

Under the guidance of the Guangxi Reconstruction Program and the promotion of
the “Pearl River Valley Revolution” Theory, Guangxi made great achievements in both
mass mobilization and reconstruction in the 1930s, particularly in military mobilization.
The achievements of mass mobilization and reconstruction in Guangxi made a strong
impression on visitors to the province. As some visitors pointed out, after they entered

357
Quoted in Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 9. Here Shih Ta-k’ai (Shi Dakai) and Li
Hsiu-ch’eng (Li Xiucheng) were heroes of the Taipings, and natives of Guangxi.
358
Ibid, p. 19.
359
For example, see Hou Zhenqiu, “‘Yongwang de Guangxi’ shicha ji”, Liang Wenwei et
al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, pp. 38-46.
360
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 167.

150
Guangxi, the first impression they obtained was that they could hear shouted words of
command and see military drilling everywhere. In other words, entering Guangxi was the
same as entering a big military camp.361 Therefore, Guangxi was lauded as the “province
of Spartans”.362 These comments might have exaggerated the achievements of Guangxi,
but really reflected the fact that the Clique was striving to implement mass mobilization in
order to achieve and strengthen the self-defence force of the nation, in which a kind of
militarism was forming throughout the province in the 1930s. As Hu Shi pointed out in
1935,
Until now our country has neither attained a realm of militarism or formed the self-
defence force of the nation. However, it seems that Guangxi is an exception, in
comparison with other provinces. We have to recognize that we have really felt the
Guangxi people’s militarism very common and stronger than that of any other
provinces, during our excursion to Guangxi.363
This militarism made the Guangxi people easy to be organized and trained by the
Clique through the militia system. According to Zheng Jianlu, Guangxi had trained about
half million militia men by the year 1934.364 Another source indicates also that 451,809
peasants had obtained militia training in 1935.365 Therefore, Joseph Stilwell’s estimate that
“Kwangsi could put 1,000,000 men in the field” in 1936 was reasonable.366 It was also the
reason for that Guangxi could rapidly have mobilized forty regiments of troops to the front
fighting the Japanese after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. As Li
Zongren recalls:
As soon as the call was issued, peasants from all over the province flooded into the
district government offices to report for duty. The number who volunteered far

361
Wuwu luxingtuan (ed.), Guiyou banyue ji, see Nanning minguo ribao, 20/10/1932, p.
5.
362
See Anonymous, “Guangxi: Province of Spartans”, People’s Tribune, No. 5 (1933),
pp. 27-32.
363
See Hu Shi (Shizhi), “Guangxi de yinxiang”, in Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi
yinxiang ji, p. 53.
364
Zheng Jianlu, Guiyou yiyue ji, Shanghai: ZHSJ, 1935, p. 60.
365
Guangxi nianjian (Second Issue), 1935, p. 1117.
366
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).

151
 exceeded our needs, and we had to cast lots to decide on those to be taken. In less
than a month we had organized four armies totalling forty regiments.367
It is true that Guangxi was the fastest province in action after Nanjing issued the order of
national general mobilization for resisting Japan,368 and the province was listed as the top
provider of soldiers in numbers (nearly one million) to fight the Japanese in the field during
the War of Resistance.369 This fact indicates that Guangxi’s mass mobilization made great
contributions to the important roles the Clique played during the War.
The success of Guangxi’s mass mobilization mainly relied on its militia
organization.370 In short, based on the perception of China and their framework and
policies as dealt with earlier, the Clique worked out the “sanzi zhengce” (The Three-fold
Self-reliance Policy), i.e. “ziwei” (self-defence), “zizhi” (self-government), and “ziji” (self-
sufficiency), to be the core of mass mobilization and reconstruction.371 Here, the Guangxi

367
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 322.
368
Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b, p. 336.
369
Ren Shaoxi, Kangzhan zhong de Zhongguo junshi, Guilin: Kangzhan shudian, 1940,
p. 214. Also see Guangxi sheng zhengfu tongjishi (ed.), Guangxi tongji shuzi tiyao, Guilin
1946, pp. 20-21.
370
As many writers have discussed this issue in their Guangxi studies, it is unnecessary to
repeat their work in this thesis. In this section, I just give a brief review of the
achievements of Guangxi in mass mobilization and reconstruction to show the influence of
the Clique’s perception of China and policies on its practices in the province. For details of
discussion by those writers, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation, Chapter 9; Eugene Levich,
The Kwangsi Way, Chapter 4; Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu
chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b; Huang Xili, “Xin Guixi ‘sanzi sanyu’ zhengce he
‘Guangxi jianshe gangling’ shuping”, XSLT, No. 5, 1989, pp. 83-89; Yuan Liya, “Xin
Guixi shiqi de Guangxi jiceng zuzhi”, XSLT, No. 5, 1989, pp. 90-94; and Zhang
Zhuangqiang, “Lun sanshi niandai de Guangxi mintuan”, YLSZXB, No. 1, 1984. For more
information about Guangxi militia in the 1930s, see Yu Shixi, “Xin Guixi de mintuan
zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 13; Lu Yi, “kangzhan qianhou Guangxi jianwen”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 11; Liang Kan, “Xin Guixi jituan de mintuan zhengce jiqi shishi”, NNWSZL, No. 4
(1987); Li Po, “Guangxi de mintuan”, GXWX, No. 9 (1980); and articles of Xin Wu, Xiao
Yedao, Wang Xunzhi, Wang Heng, Pan Yizhi, Mo Weiyi, Lei Yin, Huang Tianshi, Chen
Liangzuo, Chen Lijiang, Chen Enyuan in the Bibliography of this thesis. Also see speeches
of Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Huang Xuchu on militia; CYGL, Vol. 2, No. 3; Ye Xin’an
(ed.), Xin xi’nan teji, Shanghai: Qingnian zazhishe, 1940; and other documents on militia
and Guangxi reconstruction compiled and published by the Guangxi authorities in 1930s.
371
For detailed discussion of the Sanzi zhengce, see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way,
pp. 65-98; Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 163-93; Chu Hongyuan, “1930 sanshi

152
leaders regarded the Three-fold Self-reliance Policy as the practice of Sun Yatsen’s Three
Principles of the People.372 In other words, self-defence, self-government and self-
sufficiency were the prerequisites to achieve nationalism and people’s rights and livelihood
of Sun Yatsenism in Guangxi,373 in which self-defence became naturally the foundation of
the Three-fold Self-reliance Policy to meet the needs of both existence of the Guangxi
group and national salvation against Japanese aggression.374 Based on this, the “sanyu
zhengce” (Policy of Three-Incorporation), i.e. “yubing yutuan” (militia training of able-
bodied men to produce soldiers), “yumu yuzheng” (troops raising through conscription) and
“yujiang yuxue” (military training of students to produce officers), became the motive
forces to implement the Three-fold Self-reliance Policy.375 Thus, the militia in Guangxi no
longer was a single folk self-defence force only, but had become the armed organization
with the military, political, economic, cultural and educational functions by the whole
people, controlled and guided by the Clique through all levels of the government from
above to below to serve mass mobilization and reconstruction in the province.
Mass mobilization in Guangxi through the militia system helped the Clique
effectively to control the whole province from above. The Clique trained over 30,000
officers during the 1930s to carry out its policies in the rural society,376 for which they

niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b; Bai Chongxi,

Mintuan zhengce yu minzu geming, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938; Bai Chongxi, Bai
fuzongsiling yanjiang ji; and Li Zongren, Mintuan yu junxun, Nanning: MTZKS, 1939.
372
Li Jiajun, Li Zongren xiansheng zhuan, Shanghai: Housheng shudian, 1948, pp. 6-7.
373
Huang Xuchu, Zhongguo jianshe yu Guangxi jianshe, Guilin, 1939, pp. 207-215.
374
For details of this policy, see Li Zongren, Sanmin zhuyi zai Guangxi, Nanning:
MTZKS, 1938; and Bai Chongxi, Bai fuzongsiling yanjiang ji. Also see Qian Shifu (ed.),
Bai Jiansheng xiansheng lun sanzi zhengce yu Guangxi jianshe, Nanning: Jianshe shudian,
1938, and Qian Shifu (ed.), Li Delin xiansheng lun Guangxi jianshe yu fuxing Zhongguo,
Nanning: Jianshe shudian, 1938. For discussion of this policy, see Eugene Levich, The
Kwangsi Way, pp. 65-98; Diana Lary, Region and Nation, Chapter 9; and Chu Hongyuan,
“1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b.
375
For detailed discussion of this policy, see Diana lary, Region and Nation, Chapter 9;
Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, Chapter 4; and Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi
de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b. Also see Bai Chongxi, “Sanyu
zhengce”, Bai Chongxi xiansheng zuijin yanlun ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJ, 1936.
376
See Chu Hongyuan, “1930 sanshi niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b, p. 326. For details of the implementation of the Clique’s

153
developed a system “sanwei yiti” (Three-in-One).377 Through adopting effective measures
of “xing xinzheng yong xinren” (carry out new policies and use young officers) to
implement its policies, the Clique could effectively have mobilized the masses in every
corner throughout the province.378 Meanwhile, it could have destroyed local feudal gentry
influence (e shili), which had controlled administration, judicature, litigation and economy
of the rural society in traditional China,379 as their traditional roles had been replaced by

policies in training militia officers, see Qian Shifu (ed.), Shijie diyige teshu xuexiao:
Guangxi mintuan ganbu xuexiao, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938; Guomin gemingjun disi
jituanjun zongsilingbu (ed.), Guangxi mintuan tiaoli zhangze, 1934; and Guangxi mintuan
ganbu xuexiao, compiled and published by the Guangxi Militia Cadres Academy, Nanning,
1938.
377
The so-called “Three-in-One system” meant that an administrative officer in a basic
unit, for example, a village, or a town, or a ward, was at the same time captain of local
militia team and the principal of the primary school as well. According to the regulations
of militia organization issued by the Clique in the 1930s, each village, or town, or ward,
should set up a militia team, because all adults between ages of 18-45 who lived in the
province are required to take militia training and were responsible for the duty of serving
region and nation. This is the “bingmin heyi” or “bingnong zhengce” (policy of union of
soldiers and peasants or people), according to Nanning minguo ribao (26/10/1932, p. 1).
Meanwhile, each village, or town, or ward, was required to establish a primary school to
teach both children and adults. Therefore, the officer in a basic unit had to shoulder
responsibilities of administering, training and educating the masses at the same time. For
detailed discussion of this system, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 163-93; Eugene
Levich, The Kwangsi Way, pp. 109-114; Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de
dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b; Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng
zuijin yanlun ji; Huang Xuchu, Ganbu zhengce, Guilin: Wenhua gongyingshe, 1940; and
Kang Zhenhua, Guangxi de sanwei yiti zhi, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938.
378
For details of “xing xinzheng yong xinren”, see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, pp.
109-120; Diana Lary, Region and Nation, Chapter 9; Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai
Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b; Huang Xuchu, Ruhe
tuixing xinzheng, Guilin: GXJSYJH, 1940; Bai Chongxi, Bai fuzongsiling yanjiang ji, and
Bai Chongxi xiansheng zuijin yanlun ji; Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zongsilingbu
(ed.), Guangxi mintuan gaiyao; Kang Zhenhua, Guangxi de jiceng jianshe, Nanning:
MTZKS, 1938, and Zenyang yunyong mintuan tuidong jianshe, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938.
379
For details of relations between local feudal-gentry influence and rural society, see Fei
Xiaotong, Xiangtu Zhongguo, Shanghai: Zhongguo guanchashe, 1947; Fei Hsiao-tung, “An
Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes”, in Fei Hsiaotung, Chinese
Village Close-Up, Beijing: The New World Press, 1983, pp. 124-157; and Wang Zaoshi,
Zhongguo wenti de fenxi, Shanghai: ZHSJ, 1935.

154
those young officers, who were aged mostly between 20-40.380 To secure and strengthen its
control over the province and support those young officers to carry out the new policies in
the rural society, the Clique issued “Regulations of Guangxi for Punishing Local Tyrants
and Evil Gentry” in 1935 to suppress any actions in opposition to mass mobilization and
reconstruction carried out by the Guangxi authorities.381 Thus, the Clique combined well
the militia system to the basic units and organs beyond the county government to meet the
needs of regional or local self-government. Generally speaking, in levels of township (a
rural administrative unit under the county), village, and ward, the Guangxi authorities
successfully practised self-government and coincided with the purposes which were
formulated by the Clique and were written in “the section of political reconstruction” of the
Guangxi Reconstruction Program.382 It is safe to say that the Clique successfully linked
regional affairs with the fate of the nation, while this group was striving to consolidate its
own rule in the province. That is to say, political regionalism in Guangxi was combined
with nationalism under the guidance of the Clique’s Program and policies.
With the promotion of militia, Guangxi also made great achievements in
reconstruction. In short, the province roughly achieved self-sufficiency of food production
and supply and balance of external trade, although the achievements were due to the fact
that the Guangxi people practised strict economy and were encouraged to use local

380
According to an investigation taken in 1932-1933, over 80% officers in Guangxi were
in the ages between 20-40. See Guangxi nianjian (Second Issue), 1935, p. 1126.
381
See “Guangxi chengzhi tuhao lieshen tiaoli”, CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 3-5.
382
For the purposes of the section of political reconstruction of the Guangxi
Reconstruction Program, see Yao Liang and Lu Qi (eds.), Guangxi jianshe zhongyao
wenxian, Guilin: The Provincial Government of Guangxi, 1947, pp. 2-3. For the
achievements of Guangxi's self-government in basic units under the county, see Eugene
Levich, The Kwangsi Way, Part II; Guangxi sheng zhengfu (ed.), Zhonghua minguo ershisi
niandu Guangxi sheng xianzheng sheshi zongze, Nanning, 1935; Guangxi sheng xianxing
fagui huibian, 1936, Guangxi sheng xianjieduan xian jianshe gangling, n.d., n.p.; Guangxi
sheng zhengfu minzhengting (ed.), Guangxi sheng xian xiang cun zizhi fagui huibian,
Guilin, 1938; Guangxi gexian gaikuang (1933), Nanning, 1934; Kang Zhenhua, Guangxi
de jiceng jianshe, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938; Pan Jingjia, Kangzhan zhong Guangxi xiang
zhen cun jie zhang, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938, Mintuan yundong yu jiceng jianshe, Nanning:
MTZKS, 1938; and Qiu Changwei, Guangxi xianzheng, Guilin: Wenhua gongyingshe,
1941.

155
products to decrease dependence on imported goods.383 The most successful achievement
of Guangxi’s reconstruction in the 1930s was the development of modern communication
by building highways and erecting telephone lines. According to official statistics, 1,092
kilometres of highway were built in 1928;384 two years later this highway construction was
increased to 2,197 kilometres, and 6,821 kilometres in 1935.385 By 1940, Guangxi erected
telephone transmission lines over 40,000 kilometres, mostly finished before 1937.386
Without militia force and mass mobilization, it is hard to imagine that Guangxi could have
made so great an achievement in reconstruction. These achievements further facilitated the
Guangxi authorities' efforts to control and mobilize.
In rural economic reconstruction, the Clique carried out the “cangchu jigu”
(keeping grains in a storehouse) policy to look after the welfare of peasants when natural
disasters such as flood and drought occurred in the province. Meanwhile, the Guangxi
authorities established the “gonggeng” (cropping system by the public) system by
employing the militia force to cultivate the public land in order to add accumulation for the
“cangchu jigu”.387 This policy was designed to oppose the CCP’s land redistribution policy
which involved violence. The Clique tried to employ non-violent means to reform the rural
society and to convince the people that their policy would be an alternative to that of the
Communists in order to avoid fierce class conflict.388
Another considerable achievement was the Clique’s promotion of the people’s
educational and cultural level and quality, which was the foundation of effective promotion

383
For details of Guangxi economy in the 1930s, see Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”,
CQ, No. 190 (June 1, 1965), p. 12; and Zhang Peigang, Guangxi liangshi wenti, Changsha:
SWYSG, 1938, pp. 141-42; and Zhongguo shehui jiaoyushe kaochatuan (ed.), Guangxi de
jiaoyu jiqi jingji, Suzhou, 1937.
384
Guangxi nianjian (First issue), 1933, p. 511.
385
Guangxi nianjian (Second Issue), 1935, pp. 711-713. Chen Hui gave a different
description of Guangxi highway reconstruction from that of the provincial official statistics.
According to Chen Hui, there were about 4,800 kilometres of highway in Guangxi around
1935-1936. See Chen Hui, Guangxi jiaotong wenti, Changsha: SWYSG, 1938, p. 41-50.
386
Qiu Changwei, Guangxi xianzheng, 1941, p. 25. Also see Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin
(eds.), Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1991, Vol. 1, pp. 386-7.
387
See Chen Sanjing and Chen Cungong (eds.), Lei Yin yu minchu neizheng: Lei Yin
xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 136-7.
388
See Yao Liang and Lu Qi (eds.), Guangxi jianshe zhongyao wenxian, pp. 1-2.

156
of military, political and economic reconstruction in Guangxi.389 Under the education
system of Guangxi, not only children were required to complete compulsory primary
education, but adults were also encouraged to participate in literacy classes - a campaign to
eliminate illiteracy throughout the province based on militia organizations and the three-in-
one system.390 Undoubtedly, the education campaign at least demonstrated the Clique’s
determined effort to promote the people’s cultural and political consciousness. As Li
Doushan, a Korean who visited Guangxi in 1935, observed,
What kind of culture is urgently needed by China at present is the strong national
culture....The present cultural reconstruction taking place in Guangxi actually meets
China’s urgent needs.391
The best example of the result of this achievement is that the Guangxi troops showed their
strong political consciousness in their resistance against Japan and the high morale after the
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.392 All of these benefits should be attributed to the
Clique's education system and cultural reconstruction throughout the province, particularly
its promotion of national consciousness in the 1930s.

Conclusion

In summary, the Clique developed an informed basic perception of Chinese society

and the possibilities of the Chinese revolution. The perception was to a great extent
affected by Marxist-Leninist methodology; it emphasized the importance of organizing the
peasantry and mobilizing the masses to resist Japan, but opposed Jiang’s policy of non-
resistance to Japanese aggression. In its practical and historical application the Guangxi
Reconstruction Program guided Guangxi mass mobilization and reconstruction of the

389
For detailed discussion of Guangxi cultural reconstruction, see Eugene Levich, The
Kwangsi Way, pp. 126-40; Chu Hongyuan, “Xinhai geming qianhou de Guangxi jiaoyu”,
paper presented to the conference in memory of the 80th-year of the 1911 Revolution,
Nanning, 1991; and Li Wei, “Xin Guixi de guomin zhongxue jiaoyu”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 15,
pp. 138-57.
390
For detailed discussion of this system, see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, Chapter
9.
391
Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, p. 162.
392
See, for example, Lu Keng, Guangxijun yuanzheng ji, Hankou: Xinsheng chubanshe,
1938, p. 1, and pp. 76-80.

157
1930s; the Pearl River Valley Revolution Theory similarly became a motive force linking
regionalism to nationalism, and was justified in its aim of resisting Japanese aggression.
These perceptions had earlier provided the Clique with an ideology enabling it successfully
to control and integrate rural society through militia training. This was why Guangxi was
so successful in its reconstruction and mobilization of the masses in the 1930s and was
widely lauded as a “model province” at that time. Based on these analyses and perceptions,
the Clique strengthened its cooperation with neighbouring provinces - the southwest
regional factions - in both its own interests and in the pursuit of internal and external
policies. Furthermore, this theory led the Clique to launch the “June 1 Movement” in 1936
calling for immediate resistance to Japan through provincial mass mobilization, and to
strive for the promotion of an Anti-Japanese National United Front. Through these efforts
the Clique convinced the Guangxi people that only they could take on the task of national
salvation and lead them to the war of resistance against Japan, and, ultimately become an
alternative to Jiang's leadership. In this way, personal, group and national interests and
responsibilities were firmly combined.

158
CHAPTER FIVE

RELATIONS BETWEEN LI AND THE SOUTHWEST REGIONAL FACTIONS

There had been continuing internal conflicts within the GMD from the moment of
its establishment. The conflicts, particularly after the Northern Expedition, concentrated
either on the struggle for power between the Central Government at Nanjing and the
regions, or on differences of political lines and policies; sometimes it was a mixture of
both. Hence, these conflicts had a great impact on the rise and fall of some GMD factions,
and on the policy-making of different parties and factions. All this suggests that a priority
for internal political unity of the GMD was to settle the debates and conflicts over domestic
and external affairs with other parties and factions outside the GMD.
As leader of a strong faction with military power, Li Zongren had been voluntarily
or involuntarily involved in these conflicts since he came to power in Guangxi. Thus, his
relations with other factions and leading figures of the GMD, particularly with Guangxi’s
neighbouring provinces, the southwest regional factions, had a great effect on both his and
the Guangxi Clique’s fortunes in central and regional power structures, and also affected
his relations with Jiang Jieshi. The fact that the Clique revived its force after it was
defeated by Jiang in central China in 1929 and became the major opposition to Jiang after
then shows the importance of such relations in factional conflicts.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze and account for Li’s and the Clique’s relations
with the southwest regional factions within the GMD. It also studies the impact of these
relations on the Clique’s actions in the decade before the War of Resistance and the role of
such relations in the approach to internal political unity of the GMD, an essential
prerequisite to national political unity when China was seeking a way to resist Japanese
aggression.

159
The Role of Relations between Li and the Southwest Regional Factions in the Process
of the Internal Political Unity of the GMD

1. Definition of the Southwest Regional Faction

Factional struggles had existed throughout the Republican era. Before the Northern
Expedition, these struggles concentrated on control over the Central power in Beijing.393
During the Nanjing period, the struggles between central and regional factions were very
sharp. The so-called region (difang), in plain terms, is the opposite of the center
(zhongyang). In this sense, the region mainly means provinces. Therefore, the regional
faction was made up of the military and political leaders and cliques who controlled
particular territories (usually one or more provinces) and military forces with certain power.
Many writers trace regional factions of modern China back to the Taiping Rebellion, and
some suggest the regionalism created by the Beiyang warlords group created by Yuan
Shikai.394 Whatever the case, regional factions had existed before the establishment of the
Republic. However, regional factions which claimed to believe in a certain ideology, and
to have a concern with both national and regional affairs and interests, was the phenomenon
typical in the Republican era, particularly in the Nanjing decade. Therefore, regional
factions of the GMD originated, not during the Sino-Japanese War period as some Chinese
scholars have suggested,395 but during the Expedition, and grew in the Nanjing decade.
First, before the Expedition, China was dominated by different warlords (or militarists),
who supported different regimes in both the north and south. But regional factions,
particularly those in the Southwest, grew from the chaos and wars of this area caused by the

393
For a thorough discussion of the formation of factions and their conflicts in modern
China during 1918-1928, see Andrew Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism in
Chinese Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, pp. 27-90.
394
See Jerome Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972; Ernest
P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early
Republican China, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977; Andrew Nathan,
Peking Politics; and Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai,
Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1990.
395
Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai, p. 2.

160
fall of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Republic in 1911,396 and they only
accepted the GMD’s regime nominally following the launching of the Expedition in
1926.397 In other words, the feeling of political regionalism was stronger in the
Southwest.398 This area also was the main base of the GMD before the Expedition.399
Secondly, these factions maintained semi-independence from the Nanjing regime under the
slogans of power sharing in the region and opposing Jiang’s centralization or dictatorship.
They differed from the warlords or militarists in the Beiyang period who usually attempted
to control the Central government in Beijing. In appearance, the state of semi-
independence was similar to the federalist movement popular in the early 1920s in the
Southwest.400 But the factions in this area claimed Sun Yatsen’s ideas of regional self-
government (difang zizhi) as the guideline of their actions and actually, to some extent,
carried out policies for that, particularly at the levels of county and township, as in

396
For detailed discussion of the origin and development of these factions, see Guo
Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992; and Mo
Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990.
397
For details of relationship between the Southwest regional factions and the Nationalist
Government at Guangzhou and Nanjing later, see Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang
Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai.
398
Guo Jianlin, “Luelun xi’nan gesheng ‘zizhi’ chaoliu he ‘feidu caibing’ de husheng”,
XNJFSYJCK, No. 3.
399
For details see Mo Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi.
400
The Federalist Movement was for a federation of autonomous provinces and was
practised in the provinces in the Southwest, particularly in Hunan, following the first world
war when China seemed lost in anarchy. This movement was similar to that of the
Southwest’s semi-independence from Nanjing in regional autonomy, but different from
their origins and purposes. The former wanted to get China into a united nation through the
way of federation and was a reflection of national anarchy. The Southwest’s semi-
independence or regional self-government was the result of the Central Government’s
impotent control over this area and was aimed at sharing power with the Jiang group in the
region and sharing the leadership of the Central Government by overthrowing Jiang’s rule
if any opportunity came, such as the Guangxi Clique did so. For details of the Federalist
Movement, see Jean Chesneaux, “The Federalist Movement, 1920-23”, in Jack Gray (ed.),
Modern China’s Search for a Political Form, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.
96-137. Also see Guo Jianlin, “Luelun xi’nan gesheng ‘zizhi’ chaoliu he ‘feidu caibing’
husheng”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 3, pp. 48-67.

161
Guangxi.401 Furthermore, regional factions in the Nanjing decade were concerned with not
only regional economic reconstruction but also national affairs, particularly the issue of
Japanese aggression. This phenomenon was particularly typical in the Southwest.
It can be seen from the above that the Southwest Regional Faction means that: 1)
they were groups with political and military power which originated in the regions in the
Republican period and developed and strengthened in the Nanjing decade; 2) those groups
had long historical relations with the GMD for they were its main supporters from its
inception, and it relied on the regions as a base to expand its influence over the country; 3)
these groups were semi-independent from the GMD regime since its establishment in
Guangzhou in the early 1920s; and 4) these groups were to oppose Jiang over power
sharing (junquan) with the Jiang group in the regions, and to differ with Jiang over his
response to Japanese aggression.
The Southwest regional factions in the Republic comprised the ruling groups based
on the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Guangxi, and sometimes Hunan and
Guangdong as well. They held political power and military forces in these provinces. They
also maintained semi-independence from Nanjing in opposing Jiang. The Southwest is
traditionally a geographic term. Its provinces have always had close connections in
economics and geopolitics as they border on each other. The Southwest also embraces a
distinctive culture. Most of the provinces in this region have similar dialects and cultural
traditions. Guangxi is in the intermediary position, sharing both Cantonese and Sichuan-
Guizhou-Yunnan dialect (xi’nan guanhua) - the Southwest Mandarin, which gives Guangxi
a favourable advantage through links with speakers of both. Culture and geopolitics in the
Southwest determined to a great extent its closer internal relations and cooperation, as well
as opposition to Jiang.

2. The Role of the Southwest Regional Factions in the Internal Political Unity of the GMD

401
For a thorough discussion of the achievements of Guangxi in regional self-
government, see Chu Hongyuan, “Woguo jindai minzhu zhengzhi de ge’an yanjiu:
Guangxi sheng de xuebu minzhu, 1907-1937”, Zhengzhi kexue luncong (Taipei), No. 1
(March 1990), pp. 89-124; Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu
chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17B (December 1988), pp. 307-53; and Chu Hongyuan,
“Woguo sifa xiandaihua de ge’an yanjiu: Guangxi sifa de chuqi xiandaihua, 1907-1937”,
Keji zhenghe xuebao, No. 1, 1991, pp. 16-33.

162
 After 1912 China experienced a period of instability and chaos following the
destruction of the Qing regime. The Central Government failed to win loyalty from the
regions and had only weak control over the country. In such circumstances, political
separatism and a strong feeling of political regionalism gradually developed, particularly in
the Southwest, which led to an upsurge of regional militarism.402 In a sense, this was a
reflection of the struggle for power between different political and interest groups after the
collapse of the Qing. As a result, the government, made up of these groups, was unable to
exert effective control over national affairs.403 Although they maintained a lukewarm
political relationship with the Central Government before 1935, when Nanjing started to
pursue a policy of peaceful reunification in the Southwest, militarists in this area had long
had a great impact on China’s political situation and its development. During the early
Republican period, for example, Southwest militarists were actively involved in such
important domestic events as the huguo (the National Protection) and the hufa (the
Constitution Protection) movements. A reason why they were so active in that period was
that they aspired to make themselves national leaders, because most of them were members
of the Tongmenghui, and the Southwest was the base of the Tongmenghui, which had
endeavoured to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. It was also because they were dissatisfied
with their positions in national affairs, for Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang warlords (or
militarists) had successively dominated the Beijing regime after the fall of the Qing. This
was very important for the Southwest militarists because it planted the seeds of their later
struggle with Jiang, who controlled the GMD authorities and the Nanjing Government.
Meanwhile, it became a process in which all parties and factions were being continually
divided and recombined.404 That is to say, this was a preparatory period for political

402
For a detailed discussion of provincial politically centrifugal force emanating from the
Central Government, see Chen Zhirang (Jerome Ch’en), Junshen zhengquan, Hong Kong:
SLSD, 1979, pp. 16-23.
403
For a thorough discussion of the struggle for power in the Beiyang warlord regime, see
Andrew Nathan, Peking Politics,; and Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-
1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. On the situation of the Guangzhou
regime before the Northern Expedition in 1926, see Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao
qingdang, Taipei: Xueshu zhuzuo jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966; and Mo shixiang, Hufa
yundong shi.
404
For a detailed analysis of this process, see Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China,
1916-1928, Chapter 9.

163
unification of the country. The Northern Expedition was a significant expression of the
aspirations of the various groups and influences towards national reunification under one
central government, the symbol of political unity of the nation.
The Expedition achieved nominal national reunification under the Nationalist
regime, but failed in the issue of political unity in the country. One main reason was
Jiang’s pursuit of centralization. Under Jiang’s centralization, the interests of regional
leaders and regional development were not served. As a result, there was poor motivation
for the internal political unity of the GMD and national political unity in much of the
country. The other reason was the GMD’s failure to ward off foreign imperialism after the
establishment of the Nanjing Government. The nation was soon confronted with renewed
Japanese aggression, and in response to the national crisis, Jiang carried out a policy which
did not lead the nation to resist Japan first, but which insisted on eliminating the opposition
factions within and outside the GMD first - the policy of “domestic pacification before
external war”. Whether the policy was correct or incorrect is beyond the scope of this
thesis. But it is clear that the policy did not meet the needs of the national political situation
at that time. Even some pro-GMD historians in Taiwan, such as Guo Tingyi, admit that the
policy "was not allowed to be carried out by the circumstances".405 The regionalist
development in the 1930s, particularly that of the Clique, was actually, to some extent,
based on opposition to the policy and on common demands for regional cooperation and
reconstruction.
However, this is not to say that regionalism was of no benefit at all to the internal
political unity of the GMD. It at least moved slowly towards that goal in two important
aspects. First, the political and military regionalists in each province focused on provincial
reconstruction in economic, political, and other fields, for which they worked out a series of
reconstructive plans. To a certain extent the achievements of some provinces such as
Shanxi, Guangxi and Guangdong were remarkable.406 The efforts of regionalists led local

405
Guo Tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press,
1982, p. 623.
406
For detailed discussion of the achievements of Shanxi province under Yan Xishan in
reconstruction, see Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949,
Princeton University Press, 1967; and for details of the same issue of Guangdong under
Chen Jitang, see John Fitzgerald, “Increased Disunity: The Politics and Finance of
Guangdong Separatism, 1926-1936”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October
1990), pp. 745-75.

164
people to a belief in regional reconstruction and laid a foundation for national political and
economic development with measures applicable to local conditions.
Secondly, these regionalists paid great attention to regional or provincial
cooperation. In particular, they created political and military allies in the Southwest to
ensure implementation of their own policies in both economic and cultural development of
the provinces. It forced Jiang to pay attention to what was going on with regional interests
and to start to acknowledge regional characteristics. As a result, in dealing with
regionalists, Jiang gradually carried out a policy of compromise with other factions within
the GMD instead of that of his centralization. These factors created an atmosphere for the
Southwest regional factions to form their own policies and to look after their common
interests in the regions through strengthening relations between them. Mass mobilization in
the regions and regional military cooperation between the provinces in the Southwest
strengthened and supported these factions in this area to vie with Jiang for power.
Meanwhile, they awakened the political consciousness of the masses which was
transformed from regionalism to nationalism. With the promotion of anti-imperialism and
national salvation, once the regionalists accepted conciliation with the main faction in the
Central government, regionalism began to support internal unity for the GMD and then
national political unity. In so doing, a common interest and the demand for national action,
such as resistance against external aggression and the formation of a sub-national political
system which involved regional cooperation and some new policies applied to the local
conditions (and in this, Guangxi was a good example), served to promote the internal
political unity of the GMD.

3. The Impact of Relations between Regional Factions on the Li-Jiang Conflict

A good relationship with the Southwest first gave Li a chance to revive his fortunes
in Guangxi after he was defeated by Jiang in central China in 1929. Freed from the military
threat from the factions in neighbouring provinces, Li found enough time to consolidate and
reconstruct his base - Guangxi, a popular “model province” in the 1930s. This region then
became the weapon which Li and the Clique used to criticize Jiang’s slow progress towards

165
reconstruction.407 In a sense, reconciliation between Li and Jiang in 1936, in the eyes of the
public, meant the end of open internal conflict in the GMD. A good relationship with the
Southwest contributed to strengthening Li in both his conflict and reconciliation with Jiang.
This stability in the region formed by mutual cooperation, particularly in Guangxi,
created a favourable environment in which Li could safely introduce his policies in
Guangxi. The policies were worked out by Li and other leaders of the Clique, as they
pursued their own reconstruction and mass mobilization in the province in accordance with
the local conditions without attracting any physical GMD pressure as Nanjing left Guangxi
alone. It contributed to a great extent to Guangxi’s achievements in political, economic,
military, educational, and social reconstruction and development, and ensured continuity of
the policies.408
Furthermore, Li’s relations with other regional factions in the Southwest disturbed
the rapid spread of Jiang’s influence in this region, and made Jiang’s policy to eliminate
regionalists and to centralize under himself more difficult. However, Li’s cooperation with
the Southwest militarists was also based on concern for the serious national crisis. Li and
the Clique were genuinely committed to saving their nation through regional development
and cooperation, even though they to some extent paid lip service to the wishes of the
central government, and certainly aimed at retaining power in their own regions or
province.
With the motive force of national salvation and anti-Japanese imperialism, regional
cooperation gradually constructed a sub-national political system under the banner of the

407
Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 196. Eugene Levich also points out that
Guangxi leaders planned to create a model of national resistance and development as an
example for the rest of China to follow, which was to be, the Clique seemed to hope, a
source of fatal embarrassment for Jiang Jieshi. See Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 28.
408
For detailed discussion and revaluation of Guangxi’s reconstruction in the 1930s, see
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 164-93; Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way; Chu
Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b;
Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1991; and Shen
Xiaoyuan, Li Zongren de yisheng, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1992. Also see Guangxi sheng
zhengfu shinian jingji jianshe bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Guizheng jishi, Guilin, 1946; Hu
Lin (Leng Guan) et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935;
Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; and Li
Zongren (et al), Guangxi zhi jianshe, Guilin: GXJSYJH, 1939.

166
political unity for the nation, which drove Jiang to abandon the policy of reunifying the
Southwest militarily and to carry out peaceful reunification or conciliation instead. In
return for this concession, the Southwest militarists including Li and the Guangxi leaders
accepted Jiang’s leadership of the country and of the War of Resistance. Jiang’s new
rapport with the Southwest militarists ended the open internal conflict in the GMD. This
was a prelude to national conciliation and led to the formation of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front (AJNUF), a prerequisite to political unity in the whole nation.
Clearly, the good relationship between Li and the other powerful Southwest militarists was
an important factor in forcing Jiang to seek conciliation on the internal unity of the GMD,
and allowing progress towards the political unity of the entire country.

Factors Affecting the Relationship between the Southwest Regional Factions

Guangxi borders on Guangdong, Hunan, Guizhou and Yunnan provinces. Since its
formation, the Guangxi Clique had paid considerable attention to its relations with the
neighbours, towards whom it carried out a policy of mutual aid and cooperation to
strengthen its position on the Chinese political stage or to implement its political plans
within and outside the province.409 Such a relationship was extremely important to the
Clique after 1929, when it was defeated by Jiang in its struggle for Central power and was
then forced to return to Guangxi. Having the support and cooperation from its
neighbouring provinces was an important factor for Li and the Clique to continue to
challenge Jiang's power and to carry out their own policies in the province.
Several factors contributed to Li’s relationships with the other Southwest regional
factions. On the one hand, since 1932 there were the two organizations - the Southwest
Branch of the Central Executive Committee and the Southwest Political Council of the
Nationalist Government - which existed in Guangzhou until 1936 (also called “Xi’nan
liang jiguan” - the two Southwest organizations), with Guangdong and Guangxi provinces
as its mainstays. The two organizations became the opposition to Jiang. Through the
organizations, Guangxi gained “legal” protection in the GMD and made itself semi-
independent of Nanjing. Seizing the chance, Li and other leaders of the Clique worked on
internal consolidation and reconstruction in Guangxi, so the policy of “goodwill with

409
See Cheng Siyuan, Zhengtan huiyi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1983, Chapter Four.

167
neighbours and absolute sincere unity with them” became an important aspect of the
Clique’s reconstruction and development in the province.410 On the other hand, although
Guangxi ended its open revolt against Nanjing in 1929-1931, it was still on its guard
against Jiang, who was widely believed to have plans to wipe out those factions and
political figures who held different views from him in the GMD. Furthermore, owing to
differences between the Clique and the Jiang group in internal and external affairs, the
conflict between the two parties had never ceased. Naturally, there was a need to
strengthen association and cooperation with all forces for Li’s struggle against Jiang. In
addition, maintaining friendly relations with the neighbouring provinces could frustrate
Jiang’s attempts to blockade and isolate Guangxi.
Apart from the possibility of conflict with Jiang on the national level, several
reasons committed Li to carry out the policy of goodwill with neighbours. First, since
Guangxi was a relatively poor province, it could not maintain a massive military force.
Rapid expansion of troops would obstruct Guangxi’s economic development and create
turmoil, such as had occurred in 1921-1925 after the fall of the Lu Rongting group and
frequent invasion by the neighbouring provincial troops.411 Bai Chongxi repeatedly warned
of such possibilities in those years.412 After 1932, Guangxi maintained only two armies
(jun) with fourteen regiments (totalling less than 20,000 men). Even so, its expenditure on
armaments was still more than 50% of the total of the provincial budget.413 Hence, a good
relationship with neighbours to a great extent helped to reduce Guangxi’s expenditure on
armaments.
Secondly, in the early Republican period the mood of excluding outsiders was in
vogue. Under the slogan of “natives of the province ruling their own provincial affairs”,
outsiders or outside influences (or armies) found it very difficult to set foot in provinces

410
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiaogong he qinren shanlin”, Bai fuzongsiling yanjiang ji,
Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 52.
411
For details of the situation of Guangxi at that time, see Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.),
Xin Guixi shi, pp. 1-105. Also see Huang Zongyan, “Lun Sun Zhongshan 1921 nian yuan-
Gui tao-Lu zhizhan”, GXSHKX, No. 3, 1986, pp. 52-67.
412
See Xiao Yuan (pseud.), “Ji Lu Rongting”, GWZB, Vol. XIII, Nos. 12-14 (30 March, 6
April, and 13 April, 1936); and Bai Chongxi, “Sanyu zhengce”, Bai Chongxi xiansheng
zuijin yanlun ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1936, p. 174.
413
Guangxi nianjian (First Issue), 1933, p. 622.

168
other than their own, particularly in the Southwest.414 Lu Rongting’s failure in Guangdong
in 1917-1920 had given the Clique a warning.415 Therefore, Li and Guangxi leaders had
long realized the importance of maintaining friendly relationships with their neighbours and
were careful not to take any action to destroy it.416
Thirdly, the southwestern provinces, in particular, Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan,
were the main sources of the opium products for the South China market.417 Guangxi was
not an opium growing area because weather and geographical conditions were not suitable
and the sale of opium in Guangxi was very small.418 Nevertheless Guangxi provided a
much safer route along which to transport opium from Yunnan and Guizhou via
Guangdong to Hong Kong and southeast Asia than others, such as the Yangzi River opium
route. Guangxi could have earned a large revenue from opium.419 The Clique greatly
benefited from levying taxes on the transit of this opium. It was interested in ensuring that
the opium trade flourished because “the rise and fall of the ‘tehuo’ (special goods, i.e.
opium) business was sufficient to determine the prosperity or depression of the commercial
markets of the whole province”.420 As for the income of the Guangxi provincial
government, figures given in an agricultural survey indicated that opium taxes contributed

414
Sichuan province is a good example. For details of “natives of Sichuan ruling their
own provincial affairs”, see Chen Zhirang (Jerome Ch’en), Junshen zhengquan, Hong
Kong: SLSD, 1979; Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, Beijing: HXCBS, 1987; and
Robert A. Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and Central
Power, 1911-1938, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973.
415
For details see Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan, Nanning: Guangxi
minzu chubanshe, 1987; and Mo Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990.
416
See Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, p. 70.
417
See Kuang Jishan and Yang Shurong, “Sichuan junfa yu yapian”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 3,
pp. 250-62.
418
H. G. W. Woodhead (ed.), The China Year Book, Vol. 13 (1931),
Nedeln/Liechtenstein Krans Reprint, 1969, p. 599.
419
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi yu yapian yan”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 1-20; Wang
Jialie, “Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi de guanxi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 91-103;
Chen Xiong, “Xin Guixi tongzhi xia wo suo zhuban de Guangxi ‘jinyan’”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 2, pp. 71-82; and Edmund Clubb, The Opium Traffic in China, 24 April 1934, 893.114
Narcotics/738, National Archives, Washington.
420
Qian Jiaju, Han Dezhang and Wu Bannong, Guangxi sheng jingji gaikuang, Shanghai:
SWYSG, 1936, p. 18.

169
18,031,000 yuan (Chinese dollar) to a total of provincial revenue of 32,950,944 yuan
(about 54.7% of the whole revenue) in 1934.421 Statistics given in the Guangxi Year Book
also showed that the annual incomes from opium taxes exceeded at least 10 million yuan,
reaching nearly 20 million yuan in some years during the first half of the 1930s. This
contributed nearly a half of the revenue of the province in those years.422 This explained
why the Clique worked hard to maintain friendly relationships with its neighbours, even
when these provinces provoked a conflict with it.
As an example of extreme measures designed to preserve relations, after Tang
Jiyao’s defeat in his invasion of Guangxi in 1925, Huang Shaohong, Governor of the
Guangxi provincial government at that time, immediately sent a delegation to Yunnan to
promote and renew the relationship between the two provinces.423 On the other hand, Li
Zongren was determined to maintain the Guangxi opium route by using any means he
could. For instance, in the mid-1930s, Jiang ordered a change to the transportation route of
opium export from Yunnan and Guizhou, avoiding Guangxi in favour of the other province
(i.e. Hunan) in order to put economic pressure on the Clique. To defend its interests, Li
even sent troops disguised as bandits to Hunan. These troops raided and harassed the
opium transportation route, forcing the opium tradesmen to return to the former Guangxi
route.424 Thus it can be seen that the Clique’s relations with the Southwest militarists were
to a great extent determined by economic factors, and more precisely the issue of opium
revenues.

Li’s Relationships with the Southwest Regional Factions

421
Xingzhengyuan nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui (ed.), Guangxi sheng nongcun diaocha,
Shanghai: SWYSG, 1935, pp. 259-260.
422
Guangxi Nianjian (First Issue), 1933, pp. 621-630; and Guangxi nianjian (Second
Issue), 1935, p. 830.
423
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, p. 126.
424
Huang Bingdian, “Jiang-Gui zhengduo yanshui de yimu”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 59-
61.

170
 As the political and economic situation in each province of the Southwest was
different, in dealing with relationships with the factions in the provinces of Yunnan,
Guizhou, Guangdong and Sichuan, Li Zongren’s strategy was different in each case.

1. Li’s Relations With Yunnan

In their studies on Yunnan’s relations with the Guangxi Clique, Chinese historians
have often assumed that the former was closer to Jiang Jieshi than to the latter.425 This was
not the case. In fact, Yunnan’s concern was, on the one hand, the balance of power
between Nanjing and Guangxi. The defeat of either would have been a severe threat to its
independence, apart from the economic tie between Yunnan and Guangxi in the opium
trade.426 On the other hand, Guangxi was interested not only in gaining a large income
from opium taxes in which Yunnan was a main source of opium products, but also in
keeping Yunnan at least neutral. However, relations between the two provinces underwent
two periods (i.e. the Tang Jiyao and Long Yun periods) as a result of changes in the
political situation.
In the first period, Li and the Clique were defending their base in Guangxi against
invasion by the Yunnan Army led by Tang Jiyao in 1925, as dealt with in Chapter Two.
Generally speaking, this was the period during which China was being reunified by the
GMD. The relationship between Li and Yunnan was subsequently to some extent
concentrated on how to approach reunification of the country. Tang Jiyao’s political
ambition left Yunnan in opposition to the GMD which was based on Guangzhou.427 As a
faction of the GMD and one of the main forces participating in the Northern Expedition, Li
and his Clique were naturally opposed to Tang and prevented a possible second invasion of
Guangxi by the Yunnan Army under Tang’s command. But Guangxi also attempted to

425
See, for example, Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili
pai, pp. 89-92.
426
See J. C. S. Hall, The Yunnan Provincial Faction 1927-1937, Canberra: Department
of Far Eastern History, The Australian National University, 1976, p. 179.
427
For a thorough discussion of Tang Jiyao’s role in Chinese politics, see Donald S.
Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905-1925,
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1980.

171
resume economic cooperation in the transit of opium, sending delegations to Yunnan.428
This was an expression of the Clique’s dual policy towards its neighbouring Yunnan.
Long Yun, himself a Yi, a national minority in Southwestern China, came to power
in Yunnan after the death of Tang Jiyao in 1927. Long removed Yunnan’s hostile attitude
towards Guangxi and claimed his loyalty to the Nanjing regime, but chose Jiang Jieshi as
his political patron. Long’s choice was understandable: the Clique did not control central
power though it was one of the most powerful factions within the GMD. The Chinese
preferred to emphasize the “fatong” (orthodox legitimacy). In the GMD, emphasizing
“fatong” meant to carry on the cause of Sun Yatsen. In other words, anyone who upheld
“fatong” would have an opportunity to be successor to Sun. This was a key issue in the
struggle between Jiang Jieshi, Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and other factions in the GMD.
Li Zongren did not have any advantage in this respect. Also, Long faced challenges from
several sub-factions in the province after he came to power but could call for support from
the central government when the latter vied with him for provincial power from time to
time. His right to support in suppressing rival sub-factions in the province was granted
under the “fatong”. Only Jiang could provide such support at that time. As relations
between the Clique and Jiang worsened, Long’s loyalty to the latter increased.429 This was
why Long, after the Jiang-Gui War broke out in the spring of 1929, commanded the
Yunnan troops to attack Guangxi via Guizhou in 1929-30, though this strategy ultimately
failed.430 However, Long’s invasion of Guangxi, apart from his interest in supporting
Jiang, was widely believed to be the result of his dissatisfaction with the state of the transit
of opium through Guangxi. In other words, it was touched off by a dispute over opium
revenues between the two provinces rather than an expression of more superficial politics
in which Yunnan was nominally on the side of Nanjing under Jiang.431 Certainly,

428
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52 (1964), p. 57.
429
Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai, pp. 89-92; and
Jiang Nan (Liu Yiliang), Long Yun zhuan, Taipei: Tianyuan chubanshe, 1987, pp. 57-97.
430
For details of Long Yun’s military action against Guangxi in 1929-1930, see Archives
of the Editorial Committee for War History, The Nationalist Government, Nanjing. Also
see Huang Xuchu, “Nanning dierci weicheng zhan qinli ji”, CQ, No. 46 (1 June 1959), pp.
4-6.
431
PRO.FO371/14692 F3680/93/10, 22/5/1930; Shenbao, 31/7/1930; and E. Snow,
Journey to the Beginning, New York: Vintage Books, 1958, p. 49.

172
economic reasons also brought the two provinces together after Long’s defeat in the
invasion of Guangxi in 1930 and ensured their cooperation in the opium trade again.432
After 1931 the Clique again firmly took control of the province. Relations between
Guangxi and Yunnan entered a relatively peaceful period but were never entirely
harmonious. To improve relations between the two provinces, Li not only sent the Clique’s
senior officers, such as Ye Qi, then Chief of General Staff of the 4th Group Army (the
Guangxi Army), to call on Long occasionally,433 he also requested Hu Hanmin, the spiritual
leader of the two Southwest organizations, to write Long a letter expressing the desire of Li
himself and other leaders of the two Southwest organizations for closer and better relations
with Yunnan.434 It can be seen from the above that Li genuinely tried to establish a
friendship with Long.
However, Long played a dual role during the period of Li’s promotion, on his own
initiative, to achieve a better relationship for the Clique with Yunnan. He predicted that, in
this role, Yunnan also needed the practical cooperation of Guangxi, particularly in the
opium trade.
Long became a secret agent keeping watch on the Clique’s actions to show his
loyalty to Jiang. He frequently sent Nanjing secret reports on the Clique’s military
movements. There are indications that Long sent numerous confidential telegrams to Jiang
reporting activities of the Guangxi army, such as information about the army’s
concentration in Longzhou, a town near the border of Vietnam, and Li’s purchase of
armaments from the French in the 1930s.435 In addition, he also spied on the Clique’s
political movements.436

432
For details of Long Yun’s invasion of Guangxi in 1930 and resuming the cooperation
with Guangxi in the opium trade, see J.C.S. Hall, The Yunnan Provincial Faction, chapters
4-5, and 7.
433
“Long Yun to Li Zongren etc, 18/1/1935, 17/4/1935”, YNLSDA, No. 6 (1984), pp. 58-
9.
434
“Hu Hanmin to Long Yun”. Quoted in Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-
Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, p. 106.
435
For details of Long Yun’s confidential report on Guangxi’s activities, see Archives of
Guangxi Provincial Government, No. L4-1-6, Nanning.
436
Such as, “Long Yun to Jiang Jieshi, March 1935”, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 44.

173
 The second role played by Long was to become a mediator between Li and Jiang,
though he worked mainly for Jiang. This is understandable, partly because Long was closer
to Jiang than were other leaders of Southwest provinces, who were semi-independent of
Nanjing before 1935, and because Long’s position had been more secure than his
neighbours, such as Wang Jialie and Liu Xiang, Chairmen of Guizhou and Sichuan
provinces respectively, who faced challenges in their provinces from time to time when
they were in power. In 1935, Jiang started to carry out the policy of peaceful reunification
in Yunnan and other Southwest provinces. Although he knew Long was a “tu huangdi”
(local Lord), Jiang had to rely temporarily on him because Long had firm control over the
province, where economy, law and order were well maintained. Also, Yunnan officers of
military and civil administration from high to low ranks were all Long's trusted
followers.437 Thus, Long’s actions naturally carried a lot of weight with both Jiang and Li.
In the role of mediator, Long told Li about Jiang’s conciliatory attitude and passed the
former and the Clique's opinions back to the latter.438
Long’s actions had much to do with his attempts to expand Yunnan’s sphere of
influence into Guizhou by seizing chances as his predecessor and ex-superior Tang Jiyao
had attempted to do. Earlier in 1935 Long ordered his subordinate commanders to wipe out
Wang Jialie’s troops in Guizhou and to annex the province by seizing any chance they
could during their action to intercept the Red Army in Guizhou.439 He even sent numerous
confidential telegrams to Chen Bulei, Jiang’s private secretary, emphasizing that while
“Yunnan and Guizhou nominally are two provinces, they are, in fact, an integrated
whole”.440 This confirmed Long’s eagerness to expand his influence into Guizhou.
Probably Long had reason to know that the Nanjing Government would like to strengthen
his power in both Yunnan and Guizhou as the Government's mainstay in the two provinces

437
Jiang Nan, Long Yun zhuan, pp. 112-3; and Wang Taidong, Chen Bulei waizhuan,
Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1987, p. 98.
438
For details see YNLSDA, No. 6, p. 59, and No. 7, p. 45.
439
Sun Du, “Dianjun ru-Qian fangdu hongjun changzheng qinli ji”, WSZLXJ, No. 62.
440
“Long Yun to Chen Bulei, 20/11/1934, and 21/1/1935”, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 51.

174
- that of Jiang’s policy to use Yunnan against Guangxi.441 Perhaps he also knew that Li’s
interest was to keep Yunnan at least neutral in the struggle between the Clique and the
Jiang group. Li must have hoped that Yunnan’s influence in Guizhou would
counterbalance that of Jiang's influence. Whether for regional cooperation and
development or as a factor in the political struggle with Jiang, Yunnan’s counterbalancing
position could benefit the Clique before Li and Jiang reached a compromise. According to
a Dagong Bao editorial on April 28, 1936, Li sent a number of telegrams to Jiang urging
him to give Long authority for “pacification” in Guizhou. It is obvious from the above that
Long attempted to extend his own influence in Guizhou by using his special position in
overtly bringing a closer relationship between the Clique and the Jiang group.
In sum, Long had taken advantage of his position as a mediator to gain favour from
both Jiang and Li. According to Long himself, until the outbreak of the “June 1
Movement” of Guangxi in 1936, “I still act as a mediator to both parties in accordance with
my previous ideal, and give them (i.e. Jiang and Li) sincere advice and repeatedly send
telegrams to mediate between them.”442 It is a matter of history that Long did not join
Jiang's 400,000 troops used to besiege Guangxi during the June 1 Movement. This
naturally weakened the pressure that Jiang could bring to bear on Guangxi to some extent.
This could have been a result of Li’s careful efforts to keep Yunnan neutral in his conflict
with Jiang. In fairness it must be said that Long also played a positive role in compelling Li
and Jiang to reach a reconciliation within the GMD.

2. Li’s Relations With Guizhou

While Li's relations with Yunnan were not always satisfactory, his relations with
Guizhou were good. The Guizhou faction became one of the Clique's most important allies
in the Nanjing decade. Unlike its relations with Yunnan, the Clique had kept the Guizhou
Tongzi Faction as its ally since its rise to power. Relations between the two parties were
based on interdependence.
Guizhou was ruled by the so-called Tongzi Faction for ten years (1926-35), with
Zhou Xicheng and Wang Jialie as its leaders successively, the former from 1926 to 1929,

441
Yan Daogang, “Zhuidu changzheng hongjun de bushu jiqi shibai”, in Quanguo
zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui et al (eds.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng
qinli ji, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1990, p. 22.
442
“Long Yun to Lu Daoyuan, 17 July 1936”, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 57.

175
the latter from 1932 to 1935. Between them was Mao Guangxiang from 1929 to 1931.
Mao also was a leader of the Tongzi Faction, but, his rule of Guizhou coincided with the
period of the Guangxi Clique's struggle for survival and revival in its base - Guangxi.443
For this reason, the discussion of the Guangxi Clique’s relations with the Guizhou Tongzi
Faction will mainly focus on the periods of both Zhou and Wang, but not that of Mao.444
Several factors contributed to Zhou Xicheng’s decision to ally with the Clique.
Politically, He Yingqin and Wang Boqun, leaders of another Guizhou faction, who were
rivals of the Tongzi Faction and who had bad relations with Zhou and his followers, were
repeatedly defeated in previous battles for provincial power in Guizhou in the early
1920s.445 Unlike Zhou, He Yingqin and others not only had joined Jiang for lengthy
periods, but also had close relations with the latter since the establishment of the
Guangzhou revolutionary government. In the view of Zhou, they would make trouble if he
also joined Jiang who was then rising to power. After Guizhou joined the Expedition in
mid-1926, the troops under the command of Wang Tianpei, a general of the Tongzi
Faction, were under Li Zongren’s command most of the time before they were disarmed by
Jiang in the autumn of 1927. On the defeat of the Expedition Army under his command in
a campaign in Shandong by the northern militarists and the strong pressure from both the
Wuhan and Nanjing regimes during the same time, Jiang had to announce his retirement in
August 1927. When he left Nanjing, Jiang had Wang killed on the excuse that the latter
was responsible for the defeat of the Northern Expedition Army.446 This indicated that
Jiang had closed the door on Zhou. Thus, maintaining a friendly relationship with the
Clique, neighbour of Guizhou, would both protect and benefit Zhou in consolidating his

443
For details of Guizhou under the rule of militarists in Republican China, see Zhou
Suyuan, “Guizhou junfa shi shuyao”, GZWSZLXJ (Guizhou), No. 1, pp. 1-43; and Guizhou
junfa shi yanjiuhui and Guizhou sheng shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, Guizhou junfa
shi, Guiyang: GZRMCBS, 1987.
444
For details of Zhou Xicheng's rule of Guizhou, see Fan Tongshou, “Shilun Zhou
Xicheng jiqi dui Guizhou de tongzhi”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 1, pp. 182-202.
445
Liu Shenyuan, “Diwulu Qianjun yuanzhu xin Guixi qijia jilue”, GXWSZL, No. 15, pp.
35-39.
446
For details of the execution of Wang by Jiang, see GWZB, Vol. 4, No. 32 (21/8/1927);
Mi Xi, “Wo zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian de shihou”, Zhejiang wenshi ziliao xuanji, No. 23
(1982), pp. 27-8. Also see Zhang Yingzhi, “Luelun Wang Tianpei”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 1,
pp. 203-17.

176
power over the province. Economically, Guizhou was a major producer of opium, and, as
mentioned earlier, the opium route via Guangxi was a more important route for transporting
opium from Guizhou to South China and overseas markets than any other. Militarily, Zhou
wanted to wipe out his rivals in the province. To achieve this, he needed arms supplies. It
was much more convenient for him to purchase weapons from the British munitions
merchants through Guangxi and Guangdong. For these reasons, Zhou strengthened his
relations with both Guangxi and Guangdong.
A further cementing of relations was the signing of a secret “Guizhou-Guangxi
Agreement”,447 the exact contents of which are still unknown. However, when the Jiang-
Gui War broke out in early 1929, Zhou stood firmly on the side of the Clique.448 Jiang
issued orders on April 14, 1929 to attempt to wipe out Li’s remnant armies in Guangxi
from three routes - Yunnan, Hunan, and Guangdong but not from Guizhou. That province
was left to Long Yun who could satisfy his ambitions of securing Guizhou by passing
through that province to attack Guangxi. Zhou Xicheng commanded the Guizhou troops in
the attempt to intercept the Yunnan army and he died in this battle.449 In his memoirs,
Zhang Renmin, a senior officer of the Clique, also gave evidence to prove the close
relations between the two provinces at that time.450 The facts given above may partly
explain the essence of the Agreement. Unfortunately, with the Clique’s rapid defeat and
Zhou’s death, the alliance between the two provinces collapsed.
The alliance was not resumed until 1932 when Li and his Clique firmly regained
control over Guangxi. If the earlier alliance with Guizhou was mostly part of Li’s power

447
Wang Jialie, “Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 9, p. 94. Guangdong was also included in this agreement because Li Jishen was leader
of the Guangdong Faction at that time. More detailed discussion of Guangdong’s relations
with Guangxi will appear in next section.
448
Ibid, pp. 94-5.
449
Archives of the Editorial Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government,
Nanjing. Also see Wang Jialie, “Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, p. 95.
450
Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, Hong Kong: printed by the author himself, 1987, p.90.
According to recollections of Zhang Renmin, “Guizhou had long had a firm friendship with
us. It showed tacit sympathy towards Guangxi’s sufferings, never doing anything to harm
Guangxi province:. The other confidential report also said that Zhou Xicheng was
affiliated with Guangxi. See U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China 1911-1941, No.
7507 (May 8, 1929).

177
struggle with Jiang, the present reunion of alliance with Guizhou became part of Li’s
continued conflict with Jiang and Guangxi’s semi-independence from Nanjing. Jiang
attempted to prevent regional cooperation between the Southwest militarists, and this was
one aspect of his campaign to achieve centralization under his direct control. In resisting
Jiang, Li took the initiative to win over Wang Jialie, Chairman of Guizhou province and
leader of the Tongzi Faction after Zhou Xicheng.
Wang Jialie’s choice of Li and the Clique as his ally was clearly determined by the
internal struggle in the province and his own external conflict with Jiang. Wang came to
power in Guizhou in 1932. However, he was challenged by his rivals in the province from
time to time. This is partly because Long Yun helped General You Guocai, a Divisional
Commander of the Guizhou armies, and partly because Liu Xiang also supported General
Jiang Zaizhen, another Divisional Commander of the Guizhou armies. The two Guizhou
Generals were separately fostered by Long and Liu in their attempts to take over Wang’s
position in the province.451 Moreover, in order to gain control over Guizhou, Jiang also
supported all of Wang’s rivals. Thus, Wang felt a serious threat to his position and it is
understandable that he followed in his ex-superior Zhou Xicheng’s footsteps in standing on
the Clique’s side, as he wrote in his memoirs several decades later.452 As a result, Li
succeeded in reaching a secret agreement with Wang in 1934. It was entitled “The Military
Agreement of Guangdong, Guangxi and Guizhou Provinces”, with the main provisions as
follows:
The three provinces shall have mutual military cooperation, should Jiang Jieshi
launch an attack on any of them. Should Guizhou need ammunition, purchase can
be made through negotiation with Guangdong and Guangxi.453
Partly as a consequence of drawing the Tongzi Faction into rejoining the former
Guizhou-Guangxi-Guangdong alliance and signing the above agreement, the Clique was
free of military threat from the neighbouring provinces of sort that had occurred in 1929-
1930. It was, to a certain extent, helpful to the Clique’s control over provincial situation
and implementation of economic reconstruction in Guangxi. The existence of the
Agreement partly explains why Jiang tolerated Guangxi’s semi-independence from Nanjing

451
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China 1911-1941, No. 8848 (June 9, 1934).
452
Wang Jialie, “Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 9, p. 99.
453
Ibid, p. 101. Guangxi’s relations with Guangdong will be discussed in next section.

178
for years.454 In 1935, Jiang finally dismissed Wang when the Central army entered
Guizhou attempting to intercept the Long March of the Red Army.455
That Li allied with the Guizhou faction strengthened the Clique itself and helped in
his rivalry with Jiang for years. There are several reasons for this alliance: the most
important one is that the factions of Guizhou had depended militarily and economically on
other powerful forces outside the province. In comparison with the factions of its
neighbours, the Guizhou faction was one of the weakest at that time. The revenues of the
province were very low.456 For example, its total revenues were only 2,908,399 yuan in
1932,457 and 2,902,079 yuan the following year.458 This was much lower than its
neighbours, but served military expansion of Guizhou militarists only, which further
worsened the provincial economics and increased the tax load on the masses.459 Moreover,
the internal struggle in the province had been going on within the Guizhou faction since
1911. Each group in the Guizhou faction vied with the others for power and each
succeeding militarist who came to power faced antagonistic powerful rivals. For example,
Zhou Xicheng fought against Li Shen, a Guizhou General supported by Long Yun; and in
the Wang Jialie period, the active opposition came from Generals You Guocai and Jiang
Zaizhen. To keep leadership in Guizhou meant reliance on outside political, military and
financial support.460 The need to transport opium to markets via neighbouring provinces
further increased the dependence of a weak province on external assistance.

454
According to Wang, Jiang had already known such a military alliance existed between
Guizhou, Guangxi and Guangdong, because General Yu Hanmou, a subordinate
commander of Chen Jitang, secretly passed the information to Jiang. For this reason, Jiang
hated Wang intensely and had attempted to dismiss him from his post. Wang Jialie,
“Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, p. 101.
455
Chen Jiren and Qiao Yunsheng, “Junfa Wang Jialie de kuatai”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 3.
456
For details of Guizhou’s economic and social situations under the rule of militarists,
see Hu Keming, “Guizhou junfa tongzhi shiqi de shehui jingji gaikuang”, XNJFSYJCK,
No. 1, pp. 218-256.
457
Guangxi nianjian (First Issue), 1933, p. 671.
458
Guangxi nianjian (Second Issue), 1935, p. 885.
459
See Wu Duanjun, “Wei junshi kuozhang fuwu de Guizhou caizheng”, XNJFSYJCK,
No. 3, pp. 354-371.
460
See Liu Yixiang, “Shilun Qianxi junfa de yifuxing he lueduoxing”, XNJFSYJCK, No.
3, pp. 326-338.

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 After Guizhou was brought under Jiang’s direct control in 1935, the already
strained relations between the Clique and the Jiang group became even further strained.
Indeed, along with the growing differences in internal and external policies, Jiang’s
economic pressure on Guangxi speeded up the outbreak of conflict between the two parties.
Jiang used his power in Guizhou to undermine the Clique by cutting off its most important
sources of revenue. He placed a heavy levy on opium in Guizhou and prevented it from
passing through Guangxi. A measure taken by Jiang was the “Regulations for Levying the
Provincial Tax on Special Goods of the Guizhou General Opium Prohibition Bureau”,
published on 30 June 1936.461 Consequently, Guangxi’s incomes from opium taxes in
1936 were reduced to less than one third, as against 1934.462 To break Jiang's economic
and military blockade, the Clique during the “June 1 Movement” gave energetic support to
those pro-Clique and anti-Jiang figures in Guizhou to organize the Guizhou Anti-Japanese
and National Salvation Army, about 20,000 men active on the border of Guizhou and
Guangxi. It broke down to some extent the Central army’s encirclement of Guangxi during
the Movement.463
Although Jiang finally broke the Guangxi and Guizhou alliance through military
occupation of the latter, Li won precious time to reconstruct and mobilize his base -
Guangxi, and formed a regional cooperation which was favourable to force the internal
political unity on the GMD.

3. Li’s Relations with the Guangdong Faction (Yuexi)

In Guomindang China, Guangdong was the birthplace of several main military and
political factions, such as those of Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Chen Gongbo, Sun Ke and
others, who to a great extent had an impact on the political development in Guangdong, and
even China. Jiang Jieshi himself originated from Guangdong also as he began his
successful political and military careers from the Guangzhou Military Government which
existed in the late 1910s and the early 1920s, first as Sun Yatsen’s military aide and then

461
Zhang Xiaomei, Guizhou jingji, Shanghai: SWYSG, 1938, p. Q30.
462
Chen Xiong, “Xin Guixi tongzhi xia wo suo zhuban de Guangxi ‘jinyan’”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 2, p. 79.
463
Chen Jiren, “Liangguang shibian qijian Guizhou kangri jiuguojun jishi”, GZWSZLXJ
(Guizhou), No. 23 (October 1986), pp. 237-255.

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Chief of Staff of the Guangdong Army. Those were steps made by Jiang as he was
gradually promoted to the position of Commander in Chief of the Northern Expedition
Army of the NRA in 1926, before he left this province. The men who really had control
over Guangdong and had influence on the province for years, however, were Li Jishen and
Chen Jitang successively, leaders of the so-called Guangdong Faction (or Yuexi), as it was
called after 1926. Their actions had more impact than any others on the Guangxi Clique’s
rise and fall in the GMD.
Apart from close connections between Guangdong and Guangxi in culture and
geography, several factors affected their relations. Politically, Guangdong enjoyed high
prestige in its political role in the early Republic. It was a major source of the Nationalist
Revolution under Sun Yatsen, particularly before the Expedition, as the province was Sun’s
birth place. It also was an area where all political and military groups over the country
assembled and debated with each other, even those factions and parties in opposition to the
GMD.464
Militarily, Guangdong was a traditional supplier of ammunition to Guangxi. In the
early Republic, Guangxi did not have an arsenal, but Guangdong had a number of big
munitions factories able to meet the needs of both Guangdong itself and the South China
market.465 For the Clique, it was convenient to obtain ammunition supplies from
Guangdong for geographic reasons. More importantly, bordering the two western colonies
- Hong Kong and Macao - Guangdong never ran short of foreign arms supplies. There is
evidence that the large purchases of foreign firearms by the Clique were made via
Guangdong in the 1920s and 1930s.466
Economically, until recently Guangdong has been the major market for Guangxi’s
rural products. For this reason, a good relationship with Guangdong enabled the Guangxi
authorities to levy taxes on these goods, including opium,467 and to gain certain financial

464
See Chen Zhirang, Junshen zhengquan, pp. 153-162.
465
For details of arsenals in Guangdong, see GZWSZLXJ (Guangzhou), No. 37, pp. 161-
167. Also see Lu Dayue, “Jiuyiba shibian hou guomin zhengfu tiaozheng binggong shiye
shulun”, KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1993, pp. 102-116.
466
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52, pp. 26-7; Archives of the
Nationalist Government, Nanjing; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), Zhonghua
minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Vol. 4. Nanjing: JSGJCBS, 1986, p. 902.
467
Chen Xiong, “Xin Guixi de juanxiang”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, p. 55.

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support for the Clique.468 This partly explains why, after the reunification of the province,
the Clique brought itself under the Nationalist Government in 1925.469 Li Zongren wrote
on May 13, 1932, in a letter to Xiao Focheng, a native of Guangdong and a veteran member
of the two southwestern organizations, "Guangxi’s policy towards the current political
situation should, in the future, be under the leadership of the Political Council and follow
Guangdong’s lead”.470 This indicates that the Clique had pursued a cooperative policy with
Guangdong since the early 1920s.
Relations between Li and the Guangdong Faction can be traced back to 1923, when
the former’s sphere of influence was limited to a small area - Yulin fu only. Li had a
chance to expand his influence in the summer of the same year, when the Clique captured
Wuzhou with the assistance of the First Division of the Guangdong Army (FDGDA). This
was the province’s richest area as well as the closest area to the Guangzhou Military
Government (GMG) under the leadership of Sun Yatsen. Through the assistance of the
FDGDA, Li and the Clique built up its close relations with the GMG. The occupation of
Wuzhou became a turning point for a new relationship between the two provinces, which
had experienced some enmity after Lu Rongting’s group and Guangdong became enemies
in 1920.471
FDGDA was a powerful troop under the leadership of Li Jishen. After the
occupation of Wuzhou, relations between Guangxi and Guangdong developed into a close
friendship, which laid a foundation for the Clique’s alliance with the Guangdong Faction in

468
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou:
Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, p. 33. Also see Kan Zonghua, “Cheng Jitang, Li
Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian de jingguo”, GXWSZL, No. 29, p.
379.
469
See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao
huibian, Vol. 4, pp. 887-912; and GWZB, Vol. 2, No. 31 (16 August 1925).
470
Quoted in Shen Xiaoyun, Li Zongren de yisheng, p. 183.
471
For details of earlier relationship between the Clique and Guangdong, see Huang
Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52; Huang Shaohong, “Jiu Guixi de
xingmie”, WSZLXJ, No. 16; and Li Jiezhi, “Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de
bianduan huiyi”, GXWSZL, No. 14, pp. 34-43. Also see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue zhi
youlai jiqi jingguo, Guangzhou, 1921.

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the future. FDGDA’s financial and military support was even more important, for it
enabled Li to reunify Guangxi in the following two years.472
Several factors contributed to the good relationship between the two parties. First,
their leading officers were all aged between 20-30, and had experienced political
movements since 1911, such as the Revolution of 1911, the National Protection Movement
and War in 1916 and the Constitution Protection Movement and War in the following
years. They were imbued with patriotic enthusiasm. Secondly, they had similar
educational backgrounds for they mostly graduated from military schools, i.e. four different
levels of military schools (sixiao - lujun xiaoxue, lujun yubei xuexiao, lujun zhongxue, and
Baoding junguan xuexiao - the Elementary Military School, the Army Preparatory School,
the Middle Military School, and Baoding Military Academy). They joined together
because they were discriminated against by old-style armies in each province.473 Li
Zongren gathered together a number of graduates of these schools, who were mostly
natives of Guangxi, as well as many in the FDGDA. When these schoolmates from the two
provinces met together, it was easy for them to form a strong force as they had much in
common ideologically.474 Furthermore, Li Jishen, Commander of FDGDA, then leader of
the Guangdong Faction, was a native of Guangxi. His high rank and key position in the
Guangdong Armies were esteemed by his fellow provincial colleagues - the Guangxi
Clique.475 It is quite possible that Li Jishen’s real purposes might have been to foster a
faction with his home province as his support base. This would have enabled him to play a

472
For details of the Guangdong Faction’s support of the Guangxi Clique financially and
militarily, see Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 26, and Wushi
huiyi, 1946, p. 110; Li Jiezhi, “Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi”,
GXWSZL, No. 14, pp. 34-43; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu
ziliao, p. 33. And for detailed story of battles in reuniting Guangxi and the support from
the Guangdong Faction, see memoirs of Huang Shaohong, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Chen
Xiong, Huang Xuchu, Li Jiezhi etc, in the Bibliography of the thesis. Also see Shenbao,
March and April 1924; and Chen Jitang, Chen Jitang zizhuan, Taipei: ZJWXS, 1974, pp.
15-22; GWZB, Vol. 2, No. 3 (18 January 1925).
473
For details of the way in which military school graduates were discriminated against
by the old-style armies, particularly the armies under Lu Rongting, see Yin Chenggang, “Li
Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7; and Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei:
Zhongwai tushu gongsi, 1975, pp. 25-30.
474
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 20.
475
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 57.

183
decisive role in the two provinces and to promote and expand his strength in his struggle
for power in the GMG, though basically his role was that of a mediator between the GMG
and Guangxi and his stated aim was to expand the Nationalist influence into Guangxi.476
In any case, the two parties, together with Guizhou as mentioned earlier, formed a
powerful political and military alliance in both the 1920s and 1930s. The Guangdong
Faction under Li Jishen (1926-29) and Chen Jitang (1929-36), in fact, played an extremely
important role in the alliance, which lasted until 1936 when Chen lost his influence in
Guangdong.
The first feature of the alliance was that the two provinces formed the base of the
most powerful opposition to Jiang in the GMD.477 They maintained semi-independence
from Nanjing by firmly holding onto the two southwestern organizations, with Hu Hanmin
as spiritual leader, until Hu’s death in May 1936. With this power, the two provinces were
free to implement their ideas in their own provinces without intervention from Nanjing.
During the Nanjing decade, the two provinces had upheld a political policy of
“overthrowing Jiang and resisting Japan”. It also was the reason why the two southwestern
organizations could coexist. In the early phase of their relationship, the objective of the two
parties was to overthrow Jiang’s dictatorship.478 After the “September 18 Incident” they
held up the banner of resisting Japan to condemn Jiang’s policy of “domestic pacification
before external war”; but, the pre-condition of the two parties’ policy was to overthrow
Jiang if he still aimed at suppressing all of his rivals. Of course, the Clique particularly was
more eager than the Guangdong Faction to overthrow Jiang in the earlier 1930s.479 To
secure the anti-Jiang base, the two parties created a relationship of mutual assistance.480

476
Li Jiezhi, “Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi”, GXWSZL, No.
14, pp. 33-34; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 33.
477
Lai Huipeng, “Jiang Jieshi yu Li Jishen mingzheng andou jilue”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 31
(1981).
478
For details of this policy, see Li zongsiling zai-Liu xunhua ji, Liuzhou: Liuzhou
minguo ribaoshe, 1931; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu
ziliao, pp. 78-92.
479
See Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”,
KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991.
480
For example, the Clique assisted Li Jishen to consolidate his rule in Guangdong by
victory over the CCP army under Generals He Long and Ye Ting who marched towards
Guangdong after the Nanchang Uprising in August 1927, and the “Guangzhou Incident”

184
This policy led to the outbreak of the “June 1 Movement” in 1936, which appealed for an
immediate launching of national resistance against Japan.
The second feature was that, while the two parties shared the same bed, they were
strange bedfellows. The Clique benefited from cooperation with the Guangdong Faction,
in particular, for its survival and revival after its defeat in 1929. Its main aim was to
promote its position in the GMD during the Li Jishen period and to overthrow Jiang’s rule
in order to restore its influence in the Central Government as well as to carry out its policies
in the nation during the Chen Jitang period.481 On the other hand, Li Jishen’s anti-Jiang
attitude was different from that of the Guangxi Clique. According to a report, Li Jishen’s
anti-Jiang stand was based on the principle of “Guangdong for the people of
Guangdong”.482 Also, Chen Jitang’s main aim was to have firm control over Guangdong.
Chen had always indicated that he did not stand firmly together with the Clique. In other
words, he did not want to entirely break his relations with the Jiang group. For example,
the two southwestern organizations often sent Nanjing a circular telegram voicing their
views on the current national events and affairs, but Chen usually sent Nanjing another
confidential telegram to explain that though he was one of signatories it did not represent
his personal opinion.483
Another feature was that the Guangdong Faction’s frequent internal split had a
direct effect on the Clique’s rise and fall in Chinese politics. That is to say, the alliance
between the two parties was broken in some years, because of the Jiang-Gui War. The
Guangdong Faction turned out to be comprised of a very complicated political and military
group. With continuing victory in the Expedition, internal splits occurred in the
Guangdong Faction as internal conflicts in the GMD speeded up. General Zhang Fakui

launched by generals Zhang Fakui and Huang Qixiang, two subordinates of Li Jishen and
natives of Guangdong who aimed at overthrowing his rule in the province. See Huang
Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 187-190. For the detailed story of the “Guangzhou Incident”
(also called the “Zhang-Huang Incident”), which occurred in November and December
1927, see Guangzhou pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou:
Pingshe, 1928.
481
“Hu Hanmin to Lixiong”. Quoted in Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang
mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, p. 120.
482
Chenbao, 26 July 1927; and GWZB, Vol. 4, No. 40 (16 October 1927).
483
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 124, p. 5.

185
first separated from the Guangdong Faction and showed his loyalty to Wang Jingwei rather
than to Li Jishen in 1927.484 Chen Mingshu, another subordinate commander of Li Jishen,
also joined Jiang when the Nanjing regime openly confronted the Wuhan regime earlier in
1927.485 On the other hand, as regionalist feeling grew and the cry for anti-territorial
expansion became louder at that time, rapid expansion of the Cliques sphere of influence
during the Expedition made itself a target of wider criticism, mostly from the Jiang faction,
Wang Jingwei and Hu Hanmin groups. Both of the latter then supported Jiang in
opposition to the Clique.486 In these circumstances, Li Jishen was embarrassed by the
position he was in: he was leader of the Guangdong Faction, but a native of Guangxi. His
subordinates were mostly natives of Guangdong. However, the help and support that he
obtained to save his rule in Guangdong were from the Clique, not from his subordinates.487
Furthermore, Guangxi troops in the garrison of Guangdong received about 300,000 to
400,000 yuan monthly after 1927, which was endorsed by Li Jishen during his rule of the
province.488 The animosity between the Guangxi Clique and the Guangdong Faction

484
For details of Zhang Fakui’s turning out of the Guangdong Faction, see Zhang Fakui,
“Fenggong, hui-Yue, hudang”, ZJWX, Vol. 33, No. 1. Also see Guangzhou Pingshe (ed.),
Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928.
485
Tang Degang and Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyi lu (Chinese version), p. 288.
486
For details that the three groups joined forces to oppose the Clique, see Zhongguo dier
lishi dangan guan (ed.), “1927 nian Jiang Jieshi deng lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan”,
LSDA, No. 1, 1984. Also see Guangzhou pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi,
1928.
487
For example, relying on the Clique’s support, Li Jishen overcame two crises in
Guangdong. One occurred when the Clique’s troops defeated the CCP’s troops led by He
Long and Ye Ting (an ex-subordinate commander of Li Jishen) in September and October
1927. In another, the Clique again drove Zhang Fakui’s troops out of Guangdong at the
end of the same year when Zhang and Huang Qixiang launched a mutiny in Guangzhou to
overthrow Li Jishen’s rule in the “Zhang-Huang Incident”. Huang Qixiang was also an ex-
subordinate of Li Jishen. See Huang Shaohong, “Zuji Ye-He nanzhengjun de zhanzheng”,
WSZLXJ, No. 24; and Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928.
488
Some documents indicate that Guangxi's military expenditure for assistance was less
than 200,000 Yuan monthly. See Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai
huiyi, p. 63. According to Huang Shaohong, it was 400,000 Yuan monthly, and this
planted the seeds of the trouble between the two provinces in the following years. See
Huang Shaohong, “Zuji Ye-He nanzhengjun de zhanzheng”, WSZLXJ, No. 24, p. 180. In a
speech, Chen Jitang also expressed Guangdong natives’ resentment over Guangxi's
extortion of a huge military expenditure for assistance from Guangdong that was at least

186
caused by strong regionalist feelings was concealed by Li Jishen’s personal relationship
with both the Clique and natives of Guangdong at that time. Consequently, in spite of Li
Jishen’s detention at Nanjing in March 1929 at the outbreak of the Jiang-Gui War, the
Guangdong Faction sided with Jiang. This is partly because its members were discontented
with Li Jishen’s favouritism towards the Clique.489 Of course, Jiang also tried to break the
alliance between the two parties by any means he could use.490 Once Jiang succeeded in
causing a split between these senior commanders (i.e. Chen Mingshu, Chen Jitang and so
on), they immediately betrayed their leader. Having lost the rear base, the Guangxi
Clique’s sphere of influence and strong military power in central China soon collapsed.
However, common interest brought the two provinces to reconciliation and
cooperation again following the “Hu Hanmin Incident” which occurred in February
1931.491 In appearance, the incident was a turning point for reconciliation between the two
provinces. In fact, several factors indicated that the Guangdong Faction, particularly Chen
Jitang, had been unable to keep fighting with the Clique. 1) The Guangdong army had been
put in a tight spot for two years in fighting with the Clique. However, it could not see the
prospect of victory over Guangxi as the latter still held fast to its own base. If the
Guangdong Faction’s effective strength was worn down in the war, Chen’s power in
Guangdong would be lost. Should Jiang further weaken other rivals within the GMD,

more than 300,000 to 400,000 yuan monthly. See Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),
Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 33.
489
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 33-34.
490
See, for example, Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), “1927 nian Jiang Jieshi deng
lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan”, LSDA, No. 1, 1984, pp. 62-64.
491
The so-called “Hu Hanmin Incident” refers to Hu, President of the Legislative Council
of the Nationalist Government at Nanjing, being detained by Jiang, Chairman of the
Nationalist Government, in Nanjing in 28 February 1931. The Incident is usually regarded
as a result of the conflict between Jiang and Hu for the latter opposed the former as
President of the national government and drew up a provisional constitution. See Hu
Hanmin, "Hu Hanmin zizhuan", JDSYJ, No. 2 1981, and No. 2, 1983; Lei Xiaocen, Sanshi
nian dongluan Zhongguo, Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe, 1955; Zhang Tongxin, Jiang-
Wang hezuo xia de guomin zhengfu, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1988; Zhongguo qingnian
junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Qingnian junrenshe, 1934, pp. 252-300;
and William Tze-fu Chu, Hu Hanmin: A Political Profile (1879-1936), unpublished PhD
dissertation, St. John’s University, 1978.

187
Chen would then be a major target.492 2) The Guangdong Faction received an annual
military expenditure of 4.3 million yuan in 1929-30 from Nanjing. Chen expanded his
troops into a force of nearly 100,000 men by taking advantage of the war with the Clique.
Jiang urged him to disarm and to reduce his annual military expenditure to 2.5 million yuan
at the end of 1930. As Chen’s troops had suffered huge casualties in the war without any
supplements from Nanjing, disarmament and reduction threatened to further weaken
Chen’s influence, which resulted in a conflict between Chen and Jiang.493 3) The conflict
between Chen Jitang and Chen Mingshu, then Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial
Government who was supported by Jiang, became more and more critical.494 4) Hu
Hanmin was Chen Jitang’s political patron. It was self-evident that Hu’s fall in the Central
Government would directly affect Chen’s position. Therefore, once Chen Jitang changed
his force to the anti-Jiang front, he could win a reputation in “defence of the GMD’s law
and discipline” and expand his political influence and military strength. Also, he could
drive Chen Mingshu away and make himself sole ruler over the province.495 5) The Clique
was the only surviving group which still upheld the anti-Jiang policy after all other anti-
Jiang factions within the GMD were defeated by Jiang in a series of civil wars during 1929-
30. If Chen took the anti-Jiang policy, he would obtain support from the Clique and make
it follow his lead, which was better than maintaining an enemy in the neighbour of
Guangdong. Chen believed that “Guangdong and Guangxi could coexist when they
cooperated and would suffer from each other if they split”; this also was a continuation of
FDGDA’s policy towards the Clique after 1923. The current war between the two
provinces also provided an illustration of this view. When he cooperated with the Clique,
Chen could obtain more external support to maintain his rule in Guangdong.496 In this
sense, the “Hu Hanmin Incident” occurred at the right time. It provided both Chen Jitang
and the Clique with a great opportunity to reach reconciliation.

492
See Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992,
p. 192.
493
See Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 39, p. 83, and
p. 95.
494
Ibid, pp. 387-389.
495
Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, pp. 192-193.
496
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 387.

188
 However, the Guangdong Faction was continually split into two groups: one headed
by Chen Jitang which was still called the Guangdong Faction (Yuexi) with its sphere of
influence in Guangdong, the other the Chen Mingshu group (i.e. the 19th Route Army),
which split from the Guangdong Faction in 1931, when Chen Jitang became reconciled
with the Clique and showed his anti-Jiang attitude openly. The group demonstrated its
loyalty to Jiang before 1931 and then built up its sphere of influence in Fujian in 1932.
Chen Mingshu’s separation from the Guangdong Faction was the result of a fierce struggle
with Chen Jitang for power over the province, rather than his quest for favour with Jiang
before 1931. After the “September 18 Incident” Chen Mingshu had conflicting views from
Jiang’s on a series of internal and external policies, particularly on the policy towards the
Japanese invasion.497
Li and the Clique cooperated equally with each of them, but had to follow Chen
Jitang’s policies in dealing with many affairs related to the two provinces, for geographical
reasons. Their attitude towards “the Fujian Incident”, which was launched by the 19th
Route Army under Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu, Cai Tingkai and Jiang Guangnai in November
1933,498 was a good example. In mid-1933 the three provinces (Fujian, Guangdong and
Guangxi) signed a secret military agreement, which called for mutual military assistance if
any one of them was attacked by the Jiang group.499 After the outbreak of the Fujian
Incident, Chen Jitang broke his promise to Chen Mingshu. Li found it difficult for the

497
For details of changes of Chen’s attitude towards Jiang, see Chen Mingshu, “‘Jiuyiba’
disi zhounian jinian ganyan”, Giu Guo Sh Bao, December 9, 1935 to February 4, 1936.
498
The Fujian Incident was launched in November 1933 by Chen Mingshu, Li Jishen, Cai
Tingkai, Jiang Guangnai and others, most of them were former members of the Guangdong
Faction. They aimed at overthrowing the Nanjing Government under the leadership of both
Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei and appealed for immediate resistance against Japan. They
claimed themselves to be separated from the GMD and formed a new party
“Shengchandang” (the Production Party) instead. They also established their own national
government - Fujian renmin zhengfu (The People’s Government of Fujian). But the
Incident was soon suppressed by Jiang in January of the following year. For details of the
Incident, see Wang Shunsheng and Yang Dawei, Fujian shibian, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin
chubanshe, 1983; and Xue Moucheng and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), Fujian shibian ziliao
xuanbian, Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1983.
499
See Xue Moucheng and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), “Fujian shibian” ziliao xuanbian, pp.
51-54. Also see Jiang Guangnai, “Dui shijiu lujun yu ‘Fujian shibian’ de buchong”,
WSZLXJ, No. 59; Cai Tingkai. “Huiyi shijiu lujun zai-Min fan-Jiang shibai jingguo”, ibid,
No. 59; and Yin Shizhong, “Fujian shibian zhong wo daibiao Li Jishen Chen Mingshu fu
Guangxi dao Ruijin qiatan jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1.

189
Clique to react to the incident though he tried to form a united government which included
the three provinces by persuading Chen Jitang to join them in facing the incident.500 As a
result, Chen Mingshu’s group was wiped out by Jiang soon after the incident.501 The
Guangdong Faction also collapsed following its further internal split during the June 1
Movement in 1936, when General Yu Hanmou, senior subordinate commander of Chen
Jitang, turned to Jiang and took over the latter’s position in Guangdong. This marked the
end of a long-term cooperation between the Guangxi Clique and the Guangdong Faction.

4. Li’s Relations With Sichuan

Sichuan is in the southwest area, but not on the border of Guangxi. Li had no
special relations with Sichuan militarists in the early GMD period. Even Liu Xiang, the
most powerful Sichuan militarist and Chairman of the province, usually supported Jiang in
many domestic affairs during this period.502 It seems that Liu was unlikely to create a close
relationship with Li and the Clique. However, common interests brought the two provinces
into an alliance in the last few years prior to the Sino-Japanese War. The form of such an
alliance was expressed as the Sichuan, Guangxi and Red Army Agreement signed by Li
and Liu, with the CCP together, in around the spring and summer of 1937.503 Detailed
provisions of the agreement are unknown. According to memoirs of the persons who took
part in signing the agreement on behalf of Liu, the main points of the agreement appear to
be that
The three parties united to resist Japan. Should Jiang ignore the resistance against
Japan and still focus on civil war the three parties would join forces to fight against
Jiang.504

500
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 73-77. Also see SHXW, Vol. 5, No. 27, and No.
29; and Vol. 6, No. 1-2.
501
See Xu Xiqing, “‘Fujian renmin zhengfu’ yundong”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1; and
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 653-689.
502
For details of Liu’s support to Jiang in the early GMD period, see Archives of the
Editorial Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government, Nanjing; and Qiao
Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, p. 99.
503
See recollections of Deng Hanxiang, “Liu Xiang yu Jiang Jieshi de gouxin doujiao”,
WSZLXJ, No. 5; and Gan Jipi, “Chuan-Kang zhengjun huiyi de xingxing sese”, WSZLXJ,
No. 33; and Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, pp. 255-256.
504
Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, p. 225.

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 Although Guangxi leaders never mentioned this agreement in their memoirs, there
is evidence that it did exist in 1937. According to a record held by the CCP in Guangxi,
General Zhang Yunyi, former Commander of the Red 7th Army in Guangxi Soviet Area
(1929-31) and then representative of the CCP and the Red Army, visited Guangxi in around
June and July 1937 and met Guangxi leaders. As a result of this visit, they signed an
agreement with its main points similar to the above.505 In his diaries, Huang Xuchu, then
Chairman of Guangxi and one of the Clique’s top leaders, also recorded that Li Zongren
convened a meeting with leading officers of the Clique in early July to discuss matters
brought up by Zhang’s visit, including perhaps the agreement with the Red Army.506 Also,
Guangxi allied with Guizhou, Guangdong and Fujian for regional military cooperation. It
would be wise for the Clique to ally itself with other regional factions, especially to form an
alliance with Sichuan, even the Red Army. This would fit the requirements for cooperation
with the Clique’s policy of “goodwill with the neighbourhood”, as discussed earlier.
This agreement, as usual, was in line with the policy of the Clique and met its needs
at that time as well. It coincided with the Clique’s policy of resisting Japan and promoting
cooperation with regional factions politically and militarily. During the “June 1
Movement”, Li Zongren proposed a number of provisions, which provided the pre-
condition for reconciliation with Jiang: freedom of the resistance against Japan, freedom of
patriotic speech by the common people, freedom of assembly and association; movement of
the Central armies from the south towards the north to resist Japan; a plan and the time to
resist Japan and so on.507 In comparison with Li’s provisions, the Sichuan, Guangxi and
Red Army Agreement was a further development of his proposal in the Movement. Li’s
provisions also were a product of the current national demands. As the Clique knew, an
open anti-Jiang policy was unlikely to win over the sympathy of the country because
resistance against Japan and national salvation had become the Chinese people’s major
concern at that time. To seek a political solution, the Clique carried out the policy of
sharing power with Jiang in the region internally, and of keeping up resistance against

505
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashi ji, Nanning: GXWSZLXJ, 1989, pp. 111-112.
506
Diary of Huang Xuchu, 5 July 1937, quoted in Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 108.
507
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 127, p. 19.

191
Japanese aggression externally.508 The Clique’s internal policy aimed at maintaining its
strength. Of course, it also indicated that the Clique was gradually removing its previous
open anti-Jiang attitude, thus laying the foundation for reconciliation with Jiang later. But,
its external policy met the national current political demands also. It would ease Jiang’s
pressure on Guangxi and also strengthen regional cooperation between Guangxi and the
Southwest. In so doing, the Clique would be able not only to continue to have a share of
political power with Jiang in the region within the GMD, but also to claim a major victory
for its tenacity in insisting on resistance against Japan. The policy became one of Li’s
powerful weapons in regional political and military cooperation and in its conflict with
Jiang. Of course, the agreement which was signed before the outbreak of nationwide
resistance against Japan was also determined by the internal and external factors of Sichuan
and the Red Army.
Sichuan witnessed frequent civil wars for over seventeen years, from 1916 to 1933.
The Central government found it difficult to intervene in their provincial affairs. However,
the year 1935 saw a chance to change the situation in the province, for the GMD
headquarters formally formulated, at the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the 4th
Party National Congress held in December 1934, a policy of peaceful reunification, but one
which still amounted to centralization under Jiang. Sichuan was high on the agenda of the
GMD.509 However, Sichuan had adopted the policy of “closing the province and excluding
the outsiders”, for a long time. In theory, the policy of peaceful reunification benefited the
internal political unity in the GMD, but Jiang's centralization also hurt the interests of
Sichuan militarists including Liu Xiang. Therefore, a conflict between Liu and Jiang
suddenly flared up. Liu abandoned his previous pro-Jiang policy, which aimed at obtaining
Jiang’s political and financial assistance for strengthening his position in the province, and
started to get in touch with other factions in opposition to Jiang. The Clique certainly was
one which he wanted to contact.510 At the same time, Li and the Clique met Liu’s needs
after the Guizhou province was brought into Jiang’s centralization in 1935. As a result, the

508
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 126, p. 15.
509
Yan Daogang, “Zhuidu changzheng hongjun de bushu jiqi shibai”, in Quanguo
zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng qinli ji,
p. 11.
510
For details see Deng Hanxiang, “Liu Xiang yu Jiang Jieshi de gouxin doujiao”,
WSZLXJ, No. 5.

192
two parties formed an alliance. For example, during the “June 1 Movement”, Liu rejected
Jiang’s demand that he denounced Li’s action in Guangxi. Moreover, Liu also secretly
prepared for consistent action with Li by moving his troops to respond to the Movement.511
Furthermore, when the “Xi’an Incident” occurred on December 12, 1936,512 Liu firmly
backed Li in proclaiming support for Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, who
launched the Incident and called for immediate resistance to Japan. Meanwhile, Liu and Li
also issued a joint circular telegram opposing Nanjing’s policy of dispatching troops to
attack the provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu, which were occupied by both the Northeast
troops (Dongbeijun) and the Northwest troops (Xibeijun) under the command of Zhang and
Yang respectively, in response to the Incident.513
On the other hand, the CCP headquarters and the Red Army arrived and captured
north Shaanxi after 1935. For survival and in response to the political demands of national
salvation, the CCP needed a reconciliation with all parties and factions throughout the
country, even including the Jiang faction. In short, the CCP could cooperate with any
faction and party for those purposes.
The CCP’s contact with the Guangxi Clique can be traced back to the period of the
“June 1 Movement” or even earlier. During the Movement, Li sent a delegation on his
behalf to North Shaanxi to explore the prospects of establishing an association with the
CCP. It is likely that Li made an agreement with the CCP.514 The exact points of the
agreement are still unknown. But, judging from Li’s positions in the Movement and the
main provisions of the agreement with the Red Army and Liu Xiang in 1937, Li’s draft
agreement with the CCP in 1936 might have provided a basis for that of the final
document. According to the CCP’s documents, Zhang Yunyi’s visit of Guangxi in 1937

511
Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, pp. 193-194.
512
For details of the “Xi’an Incident”, see James Bertram, First Act in China: The Story
of the Sian Mutiny, New York: Viking Press, 1938.
513
Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan et al (eds.), “Xi’an shibian” dangan ziliao xuanbian,
Beijing: DACBS, 1986, pp. 122-3.
514
“Mao Zedong to Li Jishen, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, September 22, 1936”, Mao
Zedong shuxin xuanji, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, pp. 70-72.

193
was for normal signature of the agreement with the Clique, which Li had drafted one year
before.515
After the settlement of the “June 1 Movement”, Li and the Clique moved the capital
of Guangxi from Nanning to Guilin as part of their preparation for starting the Sino-
Japanese War, and Jiang also promised to lead the national resistance against Japan when
the Movement was settled peacefully.516 However, Jiang still did not state that China’s fate
had been at its most critical moment, though he actually speeded up his preparation for the
war of resistance.517 Despite his new position, large numbers of troops in Shaanxi and
Gansu mustered by Jiang were for the purpose of continuing civil war, not for the resistance
war in Suiyuan province against Japanese invasion, which occurred in the second half of
1936.518 After the “Xi’an Incident”, large numbers of the Central Army were still gathered
in the provinces of Henan, Shaanxi and Gansu, in an attempt to eliminate the Northwest
troops and the Northeast troops under Generals Yang and Zhang respectively. It seemed
that the crisis of civil war still existed. In these circumstances, not surprisingly, the
Guangxi Clique, Sichuan and the Red Army strengthened their contact, and then signed the
above agreement. Each side in the agreement was concerned with its own interests; but the
agreement also achieved a wider political unity among these groups with different interests,
policies and even ideologies. To a great extent, the main provision and theme of the
“Sichuan, Guangxi and Red Army Agreement” and the subsequent compromise with Jiang
showed that all parties and factions, however concerned for their own interests, still cared
for a larger cause - the AJNUF to save the nation.

515
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashi ji, p. 111-2.
516
On Jiang’s promise to lead the resistance against Japan, see Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui
yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 127, p. 19.
517
For a thorough discussion of Jiang’s preparation of the war against Japan, see Li
Yibin, “Huabei shibian hou Guomindang zhengfu duiri zhengce de bianhua”, MGDA, No.
1, 1989; and Le Jiaqing and Jiang Tianying, “Ping kangzhan qianxi Guomindang Nanjing
zhengfu de kangri zhunbei”, FDXB, No. 5, 1987; and Chen Qianping, “Shilun kangzhan
qian Guomindang zhengfu de guofang jianshe”, NJDXXB, No. 1, 1987.
518
For details of the war of resistance against Japan in Suiyuan province, see Quanguo
zhengxie wenshi yanjiu weiyuanhui et al (eds.), Fu Zuoyi shenping, Beijing: ZGWSCBS,
1985. Also see Yu Zidao, “Suiyuan kangzhan shulun”, KRZZYJ, No. 4, 1993, pp. 64-85.

194
 The agreement also indicated that regional militarists were not always enthusiastic
about power sharing with the central factions, particularly with the Jiang group, on the one
hand, but were aware of the necessity of preparing for resistance against Japan, on the
other. It was also a challenge to the validity of Jiang’s “domestic pacification before
external war” policy. It played a significant role in promoting further regional unity or
cooperation towards national political unity under the promotion of the driving force of
national resistance against Japanese aggression.
However, the agreement was no longer necessary shortly after it was signed. The
“July 7 Incident” in 1937 led China to a national cooperation in the war of resistance
against Japanese aggression, which marked the formation of the AJNUF. After making
sure of Jiang’s determination to resist Japan, Li and Bai left their base Guangxi for the Fifth
War Zone in Central China and Nanjing immediately. Several hundred thousand Guangxi
troops, who had been trained by Li and Bai for the war, at once marched to the front in East
and Central China. During the Sino-Japanese War, Li, Bai and the Guangxi troops under
their command played their part bravely and were widely respected.519 Liu Xiang, in spite
of his prolonged illness, also led the Sichuan troops in person to the battlefield, and finally
died in his post of Commander of the Seventh War Zone in Wuhan.520 The Red Army,
which was reorganized as a group army of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army under the
leadership of Jiang soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, immediately sent all
three of its main principal divisions (shi) to the Shanxi front and joined the battle array of
the Second War Zone under the command of General Yan Xishan.521 All these actions
should be regarded as implementations of the common goal that the three sides pursued

519
See Zhong Yueyun, Guangxi xueshengjun, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938; Zhao Yilin, Li
Zongren jiangjun zhuan, Shanghai: Dashidai shuju, 1938; Zhang Guoping, Bai Chongxi
jiangjun zhuan, Hankou: Zhandou chubanshe, 1938; Tuo Huang (ed.), Jinri de jiangling,
Shanghai: Tongyi chubanshe, 1939; Pin Zhi, Guibing jiahua, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938; Lu
Keng, Guangxi jun yuanzheng ji, Hankou: Xinsheng chubanshe, 1938; Feng Jupei,
Kangzhan zhong de diwulujun, Hankou: Jianguo shudian, 1938; and Li Jiajun, Li Zongren
xiansheng zhuan, Shanghai: Housheng shuju, 1948.
520
See Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, pp. 227-256.
521
Yang Kuisong, Shiqu de jihui? - Zhanshi guogong tanpan shilu, Guilin: The Guangxi
Teachers University Press, 1992, pp. 55-59. Also see Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao
chubian - duiri kangzhan shiqi: de bian - zhonggong huodong zhenxiang, Vol. 1, edited by
Qin Xiaoyi and published by Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi
yanjiuhui, Taipei, 1985.

195
when signing the agreement above. Of course, all of their actions depended on Jiang’s
determination to lead the whole of China to resist Japanese aggression.

Conclusion

Li Zongren’s relations with the Southwest regional factions showed that the
regionalist development in the Nanjing decade had a dual character. On the one hand, the
regional interrelations assured the Cliques interests in the region, and this enabled Li and
his Clique to challenge Jiang. It was under the slogan of “sharing power with others in both
the Central government and the region” that the regional factions opposed Jiang’s
centralization in order to defend their own interests. On the other hand, the interrelations
promoted regional cooperation. In a sense, this regional cooperation was a wider regional
unity in political, economical and psychological terms, when China had not yet reached
national political unity as all factions and parties had differences on domestic and external
affairs. Such regional unity usually appeared in the form of the military and political
cooperation or alliance between factions in the regions. However, the cooperation or
alliance between regional factions was affected by the current political tendency of resisting
Japan, which also became the motive force to develop and strengthen Li and his Clique’s
relations with the neighbouring factions. As a result, the development of such regionalism
carried a political coloration. It naturally conflicted with Jiang's centralization or
dictatorship at home and policy of “domestic pacification before external war”, namely, the
policy of non-resistance against Japan. In short, through military and economic cooperation
or alliance, regional militarists were able to maintain their own powers in the region and to
prevent Jiang’s influence penetrating into their territories for which they shared power in
regional structures with the Jiang faction by maintaining the state of semi-independence
from Nanjing. Meanwhile, cooperation and alliance enabled some factions in the region
such as the Clique to seek an opportunity to return to the centre to replace Jiang or to share
power with him. Furthermore, the fact of the Clique maintaining good relations with other
factions in the Southwest indicates that it was to a great extent going with the tide of the
current national feelings to justify their actions.
In the Clique’s relations with regional factions the dual character had interacted,
sometimes showing its own interests stronger, sometimes indicating a stronger response to
the current political tide of the nation. In short, in terms of its relations with its neighbours,

196
the Clique was concerned with its own survival, when its base was not firm such as in
1929-1931; and it paid more attention to regional cooperation in military and politics, when
the national crisis was more and more critical. This was the main reason why Li was able
to bring about reconciliation with Jiang for the purpose of resisting Japan, the most urgent
task for China in the 1930s. In other words, regional cooperation or alliance did contribute
to the internal unity of the GMD and the political unity of the nation under those
circumstances.
For Guangxi, cooperation or alliance with its neighbours provided favourable
conditions to work on political, military, economic and educational reconstruction in the
province by freeing it from the Jiang group’s direct pressure, both economic and military.
The Clique was able to use it to vie with Jiang for power and to make itself an formidable
anti-Jiang group in the GMD, on the one hand, and to devote itself to reconstruction of
Guangxi physically and spiritually as a “model province” for its achievements, on the other.
Meanwhile, it also forced Jiang to promise to lead national resistance against Japan, and
contributed finally to the formation of the AJNUF. In this sense, the “June 1 Movement”
marked the appearance of an embryonic form of such a united front.522 From then on, the
Clique abandoned its open anti-Jiang policy and shifted to support Jiang’s leadership for
resistance against Japan. That is to say, relations with the Southwest regional factions were
very important to the Clique for its development politically and militarily. In short, Li’s
relations with the Southwest regional factions were of considerable significance.

522
This issue will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

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CHAPTER SIX

“RESISTING JAPAN IS THE ONLY WAY”:

- LI ZONGREN’S IDEA OF “SCORCHED EARTH RESISTANCE”

In the 1930s, the traditional interests and status of the great Powers in Europe were
threatened by both Germany and Italy. Both countries were regarded by the Powers as the
forces dangerous to the western world. Taking the advantage of the fact that the Powers
were paying most of their attention to Europe, Japan speeded up its aggression in China. In
such circumstances, each party and faction in China had to answer a common question:
how would they respond to Japanese aggression? Undoubtedly, most of them claimed that
they would stand for resistance, at least it seemed to be so on the surface. But, a question
arising from that: how and when would China begin to resist Japan? Here, each party and
faction had a different answer, and these varying policies reflected the political attitudes of
the different parties and groups, and caused the political conflict among them. Within the
GMD, the Guangxi Clique and Jiang Jieshi were in bitter conflict over this issue. As stated
earlier, the establishment of the new triumvirate leadership and the formation of internal
cohesion within the Clique, as well as the common political ideology, contributed to the
consolidation of the Guangxi group’s base and revival of its forces. Consequently, the
Clique was able to renew expansion of its strength in the province and to catch the attention
of the country in the 1930s for its achievements both in reconstruction and mass
mobilization. All these achievements were based on its anti-Japanese policy which differed
from that of Jiang. More importantly, facing the critical national crisis with a strong anti-
Japanese policy provided Guangxi favourable conditions to develop and build upon
cooperative relationships with the neighbouring provincial factions and to strengthen its
own forces in opposition to the centralization of Jiang; on the other hand, it also enabled the

198
Clique to form a political outline - the Guangxi Reconstruction Program, a theoretical
foundation to guide its activities in the province and in national affairs in both mass
mobilization and preparation for fighting Japan, in contrast to Jiang’s policy of “rangwai
bixian annei” (domestic pacification before an external war). As a result, Guangxi under Li
Zongren gained wide acclaim as the “model province” through militia organization and
mass mobilization, and particularly effective anti-Japanese propaganda and nationalist anti-
Japanese education throughout the province. Noting this new and dynamic atmosphere, in
particular, the strong feelings for patriotic resistance throughout the province, Guangxi was
regarded by Sherwood Eddy, an American missionary who visited the province in 1934, as
the hope of China in achieving national restoration and liberation.523 Historians who have
studied modern Guangxi, such as Diana Lary, Eugene Levich and Chu Hongyuan, also set
high values on this reconstruction and mobilization of the 1930s.524 The aggressive
promotion of “fan-Jiang kangri” (opposing Jiang and resisting Japan) was a key factor
dominating the Clique’s actions in the 1930s. A discussion of this issue could enable us to
assess the roles played by the group in achieving internal unity within the GMD and in the
formation of the Anti-Japanese United National Front (AJNUF) later.
There is evidence that the policy behind Guangxi’s mass mobilization and
preparation for fighting Japan had always been centred on the anti-Japanese ideas of Li
Zongren and other Guangxi leaders. Levich and Chu have also noted that the Clique built
its theoretical foundation on simple, single minded pursuit of resistance.525 However, they
failed to discuss the following questions. What were Li’s seminal ideas in this regard?
What were the details of the policy of the Clique? When did the policy take form? How
did the policy serve the dual military and political character of the Clique? Was there any
interrelationship between the policy and the “June 1 Movement” launched by the Clique in
1936? We have seen that the political tactics and ideas of Li and the Clique provided the

523
Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, 7 January 1935
(printed by the author).
524
Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 163-92; Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way
in Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, pp. 65-
98; and Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b (1988), pp. 307-353 (hereafter as “1930s”).
525
Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, pp. 63-98; and Chu Hongyuan, “1930s”, pp. 307-
353.

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thrust of mass mobilization in Guangxi and drove the Clique to promote the formation of
the AJNUF. Also, they evolved to the point of transforming the anti-Jiang policy into one
of “bi-Jiang kangri” (forcing Jiang to resist Japan). Thus, as the result of subtle
modifications to the original anti-Japanese idea, the Clique was gradually changing its anti-
Jiang policy into that of anti-imperialism, and regarded that as the precondition for all its
actions. The growing anti-Japanese movement in Guangxi, in turn, pushed Li and the
Clique further to show their determination to advance their policy of resistance. As a result,
whatever their reservations about Jiang, their actions in response to the situation of China at
that time were helpful to reach internal unity within the GMD before the formation of the
AJNUF. Partly because of the Clique's effort, Jiang was also compelled to change his
policy of elimination of his opponents within the GMD, and to carry out a policy of
reconciliation with other factions and groups, including the Clique and the CCP and to
prepare for a national war against Japan.
This chapter will analyze the Clique’s anti-Japanese idea, focusing on the views of
Li Zongren, but including those of the other Guangxi leaders. It will also account for the
formation and change of the Clique’s policy towards Japanese aggression. It will explain
the relations of the Clique’s anti-Japanese policy with Guangxi’s preparation for war
through mass mobilization and national political unity.

The Background and Origin of “Jiaotu kangzhan” (Scorched Earth Resistance)

The conflict between Li and Jiang was fundamentally over policy towards Japanese
aggression in the 1930s. In the critical situation of the national crisis, Li and the Guangxi
leaders saw resistance as the cornerstone of the Clique’s policy towards Jiang and Japanese
aggression. This policy had gradually been transformed from “party protection and national
salvation” (hudang jiuguo) in 1929-1931 into “resisting Japan and opposing Jiang”. In
contrast to Jiang’s policy of “rangwai bixian annei”, the policy of the Clique was
eventually summed up by Li as the famous anti-Japanese idea - “jiaotu kangzhan”
(scorched earth resistance). This idea guided the Clique’s actions in the 1930s and became
part of the national policy in the Sino-Japanese War after the July 7 Incident in 1937.
According to Li himself, “scorched earth resistance” was the only way to save the
nation from subjugation and to ensure its survival. Li said,

200
 We must base our resistance on the determination that we would rather make a
scorched earth all over the country than surrender without fighting, and to launch
the whole nation immediately into a national liberation war as our reply to the
invaders. Only in so doing can we show the great Chinese national ability and spirit
for standing on her own feet and subsisting by her own efforts. Only then could
China survive in the world.526
The term “scorched earth policy” originated from the Napoleon War in 1812. When the
French troops under the leadership of Napoleon invaded Russia they were defeated by just
such a policy of the Russian people, because it meant burning and destroying all property in
a given area before giving it up to an advancing enemy. Li himself and his subordinate
commanders had mostly obtained a sound military education and learned of the history of
the famous wars throughout the world. Also, most of his Brains Trust had gone to Moscow
for their education. They would undoubtedly have learned of actions taken by Russia
against the army of Napoleon in 1812 when Moscow was burned rather than allowing the
invader viable winter quarters. Of course, Li’s “jiaotu kangzhan” at least had the same
meaning of burning crops, and destroying buildings, etc that might be useful to enemy
forces occupying a district. For example, during the Sino-Japanese War, when the Guangxi
troops defended Guilin, they resorted to this measure.527 However, the notion of scorched
earth was basically a tactic, not a general policy of warfare; therefore, scorched earth was a
part of the strategy and tactics of Li’s anti-Japanese policy. Here, what Li emphasized was
the determination to resist, i.e. as the Chinese saying goes, “ningwei yusui, buwei waquan”
(rather be a shattered vessel of jade than an unbroken piece of pottery) - better to die in
glory than live in dishonour. This signified resistance until the end, including even the
scorching of all China’s earth.528 Li’s policy of scorched earth resistance was the result of
this philosophy.529 This policy was first officially announced in an article on 17 April
1936,530 and afterwards systemized by Li through a series of speeches and articles around

526
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, SMZYYK, Vol. 7, No. 5 (1936), p. 145.
527
See Cao Wei and Huang Mengnian, “Guilin ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ qinli ji”, WSZLXJ, No.
40, pp. 181-190.
528
Ren Biming, “Jiaotu Kangzhan”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, Hong
Kong: Zhujiang ribaoshe, 1937, p. 116.
529
Quanmianzhan zhoukanshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan de lilun yu shijian - Li Zongren
yanlun ji, Nanning: QMZZKS, 1938, p. 2 (hereafter as Lilun yu shijian).
530
Ibid, p. 10. Also see SMZYYK, Vol. 7, No. 5 (1936), p. 145.

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1936-1937. Therefore, the article of 17 April was regarded as “the first Chinese voice
explaining systematically the scorched earth resistance policy”.531 Li himself was lauded as
the “zuzong” (forebear) of this policy.532 At the same time, his colleagues Bai Chongxi,
Huang Xuchu, and other members of the Clique, also contributed to the scorched earth
resistance theory.533 Of course, Guangxi became recognised as the source of this theory.534
The creation of the scorched earth resistance policy was due to the interaction of
internal and external factors. On the one hand, it was a product of the intensifying conflict
between Japan and China and the extremely serious national crisis going back several
decades.535 On the other hand, the policy was also an outcome of the continuity of the
Clique’s struggle with Jiang. Before 1931, the Clique had struggled with Jiang for years.
As stated earlier, their struggle was not only for central power but also for a say in what
measures should be carried out in internal and external affairs after the accomplishment of
the national unity under the GMD in 1928. As John King Fairbank pointed out, faced with
the national crisis, the main task of China’s struggle for national sovereignty “had to give
way to China's patriotic resistance to the Japanese militarists’ effort to conquer China”.536
In other words, after 1931, any differences between various Chinese groups and parties
should be dissolved and all energies used to resist Japan and to save the nation from

531
Quanmianzhan zhoukanshe (ed.), Lilun yu shijian, p. 1.
532
Huang Xuchu, “Guanche jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),
Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 65. In fact, after the “September 18 Incident”, Li and other Guangxi
leaders had already expressed the anti-Japanese idea through a series of speeches and
lectures. The term “jiaotu kangzhan” was adopted by them as a summation of these
speeches and lectures.
533
Bai Chongxi also expressed and explained the main ideas of this theory through a
series of speeches in the first half of the 1930s. See, for example, Bai Chongxi, “Kangri
jiuguo”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 42-61.
534
Cai Tingkai, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shixian xing”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu
kangzhan, p. 66.
535
For discussion of conflict between Japan and China since the 19th century and the
growth of the Chinese people’s consciousness of the need for resistance, see Zhou Kangxie,
Yang Jialuo, Wang Jianqiu, Shao Minghuang, Wu Jingping, Yang Kuisong, Zhu Yunxing,
Shen Qianfang, Qiu Qianmu, Lou Xiange, Tang Baolin, Roger, Jeans, and Zhongguo
shixuehui, in the Bibliography of this thesis.
536
John King Fairbank, China: A New History, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 279.

202
extinction. In such circumstances, the policy that Jiang carried out - not to resist the
Japanese but to first strive for the elimination of his political and military opponents -
became a liability to him, and an advantage to Li and his Guangxi group. The national tide
was turning in Li’s favour, and his former anti-Jiang policy (party protection and national
salvation) in the earlier stage of the Clique’s struggle with Jiang was quickly transformed
into that of both anti-Japan and anti-Jiang.537
The Clique openly called for national resistance soon after the “September 18
Incident”.538 However, the Clique's anti-Japanese policy was more than lip service for
political gains, but was put into the action as well. Just two days after the partial resistance
war in Shanghai broke out on 28 January 1932, Li and other leaders of the southwest
organizations demanded that the central government in Nanjing send a large number of
troops to reinforce the 19th Route army, the Guangdong troops fighting the Japanese in
Shanghai. Next day, by joining with Sun Ke and other senior GMD leaders, Li again sent a
telegraph to General He Yingqin, the Minister of War of the Nanjing Government, urging
him to mobilize all troops and air force stationed around Nanjing to fight the Japanese on
the ground that “today China’s chance for existence could be decided by the war in
Shanghai”.539 Bai Chongxi, also, on behalf of the Guangxi troops, requested a battle
assignment to reinforce the 19th Route Army by leading the Guangxi troops.540 As a
professional soldier, Li himself had a guilty conscience, for he would not have an
opportunity to participate in the resistance war.541 In his place, over a thousand Guangxi
troops were shipped to Shanghai in support of the resisting force.542 Meanwhile, he also

537
See, for example, Kong Linggui, “Guonan qizhong qingnian yingyou de nuli”, JXXK,
No. 13 (1934), pp. 27-8; and Yu Yunlong, “Women de shiming”, JXXK, No. 17 (1934), pp.
14-5.
538
Nanning minguo ribao, 27 September 1931, p. 2.
539
Ta Kung Pao (Da Gong Bao), February 1, 1932. Also see Li Zongren, “Xi’nan
tongzhi yao fuqi jiuguo de zeren”, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, Nanning:
GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 102 (hereafter as Li zongsiling).
540
Quoted in Cao Guangzhe, “Shilun xin Guixi ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ de zhuzhang yu
shijian”, unpublished M. A. thesis, the Chinese People’s University, Beijing, 1988, p. 17.
541
See Li Zongren’s inscription, in Mengyu shanguan zhuren (ed.), Zhonghua di shijiu
lujun xuezhan shi, Hong Kong, 1932.
542
Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1982, p. 295.

203
attacked the practice of Jiang, who held back a large number of troops for civil war but not
for the reinforcement of the resisting force - the 19th Route Army, and condemned the fact
that Jiang had signed the Songhu Truce with Japan in May.543 The Japanese troops invaded
Rehe province and North China by crossing the Great Wall in the following year. In
response to this threat to national sovereignty, Li joined forces with Chen Jitang, leader of
the Guangdong Faction, and Cai Tingkai, Commander of the 19th Route Army that was
stationed in Fujian province after the resistance war in Shanghai. They sent a force
composed of volunteers recruited from the three provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong and
Fujian and commanded by Cai himself in order to reinforce the defence of North China in
May. These troops were ordered by the central government under Jiang to stop their march
at Hunan province and withdrew to their native provinces after Nanjing had signed the
Tanggu Truce to appease Japanese demands in the same month.544 Even so, two months
later Li contributed 100,000 yuan (Chinese dollars) to the “Christian General” Feng
Yuxiang, former leader of the Northwest troops and former Commander in Chief of the 2nd
Group Army of the NRA during the Expedition, in support of the latter’s attempts to
organize an Anti-Japanese People’s Army in Chahar province, the front of North China,
with the object of arousing a popular campaign against Japanese aggression and the
compromise policy embodied in the Tanggu Truce. According to Feng, the Clique was the
only group that gave him financial support for his campaign at that time.545 Feng’s
campaign soon failed under the combined attack of both the Japanese troops and Jiang’s
Central Army. But Li not only praised Feng’s patriotic action but also strongly condemned
Jiang for suppressing the anti-Japanese activities, and asked Nanjing to maintain this anti-
Japanese army, which now came under Generals Fang Zhenwu and Ji Hongchang, Feng’s
two senior subordinates in the Chahar resistance war.546

543
Li Zongren, “Jiechu guonan yao kao ziji nuli”, Li zongsiling, pp. 137-41.
544
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Zhongguo
qingnian junrenshe, 1934, pp. 573-4; Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, pp. 308-9. For
Nanjing’s appeasement of Japan in the war of Rehe and the Great Wall, and details of the
Tanggu Truce, see T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, New York: The McMillan Company,
1938, pp. 40-50.
545
Feng Yuxiang, Wosuo renshi de Jiang Jieshi, Hong Kong: Wenhua gongyingshe,
1949; reprinted Hong Kong: Qishi niandai zazhishe, 1975, p. 37.
546
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, p. 616 and p. 646.

204
 In addition to its resistance attitude towards Japanese aggression, the Clique had to
include opposition to the policies of Jiang. They regarded Jiang as a dictator and an
obstruction to effective resistance, and both were seen to be the common enemy of the
Chinese war of national liberation war.547 In this conflict, personal or group interests and
the national revolutionary commission were united in both anti-Japan and anti-Jiang
activities. Simultaneously, they pursued an anti-Communist policy as well. This anti-
Communist attitude had festered for years following their dissatisfaction with the CCP’s
pro-Russian policy particularly during the central east railway incident of 1929, as
mentioned in Chapter Four, which was regarded as a traitorous action. It was remembered
along with the CCP’s attempts to overthrow the Clique’s rule in Guangxi during 1929-
1931, the critical period when the Clique was confronting the combined attack of both the
CCP’s Red Army and Jiang’s Central Army which had joined forces with the troops of
Guangxi’s neighbouring provinces, such as Guangdong, Yunnan and Hunan as well.548
With such historical background the policy in dealing with the internal and external affairs,
i.e. “goodwill and sincere unity with the neighbouring provinces internally and striving for
resistance against Japan and suppression of the Communists until the end externally”, was
determined by the Clique in the latter part of 1931 and the early months of 1932.549

547
See Quanmianzhan zhoukanshe (ed.), Lilun yu shijian, pp. 79-102; “Wu Tiecheng’s
Confidential Correspondence”, the Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing, Serial 2,
No. 5412; and Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou jiqi Hu-Jiang hejie”,
KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, pp. 101-140 (hereafter as “Hu Hanmin”).
548
For details of the Chinese Communists’ actions in Guangxi and their attempts to
overthrow the Clique’s rule and to establish its own regime based on the Soviet model in
the province, see Wu Xi, “Huiyi Longzhou qiyi he hong bajun jianli qianhou”, HQPP, No.
19 (1980), pp. 248-70; Diana Lary, “Communism and Ethnic Revolt: Notes on the Chuang
Peasant Movement in Kwangsi, 1921-31”, The China Quarterly, No. 49 (1972); Graham
Huchings, “The Troubled Life and After-life of a Guangxi Communist: Some Notes on Li
Mingrui and the Communists in Guangxi Province before 1949”, The China Quarterly, No.
104 (December 1985), pp. 700-8; Shi Hua (pseud.), “Guangxi gongchandang de guoqu ji
xianzai”, in Haitian chubanshe (ed.), Xiandai shiliao, Shanghai: Haitian chubanshe, 1934,
Vol. 2, pp. 316-322; Gong Chu, Wo yu hongjun, Hong Kong: Nanfang chubanshe, 1954;
Mo Wenhua, Huiyi hong qijun, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1979. For details of the Clique's
struggle for survival in Guangxi, see “Archives of the Editorial Committee for War History,
the Nationalist Government, Nanjing”, in The Second Historical Archives of China,
Nanjing.
549
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiaogong, qinren shanling”, in Bai Chongxi, Bai fuzongsiling
yanjiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 52 (hereafter as Bai fuzongsiling).

205
 The modification of the Clique’s policy began in 1935. The Clique gave up its anti-
Jiang policy on the surface,550 for Jiang successfully drove the Chinese Communists out of
their base in Jiangxi to the northwest area and tried to pursue a policy of reconciliation with
his opponents within the GMD, on the one hand; and it had by then consolidated its base
and was now urgently calling for full national resistance and intent on dissolving all
differences between various groups and parties as a precondition of resistance in opposition
to Jiang’s “rangwai bixian annei”, on the other. In other words, the Clique’s policy was
turning to forcing Jiang to resist Japan.
The scorched earth resistance was the product of interaction of all these forces. The
term “scorched earth”, in fact, first appeared in May 1933 when the Japanese invaded Rehe
and other provinces south of the Great Wall. Faced with a critical situation of imminent
Japanese occupation of Rehe and penetration into North China, a writer called for the
“jiaotu dikang” (scorched earth resistance) in the Beiping and Tianjin areas in an article
published in the Shijie ribao (The World Daily) of Beiping on 15 May 1933.551 However,
there is no corroborative evidence which indicates that such an idea was further expanded
by anyone else at that time. A possible explanation for this is that the article focused only
on resistance in the Beiping and Tianjin areas but not on the national mobilization to fight
Japan. Moreover, the Chinese troops in Rehe and Hebei along the Great Wall were soon
defeated by the Japanese, and Nanjing was compelled to sign the Tanggu Truce in the same
month. As part of this truce anti-Japanese activity was suppressed by Nanjing to appease
Japanese demands. Whatever the reason, the idea lapsed until the same term of “jiaotu
kangzhan” was adopted and systematically explained by Li three years later, finally
becoming a famous national slogan in the War of Resistance.

Li Zongren’s Idea of “Jiaotu kangzhan”

According to Li and the Clique, the scorched earth resistance theory was applicable
in two areas: one was “the national policy towards Japan”, and the other “the strategy and

550
GWZB, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1/1/1934); and Zhongguo dashi ji, compiled and published by
Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries, Washington, D.
C., 1973, Vol. V, p. 199. Also see “Wu Tiecheng’s Secret Correspondence on 14
December 1933”, The Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing, Serial 2, No. 5417.
551
Also see Anonymous, “Buxi ‘jiaotu’ dikang”, GWZB, Vol. 10, No. 20 (22/5/1933).

206
tactics of resisting Japan”.552 The former mainly sets forth general and specific policies
towards Japan, and among them it is emphasized as the key issue. The latter gives specific
directions on how the Chinese people and soldiers would carry out the policy in War of
Resistance.

1. The National Policy towards Japan - Scorched Earth Resistance

1.1. The Significance of Scorched Earth Resistance

As Li declared, he and the Guangxi leaders only insisted on scorched earth
resistance as the national policy after profound consideration of the future of their country
and nation.553 Three main factors had influenced them in coming to accept the necessity
for the policy.
First, “the national restoration could not be achieved until the War of Resistance
was launched.”554 This consideration was based on the situation of the conflict between
China and Japan. After 1931, Japan not only occupied the northeast, north, and southeast
areas of China in succession, but also robbed the resources of China and destroyed its
economy by smuggling a large quantity of Japanese goods via North China. All these
further deepened the Chinese national crisis.555 Li declared that every patriotic Chinese
should make a positive response to this crisis, no matter which party or faction he or she
belonged to or what kind of idea or “ism” he or she believed in or supported. Japanese
aggression must be actively opposed. Although Guangxi was far from the front facing the
Japanese invasion, he and his colleagues could not sit idly by and remain indifferent to the
critical situation of China. They had realized that “Japanese aggression was to reach for a
yard after taking an inch and its aim of conquering China would be successful in the end”.
Therefore, Li felt that “only resistance could enable China to survive, while non-resistance

552
Lilun yu shijian, pp. 25-6; and Luo Ningfu, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shiji”, in Zhujiang
ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 105-7.
553
Qian Shifu (ed.), Li Delin xiansheng lun Guangxi jianshe yu fuxing Zhongguo,
Nanning: Jianshe shudian, 1938, p. 66 (hereafter as Li Delin).
554
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, p. 148.
555
For details of the Japanese smuggling in North China, see Hallett Abend, My Years in
China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, 1943, pp. 207-11; and Junshi kexueyuan junshi
lishi yanjiubu, Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi, Beijing: JFJCBS, 1991, Vol. 1, pp. 311-52.

207
or surrender could cause her to rapidly collapse. In other words, in the situation of Japanese
aggression, the Chinese people have no room for any other course of action except resolute
resistance.”556
Secondly, “for the purposes of carrying forward our country’s existing culture and
creating an advanced one for the future, the only way forward is to launch the national war
of self-defence immediately.”557 According to Li, only a total war against foreign invaders
could enable the country to survive and regenerate from subjugation. This was a decision
imposed by the course of modern Chinese history. Li and the Clique believed that the
Chinese nation had been enslaved by imperialism, and the Chinese culture had been ruined
by foreign aggression after the Opium War in the 1840s.558 As a result, China was not only
unable to retain its independence in politics, but also unable to stand on her own feet
economically and unable to act on her own in diplomacy in the world as well. Li suggested
further that culture was the basis of existence for a nation. The judgement of a national
cultural value was mainly dependent on whether it could ensure the nation's existence and
progress. According to this, Li even thought that owing to imperialist aggression the
Chinese culture had already been brought to a standstill. Therefore, the first item of the
agenda of Chinese national salvation was to act on her own to change this state of inertia
into that of a developing one. To develop this culture, the most effective measure was the
national war of self-defence, for it alone would make the changes necessary in the morale
of the nation.559 This analysis partly explains why Li frequently called for the launching of
a national war against Japan after the “September 18 Incident” and insisted on resistance as
the only way for national and cultural survival.560 Moreover, according to Li, the national
war, particularly that of self-defence, had historically been a motive force for social
development and progress. He used the following examples to support his argument. The

556
Li Zongren, “Wode zhuzhang - jiaotu kangzhan”, in Lilun yu shijian, p. 2.
557
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, p. 148.
558
For detailed discussion and explanation of this history, refer to JXXK, No. 13, pp. 49-
55, and No. 18, pp. 7-10; and Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu zong
zhengxunchu (ed.), Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, Nanning, 1936.
559
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 9.
560
Li Zongren, “Dikang caishi weiyi de chulu”, in Wang Kuiyi et al, Yinian lai zhi
Guangxi, Nanning: Nanning minguo ribaoshe, 1933, n.p.

208
Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period in ancient China, the Roman Empire,
and even the Europe of the nineteenth century all achieved great social progress because of
various defensive wars, according to Li. In contrast, there were signs that the cultures of
such nations as Egypt and India were disintegrating because they did not have the capability
of self-defence.561
Li’s assessment proved to be a correct reflection of the national situation. Nanjing
had not openly proclaimed a war to recover the lost territories but on the contrary had
suppressed the demands for resistance throughout the country in the 1930s. Although
Nanjing under Jiang was indeed preparing for resistance,562 the impression that it gave to
the people was one of abject concessions to Japan. As a result, an even more critical
national crisis than ever before seemed inevitable. Many Chinese believed that the fate of a
slave without a country was facing the Chinese people if China failed to fight a war of self-
defence.563 In this situation, the “sense of mission”, namely, saving the nation from
subjugation and ensuring its survival pushed Li and the Clique to call for immediate
resistance and stimulated him to put forward his systematized plan - scorched earth
resistance.
Li believed that the Japanese wanted to conquer the whole of China. To that end,
Japan would use any means to split both Chinese territory and the people. Its tactics were
to seize new territories in sudden, terrorising raids, and then to offer periods of peace and
relief from terror in a truce to giving them time to consolidate for further incursions. The
Chinese people must be determined to fight the invaders. Here, Li condemned the Japanese
Government and militarists; but was reluctant to blame the Japanese people. He suggested
that the common people of Japan were also victims of the Japanese imperialists and were
also oppressed by their government. The common Japanese people would wish to pursue
peace, not war. For this reason, Li himself and the Chinese people maintained respect for
the Japanese people, expecting them to overthrow the domestic fascist rule and to strive for

561
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, pp. 148-9.
562
For discussion of Jiang’s preparation for resistance against Japan, see Chen Qianping,
“Shilun kangzhan qian Guomindang zhengfu de guofang jianshe”, NJDXXB, No. 1, 1987;
and Lu Dayue, “Jiuyiba shibian hou guomin zhengfu tiaozheng binggong shiye shulun”,
KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1993, pp. 56-68.
563
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe (ed.), Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 705-6.

209
their own national liberation and peace.564 This consciousness shows that Li was not
automatically opposed to everything foreign, nor harboured ideas of expansion beyond
China’s borders. His focus was solely on defence of Chinese territory and resistance to
aggression. He did, however, advance a stern moral view of the positive attitude each
Chinese should have in the national crisis. China’s resolute resistance might also help the
Japanese people to overthrow the reactionary Japanese Government, and replace it with one
that would really represent their interests and rights. Only in this way, the two countries
could establish a reasonable relationship under the principle of equal and mutual
assistance.565 This view clearly explains Li’s stand: only the nation that held the constantly
striving spirit and the determination to resist foreign aggression could have the possibility
and ability to establish an equal relationship with a foreign country.566 In fact, some
Western observers also shared this view. For example, during the 1930s, Hallett Abend, an
American correspondent in China, warned time after time “that only a small clique was
responsible for the policy of aggression, that there would be a revolution in Japan, or that
there existed in that empire a ‘liberal element’ which would eventually restrain Japanese
militarism.”567 Although the revolution which both Li and Abend expected in Japan did
not happen, this view reflected a common perception of internal conflict within Japan by
people at that time.
Li concluded that “the existence or death of China is dependent on whether the
nation herself could resist Japan”.568 In his view, the outcome of the war relied mainly on
whether Chinese spiritual force could be fully used, not in the comparison of Chinese
material force with that of the enemy and in terms of material superiority only. For him, the
rise or fall of China was almost entirely a question of morale: Could most soldiers and
people of the country become imbued with the “consciousness” of resistance? Could the
military and political authorities find the will to lead the country to total resistance? Could
the leadership and the rank and file be of one mind and one heart to accept the struggle and

564
Li Zongren, “Wode zhuzhang”, p. 8.
565
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, p. 149.
566
Lilun yu shijian, pp. 137-51.
567
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 201.
568
Li Zongren, “Wode zhuzhang”, p. 8.

210
face the sacrifices determinedly for a war of national liberation based on the spirit of
scorched earth resistance?569 In this way, Li had successfully transformed the Guangxi
people’s political consciousness from an identity with local and regional honour to one on
the national level. He had successfully put the Clique’s conflict with Jiang into a new
category, a difference over that of policies towards Japan while at the same time, providing
a framework to his explanation of policies and actions carried out by the Clique in the
1930s. According to Li himself:
After the “September 18 Incident”, we had firmly set ourselves two basic tasks.
One was to carry out positive reconstruction in the province; then to enhance the
reconstruction of national defence; and finally to train militia and carry out an
efficient conscription system in order to create the foundation of resistance. The
other was to stand for peace and unity on the issues of domestic politics on the one
hand, and, on the other, to move the Central Government by bringing our absolute
sincerity to it in order to strengthen its policy towards Japan and to enable it to
move towards the way of positively waging a war of resistance.570
Thus it is possible to say that, in an extremely serious national crisis, Li was
outstanding among leaders in correctly assessing the crisis, and explaining the significance
of and necessity for immediate resistance. His loud, cogent appeal to the public to assist
positively to ensure the determination of a new, courageous national policy towards Japan
was backed by effective propaganda that explained and justified the practice of scorched
earth resistance in the first half of the 1930s.

1.2. Criticism of Non-resistance Policy

To strengthen his stand for resistance, Li also criticized non-resistance, i.e. Jiang’s
policy of “rangwai bixian annei”. Li suggested that this policy was the source of the
current critical national crisis.571 Sun Yatsen, according to Li, once regarded the theory of
“zhiyi xingnan” (knowing is easy but doing is hard) as the obstruction of revolution. Li and
the Clique therefore also claimed non-resistance theory as the main obstruction to Chinese
national liberation. Under this theory, they pointed out, over one third of national territory
and sovereignty had been lost, and over one fifth of the Chinese people had fallen into the

569
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, p. 149.
570
Li Zongren, “Jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang yu shijian”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),
Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 27-8.
571
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, DFZZ, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January
1937), p. 17.

211
hands of the Japanese. At the same time, the harm done by the policy to the Chinese
national spirit and national human dignity was uncountable. This policy was leading the
nation to total foreign subjugation. And the Chinese nation would not be liberated and
restored until the theory was fully abandoned.572 Li fiercely attacked those positions that
were derived from non-resistance. He supported his stand for scorched earth resistance
with the following arguments:
1). Analysis of the possibility of international intervention
Faced with Japanese aggression, some Chinese possessed a view that waited for the
mediation of the League of Nations and intervention by the United States of America and
the United Kingdom. Such a mentality, dependent on international intervention, became
their only policy towards Japan, which Li called the “dependent idea”. He pointed out that
the facts of the past five years (from 1931 to 1936) had suggested that the League of
Nations was impotent to settle any Sino-Japanese conflict. Furthermore, all the existing
international laws agreed upon for the purpose of keeping a balance of power among the
great Powers, such as the Washington Order, had been broken by the Japanese militarists.
Although China’s Central Government had appealed for the mediation of the great Powers,
there had been no response whatever. The facts above indicated that no international laws
were reliable. To save the nation, China could only rely on the forces of the Chinese people
themselves. In the situation of facing the desperate attack from the enemy, if China wished
to survive, the only way was self-defence, and to be more exact, to strive for her existence
with iron and blood.573
The above analysis and criticism of the role of the League of Nations made sense.
In his recollection several decades later, Gu Weijun (V. K. Wellington Koo), Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Nanjing at that time, also recognized that this international body was not
able to carry out any positive measure to stop Japanese aggression in China.574 Even the
Paper of the League of Nations Lytton Commission for investigation of the Sino-Japanese
conflict did not condemn Japanese aggression, but suggested that the reason for its
occupation of three provinces of northeast China by force was caused by the latter. This

572
Quanmianzhan zhoukanshe (ed.), Lilun yu shijian, pp. 9-10.
573
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 21.
574
Gu Weijun, Gu Weijun huiyi lu, translated by Chinese Academy of Social Science.
Beijing: ZHSJ, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 56-70.

212
Paper was of course criticized by the Chinese.575 It demonstrated that the League of
Nations was impotent on the issue of Japanese aggression, and had no authority to deal
with the Sino-Japanese conflict. In fact, early in 1932 when the League of Nations began to
investigate the conflict and the facts of Japanese aggression of China, Li and the Clique had
taken a sceptical and opposing attitude towards this action.576 After the Paper was released,
Li also attacked the fact that it boosted Japan’s aggressive arrogance. He suggested that the
Paper was a humiliation for the whole Chinese nation.577 That is to say, Li and other
Guangxi leaders were acutely aware that the impotent intervention of the League of Nations
was a consequence of a weak China lacking any power for independent diplomacy. Bai
Chongxi repeatedly emphasized this over the years. According to Bai, a country’s
“gongping” (fairness) or “gongli” (universal principles of nature and society, national law)
in the world could only be obtained by depending on its strength. China could not maintain
her “gongping” and “gongli” in the world until she could fight for herself. In other words,
only by fighting foreign aggression could China maintain the rights and peace of the
country in the world.578 The Guangxi leaders’ perception of the actual situation of China
and the weak role of the League of Nations was used to change the dependent mentality of
the Chinese people and to encourage them to fight for national salvation on their own
behalf.
2). Refutation of the View of “tuirang qiuhe”
Li also criticized the view of “tuirang qiuhe” (making concessions and suing Japan
for peace). This view was based on the assumption that the Japanese sought localised
territorial gains and had no plans to occupy the whole of China. According to this
assumption, Japan, as a small country, was unable to annex the whole territory of China.

575
The main points of the Lytton paper of the League of Nations practically admitted the
justice of the Japanese claims to Manchuria, northeast China. See Tom Walsh, The Sino-
Japanese Conflict, Sydney and London: Angus and Robertson Ltd., 1939, pp. 79-80. For
detailed criticism of the paper given by the different groups and factions, see Zhonghua
quanguo guonan jiujihui (ed.), Guolian diaochatuan baogaoshu jiqi piping, n.d. (1933?),
n.p.
576
See Li zongsiling, p. 104, p. 110, and p. 120.
577
For details of Li’s opinion on the paper of the League of Nations, see Zhonghua
minguo guonan jiujihui (ed.), Guolian diaochatuan baogaoshu jiqi piping, pp. 151-2.
578
See Bai fuzongsiling. pp. 251-2. Li Zongren also possessed the same view. See Li
zongsiling. p. 177.

213
Japan’s invasion strategy in China was mainly to secure the latter’s frontier region and
other partial interests. Once all of Japan’s desires had been satisfied, the relationship
between China and Japan could be rearranged. To refute this view, Li argued that “Japan’s
desires for possession in China were endless”. The Japanese policy towards China was one
of total conquest.579 In this critical situation, China “could only survive in resistance,
otherwise it would fall in non-resistance”.580
History has shown that Li’s view clearly reflected the actual situation of China at
that time. As leader of a faction, Li naturally considered his group’s interests. But, as a
patriotic military leader, he was also seriously concerned with national affairs and gave
them a higher priority. In fairness, it must be said that this applied also to most of the
Nationalist and Communist leaders during those critical years when China was most
threatened. Li also possessed a capability for brilliant analysis and exposition of the
national situation and the prospects of China, according to some people who even
supported Jiang at that time.581 Like other farsighted military leaders, Li had a keen insight
into Japanese ambitions in China. These facts showed that Japan attempted to maintain
China in a state of disunity among separate governments so that it could easily manipulate
this divided country. As Li and the Clique pointed out, Japan's policy towards China and
its actions in this country showed that it aimed at not only regional and provincial interests
but at totally controlling and conquering, and then finally eliminating the whole Chinese
nation under total Japanese hegemony. The facts of Japanese aggression in North China in
the first half of the 1930s also proved its ambition.582 Anyone who believed Japan's actions
were limited to minor interests in China actually ignored the history of Japanese aggression
in China since 1894. As the leader of a faction with powerful military forces and a well-
organized structure in mass mobilization and political organization, in opposition to Jiang’s
policy of “rangwai bixian annei”, Li’s open declaration of resistance was welcomed by

579
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 18.
580
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, p. 145.
581
See “Li Zongren”, in Yuan Qingping (ed.), Dangdai dangguo mingren zhuan,
Nanjing: Junshi xinwenshe, 1936. Also see Chen Xiaowei’s comments in Tianwen Tai, 24
April 1938.
582
For details of Japanese aggression of North China, see T. A. Bisson, Japan in China,
pp. 40-109.

214
many people who believed that, for them, Li “showed the firm will of the Chinese soldiers
to fight Japan”.583
In fact, Li’s criticism of the above view of “tuirang qiuhe” was also a reflection of
Guangxi’s preparations for war, particularly after the “September 18 Incident”, and the
outcome of mass mobilization in the province. For example, the core of Guangxi mass
mobilization was militia training. The main political teaching materials of militia training
were the history of imperialist aggression of China, particularly that from Japan and its
ambitions in China.584 The following Guangxi anti-Japanese song, used in militia training,
also expressed the Guangxi people’s perception of Japanese aggression and the
determination to resist.
The Japanese devils robbed our three provinces in the northeast,
Fellow compatriots should urgently wake up,
Be ready to die in recovery of the lost territories,
Fighting for the existence of our country;
We should undergo self-imposed hardships so as to strengthen our
resolve to wipe out the national humiliation,
Takes ten years to add production and build up forces (shinian shengju),
and takes ten years to educate and train the masses (shinian jiaoxun),
With sufficient strength,
To eliminate the Japanese.585
This song reveals a simple consciousness and is a concentrated expression of the Clique’s
policies in fighting Japan.
3). Condemnation of Delays in Preparations for War
According to one view, China did not have the national strength and capability to
fight Japan, so she should endure humiliation in exchange for peace, and this would give
her more time to prepare for war; otherwise, precipitate action would lead the country to
destruction. Li attacked this position, pointing out sharply that it was tantamount to letting
the nation perish slowly. In fact, the advocate of delay was Jiang. After 1931, Jiang openly
declared that “Japan would occupy all important areas of China and eliminate her only in
ten days, or even in three days, if she immediately offered resistance to Japan without

583
Ren Biming, “Jiaotu kangzhan”, pp. 115-6.
584
See Wei Renzhong, “Liuzhou qu tuan ganxundui gongzuo baogao”, CJYK, Vol. 2,
No. 2 (December 1934). Also see Guangxi Wuzhou qu mintuan qikan, No. 1 (June 1934),
pp. 11-3.
585
Shiwujun niankan, 1933, p. 7.

215
careful consideration”.586 Instead, China should prepare to strengthen national forces for
the chance to resist Japan.587 Here, we do not deny that Jiang adopted the position of
fighting Japan, but the means he employed were open to question. Song Meiling (Mayling
Soong), Madame Jiang, told an American journalist: “Of course we must fight Japan, but
we won’t try it until we are sure of at least being able to hurt our adversary seriously”.588
However, such a policy could not stop the aggression of the enemy. On the contrary, the
result was that under this policy the enemy pressed forward steadily from the northeast to
North China while Jiang appeased them at every step. To refute this view, Li argued as
follows.
First, it was true that China lacked the national strength of Japan, and China must
prepare for war. However, given the traditional ambition of the Japanese to complete the
conquest of China, would the enemy not also speed up its aggression while China was
preparing to resist? Secondly, would the enemy's increased preparations not be as fast or
faster than those of China? Furthermore, would China's strength ever be enough to
compare with the enemy's superior industrial and economic base and the advanced
technology and scientific elites as well? Li argued that, under the formidable foe's
desperate attack, China’s territory was reducing, her population was being divided, her rich
national resources were being stolen, and her national sovereignty was being limited and
harmed. In this situation, China was more and more falling under Japan's control. If she
tried to maintain her integrated tariff, the enemy destroyed it through smuggling. If she
endeavoured to preserve a national spirit, the enemy suppressed it by using the excuse of
“eliminating the anti-Japanese idea”. If she tried to utilize foreign capital for national
reconstruction, the enemy obstructed it by taking various measures to oppose and disrupt
international assistance. If she strove to build up a complete national defence system, the
enemy limited it by using its ingenuity, demanding the establishment of a demilitarized
zone or a special zone, requiring more territory, and so on. In other words, all actions and
movements of China were now put under close surveillance and interference by the

586
Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Xian zongtong Jianggong quanji, Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua daxue
zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1984, p. 878.
587
Qin Xiaoyi (ed.), Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian - duiri kangzhan shiqi:
xubian [1], Taipei: Zhongguo GMD zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiuhui, 1981, p.
317.
588
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 224.

216
superior and arrogant enemy. Consequently, China’s national economy was declining, and
the national spirit was ebbing away. Li further argued that, in such circumstances when
China was being destroyed, how could she find time or the opportunity for preparation for
resistance?589
In my opinion, the above refutations are all valid. Faced with Japanese invasion,
the Nationalist Government did not resist but, instead, signed a series of treaties or truces
with Japan, such as the Songhu Truce (May 1932), Tanggu Truce (May 31 1933), and He-
Umetsu Agreement (July 1935), each one making further concessions to the invaders.
China’s reward from these concessions was not that Japan slowed the pace of invasion, but
it further encouraged the enemy’s aggression. After each concession, Japan set more
demands on the Chinese government and speeded up its aggression.590 According to Li,
Jiang’s view of preparation for war denied the Chinese nation a chance to employ her
patriotic morale in resistance against the foreign invader, i.e. that “not to be subdued by
force” (weiwu buneng qu), a part of Confucianism - the Chinese spiritual life. Here, the
spearhead of Li’s criticism went to Jiang and some scholars who preached the same
position.591 As these scholars were famous in the country, their speeches and ideas in
response to Japanese aggression favoured Jiang’s position and countered Li’s rallying cry
of resistance. Li called this “delay for preparation” view the position of hanjian (Chinese
traitor). He conceded that China might pay a high price for immediately launching
resistance. However, this was the only way to strive for victory over the invaders, “more
early more surely winning”.592 The reason for the final victory was that, according to a

589
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 20.
590
For details of Japanese aggression of China step by step after 1931, see T. A. Bisson,
Japan in China, pp. 40-109. Also see Tong Dong and Xie Xueshi, “Huabei shibian shi
jiuyiba shibian de jixu”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, pp. 86-100; and Qi Fulin, “Huabei fenzhi yu
sange Riben Zhongguotong”, KRZZYJ, No. 3, 1992, pp. 190-204.
591
An example is the journal entitled Duli pinglun (Independent Critique) which
published a number of articles on preparation of war against Japan written by many
scholars in the first half of 1930s. Among them was Hu Shi (Shizhi), a famous philosopher
who taught at the Beijing University at that time and was later the Ambassador to the USA
during the Sino-Japanese War. See Shao Minghuang, “Kangzhan qian beifang xueren yu
‘Duli pinglun’ (1932-1937)”, M. A. thesis, National Political University, Taipei, 1979. Hu
changed his position to resistance after July 1937. See Geng Yunzhi, “‘Qiqi shibian’ hou
Hu Shi duiri taidu de zhuanbian”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1992, pp. 186-198.
592
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 22.

217
writer named He Sijing, China would regenerate from the war against Japan as the
phoenix.593 This is a way of saying that Li’s criticism of the position of “delay for
preparation” and his stand for resistance inspired people and enhanced enthusiasm for
resistance. It was a “blood oath”, according to some, and an expression of the Chinese
nation’s unyielding spirit of resistance.594 Also, it embodied the pursuit of Li and his
Clique for the exclusion of the imperialist influences from China, one of the two purposes
of the Nationalist Revolution. In a word, China could be freed from the oppression of
imperialism through the national revolutionary war to strive for final national survival.595
4). Refutation of the View of “rangwai bixian annei”
According to the view of “rangwai bixian annei, tongyi caineng kangri”, China
could not fight Japan until the interior had been united and the Communist bandits had
been cleaned out. Consequently, China should pay great attention to pacifying the interior
before resistance against foreign aggression. Li pointed out that this view ran counter to the
necessity of fighting Japan. According to Li, China had been politically united after the
“September 18 Incident”. The reason for the so-called “disunity” of China, in fact, was
spiritual; or, to be more exact, the “disunity” meant only that China had still not formed a
nationwide policy towards Japan. As for the Communist problem, it was caused solely by
the decline of the national economy. That is to say, the Chinese Communists could use the
collapse of the national economy to reach its purpose of taking over national power.596
However, in a sense, the decline of the national economy and other social problems were
mostly caused by imperialist aggression.597 At present, Japan was the most dangerous
enemy of China and the biggest obstruction to China’s reconstruction and independence.
Unless she was freed from the exploitation and oppression of Japanese imperialism, China

593
He Sijing, “Businiao zhi si yu sheng”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp.
69-84. He Sijing belonged to “Jiuguohui” (Federation of National Salvation Associations).
594
Ren Biming, “Jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 115.
595
Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo lianhehui (ed.), Guangxi kangri jiuguo zhongyao wendian
huiji, Nanning, 1936, p. 3.
596
For details of the Clique’s discussion of the Communist issue caused by China’s
internal problems, such as the economic problem, see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9 (June 1936); and
JXXK, No. 13 (1934).
597
See Li Zongren, “Nuli zengjia shengchan chongshi minzhong liliang”, Li zongsiling.

218
could never have a healthy development of her national economy, and the growing strength
of Communism could not be countered. Li emphasized that, to achieve the actual and
spiritual revival and unity of the whole country, a nationwide resistance should be launched
immediately. To pacify the Communists, priority would be given to relief of the harmful
effects of Japanese damage to China’s national economy. However, in Li's view, resistance
would become the cornerstone of national unity, and this itself would provide a counter to
the Communists.598 The constantly repeated call of the Clique was, “only resistance against
foreign aggression could achieve domestic pacification, and only resistance against Japan
could lead China to unity”.599
This sums up the widespread criticism directed at Jiang’s policy of “domestic
pacification before external war”. Jiang had proclaimed it on the eve of the “September 18
Incident”, and it became the central thrust of his national policy towards both internal
affairs and Japanese aggression.600 Objectively speaking, such a policy might be
considered reasonable in ordinary times if free of an ongoing invasion. However, faced
with Japanese aggression within the country itself, holding to this policy at least indicated
that Jiang did not understand the current situation. On the one hand, Japan could
conceivably conquer the whole of China before Jiang achieved his purpose of domestic
pacification. On the other hand, he was equating the invasion by Japan with struggle and
conflict between himself and other factions and parties in China. The quarrels between
groups were in fact those of people holding differing political ideas and policies within a
nation, but were never the same as the savage conflicts which occur in war between

598
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 18.
599
She Yu, “Liji kangzhan ji kangzhan shijian zhong zhi zhu wenti”, CJYK, Vol. 3, No.
10 (August 1936).
600
For details of the origin and development as well as failure of this policy, see Ishijima
Noriyuki, “Guomin zhengfu de ‘annei rangwai’ zhengce jiqi pochan”, in Ikeda Makoto
(ed.), Kangri zhanzheng yu zhongguo minzhong, Beijing: QSCBS, 1989, pp. 62-79. Also
see Gao Cunxin, “Zhang Xueliang he Jiang Jieshi zai ‘rangwai’ yu ‘annei’ wenti shang de
fenqi”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1992, pp. 44-51; Wu Tianwei, “Jiang Jieshi yu ‘Jiuyiba shibian’”,
KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1992, pp. 41-53; Xie Guoxing, “Suowei ‘He-Umetsu xieding’”, KRZZYJ,
No. 3, 1993, pp. 57-74; Yu Xinchun, “Jiuyiba shibian shiqi de Zhang Xueliang yu Jiang
Jieshi”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, pp. 42-63. One of the most important references is, Guan
Ning and Zhang Youkun (translated), Jianmo wushi yunian Zhang Xueliang kaikou
shuohua - Riben NHK jizhe zhuanfang lu, Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1992
(hereafter as Jianmo wushi).

219
nations. The Chinese have a saying, “xiongdi xiyuqiang, waiyu qiwu” (brothers quarrelling
at home join forces against attacks from without). Under the threat of external invasion,
clearly the most important task of all parties and groups was to resist Japan, because all
internal disputes would be dissolved when the national crisis faced China.601 Surprisingly,
the Clique, like the Communists, realized and met (or we might say that it used) this
tendency after the “September 18 Incident”, no matter what kind of purpose it had.
According to the intense propaganda of the Clique, all disputes between various factions
and parties should only be solved in resistance.602 The Clique’s policy of “annei weiyou
rangwai, tongyi weiyou kangri” (only resistance against foreign aggression could achieve
domestic pacification and only resistance against Japan could lead China to unity) was an
obvious attempt to gain the support of the public in order to oppose Jiang’s “rangwai
bixian annei”, and was widely recognised as an essential alternative to the latter.
It is obvious that Li’s analysis discussed above was to serve the Clique’s dual
purpose of achieving resistance and reducing the power of Jiang. However, whatever can
be seen to be the motivation behind the choice of policies, the final value judgement is
whether it was advantageous or harmful to the national interests and whether it met the
needs of the time. In response to external aggression, calling for immediate resistance was
at least a positive attitude, because it met the needs of defending the interests of the nation
and country. It is unnecessary to deny that Jiang also had the determination to resist Japan.
After all, he eventually led the national resistance for eight years (1937-1945) until the final
victory. The problem is that Jiang unwisely inverted the order of priority, placing internal
concerns ahead of external concerns at a crucial time in China’s history. In defence of
Jiang it needs to be said that national political unity, even the internal unity of the GMD,
was a most important task for China if Japan was to be successfully resisted. As Zou Lu, a
GMD veteran and a senior leader of the southwest organizations and Chancellor of
Zhongshan University at Guangzhou, addressing the Fifth National Guomindang Congress
on November 18, 1935, declared,
Kuomintang comrades, whether from the South or the North, have gathered here
with a firm belief in the necessity of internal cohesion. Such unity cannot be

601
Guo Tingyi also suggests that Jiang’s policy of “rangwai bixian annei” was not
logically attuned to the national tendency to offer resistance, in such a situation. See Guo
Tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982, p. 623.
602
CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 10.

220
 achieved by means of force, but of a spontaneous common desire to stand together
and face the present crisis.603
Even in contemporary studies, some modern Chinese historians still suggest that Li
and the Clique were motivated only by personal gain in their struggle with Jiang, and
cynically exploited the anti-Japanese stance as a means of securing national power.604
Obviously, this view distorts the personal intentions of both Li and the Clique. It also can
be said that, in a sense, this view is the continuity of propaganda used by Jiang's followers
to attack Li and the Clique by any means in past conflicts. Scholars who continue to
question the Clique’s motives obviously obscure the demarcation between disunity over
territory and disputes of policies between different political groups in the 1930s. In fact, as
mentioned earlier, China was not disunited territorially before the War of Resistance,
except for that occupied by Japan. In politics also, there was only one National
Government at that time. However, it is understandable that there were widely different
positions here because so many problems and difficulties confronted the Nanjing
Government. In spite of all this, the differences within the GMD did not envisage a
separation of the nation, but centred on opposition to one individual - Jiang Jieshi - for his
ambitions towards dictatorship.605 It is correct to say, as some scholars point out, that what
was called disunity was a reflection of major disputes over policies and ideas for national
reconstruction and internal and foreign affairs.606 Pan Gongzhan, a follower of Jiang and a
senior GMD politician, in an article published in 1937, regarded these disputes as a
problem of political unity within the GMD, and this basically reflects the view of some
Nationalists regarding this issue.607

603
Quoted in T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, p. 92.
604
See, for example, Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong chubanshe,
1977, pp. 229-36; and Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai:
SHRMCBS, 1992, pp. 350-54.
605
See “Wu Tiecheng’s Confidential Correspondence”, Archives of the Nationalist
Government, Nanjing, Serial 2, No. 5412.
606
Zhang Jucheng, “Kangri zhanzheng qian Zhongguo shi butongyi de ma?”, KRZZYJ,
No. 2, 1993, pp. 33-5; and He Xincheng, “Lun jiuyiba shibian hou Zhongguo de tongyi
wenti”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1994, pp. 12-24.
607
See Pan Gongzhan, “Shinian lai de zhongguo tongyi yundong”, in Zhongguo wenhua
jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo, Shanghai, 1937; reprinted Hong
Kong: Longmen shudian, 1965, pp. 1-20.

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 The examples and explanations above will serve to show that Li’s assessment that
“only resistance against foreign aggression could achieve domestic pacification and only
resistance against Japan could lead China to unity” represented a political position for the
settlement of internal disputes within the GMD, even the nation. In a sense, it met the
needs of active resistance. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937,
all factions and parties, whether within or outside the GMD, immediately sent their troops
to the fronts and all acted under the command of Jiang. This indicates that all internal
political problems of China could be resolved once the factions formed a common target,
i.e. the national policy towards Japan. In other words, it achieved an outward political unity
throughout the country in striving for national liberation. Although it was temporary, this
political unity throughout the country brought the Chinese nation into a period
characteristed by a common purpose - resistance and reconstruction of the nation (kangzhan
jianguo), which was the national policy towards Japan that Li had advocated in his
“scorched earth resistance” idea. This achievement of political unity was built on a
cooperation between all parties, although it could not be maintained after the victory over
Japan because the differences between parties, particularly those between the CCP and
GMD, were too great to allow unity to continue.
5). Criticism of the Opportunist View of “Waiting for the Possibility of the
International Situation Changing”
This opportunist view was based on predictions of the outbreak of the Second
World War was inevitable, because of increasing conflict in Europe between the main
imperialist countries there, and between Japan and Russia, the USA, and Britain. In this
situation, China should endure invasion and humiliation and wait for the world war which
was coming, and then China could recover all lost territories and national sovereignty with
the assistance of the Powers involved in fighting the war against Japan. Opposing this
opportunism of reliance, Li contended that chance was not reliable, as it was only an
external factor, not an internal one, even if it did occur. According to Li, although the
USA, Soviet Russia and Britain indeed were in conflict with Japan and dissatisfied with its
actions in east Asia, no one could state with certainty that their differences at the present
time could not be settled without a war against the latter.608 Li gave reasons for his
argument as follows:

608
Lilun yu shijian, p. 12.

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 First, the USA was quietly engrossing itself in domestic economic development and
engaging in armament expansion. It still maintained its initial “keeping silent” policy
towards the Far Eastern issue on the one hand, and had a closer economic relationship with
Japan than that with China on the other. It was unlikely to break off its relations with Japan
just because of the crisis facing China.
Second, British interests and overseas territories were indeed under threat from
Japan. However, in 1936 the fall of Ethiopia to Italian aggression, the extension of the
fascist-backed Spanish civil war, and the formation of a European fascist front by Germany
and Italy, had already weakened Britain's traditional status in the world. Britain would
require all its strength to deal with issues in relation to its interests and rights in Europe.
Therefore, when dealing with its policy towards Far Eastern issues, it had to accommodate
Japan and was content with Jiang's attempt to placate the Japanese in China. The above
facts suggested that Britain would not offend Japan only to protect its interests in China, as
its principal interests were in Europe.
Furthermore, as it was under threat from the Japanese-German Anti-Communist
alliance, and was faced with the rising strength of world fascism, the only option available
to Soviet Russia to defend itself was to continue its policy of peaceful diplomacy as it
strove for time to continue consolidation of national defence to assure socialist
reconstruction within the country. It was obvious that no country would be prepared to
launch a war against Japan in the immediate future.609
On the other hand, in Li’s analysis, Japan’s strategy at the present was to focus on
the conquest of China. To that end, Japan had to revise its policies towards Britain and the
USA. Its policy towards Russia was also to bluff and bluster only. It was obvious that
Japan did not feel confident of success in a direct challenge which might involve the USA,
Britain or Russia. In such circumstances, according to Li, if China could not resist
aggression with its own strength and merely waited for such uncertain international
assistance, the possible outcome was that China would become the total victim of Japanese
aggression before any international help did come.610

609
Li Zongren, “Cong guoji douzheng shuodao women minzu de chulu”, Li zongsiling,
pp. 233-43.
610
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 18. In his serial speeches before
the scorched earth resistance, Li had repeatedly confirmed that China could not rely on the
outbreak of the conflict between the Powers and Japan. Even if the conflict broke out, Li

223
 Later events were to show that Li’s analysis was virtually identical with the actual
international situation.611 As Edgar Snow pointed out, two years after the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War, in July 1939,
No more ironic than the fact that Japan still got more than half her imported war
materials from China's traditional best friend, Uncle Sam. Most of the Russian
munitions went into China either through Burma or Indo-China until in June, 1940,
Japan compelled the French to close the railway into Yunnan. When the British
complied with Japanese demands, and closed the Burma highway, China was left
with but one free route of supply - the desert road from Russian Turkistan.612
This confirms Li’s analysis of the great Powers’ attitude towards Japan. Indeed, the
forecast of the imminent outbreak of the Second World War was then a popular topic in
China. Li and the Clique also knew such a war was inevitable.613 They believed that 1936
was a possible year for the outbreak of world war.614 It was believed, however, that the war
would be motivated by demands for national liberation for the oppressed people in the
world. This was regarded as an advantageous chance for the Chinese nation to strive for
their own ultimate national independence and liberation, and according to Li, the best
measure to promote such a war for the Chinese people was to resist Japan. Resistance
would eventually ensure China’s final victory over the invaders.615
Certainly, like many other leaders of the Nationalists, Jiang also wanted to fight
Japan as that of the Clique.616 The problem is that the Clique and Jiang had different
responses to the possibility of the coming world war. The Clique proclaimed a positive

suggested, China would be the biggest victim for they would take China as the main
battlefield of the war between them, which Li called the war of imperialist struggle for
dividing China. See Li zongsiling, pp. 131-5, 137-41, and 233-44.
611
For detailed discussion of the west Powers’ attitude towards Japanese aggression of
China, particularly Britain’s attitude, see Sa Benren, “Taipingyang zhanzheng qian shinian
jian Yingguo dui Zhongri zhanzheng de taidu he zhengce”, KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1994, pp. 38-
50.
612
Edgar Snow, Scorched Earth, London: Gollanez, 1941, p. 174.
613
See, for example, Li Zongren, “Fuxing zhonghua minzu shi women weiyi de renwu”,
Li zongsiling, pp. 203-12.
614
See CJYK, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May 1935); and JXXK, No. 13 (1934).
615
Ibid.
616
Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Xian zongtong Jianggong quanji, Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua daxue
zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1984, p. 877.

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attitude towards the prediction, while Jiang held a negative one which was to wait for its
coming patiently, at least it seems to be so on the surface. These differences can partly
explain Li’s position that China should still rely on its own strength to strive for the final
victory of resistance, even if considerable foreign military assistance would become
available to it from other nations with the outbreak of a world war.617 This suggested a
resolute attitude towards resistance on the one hand, and a firm confidence that the Chinese
could fight a resistance war successfully, even alone, on the other.
Why did Li and the Clique always emphasize reliance on its own strength to launch
and conduct a war of resistance? A possible answer is that the Clique had few contacts
with imperialist countries, and little support from any Western Power though it was an
important military and political faction within the GMD.618 Perhaps because of this failure
to obtain any support from the western Powers, according to Tom Walsh, Li and the Clique
increased pressure on Jiang for resistance and began to stimulate hatred of the
“imperialists”.619 Whatever the case, this background enabled the Clique to maintain a
reputation for independence from Nanjing in dealing with internal and external issues.
Through aggressive criticism of all the varying forms of the non-resistance policy,
Li explained the reasons why China must fall if it did not resist Japan, and he emphasized
through analysis the consequences to the nation if China did not end Jiang's policies of
compromise and concession and accept a total “scorched earth resistance”.

1.3. Analysis of the Harmfulness of Non-resistance

First, the consequence of non-resistance was to encourage endless Japanese
aggression. According to Li, Japan habitually practised threatening and cheating tactics to
serve its principle of winning victory without war. In the initial stage, Japan might never

617
Li Zongren, “Jiechu guonan yaokao women ziji de nuli”, Li zongsiling, pp. 137-41.
618
Li and the Clique made a failed attempt to establish contact with the French Indochina
authority in order to obtain military support from France during the two years of 1936-37
before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. This attempt was based on the quest for
arms to fight a war of resistance against Japan and not for opposition to Jiang. For details
of this contact, see T.G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic Memoirs, Lanham:
University Press of America, 1989, pp. 53-78, and 85-91. T. G. Li was the key figure , who
was on behalf of Guangxi leaders Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, involved in the deal with
the French Indochina authority at that time.
619
Tom Walsh, The Sino-Japanese Conflict, p. 81.

225
have launched a full scale war if it had not become convinced that an easy victory over all
of China was within its reach. Its unbridled aggression had resulted because Nanjing did
not resolutely resist the incursion with all her power right at the outset of hostilities.
Consequently, Japanese aggressive ambition was encouraged. The loss of territories in the
Northeast areas after 1931 was an outcome of non-resistance. Although some defensive
actions taken by Chinese troops occurred afterwards, such as in Shanghai (1932), Rehe and
the Great Wall (1933), these all failed due to Nanjing’s non-resistance policy.620 Moreover,
not only did Nanjing not support these actions, it actually suppressed them. As a result, the
enemy obtained maximum benefits at minimum cost. Non-resistance was crippling China.
As Li pointed out, the problems facing China now, such as that of the Communist-defence,
the east Suiyuan crisis, the North China problem, and even the so-called Hirota’s Three
Principles, were caused by such non-resistance policy.621
Secondly, non-resistance had resulted in betrayal from both separatist movements
and subversion by Chinese traitors. According to Li, Japan used Chinese traitors
successfully in its conspiracy of “yihua miehua” (using Chinese to eliminate Chinese), the
clever and sinister means used by Japan in its attempts to conquer China. Manzhouguo (the
puppet government sponsored by the Japanese in Manchuria), the east Hebei autonomous
government, and the Inner Mongolian Independent Movement were separatist examples.622
Pu Yi (the last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty), Yin Rugeng, and Li Shouxin were all
notorious Chinese traitors.623 However, as Li Zongren pointed out, the non-resistance
policy had encouraged the creation of separatist movements and Chinese traitors.

620
For details of these partial resisting actions, see Yu Zidao, “Zhongguo jubu kangzhan
zonglun”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, pp. 64-85; and the same writer, “Lun Suiyuan kangzhan”,
KRZZYJ, No. 4, 1993, pp. 129-146.
621
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 19. For details of Hirota’s Three
Principles, see T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, p. 26.
622
T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, pp. 40-77. Also see Edwin Pak-wak Leung, “Regional
Autonomy Versus Central Authority: the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement and the
Chinese Response, 1925-1947”, Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (1987), pp.
49-62; and Feng Hanzhang, “Shilun Riben ‘huabei fenzhi’ celue de xingcheng”, KRZZYJ,
No. 3, 1993, pp. 44-56.
623
For a short biography of Pu Yi, see Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard
(eds.), Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971, Vol. 3, pp. 80-6. For details of Li Shouxin, see Liu Yingyuan, “Li Shouxin
toudi jingguo”, WSZLXJ, No. 63 (1979), pp. 53-61.

226
Therefore, if Jiang's non-resistance policy was maintained, the separatist movements and
puppet authorities of Chinese traitors would not only occur in north China but spread
throughout the country. In the end, China would be impotent even if it finally attempted to
resist Japan, because China would be riddled with Japanese puppet authorities headed by
Chinese traitors.624 Indeed, there were so many Chinese traitors after the “September 18
Incident” that they became accomplices of Japanese aggression. There is evidence that the
puppet troops of Chinese traitors were used by Japanese imperialism to attack Chinese
armies and people both before and during the war of resistance.625 Li’s anxiety were
certainly justified.
Furthermore, non-resistance would demoralize the national will to fight. In Li’s
view, the most important weapon of the oppressed nation in resistance to invaders did not
lie in airplanes and cannons only but in a strong national will to fight. The greatest
obstruction experienced by Japan during its attempted conquest of China was this strong
Chinese national will. However, in the circumstances of non-resistance, the national will
had been affected, resulting in the emergence of pro-Japanese Chinese traitors and puppet
authorities. Further, it had partly disarmed spiritually the Chinese national will to
resistance against foreign aggression.626
Finally, non-resistance gradually destroyed the material foundations of effective
national defence, Li emphasized. This included the development of the ordinary national
economy, the promotion of a military industry, food control and communication, and
population and labour distribution. No resistance would be possible once these capabilities
had declined beyond a certain standard. Many aspects of these essential elements were
either being destroyed or controlled by Japan. Japanese smuggling in North China and the
dumping of vast quantities of Japanese goods in the Chinese markets were threatening or
destroying China’s national economy. Japan controlled key railways in North China and
most of the mining industry. Over 80,000,000 of the Chinese population had been removed
by Japan from the main body of the Chinese nation to become Japan’s slaves, which almost
equalled the whole Japanese population. The above facts showed that China had already

624
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 16-7.
625
See Jiang Kefu (ed.), Minguo junshi shi luegao, Beijing: ZHSJ, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 88-9,
and p. 99.
626
Lilun yu shijian, pp. 15-16.

227
lost much of her capacity for preparation of the material necessities of national defence.
The foundations of the national economy were growing weaker and weaker. Li concluded
that China would be in no condition to accomplish the material preparation of national
defence unless she reversed disaster by immediate resistance.627
In his advocacy of “scorched earth resistance”, Li listed four immediate tasks for the
Nationalist Government, the GMD. 1). China must counterattack with a war of national
liberation with iron and blood to break the imperialist chains which Japan had imposed on
the Chinese people. 2). It must appeal to Japanese people to stop the Japanese imperialist
aggressive ambition and establish a real and permanent peace between China and Japan.
3). It must prevent the activities of Chinese traitors, and consolidate the united front of
national salvation over the country. And 4). It must build up the spiritual and material
foundations of the nation and strengthen the national defence forces.628

1.4. The Prospect of Scorched Earth Resistance

A reason for supporting Li's call for immediate resistance was that he firmly
believed in the inevitability of the Chinese nation’s final victory over the Japanese invaders.
This confidence was not merely in morale, but was based on his analyses of China’s
military, economic, political and international potential in comparison with that of Japan.
1). Militarily
China’s military armaments were weaker than those of Japan, and the latter had
more advanced military equipment than that of the former. However, Li emphasized there
were many examples in Chinese history where a weaker group finally defeated a stronger
enemy in war, for example, the Qing Dynasty which was overthrown by Sun Yatsen and his
revolutionary colleagues, the GMD’s victory in the Northern Expedition, and the 19th
Route Army’s victory over the Japanese troops in the early stage of the Shanghai resistance
in 1932.629 Even recently the Ethiopian resistance against Italian aggression, which had
started in 1935, had lasted over eight months, using poor weapons against modern well-
equipped and well-armed Italian troops. Therefore, the main condition of victory in the

627
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 20.
628
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 19-20.
629
For details of the 19th Route Army's resistance in Shanghai, see Mengyu shanguan
zhuren (ed.), Zhonghua Shijiu lujun xuezhan shi.

228
revolutionary war was the resolutely sacrificial spirit of the oppressed group or nation.630
In the coming war against the Japanese, the Chinese nation, as an oppressed nation, would
strive for national liberation with one heart and one mind. On the contrary, as the
battlefield was in China, Japan could not put its whole population into the war, only its
limited number of troops.631
Even in the military sense, China had certain advantages, according to Li. First,
China had resources in troop manpower ten times greater than Japan. Secondly, many of
the Chinese troops had a long history of war experiences and could bear hardships and
stand hard work. At least Li himself and his troops were in this category. As Evans
Fordyce Carlson commented in early 1938 when he visited Li at the war front at
Taierzhuang, “in his simple manner of living he more really approached the standards of
the Eighth Route Army than any other Central Government leader I had met”.632 The
Guangxi troops were also praised by Chinese and foreign observers for their ability to
withstand hardships and constant hard work.633 Furthermore, Li believed that once war
against Japan broke out, the only option available to the enemy was that it must fight
harried battles to try to force a quick decision. China’s countermeasures were to bottle up
the enemy with protracted warfare. The Japanese advantage showed in decisive battles by
the main forces. In response to this China fought with guerrilla warfare in order to
consume it gradually. Another Japanese advantage lay in its occupation of China’s main
coastal cities. China, however, as Li emphasized, could use the vast inland to strengthen
the defence and to clear all fields to cause suffering among Japanese troops. These were
China's strategic and tactical advantages over those of Japan. Finally, the facts of poor

630
Li Zongren, “Jingshen zhansheng wuzhi”, Li zongsiling. pp. 153-64.
631
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 21.
632
Evans Fordyce Carlson, Twin Stars of China: A Behind-the-Scenes Story of China's
Valiant Struggle for Existence by A U. S. Marine Who Lived and Moved with the People,
New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1940; reprinted Hyperion Press, Inc., Westport,
Connecticut, 1975, p. 137.
633
See, for example, Lu Keng, Guangxi jun yuanzheng ji, Hankou: Xinsheng chubanshe,
1938; and Feng Jupei, Kangzhan zhong de diwu lujun, Hankou: Jianguo shudian, 1938;
Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia, Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing
Company, 1942, p. 184; Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and
Military Efficiency, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31; and Olga Lang,
“The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. XII, No. 1 (March 1939),
p. 20.

229
transport and communication facilities and the undeveloped economic resources as well as
the decentralized economy of China were to cause many problems and difficulties for Japan
in a protracted war. As a result, Li was confident that the weakness of the enemy would be
gradually exposed in the war. In the end, the fate that would wait Japanese imperialism
must be defeat.634
2). Economically
Although Japan temporarily had a strong economic foundation, it mainly relied on
supplies of overseas raw material, particularly from China. However, the expanding
military budget and over 700-800 million dollars of financial deficit as well as over 10
billion dollars of national debt had already brought Japan into an economic crisis. Li
believed that once Japan was involved in the war with China, this economic burden would
deepen, because China would close all markets to it and cut off the raw material supply
line. Japanese goods would be discriminated against by the Western Powers through their
sympathy for the Chinese. As for China, its economy was not only centred on the coastal
cities but also spread inland. Even if the Japanese troops occupied all coastal cities, China
could reconstruct her national economy and other industries in the inland and had a
virtually inexhaustible supply of manpower. Moreover, China was mainly an agricultural
society with a self-sufficient economy. It could support a national war against foreign
aggression, because Chinese soldiers could bear poor living standards and work hard.
Japan would be unable to win the war quickly, and in time, would face the problem of an
insufficient economy and short supplies as the war protracted. These were the
635
unfavourable factors which would lead Japan to final defeat.
3). Politically
In Li’s view, Japan’s developed capitalism and desperate external aggression were
resulting in falling living standards for its common people. The potential crisis stimulated
the rise of fascism. Japan could plunge into political crisis due to the collapse of
democratic politics and conflict between various factions.636 If China rose in self-defence,

634
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 22.
635
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 21-22.
636
For details and discussion of this political crisis of Japan, see T. A. Bisson, Japan in
China, pp. 192-235; and Richard Yungdeh Chu, “Dui jindai Riben junguo zhuyi fazhan
beijing de pouxi yu sikao”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1992, pp. 13-25.

230
it would strike the Japanese invasion force and support the domestic revolutionary force of
Japan in demanding reforms in that country. It might also encourage the national
revolution forces in Korea and Taiwan, the two Japanese colonies. On the other hand,
Chinese resistance was self-defence. With the common target of striving for the survival of
national existence and national liberation, all Chinese forces and parties would unite and
consolidate to form a united front over the whole country. Except for a small group of
Chinese traitors, all Chinese citizens, including all factions and groups, would fight the
Japanese invaders until the final triumph. This was the advantage that China could finally
bring to bear in order to defeat Japan.637
4). Internationally
As stated above, the three Powers, i.e. the USA, Soviet Russia and Britain, were
not, at present, prepared to fight Japan. However, all activities of the expanding Japanese
influence in east Asia would cause intense conflict with the Powers. At the same time,
Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, broke the Washington Order that ensured a
balance of influence among the Powers in the world, and entered into an alliance with
Germany and Italy. These actions seriously threatened the interests of the three Powers in
both Asia and Europe. In other words, Li believed that Japan was gradually becoming the
common enemy of the three Powers and other countries in the world which were at war
with Japan's new partners, the Axis Powers. This would be a favourable development that
China could exploit. Naturally, in defence of their interests in East Asia these countries
would give support, in materials and public opinion, to the Asian nations such as China
which resisted Japan. Of course, for the oppressed nation, a precondition for obtaining
international support was that it was able to fight with force and spirit against the enemy.
For Li, the only way to obtain international support was that China should resist the enemy
with all her own strength.638
Based on the above analyses of comparative strengths and weaknesses between
China and Japan, Li pointed out that China could resist Japan and fight until eventual
victory. In the war, the inferiority of the enemy would be exposed day by day, while the
superiority of China would gradually grow into full play. Consequently, “material
superiority of the Japanese troops would not be able to be put to good use, while the

637
Lilun yu shijian, pp. 20-21.
638
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 23.

231
superiority of our country, even the inferiority, would provide us with a base for the final
winning of the war”.639 So long as the Chinese nation could unite with one heart and one
mind and resist the aggression, Japanese imperialism would be not only unable to conquer
China, but also find itself tightly encircled in the ocean of the Chinese national liberation
war. He concluded that the extreme crisis of the Chinese nation was not the unceasing
Japanese incursions, but the Chinese government's endless concessions to the invaders.
Therefore, the first step towards national restoration was to abandon the existing concession
and non-resistance policies.640 “China must be able to triumph over the enemy”, Li
emphasized. “Meanwhile, the determination to resist and gain the final victory would
inspire the Chinese nation on to make a leap, thus accomplishing the great historical
mission of national restoration”.641
Li’s analysis of the possibilities of successful resistance was basically sound. The
historical events after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, such as the war being at a
stalemate in 1939 when the Japanese dream of fighting harried battles to try to force a quick
decision had been broken, and the great Powers joining forces to fight Japan after 1941,
indicated that the possibilities did exist. Assured of these possibilities, Li remained
optimistic about the prospect of resisting Japan and China’s final triumph. After the
outbreak of the nationwide War of Resistance, he further pointed out that China already
possessed the three essential conditions for final victory. The first one was “the national
consciousness and internal unity of the nation”. This was, in fact, a target that the Clique
had pursued in recent years, in the Clique’s collaboration with the southwest regional
factions, even reconciliation with the Communists and later with Jiang. The second
condition was “to hold a minimum self-defence capability”. This was also a policy
summation of Guangxi’s militia training and mass mobilization as well as provincial
reconstruction. The system of “bingmin heyi” (union of soldiers and people) with a
common target, i.e. resistance against Japan, and the promotion of Chinese nationalism,
also became strong weapons with which to fight the invaders. There is evidence that the
Clique soon mobilized over 300,000 troops and sent them to various fronts during the

639
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, p. 147.
640
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 23.
641
Li Zongren, “Jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang yu shijian”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),
Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 31.

232
Shanghai campaign in 1937.642 The third essential condition was “to obtain sufficient
international support”.643 The fact that some nations gave support to China after the
“Marco Polo Bridge Incident”, suggested that the Chinese national liberation war had won
a certain sympathy in the world, including those major countries already in potential
conflict with Japan in east Asia, such as Soviet Russia and U. S. A., even though there were
some special reasons for their aid to the Nationalist Government and such support was very
limited. Anyway, with these justifications of the correctness of his policies, Li remained
firmly convinced that China could win complete victory over Japan.

2. Strategy and Tactics of Scorched Earth Resistance

As mentioned earlier, scorched earth resistance, as “the national policy towards

Japan”, was also “the national policy of resistance against Japan”. According to Li, the
scorched earth resistance policy included three main strategies, i.e. full-scale warfare,
offensive warfare, and protracted warfare. In other words, after the national policy towards
Japan was affirmed, the strategy and tactics of resistance had to be defined as follows:

2.1. Full-scale Warfare

“Full-scale warfare” referred to war in which the whole nation was involved, a war
in which all able-bodied Chinese nationals would participate.644 It was to include four
tactical principles.
1). It was a war demanding action along all fronts, not merely in chosen areas. As
Li pointed out earlier, the strategy of Japanese conquest of China was to use superior forces
at selected points of attack. If China only resisted the Japanese attack in these areas chosen
by the enemy, it would fall into the trap of doing what the Japanese troops hoped for. The
enemy could concentrate its superior military equipment and forces to eliminate China's
effective strength in a series of set-piece battles. By this strategy the enemy could maintain

642
Li Po-sheng, “How Kwangsi Trains Its Troops”, People’s Tribune, Vol. XXV, No. 3
(May 1938), p. 141; and Kang Zhenhua, Dongyuan erbai wan, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938, p.
7; and Ren Shaoxi, Guangxi de dongyuan sheshi he nengli, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938, p. 4.
643
Li Zongren, “Kangzhan shengli de biran xing”, in Qian Shifu (ed), Li Delin, pp. 77-81.
644
Li Zongren, “Jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang yu shijian”, p. 32.

233
the pressure wherever it chose, preserving its forces. In this way, China would be forced to
retreat at every step until drained of all self-defence capability. This analysis was actually a
criticism of the failure of all partial wars of resistance that occurred after the “September 18
Incident”, such as Ma Zhanshan’s resistance at Nenjiang (Heilongjiang province) in 1931,
the 19th Route Army’s resistance at Shanghai in 1932, and the Great Wall resistance in
1933. It was also the summation of experience and lessons learned from the partial wars of
resistance. Based on this, Li and Bai suggested that China should resist the Japanese troops
on all fronts at once in one fluid and flexible envelopment which used the whole Chinese
territory as the battlefield. In so doing, Japan would not be able to employ its strategy of
mounting attacks in succession. Also, Japan would have difficulty in time and space
reinforcing its troops to counter continual harassment. China, on the other hand, would be
able to change her passive position in the beginning stage into that of constant initiative
until the complete victory over Japan.645
2). Resistance was a war of the whole people, so it would not rely on troops only.
Although China had a large number of armies, its fighting capacity was weaker than that of
Japan because of poor armaments and weapons. It was not enough to rely only on the
Chinese army to resist Japan, a well-armed invader, but it must rely on all forces of the
whole nation and people.646 In short, the masses were the sources of resistance and the
main force of their support. As Li pointed out,
Only strengthening mass organization and carrying out mobilization of the whole
nation as well as enabling 400 million Chinese people to rise with the force and
spirit to fight the Japanese bandits can form a new and firm Great Wall. This is the
line of defence that the enemy cannot break through, no matter how cruel and
ferocious, fierce and brutal it is.647
In fact, Guangxi militia training and mass mobilization had also been guided by this
concept. After the Shanghai campaign in August to October 1937, Li again gave these
instructions to both Guangxi and the 5th War Zone, where he was Commander-in-Chief:

645
Qian Shifu (ed.), Li Delin, pp. 69-70.
646
Bai Jiansheng xiansheng yanlun ji, Guilin: GXJSYJH, 1941, pp. 4-6.
647
Li Zongren, “Dangqian women yingyou de nuli”, Li Delin xiansheng yanlun ji, Guilin:
GXJSYJH, 1941.

234
Now one of the most important and urgent tasks was “to arouse the masses to participate in
the war of resistance”.648
3). Full-scale warfare also referred to a comprehensive resistance with military,
political, economical and cultural cooperation, but not a purely military resistance.649
According to both Li and Bai, the Sino-Japanese War was not only a decisive engagement
between the military forces of the two countries, but also a competition between them in
which manpower, financial resources and material resources were the fighting counters. In
other words, it was a contest between all forces of the two countries. Therefore, the form of
this war was not a unilateral military action. All political, economical and cultural forces
could be used as powerful weapons of the war.650
4). Full-scale warfare also meant national resistance by uniting all parties and
troops that stood for fighting Japan, for it could not become a war of resistance joined by
one party or faction only.651 Here the Clique clearly showed its support for the anti-
Japanese national united front, which had for years been a foundation stone of the Clique’s
policies.

2.2. Offensive Warfare

The War of Resistance should be an offensive war, not a defensive one. Li
regarded defensive warfare as passive and inactive. If the Chinese troops only engaged the
enemy when attacked, or if the Chinese troops did not continue action when the enemy
gave up the attack, China could hardly take the initiative from Japan and maintain closely
concerted and continuous action between all war zones. Instead, China must always take
the initiative in warfare and replace defence with the offensive spirit. Li suggested that
offensive warfare was now the way to defeat the enemy and to lead the country to final

648
Li Zongren, “Jinhou de zhanju”, Li Delin xiansheng yanlun ji.
649
Li Zongren, “Fuxing zhonghua minzu shi women weiyi de renwu”, Li zongsiling, pp.
203-12.
650
Bai Jiansheng xiansheng yanlun ji, p. 9. For detailed discussion of this idea, see Cao
Guangzhe, “Xin Guixi ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ lun shuping”, GXSHKX, No. 3, 1987, pp. 133-
147; and Zeng Chenggui, “Lun Li Zongren de kangzhan sixiang”, HBSHKX, No. 8, 1987,
pp. 53-9.
651
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 23.

235
victory.652 The two campaigns of the Chinese Army in the early stage of the Sino-Japanese
War might explain the efficiency of offensive warfare. The Shanghai campaign, lasting
from August to November 1937, was conducted under the principle of defensive warfare,
and the Chinese troops lost the initiative in each defence line.653 By carrying out offensive
warfare, China could maintain the initiative in the Taierzhuang campaign in the spring of
1938 and won a great victory in the battle.654 As a professional soldier, Li’s military skills
were highly appreciated by both his countrymen and foreign observers. Commenting on
the war, Captain Evans Fordyce Carlson, who was a foreign observer from the Chinese side
during the Taierzhuang campaign, put Li at the top of the list of the best field commanders
of China.655 In this sense, Li’s principle of offensive warfare was a valuable tactic.

2.3. Protracted Warfare

Protracted warfare referred to long and continuous war against Japan at any cost
until China reached the moment of triumph.656 Li chose this strategy for the following
reasons.
First, although it had a well developed economy, Japan was faced with problems of
a shortage of natural resources, a narrow and small land area, and a much smaller
population than China. Also, there was the powerful enemy (i.e. the western Powers)
against Japan. All these ruled out the possibility that Japan could fight a protracted war,
and it was forced into the strategy of fighting a quick campaign, to make a quick victory.
On the contrary, China had vast territory and abundant resources. This would enable her to

652
Qian Shifu (ed.), Li Delin, p. 70.
653
For details of the campaign, see Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui
(ed.), Bayisan Songhu kangzhan: yuan Guomindang jiangling kangri zhanzheng qinli ji,
Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1987.
654
For details of the Taierzhuang Campaign, see Junshi weiyuanhui junlingbu diyiting
disichu (ed.), Taierzhuang jianmia zhan, Archives of the Editorial Committee for War
History, the Nationalist Government, Nanjing. Also see U. S. Military Intelligence Reports
- China, 1911-1941, No. 9661 (May 5, 1938).
655
Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency, p. 28.
656
Lilun yu shijian, p. 30.

236
protract the war strategically. To break the Japanese dream of fighting a quick campaign to
make a quick victory, China must practise protracted warfare.657
Secondly, Japan had first class arms and equipment. Therefore, China could not
take the risk of large scale, sudden, decisive engagements with the enemy. Instead, China
could use the strategy of protracted warfare to force Japan to expend its manpower and
other resources in thousands of small engagements which left its troops in a state of
exhaustion. Then China could make the counterattack to win the war.658
Also, the Chinese national economy was based on agriculture. Li suggested that
this was an advantageous condition to support this strategy. The great numbers of the
Chinese population and the vast territory were also of help to the defender. On the one
hand, in a long and protracted war, Japan's manpower would be consumed. On the other
hand, if Japan occupied large territories, its limited troops would be dispersed and forced
into more complex and exhausting defence. Consequently, China, with her overwhelming
superiority in numbers, if not in equipment, could concentrate large forces anywhere to
strike at her enemy.659
Finally, Li believed that international conflict between Japan and the allied Powers
would become more certain as the Sino-Japanese war became prolonged. In the end, the
international circumstances would be more favourable to China.660
The main features of protracted warfare focused, tactically, on a combination of
“zhendi zhan” (positional warfare) with “yundong zhan” (mobile warfare) and “youji zhan”
(guerrilla warfare). These three types formed the “quanmian zhanshu” (full-scale tactic).
This full-scale tactic included not only the combination of the military, political,
economical, and cultural forces, but also a dialectical unity of time and space.661 Thus, in

657
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 22.
658
Bai Chongxi, “Zili gengsheng yu chijiu kangzhan”, Bai Jiansheng xiansheng yanlun
ji, pp. 288-290.
659
Li zongsiling, pp. 245-9. Also see Bai Chongxi, Kangzhan liangnian de huigu yu
qianzhan, Hong Kong: Tianwen Tai, 1939, pp. 12-4.
660
Li Zongren, “Jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang yu shijian”, pp. 38-9. For discussion of
reasons for carrying out the protracted warfare, also see Cao Guangzhe, “Shilun xin Guixi
‘jiaotu kangzhan’ de zhuzhang yu shijian”, pp. 12-14; and Zeng Chenggui, “Zailun Li
Zongren de kangzhan sixiang”, XSLT, No. 4, 1988, pp. 88-92.
661
Bai Jiansheng xiansheng yanlun ji, pp. 9-12.

237
the use of space, China’s forces could use the whole country as a battlefield, with no
distinction between front, back, left and right, and no distinction between east, west, south
or north. In the matter of time, China could practise mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare in
wide-ranging small strikes without time restrictions. These could be combined with
positional warfare to protract the war until all favourable factors were changed to suit the
Chinese troops. In employing these tactics, according to Bai, China could “trade space for
time, and add up many small victories to a big one to wear down the enemy’s effective
strength”. He also emphasized in March 1938 that this full-scale tactic was a elastic
protracted warfare well applying in the war.662
In general, the Clique emphasized, mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare were the
two main tactics of protracted warfare strategy.663 Both tactics were interdependent. In
other words, mobile warfare stressed “trading space for time”, while guerrilla warfare
emphasized “adding up many small victories to a big one”.664 For Bai, protracted warfare
was the main principle of the resistance strategy.665 The two main tactics were also
extensively adopted by the National Government and the Chinese troops.666

The above suggests that scorched earth resistance met the needs of the time. Its
value became affirmed through experience of success in the war. Not that it had ever
lacked support. From the moment Li officially promulgated and explained his doctrine, all
forces that stood for resistance gave it a positive response. They set high value on this new
approach, for it was, according to Cai Tingkai, “not only the voice of the Guangxi people

662
Bai Chongxi, “Junshi kangzhan yu zhengzhi kangzhan”, Bai Chongxi jiangjun zuijin
yanlun xuanji, Wuhan, 1938, pp. 26-7.
663
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 21. Also see Luo Ningfu, “Jiaotu
kangzhan de shiji”, ibid, pp. 105-7. Li and Bai also emphasized the combination of both
mobile and guerrilla warfare in the war. The Taierzhuang campaign in the Spring of 1938
was just such a successful practice. For details see Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.),
“Taierzhuang zhanyi qijian Li Zongren midian xuan”, LSDA, No. 3, 1984.
664
Bai Chongxi, “Junshi kangzhan yu zhengzhi kangzhan”, pp. 26-7.
665
Ibid.
666
Chen Dunde, Guigen - Li Zongren yu Mao Zedong he Zhou Enlai woshou, Beijing:
JFJWYCBS, 1990. pp. 89-96. Also see Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong:
Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, p. 134; and the writer’s interview with Mr Xie Hegeng, Beijing,
29 October 1992.

238
but also that of the whole of the people throughout the country.”667 The policy was "the top
target of the national revolution”,668 “the last chance for the life of the Chinese nation”,669
and “the most determined spiritual demonstration of the liberation war”.670 The strategy
and tactics of scorched earth resistance were “the strategy to guarantee victory”,671 and “the
raging flames of the national salvation”.672 It was even said that
Its every word is brimming with vigour and the Chinese national spirit. It is the
‘blood oath’ - the blood oath of launching the war for national existence. It can
break all ideas of non-resistance and lead all hesitant minds to determine that
‘honour permits no turning back’ for the final sacrifice.673
General Fu Zuoyi, Commander in Suiyuan province in 1936, also was convinced that
carrying out scorched earth resistance could defeat the enemy, based on his experience in
the resistance.674 The above emotional valuations might exaggerate the importance and
role of the policy, but the fact that scorched earth resistance created a widespread impact on
the promotion of resistance among various parties and factions is not open to doubt. Even
the CCP and its leader Mao Zedong openly expressed "welcome of the anti-Japanese
position of Mr Li Zongren, one of your party’s leaders”, in a letter of June 20, 1936 to the
GMD Central Committee.675 After the “Xi’an Incident” of December 1936, the Guangxi
Branch of the CCP Central Committee also called for provincial mobilization in
accordance with Commander-in-Chief Li Zongren’s scorched earth resistance idea to start

667
Cai Tingkai, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shijian xing”, p. 67.
668
Zhang Bojun, “Cong Guangxi jiaotu kangzhan shuoqi”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),
Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 88.
669
Cai Tingkai, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shixian xing”, p. 67.
670
He Sijing, “The Death and Birth of Phoenix”, p. 79.
671
Luo Ningfu, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shiji”, p. 105.
672
He Shan, “Duiyu jiaotu kangzhan de guancha”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu
kangzhan, p. 125.
673
Ren Biming, “Jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 115.
674
Fu Zuoyi, “Yong xianxue lai zhengqu minzu fuxing”, Zhujiang ribao, 1 June 1937.
675
Zhongyang tongzhanbu and Zhongyang dangan guan (eds.), Zhonggong zhongyang
kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, Beijing: DACBS, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 168.

239
the war against Japan.676 These strategies and tactics were afterwards practiced throughout
the war.677 All these suggest that the contributions of Li and the Clique to resistance and
national unity were fully acknowledged by all parties and factions that insisted on
immediately resisting Japan at that time.
However, Li’s policy has not received enough attention from modern Chinese
historians. Even “protracted warfare”, the main strategy of scorched earth resistance, is
ignored by some Chinese historians in their studies of the War of the Resistance. Of
course, it is understood that many people at that time also advocated similar policies and
strategies to those of Li, but his advocacy of a determined resistance policy and a special
kind of warfare offered a complete analysis and explanation of the necessity, prospect of
resistance and strategy and tactics for fighting the war. Moreover, Li was earlier and more
systematic in declaring such a policy with strategy and tactics better worked out than those
who also possessed similar ideas at that time. His ideas had also the authority of the leader
of a faction with powerful military strength and well-organized support within the GMD.
Some historians have attributed the strategy to the innovation of the CCP in the war. For
example, according to scholars of the Military Science Academy of China, during the war,
the CCP was credited with the general strategical principle of the War of Resistance - the
political line of the whole national resistance and the protracted warfare.678 It is in fact an
incorrect view. The CCP’s principle was openly declared in June 1938. The declaration
was marketed by the publication of Mao Zedong’s article “On Protracted War”.
Unfortunately, this was two years later than that of Li’s. Undoubtedly, these ideas have
been available for many years and in earlier wars, but they provided motivation and
direction at a critical moment in China’s time of crisis. Mao’s idea was, indeed, a more
systematized one than that of the Clique, as some commentator suggest;679 however, Mao
had already become familiar with Li’s ideas by 1936 after the latter had detailed his plan for

676
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashi ji, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, p. 106.
677
For details see Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jinpu xian zhanji, Guilin, May 1938.
678
Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi, p. 5.
679
Cao Guangzhe, “Xin Guixi ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ lun shuping”, GXSHKX, No. 3, 1987,
pp. 145-6; and Cao Guangzhe, “Shilun xin Guixi ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ de zhuzhang yu
shijian”, p. 47.

240
scorched earth resistance and sent a liaison man to Northern Shaanxi to establish
relationship between the Clique and the Reds. In his letter to Li and Bai on September 22,
1936, Mao seems to have agreed with both their policy towards Japan and plan of
establishing a united front.680
Some confusion also exists over Bai Chongxi’s famous tactics of “trading space for
time, and adding up many small victories to a big one”, a summation based on the scorched
earth resistance. According to Cheng Siyuan, Bai’s tactics were derived from Mao’s “On
Protracted War”.681 In fact, this is not the case. Bai officially proposed the plan to use
these tactics on March 18, 1938.682 But Mao’s article mentioned above was collected from
a series of his speeches in Kangda (The Anti-Japanese Military and Political University) at
the end of May and in early June. Thus, the publication of Mao’s work had to occur some
time after June. Cheng appears to have forgotten that Bai’s tactics were promulgated at
least two or three months earlier than Mao’s work. In fact, Bai’s tactics also became the
top strategic principle for all troops under the national government and were soon
distributed to fighting units throughout the country. They owed much more to Li; indeed
they were part of the Clique’s tactical plans.

Other Theories for Resistance: Yan Xishan’s “Shoutu kangzhan”

As Japanese aggression grew because of non-resistance, other popular anti-Japanese

positions, stimulated by the fervent Chinese patriotism of the time, were formed. Among
them was “shoutu kangzhan” (defence and resistance) initiated by Yan Xishan, leader of
the Shanxi Faction - a regional group unpopular in the eyes of Jiang and his followers.
Yan’s policy of “defence and resistance” was formally created around the summer and

680
Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p. 70.
681
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 134. Cheng was a senior member of the Clique,
and a trusted follower of both Li and Bai. In 1938, he worked for Bai in Wuhan.
682
Bai Chongxi, “Junshi kangzhan yu zhengzhi kangzhan”, pp. 26-7. According also to
Xie Hegeng, Confidential Secretary to Bai in 1937-39, Bai’s tactics were put forward in the
early part of 1938. For details of the promulgation of these tactics, see Chen Dunde,
Guigen, pp. 89-96. This argument is also based on the writer’s interview with Xie in
Beijing on 29 October 1992. According to these facts, it is obvious that Cheng’s account is
untrue. As a trusted follower of both Li and Bai, and a staff worked for Bai in 1938, Cheng
should not have made such a mistake in his memoirs. Of course, the real reasons for this
mistake are unknown.

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autumn of 1936.683 In the two decades from the end of the 1920s to the 1940s, Li and Yan
were both regarded as representatives of the regional factions within the GMD. They each
put forward an anti-Japanese plan at approximately the same time and called for immediate
resistance though they were distrusted by Jiang’s people who controlled the Central
Government. The appearance of Yan’s policy, coinciding with that of Li's, reflected the
many common interests they shared. Therefore, a brief comparison may help us to
understand the situation of the time and the roles they played in the promotion of resistance.
According to Yan himself, his idea was based on a resistance policy which did not
concern itself with success or failure in battles but with the “significance” of resistance
against foreign aggression. Resistance was the responsibility of the entire population and
should be continuous and without hesitation. In other words, faced with Japanese
aggression, China’s existence demanded resolution and determination and a willingness for
sacrifice regardless of gains or losses, but only in defending the present territory and even
though China’s available manpower and material forces were not equal to those of
Japan.684 Obviously, like Li’s scorched earth resistance, Yan’s position of defence and
resistance ultimately relied on the spirit of the Chinese people. It indicated that the Shanxi
Faction at least demanded defence of its own territory, a front of Japanese aggression from
North China.
Yan’s and Li’s ideas were similar in several aspects. First, both put forward the
need for immediate national mass mobilization to defend the country. In consideration of
its own interests, Shanxi was the more urgent in need of protection in 1936. In that year
Japan speeded up its step-by-step invasion of Suiyuan province, which was part of Yan’s
territory and a front facing the Japanese sponsored Manzhouguo. This aroused Yan to meet
the sudden threat by mobilizing the masses.685 Based on his idea for defence of sovereignty
and resistance against aggression, Yan directed General Fu Zuoyi, his subordinate and

683
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, Beijing: ZGZYDXCBS,
1991, p. 271; and Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949,
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 243 (hereafter as Warlord Yen
Hsi-shan).
684
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, p. 271.
685
Shanxi sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Yan Xishan tongzhi
Shanxi shishi, Taiyuan: SXRMCBS, 1981, p. 198.

242
Chairman of Suiyuan, to launch a campaign to drive the Japanese invaders out of the
province by the end of the same year.686
Secondly, both plans were the products of dissatisfaction with Jiang’s continued
appeasement of Japan, and both leaders attacked Jiang's policy of “domestic pacification
before an external war”. Faced with the combined attack of the Japanese and the Inner
Mongolian puppet army sponsored by Japan, Yan put forward the idea of “defence and
resistance” and to counterattack the opposition to defend his own territory - both Shanxi
and Suiyuan.687
Furthermore, both Li and Yan rejected the position that Japan could not be resisted
until China had time for sufficient preparation. Yan argued that this was to place the effect
before the cause. He emphasized that resistance was for defending the territory, for not
surrendering any more provinces, while building resources for an eventual offensive, and
warned that if Suiyuan under his control was lost to Japan, it would be a national
disgrace.688
Finally, both Li and Yan were mobilizing, organizing, educating and arming the
masses. The Clique used militia training as a motive force, while Yan organized the
Sacrifice League (Ximenghui) and other groups to conduct the war.689 It goes without
saying that Yan’s dissatisfaction with Jiang was a primary reason for him to organize his
own masses to resist aggression.690
However, there were some differences between Li and Yan. First, “defence and
resistance” was to a great extent a product of consolidation of Yan's own rule in both
Shanxi and Suiyuan. Yan was believed to have held a pro-Japanese attitude before the
1930s. He went to Japan for military education before the revolution of 1911. After he

686
For details of resistance war in Suiyuan under Yan’s sponsor, see Quanguo zhengxie
wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Fu Zuoyi shengping, pp. 160-205; and Yu Zidao,
“Suiyuan kangzhan shulun”, KRZZYJ, No. 4, 1993, pp. 129-48.
687
Shanxi sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Yan Xishan tongzhi
Shanxi shishi, p. 196; Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, pp. 273-4;
and Yu Zidao, “Suiyuan kangzhan shulun”, KRZZYJ, No. 4, 1993, pp. 129-46.
688
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, p. 274.
689
For details of Yan’s mobilization for war, see Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan,
pp. 228-56.
690
Jack Belden, China Shakes the World, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, p. 51.

243
was defeated by Jiang in 1930, he fled Shanxi into exile in Dalian, the port of Manchuria
which had been in the Japanese hands since 1905 when Japan defeated Russia and
occupied this port. Yan was well protected by the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed in
Manchuria. Under the arrangement of the Japanese he sneaked back to his base - Shanxi,
just before the outbreak of the “September 18 Incident”.691 Only when his existence in
Shanxi and Suiyuan was directly threatened under the Japanese attacks after 1935 did Yan
become increasingly antagonistic. According to Gillin, Japanese economic aggression
against China destroyed the local market for the textile and mining industries in Shanxi,
and caused Yan to realize that Japan menaced the well-being of his regime. The Japanese
occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and invasion of Chahar and Suiyuan after 1933 for the
avowed purpose of freeing Mongols there from the domination of the Chinese, the
engineering of North China “autonomy” from the central government in 1935, all
threatened Yan's dream of bringing all of northwestern China under his control.692
Rumours circulated to the effect that after taking Suiyuan the Japanese would attack Shanxi
and overthrow his rule.693 The Japanese undoubtedly wanted Shanxi as well as Inner
Mongolia for the rich natural resources in these areas.694 Yan was under considerable
popular pressure to resist Japan and he did not want to lose the support of his youthful
followers who were imbued with patriotic enthusiasm and anti-Japanese feeling.
Meanwhile, like the Guangxi Clique, Yan also competed with Jiang for regional power. By
driving the Communists from Jiangxi into the northwestern areas, particularly the Northern
Shaanxi, neighbour of Shanxi, Jiang undoubtedly hoped to establish his own authority in
Shanxi after 1935.695 Yan had good reason to appeal for the establishment of the national
united front and to turn to the Communists for assistance. He feared that Jiang was
preparing to sacrifice Shanxi and the rest of North China to appease Japan without a

691
Jiang Shunxing and Li Liangyu, Shanxi wang Yan Xishan, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS,
1989, pp. 110-1.
692
Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 210-4.
693
Ibid, p. 230.
694
Ibid, p. 214.
695
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, pp. 266-70; and Donald
Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, p. 228.

244
struggle.696 He also needed help from other groups throughout the country, even the
Communists, to defend Suiyuan and maybe Shanxi as well.697
However, the territory of Guangxi, in southwest China and bordering French
Indochina, did not come under the direct threat of Japan at that time. Although Jiang’s
attempts to eliminate all his domestic opponents confronted both the Clique and Yan so
that they took anti-Japanese resistance as a cause to struggle with the former, Li’s initiative
was far more driven by genuine patriotism than that of Yan. Both had different attitudes
towards internal and external affairs. Yan regained control of Shanxi in 1932 after
conciliating with Jiang. Around the need for power, Yan could oppose or support Jiang. In
the same way, he had been pro-Japanese at times and resisted the Japanese threat at
others.698 For Li and the Clique, their anti-Jiang stance was based on their perception of
what Chinese society and Chinese revolution should be, as stated in Chapter Four. As the
Clique had always considered itself as a more revolutionary force than Jiang, the crucial
difference from the latter was its more radical policy towards Japan.699
On the other hand, Yan’s “defence and resistance” idea was, according to himself,
limited to the scope of “zicun” (self-existence) and “zigu” (self-strength).700 In other
words, Yan’s activities were to be limited to fighting in the areas under his direct rule. In
contrast to Yan, the Clique’s philosophy was born out of concern not only for the region but
the dream of a united China, and up to the national level. This could perhaps explain why
Yan had held to his base in Shanxi during eight years of war against Japan, while both Li
and Bai led several hundred thousand Guangxi troops fighting in central China and left
Guangxi behind them even though their base was eventually twice invaded and ruined by
the Japanese. It was perhaps a reflection of Yan’s philosophy of everything for the
existence of his own status and his group’s interests, according to some Chinese

696
Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, p. 218, and p. 233.
697
Ibid, pp. 228-41.
698
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, p. 250.
699
See Li Zongren, “Xi’nan tongzhi yao fuqi jiuguo de zeren”, Li zongsiling, pp. 99-102;
and Guangxi yu Zhongguo geming, Nanning, 1936.
700
Quoted in Jiang Shunxing and Li Liangyu, Shanxi wang Yan Xishan, p. 146.

245
historians.701 That is why Yan rebuked the call of immediate resistance to regain China’s
lost territories as indulging in “irresponsible heroics” and warned that trying to regain
China’s lost territories before China was better prepared would be suicidal. In this way, it
is not difficult to understand what Yan declared at that time, i.e. “We must fight rather than
surrender more territory”, “but until we are stronger we cannot retake what already is
lost.”702 This was in contradiction with his stated intention of sacrificing all of his strength
and resources to resist Japan to the end.703 There is an indication here that Yan’s concern
and hesitation in launching the nationwide war of resistance were not dissimilar to Jiang’s.
In spite of all this, the ideas of both Li and Yan were the products of the interaction
of the internal dynamic forces impelling China forward and external forces stimulating her
to struggle for national salvation and independence. They mixed their interests in regional
affairs with those of the nation. Both had historical significance in urging the War of
Resistance. As regional forces, Li and Yan were already conscious of the inevitability of
both the national war for independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and the
national united front to dissolve all differences among all groups and parties for resistance
war. Both separately formed a united front with other groups including the Communists.704
These factions which appeared within the GMD finally compelled Jiang to meet the
national need for unity, particularly in spiritual unity, and for the common task of fighting
Japan.

Conclusion

The Clique’s blueprint for resisting Japanese invasion indicates its perception of the
continuity of the Chinese revolution. Given a systemized analysis of the internal and
external factors, the “jiaotu kangzhan” idea explained the necessity of and prospects for

701
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, p. 250.
702
Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, p. 243.
703
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, pp. 265-6.
704
For details of Yan’s cooperation with other parties and groups, particularly the CCP,
see Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 228-41; and for details of the Clique’s
practice in formation of a united front with other groups and parties in this year, see the
next chapter.

246
scorched earth resistance. Meanwhile, it also set out the strategy and tactics for a successful
outcome of the war for national liberation and independence. Under the circumstances of
intensifying Japanese aggression in North China and intensifying calls for a patriotic
resistance movement, the appearance of the scorched earth resistance policy met the needs
of China after 1935. After the “September 18 Incident”, the Guangxi leaders had begun to
organize for resistance. They instituted militia training, and began anti-Japanese
propaganda throughout Guangxi, integrating policies with adjoining provinces, rallying
support based on regional identity with the glorious history of the Pearl River Valley in
modern China and the Clique’s “sense of mission” in the Chinese revolution, as dealt with
in Chapter Four. The leadership and the rank and file of Guangxi were determined to resist
Japan.705 In the following years Li refined the strategy and tactics for scorched earth
resistance. At the same time the movement for national salvation and unity was growing
rapidly throughout China, especially after the “December 9 Movement”.706 Guangxi
naturally could not keep silent.707 Li Thus put forward the “jiaotu kangzhan” idea and
called for immediate total war against Japan. In so doing, this idea linked with the
“Guangxi Reconstruction Program”, and further pushed regional identity of the Guangxi
people to the level of national affairs, at least at a theoretical level. This idea was
undoubtedly premised on a theoretical foundation for fomenting an anti-Japanese
movement in Guangxi and mobilization of the masses to resist Japan. There is evidence
that Guangxi was the only province at the that time where anti-Japanese propaganda and
demonstrations could not only be freely engaged in but which were sponsored by the

705
For example, all periodicals in Guangxi of the 1930s freely published anti-Japanese
articles, such as JXXK, ZLYK, CJYK, and GXDXZK, and the anti-Japanese movement in
Guangxi were all sponsored by the government and army. The anti-Japanese feeling was
also very strong among the Guangxi people, particularly officers and soldiers. See, for
example, Qin Lianfang, “Yao butouxiang buqufu caineng jiuguo”, in Junshi xinwenshe
(ed.), Dangdai dangguo mingren yanjiang ji, diyi ji, Nanjing: Junshi xinwenshe, June 1935,
Vol. 1, pp. 73-7.
706
The movement is regarded as one that represented the awakening of Chinese
nationalism. The movement was launched by students and young intellectuals at Beiping
(Beijing) and soon spread to most of the important cities throughout the country. For
details of the “December 9 Movement”, see John Israel, Student Nationalism in China:
1927-1937, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, by Stanford University Press,
Stanford, California, 1966; and T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, pp. 110-53.
707
Huang Zongyan, “Zhanqian Guangxi de kangri jiuwang yundong”, Guangxi ribao,
7/11/1985; and Zheng Shaodong, “‘Yierjiu’ yundong zai Guangxi”, ibid, 9/12/1984.

247
authorities.708 In contrast to this, the anti-Japanese feeling and activities were suppressed in
the provinces under Jiang’s control, particularly after the “December 9 Movement”.709
Another motive force behind Li’s anti-Japanese policy was that he hoped to be considered
as the leader of the national revolution for fighting Japan and to replace Jiang, who believed
China incapable of effective war against Japan and insisted that national unity must be
achieved before resistance.710
The idea of a scorched earth resistance policy had a great impact on both Guangxi
policy and national politics. First, under that policy, the Clique insisted that “only
resistance could achieve domestic pacification”. This opposed Jiang’s policy of “domestic
pacification before an external war”. This provided a framework for the Clique’s
transformation of its “opposing Jiang and resisting Japan” policy into that of “forcing Jiang
to resist Japan” on the basis of joining forces to resist the invaders. Secondly, this idea was
linked with Guangxi reconstruction and mass mobilization to serve the Clique’s dual
character in both military and politics. Meanwhile, the idea of scorched earth resistance
elevated Chinese patriotism from the regional level to that of a national consciousness. It
also provided the new basis for the cohesion of the secret political organization within the
Clique, and for propaganda of Guangxi using the existing theory of the Pearl River Valley
Revolution which Li and the Clique put forward, as accounted earlier, in which the Clique
was presented as the main and heroic force in both the Nationalist Revolution and the
future war of resistance against Japan.
Furthermore, the active and immediate resistance policy was not merely lip service
on the part of the Clique, but was actually put into practice. It guided Guangxi’s anti-
Japanese movement in the events to come, on the one hand; and the Clique called for a
national united front for resistance and strove for unity and cooperation with all other
groups and parties, naturally including Jiang, because this idea provided the best reason for
reconciliation with him in forming the united front within the GMD before achieving the

708
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton: Press vs Truth”, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10
(July 1936), pp. 196-7; Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, Ibid, pp. 188-
90; and Xia Chao, “Shilun ‘liangguang shibian’”, JDSYJ, No. 3, 1986.
709
George E. Taylor, “The Powers and the Unity of China”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. IX, No.
4 (December 1936), p. 538; and T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, pp. 110-53.
710
JXXK, No. 17, pp. 7-10.

248
national united front, on the other. The implementation of the policy by the Clique is the
subject of the following chapters.

249
CHAPTER SEVEN

BACKGROUND TO THE “JUNE 1 MOVEMENT”

As Hallett Abend pointed out, the Guangxi Clique was genuine in its anti-Japanism
in the 1930s.711 Indeed, the Clique not only insisted on resistance, but also tried to put this
policy into practice throughout the country. The “June 1 Movement” (liuyi yundong) in
1936 was an example. This was the name given to Guangxi’s mass mobilization and
activities in resistance against Japan. This to a great extent compelled Jiang Jieshi to
abandon the implementation of his policy of annei rangwai within the GMD, and to instead
compromise with other factions, particularly the Southwest regional factions with the
Clique as head, in order to reach unity within the Nationalists, which was, however, a
temporary and superficial one at best. This result was a promise from Jiang to fight Japan.
In the end, the movement at least achieved an apparent unity within the GMD with the
common target of resistance. This achievement also provided the Nationalists with a
favourable condition for reconciliation with all other groups and parties throughout the
country, mainly with the Communists, leading to the formation of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front (AJNUF).
Unfortunately, western scholars of modern Chinese history usually neglect the
significance of the June 1 Movement and its impact at the time. It is surprising that Eugene
Levich has not discussed this important event even though his study especially focuses on
the Guangxi’s preparation for the Sino-Japanese War.712 On the other hand, although she

711
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943, p.
223.
712
For details see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931-1939,
Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993; Kui-kwong Shum, Chinese Communists’ Road to

250
has touched on the issue of the movement in her study of Guangxi, Diana Lary also regards
it to a great extent as an action in the Clique’s struggle for power with Jiang rather than as a
factor in the conflicting policies towards Japanese aggression. In the end, the movement
did not escape the fate of defeat by Jiang.713 In evaluating this, Lary goes too far to assume
that the Clique’s defeat in the movement marked the end of the Clique as a faction within
the GMD.714 Her interpretation of the movement fails to explain the interaction of the
Clique’s anti-Japanese practice and policy as we have discussed it earlier, and its important
role in and contributions to the Sino-Japanese War in the following years, as discussed by
such observers and scholars as Evans Carlson and Eugene Levich.715
In fact, these different evaluations and views of the June 1 Movement stem from
different understandings of the historical backgrounds at that time, even though all writers
have recognized the importance, either within the GMD or throughout the nation, of unity
and resistance. As we have seen, the most urgent task of China in the 1930s was to resist
Japanese aggression and to strive for Chinese national liberation, which indicated that the
policies of each party had to be based on the imperatives of resistance. The problem is that
both scholars and observers have not used same criteria when they discussed the June 1
Movement. Based on the prerequisite to resistance, the criteria in this case should be as
follows: 1) Whether its program and policy coincided with the needs of the time; 2)
Whether its practice was guided by its program and policy; and 3) Whether its result
benefited or harmed development of a national anti-Japanese movement. Using different
criteria, one would of course have a different view of the movement.
This chapter will mainly analyse the background of the June 1 Movement and the
factors which affected the Clique’s practice of “forcing Jiang to resist Japan”. In this
analysis, we will explain why the Clique launched the movement and why Li Zongren and

Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-1945, Hong Kong and London:
Oxford University Press, 1988; and Wu Tien-wei, The Si-an Incident: A Pivotal Point in
Modern Chinese History, Ann Arbor: Michigan University, 1976.
713
See Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-
1937, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, Chapter 7.
714
Ibid, p. 206.
715
Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency, New
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31; and Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, pp.
173-7.

251
Bai Chongxi persisted for three months until September when they reached a reconciliation
with Jiang to end their actions peacefully.

Origin of the “June 1 Movement” and Its Relations with the Japanese

The “June 1 Movement” was the wording used by the Clique. In a joint assembly
of the party, government and army held at Nanning on June 1, 1936, Bai, on behalf of Li
and the Clique, publicly declared that Guangxi, together with Guangdong, was initiating a
movement aimed at resisting Japan for national salvation (kangri jiuguo) from that day on.
The Guangxi troops were soon reorganized by both the Southwest Political Council of the
GMD and the Southwest Executive Committee of the Nationalist Government, i.e., the two
Southwest organizations (xi’nan liang jiguan) at Guangzhou, as the Nationalist
Revolutionary 4th Army Group of the kangri jiuguojun (the resisting Japan and national
salvation army). A couple of days later, the Guangxi troops, joining force with the
Guangdong troops which were renamed the Nationalist Revolutionary 1st Army Group of
the kangri jiuguojun under Chen Jitang, marched northward with the intention of fighting
Japan, according to the propaganda of the Southwest. Meanwhile, the Clique mobilized the
province politically, militarily and financially for the purpose its leaders had declared. The
movement continued for three months until September when the Guangxi leaders came to a
reconciliation with Jiang under certain conditions. They had succeeded in forcing Nanjing
to promise to start a war of resistance as soon as possible, and their action ended peacefully,
without a military clash between the two factions. The Clique named this movement by its
initial date, believing, from the top levels to the lower ranks, that this was the beginning of
effective resistance to Japan. According to Li, the movement referred to a crucial moment
in the national revolution and in anti-imperialism - Japanese imperialism, a purpose that the
Clique had pursued as the Guangxi Reconstruction Program stated.716 The June 1
Movement was a practice or a “dress rehearsal” for the Clique’s “scorched earth resistance”
policy.
However, in the view of some people outside Guangxi, the movement was called
“xi’nan shibian” (the Southwest Incident) or “liangguang shibian” (the Two Guangs

716
See Li Zongren, “Liuyi yundong yu Zhongguo minzu geming”, CYGL, Vol. 2, No. 8
(1937), p. 47.

252
Incident, or the Guangdong-Guangxi Incident), and “xi’nan yidong” (the Southwest
Rebellion) or “liangguang yidong” (the Two Guangs Rebellion, or the Guangdong-
Guangxi Rebellion). Speaking in the Chinese way, the different wording used to describe
the movement indicates a different view of its nature. Consequently, these different natures
result in different evaluations. On the one hand, the term “the Southwest rebellion”, or “the
two Guangs rebellion” at that time referred to a regional faction’s conflict with the main
faction in the central government for power and interests in both the region and the centre,
and a struggle against Jiang. In those views, particularly expressed by supporters of Jiang,
the Guangxi leaders, including Chen Jitang, sought to use the calls for resistance to conceal
their real aim of struggling for more power and the increase of self interests. This
movement was believed to be an action of the remnant warlords in an attempt to maintain
regional separation from the central government.717 On the other hand, as it occurred at a
time when the Japanese had speeded up their invasion and separated activities in both
North and South China, according to some “confidential documents” of Nanjing, the
actions of the two Guangs amounted to a regional separatist movement aimed at
maintaining selfish personal interests with the backing of the Japanese. The Clique was
suspected of collusion with Japan in order to separate the Southwest, i.e. Guangdong and
Guangxi provinces, from the titular control of the central government. There were
accusations that the movement harmed the nation in its collusion with Japan.718 Such a
critique provides a major source for many Chinese historians, both pro-Jiang and pro-
Communist, who wish to label the movement as a selfish action of the regional factions or
a case of collusion. This view had, in fact, spread throughout the country even at the
beginning of the movement, and, to a great extent, was directed by the mass media under

717
See GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24 (June 22, 1936); K. B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent
Canton Revolt and After, Canton: Mr K. B. Vaidya for National Publishers, Ltd., 1936, pp.
6-9, and pp. 41-5; Anonymous, Tezhong zhengzhi tongxun: Liangguang panluan neimu,
June 1936; and Anonymous, Dui xi’nan yidong xuanchuan yaodian: Dui liangguang
yidong zhi renshi, June 1936. The word “Confidential” appears on the cover of the latter
document. Both documents show neither publisher nor place. However, judged from the
contents of the documents, they seem to be compiled and published by the GMD
propaganda organizations under Chen Lifu, a powerful supporter of Jiang and a veteran of
the GMD, or by the Blue Shirts under General Dai Li, head of the secret police force in the
Nanjing Government.
718
See Anonymous, Tezhong zhengzhi tongxun: Liangguang panluan neimu; and
Anonymous, Dui xi’nan yidong xuanchuan yaodian: Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi.

253
the control of the Jiang regime.719 The Nanjing Government carried out a strict censorship
policy throughout the country even though some provinces were not under Jiang's direct
control. The Jiang regime controlled the national mass media and blocked information and
opinions favourable to the Clique from wide dissemination.720 As a result, the propaganda
of Nanjing under Chen Lifu, a powerful follower of Jiang and a GMD veteran, undoubtedly
had an impact on the national mass media. Under these circumstances, the people did not
fully know the real aims of the Clique, and to a great extent, had to accept the propaganda
of Nanjing, believing the movement had some regional separatist colour, at least.721 Such a
view has also been adopted by some historians.722
Another reason for the regional separatist image of the June 1 Movement was a
result of the defection of Guangdong generals to Jiang in July 1936 because of their
discontent with Chen Jitang. As participants of the movement, it is understandable that
these generals, headed by Yu Hanmou, had to seek some excuses for their action. The best
excuse was to echo the Jiang regime’s criticism and denunciation of the movement as a
subversion of the cause of China’s unification which Jiang had been pursuing for so many
years.723
However, it seems that the criticism was more propaganda than truth in the light of
presently available sources. The reasons are as follows.
A main point of censure of the Clique in the movement was its collusion with
Japan. However, this was based mainly on the sources and information provided by

719
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10, pp.
188-90; Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton”, ibid, pp. 196-7; and GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24
(June 22, 1936).
720
For example, Guangxi’s publications and periodicals were banned from distribution in
other provinces before 1936, as a Guangxi periodical stated. See CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 11
(August 1936), p. 76. I believe such a statement was to a great extent a real reflection of
the situation at that time, because I could rarely find these Guangxi periodicals in libraries
outside the province except in Guangdong, when I conducted my field work in preparation
for this thesis in China in 1992.
721
See, for example, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 23, No. 24, No. 25 and so on in 1936.
722
For example, Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong chubanshe, 1977,
p. 236.
723
See Zhu Zhensheng (ed.), Li Hanhun jiangjun riji, Hong Kong, Lianyi yinshua gongsi,
1975, pp. 7-12.

254
Japanese newspapers or agencies in China. These sources and information asserted that the
movement pretended resistance but in reality aimed to overthrow the Central Government,
after the Southwest acted in June 1936.724 At the same time, by exploiting the fact that the
movement occurred in the Southwest, the Japanese fomented and spread rumours, for
example, that they provided financial and military assistance to the Southwestern leaders
and were also directly involved in the activities carried out by the two Guangs.725 As a
result, such Japanese propaganda had a wide impact on the Chinese mass media. As
Guowen zhoubao (National News Weekly, or Guowen Weekly) pointed out, "the
atmosphere created by the Japanese caused simple and honest Chinese citizens to have an
absolute suspicion of the two Guangs’ matter."726 Reactions of western observers to the
movement were, to a great extent, affected by these sources and information as well, due to
the fact that their perception and knowledge of the movement were based largely on the
Japanese agencies. For example, according to Guowen zhoubao, a western writer named
“Sabotage” also shared the above Japanese view.727 Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell, Military
Attache of the U. S. Embassy in China in the 1930s, also reported that the “most prominent
reports (on the movement) are by the Domei Agency, which is Japanese controlled.”728
Therefore, these Japanese sources and information were able to create a bad image; an
example is that “more evidence is coming to light to show that the Kwangsi leaders have
received financial and military assistance from Japan.”729 Except for the above Japanese
sources, however, I have found no corroborative evidence to confirm the existence of
collusion between the Guangxi Clique and Japan.
It is important to ask why these claims of collusion were released only when the
June 1 Movement began. If such a movement was really a part of “clever Japanese

724
See “Yizhou jian dashi” (The Major Events of the Week), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p.
1.
725
For example, the “confidential documents” of Nanjing were also partly based on these
Japanese news reports. See Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, p. 13. Also see
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton”.
726
See “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 1.
727
“Foreign Views”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 1.
728
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9392 (June 5, 1936), p. 4.
729
Ibid, No. 9426 (June 13, 1936), p. 4.

255
conspiracies", as Jiang's followers claimed,730 why did the anti-Japanese propaganda and
policies as well as mass mobilization throughout the province win such great support from
the Guangxi people who “are proud of their province and believe that they are being led by
trained men under a new system, that the system is sound and big with promise for the
future”?731 As mentioned in the previous chapter, to achieve its end of conquering China, a
method frequently used by Japan was yihua miehua (use Chinese to eliminate Chinese).
Therefore, it is not surprising that Japan spread rumours to incite factions within the GMD
to struggle against each other in order to divert the attention of the Chinese people from
external aggression to internal strife. Meanwhile, some Japanese, particularly notorious
militarists, such as Doihara Kenji, had tried their best to associate suspicion of collusion
with Chinese who advocated resistance against Japan. The real aim of these Japanese
activities, according to a Japanese writer, was to create for these people a pro-Japanese
image in order to falsify their reputation.732 As the Japanese aim was so obvious, even the
above “confidential documents” of Nanjing in dealing with the movement had to express
their doubt on these Japanese sources.733 In a word, the Japanese sources and information
are highly suspect.
It is true that Guangxi purchased Japanese arms, a matter which was often referred
to as evidence of the Clique’s collusion with Japan. There were indications that the most
important purchase occurred when the Clique took over an order of airplanes which the
19th Route Army had sent to Japan. General Cai Tingkai, commander the 19th Route
Army in fighting against the Japanese in Shanghai in 1932, placed an order for Japanese
airplanes and arms in 1933 to prepare for a revolt against both Jiang and the Japanese
aggression against China. However, after paying a large deposit on this purchase there was

730
See, for example, Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, p. 12.
731
See Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, 7 January 1935,
printed by the author himself, p. 3. For details of anti-Japanese enthusiasm and positive
participation in the movement, see Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan (ed.), Liuyi yundong
jinian tekan, Guilin, June 1937. Western observers were also surprised by the morale of
the Guangxi people and their trust in the provincial authorities. For details of these
observations, see U. S. Military Intelligence Reports -China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5,
1936).
732
Yahara Kenkichi, Qianlu suibi, Hong Kong: Zhanggu yuekanshe, 1974, pp. 77-81.
733
See Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, p. 20.

256
no delivery of these goods, and his army was defeated by Jiang early in 1934. Although he
was in exile in Hong Kong, Cai still kept a close relationship with the Clique. A small unit
of the remnant of the 19th Route Army after 1934 was accepted by the Clique and
reorganized as a regiment of the Guangxi troops, but this unit received financial assistance
from Cai rather than the Guangxi authorities as it was still loyal to its former leader.734
Through the introduction of Cai and General Weng Zhaoyuan, a former Divisional
Commander (shizhang) of the 19th Route Army, Guangxi needed only to pay another one
third of the price to take delivery of these airplanes.735 Moreover, there is evidence that the
Clique bought heavy shipments of Japanese arms, particularly cannons and military
communication equipment.736 These facts indicated that Japan encouraged the Clique to
struggle against Jiang on the one hand and that the Clique played the “Japan card” in
Chinese political game on the other.737 However, in view of the fact that Jiang had, after
the Fujian rebellion in 1934, adopted a policy of encirclement of Guangdong and Guangxi
by placing Nanjing and Nanjing-controlled troops in the surrounding provinces of Guizhou,
Yunnan, Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian,738 it is not difficult to understand why the Clique
would purchase arms from the outside, and from any source, to defend and strengthen
Guangxi. By this means the Clique gained extra advantage for a small amount of money in
comparison with other armament purchases.739 It is understandable that Li and Bai would

734
Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1982, p. 443.
735
Feng Huang, “Wosuo zhidao xin Guixi goujie riben diguo zhuyi gaikuang”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 5 (1963), p. 49. Hereafter as “Gaikuang”. Also see U. S. Military
Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
736
Kan Zonghua, “Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang ‘liuyi’
shibian jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961), pp. 91-2; and Anonymous, Dui liangguang
yidong zhi renshi, pp. 3-13.
737
Hallett Abend has the same explanation for the Clique’s purchase of Japanese
armaments. See Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 197-8. The current evidence
indicates that the purchase of Japanese arms was made by both Guangxi’s and Japanese
business agencies in Hong Kong but not by the Guangxi authority and the Japanese
government. It seems that this deal in purchasing arms, to a certain extent, was unofficial
rather than official. Certainly, more evidence about this matter still needs to be unearthed.
See Kan Zonghua, “Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian
jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 91-2.
738
Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, Guiyang: Yugao shudian, 1946, p. 13.
739
Feng Huang, “Gaikuang”, pp. 49-50.

257
not miss this opportunity even though their action might compromise their chance for anti-
Japanese leadership and belief in their honesty.
Following delivery of these arms to Guangxi, some important Japanese officers,
such as Doihara Kenji, and a number of Japanese military instructors visited and came to
the province. This is not surprising. It was a common phenomenon for Japanese officers to
visit the central and regional authorities in China before the Sino-Japanese War. Through
these activities the Japanese hoped to put China into a state of continuing internal struggle
and division.740 Under these circumstances, all Chinese authorities from Nanjing to the
regions had to deal with the Japanese, however reluctantly. The key to the Clique’s contact
and deals with the Japanese is whether these involved military agreements between the
province and Japan and whether the Clique made any concessions to Japan when
purchasing its arms. If the answer is yes, then the actions of Guangxi could be denounced
as bringing harm to the nation. However, I have not found any corroborative evidence for
the claims of the Japanese sources. If the answer to the above questions is negative, why do
some writers still accept the claims of the Japanese sources as true? An answer probably is,
according to Liang Min-teh, “evidently the correspondent’s personal enthusiasm for the
generalissimo has overshadowed the interests (in acceptable evidence)”.741 In other words,
these pro-Jiang journalists created an atmosphere of support for Jiang and attacked his
opponents through the mass media or propaganda.
Such propaganda was at the same time assisted by “the strict censorship of Nanking
over all news sources other than (those of) the Japanese.”742 As a Western journalist stated:
Nanking has done its worse to make it appear that the Southwest is the paid agent of
Japan, and is starting a civil war at this time in order to make easier Japan’s
absorption of China.743
The censorship of Nanjing indeed had a great impact on the mass media. For example, in
regard to the death of Hu Hanmin, the spiritual leader of the Southwest, Guowen zhoubao,
a weekly with wide influence throughout the country and an organ of the Political Study

740
Hallett Abend describes a Japanese conspiracy in which the Japanese hoped to get
some leaders in Nanjing to sign an agreement favourable to Japan. This was an example of
such Japanese activities. See Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 212-5.
741
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton”, p. 197.
742
Ibid.
743
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, p. 223.

258
Faction (zhengxue xi) with the function of “little criticism but big help to the Nanjing
Government”, according to some sources,744 reported that the elimination of the
Communists was Hu’s deathbed call, but his other two calls were deliberately omitted by
this weekly and other newspapers and periodicals.745 In fact, according to his deathbed
calls, Hu put resistance against Japan (kangri) as the premier one - the most urgent task
facing the Chinese people at present, then the downfall of the politics of dictatorship (tuifan
ducai zhengzhi), i.e. Jiang’s rule, second, and the elimination of the Communist bandits
(suqing gongfei) as the third task. Hu also linked these three calls with Sun Yatsen’s
sanmin zhuyi (i.e. nationalism, democracy and the people’s livelihood).746 After Hu’s death
on May 12, the two Southwest organizations immediately reported his deathbed calls in full
to Nanjing by telegram. However, the newspapers and periodicals under Nanjing’s control
rarely made them known to the public.747 It is certain that the Jiang group did not allow
publication of them, because it knew how to prevent unfavourable news from appearing in
the newspapers and how to use the mass media to serve its own purpose.
Although present sources are not sufficient to prove the existence of a collusion
between the Clique and Japan, the question still remains: why did Li and Bai play such a
dangerous “Japan card” while they were loudly calling for nationwide resistance and
preparing for war against Japan? The following reasons might explain the actions of
Guangxi in purchasing Japanese arms and employing Japanese military instructors.
The Japanese instructors were mostly limited to the fields of teaching the operation
of cannons, military communications and airplanes.748 As Hu Shi pointed out after his

744
Da Xiao (pseud.), “Guanyu Jiang Jieshi lingdao xia de Guomindang zhu paixi de
ruogan kaocha”, Archives of the Nationalist Government, Nanjing, No. I1-118.
745
See “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 19 (18 May 1936), p. 2.
Other newspapers such as Zhongyang ribao (The Central Daily) also did not mention Hu’s
deathbed calls. For details of people’s comments and views on Hu’s death, See “Selected
Domestic and Overseas Opinions”, in Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (Chairman Hu Funeral
Committee) ed., Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, Guangzhou, May 1936, pp. 1-53.
746
See Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.
747
Chaoran Bao (Detachment Post), the organ of the National Socialist Party, criticized
the Nanjing Government's blockade of Hu’s deathbed calls. See “Appendices - The Public
Opinion Relating to the June 1 Movement”, Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (comp.), Liuyi
yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, Nanning, 1937, p. 261.
748
Feng Huang, “Gaikuang”, pp. 48-9.

259
visit to the Southwest in 1934, although Guangxi had achieved a successful reconstruction
in the province, several difficulties still existed which limited its achievements. Among
these was a lack of qualified technicians.749 In fact, the Clique employed not only the
Japanese experts. Several British and American as well as Canadian instructors had
accompanied an earlier shipment of airplanes purchased from Britain. The Clique
employed these Western instructors to teach its pilots in the province, and some of them
had even remained in Guangxi until the eve of the Sino-Japanese War.750 Interestingly,
another reason given for the employment of Japanese flying instructors, according to
General Feng Huang, Principal of the Guangxi Air Force Academy in the 1930s, was that
they were more skilled and experienced than most Western instructors.751 In 1992, when I
interviewed Feng, he told me that the employment of Japanese instructors was based on the
needs of the Clique for technicians at that time and these were not available in the
province.752 Bai Chongxi at that time also gave the same explanation as Feng.753 Such an

749
Hu Shi, “Nanyou zayi”, DLPL, No. 164 (1935).
750
Feng Huang, “Guangxi hangkong xuexiao gaikuang”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 35 (1992), p.
3; and the same author, “Guangxi hangkong xuexiao”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961), p. 78.
751
Feng Huang, “Gaikuang”, p. 51.
752
I think this statement reflects the real situation of Guangxi at that time, based on the
writer’s interview with Feng Huang, Nanning, Guangxi, October 1992. In comparison with
his earlier recollections (see Feng Huang, “Guangxi hangkong xuexiao”, GXWSZLXJ, No.
5 [1963]), Feng’s interview of 1992 and the previous wording contradict each other. Feng
claimed that the Clique’s employment of Japanese aviation instructors was a part of the
evidence for the Guangxi group’s collusion with the Japanese in his earlier recollection.
However, Feng’s wording of the employment of the Japanese Instructors in his recollection
is the by-product of the time, when, i.e. the 1950s and 1960s, all people in China
condemned the old society (jiu shehui), i.e. the Guomindang regime, for whatever the thing
the previous authorities did. Under these circumstances, those former senior GMD
politicians and militarists, both from the Central Government and the regional authorities,
willingly or reluctantly, vied with each other in condemning the former authorities as much
as they could in order to vindicate their innocence of the events in which they had
participated, regardless of the motive behind the facts they accounted for in the past.
However, the statements or judgements of these authors on those events are open to
scrutiny because, as many know, they had to do this to gain favour with the Communist
authorities. But, today the authorities of China and more and more scholars there have
begun to reevaluate the policies of regional factions, even the main group in the Nanjing
Government, and have put a higher value on the some important events such as the Fujian
Rebellion and the “Xi’an Incident”. Under these circumstances, these figures, who
participated in these events in the Guomindang era and are still alive, have also started to
revise previous incorrect recollections. When I interviewed Feng in 1992, he was over

260
explanation is reasonable and understandable, because it was becoming increasingly
necessary to employ relevant technicians when purchasing any advanced modern weapon
or piece of military equipment.754 Such employment was hardly evidence of collusion with
Japan, but indicated the technical deficiencies in Guangxi itself.
All activities of visitors to Guangxi in the 1930s were well controlled by the Clique.
A writer, who was a former subordinate of Wang Gongdu - Li Zongren’s adviser - recalls
that Guangxi’s secret police under Wang's command kept watch on all visitors, including
the Japanese.755 Even the Japanese flying instructors, according to Feng, were allowed to
stay only at Nanning and were not allowed to meet the British instructors in Liuzhou, the
base of the Guangxi air force.756 These facts indicate that the Clique was very careful when
they employed instructors from Japan - the assumed they were the enemy of the future.
This practice of employing Japanese instructors might reflect an opportunistic psychology
on the part of the Clique: it wanted to learn about Japanese weapons and technology on the
one hand and to promote combat effectiveness of the Guangxi troops on the other.757 It
seems to be typical pragmatism. Whatever their secret reasons, however, all these Japanese
instructors were dismissed and expelled from the province before the outbreak of the June 1
Movement.758 After that, no Japanese had been allowed to stay in or to enter Guangxi

ninety years old, and he no longer held emotive attitudes towards those activities in which
he participated in the old society. Therefore, I believe that Feng’s account of the June 1
Movement and other events in the interview is, in general, reliable.
753
Quoted in Feng Huang, “Gaikuang”, p. 51.
754
In his memoirs, T. G. Li also tells a story about two French officers, employed by the
Clique just after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (though they were soon recalled by
the French authorities), teaching the Guangxi troops how to use and maintain an anti-
aircraft heavy machine gun, because the Guangxi soldiers lacked modern industrial
knowledge. See T. G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic Memoirs, Lanham:
University Press of America, 1989, pp. 87-91.
755
Liang Boming, “Daonian Wang Gongdu, Xie Cangsheng xiansheng”, GXWX, No. 10
(1980), p. 44. Also see Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning:
GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 210.
756
Feng Huang, “Guangxi hangkong xuexiao”, p. 77.
757
The writer’s interview with Feng Huang, 1992.
758
Kan Zonghua, “Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang ‘liuyi’
shibian jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961); and Huang Xuchu, “Sheng zhengfu Huang
zhuxi jinggao Guangxi quansheng minzong shu”, CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12 (September 1936).

261
again.759 Further, the fact that Cai Tingkai and his followers joined the movement in
August had already quashed the rumours about Guangxi’s collusion with Japan, as Cai and
the former 19th Route Army had already been lauded by many people for their resistance
against Japan since 1932.760 Jiang’s followers must have known these facts, yet their
“confidential documents” in relating measures aimed to suppress the June 1 Movement,
which was really engineered by the Clique,761 were distributed secretly with a limited
circulation only. They instructed units and organizations loyal to Jiang to keep or file these
documents secretly or immediately destroy them after reading.762 These instructions
indicate that the so-called Guangxi’s collusion with Japan in the June 1 Movement as part
of a pro-Japanese conspiracy was, to a great extent, a propagandizing ploy of the Jiang
group in order to destroy the reputation of the Clique, rather than the truth.763 Hallett
Abend makes a fair comment, as follows:
It is true that Kwangsi used Japanese military advisers, and has purchased arms,
munitions and airplanes from Japan, some purchases probably being made under
liberal credits. But there can be no question of the genuineness of the anti-Japanese
spirit of both the leaders and the people of Canton and Kwangsi.764

Reasons for Launching the June 1 Movement

759
Zhujiang ribao, May 28, 1937, p. 2.
760
Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, p. 444; and Jin Ming, “Cai Tingkai ru-Gui de
yingxiang”, CYGL, Vol. 1, No. 5 (August 20, 1936), pp. 13-5. Cai and other former leaders
of the former 19th Route army formed a new organization entitled “Zhonghua minzu
geming tongmeng” (the Chinese National Revolutionary Coalition) in Hong Kong in 1935,
with resistance to Japan and the overthrow of Jiang as its aim. See Giu Guo Sh Bao (Au
Secours de la Patrie), January 4, 1936; and Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi
guogong hezuo jishi, Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 40-3.
761
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9408 (June 19, 1936).
762
For details of these instructions, see Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, and
Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi.
763
People at that time had already pointed out this aim pursued by the Jiang group. For
details of these discussions, see Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”; and
Liang Min-teh, “Nanjing vs Canton”.
764
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, p. 223.

262
 As part of the “scorched earth resistance” policy, the June 1 Movement was a
reaction against Jiang’s annei rangwai policy. The Guangxi leaders had insisted that only
resistance could ensure real unity in both the GMD and the entire country. However, they
also opposed Jiang himself, or to be more exact, his dictatorship over the country. As a
result, some Western sources believed that the movement was a result of Guangxi's
resentment against Jiang only.765 According to these, Li and Bai were both ambitious men
and in order to fulfil their ambitions to replace Jiang and to avenge themselves of the insult
levelled at them by the latter in 1929, both of them, particularly Bai, were depicted as still
plotting in the solitude and the exclusiveness of Guangxi about ways and means of teaching
Jiang a lesson.766 Relying on these sources, some historians have also stated that the
movement was motivated by a desire to oppose Jiang.767 It would be a great mistake,
however, to view this conflict purely and simply as a personal issue between the Jiang
group and the Southwestern leaders, including those of Guangxi, because this view could
not answer the following questions. Why had all statements and telegrams issued by the
two Southwest organizations called for resistance against Japan only, and appealed to Jiang
himself to lead the nation in fighting Japan at the same time? Why did such a movement
enjoy the support of all political parties and groups all over the country which advocated
putting aside all disputes among them instead of uniting them for immediate resistance?
Why had the Clique remained in its base in the province, and at its normal strength even
after Jiang had to accept its demands on internal and external matters in the end? To
answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the factors which acted on the
movement.
It is true that the Clique had had a bad relationship with Jiang from 1929. But its
resentment against Jiang was eventually focused on the latter's internal and external
policies, especially on his policy of non-resistance after 1931, which we have discussed in
the previous chapter. As we have seen, Jiang’s appeasement of Japanese aggression and
military suppression of his opposition at home after 1931 were the main reasons for the two
Southwest organizations existing in Guangzhou as powerful critics of his policy. Yang

765
See “Selected Domestic and Overseas Opinions”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 2; and K.
B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and After, pp. 6-9.
766
K. B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and After, p. 7.
767
Tang Degang, “Xi’an shibian liuyi shibian wushi zhounian”, ZJWX, Vol. 50, No. 2.

263
Tianshi, a Chinese historian, has stated that opposition to Jiang’s annei rangwai policy lay
behind the secret activities of Hu Hanmin who planned to overthrow Jiang, with the
assistance of the Clique.768 Many people believed Jiang’s “domestic pacification” was
directed against not only the Communists and other parties and groups but also the Clique,
although ostensibly it was a tactic of Jiang’s unification of China.769 A main aim of annei
rangwai, according to Ma Junwu, a GMD veteran and Chancellor of Guangxi University in
the 1930s, was to eliminate the influence of Guangxi and Guangdong, and then to make a
compromise with Japan.770 Such an opinion, although it was biased, was so widespread
that any action taken by Jiang in dealing with domestic affairs was suspected of being
motivated against the Clique and the Southwest.771 Indeed, Jiang's actions at that time were
open to suspicion. For this reason, in 1936 a writer criticized Jiang for ignoring Japanese
aggression in North China, while concentrating a large number of the Nanjing troops in
South China to suppress his opponents. That writer argued that,
Instead of unifying the North, Chiang Kai-shek chooses to unify the South; instead
of driving out the Japanese invaders from Hobei, Chahar, and the four Northeastern
provinces, he prefers to settle an account with General Chen Chitang in Kwangtung,
and General Pai Chung-hsi in Kwangsi; instead of sending an expeditionary force to
subdue the autonomous government in East Hobei under the open traitor Yin Ju-
keng, he has long since disposed large bodies of troops in Fukien, southern Kiangsi,
Kweichow, and Hunan Provinces to get ready to attack the Southwestern troops.772
Judging from the above, it is not difficult to understand why the Clique simultaneously
insisted on the policy of opposition to Jiang and resistance against Japan for a couple of
years after the “September 18 Incident”.

768
Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”, KRZZYJ,
No. 1, 1991, pp. 101-140.
769
For details of the suppression of parties and groups in opposition to Jiang, see Roger
Jeans, “Third Force: Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) and the National Socialist Party of
China, 1932-1937”, Republican China, Vol. XIX, Issue 1 (November 1993), pp. 113-45;
Qiu Qianmu, “Lun Zhongguo qingniandang de kangri jiuguo zhuzhang”, KRZZYJ, No. 4,
1992, pp. 35-50. Also see Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, p. 108.
770
Guangxi daxue zhoukan (Guangxi University Weekly), Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 26,
1932).
771
For example, many believed that the real aim of Jiang’s pursuit of, and attacks on the
Red Army westward was to wipe out his opposition in the Southwest. See Hu Yugao,
Gongfei xicuan ji, pp. 79-80, and pp. 108-110.
772
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton: Press vs Truth”, p. 196.

264
 But the Clique began eventually to change the above policy into that of forcing
Jiang or supporting him to resist Japan after 1935, as discussed in Chapter Six. In fact, this
change coincided with Jiang’s gesture to peacefully settle the differences between the two
parties. Two reasons led Jiang to extend the olive branch to the Clique, including Hu
Hanmin. On the one hand, Jiang had eventually consolidated his rule in Central China after
he had successfully driven out the Communists to the Northwest from its base in Jiangxi,
and he realized that he could no longer refuse the demand for resistance. Instead he slowly
adjusted policy towards Japan and secretly prepared for a war of resistance.773 According
to Huang Shaohong, faced with Japanese aggression, Jiang had started to have concerns for
opinions from other sides within the GMD. Of course, Jiang's attitude was based on the
condition that his leadership was widely recognized.774 This was the background to the
Second Plenum of the GMD’s 4th National Congress held at the end of 1934 with the
declared policy of peaceful unity within the party as the main principle which Nanjing
would pursue. At the same time, Japanese aggression in North China, and the so-called
“North China autonomy movement” engineered by the Japanese in order to separate this
territory from the control of Nanjing, further deepened the national crisis, and threatened
Jiang's rule. Under these circumstances, Jiang began to secretly contact both the CCP,775
and his opponents within the GMD, mainly Hu Hanmin and the Guangxi Clique, seeking to
solve the differences between them. This was why Hu headed overseas in the summer of
1935 to observe and consider Jiang’s sincerity in embracing unity with other groups and
factions.776
At the same time, General Long Yun, ruler of Yunnan province, tried to play the
role of intermediary between the Guangxi and Jiang, which I have discussed in Chapter

773
For discussion of Jiang’s preparation for resistance and readjustment of his policy
towards Japan, see Chen Qianping, “Shilun kangzhan qian Guomindang zhengfu de
guofang jianshe”, NJDXXB, No. 1, 1987; and Meng Guanghan (ed.), Kangzhan shiqi
guogong hezuo jishi, Vol. 2, pp. 810-866.
774
See “Huang Shaohong to Li Zongren and Others, August 31, 1936”, in Chongqing shi
dangan guan (ed.), “Liangguang liuyi shibian hou Jiang Jieshi yu Li Zongren deng laiwang
handian”, LSDA, No. 4, 1987, p. 76.
775
Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi guogong hezuo jishi, Vol. 2, pp. 695-
725, and pp. 810-34.
776
For details of Hu’s negotiations with Jiang for mutual cooperation in the anti-Japanese
issue, see Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”.

265
Five. Furthermore, there is evidence that the Clique tried on its own initiative to negotiate
with Jiang for mutual cooperation with the common aim of resistance, attempting to leave
all disputes aside in favour of a resistance policy for national salvation. This contact
between the two parties also had the backing of Huang Shaohong, the former second-in-
command of the Clique and now Chairman of the Provincial Government of Zhejiang.
Huang Xuchu, the third-in-command of the Clique and Chairman of the Provincial
Government (sheng zhuxi) of Guangxi, and General Ye Qi, Chief of General Staff (zong
canmouzhang) of the 4th Army Group, i.e. the Guangxi troops, were the key figures of the
Clique involved in negotiation with Jiang Jieshi in order to solve the disputes between the
two parties. In the summer of 1935, Ye flew to Chengdu, capital of Sichuan, and met
Jiang, who was then commanding the central army and the Sichuan army in pursuit of the
Red Army which was then undertaking its historic “long march”. Also, at this time, Huang
Shaohong visited his home province to discuss cooperation between the Clique and Jiang
with his former colleagues.777 Along with these contacts, Huang Xuchu was present in
November, during the GMD’s 5th National Congress, and negotiated with Jiang in
Nanjing. In the end they reached a draft agreement. The Clique would recognize Jiang’s
leadership in the nation and support him if he took the lead in resisting Japan and promoted
the positions of the Guangxi leaders in the central government, looking after their interests
in both the regions and the centre as well.778 It seemed that the two parties had reached the
point of joining forces to resist Japan through this agreement.
However, Jiang at that time failed to keep his promise to the Clique.779 Instead he
took measures to put pressure on the province by cutting off the opium route via Guangxi.
As a result, Guangxi lost its most important financial source. Moreover, Jiang concentrated
large numbers of Nanjing troops in Guangxi’s neighbouring provinces to threaten the
Clique’s existence. This was the motive force pushing the Clique to join forces with
Guangdong in launching the anti-Japanese movement in response. This proved to be a
powerful method of dealing with Jiang’s pressure on the Southwest. After his return to

777
See “The Major Events of the Weeks”, GWZB, Vol. 12, No. 35 (9/9/1935), p. 1.
778
For details of negotiation between the Clique and Jiang, see Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi
yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 126 (1/10/1962), pp. 13-16
(hereafter “Guangxi”); and Huang Shaohong, “Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi”,
WSZLXJ, No. 7. Also see GWZB, Vol. 12, No. 35 (9/9/1935).
779
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 126, p. 16.

266
China early in 1936, Hu Hanmin, also acting on behalf of the Clique, put forward a “plan to
save the nation” to Nanjing in order to deal with the escalating national crisis, but no reply
came from Jiang and Nanjing.780 The reason for Hu’s advocacy of immediate resistance
against Japan is that he (including the Clique) shared Jiang's ambition to control the whole
country at that time; but they differed in response to the national crisis faced China. This
was one of the reasons why Hu remained in Guangzhou after his return to China in 1936,
instead of keeping his promise to Nanjing to cooperate with Jiang. Unfortunately, Hu never
lived to experience the eventual reconciliation. His last words before his death, “things go
contrary to my wishes (shiyu yuanwei),”781 in fact, indicate a heartbreaking disappointment.
Hu’s disappointment reflected the further Japanese aggression in North and South
China, a national crisis for which Jiang had failed to take sufficient measures. In Chapter
Six, I have discussed the Japanese ambition to conquer China and its strategy of dividing
the Chinese nation, and subduing each region separately. Li Zongren’s impassioned
declaration of his famous “scorched earth resistance” came as the new national crisis forced
all Chinese to consider the way out for their country. Since 1935, the Japanese had
engineered the “autonomy movement”, not only in North China but also in other areas.
Under these circumstances, a traitorous regime - “East Hebei Autonomous Government”,
headed by Yin Rugeng and sponsored by the Japanese, was established late in 1935. North
China looked certain to lose a second piece of territory; Manzhouguo in northeast China, a
puppet government established after Japan completely occupied three provinces of this
area, had already appeared in 1932. Moreover, starting from 1936, the Japanese military
continuously massed troops in North China. By May, over twenty thousand Japanese
troops had been sent to this area and they frequently provoked the Chinese troops. There
were indications that North China was becoming a new Japanese colony.782
Meanwhile, Japanese smuggling in North China was more and more rampant.
These activities not only threatened China’s national economy and destroyed local

780
Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), Zhonghua minguo shi shiliao changbian,
Nanjing: The Nanjing University, 1993, Vol. 38, p. 316.
781
See Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu Xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.
782
See “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 20, p. 5; Giu Guo Sh Bao,
April 25, 1936; Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 194-211; and Quanguo zhengxie
wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui et al (eds.), Qiqi shibian - yuan Guomindang jiangling
kangzhan qinli ji, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1986.

267
commerce and industries but also hurt the interests of the Powers in this area.783 In just one
week from 4th to 10th May, for example, China lost taxes of over 1.8 million yuan
(Chinese dollars), as Japanese smuggled goods including large shipments of weapons
through East Hebei flooding Tianjin and other areas in the North.784 There are indications
that, from August 1, 1935 to May 10, 1936, China lost taxes amounting to 30 million
yuan.785 Japanese smuggling activities seriously harmed China’s national economy.
According to Hallett Abend,
Nanking’s customs houses at Tientsin and Shanhaikwan, which normally collected
about $40,000,000 a year, collected a little less than $8,000,000 during the first
twelve months that the flood of Japanese goods came through Yin Ju-keng’s
ports.786
While North China was under the threat of the enemy, South China was also in a
dangerous situation. Doihara Kenji, the most active and powerful head of Japanese military
intelligence in China, and other Japanese militarists, engineered not only the “Hua'nan
guo” (South China Nation) in Shantou, Guangdong, but also the “Fujian guo” (Fujian
Nation) in Xiamen (Amoy), Fujian.787 Encouraged by the success of their military and
economic activities in North China, the Japanese began smuggling on a grand scale from
Taiwan to South China. In one year, 1935-1936, legal imports of kerosene dropped from
1,852,000 cases to 310,000 cases. Legal sugar imports declined in the same period of time,
from 18,004,000 pounds to only 2,503,000 pounds. The price of sugar dropped from $22
to $15 a picul788 - a measure of 133 pounds. China's import duty on sugar at that time was
$14.50 per picul.789 The loss of customs from imported sugar alone indicates the harm

783
For details of impact of the Japanese smuggled goods on the markets of Western
Powers in North China, see Shenbao, May 11, 1936, p. 3.
784
See “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 20 (5/5/1936), pp. 3-5.
785
Ibid.
786
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 208.
787
Giu Guo Sh Bao, 25/4/1936. Also see Xia Chao, “Lun liuyi shibian”, JDSYJ, No. 3,
1986, p. 195.
788
Picul, a Chinese weight measure equal to about 60-64 kg (the maximum load a man
could carry).
789
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 210.

268
caused by Japanese smuggling in South China and this aroused strong anti-Japanese
feeling. As Liang Min-teh pointed out at that time,
Smuggling is just as widespread in the South as it is in the North. It alone is enough
to fan up anti-Japanese feeling among the traders. Just consider the sugar trade, for
example. Through Hobei and Shangtung the Japanese sugar smugglers are
dumping enormous quantities of cheap sugar into the entire Yangtze valley, and
have brought down the price to less than $14 silver per picul of 133 pounds. The
sugar from the Southwest on the Shanghai market had to drop its price within a few
months from $21 to $19 and then to what is considered its minimum profit basis of
$17 per picul. As it still cannot stand the competition of the Japanese, the factory
production in Kwangtung has to be cut down drastically, and shipping and banking
of this trade have to stop altogether. Kwangtung lost its general market in the
Northeast after the Japanese occupation in 1931; now it is losing its large market in
the Yangtze region. The Kwangtung merchants can scarcely be blamed, therefore,
for their high anti-Japanese feelings. They have no sympathy with a pro-Japanese
government under Chiang Kai-shek, but they are willing to support any government
which posts an anti-Japanese slogan.790
Moreover, in early 1936, the Japanese frequently provoked local authorities in
Shantou, Guangdong, and made lots of trouble in the entire area. Japanese warships were
also sent to the South China Sea with the excuse of protecting their people in South China.
These warships and the Japanese traders, legal and illegal alike, gathered military
intelligence in China everywhere they could. South China came under the direct threat of
the aggressive Japanese influence.791
Although Nanjing failed to take action in response to increasing Japanese military
and economic aggression, the new national crises after 1935 further aroused strong Chinese
response, urging a new and more large-scale movement of resistance.792 Even those people
from the higher levels of the Nanjing Government realized the inevitability of resistance.
For example, Song Ziwen (i.e. T. V. Soong), Minister of Finance in the Nanjing
Government, had already stated that, “it is a great mistake to try to negotiate with Japan
about anything”.793 Hu Hanmin and the Clique found much fertile ground for their pleas
for resistance and their claims to leadership. There are indications that Hu, after his return

790
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton: Press vs Truth”, p. 197.
791
See Zhu Zhengsheng (ed.), Li Hanhun jiangjun riji, Vol. 1, pp. 43-4.
792
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 210-1; and Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs
Canton”.
793
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, p. 215.

269
to Guangzhou, frequently convened secret meetings with Li Zongren, Chen Jitang and other
senior leaders of the two Southwest organizations in his house. People believed the
Southwestern leaders should have reached some political and military solutions to the
future of China and made some practical plans or policies that the people of the Southwest
could follow. Strangely, the exact plans are unknown,794 but there are indications that Hu
and the Clique still had the plan to launch a national resistance in opposition to Jiang's non-
resistance, and the June 1 Movement was to put the scorched earth resistance policy into
practice.
First, as stated earlier, Li’s “scorched earth resistance” policy called for immediate
resistance. Before publishing it, Li sent it to Hu Hanmin and discussed it with him. Hu
agreed with his views.795 Second, after his return to Guangzhou, Hu insisted on promoting
nationalist education and propaganda to meet the needs of resisting Japan and national
salvation.796 The purpose was to prepare public opinion for the coming war. Furthermore,
although he still insisted that jiaogong (suppression of the Communists) and tuifan ducai
(overthrow of dictatorship) were part of the policies which should guide the Southwest, or
even the whole country if possible, Hu believed, “it is better to come under the rule of the
Communists than to be eliminated by Japan.”797 This indicated his determination to resist
Japan and why he nominated the anti-Japanese war as the most urgent task. According to
correspondence from Guangzhou on 24 May, the Southwest had been preparing to launch a
national war against Japan before Hu’s death, and afterwards did not stop this action, but
speeded up preparations.798 The slogans and other propaganda of the Southwest after Hu’s
death were all directed towards this aim.799 Nanning Minguo Ribao (Nanning Republican

794
See Zhongguo dashi ji, compiled and published by Center for Chinese Research
Materials Association of Research Libraries, Washington, D. C., 1973, Vol. V, pp. 354-9.
795
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1979, p. 316. Li’s article was also published in Sanmin zhuyi yuekan, Vol.
7, No. 5 (May 15, 1936).
796
Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.
797
Giu Guo Sh Bao, March 20, 1936.
798
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.
799
For details see Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p.
14.

270
Daily), official organ of the Clique, became even more determined in its call for immediate
resistance just after Hu’s death.800 In fact, Li and Chen had already called and prepared for
a war against Japan early in 1936. According to Joseph Stilwell’s report, Chen and Li also
stated they, once the war broke out, would immediately put 70,000 and 50,000 troops,
respectively, into the field, though they finally failed to do so, as Jiang could not be moved
to go to war yet.801
There can be no doubt that the Clique was keen to put its policy of resistance into
practice. That is to say, the movement seemed to be the most positive response to the
further aggression and Japan’s smuggling activities in 1936 and disappointment at Jiang’s
failure to ward off the Japanese threats. Hallett Abend’s comments were very much to the
point:
The Southwest are sincere in their anti-Japanism and in their belief that if Chiang
Kai-shek continues in power China will be “given away to Japan, bit by bit”, while
General Chiang husbands his military and cash reserves to sustain his own domestic
position against domestic adversaries. The Southwest sincerely wants to reorganize
the Central Government, and then arouse the patriotism of the Chinese people in
order to make an effort to regain North China and Manchuria.802
Therefore, the Southwest would not wait any longer, but decided to take action in
opposition to Jiang’s impotence in dealing with the Japanese. After they had dealt with
Hu’s funeral, the two Southwest organizations telegraphed to Nanjing its intention of
moving its troops to North China against Japan, and both Guangdong and Guangxi were
soon mobilized, which began the June 1 Movement.
Jiang's decision to settle his differences with the Southwest by force also spurred
the two Guangs into launching the movement. It is possible that Jiang had adopted three
principles in dealing with the two Guangs' semi-independence from Nanjing about May
1936. According to Li’s memoirs, these were as follows: 1) The thorough elimination of
the power of Li and Bai in Guangxi, with the central government helping Guangdong in
their use of troops for the purpose; 2) The expulsion from Guangdong of anti-Jiang
veterans such as Xiao Focheng; and 3) The maintenance of the status quo in Guangdong.803

800
Nanning minguo ribao, 13 May 1936.
801
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).
802
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 223.
803
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 303.

271
These principles indicated that Jiang would attempt to wipe out the Clique as a top priority.
However, if Guangxi was defeated by Jiang, Guangdong could not maintain its position.
Both Chen and Li of course knew it was Jiang’s tactic of “killing two birds with one stone”
(yishi erniao) in order to split the powerful Guangdong-Guangxi alliance, a force ever
threatening to Jiang's rule over China. In their own positions and interests, Guangdong and
Guangxi had to take measures in response to Jiang’s principles; and the best justification
for taking such measures was of course that which would be accepted by many Chinese,
that of fighting Japan. The death of Hu Hanmin provided Jiang with an opportunity to
speed up his settlement of the two Guangs matter. Soon after Jiang had sent five senior
members of Nanjing to Guangzhou to pay a condolence call after Hu's death in mid-May,
rumours about Jiang’s more concrete intentions of eliminating the two Southwest
organizations spread throughout the country. According to some sources, these principles
included:
1) The abolition of the Southwest Executive Committee of the Nationalist
Government and the Southwest Political Council of the GMD;
2) Reorganization of the Guangdong provincial government;
3) Retirement of all senior leaders of the two Southwest organizations and
reappointment of their positions by Nanjing;
4) The change of Chen Jitang's position from Commander-in-Chief of the 1st
Army Group to Field Commander of the 4th Route Army (Guangdong
troops), and the reappointment of all commanders of this army by Nanjing;
and
5) The unification of Guangdong currency into the central system.804
If these principles really existed and were carried out, Chen would no longer be able
to maintain his power in Guangdong. But Jiang, in a speech on June 8, 1936, denied the
existence of such principles.805 I also have not found corroborative evidence to prove their
existence. However, Jiang often used the tactic of allying himself with nearby forces to use
them in subduing opposition in an area, and he had already concentrated large numbers of
troops to encircle the two Guangs. It was not unreasonable to assume that Jiang would
carry out these policies to eliminate the Clique, his largest opponent within the GMD.806

804
Cheng Siyuan, “Liangguang shibian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 22, pp. 47-56; Liu Fei,
“Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian”, WSZLXJ, No. 3; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),
Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou: Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, p. 373.
805
See Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, p. 30.
806
Some sources show that senior leaders of Nanjing, such as Ju Zheng, Sun Ke and Li
Wenfan, did take advantage of Hu’s funeral ceremony in Guangzhou to discuss the issue of

272
The same tactics had served him well in 1929, during the Wuhan Incident (dealt with in
Chapter Two) when Jiang successfully eliminated the influence of the Clique in Central
China for almost a decade.

The Motive Force Behind the Launching of the June 1 Movement

It was also understandable that the Clique and Chen Jitang would launch their anti-
Japanese movement as a counter measure. First, in so doing, the two Guangs could not
only be maintained as a powerful political force within the GMD as usual but could also
win a commanding reputation in the anti-Japanese movement.807 The Clique expected the
War of Resistance to be most effective in North China and the Yangzi valley and these
areas were far from their home base. The earlier resistance began, the more likely it would
be that the enemy would not be able to reach provinces like Guangxi. Also, success in the
North would bring prestige and a much better chance of returning to the central government
control of or a share in the leadership of resistance to Japan; it would also reinforce its rule
of the whole country.808
Second, the successful launching of resistance would efficiently frustrate Jiang's
plan of eliminating the two Guangs, and if Jiang refused to take the lead in fighting Japan,
it would provide them with a good reason to argue for his replacement. It is self-evident
that ideally they wished to replace Jiang and to assume leadership of the country in resisting
Japan through the movement.809 This might be an important motive force behind the

“unity” between Nanjing and the Southwest (i.e. the two Guangs), but the details of the
negotiations and the results are unknown. See Zhongguo dashi ji, Vol. V, p. 374. Other
evidence is the recollection of Jiang’s intelligence officer who was in Guangzhou at that
time. In this recollection, the writer acknowledges Jiang’s ambitious plan to eliminate the
Southwest and his mission in Guangdong was to coincide with Jiang’s purpose in the
Southwest. See Shi Xin (pseud.), “Liangguang shibian qianhou de huiyi zhiyi”, CQ, No.
172 (1/9/1964), p. 14.
807
Liu Fei, “Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian”.
808
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).
809
In fact, in the first half of 1936, Chuanjin yuekan and Nanning Minguo Ribao, official
organs of the Clique, frequently advocated a war of resistance and urged Li and Bai to lead
resistance if Jiang failed to do so. See Chuanjin yuekan, Vol. 3, No. 8 (May 1936) and No.
9 (June 1936); and Nanning Minguo Ribao, April 26, 1936, p. 2.

273
movement. In fact, Joseph Stilwell had already sensed this earlier in 1936. In a
confidential report, he pointed out that the Southwest believed Jiang did not want to go to
war with Japan because of his desire to maintain his own supremacy in China; as this
American officer saw it, war meant the certain downfall of Jiang at the hands either of the
Southwest and Japan. For this reason, Joseph Stilwell believed that:
Chen and Li, once in the lower Yangtze, and in superior military force might very
well issue an impassioned plea to the nation to rally and save that great region under
Canton auspices. In case of the success of such a plea the supreme national power
would fall like a ripe plum into the laps of Chen and Li, who would be not loath to
receive it.810
Finally, it was the most propitious time and the most convincing reason for the
Clique and Chen Jitang to take action by carrying out Hu’s rhetorical unfinished tasks on
the one hand and promoting their reputation as the logical replacements for Jiang on the
other. These based their decision on their judgement of the growing anti-Japanese
sentiment around the country. According to their judgement, the year 1936 was a critical
time in which the world war could well break out (for reasons discussed earlier). It also
was the year of resisting Japan for national salvation as well.811 Once they initiated the
war, they believed that the whole country would rally to their call for resistance; if Jiang did
not respond to the wishes of the people, his prestige would collapse.812 Launching such a
movement had in fact been well planned by the Southwestern leaders before and after Hu’s
death, and they had widely contacted other minority parties and groups and discussed the
possibility of war against Japan. The suggestion of General Chen Mingshu, former leader
of the Fujian Rebellion, in a telegram to Zou Lu, a GMD veteran and a senior leader of the
Southwest, on May 21, is an example of the major responses. Chen said,
What the Southwestern leaders can do at present is to unite together and insist on a
total struggle of resistance against Japan, and to establish a certain scale of anti-
Japanese unity in the Southwest, as well as to strike relentless blows at the Japanese
pirates’ aggression. In so doing, once the Southwest is rising to the call for fighting
Japan, the whole country will give a positive response. At present the feeling that
the national people bitterly hate the Japanese pirates has already become white-hot.
Such a will held by the 400 million people must become a powerful backup force of
yours. Thus these people who fawn on foreign powers and beg to preserve their
own wealth and rank will destroy themselves before the angry people if they do not

810
U. S. Intelligence Military Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).
811
Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936.
812
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 305.

274
 follow you and participate in the war against Japan. This is not only the best self-
defensive way of the Southwest but also that of the whole nation.813
In short, the interaction of these internal motive forces and the external factors
favourable to the Southwest pushed the Guangxi leaders, also including Chen Jitang, to
launch the June 1 Movement in 1936.

Conclusion

It can be seen from the foregoing analysis that the June 1 Movement was a natural
continuation of the Guangxi Clique’s scorched earth resistance policy and its practice. The
allegations of collusion with Japan came mostly from the propaganda of Nanjing, using
Japanese sources with scant facts. Although there is evidence to indicate that the Clique
had some contacts with Japan in order to purchase arms and that these contacts indeed
aroused suspicions among many people, there is no corroborative evidence to show that the
Clique was in collusion with Japan when the movement was launched. In addition to
protection of their own territory and countering military pressure from Jiang, the real
motive force was the need for nation-wide resistance, because the Southwest had already
realized, as a newspaper said, that this was the year of national salvation for the Chinese
people.814 They also realized that such a movement could coincide with the anti-Japanese
positions of many, and gain wide support from the Chinese people,815 including some
Nationalist leaders such as Feng Yuxiang.816 The call for immediately launching a war of
resistance even had its echo in the Nanjing government. For example, after the Japanese
had forced China to sign an agreement on demands in North China late in 1935, Song
Ziwen (T. V. Soong) declared heatedly:

813
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 20, 1936.
814
She Lun (Editorial), “1936 - Kangri jiuguo nian”, Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936, p.
1.
815
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 127
(October 16, 1962), p. 17; and also see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9, p. 12.
816
Giu Guo Sh Bao, May 20, 1936.

275
 This is a time for fighting. If we do not resist now, our chance may be lost for good
and all. Even a defeat, after all, is something. It is better to fight and to lose, than
to give up everything without a struggle.817
When Nanjing withdrew 140,000 troops of the Central Army, and later another 40,000
more troops, from North China at the end of the same year, T. V. Soong said further, “it
would have meant thousands of people killed, but even street fighting is better than not
fighting at all."818 It indicates that the call for immediate military resistance brought wide
and favourable reactions from many groups, even including some in the Nanjing
Government. According to Western sources, the Guangxi leaders were also backed by a
clique at Nanjing. In other words, their anti-Japanese action was echoed by some leaders of
Nanjing.819 As Hansu Chan pointed out, launching a movement for resistance against
Japan had already become “a matter of life and death for the Chinese nation.”820
There is enough evidence to show the existence of personal ambitions as one
motive behind the movement and opposition to Jiang, but the prerequisite to anti-Jiang
activity was opposition to his non-resistance policy. That is to say, the purpose of the
movement was to urge Jiang to lead a nationwide resistance. Only when Jiang still refused
the appeal for this leadership, and even responded by military threats against both Guangxi
and Guangdong, did the Southwestern leaders act by instigating the June 1 Movement. In
such a way, the Southwestern leaders combined the national interest and personal
ambitions.
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the June 1 Movement met the needs of the time.
As James Bertram, a British correspondent in China in the 1930s, pointed out after the
movement,
The motives behind this movement were somewhat suspect, but it is noteworthy
that it could command mass support only on a programme of more active resistance
to the inroads of Japan.821

817
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, p. 215.
818
Ibid.
819
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9499 (December 10,
1936). Also see Giu Guo Sh Bao, May 20, 1936.
820
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, p. 188.
821
James Bertram, First Act in China: The Story of the Sian Mutiny, New York: Viking
Press, 1938, p. xiv.

276
 Statements and telegrams from the Southwest during the movement indicate also
that all actions were, indeed, designed to urge Jiang to wage an immediate resistance, even
though we can accept that there were suspect motives behind it. Just based on these, some
writers believe that the movement was both anti-Jiang and resisting Japan.822 This is
correct because it basically reflects the complicated motives behind the movement.
However, those writers still use a static and undynamic view to examine the movement,
including its development and resolution, thus, neglecting the factors and circumstances
affecting the Clique’s policies and practice in the movement. In fact, these factors and
circumstances interacted with the Clique’s policy and impelled the Guangxi leaders to
readjust their purposes to coincide with the demands of the time. These will be the main
subject of the next chapter.

822
For details of relevant studies, see Cao Yuwen, “Lun kangzhan qianxi xin Guixi de
‘qiqiang zhengzhi’”, XSLT, No. 1, 1991, pp. 100-5; Xia Chao, “Shilun ‘liangguang
shibian’”, JDSYJ, No. 3, 1986, pp. 194-215; Guo Xiaohe and Luo Jianing, “‘Liangguang
shibian’ qianhou xin Guixi zhengzhi taidu de bianhua”, GXDXXB, No. 1, 1985, pp. 90-4;
Li Jingzhi, “‘Liangguang shibian’ de xingzhi chutan”, LSDA, No. 1, 1986, pp. 100-4;
Zhang Guangchuan, “‘Liangguang shibian’ xinyi”, Zhengming (Discussion), No. 2, 1991,
pp. 36-9; and Zhang Meiling, “Li Zongren bi Jiang kangri de lishi diwei yingyu chongfen
kending”, Tansuo, No. 4, 1987, pp. 31-6.

277
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE JUNE 1 MOVEMENT: COMPELLING JIANG TO RESIST JAPAN AND

THE CLIQUE’S ROLE IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

The previous chapter discussed the background to the launching of the anti-
Japanese movement, with its supposedly suspect motives, by the Guangxi Clique and the
Southwestern leaders. This chapter will analyze how the Clique put the “forcing Jiang to
resist Japan” policy into practice and examine the measures carried out by Jiang when
dealing with the June 1 Movement, its development and result. The issues of how the two
parties reached reconciliation and to what extent the Clique contributed to the AJNUF will
also be dealt with. Through the analysis of these issues, I will argue that the June 1
Movement was a test in the formation of the AJNUF and an important factor in the
reconciliation between the Clique and Jiang. I will also discuss the significance of the
movement for the important events which followed, in particular, the “Xi’an Incident”,
which took place three months later.

“Forcing Jiang to Resist Japan”

The June 1 Movement lasted three months until early September 1936. it can be
divided into two phases: the first from June 1 to July 18, in which Guangdong and Guangxi
were the main force, and the later phase when Guangxi proceeded its own. Guangxi was
the only participant of the June 1 Movement from beginning to end.
In the first phase, with Guangzhou as its centre and the Guangdong-Guangxi
alliance its main pillar, the activities of the movement included the military measures taken
by the Clique and Chen Jitang and the constant political pressure on Nanjing urging it to
declare war immediately against Japan, and, in response, Jiang’s various tactics to counter

278
this movement. In other words, the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy was carried out by a
combination of propaganda campaigns and military pressures. Along with the developing
and changing situation with the two Guangs, the movement eventually fixed on constant
appeals to Nanjing to promise to take the lead in national resistance on the lines that the
Southwest had propagandized. Of course, the real sponsors of the movement, according to
Joseph Stilwell, were Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi.823 For this reason, the discussion of the
main activities is focussed on the Clique.
The Southwest Political Council of the GMD and the Southwest Executive
Committee of the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou issued a circular telegram on May
26, only one day after the funeral of Hu Hanmin, urging Nanjing to protect the country
against the increase in the number of the Japanese troops in North China.824 According to
Liu Fei, Bai’s aide at that time, it aimed to express the Southwest’s anti-Japanese attitude
and determination to sway public opinion. Through openly publishing this telegram they
expected to attract people's sympathy for their stand and to arouse patriotic feelings against
Japanese aggression, on the one hand, and to incite people's discontent with Nanjing for its
impotence and non-resistance in its failure to deal with the further Japanese aggression in
both North and South China after 1935, on the other. Meanwhile, issuing such a circular
telegram was also an exploratory action of the Southwest in its preparation to implement
the forcing Jiang to resist Japan policy.825 Thus, this event seemed to be a prelude to the
official launching of the June 1 Movement.
On June 1, the Southwest Political Council and the Southwest Executive
Committee held an official meeting and moved to submit a petition to the Nanjing
Government and central party headquarters of the GMD calling on the Nationalist
Government to take the lead in resisting Japan. The petition stated that China was facing a
moment when the country's fate hung in the balance as Japan speeded up its aggression in
not only North but also South China. It emphasized that only resistance could ensure the

823
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9408 (June 19, 1936).
Hereafter as U. S. Military.
824
For details of the increase in Japanese military forces in North China in the first half of
1936, see “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 25, 1936), p. 5;
and SMZYYK, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (August 31, 1936), pp. 33-54.
825
Liu Fei, “Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian’, GXWSZL, No. 29 (1990), pp. 290-291 (hereafter
as “Liangguang”).

279
survival of the country, and that the nation had no way out except for the whole country to
rise together with force and spirit to fight a last-ditch battle against the enemy. In the
petition they pledged full support if Nanjing would resist with armed forces. The
concluding paragraph of the message, which was strongly worded throughout, stated that
“feeding the enemy with territory is like feeding fire with firewood and is national suicide.
We insist that not one more inch of Chinese territory be alienated.”826 Perhaps seeking to
exploit the occasion as propaganda, the two Guangs issued another circular telegram to the
entire nation, publishing the contents of the petition in full on June 2. In the telegram they
asked the Central Government to permit them to march northward to fight Japan and
recover the lost territories. The telegram also expected all parties and groups throughout
the nation to press Nanjing to pass a resolution to fight Japan.827 Two days later, scores of
army generals in the provinces of the two Guangs led by Chen Jitang and Li Zongren issued
another circular telegram of support for the earlier resolution of the Southwestern
authorities calling for resistance against Japan and pledging to lead their men “to avenge
the age-old humiliation of the country and strive to ensure the continued existence of the
nation.”828 This telegram was the manifesto of the Southwest, and it reflected their
consciousness of striving for national independence and liberation. Of course, it was a very
good platform from which the Southwest could launch the movement. Whatever the
motive, the message reflected a strong anti-Japanese feeling. As Bai emphasized on June 5,
they “would rather die free men than live as slaves under Japanese domination.”829
Meanwhile, as the advocate of “scorched earth resistance”, Li also called on military

826
U. S. Military, No. 9392 (June 5, 1936); and Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo lianhehui
(ed.), Guangxi kangri jiuguo zhongyao wendian huiji, Nanning, 1936, p. 103 (hereafter as
Huiji).
827
For details of the telegram, see Nanning minguo ribao, June 3, 1936. Also see Liu
Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 291; Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue
chubanshe, 1987, p. 88, and the same author, “Liangguang shibian”, GXWSZL, No. 22
(1985), pp. 48-9; Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe
yishu”, CQ, No. 127 (16/10/1962), p. 17 (hereafter as “Guangxi”); Te-kong Tong and Li
Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp.
307-8; and Huiji, pp. 102-4.
828
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 307-8; and Huiji,
pp. 49-50, and p. 104.
829
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10, p.
188.

280
leaders throughout the country to “shed their blood in the cause of anti-Japanese
salvation.”830 Soon the two Southwestern organizations accepted the request of these army
generals and reorganized the troops of the two Guangs as “kangri jiuguojun”, marching
northward under the flag of fighting Japan.831 The “bi-Jiang kangri” policy was in action.
These events marked the beginning of the June 1 Movement. The two provinces,
particularly Guangxi, carried out a general mobilization to meet the needs of anti-Japanese
activity. Thus, Guangxi, together with Guangdong, politically and militarily completed
preparation for “bi-Jiang kangri’.
At the same time, the Clique publicised in the province that the movement was a
patriotic action with the sole aim of fighting Japan. This policy was widely propagated by
the provincial authorities not only in the mass media but also to the people through its
militia system. The entire province of Guangxi was mobilized under the anti-Japanese flag.
Militia and army were reorganized. Various anti-Japanese mass organizations, such as, the
National Salvation Association of Guangxi Cultural Circles (Guangxi wenhuajie jiuguohui)
and the National Salvation Association of Guangxi Workers (Guangxi gongren jiuguohui),
were established throughout the province. Women, students, and workers, all joined the
movement.832 Students of tertiary and middle schools were more radical than others, but
their patriotic enthusiasm was well used and guided by the Clique. As a result, they were
organized as the Guangxi Student Army Corp.833 They were soon divided into many small
propaganda units and then sent to the countryside in order to mobilize the peasants and
other masses for the patriotic cause of fighting Japan and saving the nation.834 It seemed
that a tide of anti-Japanese movement promoted and sponsored by the Clique had already
appeared in Guangxi.

830
Ibid.
831
Huiji, p. 104.
832
For details of these mobilizations, see Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan zizhihui (ed.),
Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, Guilin, 1937; and Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993, chapters 4, 8,
and 14.
833
Shenbao, June 29, 1936, p. 3.
834
Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan zizhihui (ed.), Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, pp. 14-7,
50-6.

281
 In fact, the Southwest had already mobilized in both military preparation and
propaganda before June, even before the death of Hu Hanmin. Utilizing the alleged
menace of imminent Japanese invasion to impress the people with their patriotic
obligations, the authorities had enlisted the service of the newly organized National
Propaganda Commission to spread the doctrine of national defence and were enlisting
popular cooperation by various means for starting a war against Japan.835 This was a
response to the rising tide of national unity for resisting Japan since the end of 1935, which
many parties and groups had called for.836 Further evidence might also explain the
apparently spontaneous action in the two Guangs. In May, a special Guangdong
Commission made a tour of inspection in Guangxi, one of its main objects being to study
the provincial military system, particularly that of the militia.837 These might also be
considered as coincidental actions of the two provinces in preparation of mass mobilization
for action under the slogan of resistance.
To add fuel to the flame of the movement and to provide it with a just cause for the
action, the Guangxi leaders also frequently emphasized that their aim coincided with the
call of the Southwestern authorities. For example, when the Guangxi troops were on the
way northward, Li and Bai both repeatedly reiterated, through a series of orders and public
notices, that the movement was only for resisting Japan and national salvation, not for
opposing any individuals.838 For example, Bai clearly announced in his official declaration
at the launching of the movement and mass mobilization on June 1:
When the entire nation has already reached the point of extinction, all existing
personal feelings of the past, gratitude or resentment between different groups and
parties, should be put-aside. From now on Chinese should not fight each other
anymore. Instead we Chinese should reunite and fight Japanese imperialism,
standing on one front.839

835
U. S. Military, No. 9369 (22/5/1936); Giu Guo Sh Bao, 25/6/1936; and Hu zhuxi
zhisang weiyuanhui ed., Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, Guangzhou, 1936 (hereafter Hu
xiansheng).
836
Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936.
837
U. S. Military, No. 9369 (22/5/1936), p. 3. Also see “Guangxi of the Month”, CJYK,
Vol. 3, No. 9 (1936), p. 12.
838
Huiji, p. 61.
839
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiuguo”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, Hong
Kong: Zhujiang ribaoshe, 1937, p. 58.

282
 Indeed, these proclamations stated clearly that the Guangxi authorities were
building up a strong momentum which opposed civil war and regarded resistance as the
sole aim of the projected northern expedition. Obviously, it aimed, through mass
mobilization and wide propaganda, to put pressure on Jiang and Nanjing to make a
resolution for war against Japan.840 In so doing they renounced or concealed their personal
ambitions, if these really existed, which lay behind this movement from its inception. The
demands of national affairs came first, and they openly linked their ambitions with struggle
for national salvation. The CCP followed the same tactics at this time, or at least it seemed
to be so on the surface, possibly because they recognised that the tide of the time favoured
any groups and parties taking action against Japanese aggression; but certainly their
influence added to the anti-Japanese tide, regardless of what their motives were.841 As Bai
stated, the Guangxi group had issued many manifestos and petitions to Nanjing calling for a
war of resistance since 1931, now they found themselves no longer able to tolerate
Japanese aggression. Therefore, it was the time to put their anti-Japanese policy into
action, instead of enduring Nanjing’s continuing impotence.842
The Guangxi troops publicly declared their aim to the public in order to win popular
support. They strongly believed their action was for universal principles of nature and
society (gongli), and justice (zhengyi), for existence (shengcun) and self-defence (ziwei),
and for national conscience (liangxin) and moral personality (renge). This reflected a belief
that, as the Clique repeatedly emphasized, the people of the Pearl River valley should
shoulder more responsibility in fighting Japan.843 For this reason, they clearly declared
their aims as follows:
1) We insist that the national government immediately break off all relations
with Japan, and abolish all humiliating treaties and agreements with Japan.
2) We oppose any kind of civil war and oppose any policy which results in
Chinese and the Chinese troops fighting each other.
3) We invite all anti-Japanese forces, no matter which region or party and
which army or section of the masses they belong to, to join us in order to
form a national revolutionary front for resistance.

840
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.
841
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.
842
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiuguo”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 56.
843
Ibid, pp. 53-54.

283
 4) On marching northward, we will not attack any towns and individuals or
troops, but we will join forces with the national people and strenuously fight
any one or group who declare themselves to be Chinese traitors and
endeavour to impede our progress northward.844
There is evidence that the Guangxi troops marching northward at that time were
mobilized by the above policies. Even Joseph Stilwell did not deny this. He recognized
that the policies sounded good and that morale of the Guangxi people was high under the
influence of such political propaganda.845 To demonstrate more widely their declared
purpose, the Clique also distributed large numbers of propaganda leaflets with slogans such
as “Expand the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement”, “Japanese Is Our External
Enemy”, “Down with Japanese Imperialism”, “Down with Opponents of the Anti-Japanese
Movement”, “Down with All Sino-Japanese Treaties Signed Under Duress”, and so on.846
They expected a broad and positive response throughout the country to this call. Thus, they
completed preparation for influencing public opinion for “bi-Jiang kangri” through such
propaganda.
It can be seen that the Clique’s “bi-Jiang kangri” policy had already become
apparent. Its spearhead, at least outwardly, was directed against Japanese aggression, not
internal disputes. It sent Nanjing a message that resistance was the responsibility of every
Chinese. The message had a dual content. First, all of the people should rise to resist
Japan; and secondly, if some powerful people did not want to do this, then the Clique
would lead the Chinese people to do so without hesitation.847 The Clique thus tried to
convince the whole country that they were not only sincere themselves in wanting to resist
Japan but also willing to promote Nanjing in the movement of national liberation. In that
way, “bi-Jiang kangri” was put into effect. Meanwhile, the Pearl River Valley
Revolutionary theory, in which the people of the two Guangs were lauded as the main force
of the national revolution with the Clique as the leader, was closely linked with the anti-

844
Huiji, p. 48.
845
U. S. Military, No. 9446 (July 31, 1936).
846
During the movement, the newspapers in Guangxi published anti-Japanese slogans
daily, among them Nanning minguo ribao was a best example. See Nanning minguo ribao,
June 1936. Also see Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, p. 188.
847
See “Liuyi yulun yiban”, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, Nanning, 1937, p. 266.

284
Japanese movement they launched. Thus, personal purposes and ambitions, even if they
still existed, were increasingly weakened as the movement developed. Once Jiang’s policy
was changed, for example, he came to cooperate with other groups and parties for
resistance, and any ideas of anti-Jiang action were no longer relevant to the universal ideal.
In such circumstances, “fatong” (orthodox legitimacy) was widely endorsed. Li and other
Southwestern leaders consequently recognized, until the war was won, Nanjing as the sole
government of China, even though it was actually under the control of Jiang, whom they
distrusted and even opposed. Before even considering any chance of replacing Jiang, they
wanted to fight Japan to convince that their actions reflected the wishes of the majority of
the people.848 On the other hand, the differences between them, which were frequently
emphasized, were mostly concerned with policies towards Japanese aggression. They
never missed an opportunity to explain their different measures in dealing with Japan.849
That is to say, the situation forced the Clique to avoid, as much as it could, building up the
image of a region actually opposing the central government for power only; but they
fostered the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy because it could attract more public support and
legitimate its opposition to Jiang.850
Once the “bi-Jiang kangri” movement was initiated, the Clique had to follow this
direction; otherwise, their actions would make no sense. As the Chinese saying goes,
“water can either carry or destroy the boat”. The movement was the boat sailing in the
water of the masses who were imbued with patriotism. The Guangxi leaders of course
knew how to use the masses, particularly the popular tide they had set in train and they
emphasized the importance of the masses and mass mobilization, which later could also
become a powerful force used by the Clique in opposition to Nanjing.851 As Liu Fei
pointed out, the only thing that the Clique could do was to elevate the banner of resisting
Japan at a time when the movement for that purpose was already on the way. This was also

848
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.
849
Ibid. Also see Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, Guiyang: Yugao shudian, 1946, p. 110.
850
Huiji, pp. 107-110.
851
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiuguo”, Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 54-6;
and Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, pp. 157-65, and
pp. 203-12.

285
the way to avoid any suggestion of a regional image which might cause unfavourable
criticism of them.852
Resistance against Japan became the basis of Guangxi reconstruction and
mobilization, and this was recognized within and outside the province. Visitors, whether
from overseas or from other provinces, commented favourably on Guangxi and lauded it
with the title of “model province”,853 for the Clique imbued the population generally with
enthusiasm for its policies of both reconstruction and mass mobilization (dealt with in
Chapter Four). The enthusiasm of the masses was of course channelled by the Clique into
self-defence, which could effectively serve both the national and provincial levels.
Recognising the powerful force created by the mobilization of the masses in the province,
Sherwood Eddy said, “I see in Guangxi a hope of the new China”.854 Of course, Li and Bai
paid great attention to these comments, which were regarded as a clear indication that their
pursuit of correct policies had been recognized by the people.855 However, these
appreciations were often the result of encouragement or pressure from the Clique itself. To
defend further their reputation as the leading figures in resistance, they had ultimately to
succeed with the policy of forcing Jiang to resist Japan.
In fact this latter stance as a central pillar of the Clique’s policy represented a subtle
change in emphasis. Before his death, Hu had repeatedly emphasized “downfall of
dictatorship as a prerequisite to resisting Japan”.856 According to Xiao Focheng, a GMD

852
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 293.
853
For details of those people’s comments on Guangxi reconstruction and mass
mobilization such as speeches and articles of Chen Baoyin, Chen Lijiang, George
Sherwood Eddy, Huang Tianshi, Jiang Kanghu, Hou Zhenqiu and Wang Heng, see Leng
Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; Liang Wenwei
et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; and Guomin gemingjun
disi jituanjun zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Li-Gui zhongwai mingren yanjiang ji, Shanghai:
ZHSJ, 1936; Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, January 7,
1935, printed by the author himself; and U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
854
Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China? p. 2.
855
See Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 259-65; Bai fu zongsiling yanjiang ji,
Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, pp. 19-24; and Bai Chongxi xiansheng zuijin yanlun
ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1936, pp. 14-6.
856
For details of Hu’s ideas on “downfall of dictatorship, resistance against Japan and
suppression of Communism”, see Hu Hanmin xiansheng wenji, Taipei: Guomindang
zhongyang dangshihui, 1978; Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng; and

286
veteran and a senior leader in the Southwest, although the Southwest still insisted that it
must carry out Hu’s three deathbed calls, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, at present
resistance was more important and urgent than the others.857 This, of course, still left the
Clique with excellent reasons to take action against Jiang’s “non-resistance”; and their
propaganda took this into account.
Another factor affecting the actions of the Clique was the tactics of the Communists
and the Red Army in their Eastern Expedition which ended just before the June 1
Movement began. The Eastern Expedition of the Red Army took place between February
and May 1936; the army marched eastward, passing through Shanxi province towards
Hebei province under the flag of fighting the Japanese. After fighting with both Yan
Xishan’s troops and Jiang's Central Army which rushed to Shanxi province as a
reinforcement for Yan, the Red Army withdrew to their base in northern Shaanxi with the
stated purpose of avoiding further civil war with Jiang and other regional troops.858
Whatever reasons might be given to account for this action, during the expedition the Red
Army widely propagandized their position on stopping civil war in the cause of unity for
resisting Japan,859 which to a great extent coincided with the mood of the growing tide of
national resistance. It was a clever political tactic of the Communists and the Red Army,
and their propaganda was used to real purpose, and helped to expand their strength. The
Clique was aware of the positions and tactics of the Red Army because Li and Bai sent their
representative to contact the Communists and the latter also sent their agents to Guangxi

Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou:, 1934, pp. 1-2. For
more details of these, see Hu Hanmin (ed.), Sanmin zhuyi yuekan (SMZYYK), Guangzhou,
1933-36.
857
Huiji, p. 117.
858
For details of the Red Army’s Eastern Expedition, see Jiang Shunxing and Li Liangyu,
Shanxi wang Yan Xishan, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1989, pp. 141-4; Zhonggong
zhongyang dangxiao (ed.), Yan Xishan pingzhuan, Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang
dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, pp. 256-61; Jiang Kefu (ed.), Minguo junshi shi luegao,
Beijing: ZHSJ, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 435-9; and Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in
Shansi Province 1911-1949, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.
859
Zhongyang tongzhanpu and Zhongyang dangan guan (eds.), Zhonggong zhongyang
kangri tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, Beijing: DACBS, 1985, Vol. 2, pp. 108-41
(hereafter as Wenjian xuanbian).

287
before and after the June 1 Movement.860 Under these circumstances, the Clique learned a
lot from the experience of the Communists.
However, the Clique was regarded at that time as having been the most important
opponent of Jiang since 1931, which was another reason for careful planning to implement
the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy. Indeed, each time Nanjing yielded to Japanese demands or
carried out some suspect policies and measures under Japanese pressure, Li and Bai always
stood in opposition. It was a vulnerable position because the supporters of Jiang found
excuses to criticize them as remnant warlords.861 For example, after the June 1 Movement
was launched, a newspaper suggested it to be a case of giving vent to personal spite.862 Li
and Bai must have anticipated this,863 for even before the movement, they had foreseen the
many difficulties ahead. As Li himself pointed out, when the movement really began, they
had mounted a tiger and could not get off.864 The situation, however, propelled them
forward and, once committed, they had no choice but to follow wherever it led.
The development of the movement indicated that the purpose of “bi-Jiang kangri”
was not easy to achieve. It quickly became apparent that the Clique and Chen Jitang had
underestimated the strength of the measures Jiang would take.
While the two Guang troops marched northward into Hunan, Jiang published a
series of telegrams and speeches in response. On the one hand, Jiang expressed his
sympathy with the anti-Japanese action of the Southwest; on the other, he emphasized such
action should be taken only in unity, that is, he declared that the Southwest should take
action only after Nanjing had made a firm decision to deal with the new Japanese
aggression.865 In this way, he hinted that the Southwest was doing what suited itself. In

860
Liu Zongrong, “Xi’an shibian de huiyi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 49-56 (hereafter as
“Xi’an”); and the same author, “Huiyi wo zai Guixi gongzuo shi de jijianshi”, WSZLXJ,
No. 73 (1981), pp. 29-36. Also see Chen Dunde, Guigen - Li Zongren he Mao Zedong he
Zhou Enlai woshou, Beijing: JFJCBS, 1990, pp. 23-45.
861
See, for example, Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, n.p., 1936; and
Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, n. p., 1936.
862
Shenbao, June 13, 1936, p.3.
863
Huiji, pp. 4-8; and pp. 53-66.
864
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 307.
865
For details of Jiang’s telegrams and speeches, see Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong
zhi renshi, pp. 29-36; and Jizhe, “Yue-Gui wenti zhi zhankai”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24

288
addition, he sent some representatives to negotiate with the Southwest on future mutual
cooperative action against Japan.866 It seemed that Jiang was successful, because, under the
cover of these statements, he secretly and rapidly moved large numbers of the Central
troops to the borders of the two Guangs and its neighbouring provinces, and, as a result,
blocked the way of the two Guang troops marching northward.867
As stated earlier, before launching the movement, the Clique believed there would
be a positive response from people all over the nation once their action took place. Now
that the flag had been raised, however, the expected patriotic reaction did not appear, and
this was particularly evident in Hunan, the passageway through which the two Guang
troops would march. To enlist the sympathy and support of Hunan, the Clique, in fact,
even while the movement was being prepared, sent General Liu Fei to Changsha calling on
He Jian, ruler of Hunan province. He Jian expressed his support for this movement and
promised to join once the Guangxi troops arrived at Changsha. But this was merely an
empty promise. In fact, He Jian proved to be a double agent. He secretly reported to Jiang
the action the Southwest would take.868 After the movement began and the Guangxi troops
entered Hunan on their northward march, the Clique sent General Li Pinxian, former
colleague of He Jian and now Chief of General Staff of the Guangxi troops, to Changsha to
discuss the same matter. Again, He Jian played the same trick. The Guangxi troops wasted
time on the Hunan border waiting for the promised action from He Jian but it did not
eventuate. Li Pinxian’s mission to Hunan failed.869 Instead, a large number of the Central

(June 22, 1936). Also see “Fragments of newspaper cuttings in 1936”, Archives of the
Nationalist Government, Vol. 787, serial No. 919, in The Second History Archives of
China, Nanjing.
866
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.
867
Luo Ziwen, “Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian zhong He Jian wanlong liangmian shoufa”,
HNWSZLXJ, No. 5 (1963), pp. 185-91 (hereafter as ‘“He Jian”).
868
Liu Tingfang, “Wo shuofu Jiang Jieshi xiansheng huajie yichang neizhan weiji - ji
liangguang shibian weiceng gongkai de yiduan neimu”, HNWSZL, No. 29 (1988), pp. 199-
206 (hereafter as “neimu”); and Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 289. Also see Shenbao,
15/6/1936, p. 9.
869
For details see Luo Ziwen, “He Jian”. Also see “The Major Events of the Week”, and
Jizhe, “Yue-Gui wenti zhi zhankai”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24; Cheng Siyuan, “Wo suo
zhidao de Bai Chongxi”, XSLT, No. 4, 1987, p. 81, and Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan,
Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1989, p. 187.

289
troops led by General Chen Cheng, the most trusted follower of Jiang, flooded into Hunan
and occupied Hengyang, the very important city and strategic point in southern Hunan. He
Jian soon joined Jiang to oppose the Southwest. Jiang had taken advantage of this
situation, at least in military terms. Under these circumstances, the Guangxi troops stopped
marching northward and were ordered to withdraw to the border of their home province to
show their sincerity in avoiding a fight with other Chinese troops as they had promised in
all their propaganda, because they did not want to provoke a civil war against Jiang.870
In fact, the delay had ruined a favourable chance for the Clique and Chen Jitang to
defeat Jiang if they had exploited the advantage they had. When the June 1 Movement was
launched, a good chance existed for the Southwestern leaders to gain an initial advantage
quickly by a swift move into Hunan. If, when they showed their hands and marched into
Hunan, they had gone in wholeheartedly and vigorously attacked Hengyang, they could
probably have taken it at once, as they had in 1930.871 Then a rapid advance on Changsha
would have given them an even chance of overrunning Hunan and perhaps drawing He Jian
into the camp of the Southwest. The possibility of success would have attracted to their
side all the many elements that were always ready in a Chinese civil war to rush to the aid
of the victor, and the action of He Jian later joining Jiang was just an example. With
Hunan in their possession, other provinces in Southwest and Northwest, particularly those
factions under the leadership of generals such as Liu Xiang of Sichuan province, Zhang
Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, leaders of both the Dongbeijun (the Northeast Troops) and
the Xibeijun (the Northwest Troops) now stationed in Shaanxi province, could have been
counted on,872 and Jiangxi province, which was under the firm control of Jiang, directly
threatened. Such a situation could have made their chances of success rosy, for Jiang could

870
U. S. Military, No. 9408, (June 19, 1936). Also see “Li Zongren’s speeches on the
days of June 8, 13, 29”, and “Telegrams of Li Zongren and others on June 18 and 21”,
Huiji, pp. 1-9, and pp. 50-4.
871
For details of the occupation of Hengyang by the joint forces of the Clique and Zhang
Fakui’s “Ironside” in 1930, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-
jen, pp. 278-9; Zhang Dihai, “Zhang-Gui jun fan-Jiang zhong de Beiliu ji Hengyang
zhanyi”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 19, pp. 45-8; and Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou:
Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 206-7.
872
For details of Liu Xiang’s active response to the June 1 Movement and his
coincidental action with the Clique, see Chapter Five of the thesis; also see Qiao Cheng and
Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, Beijing: HXCBS, 1987, pp. 193-6. The detailed actions of Yang
and Zhang will be accounted for in the following section.

290
not have counted on any help from the provinces of Shandong, Hebei and Shaanxi, where
the Clique also had sent representatives and asked them to join and support its side. These
factions also had made positive response to the movement, although secretly.873 But,
instead of pushing ahead and putting it to the test, as soon as they crossed the Hunan border
earlier in June, the Guangxi troops sat down in expectation of He Jian’s participation in the
movement and later in dismay as their concern grew about a civil war when Jiang’s troops
rushed into Hunan. The Southwest undoubtedly made two serious miscalculations, i.e. it
overestimated the active response of other groups and parties to its policies and it
underestimated the speed and force of Jiang's measures against the movement. Although
Zhang and Yang as well as Liu Xiang had made certain plans which coincided with the
action of the Southwest, they could not carry out these plans once the troops of the two
Guangs remained their northward march and stayed at their home borders.874 Immediately
the two Guang armies stopped, Hunan at once began to fill up with Jiang’s troops. The
chance had been lost, and the tide at once turned against them.875 The result was contrary
to their expectations, and by hesitating, they had put themselves in a dangerous situation
and were forced to expend a great deal of energy to escape and recover lost ground.
Would the Southwestern leaders, particularly Li and Bai who were always
considered to be the best Chinese militarists and commanders, not have known the chance
which they were missing? I think they would have known. One reason for missing this
chance might be that, according to Joseph Stilwell early in 1936, they did not want civil
war, but if war came they would take every chance it offered to protect and improve the
position of the Southwest provinces.876 In my opinion, another possible answer was the
positive response from the Red Army.877 Although there is no corroborative evidence to

873
See Huiji, p. 29; and Ying Detian, Zhang Xueliang yu Xi’an shibian, Beijing: ZHSJ,
1980, p. 75 (hereafter as Zhang Xueliang).
874
For details of these actions, see Liu Zongrong, “Xi’an”. The reasons for the failure of
implementation of these plans worked out by Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang will be
further discussed in the following section.
875
Joseph Stilwell also had the same opinion when the Southwest authorities ordered the
two Guang troops to stop on the Hunan border, failing to take advantage of the chance to
defeat Jiang’s troops. See U. S. Military, No. 9446 (July 31, 1936).
876
U. S. Military, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).
877
Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 161-164.

291
indicate that a practically cooperative action existed between the Clique and the Red Army,
the tactics carried out by the latter during their Eastern Expedition, such as the use of the
political propaganda of resistance to serve their march eastward through Shanxi, averting a
crucial military clash with the strong Central Army, might have influenced the Clique to
take similar action.878 Moreover, the statement and manifesto of the CCP coinciding with
the action of the Southwest might have encouraged the Clique in their hope that a wide
positive response to their action would soon spread throughout the country. The Clique
also contacted the Communist branches in both Hong Kong and Tianjin before and after the
launching of the movement.879 However, regardless of their possible hopes, it was wise of
the Clique to make the decision to withdraw the troops to the border of Guangxi in order to
avoid a civil war. Under these circumstances, the Clique’s action indicated that it insisted
on the policy of “bi-Jiang kangri” rather than that of overthrowing Jiang only. The
withdrawal also clearly indicated their purpose focused more on Japanese aggression than
on fighting Jiang, for there is no evidence to suggest the Guangxi troops were engaged in a
battle.
The Clique seems to have badly underestimated the impact of the power of
censorship by Nanjing, as a result of which their voice hardly spread outside the Southwest.
While it is true that the policies of the Southwest appeared to be sound and to meet the
needs of the time, theirs was a “difang” (regional) voice, which worked to the detriment of
both Guangxi and Guangdong. The Jiang group could freely use the mass media they
controlled to condemn the whole movement as part of a Japanese conspiracy, and as a
regional rebellion against the central government backed by the Japanese; it moreover
banned all newspapers in their territory from printing the opinions of the Clique and the
Southwest (as discussed earlier). They criticized the movement as a disruptive element
hindering the plan of the Central Government in preparing for resistance.880 Further, Jiang

878
Ibid, pp. 108-41.
879
Ibid, pp. 161-4. For details of the Clique’s contact with the CCP, see Yun Guangying,
“‘Liuyi yundong’ qianhou wodang zai Nanning huodong de pianduan”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9,
pp. 45-8 (hereafter as “Liuyi”); Chen Dunde, Guigen, pp. 9-10, and pp. 23-48; and
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashiji, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, pp. 98-100
(hereafter as Dashiji).
880
See, for example, Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong de renshi; and Anonymous,
Liangguang panluan neimu. In fact, the Nanjing Government did carry out some measures

292
organised all his subordinate generals and other factions and associations to issue circular
telegrams in opposition to the Southwest. Through this, a campaign of fear and distrust
against the Southwest, particularly the Clique, was influential in forming public opinion.881
The Southwest was placed in a negative position.882 In this way, Jiang cleverly guided
public opinion, and successfully transformed the Southwest's demands for resistance into a
regional quarrel with Nanjing, that is to say, a regional revolt against the centre.883
Moreover, Jiang was able to manipulate the mass media to convert this quarrel between the
Centre and the region into one of contradictions between region only, i.e. between
Guangdong and Guangxi, or even one of internal dissension within Guangdong itself
only.884 Jiang no doubt realized that he could not overtly deny the demands of the
Southwest for resistance; he could not overtly suppress their actions, as these demands and
actions were ultimately justified by events and were an expression of a good deal of
Chinese public opinion. Instead of a military clash with the Southwest, he therefore elected
to use the mass media, by condemning the suspect contacts of the Clique with the Japanese
to create the image of a treasonable and devious Southwest leadership.885 Following the
apparent initial success of the above measures, Jiang announced that the Second Plenum of
the 5th Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the GMD was scheduled to be
held in Nanjing in July. He stated that vital decisions would be made at that session.
Through this tactic, he won time to complete his plans to deal with the movement, while
leaving the Clique and the Southwest in limbo.

in preparing for resistance against Japan. For details see Le Jiaqing and Jiang Tianying,
“Ping kangzhan qianxi Guomindang Nanjing zhengfu de kangri zhunbei”, FDXB, No. 5,
1987.
881
Huiji, pp. 28-9; and “‘Liuyi’ yulun yiban”, Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi
yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 268-71. Also see “1936 nian jianbao shanpian”,
Archives of the Nationalist Government, Nanjing.
882
See “1936 nian jianbao shanpian”.
883
See Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, pp. 29-34.
884
Giu Guo Sh Bao, October 8, 1936.
885
In fact, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi and Liangguang panluan neimu, two
confidential documents of Nanjing published in June 1936, have clearly indicated this
purpose and the measures used against the movement.

293
 Faced with this unfavourable situation, the Southwest was placed in a passive
position. Under the pressure of Jiang's counter-measure, the Southwest was obliged to
explain their aim as one of asking Nanjing and Jiang Jieshi to take the lead in resistance,
and the Clique had to fall back on the policy of “bi-Jiang kangri” and to disclaim their
personal purpose of achieving Jiang's downfall.886 Their original scheme having led them
into the trap that Jiang had set for them, the only thing that the Southwest could do to
escape from this was to continue to express the need to resist Japan and force Jiang to
commence the war against Japan. Thus, the policy of “bi-Jiang kangri” gained emphasis as
a result of the developing situation.
First, the Clique and Chen Jitang worked energetically to break the blockade of
Jiang’s censorship and to refute the criticism from Nanjing,887 then to draw sympathy for
their anti-Japanese stand through increased numbers of circular telegrams as well.888 For
example, Chen Jitang further stated the aim of their action to the mass media in mid-June:
We have also requested Chiang Kai-shek to assume the leadership of our armies
and to lead the way across the Yellow River. But our wire (telegram) has not been
answered. We do not care through what provinces the route lies. Any way that will
lead northward will be agreeable.889
At the same time, Li and Bai continually and frequently telegraphed to Jiang urging him to
lead the resistance. No doubt, all of these were published through the propaganda organs of
the Clique and those which supported it.890 For example, in a circular telegram to Jiang on
June 29, Bai said that he would personally command the Guangxi troops in the field to
follow the former in fighting Japan if Jiang would resolutely lead a national resistance;
furthermore, Bai claimed he would like to be a fighter or a “maqian xiaozu” (cat’s paw) of
Jiang at the front.891 Here the Guangxi leaders clearly sent a message to Jiang, i.e. if he

886
For details of propaganda used in the Guangxi Clique’s policies towards Japanese
aggression and urging Nanjing to take the leadership of fighting Japan, see Huiji, pp. 49-66.
887
See Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 291-2. Also see “‘Liuyi’ yulun yiban”, in Nanning
Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 255-279.
888
For details of these telegrams, see Huiji, pp. 49-101.
889
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”
890
For details of these telegrams, see Huiji. Also see Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo
lianhehui (ed.), Duiri kangzhan de qiantu, Nanning, July 1936.
891
Huiji, p. 57.

294
cared to fight Japan, his leadership would be recognized by his most important rival. This
was an expression of the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy. Moreover, in their telegrams to other
Nanjing leaders, Li and Bai as well as Chen Jitang repeatedly asked them to push Jiang to
proclaim immediately a war against Japan to save the nation.892 Meanwhile, they warned
Jiang that he would shoulder the responsibility of civil war if it really occurred, as he had
not used the Central Army which was stationed in the front line of the provinces close to
North China to resist Japan but had moved them down to South China in order to wipe out
the forces whose one desire was to fight Japan. They gave Jiang dubious praise by
claiming he was “brave in civil war but nervous in resisting foreign aggression”.893 In fact,
it became a “telegram war” between the two sides. This term enunciates a characteristic of
the June 1 Movement. In this way, each side attempted to justify its actions with good
excuses.
The Clique also used their regional mass media and organized political propaganda
teams to go to the countryside to enlist the support of the people of Guangxi and to inspire
patriotism for national salvation and resentment against Nanjing's non-resistance.894 In the
local region this was quite successful. For example, Zhao Biyun, a girl student of the
middle school at that time, in explanation of her reasons for joining the Student Army Corp,
stated that her motives came from the long-term patriotic education in resisting Japan and
national salvation that she had had since her primary school, and from her discontent with
Jiang's non-resistance against foreign aggression but military suppression of anti-Japanese
forces at home.895 Even in the small villages, a journalist found such propaganda slogans
as “Down with Japanese Imperialism” and “We Will Be Slaves Without A Nation If (Jiang
Jieshi, or Nanjing) Still Maintains Non-Resistance”.896 At the same time, the Clique used
other mass media sponsored by some minority groups and parties located in Hong Kong

892
Ibid, pp. 60-6.
893
Ibid, p. 52.
894
For details of the Clique’s practice in propaganda, see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12
(September 1936); and Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”. Also, Nanning
minguo ribao published many articles and reports during the June 1 Movement.
895
Zhao Biyun, “Wo de juexin” (My Determination), CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
896
Zhujiang ribao, 9 June 1937.

295
and the Shanghai Concession to support their policy and action.897 They also sent several
senior members of the Southwest authorities to Nanjing to attend the Second Plenum in
July. To strengthen their propaganda campaign, they submitted to the Plenum five
proposals relating to the resistance. These proposals included: 1) immediate declaration of
breaking off relations with Japan; 2) the abrogation of all Sino-Japanese treaties signed
under duress after the “September 18 Incident”; 3) immediate prevention of the increase of
the Japanese troops in North China by military force; 4) the guarantee and support of the
freedom of the people's patriotic speech and movement; and 5) the national general
mobilization for resistance against Japan under the leadership of the Central
Government.898 In a word, they wanted to use all legal forms in furthering the policy of
forcing Nanjing to fight Japan.
To a considerable extent, this propaganda helped the Clique to consolidate its image
as a firm anti-Japanese group, and won sympathy and support of all other parties and
groups which themselves had insisted on resistance.899 One hundred and fifty-six Huangpu
officers headed by Generals Li Xinjun and Lai Gang lodged a petition with Jiang urging
their “xiaozhang” (principal) to fight Japan instead of suppressing the anti-Japanese
forces.900 Most of these officers later joined Guangxi.901 Even some units of the Central

897
Zhonghua minguo guomin geming kangri jiuguojun disi jituanjun zongsilingbu
zongzhengxunchu (ed.), Xi’nan fadong kangri hou gefang zhi yulun, Nanning, August
1936; and “Liuyi yulun yiban”, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 255-279.
898
Huiji, pp. 110-115.
899
See comments of Ma Xiangbo, in Nanning minguo ribao, May 1936; and U. S.
Military, No. 9423 (July 3, 1936); and Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin:
HLJRMCBS, 1982, pp. 443-4. In his memoirs, T. G. Li also states that the reason for his
heading to Guangxi from Paris in the summer of 1936 for participation of the anti-Japanese
movement was that he “was enthusiastic about joining them in China’s coming struggle
against the Japanese invader”. See T. G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic
Memoirs, Lanham: University Press of America, 1989, p. 46.
900
CYGL, No. 2 (July 5, 1936), p. 1. Huangpu officers refer to those who graduated from
the Huangpu Military Academy and held posts in different levels of the Central Army
under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. Jiang had been Principal of the Huangpu Military
Academy since its establishment in 1924.
901
Lai Huipeng, “‘Liuyi’ shibian jieshu qianhou xin Guixi anpai fashe de liangzhi
lengjian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 152-60. Lai himself was one of these officers, including
Li Xinjun and Lai Gang, defected from Jiang Jieshi.

296
Army, such as the 51st Division and 77th Division at that time stationed in Hunan and
Jiangxi separately, turned to support the Southwest in June, as they were discontented with
Jiang’s policy of suppressing the anti-Japanese forces, even though these rebels were soon
put down and disarmed by Jiang after their uprising.902
Furthermore, the Clique worked to strengthen the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance.
Only the existence of this alliance could force Jiang to be conciliatory with them and
eventually accept their demands. The two Guang troops allied themselves with Cheng
Jitang as Commander in Chief and Li Zongren as Deputy in late June.903 To maintain the
confidence of Chen in the action, the Clique even planned to send large numbers of
Guangxi troops to Guangdong to strengthen defence of the province and to prevent any
possible attack from Jiang's troops.904
The counter-measures of the Southwest seemed to have little effect on Jiang,
however, although he refused the proposals of the Southwest, he made a statement on
foreign policy at the Second Plenum on July 13, in which he explained his attitude towards
resistance:
To protect China’s sovereign and territorial integrity is the basic principle of the
Central Government in handling its diplomatic affairs. Any infringement upon
China’s sovereign and territorial integrity by any foreign nation will drive her to the
last extremity, and then she will make the inevitable sacrifice. To be more plain, if
any foreign power should compel us to sign an agreement for the recognition of
"Manzhouguo", the time will then have come when we will not suffer any longer
and when we will make our last sacrifice.905
Although this statement might be an effort to save face for his past impotence in restraining
Japanese aggression, and although it still did not answer the question “when will China
fight?”, as Joseph Stilwell comments,906 it provided a clear explanation of the term “last

902
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 30, 1936; and Huiji, p. 42.
903
Guangzhou minguo ribao, July 16, 17, 1936; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan
(ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou: Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, pp.
366-74; Nanning minguo ribao, July 16, 17, 1936.
904
Chen Siyuan, “Wo suo zhidao de Bai Chongxi”, XSLT, No. 4, 1987, p. 82, and p. 84;
and Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.
905
Qin Xiaoyi (ed.), Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian - duiri kangzhan shiqi:
xubian (III), Taipei: Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiuhui, 1981, pp. 666-
7.
906
U. S. Military, No. 9439 (July 17, 1936), p. 4.

297
sacrifice” which Jiang had used at the 5th Guomindang Congress held the previous
November.907 The Clique and Chen Jitang had at least compelled him to go to the stage of
proclaiming resistance, even if Jiang was still only at the point of paying lip service to it.
Nevertheless, the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance collapsed in mid-July, partly as
Jiang took his customary efficient measures to destroy it by using the successful “silver
bullets policy” to buy Guangdong generals to defect from Chen Jitang. In addition he
rapidly concentrated about fifteen divisions in Hunan, twelve in Jiangxi, seven in Fujian
and eight in Guizhou, a force considerably superior to that of the two Guangs. The first
sign of an impending break-up was the desertion of several fliers of the Guangdong air
force,908 and then General Yu Hanmou, Commander of the 1st Guangdong Army and a
leader of less importance than Chen Jitang in the Guangdong army, declared himself
against the whole movement. From then on defections increased by leaps and bounds, and
every lukewarm element hastened to leave the sinking ship. The result was that all
Guangdong troops, including air force and navy, betrayed Chen Jitang and changed their
loyalty to Jiang after the latter had spent several million dollars.909 Chen reluctantly left

907
GMWX, Vol. 76, p. 25.
908
See Chen Shaoxiao, Heiwang lu, Hong Kong: ZCCBS, 1966, pp. 75-80; and
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 419.
909
The defection of the Guangdong officers was not only caused by Jiang’s silver bullet
policy but also the result that Chen Jitang distrusted his subordinate commanders,
according to Li Jiezhi, a senior commander of the Guangdong troops. Li claims that at that
time they did not believe that Chen could lead them to defeat Jiang’s army which was
marching to Guangdong and besieged this province from Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian. They
also suffered heavily from rumours throughout Guangdong and even outside of the
province that Chen had made some secret deals with the Japanese when he joined forces
with the Guangxi Clique to launch the June 1 Movement. Li Jiezhi adds, they deeply
believed that the movement served the Guangxi Clique’s own purposes only. As a result,
in their view, Guangdong would be a scapegoat of the Clique. See Guangdong sheng
dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 414-20. Certainly, some evidences from
materials mentioned above may support all these claims. In fact, reasons for the defection
of these Guangdong generals are various. Namely, it was a result of the mixture of
personal, economic, political reasons and so on. For details of the defection of the
Guangdong generals in the Movement, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs
of Li Tsung-jen, p. 308; Chen Shaoxiao, Heiwang lu, pp. 75-80; and Lin Hu, “Xi’an shibian
shi Jiang Jieshi xiang liyong wo dao Chen Jitang de yimu”, GXWSZL, No. 17, pp. 164-8;
Cheng Siyuan, “Liangguang shibian”, GXWSZL, No. 22; Chen Cheng, “Liangguang liuyi
shibian chuli jingguo”, ZJWX, Vol. 53, No. 3; Kan Zonghua, “Chen Jitang, Li Zongren,
Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1.

298
Guangdong on July 18 and headed overseas for a “study of foreign affairs”, an excuse for
saving his face. Guangdong was finally taken over by Jiang’s troops. Li returned to
Guangxi on the same day. Encouraged by this success, Jiang tried to take advantage of the
occasion to wipe out the Clique and move his rivals, both Li and Bai, away from the
province. As a result, the centre of the movement was transferred into Guangxi.
There is little doubt that the Clique put its anti-Japanese policy into practice in the
June 1 Movement, with “bi-Jiang kangri” as its concrete form, and that the movement
reflected the common demand of most people. As was pointed out at that time, “in making
the demand on Nanking to resist Japan, Canton (i.e. the Southwest) is not only speaking for
itself, but is actually expressing the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese
people.”910 Although Jiang put enormous pressure on his opponents, his action provided
them with a motive for practicing the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy more positively and clearly.
When the movement suffered heavy setbacks such as the fall of Chen Jitang in
Guangdong, how did the Clique deal with this crisis and would Li and Bai continue the
course which they had pursued in their propaganda?

The Attempt to Establish A Broad-Based Anti-Japanese National United Front

There were two options available to the Clique after Chen’s collapse in the
movement. One was to abandon their action and surrender to Jiang without preconditions.
But, in so doing, the result would justify the image promoted by the Jiang group that the
movement was selfish. This was what the Clique strove to avoid.911 Another option was to
continue the movement, even if they failed in the end, so that the nature of the movement
they engaged in would be confirmed as that of determined resistance against Japan, not for
themselves, but in terms of their policy and their demands.912 If so, the result would be
beneficial to the reputation of the Clique, to the saving of face and to the maintenance of
their notable history in the GMD. Their resistance could still make them heroes, as Cai
Tingkai and his 19th Route Army had become in Shanghai in 1932. Obviously, the second
option coincided with the policies of the Clique and was more easily accepted by it. Under

910
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”
911
Wei Yongcheng, “Zaitan ‘liuyi yundong’”, ZJWX, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 56.
912
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 293-4.

299
these circumstances, Nanning, capital of Guangxi, became the centre of practising the “bi-
Jiang kangri” policy, which brought the June 1 Movement into the second phase.
If Jiang had now kept his promise made to Huang Xuchu in the previous year, he
would have reached reconciliation and cooperation with the Clique in July 1936 instead of
September, in order to unite other groups within the GMD earlier and to concentrate more
energy on dealing with Japanese aggression. If this had happened, the movement would
have been already completed. Such an opportunity actually existed at that time.913 Before
he drove Chen out of Guangdong, Jiang stated at the Second Plenum that he and the
Nanjing Government would maintain the status quo of Guangxi. However, perhaps the fall
of Chen added to Jiang's confidence and determination to eliminate the Clique and also
provided more excuses to the Jiang group to criticize this most dangerous political rival
within the GMD. Perhaps Jiang adopted the suggestion of his political adviser Xiong
Shihui (Chairman of the Provincial Government of Jiangxi at that time) that this was the
right time to finally settle scores with Li and Bai in Guangxi.914 At the same time, his
subordinate generals, particularly those young officers originating from the Huangpu
Military Academy (Huangpu junxiao), were even more radical and keen to “teach a lesson”
to this opponent.915 Therefore, Jiang altered his original decision and ordered Li to Nanjing
as a member of the Standing Committee of the Military Affairs Council and Bai to
Zhejiang as governor of the provincial government. These were high positions, but actually
without any power. To force both Li and Bai to leave Guangxi, Jiang even strengthened his
forces in the encirclement of the province with over 400,000 troops, including those of
Guangxi’s former ally - the Guangdong troops now under the command of General Yu
Hanmou. In addition, Jiang tried to divide the Clique with the same tactics employed to
subvert Chen Jitang. There is evidence that along with his successful occupation of
Guangdong, Jiang sent millions of dollars in “silver bullets” over the Guangxi border.916

913
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 309.
914
Ibid. Other sources show that the idea came from Yang Yongtai, Chairman of the
Hubei Provincial Government, and senior member of the Political Studies Faction of
Nanjing. See Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 294; and Cheng Siyuan, “Liangguang shibian”, p.
54. Xiong was also a senior member of the “Political Studies Faction”.
915
For details see Luo Ziwen, “He Jian”. Also see Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No.
126 (October 1, 1962), p. 14.
916
U. S. Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936).

300
 However, Jiang’s efforts were in vain. He also underestimated the power and the
internal consolidation of his rival. All of his efforts in both military blockade and his
“silver bullets” campaign failed. On the contrary, these inspired the Clique and the people
in Guangxi to greater efforts for consolidation of themselves and insistence on their
previous demands and policy. Within a few days the provincial defence force had
expanded from fourteen to forty-four regiments and the militia was reorganized, ready to
engage in battle with Jiang’s troops.917 In the judgement of Joseph Stilwell, “at a
conservative estimate Kwangsi could put 1,000,000 men in the field, - poorly armed and
equipped, it is true, but fairly good soldiers as Chinese go.”918 Only the militia of Guangxi
was an inestimable force. Stilwell emphasized in a report,
Aside from her regular troops, Kwangsi depends for defence upon a large well
drilled militia which is spread over the entire province and difficult to estimate, but
it is believed that more than 100,000 could be mobilized and equipped without
great difficulty.919
It seemed that the people of Guangxi became deeply involved in support of their
leaders and the Clique, because they commonly regarded Jiang and his government as a
more fierce and dangerous opponent and they were determined not to allow Jiang’s
influence to enter Guangxi.920 Indeed, according to Stilwell, “there is an air of great
enthusiasm all over the province. No objection could be heard anywhere to the policies
which are being followed by the provincial authorities.”921 The Guangxi people made an
anti-Japanese pledge to support their leaders and urged the Clique to continue with its
policy. There were even many examples of taking an oath in public meetings to follow the
pledge throughout the entire province.922 Such a consolidation welded the province into a
force which could counter an attack by Jiang’s troops. Under these circumstances, Jiang
had to modify his projected measures against the movement.

917
The Guangxi forces were expanded to 200,000 soldiers and reorganized in twenty-one
divisions, which was a powerful force Jiang Jieshi could not underestimate. For details of
the systems and organization of the Guangxi troops during the movement, see Appendix 4.
918
U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
919
Ibid, No. 9426 (July 3, 1936).
920
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 310.
921
U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
922
Nanning minguo ribao, September 2, 1936, p. 1.

301
 In continuing the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy and countering possible attacks by Jiang
at this stage, the Clique also sought to maintain and strengthen its contacts with other
parties and groups who were willing to fight Japan. That is to say, they had put the AJNUF
into action during the movement. Its theoretical foundation derived from the scorched earth
resistance policy (as discussed earlier). In their view, once the movement for resisting
Japan was launched, all parties and groups throughout the country, whatever differences in
political belief held, had a duty to China to form a firm united front to strive for national
liberation. Nanning minguo ribao repeatedly discussed this issue and loudly called for it
during the movement.923 They believed such a movement should obtain broad support.924
There were several steps taken by the Clique in the formation of a wide anti-
Japanese united front. First, Guangxi protected freedoms of speech and the press in
contrast to Nanjing’s restriction of speech and movement that was anti-Japanese. Aside
from the areas under the control of the CCP, Guangxi might claim to be the only place
where anti-Japanese propaganda and mass demonstrations were not interferred by the
government under the flag of the GMD before 1936.925 For example, Chuangjin yuekan
(Pioneer Monthly), organ of the Guangxi troops, even published some speeches and theses
of Karl Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and other popular international Communist politicians, whose
names often appeared in publications of the CCP.926 The Clique used them to serve their
own propaganda, or, perhaps these came from its Brains Trust who were familiar with the
Communist doctrine (as dealt with earlier), as this journal in 1936 was calling for the
formation of the AJNUF to fight Japan. Whatever the underlying reason, there was
projected a generous attitude towards the mass media on the part of the Clique. Shen
Junru, a well-known figure throughout the country at that time, and his organization, i.e. the
Federation of the National Salvation Associations (quanguo gejie jiuguohui), expressed

923
For example, see Nanning minguo ribao, May 26, 1936, August 16, 1936, October 14,
1936. Also see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
924
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127 (Oct. 16, 1962), p. 16.
925
See “Liuyi yulun yiban”, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, p. 269; Jiuwang qingbao (Newsletter of National Salvation), July 26,
1936; and Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi guogong hezuo jishi, Chongqing:
Chongqing chubanshe, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 104-5 (hereafter as Kangzhan).
926
CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9 (June 1936), pp. 1-5.

302
appreciation of this practice,927 which was perhaps the reason for the participation of his
comrades and this popular organization in support of the June 1 Movement.928 Even
Western observers also recognized that freedom of speech and movement which was anti-
Japanese existed in Guangxi.929 In so doing, according to the Clique itself, it attempted to
achieve a united front in public opinion.930
As freedom of speech was a major concern of those other groups and parties at that
time, the practice of the Clique attracted much support in those sections of the dissident
media and propaganda organs which had suffered heavily under Jiang’s iron censorship.
All bodies concerned with the anti-Japanese cause were moved to assist the Clique in
countering the Jiang group’s criticism.931 Meanwhile, personalities and representatives of
all patriotic parties and groups rushed to Guangxi from all directions. In a short period
Guangxi became a medley of voices from various figures with different interests, speaking
for resistance or advocating opposition to Jiang, even seeking positions or ranks in both the
army and the government if an opposition government to Nanjing was to be set up there.932

927
Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan, Vol. 1, pp. 98-109; and “Liuyi yulun yiban”,
in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 274-
279.
928
For details of the relationship between the Guangxi Clique and the Federation of the
National Salvation Associations, see Chen Dawen, “Guixi yu jiuguohui de guanxi”,
NNWSZL, No. 5 (1988).
929
A. Bisson, Japan in China, New York: The Macmillam Company, 1938, p. 140.
930
Nanning minguo ribao, May 26, 1936, p. 3.
931
These organs included Dazhong ribao, Chaoran bao, Jiuwang qingbao, Yongsheng
Weekly, Giu Guo Sh Bao, and others published in the foreign concessions, Hong Kong, and
overseas. For details see Zhonghua minguo guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu
zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Xi’nan fadong kangri hou gefang zhi yulun, Nanning, 1936; and
“Liuyi yulun yiban”, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi
de yanlun.
932
These people were representatives of the following parties and groups: the Hu Hanmin
Faction, the Reorganization Faction, the Li Jishen Faction, the Federation of National
Salvation Associations and its branches in many provinces, the CCP, the former 19th Route
Army, Zhonghua minzu geming tongmeng (the Chinese National Revolutionary Coalition),
Shengchan renmindang (the Productive People’s Party), the Third Party, Zhonghua zhiye
jiaoyushe (the Chinese Professional Education Association), the Rural Reconstruction
Faction, the Chinese Youth Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, and other public figures
without party affiliation. For details see Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 295.

303
Indeed, as the Fujian Rebellion before, these people were prepared to form a united
government to carry out their own policy of resistance against Japan, and to oppose Jiang as
well, if he still attempted to suppress the movement. A dangerous anti-Jiang atmosphere
existed in Guangxi. Li and Bai were, of course, willing to encourage this even if they did
not expect it to culminate in a military clash with Jiang and his Central troops. According
to Liu Fei, who later became the person who carried the messages between the Guangxi
leaders and Jiang for a peaceful settlement of their differences in the movement, this was all
a tactic of Li and Bai to counter the pressure from Jiang.933 Whatever the reason, it
indicated that such a broad united front formed in Guangxi, at least partially, from aversion
to Jiang's high pressure policy against the Clique.
At the same time, the Clique strengthened its contact with the CCP in the
movement, to counter Jiang’s pressure and to plan for possible joint resistance. Apart from
frequent meetings between their representatives, there were permanent contacts both within
and outside the province.934 The most important result was a draft agreement worked out
with the CCP in forming an alliance for resistance and for forcing Jiang to resist Japan as
well.935 Although there is no corroborative evidence at present to show the detailed
contents of the entire agreement, the event itself indicated that the Clique paid great
attention to the CCP in their search for partners in concerted action. Here the CCP and the
Red Army were believed by the Guangxi leaders to be the most important force in
compelling Jiang to give up his plan of eliminating the Clique, but to accept the demands of
the latter. Furthermore, the former were regarded as a balanced force between the Clique
and Jiang, as Bai once foretold in 1934 when the Guangxi troops were ordered to check the
Red Army passing through the Guangxi border from Jiangxi for the Long March:936 “only

933
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 293-4.
934
See Yun Guangying, “Liuyi”; and the same writer, “Teshu shiming”, GMSZL, No. 10.
Yun was the representative of the Red Army under the CCP and came from northern
Shaanxi. Before the movement, the Clique sent its representative Liu Zongrong to Tianjin
to establish contact with the CCP. See Liu Zongrong, “Huiyi wo zai guixi gongzuo shi de
jijianshi”, WSZLXJ, No. 73.
935
See Wenjian xuanbian, pp. 278-9. For details of discussion of the agreement, see
Chapter Five of this thesis.
936
For details of the Guangxi troops' checking the Red Army coming from Jiangxi by
passing through the Guangxi border for Guizhou and then northward, see Zhonggong
Guilin diwei (ed.), Hongjun changzheng guo Guangxi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1986; Mo

304
the existence of the CCP and the Red Army could guarantee our survival”.937 It is safe to
say that the establishment of close contact with the CCP undoubtedly added confidence to
the Clique in confronting Jiang, and was an important factor in reaching a final conciliation
with Jiang Jieshi and joint forces between them for resistance against Japan.
Furthermore, reorganization of the 19th Route Army in the province to form an
alliance with the Clique was another important counter-measure against Jiang.938 The
reputation of the 19th Route Army, won in fighting Japan in 1932, was legendary, and the
alliance between this army and the Guangxi troops indicated determination to resist further
invasion. This expanded strength added confidence to the Guangxi people, and was a
convincing warning to Jiang against military action.
While the Clique speeded up the formation of the AJNUF, a rumour spread
throughout the entire country that Li and Bai would unite with other parties and groups
which opposed Nanjing, and form a military government in Guangxi with the aim of
resistance against both Japan and Jiang.939 The choice of persons in the planning of such a
government, including Li Jishen and former leaders of the Fujian Rebellion, had in fact
been already prepared for.940 If Jiang pushed his Central troops further into the province of
Guangxi, the Clique would immediately declare the establishment of this new government

Wenhua, Huiyi hongqijun, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1979; Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao
yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng qinli ji: yuan Guomindang
jiangling de huiyi, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1990; and recollections of Tang Yao and Yan
Daogang in the Bibliography of this thesis.
937
Tang Yao, “Hongjun changzheng zhong Bai Chongxi ‘kaifang’ Xiang-Gui bianjing de
neimu”, GXWSZL, No. 17, p. 162.
938
For details of the reorganization of the 19th Route Army, see Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai
zizhuan, pp. 441-6; and Lin Yiyuan, “Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian zhong shijiu lujun yidu
zai-Gui huifu de jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 3 (1961), pp. 150-5. This army was disarmed
by Jiang Jieshi after he defeated the Fujian Rebellion early in 1934. For details see Wang
Shunsheng et al, Fujian Shibian, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1982; Xue Moucheng
and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), Fujian shibian ziliao xuanbian, Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin
chubanshe, 1983; Cai Tingkai, “Huiyi shijiu lujun zai-Min fan-Jiang shibai jingguo”,
WSZLXJ, No. 59; Jiang Guangnai, “Dui shijiu lujun yu ‘Fujian shibian’ de buchong”, ibid,
No. 59; and Xu Xiqing, “‘Fujian renmin zhengfu’ yundong”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961).
939
Shenbao, June 13, 1936, p. 3.
940
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 295-302; and Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, pp.
18-9.

305
in Nanning. Of course, this was a tactic of the Clique. Once irrevocably committed to the
policy of calling for resistance, the Clique had to declare its intention to meet a real or
invented public demand for the formation of a united government willing to fight Japan.941
Although this planned government was never established, it seemed that a united front for
national salvation had already appeared in Guangxi. According to the writers of the Clique,
the existence of a united front was proclaimed to act as a coalition against the Chinese
traitors’ front (hanjian zhenxian) which appeased Japanese aggression but suppressed the
internal elements and forces who wanted to fight Japan.942
Actual war between the two parties was finally averted when Jiang decided to
compromise with the Guangxi leaders. Perhaps Jiang had known that, if a civil war against
Guangxi occurred, it would be a prolonged one.943 If so, before he defeated the Clique,
Jiang would face another vital threat from the CCP, which was planning to form a similar
government as that planned in Guangxi by joining forces with both Yang Hucheng’s
Xibeijun and Zhang Xueliang’s Dongbeijun in the Northwest.944 If this happened, it was
possible that his rule would be shaken to its foundations. At the critical time, some GMD
veterans with potential influence in both military and political circles, such as Cheng Qian,
Feng Yuxiang, Zhu Peide, Ju Zheng, and Huang Shaohong, persuaded Jiang to compromise
with the Clique, and played the role of intermediary between the two sides.945 The Clique
had thus successfully used the consolidation of Guangxi and its influence in the practice of

941
For details see the discussions of Giu Guo Sh Bao at the end of 1935 and in the early
of 1936.
942
CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
943
Huang Shaohong told Jiang that the Guangxi Clique would not be easy to defeat and
might resist an external attack for over three months or more according to historical
experience, and the morale of the Clique and consolidation of the interior, as well as the
varied topography of Guangxi. See Huang Shaohong, Wushi Huiyi, p. 310. Also see Yong
Sou (pseud., i.e. Zheng Renmin), “Jiang-Li diyici lihe neimu”, CQ, No. 62 (February 1,
1960), p. 5.
944
Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 171-81.
945
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 296-302; Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of
Li Tsung-jen, p.310; Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 19; and “Guiju dayou
zhuanji” (A favourable turn for the situation of Guangxi), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 35; and
“Guiju heping jiejue jingguo” (The story of the peaceful settlement of the situation in
Guangxi), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 37.

306
the AJNUF, in fact, to form a threat strong enough to compel Jiang to sit down and to talk
with Li and Bai.946 Showing his flexibility to seize the moment to compromise, Jiang
ordered all Central Government and Guangdong troops to withdraw fifty li947 from the
Guangxi border in order to avoid clashes, and the Guangxi leaders began to talk with their
old rival.948 After discussions between the two parties through Liu Fei and other politicians
and militarists, the main points of the terms that Li and Bai put forth to end their radical
action against Jiang instead of compromise with the latter are as follows:
1) The Central Government reaffirms the freedom of the anti-Japanese
movement, speech, publication, and assembly.
2) The Central Government promises that China will prepare for resistance
positively based on the present situation existing between China and Japan.
If the Japanese advance one more inch, China will carry out the nationwide
resistance. Once resistance begins, Guangxi will immediately send its
troops to join in.
3) Nanjing should make the anti-Japanese plan and schedule, and must carry it
out as soon as possible.
4) The status quo of Guangxi should be maintained and Nanjing should assist
the Guangxi troops with military expenditure.
5) Nanjing should provide three designations of the army (jun) to the Guangxi
troops and ensure Li Zongren’s commandership.
6) After the achievement of the agreement above, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi
will pledge allegiance to the leadership of Jiang Jieshi by a circular
telegram.949
In addition, except that item 3 above should be kept secret as military intelligence,
the Clique insisted that Jiang must announce these terms to the public by a speech to show
his trustworthiness. Although there was some small retrogression from their original
demand of immediate resistance, these terms still basically reflected the efforts of the
Clique in forcing Jiang to the stage of resistance, and showed that the Guangxi leaders were

946
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 310.
947
One li = 500 meters.
948
For details that suggest Jiang Jieshi took action on his own initiative in peaceful
settlement of the differences between himself and the Guangxi leaders in August 1936, see
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 91-3; Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 296-302; and U. S.
Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936), and No. 9460 (September 11, 1936). Also see
Chongqing shi dangan guan (ed.), “Liangguang liuyi shibian hou Jiang Jieshi yu Li Zongren
deng laiwang handian”, LSDA, No. 4, 1987, pp. 75-9 (hereafter as “Handian”).
949
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 297-8; and Chen Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 91-4; and
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 19.

307
realists in the Chinese political game - avoiding too drastic action to cause a result being
contrary to their original intention. It also indicated that the achievements of the practice in
the AJNUF was in fact a tactic used by the Clique to force a compromise with Jiang. In
the end, the latter adopted all terms demanded by the former in early September.950
Moreover, to show his willingness to unite all other political figures of the GMD, for
resistance, Jiang even ordered the wanted circular on Generals Li Jishen and Chen Mingshu
to be repealed, and pardoned them for having fomented the Fujian Rebellion in 1933 and
for having insisted on resisting Japan and opposing Jiang (i.e. kangri fan-Jiang) after
this.951
The result of the June 1 Movement indicates that, in most respects the Clique
achieved its objectives of “bi-Jiang kangri”. A number of writers suggest that the success
of the Clique in the promotion of the AJNUF was largely due to the CCP.952 However, the
development of modern Chinese history indicates that the formation of the AJNUF was a
reflection of the context, a requirement which many parties and groups, not the CCP only,
had called for from time to time. It is true that the CCP worked out the famous slogan -
“anti-Japanese national united front” - in 1935, which led this party not only to survive at
the eleventh hour but also to strengthen itself in the Sino-Japanese war until it successfully
overthrew the rule of the Nationalists on the mainland in 1949.953 There is no
corroborative evidence to show any close affinity with the CCP in the actions of the Clique,
even though both advocated similar policies but different tactics. For example, both of
them pushed for the formation of a united government or a national defence government for
resistance.954 In fact, the positions and policies of all parties and groups who insisted on
resistance against Japan were influenced by each other. In the case of the June 1

950
See “The major events of the week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 38, p. 1.
951
U. S. Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936).
952
For example, see articles written by Wang Jingxia, Zhang Qi, Shi Shunjin, Luo
Yunshu, Li Ming, Lu Jiaxiang, Guo Xiaohe, Luo Jianing, Gu Guanlin, Cao Yuwen, Cao
Guangzhe, Chen Mingzhong, Li Jingzhi, Zhang Meiling, Zhang Guangchuan, Xia Chao,
Wang Qingshan and Deng Xueyi, in the Bibliography of this thesis.
953
For detailed discussion of the CCP’s road to the final victory based on the AJNUF, see
Kui-Kwong Shum, Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National
United Front, 1935-1945, Hong Kong and London: Oxford University Press, 1988.
954
For details of these discussions of the Clique, see CJYK, Vol. 3, Nos. 8 and 9, 11-12.

308
Movement, the work of the Clique in the formation of the AJNUF was, to a great extent, on
their own initiative. The CCP preferred at that time to form a national united front with the
lower and middle classes in resisting both Japan and Jiang (fan-Jiang kangri).955 The result
of the movement indicated that reconciliation or unity with Jiang for resistance had been
the purpose of the Clique in the formation of the AJNUF, i.e. “bi-Jiang kangri”, although
preparation for “fan-Jiang kangri” proceeded during the movement, in case Jiang refused
reconciliation. The Clique always treated Jiang as an important element of the AJNUF.
This was perhaps a stance which suited their propaganda, for both the Clique and Jiang
were always more likely to compromise than Jiang and the CCP. As Li Zongren said on
June 8, 1936,
If the Central Government resists Japan, of course it is the fortune of our nation,
because we are willing to unite all of the people for fighting Japan with one mind.
If now they still hesitate, we simply must resist Japan by ourselves.956
The performance of the Clique in the Sino-Japanese War proved that Li and the Guangxi
troops not only put forth the political rhetoric for resistance themselves but also put it into
execution.957 As Diana Lary emphasizes, while fighting in central China, the Guangxi
troops “acquitted themselves well - far better than the majority under Nanking’s
command”958 throughout the War.
It was also a factor that the Clique, from 1931 onward, strove to build up and
develop its relationships and cooperation with other GMD factions, in particular, with those
of the Southwest region (as discussed in Chapter Five), in order to foster resistance to the
Japanese.
The Clique's AJNUF served the purpose of “bi-Jiang kangri”, which was the key to
all parties and groups who later came under Jiang’s leadership for resistance, whether they
were willing or not. In this sense, the AJNUF of the Clique was beneficial to resistance,
whatever the motive. Many writers recognize that the Clique practiced the policy of “bi-
Jiang kangri” in the movement, but they attribute it to the influence and collusion of the

955
For details of speeches and resolutions of the CCP in the formation of a national
united front for “fan-Jiang kangri”, see Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 1-166.
956
Li Zongren, “Kangri jiuguo de zhengzhi baogao”, in Meng Guanghan et al (eds.),
Kangzhan, p. 291.
957
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 155-156.
958
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 206.

309
CCP, or believe it was only with the assistance of the Communists.959 However, that was
not the case.
CCP documents before the June 1 Movement emphasized the “anti-Japanese and
opposition to Jiang” policy as their main task, although they called for a national united
front. Theoretically, this united front was based on a national defence government in which
the CCP would be the main force. In this policy, the national united front was part of the
general tactics to achieve its purpose. The CCP believed the June 1 Movement was one of
the “kangri taoni” (resisting both Japan and traitors), i.e. “kangri fan-Jiang”. For example,
in a telegram on May 20, 1936, the CCP leaders still emphasized that the single and central
task of the party at present was to oppose both Japanese imperialism and Jiang.960 On May
31, the CCP stated that its task in the two Guangs was to promote Li immediately to carry
out programs of “kangri fan-Jiang” in the sphere of Guangxi.961 In other words, there is no
corroborative evidence that the CCP had changed its policy to that of “bi-Jiang kangri”,
before the June 1 Movement.
Further, while it is true that the CCP sent its representative Yun Guangying to
Guangxi during the movement, Yun left the base of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi late
in June, and stayed in Tianjin for a short period. He could not have arrived in Nanning
until early in August 1936.962 He may have passed some CCP messages to the Guangxi
leaders, but the CCP and the Red Army had not completely changed their policy before he
left, while the Clique had already carried out the policy in the province before his arrival.
At the very least, these messages could have had no influence on the Clique's policy which
had already been put into practice; but it is possible that they ensured the Red Army support

959
For details of this view in the relevant articles, see Cao Guangzhe, Cao Yuwen, Chen
Mingzhong, Gu Guanlin, Guo Xiaohe, Luo Jianing, Li Jingzhi, Li Ming, Lu Jiaxiang, Luo
Yunshu, Wang Jingxia, Shi Shunjin, Wang Jianqiu, Zhang Qi, Wang Qingshan, Deng
Xueyi,Zhang Guangchuan, Zhang Meiling and so on, in the Bibliography of this thesis.
960
Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, p. 148.
961
Dashiji, p. 97.
962
For details of dates when Yun arrived at Nanning, see Yun Guangying, “Liuyi”.

310
for the action of the Clique, because the Communists saw it as an action which could cause
a split within the GMD bloc, according to Mao Zedong’s speech on June 8.963
On the contrary, there is evidence to indicate that the Clique’s practice in “bi-Jiang
kangri” provided an example which caused the Communists to modify their policy. The
most important evidence is a secret telegram issued by Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders
on September 1, 1936. The telegram clearly expressed the view that they should modify
their present policy (i.e. “kangri fan-Jiang”) in the promotion of the AJNUF, according to
the changed situation. It says:
The main enemy of the Chinese people at present is Japanese imperialism. For this
reason, it is wrong to put Japanese imperialism and Jiang Jieshi on an equal footing,
and the slogan of “kangri fan-Jiang” is also not suited (to the needs of the present
situation).964
Many scholars suggest that this telegram is a sign of the CCP finally forming its policy of
“bi-Jiang kangri”, instead of its previous “fan-Jiang kangri”.965 Judged from the process
of the June 1 Movement, the issue of this telegram coincided with the events that showed
the Clique and Jiang reaching a point close to reconciliation. Jiang’s new willingness to
compromise with the movement indicated that he was also willing to assume the leadership
of national resistance. It was also a chance for the CCP and the Red Army to readjust their
policy. At that time, the CCP was forming an alliance with the forces of Zhang Xueliang
and Yang Hucheng in the Northwest, which will be discussed later. Apart from this,
another main force of the Red Army led by Zhang Guotao, Zhu De, Xu Xiangqian and He
Long, i.e. the ally of the Second Front Army (dier fangmianjun) and Fourth Front Army
(disi fangmianjun), was on the way northward to the northern Shaanxi and would soon join
forces with Mao Zedong’s Central Red Army, i.e. the First Front Army (diyi fangmianjun).
The fact that the three forces of the Red Army were on the point of joining forces and that
the alliance with Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng had worked well provided the CCP
with a powerful backing to convert its policy from “kangri fan-Jiang” into that of “bi-Jiang
kangri”, at the same time as the Guangxi leaders did. In this sense, there is no doubt that

963
See Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 161-4, and pp. 167-170; Meng Guanghan et al
(eds.), Kangzhan, pp. 183-91; and Dashiji, p. 98. Also see Wang Jingxia, “Shilun
Zhongguo gongchandang yu ‘liangguang shibian’”, GXSHKX, No. 4, 1988, pp. 194-216.
964
Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, p. 251.
965
Rong Weimu and Zhao Gang, “Zhonggong ‘bi-Jiang’ celue fangzhen de xingcheng”,
JDSYJ, No. 3, 1988, pp. 280-90.

311
the Clique’s initiative provided the CCP and the Red Army with a theoretical basis for the
conversion of their policy. Of course, the result of the June 1 Movement was not the only
reason behind the CCP’s change of policy,966 but it was undoubtedly an important one.
The future of the formation of the AJNUF was made secure by the support given in
cooperation by the Clique and the CCP (as dealt with in Chapter Five), and confirmed
when reconciliation with Jiang guaranteed genuine resistance to the Japanese after the
outbreak of the “Lugouqiao Incident” in July 7, 1937. It became both the symbol and the
unifying organ of that resistance. The CCP had, by taking advantage of the unity
throughout the country to fight the national enemy, adjusted its policies to accommodate
those of the Clique, and went on to expand and develop its policies and its power base in
the AJNUF, realizing clearly the significance and potential of this unifying body. On the
other hand, the Clique, having made its deal with Jiang, began to concern itself with the
parties and groups which had come to the province to help the June 1 Movement, with
preparations for the impending war, and with ensuring that Jiang carried out fully his part
of the agreement and that its group fulfilled its duty in the field of resistance. In doing so,
they left much of the united front initiative to forces within the CCP, which alone seemed
to sense its enormous potential for power.

Relationship Between the June 1 Movement and the Xi’an Incident

Whatever the role the Guangxi Clique played in the promotion of the formation of
the AJNUF, it is certain that the June 1 Movement had a great impact on the events
afterwards. On December 12, 1936, Young Marshal Zhang Xueliang of the Dongbeijun
and General Yang Hucheng of the Xibeijun joined forces and kidnapped Jiang in Xi'an,
capital of Shaanxi province. After shocking China for two weeks with a series of
complicated negotiations and internal struggles in which many groups became involved, on
Christmas Day, surprisingly, Young Marshal Zhang personally flew his prisoner back to
Luoyang, Henan, a base of the Central troops, then to Nanjing on the following day, in his
private aeroplane. The event dramatically ended there. It was the famous “Xi’an Incident”,

966
For detailed discussion of the CCP’s “bi-Jiang kangri” change of policy, see Zhang
Guiying, “Lun Zhang Xueliang jiangjun zoushang liangong kangri de daolu”, in Quanguo
zhonggong dangshi yanjiuhui (ed.), Kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian yu dierci guogong
hezuo, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1989, pp. 294-331.

312
a milestone which greatly changed the course of modern China’s history.967 In fact, this
event had a close relationship with the June 1 Movement.968 Three days after the “Xi’an
Incident” occurred, Mao Zedong and other Red Army generals, in a telegram to the
Nationalist Government, set a high value on this incident and put it in a close relationship
with the June 1 Movement:
The Xi’an Incident today is no more than one of the triple event (dingzu ersan969),
following the Fujian Rebellion and the Two Guang Incident. In all of the three the
justice flag is resolutely raised by the wise and sagacious heroes of your party as
they have insisted on resistance against Japan and are discontented with Jiang's
actions of yielding to Japan and betraying our country.970
Indeed, the June 1 Movement not only resulted in reconciliation between the two
major factions within the GMD, but also led to disaffected generals Zhang Xueliang and
Yang Hucheng taking another and more radical action to compel Jiang by military force to

967
There are many books and material collections available on the Xi’an Incident, such as
Yin Detian, Zhang Xueliang; Li Jinzhou, Xi’an shibian qinli ji, Taipei: ZJWXS, 1972;
James Bertram, First Act in China: The Story of the Sian Mutiny, New York: Viking Press,
1938; Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China: 1936-1945, Cambridge, Mass.: East
Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1974; and Cuncui xueshe (compiled), Wei
dierci guogong hezuo puping daolu de - Xi’an shibian yu Zhang Xueliang, Hong Kong:
Dadong tushu gongsi, 1978; Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan et al (eds.), “Xi’an shibian”
ziliao xuanbian, Beijing: DACBS, 1986. Jiang Jieshi and Song Meiling as well as Kong
Xiangxi published their memoirs of the Xi'an Incident. See Jiang Zhongzheng (Jieshi),
Xi’an banyue ji, in Dadi chubanshe (ed.), Xi’an shibian sanyi, Hong Kong: Dadi
chubanshe, 1962; Jiang Song Meiling, Xi’an shibian huiyi lu, in Ibid; Lu Bi, Lun Zhang
Xueliang xiansheng, in Cuncui xueshe (ed.), Wei dierci guogong hezuo puping daolu de -
Xi'an shibian yu Zhang Xueliang, 1978, pp. 309-385; and Kong Xiangxi, “Xi’an shibian
huiyi lu”, DSYJTX, No. 11, 1982. Also see Fu Honglin, Zhang Xueliang de zhenhzhi
shengya, Shenyang: LNDXCBS, 1988; Sima Sangdun, Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, Hong
Kong: Xinghui tushu gongsi, 1986; and Tien-wei Wu, The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in
Modern Chinese History, Ann Arbor: Michigan University, 1976 (hereafter as The Sian).
968
In an article in memory of the two events of the June 1 Movement and the Xi’an
Incident, Professor Te-kong Tong expresses the same view. See Te-kong Tong, “The
Fiftieth Anniversary of the Xi’an Incident and the June First Incident: A Casual Review of
Liu Tingfang’s ‘Untold Story’”, Chinese Studies in History, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1988), pp. 79-
94.
969
Dingzu ersan might be translated as the three legs of a tripod. Here the Fujian
Rebellion, the June 1 Movement and the Xi'an Incident are treated as a whole, each
representing a leg of a tripod.
970
See “The Reds generals to the Guomindang Nationalist Government for the Xi’an
Incident, December 15, 1936”, Wendian xuanbian, Vol. 2, p. 319.

313
launch war against Japan. The Xi'an Incident, in fact, was the continuity of the policy that
the Clique insisted on in the June 1 Movement, and was the opening signal that the second
national united front between the GMD and CCP for resistance had begun to form. In this
sense, the contribution of the June 1 Movement to the AJNUF can not be overestimated.
In that case, how did the June 1 Movement relate to the Xi’an Incident? Let us
explore some possible dimensions of the relationship between them.

1. The close contact between the Guangxi Clique and the Zhang Xueliang-Yang
Hucheng union strengthened their determination to pursue the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy.
As mentioned earlier, the Clique had contacts with Zhang and Yang during the June
1 Movement. In fact, such contact can be traced back to 1934. On March 27, in a meeting
of the two Southwest organizations, Li Zongren supported the policy of getting in touch
with Zhang and his Dongbeijun.971 Of course, at that time the aim of this contact was to
serve the Guangxi’s “fan-Jiang kangri” policy.972 Zhang and his Dongbeijun also secretly
gave positive response to the Southwest.973 According to General He Zhuguo, a senior
subordinate of Zhang, the Dongbeijun had then carried out a policy of keeping in touch
with and mutual support for the Clique.974 After the Guangxi leaders changed their policy
to “bi-Jiang kangri”, the Clique strengthened contact with both Zhang and Yang.975 In
early 1936, Zhang sent Xie Fang, his private representative, on behalf of him, to Guangxi to
call on Li and Bai. Li expressed his positive feelings to the Dongbeijun, which now had
been sent to Shaanxi to fight the Red Army, which had just ended its Long March and

971
See Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”,
KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, p. 125 (hereafter as “Hu Hanmin”).
972
Ibid, pp. 109-12, and pp. 123-5.
973
Ibid.
974
He Zhuguo, “Xin Guixi yu Dongbeijun zhijian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 27-36.
975
According to Liu Zongrong, who was sent by Li Zongren to Xi’an calling on Yang
Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang in late 1935, the leaders of both Dongbeijun and Xibeijun
expressed their support of the Guangxi Clique's anti-Japanese action. For details see Liu
Zongrong, “Xi’an”. Also, in the summer of 1935, General Ye Qi met Zhang Xueliang in
Hankou. It might be regarded as the Guangxi Clique strengthening its relations, on its own
initiative, with the Dongbeijun. See Yunnan sheng dangan guan (ed.), “Liuyi shibian
zhong de Long Yun”, YNDASL, No. 7, 1984, p. 45; and Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ,
No. 126, p. 13.

314
arrived in the north of this province, and explained his belief that the Dongbeijun should
avoid a civil war with the Red Army. Instead Li hoped that Zhang could maintain his
strength to redress the stigma of “non-resistant general” when the opportunity came. Li
also expressed the will of Guangxi to cooperate with the Dongbeijun for resistance.976
When he received these messages passed by Xie Fang, Zhang “was somewhat moved”.977
Furthermore, in April of the same year, Li and Bai wrote Zhang a secret letter. In the letter,
they stated that the most urgent task of national salvation at present was that of resisting
Japan. They hoped that Zhang would join them to stop the civil war waged by Jiang and
demand instead that he fight against Japan.978 These points indicate that the Clique
frequently and continuously tried to draw Zhang and his Dongbeijun over to its side, and
perhaps, as a result, the two parties were establishing a close relationship.
The efforts of the Clique won eventual success. There is evidence that Zhang and
Yang indeed worked out a plan to coincide with the action of Li and Bai in the Southwest
during the June 1 Movement. According to some sources, the reason for the failure to put
the plan into action was that, on the one hand, both the Dongbeijun and the Xibeijun
worried at first about the security of Zhang, who was attending the Second Plenum in
Nanjing at that time, and, on the other, that after Zhang returned to Xi’an, the base of both
the Dongbeijun and the Xibeijun, the June 1 Movement had withdrawn to Guangxi and
been nearing peaceful settlement.979 Although in the end they failed to carry out the action,
the plan they formulated indicates that Zhang and Yang were in full agreement with the
demands and policy of the Clique in the movement. Whatever the motive, according to

976
For details of Zhang Xueliang’s “non-resistance” and his relations with Jiang Jieshi in
dealing with Japanese aggression before 1936, see Wu Tianwei (Tien-wei), “Jiang Jieshi yu
jiuyiba shibian”, KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1992, pp. 41-53; and Gao Cunxin, “Zhang Xueliang,
Jiang Jieshi zai ‘rangwai’ yu ‘annei’ wenti shang de fenqi”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1992, pp. 44-
51. Also see Guan Ning and Zhang Youkun (trans.), Jianmo wushi yunian, Zhang
Xueliang kaikou shuohua, Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1992 (hereafter as
Jianmo wushi).
977
Quoted in Zhu Dexin, “Lun Fujian shibian, Liangguang shibian, Xi’an shibian de
guanxi”, XSLT, No. 5, 1992, p. 39 (Hereafter as “Guanxi”).
978
For contents of the confidential letter, see GXWSZL, No. 19, p. 237.
979
Wang Juren, “Ji Xi’an shibian qianhou de jijianshi”, Quanguo zhengxie (ed.), Xi’an
shibian qinli ji, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1986, p. 135; and Shen Bocun, Xi’an shibian jishi,
1979, Beijing: ZHSJ, 1979, p. 71 (quoted in Zhu Dexin, “Guanxi”, p. 38).

315
Tien-wei Wu, the anti-Japanese stand taken by the two Guang leaders was a great challenge
to Zhang, a young man who above all took upon himself the responsibility for recovering
the lost Northeastern provinces.980 Now the more he heard of the outcry for fighting Japan,
the more he felt ashamed of his failure in resisting Japan during the “September 18
Incident” for which he had gained the stigma of a “non-resistant” general, because the
Northeastern provinces were lost when he had been the paramount leader there. Instead,
leaders and soldiers, even those who lived in the South, far away from the front facing
Japanese aggression, had insisted on the anti-Japanese stand and prepared to take action on
their own initiative.981
After the peaceful settlement of the June 1 Movement, Li again sent his private
representative named Liu Zongrong to Xi’an for discussion of further joint action. They all
expressed the wish for “further cooperation in the future”.982 Although there is no evidence
that the Clique was involved in the launching of the Xi’an Incident, it is reasonable to
suggest that the close relations with the Clique and the support from the Guangxi leaders
strengthened the determination of both Zhang and Yang to put the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy
into action as the former had already done several months earlier.

2. The June 1 Movement provided a chance for both Zhang Xueliang and Yang
Hucheng to create and develop the situation of jointly resisting Japan in the Northwest.
According to a number of reminiscences and articles, before, during, and after the
June 1 Movement, the Zhang Xueliang-Yang Hucheng union emerged and both formed
direct ties with the CCP.983 At the same time, the CCP also stepped up its alliance with
both Dongbeijun and the Xibeijun after Zhang met Zhou Enlai, one of the senior leaders of
the CCP and the Red Army, in April of that year. As a result, the three sides, i.e. Zhang’s

980
Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, p. 38.
981
Fu Honglin, Zhang Xueliang de zhengzhi shengya, pp. 158-9.
982
Xi'an shibian ziliao, Vol. 2, p. 166 (quoted in Zhu Dexin, “Guanxi”, p. 38); Liu
Zongrong, “Xi’an”; and Yin Detian, Zhang Xueliang, p. 75.
983
For example, Li Jinzhou, Xi’an shibian qinli ji, pp. 19-21; Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, pp.
51-53; Ying Detian, Zhang Xueliang, pp. 53-63; Zhang Guiying, “Lun Zhang Xueliang
jiangjun zoushang liangong kangri de daolu”. Also see Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang Chung-
cheng), Soviet Russia in China - A Summing-up at Seventy, Taipei, China Publishing
Company, 1969, p. 78.

316
Dongbeijun, Yang’s Xibeijun, and the Red Army, formed an anti-Japanese united front in
the Northwest, which the CCP and the Red Army called “sanwei yiti” (three-in-one united
front).984 In other words, when the Clique formed a united front in a region (i.e. the
Southwest) for “bi-Jiang kangri”, Jiang moved most of his Central troops to the South for
encirclement of the two Guangs, later of Guangxi only. As the military pressure from
Nanjing relaxed after several months, this undoubtedly provided a good chance for the CCP
to take advantage and to expand its own strength and to form a united front between the
Dongbeijun, the Xibeijun and the Red Army in the Northwest, and this laid a foundation for
both Zhang and Yang to later launch the Xi’an Incident.985

3. The Xi'an Incident was a reproduction of the Clique’s “bi-Jiang kangri” policy
through its use of military force to compel Jiang to resist Japan, a policy which was
carried out during the June 1 Movement.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the successful building of a united front with
other parties and groups, what the Clique depended on in carrying out the “bi-Jiang kangri”
policy was to use a subtle form of pressure, a vague threat of military force, i.e. “advice by
military force” to Jiang against his “non-resistance”. Zhang and Yang did the same, but
went much further than the Guangxi leaders. There is evidence that Yang expressed his
appreciation of the Clique’s action with his own version of military force after the June 1
Movement took place. Yang agreed with the view that this method would aim to “break
Jiang’s unification by force and the cessation of civil war”.986 Perhaps the June 1
Movement inspired in both Zhang and Yang the idea of “yinggan” (act recklessly).987 After
the peaceful settlement of the June 1 Movement, Jiang again moved his Central troops from
the Guangxi border to the Northwest. He aimed not only to eliminate the Red Army but

984
See “An outline for discussion of the task of the party” (May 30, 1936), Wenjian
xuanbian, Vol. 2, p. 158. Also see Zhang Xueliang, Xi’an shibian chanhui lu (Confession
of the Xi’an Incident), in Sima Sangdun, Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p. 389.
985
The documents of the CCP indicate that Mao and other leaders had a number of
instructions to develop and build up a united front in the Northwest for opposing both
Japan and Jiang during the June 1 Movement. See “Yuying and others to Zhu and Zhang”
(19/6/1936), Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 165-6.
986
Wang Juren, “Ji Xi’an shibian qianhou de jijianshi”, p. 135.
987
Ibid.

317
also to break the three-in-one united front. This was a similar situation to that faced by the
Clique during the June 1 Movement. It may also have supplied the reason for Zhang and
Yang to use military force to carry out radical action in order to reach their purpose of “bi-
Jiang kangri”.988 In fact, earlier in November, Yang had suggested to Zhang that they
kidnap Jiang to force the latter to launch a war of resistance.989 Whatever the motive,
Zhang finally adopted the method of “kidnapping”. The reason was, as Zhang said to his
subordinates, that he had failed in all his efforts to persuade Jiang to change the policy of
“annei rangwai”, and that radical action was the only means available.990 In fact, Li
Zongren also expressed a similar view that they had to take action of persuasion through
military force when the Southwest started the June 1 Movement.991 It indicates that the
more Jiang ignored the demand for the cessation of civil war to commence resistance, the
more opposition and radical action he would meet.

4. The demands of both the Movement and the Incident coincided.

The purpose of the Xi’an Incident was to urge Jiang to react positively to Japanese
aggression and to finally change his policy of “annei rangwai”. For this reason, Zhang and
Yang jointly put forth eight demands on December 12, 1936 as follows:
1) Reorganization of the Nanjing Government in such a way that all parties
might share the joint responsibility of saving the nation.
2) Cessation of all civil war.
3) Immediate release of the patriotic leaders arrested at Shanghai.
4) Release of all political prisoners throughout the country.
5) Removal of all restrictions on the patriotic movement of the people.
6) Safeguarding of the people’s freedom to organize and call meetings.
7) Effectual implementation of Dr Sun Yatsen’s last testament.
8) Immediate convocation of a National Salvation Conference.992

988
For details, see Yin Detian, Zhang Xueliang, pp. 84-91, Li Jinzhou, Xi’an shibian qinli
ji, pp. 25-6; Guo Zengkai, Yige lishi wenti de jiaodai, in Wei dierci guogong hezuo puping
daolu de - Xi’an shibian yu Zhang Xueliang, pp. 265-72.
989
Zhang Xueliang, Xi’an shibian chanhui lu, p. 388. In fact, before the suggestion of
Yang Hucheng, Miao Jianqiu, a radical officer of the Dongbeijun, also suggested the same
idea to Zhang. See Fu Honglin, Zhang Xueliang de zhengzhi shengya, p. 171.
990
Jianmo wushi, p. 120.
991
Li Zongren, “Kangri jiuguo de zhengzhi baogao”, p. 291.
992
A. Bisson, Japan in China, p. 168; Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, p. 82; and Ying Detian,
Zhang Xueliang, pp. 97-8.

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In comparison with the demands of the Guangxi Clique in the June 1 Movement (as
discussed earlier), the Guangxi leaders, and Zhang and Yang focused on the freedom of
speech and anti-Japanese movement and on the launching of resistance against Japan. In
fact, according to Wang Juren, secretary to Yang Hucheng at that time, six points among
these demands had already been prepared by the three sides of Yang’s Xibeijun, Song
Zheyuan, Commander of the 29th Army stationed at Hebei and Chahar provinces, and Han
Fuju, ruler of Shandong province, during the June 1 Movement, in order to issue them as a
circular telegram to support and coincide with the action taken by the Clique. The reason
for the failure to issue it was that they failed to take coincidental action, as mentioned
earlier. However, when the Xi’an Incident occurred, the famous December 12 manifesto
including the above eight demands, jointly issued by Zhang and Yang, was, in fact,
composed of the above Yang-Song-Han six demands plus items 3 and 7.993

In sum, as Zhu Dexin points out, “the June 1 Movement was the prelude to the
Xi’an Incident”.994 The latter was the continuity of, and further affirmed and expanded the
purpose pursued by the former. As a result of the Xi’an Incident, Jiang promised that the
CCP and GMD “must not have any more civil war” and must unite to repel aggression.995
Afterwards, the cooperation and the united front between the CCP and the GMD for
national salvation and resistance against Japan were set in train by a series of
negotiations.996 Under the circumstances that China needed to form a united front to fight
foreign aggression, the June 1 Movement could be seen as the prelude to the formation of
the AJNUF, and the Xi'an Incident was a continuation of the first stage of this AJNUF.
That is to say, although Jiang promised the Clique to cease civil war and to prepare for
resistance, his action of moving large numbers of Central troops and concentrating them in
the Northwest indicated that he still intended to carry out his policy of “annei rangwai”. In

993
Wang Juren, “Ji Xi’an shibian qianhou de jijianshi”, p. 135.
994
Zhu Dexin, “Guanxi”, p. 38. In this article, Zhu has the same view as the writer
discussed above.
995
Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, p. 148.
996
For details of these negotiations and the final formation of the anti-Japanese national
united front characterised by reconciliation between the CCP and GMD, see Meng
Guanghan (ed.), Kangzhan, Vol. 2, pp. 810-66; and Yang Kuisong, Shiqu de jihui? -
Zhanshi guogong tanpan shilu, Guilin: Guangxi Teachers University Press, 1992, pp. 1-59.

319
fact he broke faith not only with the Clique but also with all other parties and groups who
insisted on “rangwai caineng annei”, or “rangwai annei” (only resistance against foreign
aggression could achieve domestic pacification), including Zhang and Yang.997 In this
sense, the Xi’an Incident was necessary to complete the work that the June 1 Movement
had started but not finished.
Furthermore, the June 1 Movement achieved reconciliation between two major
political and military groups of the GMD, while the Xi’an Incident marked the
commencement of the formation of AJNUF, which was primarily formed by the two
opposed parties - the CCP and the GMD. In the Chinese situation at that time, only the
achievement of the former could lead to the latter. Historical events were often related. In
the case of both the June 1 Movement and the Xi’an Incident, the former was the
prerequisite to the latter, while the latter was based on the former and took China a step
further to reach a new point - the cessation of civil war throughout the entire nation and the
joining of forces with all parties and groups to fight Japan, because both had always centred
on “bi-Jiang kangri”. As a result, Jiang was “eventually forced to assume the leadership of
a national united front” in fighting Japan.998 In this sense, it is understood that the action of
the Clique during the Xi’an Incident, in which the Guangxi leaders supported Zhang and
Yang through the manifesto issued on December 17, demanding the reorganization of the
Central Government into an anti-Japanese national salvation regime and denouncing armed
suppression of the Xi’an rebels, and suggesting a peaceful solution of the incident as well,
was a historic and epic moment in the history of modern China. Li and Bai further declared
that the Guangxi authorities were still sticking to their anti-Japanese national salvation
policy and that the Xi’an problem should be settled through political negotiation.999 It

997
According to an interview with Japanese correspondents, Zhang recognizes that he
had insisted on “rangwai annei” as against Jiang Jieshi’s “annei rangwai”, during the
1930s. As stated in Chapter Six, the Guangxi Clique also shared the view of Zhang. For
details of Zhang’s view, see Jianmo wushi, p. 112.
998
A. Bisson, Japan in China, p. 174.
999
Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, pp. 115-6; and Ying Detian, Zhang Xueliang yu Xi’an
shibian, pp. 106-7. For details of the Clique’s response to the Xi’an Incident, see He
Zhuguo, “Xin Guixi yu Dongbeijun zhijian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 35-46; Lai Huipeng,
“Xi’an shibian yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZL, No. 17, pp. 155-7; Liu Zhongrong, “Xi’an shibian
de huiyi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 49-56; Long Zeying, “Xi’an shibian shi Guixi de taidu”,
GXWSZL, No. 17, pp. 158-9; and Bai Chongxi, “Zhongguo minzu geming jinhou de qushi,
28/12/1936”, in Nanning gengsheng baoshe (ed.), “Liuyi” Yundong hou Bai Chongxi de

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embodied the consistency shown by the Clique in carrying out its policy of “rangwai
annei” and “bi-Jiang kangri”.

Conclusion

The June 1 Movement was the culmination of the Clique’s policy of forcing Jiang
to resist Japan, which was based on Li’s “scorched earth resistance” idea. Along with
increasing military and political pressures from Jiang as counter-measures against the
action initiated by the Clique, the movement had eventually to give up all the group’s
regional and personal purposes, and the Clique was forced to focus on the pursuit of the
policy necessary to ensure China’s existence and to respond to the national tide of public
opinion in calling for resistance against Japan. In the end, through promoting the formation
of the AJNUF in the movement, which was the most successful and efficient tactic that the
Clique used, Jiang was forced to accept the demand for resistance. Of course, in this
political game, both the Clique and Jiang were winners. Jiang not only took Guangdong
under his direct control but also obtained the Clique’s declaration of allegiance to his
leadership throughout the entire nation, because the Clique outwardly abandoned its open
challenge to his leadership. For the Clique, not only did Li and Bai save face and retain
their power in the province, as Joseph Stilwell said, it appeared to be a case of “all is
forgiven, return home at once”.1000 However, the result of the movement also forced Jiang
to promise to take the leadership of active resistance against Japan, the most direct and
apparent purpose of the movement. Whatever the gain that both sides made from the
movement, the result was significant for the nation. It marked the beginning of a new era.
On the one hand, it provided an example to the CCP to readjust its policy in the AJNUF to
mirror that of the Clique, an example for converting the policy of “kangri fan-Jiang” into
that of “bi-Jiang kangri”, which was the basis on which the CCP compromised with Jiang
later. On the other hand, it encouraged both Zhang and Yang to engineer the “Xi’an
Incident”, which in the end ensured the success of the June 1 Movement. In short, this

yanlun, pp. 76-84; and Bai Chongxi, “Duiyu Xi’an shibian de renshi, 28/12/1936”, ibid, pp.
73-75.
1000
U. S. Military, No. 9460 (September 11, 1936).

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movement was a prelude to the “Xi’an Incident”, and became a prelude to the formation of
the AJNUF along with the peaceful settlement of the “Xi’an Incident”.

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CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

The relationship between regionalism and nationalism has been a sensitive issue in
modern Chinese history, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s. It has resulted in
disputes among both Western and Chinese scholars. The disputes are based on the fact that
the many different factions of the GMD which were based on regions adopted or developed
their own ideological frameworks and implemented policies in their regions different to
those of the central government under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. Li Zongren and the
Guangxi Clique are an example of this. This phenomenon was, in fact, a product of time
and context, when the old social system had disintegrated but the new one had not fully
emerged; consequently, the political unity of the nation had not been achieved. For this
reason, Diana Lary has rightly suggested that the Guangxi Clique was both regionalist and
nationalist.1001 This thesis, based on the Clique’s theory and practice in the 1930s,
indicates further that regionalism was a superficial phenomenon but nationalism became its
substance in Guangxi. In other words, Li Zongren and his Guangxi group were to lead the
people of Guangxi to nationalism by using regionalism as an indirect path. Through a
discussion of its actions in dealing with national crises and the measures taken in response
to Japanese aggression in the 1930s, I have suggested that the Guangxi Clique did not
create regionalism, but fostered and developed an already existing sentiment. The Clique
aimed to transfer this regionalism to the level of nationalism to serve its own political
needs, those of struggle with Jiang Jieshi for power in both the region and the centre and to
meet the demands for regional reconstruction and national salvation for the battle with

1001
Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1931,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 211.

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Japan. Naturally, the Guangxi Clique’s actions in consolidating its base and strengthening
its relations with its neighbouring provinces - the Southwest regional factions - were tinged
with regionalism.
However, the fact that the Guangxi Clique developed policies based on the
conditions of its province is not sufficient to suggest that this group was merely regionalist;
it strove, too, to arouse nationalist consciousness in the region. In other words, the Guangxi
Clique’s theory and practice in the 1930s were based on the region but consciously aimed
to serve the nation. Regionalism was the surface of the Clique’s political behaviour only;
nationalism was actually the substance of its actions. For the same reason, we could not
regard Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist regime in Guangzhou as regionalist during the
period 1924-1926, when the GMD authorities carried out a series of policies and launched
wars against other militarists in Guangdong to unify the province and consolidate the GMD
base. The policies carried out by Jiang Jieshi were to serve the purpose of the achievement
of nationalist ambitions; the Guangxi Clique was pursuing the same goal. In other words,
both Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi Clique were approaching the same goal, although by
different routes. As the Guangxi leaders and the Clique realised, the cultivation of
nationalist consciousness had to start with rural society, the basic level of Chinese social
structure, and it was this conception on which Guangxi's mass mobilization and
reconstruction were based. In this sense, Guangxi-type regionalism was part of the
development of Chinese nationalism.
We return to the major theme of this thesis, the relationship between regionalism
and the internal unity of the GMD, for it is this internal unity which is frequently perceived
as the precondition of national political unity and political integration. Did the Guangxi
Clique undercut or benefit the internal unity of both the GMD and the nation? This study,
through an examination of the Clique's theories and policies under the circumstances of
Japanese aggression in China, suggests that the actions of Li Zongren and the Guangxi
Clique in the 1930s were conducive to internal political unity of both the GMD and the
nation; and such internal political unity was the prerequisite for the political integration
China needed at that time.
According to Tang Tsou, analytically speaking, political integration has three
aspects, although empirically they are linked: integration among the elite, integration
between the elite and the masses, and integration of a political community. Logically and
historically, one takes precedence over the other in the order given. He suggests further that

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 Without integration among the elite, integration between the elite and the masses is
difficult to achieve; without integration between the elite and the masses, there
cannot be an integrated political community. In a disintegrated political
community, the process of political integration begins historically with the
integration of the elite or a counter-integration between the elite and the masses. To
the degree that integration is achieved, the reintegrated political community
furnishes a general framework within which the elite and the masses find their
places.1002
Through an examination of the Guangxi Clique’s efforts in mass mobilization and
reconstruction, this study suggests that they coincided with the process necessary for
political integration given above, particularly in the aspect that all sub-national political
systems, such as that of the province, served the entire national political system of the
nation. That is to say, this system refers to a political organization uniting all groups and
parties at that time (see Introduction, p. 17). After it was defeated by Jiang Jieshi in 1929 in
central China and returned to Guangxi, the Clique had already realized the importance of
unity of the elite, and it strove to consolidate its leadership. This provided Li Zongren and
the Guangxi group with not only a base from which to oppose Jiang Jieshi but also a force
with which to bargain with the latter for reconciliation and then cooperation, to achieve the
internal unity of the GMD in 1936. This unity indicated that the GMD was approaching
elite integration, and on this, the GMD was able to compromise with the CCP in 1937,
from which sprang the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This was a temporary
compromise between the Nationalists and the Communists as well as other political parties
and groups in pursuit of national salvation, and a step in the direction of political
integration, one which proved, however, to be temporary and unstable.
In terms of the integration of the elite and the masses, the Clique had achieved quite
a lot. Through a series of policies and measures taken in the province, the Clique sent large
number of well-trained officers and cadres to the countryside to mobilize the masses; this
served to arouse their nationalist consciousness and to reinforce the relationship between
the elite and the masses. In this sense, the slogan of “reconstructing Guangxi and restoring
China” was not only propaganda of the Clique but also an ideal for which it desired to
struggle. At the same time, by employing the Pearl River Valley Revolutionary theory and
the slogan of national salvation, the Clique successfully united the masses of the province

1002
Tang Tsou, “Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China”, Ping-ti Ho
and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p.
279.

325
for the purpose of resisting Japan and reconstructing the province and restoring the nation.
In other words, a sub-national political system was formed, which was a significant step in
the direction of political unity and national integration. This sub-national political system
could be readily integrated into a national political system once the appropriate conditions
emerged. Such conditions occurred with the demand for national unity and the forming of
an anti-Japanese national united front to fight Japan. The Clique’s mass mobilization in its
region was thus appropriate to the prevailing demands for increased unity and integration to
resist Japan.
The foundation of political integration in this context was mass mobilization. The
Clique rebuilt the disintegrating social order in its province to achieve regional political
integration through militia organization, the three-in-one system, and the policies of three-
fold self-reliance and three incorporations. In Guangxi, the new hierarchical structure
incorporated the party, administrative and military authorities of the province, district
militia headquarters, basic militia units and peasants. This provided the Clique with a
strong and integrated organizational structure with which to carry out its policies and to
establish efficient control over the province. The Clique’s success in mass mobilization
relied on the employment of a powerful and effective motive force, i.e. its own ideology
and political framework, which aroused the masses' political consciousness of both the
region and the nation. As Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng suggest, a political organization
which is based on a certain political program is unable to control the army. The western
parliament-type political party or group is in this category, because the army in the modern
western nation-state is subordinated to the authority of the constitution. In contrast to the
western countries, in the ultra-stable structure of modern Chinese society, the army was
only subordinated to the ideology of a certain political party or group, such as the “party
army” (e.g. both the Red Army and the Nationalist Revolutionary Army) in the Republic.
Essentially, the political party established and controlled the army by its ideology rather
than by its organizational structure.1003 Accordingly, the Guangxi Clique established its

1003
Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Kaifang zhong de bianqian: zailun Zhongguo de chao
wending jiegou, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993, p. 282. Jin and Liu
suggest that China has been an ultra-stable society for over two thousand years. According
to their view, up to now, Chinese social structure, particularly its social organizational
structure, has not been subject to changes, nor characterised with stagnation, even though
Chinese social life has frequently changed in the past two or three thousand years. China
has experienced significant periodic social turbulence, which occurred once every two or
three hundred years and often ended with a devastating temporary collapse of social

326
own secret political organization, and formulated an ideology based on its perceptions of
the need to resist Japan and its perceptions of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution;
this provided the Clique with a force able to control the army and to mobilize the masses
(see Chapter Four). As a result, not only did the Guangxi troops successfully become
subordinated to the Clique’s ideology, but the peasants also were persuaded through the
Clique’s propaganda to accept the ideology of the Clique through the medium of militia
organization and training. The Clique was able to direct this identity and sense of Guangxi
as a region to the national level.
Nationalism might originate with a sense of region. Arousing the masses’ sense of
commitment to their native place can function as the foundation for a consciousness of, and
commitment to, the nation. Serving the nation can thus start with serving the region.
Indeed, based on the local conditions, the Guangxi Clique worked out and practised
policies and programs appropriate to the needs of the region, but its ultimate aim was to
construct the nation. In so doing, the so-called Guangxi regionalism and Chinese
nationalism could coexist, the former contributing to the latter. If we say, as Lloyd
Eastman does, that Jiang Jieshi was a nationalist as he was deeply committed to the welfare
of the Chinese nation,1004 we can assert that Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique were also
nationalists of another type. The former insisted on putting the entire nation under his
dictatorship, in which there was no room for a loyal opposition; Jiang believed that anyone
who opposed him was thereby acting against the best interests of the nation. In Jiang's
view, anyone who opposed him was, ipso facto, disloyal to the nation. This presumption
motivated Jiang Jieshi to attempt to wipe out all opposition, including factions and
individuals, in the attempt to achieve political integration. But Li and the Clique strove to
mobilize the masses at the basic level of rural society in order to arouse, firstly, a regional
consciousness, and secondly, a nationalist consciousness. In other words, both Jiang and Li
had the same goal but used different means to achieve political integration.

structure. But this social structure was always able to rebuild itself. In short, according to
Jin and Liu, this social structure endures social progress and development, as well as
periodic collapse, yet maintained special organizational structure over long periods. This is
the characteristic of the ultra-stable structure of the Chinese society in both ancient and
modern times.
1004
Lloyd Eastman gives a thorough description of Jiang Jieshi’s relationship with the
nation. For details see Lloyd Eastman, The Nationalist Era in China, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 18-19.

327
 More importantly, the Guangxi Clique made a contribution to the internal unity of
the GMD and to national political unity. The Clique played a role in the formation of the
Anti-Japanese National United Front, a form of national political unity which allowed an
integrated response to Japanese aggression. After the Northern Expedition, national
political unity for resistance against Japan required political integration, in which the
internal political unity of the GMD was the necessary foundation. This required all parties
and factions to compromise. Under these circumstances, Li Zongren and the Guangxi
Clique gradually transformed their policy of “resisting Japan and opposing Jiang” to that of
“forcing Jiang to resist Japan”, and later to "supporting Jiang to resist Japan", and finally
reached reconciliation with Jiang Jieshi in 1936. This created both unity and cooperation
between the two major factions of the Nationalists. It is true that the cooperation and unity
were at times more apparent than real, but this situation provided the GMD with favourable
conditions to achieve conciliation with the Communists so that a form of national political
unity for resistance against Japan could be constructed. Moreover, the Guangxi Clique not
only strove to prepare for a war fighting Japan by mobilizing the masses and advocating the
“scorched earth resistance” idea, it also put them into practice; an example is the “June 1
Movement”. These efforts promoted the formation of the anti-Japanese national united
front and greatly influenced the outcome of the Xi'an Incident. In other words, the June 1
Movement was a prelude to the Xi’an Incident, and a “dress rehearsal” for the anti-Japanese
national united front.
In sum, based on the above discussion, this thesis suggests that the Guangxi Clique
was a faction capable of national ideology and policies within the GMD during the 1930s,
ideology and policies which transcended regionalism. While struggling with Jiang Jieshi
for power in both regional and central structures, the Guangxi Clique could readjust its
domestic and external policies for its survival and pursuit of power in accordance with the
changing domestic and external situation, and meet the needs of the national salvation
movement to promote the eventual nationwide war to fight the Japanese invader. In fact,
this important role played by the Clique in the promotion of the Resistance War had been
already recognised by some Western observers in China at that time. For example, during
the war of resistance, at least in the early stage, the Guangxi Clique was regarded as one of
three major politico-military groups of the anti-Japanese national united front in China

328
(others were the Communists and the Jiang group).1005 This is actually an affirmation of
the significant roles the Guangxi Clique played at that time. Meanwhile, this indicates that
the Clique’s attitudes towards internal and external affairs at that time were important to
national political unity. It also reflected the fact that the Clique was not a group concerned
with the extension of its own strength in the region alone, but a nationalist body as well
with a genuine concern for national affairs. Through examining the process of the Guangxi
Clique’s growth and its actions during the 1920s and 1930s, this study suggests that the
Clique was at all times a nationalist, not a regionalist group, always aiming to share the
power of the central government with other main factions of the GMD. I also argue that the
view that referred to the so-called “Guangxi Empire” in 1928 and 1929 is misleading.1006
This view also was a product of the internal political struggle for power within the GMD.
In fact, the Clique did not abandon its attempt to return to the centre even though it strove
to reconstruct the province and to cooperate with other regional factions.
As mentioned earlier, Diana Lary asserts categorically that the Guangxi Clique’s
“persistence of regionalism undercut nationalism, the nationalism of national unity”.1007
This thesis indicates that Lary’s view of the Clique’s practice of regionalism in Guangxi is
not incorrect, but the suggestion that it undercut nationalism seriously underestimates the
significance of regionalism to nationalism. In that sense, this thesis is a revision of Lary’s
view. Through a careful analysis of the documents and other materials existing at that time,
this thesis suggests that the Clique was arousing and promoting nationalism among the
masses by fostering and strengthening their identity with their own region, even though
such a practice appeared to have a strong regionalist colour. Based on materials unearthed
from various sources, this study points out further that the strategies of the Guangxi Clique
in response to the national crisis and in other policy-making benefited from a broad analysis
of Chinese society and a rational perception of the nature and significance of the Chinese
revolution. These flowed from the work of the “Brains Trust” established by the Clique
(see Chapter Three). What I have emphasized in this study is the Clique’s contribution to
the creation of national political unity and political integration in the 1930s. Compromises

1005
Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency,
New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 22-23.
1006
See Diana Lary, Region and Nation, Chapter Six, pp. 115-128.
1007
Ibid, p. 212.

329
among the various parties and factions laid the foundations for national political unity when
confronting the national crisis caused by Japanese aggression. From that point of view, the
Guangxi Clique’s efforts to achieve internal political unity both in the GMD and in the
nation should therefore be recognised.
On the other hand, this thesis, through discussing the Guangxi Clique’s roles in the
promotion to achieve national political unity and the formation of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front during the 1930s, also complements the studies by Chu Hongyuan
and Eugene Levich of Guangxi’s mass mobilization and provincial reconstruction.1008
Both Chu and Levich appraise the Guangxi Clique’s mass mobilization and reconstruction
within the province. They see the Clique’s achievements in the above two aspects as the
foundation of the major contribution of Guangxi province to the national resistance war. I
agree with their views. It is a pity, however, that the following issues are ignored in their
studies: What were the motive forces employed by the Guangxi Clique to achieve
mobilization of the masses and reconstruction? How did the Clique readjust its policies to
meet the needs of the time for national salvation? To what extent did the Clique contribute
to the promotion of the national resistance war against Japan through its policies in both
province and the southwest area? This thesis has attempted to remedy these omissions with
a detailed discussion of the above issues. I also raised some new points in discussing
several important events relating to the Clique’s theory and practice in the 1930s, which
have not been paid sufficient attention by either Chinese or Western historians.
This thesis argues that the reasons for actively practising mass mobilization and
reconstruction were closely interrelated to the readjustment of the Guangxi Clique’s
policies and guidelines in the light of changes to China's situation in the different periods.
The scope of this study has focused on the period after the Northern Expedition in 1928-29
and before the official launching of the Resistance War against Japan in 1937, when the
Japanese imperialist army was step by step expanding its invasion of China in the attempt
to conquer the Chinese nation completely. In response to the national crisis facing the
country, the Guangxi Clique developed positive policies designed to achieve national

1008
For detailed studies by both Levich and Chu, see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way
in Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993; Chu
Hong Yuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No.
17b (December, 1988), pp. 307-353; and Chu’s other articles on Guangxi in the
Bibliography of this thesis.

330
salvation. Li Zongren and his group transferred their energies from their power struggle
with the Jiang group to resistance against the Japanese invader. The main mark of this
transformation is the policy of “annei weiyou rangwai, tongyi weiyou kangri” (only
resistance against foreign aggression could achieve domestic pacification, and only
resistance against Japan could lead China to unity). This policy coincided with the needs of
anti-Japanese aggression for national salvation to oppose that of Jiang Jieshi’s “rangwai
bixian annei” (domestic pacification before external war). There is no denying the fact that
the action of the Clique aroused some suspicions that its policy was a strategy in its struggle
for power with Jiang Jieshi. Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique indeed attempted to
replace the Jiang group by exploiting the needs for national unity and resistance against
Japan. But there is no doubt that the Guangxi Clique made a point of resisting Japan and
strove to achieve it. As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, the necessary principle
to appraise correctly the roles of Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique at that time is whether
their response to the national crisis helped the course of the War of Resistance. From the
point of view of the above, the action of the Guangxi Clique to promote a nationwide
resistance against Japan should be considered in a positive light. In other words, in this
regard the practice of the Clique coincided with the national interests. Its practice both in
fostering regionalism and regional identity which had already existed in the province and in
strengthening cooperation and connection with other regional factions in the southwest was
also an attempt to guide and develop them to the level of nationalism.
An important sign that the Guangxi Clique's roles in Chinese politics of the 1930s
were formed to coincide with the needs of national salvation and in the promotion of the
Anti-Japanese National United Front was the deliberate change of its policies. After it was
defeated in the central government and central China by the Jiang group and forced to
return to Guangxi in 1929, the Clique had persisted for years in opposing Jiang Jieshi in
order to obtain revenge and to indicate its different policies from the latter in both external
and domestic affairs. The Clique began to lay equal stress on anti-Jiang and anti-Japan in
its policies after the “September 18 Incident” in 1931. However, based on its analysis of
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution and on its willingness to resist Japanese
aggression, Li Zongren and his Clique gradually changed the anti-Japan and anti-Jiang
policy into that of “forcing Jiang to resist Japan”, and then to “supporting Jiang to resist
Japan”. This change coincided with the clarion call for resistance throughout the country.
The outbreak and outcome of the “June 1 Movement” in 1936 marked the process of this

331
policy transformation. This movement laid a foundation not only for unity of the GMD but
also the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Many historians pay great
attention to the changes of the Chinese Communist Party's policy in the same aspect. They
believe that these changes led the CCP to readjust its anti-Jiang and anti-Japan policy to
that of “forcing Jiang to resist Japan”, which was the foundation of the CCP’s
reconciliation with Jiang Jieshi and the GMD at the end of 1936 and in 1937.1009 But they
ignore the actions of the Guangxi Clique and its impact on the CCP. This thesis has
indicated that the Guangxi Clique had initiated its policy change ahead of the CCP, creating
favourable conditions for a similar change of policy in that body. Both organizations then
together made step by step changes towards resistance to Japan and acceptance of Jiang's
leadership for that unified purpose. Perhaps, placing emphasis on the united front with the
CCP for the purpose of restoring the nation also planted a seed for Li Zongren’s return to
Communist China in 1965 after his exile in the United States for over fifteen years.
Based on the above view point, this thesis further explains the important roles the
Guangxi Clique played in the promotion of national resistance and the formation of the
Anti-Japanese National United Front in the following three aspects.
First, the Guangxi Clique initiated the idea of the full-scale Resistance War - the
“scorched earth resistance” (jiaotu kangzhan). This idea was officially announced by Li
Zongren on April 7, 1936, and developed further by other leaders of the Guangxi Clique
after that. Although resistance was the common demand of many political parties and
groups in China, the “scorched earth resistance” idea was for the first time comprehensively
and systematically explained as a policy, strategy and tactic of the Resistance War against
Japan. The Guangxi Clique was the first politico-military group in China to put forward
the proposition of full-scale resistance. This idea had a great impact on other parties and
groups and obtained positive response from many sides at that time. It also became a very
important part of the GMD’s policies during the War of Resistance.
Secondly, the “June 1 Movement” in 1936 was a test of the willingness of the
Guangxi Clique to practice its "scorched earth resistance" idea. The outbreak of the
Movement was frustrated by many internal and external elements, but the final outcome of
the Movement was significant. In contrast to Diana Lary’s view that the “June 1

1009
K. K. Shum’s work is a best example of the study in this field. For details see Kui-
kwong Shum, Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United
Front, 1935-1937, Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

332
Movement” failed, this study indicates that both the Guangxi Clique and Jiang Jieshi were
winners. The result of the Movement caused the GMD’s two major factions, in conflict
with each other for years, to become reconciled for the purpose of resistance against
Japanese aggression. This facilitated the internal unity of the GMD and national unity for
the struggle against Japan.
Thirdly, the Guangxi Clique’s actions in the “June 1 Movement” not only provided
the CCP with a theoretical foundation to change its policy to one of cooperation with the
GMD to form a united front for the purpose of fighting Japan, but also influenced both the
Northeast troops under Zhang Xueliang and the Northwest troops under Yang Hucheng in
launching the “Xi’an Incident” at the end of 1936 to force Jiang Jieshi to cease all civil war
and resist Japan. In this sense, the “Xi’an Incident” was the continuation of the “June 1
Movement”. In other words, the latter served the former as a link between past and future.
Furthermore, the Guangxi Clique strengthened its contacts and cooperation with both the
CCP and leaders of regional factions such as Liu Xiang in Sichuan province after the
“Xi’an Incident”. As a result, their actions contributed to the final formation of the anti-
Japanese National United Front throughout the country.
The theory and practice of the Guangxi Clique indicated that it was a politico-
military group. However, its own ideals and theoretical framework were mostly short-term;
the Clique’s measures and tactics were based on the need to achieve national political unity,
whether under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi or itself, for the launching of the resistance war
against Japan. Its plans for the future after the war of resistance were uncertain. This
explains why the Clique put all its strength into the resistance war once it broke out. Of
course, this did not mean that the Clique had abandoned its demands for a share of power in
the central government for which they had struggled with Jiang Jieshi for so many years.
However, because of the short term character of its policies, it found itself unable to keep
pace with the struggles for its own ideology and influence in post war China. Nevertheless,
the Guangxi Clique played a major role in making possible the Anti-Japanese National
United Front, and it did this, at least partly, through its successful attempt to channel
regional sentiment into identification with and defence of China as a national entity. We
can consequently see the important link between regionalism and nationalism, and the role
played by the Guangxi Clique in forging this link.

333
Appendix 1
Appendix 1.1

Names of Senior Officers of Li Zongren’s Troops in Yulin in 1922-1923

NameMilitary Schools TrainingOthers

陈陈
Chen, XiongBMA
何何何He, HaichouGMES
何何 He, WuSTB *
黄黄黄 Huang, ShaohongBMA
黄黄黄Huang, XuchuMSC, Beijing
黄黄黄Huang, Zhongyue Xiucai (秀 才)**
李李李Li, MingruiSMTSG ***
李李李Li, ShiyuGMOTC ****
李李李Li, ZongrenGIMTS
梁梁梁Liang, ChaojiBMA
林林林Lin, Zhufang University Graduate
刘刘刘Liu, Zhizhong Unknown
陆陆Lu, ChaoSTB
吕吕吕Lu, JingcunBMA
陆陆Lu, Yan*****Head of the Opium Gang
韦韦韦Wei, YunsongNMTSG******
伍伍伍 Wu, TingyangGMOTC
夏夏 Xia, WeiBMA
尹尹尹Yin, ChenggangBMA
俞俞俞Yu, ZuobaiBMA
张张张Zhang, RenminBMA
黄钟钟Zhong, ZupeiGIMTS
朱朱朱Zhu, WeizhenMSC

Notes:
* Sergeant Trainee Battalion, Guangxi, set up in the late Qing.
** The lowest scholar title for one who has passed the imperial examination in Ming and
Qing Dynasties.
*** Shaoguan Military Training School, Guangdong, set up by the Yunnan Army during
the National Protection and Constitution Protection Movements.
**** Guangxi Military Officers Training Centre, Guilin, set up in the late Qing period.
***** Lu Yan was also an ex-officer of the old Guangxi army under Lu Rongting.
****** Nanning Military Training School, Guangxi, set up by the Guangxi Troops
before and after 1911, and closed in the early 1920s after the fall of Lu Rongting’s rule in
the province.

Sources:
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen 唐唐唐, 李李李. The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.

334
Tang Degang and Li Zongren 唐唐唐, 李李李. Li Zongren huiyi lu 李李李李李李. Hong
Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987.
Bai Chongxi 白白白. Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu 白白白白白白白白李.
Compiled and printed by ZYYJYJDSYJS, Taipei, 1984.
Huang Shaoxiong 黄黄陈. Wushi huiyi 五五李李.?Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe,
1945.
Zhang Renmin 张张张. Huiyi lu 李李李.?Hong Kong, printed by the writer himself,
1987.
Huang Xuchu 黄黄黄. Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu
广广广广广广广广广广广广广李广, CQ, serialized in 1962 - 1963.
Huang Xuchu 黄黄黄.Ba-Gui yiwang lu 八八李八李, CQ, serialized in 1964 and 1965.
Huang Shaoxiong 黄黄陈. Xin Guixi de jueqi 新八新新新新, WSZLXJ, No. 52 (1964).

335
Appendix 1Appendix 1.2

Military Educated Background of Senior Officers of the 7th Army in 1926

(Before the Northern Expedition)

Name Military Schools/Training Others

Li Zongren李宗仁 GIMTS
Huang Shaoxiong 黄绍雄 BMA
Bai Chongxi白崇禧 BMA
Wang Yingyu 王应榆 BMA
Tao Jun陶 钧 BMA
Lu Yanxin吕演新 GMES
Yu Zuobai俞作柏 GMA
Yu Zuoyu俞作榆(豫) SMTSG
Li Mingrui李明瑞 SMTSG
Liu Rifu刘日福 Rose from
ranks
Zhang Guozhu 张国柱 NMTSG
Gong Shouyi龚寿仪 NMTSG
Huang Xuchu黄旭初 MSC, Beijing
Xu Zongwu许宗武 BMA
Lin Zhufang林竹舫 University
graduate
Wu Tingyang伍廷飏 GMOTC
Lu Shouqi陆受祺 BMA
Liang Chaoji梁朝玑 BMA
Xia Wei夏威 BMA
Wei Yunsong韦云凇 NMTSG
Ye Conghua叶丛华 Unknown
Hu Zongduo胡宗铎 BMA
Li Mengrong李孟蓉 Unknown
Yang Tenghui杨腾辉 NMTSG
Zhong Zupei钟祖培 GIMTS
Yin Chenggang尹承纲 BMA
Zhou Zuhuang周祖晃 BMA
Lu Huanyan吕焕炎 BMA
Yang Yi杨义 BMA
Meng Zhi蒙志 BMA
Chen Jiheng陈济恒 STB
Luo Haozhong罗浩忠 NMTSG
Lu Jingcun吕竞存 BMA
Luo Chuanying罗传英 BMA
Ma Dianfu马典符 BMA
Qin Lianfang覃连芳 BMA

336
Sources from the memoirs and recollections of Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi,
Huang Xuchu, Huang Shaohong, Zhang Renmin, Xu Qiming, Yang Zanmo and
Liang Kan and so on. See the Bibliography of this thesis for details.

337
Appendix 1Appendix 1.3

(1). Commanders of the Guangxi Militia Zones (1934)

Militia Zones Names of Commanders Military education background

南南 NANNING 梁梁梁 LIANG, Hansong BMA
梧梧 WUZHOU 陈陈陈 CHEN, Liangzuo MSC BEIJING
八林 GUILIN 陈陈陈 CHEN, Enyuan GIMTS
平平 PINGLE 蒋蒋蒋 JIANG, Ruquan BMA
柳梧 LIUZHOU 尹尹尹 YIN, Chenggang BMA
龙梧 LONGZHOU 黄钟钟 ZHONG, Zupei GIMTS
百百 BOSE 李梁李 LI, Chaofang BMA
天天 TIANBAO 谢李谢 XIE, Zongkeng GIMTS

Sources:
Yu Shixi 虞虞虞, Xin Guixi de mintuan zuzhi 新八新新张新新新, GXWSZLXJ, No.
13, pp. 164-73.

(2). Senior Commanders of the Guangxi Army in the First Half of the 1930s (Ranks
above Divisional Commander)

Armies Names of Commanders Military education background

7th Army 廖廖 LIAO, Lei BMA
...... 梁梁梁LIANG, Chaoji BMA
...... 张张张ZHANG, Yichun BMA
...... 郭郭郭GUO, Fenggang BMA
...... 陆陆陆LU, Yinji BMA
...... 周钟周ZHOU, Zuhuang BMA
...... 陈陈陈CHEN, Enyuan GIMTS
...... 覃覃李QIN, Lianfang BMA
...... 杨杨杨YANG, Junchang NMTSG
15th Army 夏夏XIA, Wei BMA
...... 韦韦韦WEI, YunsongNMTSG
...... 黄黄黄HUANG, Heling BMA
...... 黄黄黄HUANG, Zhenguo BMA
...... 贺贺朱HE, Weizhen BMA
...... 王王王WANG, Zanbin GIMTS
...... 周陈ZHOU, Yuan Rose from the ranks
...... 苏钟苏SU, Zuxin GMOTS
...... 莫莫莫MO, Shujie NMTSG
陈陈陈CHEN, Jiheng GSTB

Sources:
1). Qijun niankan 七七广七 (1935); and
2). Shiwujun niankan 五五七广七 (1934).

338
Appendix 1
Appendix 1.4

Names of the Guangxi Clique’s Senior Officers Graduated from the Baoding Military
Academy (1920s - 1930s)

___________________________________________________

Huang Shaoxiong黄黄陈 Bai Chongxi白白白

Gong Jieyuan龚莫陈 Luo Chuanying罗罗罗
Zheng Cangrong郑郑郑 Huang Heling黄黄黄
Xu Zongwu许李何 Li Chaofang李梁李
Guo Fenggang郭郭郭 Huang Zhenguo黄黄黄
Huang Xun黄黄 Huang Mian黄黄
Lei Biao雷雷 Wei Daomin韦韦韦
Lu Shouqi陆陆陆 Yu Jiaji广余余
Zhang Zhuangsheng张张白 Zhang Renmin张张张
Meng Zhi 蒙刘 Chen Hanwu陈陈陈
Liang Chaoji梁梁梁 Lu Xiangrong卢卢卢
Zhou Zuhuang周钟周 Chen Gui陈八
Lu Jingcun吕吕吕 Lu Huanyan吕吕陆
Yu Zhifang广刘李 Qin Lianfang覃覃李
Hu Letian 胡平天 Li Lin李林
Ma Dianfu马马马 Liang Hansong梁梁梁
Jiang Ruquan蒋蒋蒋 Li Zuoli李俞李
Chen Weilue陈陈陈 Huang Tao黄黄
Xu Qiming徐徐李 Liao Lei廖廖
Ye Qi叶叶 Li Pinxian李李李
Hou Rensong侯侯侯 Chen Xiong陈陈
Li Xingshu黎黎黎 Xia Wei夏夏
Xia Guozhang夏黄璋 Yin Chenggang尹尹尹
Yu Zuo俞俞俞 Yang Yi杨张

___________________________________________________

Sources:
1).The memoirs and recollections of Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, Bai
Chongxi, Zhang Renmin, and Xu Qiming. For details see the Bibliography of this thesis.
2).Yin Chenggang 尹尹尹. Li Zongren qijia jingguo 李李李新余李李, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 7, pp. 104-145.

339
Appendix 2

Names of Middle and High Ranking Officers of the Hubei Faction within the Guangxi
Clique (1927-1929)

八新桂桂桂广桂广桂桂七桂姓姓

NAMES姓 名 TERMS IN BMA保保保保

BI, Weiru毕毕蒋 1st Term天保1期
CAI, Hanxia蔡陈蔡 6th Term天保6期
CAI, Zhuo蔡蔡（文文） Unknown天保(期期期期)
CAO, Zhenwu曹曹何 Unknown天保(期期期期)
CHEN, Kuangji陈陈陈 6th Term天保6期
CHENG, Ruhuai程程程 4th Term天保4期
CHENG, Xiaobo 程程程 4th Term天保4期
CHENG, Youchuan程程程 6th Term天保6期
DONG, Nan董南 4th Term天保4期*
FU, Guangxian傅傅傅（蓝蓝） 4th Term天保4期*
HU, Shunsheng胡胡白 4th Term天保4期
HU, Zongduo胡李胡 4th Term天保4期*
HUANG, Sufu黄黄马 6th Term天保6期
JIANG, Sheng江江 Unknown天保(期期期期) *
JIANG, Zhangji蒋蒋蒋（章余） 4th Term天保4期
LAN, Tengjiao蓝蓝蓝 5th Term天保5期
LI, Huiwu李李何 Unknown天保(期期期期)
LI, Jicai李李才 Unknown天保(期期期期)
LI, Jiugao李李李 6th Term天保6期
LI, Shiqiao李李李 6th Term天保6期*
LI, Tisheng李李白 6th Term天保6期
LI, Yixuan 李李李 4th Term天保4期*
LI, Zijun李李杨 4th Term天保4期*
LIN, Yisheng林林林 6th Term天保6期*
LIU, Heding刘刘刘 Unknown天保(期期期期)
LIU, Hongkui刘刘刘 4th Term天保4期
LU, Zhibing路桂路 Unknown天保(期期期期)
NIE, Guang聂傅 1st Term天保1期
PAN, Yizhi潘李桂 3rd Term天保3期
SHI, Yuling李石石 4th Term天保4期*
SUN, Xizhi孙孙桂 Unknown天保(期期期期)
TAO, Jixian陶陶陶 6th Term天保6期
TAO, Jun陶陶 4th Term天保4期*
TAO, Meiguang陶蓝傅 4th Term天保4期
TIAN, Jiangchang田江杨 Unknown天保(期期期期)
WAN, Yiwu万万陈 6th Term天保6期
WANG, Danhou王王侯 6th Term天保6期
WANG, Ruoyu王王李 6th Term天保6期
WANG, Xiaofeng王王王 6th Term天保6期*
WANG, Yaoyu王王王 6th Term天保6期

340
WANG, Xianmin汪汪张 4th Term天保4期
WANG, Yi'nan汪汪南 3rd Term天保3期*
WEI, Zeyun魏魏魏 6th Term天保6期
WU, Liangchen吴陈吴 Unknown天保(期期期期)
XIA, Dexin夏唐苏 6th Term天保6期
XIONG, Sijiu熊熊李 4th Term天保4期
XU, Wenkai 徐徐（文文） 4th Term天保4期
XU, Xiaoshi徐王李 Unknown天保(期期期期)
YAN, Jing严严 4th Term天保4期
YU, Liangcai广陈余（孙张） 4th Term天保4期
YUAN, Ji'an袁陈袁 Unknown天保(期期期期)
ZHANG, Yayi张张张 4th Term天保4期
ZHENG, Zhong郑郑 Unknown天保(期期期期)
ZHOU, Kezhi周周桂 Unknown天保(期期期期)

Note:

1.* Refers to those who followed Hu Zongduo to join the Guangxi Clique’s armies
under Li Zongren and Huang Shaohong and to be promoted from the period of
Guangxi reunification.

2. In the 18th and 19th armies, all officers of middle and high ranks above Battalion
Commanders were BMA graduates and were natives of Hubei.

Sources:

All names above are collected from reminiscences of Huang Sufu, Li Chunchu,
Lu Yuqian, Tu Yuntan, Lan Tengjiao, and Lu Zhibing. Please see the
Bibliography of this thesis for details.

341
Appendix 3

Names of Guangxi's Returned Students from Soviet Russia Before and After the
Northern Expedition

Wang, Gongdu王王王
Wei, Yongcheng韦韦尹
Huang, Puxin黄黄黄
Su, Feng? 粟粟
Li, Zongyi李李张
Li, Bixiao李李李female
Li, Yichen李张李
Li, Aiyun李李韦
Li, Wenzhao李文李
Zheng, Shulian (Shuluan)郑郑郑 (郑淑) female
Xie, Qimeng (Feizhi)谢谢谢 (非桂) female
Li, Xuelei李李李
Chen, Keli陈周陈
Mo, Chou莫莫 female
Guo, Renwu郭张陈
Xie, Cangsheng谢谢白
Yang, Shuyou杨莫杨
Yi, You易易
Zhang, Weixia张夏张
Zeng, Xiying曾孙曾
Li, Yueting黎黎黎
Qin, Qiang秦秦
Wang, Haoming王王李
Wen, E文文
Gao, Sumin桂黄张
Ou, Weiwen区区文
Bi, Youqing闭闭闭
Huang, Zhongjie黄黄莫
Huang, Chu黄黄
Huang, Moruo黄黄王
Mo, Shiqi莫李莫
Qin, Zhongping (Zhonglin)覃黄平 (黄林)
Zhao, Keren赵赵张
Zhou, Kezhuang周周周
Hu, Peiwen胡胡文
Hu, Xuelin (Bingqiong)胡胡林 (路炳)
Su, Mei苏苏
Wei, Xiuying韦秀罗female
Wei, Bihui韦李李female

Sources:

342
1) Wang Jifei 王李王. Zhongguo liu-E xuesheng zhi yanjiu (1890-1942)
广黄中中胡白桂中中, 1890-1942. M. A. thesis, National Political University, Taipei,
1982;
2) Hou Kuangshi 侯陈侯. Li-Bai junfa jituan neibu paixi andou ji Wang Gongdu zhi
beisa 李白七李李新李李李新李李李王王王桂李李, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12;
3) Song Houreng 宋宋宋. Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi 王王王广新八新, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 12;
4) Huang Qihan 黄徐陈. Guomindang Guixi jianwen lu 黄张国八新国国李, XSLT, No.
5, 1986; and
5) Wan Zhongwen 万黄文. Guixi jianwen lu 八新国国李. Guilin: History Department of
the Guangxi Normal University, 1983.

343
Appendix 4

Expansion of the Guangxi Troops During the June 1 Movement 1936

Titles of Armies Names of Commander

The 4th Group Army Li, Zongren李李李(Commander-in-Chief)

Bai, Chongxi白白白(Deputy Commander-in-Chief)
Li, Pinxian李李李(Chief of General Staff)

7th Army Liao, Lei廖廖(Commander)

Zhou, Zuhuang周钟周(Deputy Commander)
19th Division Zhou, Zuhuang周钟周
21th Division Yang, Junchang杨杨杨
24th Division Cheng, Shufen程莫程(native of Hubei 鄂侯)

8th Army Li, Pinxian李李李(Commander)

Liu, Shiyi刘刘刘(Deputy Commander, native of Jiangxi 赣
侯)
20th Division He, Xuan何何(native of Hunan 湘侯)
22th Division Mo, Shujie莫莫莫
23th Division Xu, Qiming徐徐李

15th Army Xia, Wei夏夏(Commander)

Wei, Yunsong韦韦韦(Deputy Commander)
43th Division Wei, Yunsong韦韦韦
44th Division Wang, Zanbin王王王
45th Division Su, Zuxin苏钟苏

Other Divisions under Direct Command of the 4th Group Army Headquarters

25th Division Zhang, Yichun张张张(native of Anhui 皖侯)

26th Division Huang, Heling黄黄黄
27th Division Yan, Renyi (native of Hunan 湘侯) 颜李刘
28th Division Qin, Lianfang覃覃李
29th Division Chen, Enyuan陈陈陈
30th Division Hu, Tianle胡天平
31th Division Qi, Daozheng漆韦漆
32th Division Jiang, Ruquan蒋蒋蒋
33th Division Lu, Yinji陆陆陆 (native of Guizhou 黔侯)
34th Division Lai, Gang赖唐(native of Guangdong 粤侯)
46th Division Ou, Shounian区区广(native of Guangdong 粤侯)
47th Division Weng, Zhaoyuan翁翁翁(native of Guangdong 粤侯)

Note:

344
All commanders listed above were natives of Guangxi except those I mentioned in the
bracket of the table.

Sources:
1) Liang Jiaju 梁余梁. Diwulujun cangsang jiyao 第五路七郑第李第, GXWX, No. 10;
2) Yang Zanmo and Liang Kan 杨王杨, 梁梁. Xin Guixi de guomin gemingjun diqijun
de xingwang shi 新八新新黄张新新七第七七新新新新 , NNWSZL, No. 8;
3) Xu Qiming 徐徐李. Xu Qiming xiansheng fangwen jilu 徐徐李白白白白白李.
Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1983; and
4) Nanning minguo ribao 南南张黄南南 , June to September 1936.

345

G  lossary

Anhui (Wan) 袁安（皖）

annei rangwai (domestic pacification before external war) 袁李安安
annei weiyou rangwai, tongyi weiyou kangri (only resistance 袁李安闭安安
against foreign aggression could achieve domestic pacification, 统张才统统南
and only resistance against Japan could lead China to unity)
antu zhongqian (consciousness of being attached to one's native 袁安郑安
land and unwilling to leave it)

Bai Chongxi (Jiansheng), or Pai Chung-hsi (Ch'ung-hsi) 白白白（健白）

baihua (Cantonese) 白白
Baoding 天保
Baoding bang, or Baiding pai (The Baoding Group) 天保桂，天保李
Baoding junguan xuexiao (The Baoding Military Academy) 天保七桂胡保
baojing anmin (protection of the area and pacification of 天保袁张
residents)
beifa (The Northern Expedition) 桂北
Beihai 桂何
Beijing (Beiping) 桂北
Beiliu 桂北
beishang kangri (march northwards to resist Japan) 桂北统南
Beiyang 桂北
bi-Jiang kangri (forcing Jiang to resist Japan) 逼蒋统南
bianqian huiyi (The Disarmament and Rehabilitation 编编编编
Conference)
Bie Tingfang 别伍李
bingmin heyi (union of soldiers and people) 兵张广张
bingnong zhengce (union of soldiers and peasants policy) 兵兵兵兵
Bose 百百
businiao (phoenix) 期不不

Chahar 察察察
Cai E 蔡文
Cai Tingkai 蔡蔡蔡
cangchu jigu (keeping grains in a storehouse) 仓仓仓仓
chaxu geju (Chinese social structure) 差差差差
Changsha 长长
Chaoran bao 陆超南
Chaozhou 潮梧
Chen bao (Morning News) 晨南
Chen Cheng 陈陈
Chen Cungong 陈吕陈
Chen Gongbo, or Ch'en Kung-po 陈王陈
Chen Jitang, or Chen Chitang 陈陈陈
Chen Jiongming 陈陈李
Chen Lifu 陈陈陈

346
Chen Liangzuo 陈陈陈
Chen Mingshu 陈陈陈
Chen Xiaowei 陈陈夏
Chen Xiong 陈陈
Cheng Qian 程程
Cheng Siyuan 程熊程
Cheng Shufen 程莫程
chijiu zhan (protracted warfare) 持持持
Chuan-Gui-Hong xieding (“The Sichuan, Guangxi and “程八川川保”或“川八程川保”
the Red Army Agreement”)

Da Gong Bao (Ta-Kung Pao) 大王南

da Guangxi zhuyi, or Ta Kuang-hsi chu-i (greater Guangxi-ism, 大广广大张
or greater Kwangsi-ism)
Dai Li 戴戴
Dalian 大覃
Dazhong ribao 大大南南
dang daibiao (Party Representative) 国党党
danghua (partification) 国党
dangtong (Party Legitimacy or Orthodox) 国统
dangzheng (intraparty conflicts) 国党
dangzhi (Party Rule) 国党
dao-Jiang kangri(overthrowing Jiang and resisting Japan) 倒蒋统南
De'an 唐袁
Deng Benyin 邓邓邓
Deng Yanda 邓邓邓
Dian (Yunnan) 滇（韦南）
dier fangmianjun (the Second Front Army) 第第徐第七
dier guxiang (the second homeland) 第第第第
difang (region, locality) 地徐
difang shishen (local gentry) 地徐刘地
difang yishi (regional identity, or provincialism) 地徐地地
difang zizhi (regional self-government) 地徐地党
disi fangmianjun (the Fourth Front Army) 第第徐第七
diyi fangmianjun (the First Front Army) 第张徐第七
dingguijun (the Guangxi Pacification Army) 保八七
dinggui taozei lianjun (the Guangxi Pacification and Bandit 保八定定郑七
Suppression Joint Army)
dingzu ersan (the three legs of a tripot) 刘鼎鼎鼎
Doihara Kenji 安土土陶第
Domei(Agenct) 同同同
Dongbeijun (The Northeast Troops) 东桂七
Dongfang zazhi (The Eastern Miscellany) 东徐东刘
dongli (dynamism, driving force, motive force) 动动
dongzheng (the Eastern Expedition) 东东
duban (Military Governor) 督督
duli (autonomy, or independence) 独陈
Duli pinglun (The Independent Critic) 独陈独独
Duan Qirui 段陆李

347
 
E (Hubei) 鄂（桂桂）
E-ren zhi-E (Hubei for the Hubei People) 鄂侯党鄂
e shili (evil force) 恶恶动
Eddy, Sherwood 艾艾

fatong (orthodox legitimacy) 法统

fan di (anti-imperialism) 反反
fan geming (counter-revolution) 反新新
fan-Jiang kangri (opposing Jiang and resisting Japan) 反蒋统南
fan-Jiang lianmeng (the anti-Jiang coalitions) 反蒋郑同
Fan Shisheng 范李白
Fang Zhenwu 徐曹何
feichang huiyi (the Special Congress of the GMD) 非非编编
feijun (the Flying Army) 飞七
Fei Xiaotong (Fei Hsiao Tung) 费陈费
fenzhi hezuo(cooperation between separated governments) 分党广俞
Feng Huang 冯冯
Feng Yuxiang 冯冯期
fu (prefecture) 府
fuguo qiangbing (enrich the state and strengthen the military) 富黄秦兵
Fujian, or Fukien 福福
Fujianguo (Fujian Nation) 福福黄
Fujian renmin zhengfu (The People's Government of Fujian) 福福侯张兵府
Fujian shibian (the Fujian Rebellion) 福福福福
Fu Zuoyi 傅俞张

Gaizupai (The Reorganization Faction) 改新李

Gansu 甘甘
gangjun (the Steel Army) 钢七
gonggeng (cropping system by public) 王公
gongli (universal principles of nature and society, national law) 王公
gongji zhan (offensive warfare) 攻攻持
gongnong geming (the proletarian revolution) 工兵新新
gongping (fairness) 王平
Gu Weijun (V. K. Wellington Koo) 顾贺陶
guanhua (Guilin dialect, i.e. a dialect of the Southwest 桂白（八林桂白）
Mandarin which is popular in north Guangxi and Yunnan,
Guizhou and Sichuan provinces)
Guanxi 关新
Guang 广
Guangdong (Yue), or Kwangtung 广东（粤）
Guangxi (Gui), or Kwangsi 广广（八）
Guangxi dingguijun (Guangxi Pacification Army) 广广保八七
Guangxi gongren jiuguohui (the National Salvation Association 广广工侯广黄编
of Guangxi Workers)
Guangxi jianshe gangling (Guangxi Reconstruction Program) 广广福广尹广
Gaungxi jianshe yanjiuhui (Guangxi Reconstruction Studies 广广福广中中编
Association)

348
Guangxi junxiao (Guangxi Military School) 广广七保
Guangxi lujunxiaoxue (Guangxi Military Elementary School) 广广陆七广胡
Guangxi lujun sucheng xuexiao (Guangxi Intensive Military 广广陆七广尹胡保
Training School)
Guangxi mintuan ganbu xuexiao (Guangxi Provincial School 广广张新广李胡保
for Militia Cadres)
Guangxi mofan ying (Guangxi Model Battalion) 广广杨范广
Guangxi Nanning junxiao (Guangxi Nanning Military School) 广广南南七保
Guangxi quansheng suijin duban (Commissioner of Guangxi 广广广广广广督督
Provincial Pacification Office)
Guangxi taozeijun (Guangxi Bandit Suppression Army) 广广定定七
Guangxi tuanti (the Guangxi group) 广广新广
Guangxi wenhuajie jiuguohui (the National Salvation 广广文党广广黄编
Association of Guangxi Cultural Circles)
Guangzhou, or Canton 广梧
Guangzhou shibian (Guangzhou Incident) 广梧福福
guigen (consciousness of return to someone's homeland) 归归
Guilin 八林
Guiping (Xunzhou) 八平
Guixi (The Guangxi Clique) 八新
Guizhou (Qian), or Kweichow 贵梧（黔）
Guizhou kangri jiuguojun (the Guizhou Anti-Japanese and 贵梧统南广黄七
National Salvation Army)
Guomin gemingjun (the Nationalist Revolutionary Army) 黄张新新七
Guominjun (The National People's Army) 黄张七
Guomin zhengfu xi'nan zhixingbu (the Southwest Executive 黄张兵府广南国黎李
Committee of the Nationalist Government)
Guo Tingyi 郭伍汪
Guowen zhoubao (National News Weekly, or Guowen Weekly) 黄国周南

Han 陈
Han Fuju 韩韩韩
hanjian (Chinese traitor) 陈汉
hanjian zhenxian (Chinese Traitors Front) 陈汉汉汉
Hankou 陈汉
Hebei, or Hobei 河桂
He Jian 何健
He Long 贺龙
Henan 河南
He Shan 刘和
Heshengqiao (Hesheng Bridge) 贺贺贺
He Sijing 何熊严
He-Umetsu, or He-Umetze (Agreement) 何蓝川保
He Wu 何何
He Yingqin 何何何
He Zhuguo 何何黄
Heilongjiang 黑龙江
Heiqi jun (the Black Flag Army) 黑黑七
Hengyang 衡衡

349
Hirota 广田
Hong Xiuquan 洪秀广
Hong (Xiuquan) - Yang (Xiuqing) 洪(秀广)－杨(秀闭)
Hsuchow, or Xuzhou 徐梧
Hubei (E) 桂桂
Hubei bang, or Hubei pai (the Hubei Faction) 桂桂桂（桂桂李）
hudang jiuguo (Party Protection and National Salvation) 护国广黄
hudang jiuguojun (the Party Protection and National Salvation 护国广黄七
Army)
hudang jiuguo zhanzheng (the War of the Party Protection and 护国广黄持党
National Salvation)
hufa (the Constitution Protection) 护法
Hufajun (the Constitution Protection Army) 护法七
hufa yundong (the Constitution Protection Movement) 护法魏动
hufa zhanzheng (the Constitution Protection War) 护法持党
huguo (the National Protection) 护黄
Huguojun (the National Protection Army) 护黄七
huguo yundong (the National Protection Movement) 护黄魏动
huguo zhanzheng (the National Protection War) 护黄持党
Hu Hanmin (Zhantang) 胡陈张
Hunan (Xiang) 桂南（湘）
Hu Shi 胡胡
Hu Zongduo 胡李胡
Huananguo (The South China Nation) 华南黄
Huang Jilu 黄黄陆
Huang Qihan 黄徐陈
Huang Qixiang 黄叶黄
Huang Shaohong (Jikuan), or Huang Shaoxiong 黄黄黄(黄季)，或黄
黄陈
Huang Xuchu 黄黄黄
Huangpu 黄黄
Huangpu junxiao (the Huangpu Military Academy) 黄黄七保
huiban (Deputy Governor, or Deputy Commissioner) 编督
huidang (secret society) 编国
huiguan (native-place associations) 编会

Ji Hongchang 吉刘杨
Jinan 陈南
ji xiaosheng wei dasheng (adding up many small victories to 仓广贺朱大贺
make a big one)
jiaxiang guan (native, or regional emotion) 余第家
jianguo dagang (Fundamentals of National Reconstruction) 福黄大尹
jianshe Guangxi fuxing Zhongguo (reconstructing Guangxi 福广广广韩新广黄
with the end of restoring China)
Jiang Guangnai 蒋傅蒋
Jiang Jieshi (Zhongzheng), or Chiang Kai-shek 蒋蒋李（广中）
Jiang-Gui zhanzheng (the Jiang-Gui War, or the War between 蒋八持党
the Jiang group and the Guangxi Clique)
Jiangsu, or Kiangsu 江苏

350
Jiangxi, or Kiangsi 江广
Jiang Zaizhen 蒋蒋朱
jiaogong (suppression of the Communists) 剿剿
jiaotu dikang (the scorched earth resistance) 焦安焦统
jiaotu kangzhan (the scorched earth resistance) 焦安统持
Jinxi (the Shanxi Faction, or the Yan Xishan Faction) 晋新
jingguan daibian (to examine the situation carefully in order to 静家静福
wait for change)
jingji guafen (economic dismemberment) 李陈经分
jiu Guixi (the old Guangxi Clique) 旧八新
jiuguohui (Federation of the National Salvation Associations) 广黄编
Jiuwang qingbao (National Salvation Newsletter) 广新救南
jiuyiba shibian (the September 18 Incident) 李张八福福
Ju Zheng 居中
juewu (enlightenment) 觉觉
jun (army) 七
junquan (sharing power) 均均
junquan tongzhi (the rule by military force) 七均统党
junwu shanhou duban (military affairs reconstruction 七军军军督督
commissioner)

kangri 统南
kangri fan-Jiang (resisting Japan and opposing Jiang) 统南反蒋
kangri jiuguo (resisting Japan for national salvation) 统南广黄
kangri jiuguojun (Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army) 统南广黄七
kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian (the Anti-Japanese National 统南张抗统张持汉
United Front)
kangri taoni (resisting Japan and opposing traitors) 统南定抗
Kang Youwei 康闭朱
kangzhan (the War of Resistance) 统持
kao (examination) 考
kejun (guest army) 客七
kuoda huiyi (Enlarged Congress of the Guomindang) 扩大编编
Kwantung (i.e. Kwantung Army) 关东七

Lai Huipeng 赖赖赖

Lai Gang 赖唐
Lan Tengjiao 蓝蓝蓝
Leng Guan (Hu Lin) 冷家（胡胡）
Li-Bai (Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi) 李－白（李李李刘白
白白）
li 里
li (social norms) 公
Li-Bai-Huang tizhi (Li-Bai-Huang Leadership System) 李－白－黄广黄
Li Chunchu 李李黄
Li Doushan 李李和
Li Hsiu-ch'eng, or, Li Xiucheng 李秀尹
Li-Huang-Bai tizhi (Li-Huang-Bai Leadership System) 李－黄－白广黄
Li Jishen (Renchao) 李陈李（张潮）

351
Li Mingrui 李李李
Li Pinxian 李李李
Li Renren 李张李
Li Shen 李李
Li Shiyu 李李李
Li Shouxin 李李李
Li Wenfan 李文范
Li Wenxin 李文李
Li Xinjun 李新杨
lixing (intuitive reason) 公理
Lixiong 动力
Li Yixuan 李李李
Li Zongren (Delin), or Li Tsung-jen, Lee Chong-jen 李李李（唐德）
lian-E ronggong (ally with Soviet Russia and admit the 郑中联剿
Communists)
liang (tael) 两
liangguang (Guangdong and Guangxi, two Guangs) 两广
liangguang shibian (the two Guang Incident, or Rebellion) 两广福福
Liangguang yidong (the two Guang Incident, or Rebellion) 两广两动
Liang Qichao 梁徐陆
Liang Shuming 梁梁梁
liangxin (conscience) 陈黄
Liao Lei 廖廖
Lingui 临八
Lin Hu 林林
liu-E pai (the Students Returned from Russia Faction) 中中李
Liu Fei (Weizhang) 刘刘（朱章）
Liu Shiheng 刘刘衡
Liuwan dashan (sixty thousand mountains) 六万大和
Liu Xiang 刘湘
Liuyi shibian (the June 1 Incident) 六张福福
Liuyi yundong (the June 1 Movement) 六张魏动
Liu Yongfu 刘韦福
Liu Zhongrong 刘黄联
Liu Zhenhuan 刘刘刘
Liuzhou 柳梧
Longtan 龙龙
Longtan zhanyi (the Longtan Campaign) 龙龙持龙
Long Yun 龙韦
Longzhou 龙梧
Lu Diping 鲁鲁平
Lu Daoyuan 鲁韦鲁
Lugouqiao shibian (the Lugouqiao Incident, or the July 7 芦芦贺福福
Incident, or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident)
Lu Huanyan 吕吕陆
lulin (banditry) 绿林
Lu Rongting 陆卢伍
Lu Weiqian 卢毕卢
Lu Yi 陆陆

352
Luoyang 洛衡

Ma Junwu 马马何
maqian xiaozu (cat's paw) 马马广马
Ma Xiaojun 马程七
Ma Zhanshan 马马和
Manzhouguo 满满黄
Mao Guangxiang 毛傅黄
Mao Zedong, or Mao Tse-tung 毛魏东
Meizhou pinlun (Critic Weekly 每周独独
Mengyu shanguan zhuren 梦广和会大侯
Miao Jianqiu 苗苗苗
Minguo ribao (Republican Daily) 张黄南南
minquan (people's rights) 张均
minquan tongzhi (the rule by civic rights) 张均统党
minsheng (voice of the people) 张江
minsheng zhuyi (people's livelihood) 张白大张
mintuan (people's militia) 张新
minyi (will of the people) 张地
mu (land unit) 亩

Nanchang 南杨
Nanjing, or Nanking 南北
Nanlu (southern Guangdong) 南路
Nanning 南南
Nanning minguo ribao (Nanning Republican Daily) 南南张黄南南
Nenjiang 嫩江
Ning-Han duili (Nanjing-Wuhan split) 南陈宁陈
Ning-Yue duili (Nanjing-Guangdong split) 南粤宁陈
ningwei yusui, buwei waquan (rather be a shatterd vessel of 南朱冯宁，期朱不广
jade than an unbroken piece of pottery)
nongcun jianshe weiyuanhui (Rural Reconstruction 兵农福广农农编
Commission)
nonggong geming (the peasant-proletarian revolution) 兵工新新
Nuli zhoubao (Endeavour Weekly) 努动周南

Pan Gongzhan 潘王潘

Pan Yizhi 潘李桂
Pu Yi 溥溥

qiqi shibian (the July 7 Incident) 七七福福

qi (term) 期
Qian (Guizhou) 黔（贵梧）
Qian-Gui lianmeng (Guizhou-Guangxi Alliance) 黔八郑同
Qian-Gui xieding (Guizhou-Guangxi Agreement) 黔八川保
Qian Shifu 钱钱钱
Qin (the Qin Dynasty) 秦
Qin Lianfang 覃覃李
Qing (the Qing Dynasty) 闭

353
qingdang (party purification) 闭国
qinggong (purging the Communists) 闭剿
Qiu Changwei 邱杨区
quanguo gejie jiuguohui (Federation of National Salvation 广黄全广广黄编
Associations)
quanli (assertion of rights) 均权
quanmian zhan (full-scale warfare) 广第持
quanmian zhanshu (full-scale tactic) 广第持党
quanmin geming (national revolution) 广张新新
qunyan (Your Say) 群群

rangwai (resist foreign aggression) 安安

rangwai annei (resistance against foreign aggression before 安安袁李
domestic pacification)
rangwai bixian annei (domestic pacification before external 安安攘白袁李
war)
rangwai caineng annei (only resistance could reach domestic 安安才统袁李
pacification)
Rehe 热河
Ren Biming 张毕李
renge (moral personality) 侯差
Rikugun Shikan Gakko (Japanese Military School) 南邓陆七刘桂胡保
Rongxian 联容
Ruoxi 箬箬

sangang wuchang (the three cardinal guides and the five 鼎尹五非
constant virtues)
sanmin zhuyi (the Three Principles of the People) 鼎张大张
sanmin zhuyi geming tongzhihui (the Revolutionary 鼎张大张新新同刘编
Association of Comrades of the Three Principles of the People)
sanwei yiti (Three-in-One) 鼎三张广
sanyu zhengce (policy of three incorporations) 鼎三兵兵
sanzi zhengce (policy of three-fold self-reliance) 鼎地兵兵
Shandong, or Shantung 和东
shanhou huiyi (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Conference) 军军编编
Shanhaiguan, or Shanhaikwan 和何关
Shanxi, or Shansi 和广
Shantou 汕汕
Shaanxi, or Shaansi 陕广
Shanghai 北何
Shen Baofan 申天申
Shen Hongying 沈刘罗
Shen Junru 沈陶沈
sheng (province) 广
shengchan dazhong (the productive masses) 白生大大
Shengchandang (The Productive Party) 白生国
shengcun (existence) 白吕
shengzhang (provincial chief administrator, or governor) 广长
shengzhuxi (Chairman of the provincial government) 广大省

354
shi (army division) 师
Shibao (The Times) 侯南
shichu youming (dispatch troops with just cause) 师师闭姓
Shih Ta-k'ai, or Shi Dakai 李邓石
shiming gan (sense of mission) 使新使
shinian shengju, shinian jiaoxun (takes ten years to add 五广白十，五广十十
production and to build up forces, and takes ten years to
educate and train the masses)
Shishi xinbao (China Times) 侯福新南
shiyu yuanwei (things go contrary to one's wishes) 福广事事
shizhang (Divisional Commander) 师长
shoutu kangzhan (Defence and Resistance) 李安统持
sishu (private school) 私私
sixiao (lujun xiaoxue, lujun yubei xuexiao, lujun zhongxue, 第保（陆七广胡、陆
Baoding junguan xuexiao [the Elementary Military School, the 七军军胡保、陆七广
Army Preparatory School, the Middle Military School and 胡、天保七桂胡保）
Baoding Military Academy])
Songhu 韦凇
Song Ziwen (T. V. Soong) 宋李文
suqing gongfei (the suppression of the Communist bandits) 甘闭剿肃
Suiyuan 广程
Sun Chuanfang 孙罗李
Sun Ke 孙孙
Sun Wen xueshuo (Sun Yatsenism) 孙文胡孙
Sun Wen zhuyi (Sun Yatsenism) 孙文大张
Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yatsen, Sun Wen) 孙广和（孙林李，孙
文）

Taierzhuang, or Taierchuang 台台周

Taiping (i.e. the Taiping Rebellion) 太平天黄
Taiwan 台台
Tan Yankai 谭谭谭
Tang Degang (Tong, Te-kong) 唐唐唐
Tanggu 塘塘
Tang Jiyao 唐陶唐
Tang Shengzhi 唐白唐
Tao Jun 陶陶
taozeijun (Bandit Suppression Army) 定定七
tehuo (special goods - opium) 特特
teweihui (special committee) 特农编
tianfu (land taxes) 田田
Tianjin, or Tienjin 天天
Tanaka Giichi 田广张张
tiejun (the Ironside) 铁七
tiexue zhengce (iron and blood policy) 铁李兵兵
Tongguan 潼关
Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance) 同同编
tongxiang guannian (local particularism) 同第家同
tongxianghui (regional fellows association) 同第编

355
tongyi caineng kangri (national unity before resistance) 统张才统统南
Tongzixi (the Tongzi Faction, Guizhou) 桐桐新（贵梧）
tuhao lieshen (local tyrants and evil gentry) 安土土地
tu huangdi (local lord) 安土反
tuanti (group) 新广
tuifan ducai (downfall of dictatorship) 推推独推
tuifan ducai tongzhi (overthrow of dictatorship politics) 推推独推统党
tuirang qiuhe (making concessions and suing Japan for peace) 退退退刘
tuoxie zhengce (concession policy towards Japan) 妥川兵兵

Wang Boqun 王王群

Wang Gongdu 王王王
wangguo (loss of country) 新黄
Wang Jialie 王余王
Wangjiapu 王余王
Wang Jingwei (Zhaoming) 汪汪汪（兆陈）
Wang Juren 王王侯
Wang Tianpei 王天钟
Wang Yingyu 王何王
weili (power alone) 安动
Wei Ruilin 韦李胡
weiwu buneng qu (not to be subdued by force) 夏何期统威
Wei Yongcheng 韦韦尹
wenhua jianshe (cultural reconstruction) 文党福广
Weng Zhaoyuan 翁翁翁
Wokou (Japanese pirates) 倭倭
Wuhan 何陈
Wu Peifu 吴胡吴
wusheng liangjun zongsiling (Commander-in-Chief of Ally of 五广郑七五五五
Five Provinces)
Wu Tiecheng 吴铁吴
wuye youmin (unemployed vagrants) 无无无张
Wuzhou 梧梧

Xi'an shibian (the Xi'an Incident) 广袁福福

Xibeijun (the Northwest Troops) 广桂七
Ximenghui (the Sacrifice League) 牺同编
xi'nan guanhua (the Southwest Mandarin) 广南桂白
xi'nan liang jiguan (the two southwest organizations) 广南两西关
xi'nan shibian (the Southwest Incident) 广南福福
xi'nan yidong (the Southwest Revolt) 广南两动
Xishan huiyi pai (the Western Hill Faction) 广和编编李
xizheng (the Western Expedition) 广东
Xiamen (Amoy) 厦厦
Xia Wei 夏夏
xian (county) 容
Xiang (Hunan) 湘（桂南）
xiangtu qing (native, or regional emotion) 第安救
xiangtu wenhua (native, or regional culture) 第安文党

356
xiangtu yishi (regional identity) 第安地地
Xiao Focheng 萧萧尹
xiaozhang (principal) 保长
Xie Cangsheng 谢谢白
Xie Fang 解徐
Xie Hegeng 谢刘谢
xin Guixi (the New Guangxi Clique) 新八新
xinzheng (new policies, new administration) 新兵
xing xinzheng yong xinren (carry out new policies and use 黎新兵行新侯
young officers)
xiongdi xiyuqiang, waiyu qiwu (Brothers quarreling at home 力兄兄兄兄，安外外
join forces against attacks from without) 侮
Xiong Kewu 熊周何
Xiong Shihui 熊熊李
xiucai (the graduate of the first level of examination - i.e. 秀才
Prefecture - in the imperial examination system from Tang to
Qing Dynasties)
Xu Qiming 徐徐李
Xu Xiangqian 徐徐马
xunkan (thrice-monthly) 旬七
xunzheng (the tutelage) 十兵
Xunzhou 浔梧

Yahara Kenkichi 矢土矢吉

Yan'an 谭袁
Yan Jing 严严
Yan Xishan 阎阎和
Yanxi (the Yan Xishan Faction) 阎新
Yan Yangchu 晏衡黄
Yang Hucheng 杨林吴
Yang Tenghui 杨蓝李
Yang Ximin 杨孙杨
Yang Yongtai 杨韦永
Yangzi, or Yangtse, Yangtze (River) 杨李（江）
Ye Kaixin 叶石叶
Ye Qi 叶叶
Ye Ting 叶叶
Yi 彝
yigui zhigui (using natives of Guangxi to replace others) 汪八黄八
yihua miehua (using Chinese to eliminate the Chinese) 汪华以华
yi kongjian huan shijian (trading space for time) 汪以以以侯以
yishi erniao (killing two birds with one stone) 张李第不
Yin Chenggang 尹尹尹
Yin Rugeng, or Yin Ju-keng 邓程公
yindan zhengce (silver bullets bribery policy) 银银兵兵
yinggan (act recklessly) 硬广
Yongfu 韦福
Yongsheng zhoukan (Immortal Weekly) 韦白周七
You Guocai 犹黄才

357
youhuan yishi (consciousness of warrying adversity out) 易忧地地
youji zhan (guerrilla warfare) 无攻持
youmin (vagrant) 无张
youmin fenzi (lumpen proletariat) 无张游李
youyong (disbanded soldiers) 无游
yubing yutuan (militia training of able-bodied men to produce 三兵兄新
soldiers)
Yu Hanmou 广陈余
yujiang yuxue (military training of students to produce officers) 三寓兄胡
Yulin 冯林
yumu yuzheng (troop raising through conscription) 三寓兄东
Yu Zuobai 俞俞俞
Yu Zuoyu 俞俞俞
yuan (Chinese dollar) 圆（陈）
Yuan Shikai, or Yuan Shik-kai 袁虞袁
Yue (Guangdong) 粤（广东）
Yue-Gui lianmeng (Guangdong-Guangxi Alliance) 粤八郑同
Yue-Gui zhanzheng (Guangdong-Guangxi War) 粤八持党
yuejun diyishi (the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army) 粤七第张师
yueren zhiyue (Guangdong for the Guangdong people) 粤侯党粤
Yuexi (the Guangdong Faction) 粤新
yundong zhan (mobile warfare) 魏动持
Yun Guangying 韦广罗
Yunnan (Dian) 韦南（滇）

zapaijun (inferior brand armies) 东杂七

Zhang Bojun 章王陶
Zhang Dihai 张鲁何
Zhang Dingfan (Boxuan) 张保申（王伯）
Zhang Fakui (Xianghua) 张张张（徐华）
Zhang-Guijun (Zhang Fakui-the Guangxi Clique Joint Army) 张－八七
Zhang Guotao 张黄张
Zhang-Huang shibian (the Zhang-Huang Incident or Zhang- 张－黄福福
Huang Rebellion)
Zhang Junmai 张马张
Zhang Renmin 张张张
Zhang Wenhong 张文刘
Zhang Xueliang 张胡陈
Zhang Yunyi 张韦林
Zhang Zongchang 张李杨
Zhang Zuolin 张俞胡
Zhao Biyun 赵李韦
Zhao Hengti 赵陈李
Zhejiang 浙江
zhendi zhan (positional warfare) 汉地持
Zheng Jianlu 郑福郑
zhengtong (sole legitimacy) 中统
Zhengxuexi (the Political Studies Faction) 兵胡新
zhengyi (justice) 中张

358
zhengzhi fenhui (Branch Political Council) 兵党分编
zhengzhi huiyi (political conference) 兵党编编
Zhili 直直
Zhi-Lu lianjun (Zhili-Shandong Joint Army) 直鲁郑七
zhiyi xingnan (knowing easily but doing with difficulty) 知易黎知
Zhongguo Guomindang hudang jiuguo qiannian juntuan (the 广黄黄张国护国广黄
Party Protection and National Salvation Young Army Corp of 青广七新
the Chinese Nationalist Party)
Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan (the 广黄黄张国新新青广
Revolutionary Young Army Corp of the Chinese Nationalist 七新
Party)
Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui (the Revolutionary 广黄黄张国新新同刘
Association of Comrades of the Chinese Nationalist Party) 编
Zhonghua minzu geming tongmeng (the Chinese National 广华张抗新新同同
Revolutionary Coalition)
Zhonghua zhiye jiaoyushe (the Chinese Professional Education 广华中无十中同
Association)
zhongyang (the Centre) 广广
zhongyang jun (the Central Army) 广广七
zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xi'nan zhixingbu (Southwest 广广国黎农农编广南
Executive Branch of the Central Executive Committee) 国黎李
zhongyong (golden mean) 广中
Zhong Zupei 黄钟钟
Zhou Dai 周周
Zhou Enlai 周陈广
Zhou Xicheng 周广尹
Zhu De 朱唐
Zhu Dexin 朱唐新
Zhu Foding 朱萧保
Zhu Hongyuan (Chu Hongyuan) 朱朱鲁
Zhujiang liuyu geming (the Pearl River Valley Revolution) 珠江北珠新新
zicun (self-existence) 地吕
zidong (individual initiative) 地动
zigu (self-strength) 地自
zijue (self-awareness) 地觉
zili gensheng (self-reliance) 地动自白
ziwei (self-defence) 地汪
zizhijun (self-governing army) 地党七
zizhu (autonomy) 地大
zong canmouzhang (Chief of General Staff) 五总余长
zong canyi (Chief Advisor) 五总编
zongfa zhidu (patriarchal clan system) 李法黄王
zongsiling (Commander-in-Chief) 五五五
Zou Lu 邹鲁
zuigao yuanze (the uppermost principle) 最桂土最
zuzong (forebear) 钟李

359
360
 Selected Bibliography

CHINESE SOURCES 广文中中

I. 土原王私原原中中

１、原原

郑重重原原会编：“两广六张福福军蒋蒋李广李李李两广八两两”，，历新原原》,1
987广第4期，75-79页。
大广 (笔姓)：“关兄蒋蒋李广关关新黄张国关李新新王广考察”,
国南北：广黄第第历新原原会，，黄张兵府原原》李宗宗 I1-118.
广东广原原会编：，陈陈陈中中中中: 1928-
1936》，广梧：广东广原原会，1985广。
，广广广兵府原原》，南南：广广原原会。
，黄张兵府原原》，南北：广黄第第历新原原会。
，黄张兵府持新编国农农编原原》，南北，广黄第第历新原原会。
七福农农编七五李第张军第第军编：，台台周台以持》，1938广4月，同北。
李韦陈编：，“李张八”福福新中》，台桂，中广正差，1977广。
“定北八新七李文讨”1929广，南北，广黄第第历新原原会。
“定北八新何罗大尹”，1929广，同北。
万李陈、徐重苗大编：，广华张黄新新中长编》，70宗，南北，南北大胡师南同
，1993广。
“1932-34广吴铁吴年两”，，黄张兵府原原》，南北：广黄第第历新原原会。
“1936广年南年年”，同北。
韦南广原原会编：“两广六张福福马龙韦广蒋蒋李两广八两两两”，，历新原原》
，1987广第1期，68-79页。
韦南历新原原会编：“六张福福广新龙韦”，，韦南历新原原》, 1984广第6-7期。
广黄第第历新原原会编：，广华张黄新原原中中中编》，第4宗，南北：江苏江江
师南同, 1986广。
广黄第第历新原原会编：，“广袁福福”原原中中两编》，桂北：原原师南同，198
6广。
广黄第第历新原原会编：，广黄黄张国第张第中广黄党党大编编编新中》，南北
：江苏江江师南同，1986广。
广黄第第历新原原会编：“陈陈私侯李李中中: 1935-
1944”，，张黄原原》，1987广第1期，8-21页。
广黄第第历新原原会编：“1927广蒋蒋李两郑汪黄八两两两”，，历新原原》，198
4广第1期。
广黄第第历新原原会编：“台台周持龙期以李李李年两两”，，历新原原》，1984
广第3期。
广广原原会、广黄第第历新原原会、吉林广同编孙胡吉编：，南邓反黄大张日华
原原两编 _“李张八”福福》，桂北：广华正差，1988广。

361
２、1920－30广党师南张黎新郑第南七东刘两

，梁朝王独》，香香：1936-37广
，晨南》，北何：1920广党
，创创月七》，南南：1934-36广
，国江周七》，南南：1931广
，东徐东刘》，北何：1920-1930广党
，独陈独独》，桂平：1932-37广
，反南周七》，南南：广广广国李, 1928广
，广黄侯南》，法黄法黎：1935-37广
，广保保七》，南南：1936-37广
，广广大胡周七》，梧梧：1932-35广
，广广新新七广月七》，南南：1926广
，广广梧梧区张新期七》，梧梧：1934广
，广广胡白广月七》，八林：1937广
，广梧张黄南南》，广梧：1920-1930广党
，黄国周南》，天天：1920-1930广党
，航以胡保特七》，柳梧：1937广
，福广中中》，八林：1938-44广
，七保旬七》，南南：1933-34广
，统南广黄旬七》（广广张大统南广黄编大督），南南：1931广
，南南张黄南南》，南南：1932-37广
，努动周南》， 桂北：1923广
，群群》（中留广广同胡编大督），广梧：1920-1930广党
，七七广七》，柳梧：1935广
，鼎张大张月七》，广梧：1936广
，同编新国》，南北：1933-34广
，申南》，北何：1920－1930广党
，申南月七》，北何：1930广党
，白路》，南南：1928广
，虞广世傅桂广华文党》，第1宗，长长：1928广10月
，五五七广七》，南南：1934广
，天文台》[广周独独]，香香：1930-1940广党
，何陈张黄南南》，何陈：1927广
，徐关周南》，广梧：1920广党
，中路月七》，南南：1937广
，指南指》，冯林：1931-1934广
，广广兵党编编何陈分编月南》，何陈：1928广
，珠江南南》，香香：1936-38广

３、王私文李中中两

白白白：，白白五五五邓白李》，南南：黄张新新七第第李新七五五五李，1935
广
白白白：，白白五五五最白群独》，八林：广广南南同，1937广
白白白：，白白白白白最白群独李》，南南：1936广
白白白：，白健白白白群独李》，八林：广广福广中中编，1941广
白白白：，七十广张新》，八林：广第持周七同，1938广
白白白：，白白白寓七最白群独两李》，何陈：1938广

362
白白白：，六张魏动军白白白新群独》，南南自白南同编陆师南，1937广
白白白：，统持两广新李顾广马抗》，香香：，天文台》广周独独同，1939广
白白白：，张新兵兵广张抗新新》，南南：张新周七同，1938广
白白白：，五六广闭国魏动新李李》，南南：广黄黄张国广广广国李何罗李，193
2广
查福查编：，黄张国改新李中中两编》，郑梧：河南侯张师南同，1986广
邓桂陈、谢新唐两编：，太平天黄新中》，台桂：文何师南同，1976广
冯刘法编：，广黄兵农李陈中中》，北何：商军商正会，1935广
广广全广统南广黄郑广编编：，广广统南广黄郑第文两中李》，师南地期期，193
6广
广广全广统南广黄郑广编编：，统南群独李桂五：宁南统持新马对》，宗5，南南
：1936广7月
广广张新广李胡保编：，广广张新广李胡保》，南南：1938广
，广广师广汉广易广广 1932-1937》，八林：1938广
广广广兵府编：，广广广广：第张李》，南南：1934广
广广广兵府编：，广广广广：第第李》，南南：1936广
广广广兵府编：，广广广广广段广兵第广》，师南地期期，1945广
广广广兵府编：，广广广广广段容福广尹广》，师南地刘师南广游期期
广广广兵府编：，广广广十中广广统广》，师南地期期，1936广
广广广兵府编：，广广广特广十中》，师南地期期，1940广
广广广兵府编：，第五鼎广王广广广广兵白李》，南南：1934广
广广广兵府编：，第五第广王广广广广兵广二》，南南：1935广
广广广兵府编：，广华张黄第五鼎广王广广广全容中费中广中师广中正》，南南
：1935广
广广广兵府编：，广华张黄第五第广王广广广容兵广广五最》，南南：1935广
广广广兵府编：，广广广兵府督福广最》，八林：1935广
广广广兵府编：，广广广广兵白李：张第五第广王民第五鼎广王》，南南：1934
广
广广广兵府编：，广广广广黎法广中编》，南南：1936广
广广广兵府五广福广编陆农农编编：，八兵李钱, 1931-1941》，八林：1946广
广广广兵府张兵军编：，广广广容第农地党法广中编》，南南：1938广
广广广兵府张兵军编：，广广全容广广 (第五第广王)》，八林：1934广
广广广兵府统广军编：，广广统广广正》，南南：1934-35广
广广广兵府统广军编：，江古广广古八姓侯广》，八林：1934广
广广广兵府统广军编：，广广统广期广广第》，八林：1946广
广广广何罗李编：，闭国广正》，南南：1927广
广广蒋期张抗同编历新广查新编：，广广广广新新中中》，南南：广广侯张师南
同，1960广
广广广广王广编：，第张徐第七护国广黄持新黄第》，师南地刘师南广游期期
广广广广王广编：，保八定定郑七统张广广持新黄第》，师南地刘师南广游期期
广广广广王广编：，完尹桂北持新黄第》，师南地刘师南广游期期
广广胡白七第张广编：，广广胡白七》，师南地期期：白生正生，1939广
广广胡白七李钱编国农农编编：，广广胡白七李钱》，师南地刘师南广游期期，1
941广？
广梧平同编：，广梧福福广北何编编》，广梧：平同，1928广
黄张国广广农农编广广广国李：，李白两广广农农最白群独李》，八林：黄张国
广广农农编广广广国李，1937广
黄张国广广农农编广广广国李：，李白两广广农农最白群独鼎李》，八林：黄张
国广广农农编广广广国李，1937广

363
黄张新新七第第李新七五五五李编：，广广张新广第》，南南：1935广
黄张新新七第第李新七五五五李编：，广广张新广广章最》，南南：1934广
黄张新新七第第李新七五五五李编：，护国广黄李》，南南：1931广
黄张新新七第第李新七五五五李编：，李五五五白白五五五统南广黄群独》，师
南地期期（南南？）：1936广？
黄张新新七第第李新七五兵十军编：，莅八广安姓侯邓白李》，北何：广华正差
，1936广
黄张新新七第第李新七五兵十军编：，广广广广黄新新》，南南：黄张新新七第
第李新七五五五李，1936广
，胡陈张白白文李》，台桂：黄张国广广国新编，1978广
黄黄黄：，广李兵兵》，八林：文党文何同，1940广
黄黄黄：，广广福广何广广新路汉：黄黄黄白白群独桂第》，八林：1940广
黄黄黄：，黄黄黄白白邓白李》，南南：1935广
黄黄黄：，黄黄黄白白群独李》，八林：广广福广中中编，1941广
黄黄黄：，蒋何推黎新兵》，八林：1940广
黄黄黄：，广黄福广广广广福广》，八林：广广福广中中编，1939广
蒋韦严编：，陈南五鼎济原》，台桂：中广正差，1978广
蒋五统群独中编编陆农农编编：，蒋五统群独中编》，台桂：1956广
居中：，居觉白白白广李》，台桂：1954广
七福新国同编：，当党国黄姓侯邓白李》，宗1，南北：七福新国同，1935广6月
李陈李：，李陈李寓七南白》（朱曹江编国），香香：郑联商联王五，1975广
李李李两：，广广桂福广》，八林：广广福广中中编，1939广
李李李：，李唐德白白独广广福广广韩新广黄》(钱钱钱编)，南南：福广正生，19
38广
李李李：，李唐德白白群独李》，八林：广广福广中中编，1941广
李李李：，李五五五最白邓白李》，南南：黄张新新七第第李新七五五五李，193
5广
李李李：，张新广七十》，南南：广第持周七同，1939广
李李李：，鼎张大张三广广》，南南：广第持周七同，1938广
刘刘刘编：，闭梁清文清费考》，北何：师南同刘师南广游期期
罗余罗大编：，新新文清》，台桂：广黄黄张国广广农农编国新编国农农编，195
3- .
罗余罗大编：，广华张黄新中广编》，台桂：1968-
毛魏东：，毛魏东正李两李》，桂北：侯张师南同，1983广
毛魏东：，毛魏东两李》，桂北：侯张师南同，1991广
彭李大编：，广黄广党新中中两陆》，桂北：广黄侯张大胡师南同，1989广
蒲江蒲编：，广广大福白
[张陈民张五李]》，八林：广广广兵府编广农农编，1940广
千余梁编：，广黄兵农李陈独文李》，北何：商军商正会，1936广
千余梁、韩唐章、吴广兵：，广广广李陈广广》，北何：商军商正会，1936广
秦陈溥大编：，广华张黄郑第新中黄编 -
宁南统持侯期》，台桂：广黄黄张国广广农农编国新中中农农编师南，1981广
广第持周七同编：，焦安统持新公独广钱焦 - 李李李群独李》，南南：1938广
侯党文清同编：，广黄无救 -“七马李福七”》，北何：侯党文清同，1937广8月
孙石陈大编：，广黄白党工无新中中》，桂北：孙胡师南同，1961广
，定蒋文两李黄编》，广梧：黄张国非非黄编编陆师南，1931广
，定蒋群独李黄编》，广梧：黄张国非非黄编编陆师南，1931广
汪严虞大编：，广黄白党工无新中中》，桂北：孙胡师南同，1957广
王王张两：，张广广桂广广》，南南：南南张黄南南同，1933广

364
吴黄李两编：，国黄姓侯郑第正党》，北何：中文汇正差，1929广
黎兵吉兵农韩新农农编编：，广广广兵农广查》，北何：商军商正会，1935广
许邓广编：，蒋五推蒋蒋侯正李》，浙江：浙东侯虞以同，1942广
薛余尹、郑广军编：，福福福福中中两编》，南杨：江广侯张师南同，1983广
杨余杨大编：，广法持党文清中编》，台桂：刘文正差，1973广
杨余杨大编：，广南持党文清中编》，台桂：刘文正差，1973广
杨林陈编：，邓邓邓白白邓邓》，香香：1949广
姚姚、陆陆编：，广广福广郑第文清》，八林：1947广
佚姓：，李李李李最白张党新群独》，师南地期期，1936广
佚姓：，两广两两李两：特广兵党费特[秘年]》，师南地期期，1936广6月
佚姓：，宁两广两动桂对地：宁广南两动何罗第广[秘年]》，师南地期期，1936广
6月
张外张大编：，白五统蒋王广李》，台桂：广华文党大胡广华胡中吉，1984广
章闭张大编：，广黄白党兵无新中中》，桂北：鼎郑正生，1957广
广剿北何重农国新中中东李农农编编.：，“张第李”汪军北何广黄编新中两陆》，
北何：北何同编孙胡吉师南同，1987广
广剿广广区农国新中中东李农农编编：，左左江新新归左地》，桂北：广剿国新
中中师南同，1989广
广剿八林地农编：，川七长东李广广》，南南：广广侯张师南同，1986广
广黄黄张国广广七福兵党胡保第张分保兵十军编：，李五五五三柳十白李》，柳
梧：柳梧张黄南南同，1931广
广黄孙胡吉历新中第鼎中编：，广黄广党兵党新中中中编》，南北：油商邓，195
9-61广
广华张黄黄张新新统南广黄七第第李新七五五五李五兵十军编：，广南张动统南
军全徐桂后独》，南南：1936广8月
广华张黄黄张新新统南广黄七第第李新七五五五李五兵十军编：，邓李新七本李
新》，南南：1936？
广华张黄石黄五五广文清编国农农编编：，广华张黄石黄五五广文清：第张编，
第张第：列秦日陈[鼎]》，台桂：中广正差，1970广
广广统持李、广广原原会编：，广剿广广统南张抗统张持汉文七两编》，3宗，桂
北：国新师南同，1985-86广
周康周大编：，甲甲广南持党》，香香：白文正生，1973广
珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，香香：珠江南南同，1937广10月
珠江南南同编：，天津汉持差》，八林：1938广

４、外其郑第新中

(A) 正江
曹曹曹：，冯三南北》，北何：兵党中中同，1934
曹十李：，广黄统持中新》，北何：1947
陈王陈：，第广四兵李》，北何：商军商正会，1936
陈陈：，广广广费白广》，长长：商军商正会，1938
陈陈：，广广宁安广易统黄》，八林：广广广兵府编广农农编，1941
樊陆南：，当党广黄姓侯李》，北何：陈蒋正差，1931
冯王冯：，统持广新第五路七》，陈汉：福黄正生，1938
冯冯期：，冯三南北南讨李》，师南地期期，1937广1月
傅傅华编：，广黄当党姓侯罗》，北何：1948
何天师南同编商：，广党新中》，4宗，北何：何天师南同，1933-1935
胡胡(冷家)两邓：，广广福广李独》，南南：黄张新新七第第李新七五五五李，19

365
35
胡胡桂：，剿肃广共白》，贵衡：胡桂正生，1946
胡大省党胡农农编编商：，胡白白李同胡七》，广梧：1936广5月
华华师南王五编商：，广黄广第统持大福白》，北何：1938
程第(笔姓)：，独李李李广广华反动李》，香香：王宇正宇，1948
江陈鲁：，广南古黎东西》，北何：1937广
亢亢党：，动农第百万》，南南：张新周七同，1938
亢亢党：，广广新广广福广》，南南：张新周七同，1938
亢亢党：，广广新鼎三张广黄》，南南：张新周七同，1938
亢亢党：，广广福广广统持》，南南：张新周七同，1938
亢亢党：，怎怎魏行张新推动福广》，南南：张新周七同，1938
亢亢党：，张新黄王广福黄》，南南：张新周七同，1939
赖赖兄大编：，广广张广》，南南：广广广兵府编广农农编，1935
李余李：，李李李白白罗》，北何：吼江正生，1948
李钟白：，八新左粤桂桂广李外李李》，广梧：1921
李李李：，广广福广尹广七福福广》，南南：1937
梁北梁：，广广张新新邓创》，南南：张新周七同，1938
梁北梁：，广广新广广广李》，南南：张新周七同，1938
梁梁梁：，广黄张抗地广魏动最军觉觉》，北何：1936
梁文夏两邓：，广广商卢白》，南南：黄张新新七第第李新七五五五李，1935
刘马王：，李李李白白白两寓七》，陈汉：持李师南同，1938
刘张飞编：，统南罗陈特西》，陈汉：大侯党正生，1938
，六张统南魏动李同特七》，八林：广广大胡文法胡吉编陆师南，1937广6月
陆谢：，广广七程东白》，陈汉：新白师南同，1938
卢卢统：，黄张兵龙三广广》，南南：张新周七同，1939
卢湘卢：，八无刘桂》，广梧：广梧广督十青广编，1934
卢俞卢：，广黄统持七福张潘新》，北何：张一正生，1941
罗飞赖：，李李李广白白白》，陈汉：福黄正生，1938
毛熊陈编：，张黄五五广汪马桂蒋蒋李白白》，北何：1936；香香：龙厦正生推
商，1965
梦梦和会大侯编：，广华第五李路七李持新》，香香：1932广3月
潘潘潘：，广广怎怎动农广广》，南南：张新周七同，1938
潘潘潘：，统持广新广广第黄农抗长》，南南：张新周七同，1938
潘潘潘：，张新魏动广广广福广》，南南：张新周七同，1938
潘文袁：，粤八商卢》，北何：白生正生，1936
李桂：，八兵潘白》，南南：张新周七同，1938
钱钱钱编：，虞广第张世特世胡保:
广广张新广李胡保》，南南：张新周七同，1938
钱钱钱编：，白健白白白独鼎地兵兵广广广福广》，南南：福广正生，1938
钱钱钱编：，李唐德白白独广广福广广韩新广黄》，南南：福广正生，1938
邱杨区：，广广十中广广广第》，南南：张新周七同，1939
邱杨区：，广广容兵》，八林：文党文何同，1941
张黄任：，广广新动农广广刘统动》，南南：张新周七同，1938
张黄任：，统持广新广黄七福》，统持正生：1940
五马李司：，桂北军桂全李熊潮》，桂平：梁和同，1930
孙党王：，统持福黄尹广广广广福广尹广》，南南：张新周七同，1939
陶王陶：，白党近国》，北何：1945
陶亢唐编：，鸦年桂古鸦》，北何：王宇王师南同，1937
田世田邓：，广广古黎白》，北何：广华正差，1935

366
拓拓编：，古南新寓广》，北何：统张师南同，1939；Washington, D.C.: Center for
Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries推商, 1969
王王侯：，广黄白广新分中》，北何：广华正差，1935
文王直：，最白鼎五广广黄七福新》，台桂郑商, 1962
吴贺吴：，广广侯福黎兵》，八林：1940
五五古黎新编：，八无广月白》，北何：广黄古黎同，1932
广韦(笔姓).：，统持广新广广》，南南：张新周七同，1938
徐程李：，广广桂三寓兄胡兵兵》，师南地期期：广广广兵府十中军，1938
徐张白：，广广广容黎兵关新》，郑重：商军商正会，1943
杨余陈：，张黄五五广胡白魏动》，北何：1927
叶陈叶：，八无广月白》，广梧：1934
叶黄袁编：，新广南特陆》，北何：青广东刘同，1940
袁闭平编：，当党国黄姓侯罗》，南北：七福新国同，1936
恽林群：，统持广兵张》，北何：大侯党师南同，1937
张黄平：，白白白寓七罗》，陈汉：持李师南同，1938
张黄平：，铁七寓广列罗》，广梧：1938
张钟唐：，广广广广白广》，长长：商军商正会，1938
张白张：，广广李陈地公》，八林：文党文何同，1941
张张蓝：，贵梧李陈》，北何：商军商正会，1938
张国张编：，统持广新兵国刘李别》，郑重：读正白生师南同，1939
张桐白：，黄张新新七桂北持党新》，北何：商军商正会，1933
赵近赵：，李李李寓七罗》，北何：大侯党正差，1938
枕中(笔姓)：，广广全广广新广新魏动》，南南：张新周七同，1938
郑福郑：，八无张月白》，北何：广华正差，1935
广华独编会编：，陈大新新广黄》，郑重：1939；Washington, D. C.： Center for
Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries郑商，1969
广华广黄黄知广陈编编商：，黄郑广查新南讨正李外国独》，师南地刘师南广游
期期（1933？）
广黄同编十中同考察新编：，广广新十中李外李陈》，江苏无阎：广黄同编十中
同，1937
广黄青广七侯同：，反蒋魏动新》，广梧：广黄青广七侯同，1934
广黄文党福广川编编：，统持马五广桂广黄》，1937广黄南；香香：龙厦正生郑
商，1965
，广安侯刘黄中广桂李李李白白》，师南地期期：桂张师南同编陆师南，1948
黄月韦：，广广胡白七》，南南：张新周七同，1938
周吕：，广广广兵府广广督王李李广广》，八林：1940
朱外华：，张李第七广一李李》，北何：新新师南同，1933
朱黄：，张张张寓七》，陈汉；群动正生，1938
朱兆华、王唐王：，台台周大编持》，河南：1942

(B) 白白广文章

白白白：“广广朱广广第编广张新”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1937广2月)，pp.

3-7
白白白：“怎怎广黄桂怎”，，七七广七》(1933)，pp. 11-3
白白白：”怎怎完尹五公邓中关广新使新”，五五古黎同编：，八无广月白》，pp.
40-53
白白白：“广广地广兵兵新广广段”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, No. 11, pp. 49-54
白白白：“六张魏动桂六定”，，李白两广广农农最白群独李》，1937

367
白白白：“黄公福广心张心福无新土动动”，，七保旬七》，No. 19 (1 March 1934),
pp. 2-6.
白白白：“我我第四不里我白” ，七保旬七》，No. 10 (September 1936).
白白白：“广第持党广广第持中”，广华独编会编：，陈大新新广黄》，郑重：193
9；Washington, D. C.： Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research
Libraries郑商，1969
白白白：“统南广黄”，珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，1937，pp. 42-61
白白白：“统南剿剿，亲李军德”，，白白五五五邓白李》，1935
白白白：“地动自白广持持统持”，，白白白白白群独李》，八林：1941
白白白：“七福统持广兵党统持”，，白白白寓七最白群独李》，何陈：1938
白白白：“鼎三兵兵”，，白白白白白最白群独李》，南南：1936
白白白：“宁兄广袁福福新对地”，南南自白南同编：，“六张”魏动军白白白新群独
》，1937，pp. 73-75
白白白：“广黄张抗新新古军新中恶”，同北，pp. 76-84
白白白：“朱国黄牺为新为黄”，，南南张黄南南》，1931广7月30－31南
蔡中薛：“新广广新李陈福广”，，东徐东刘》，Vol. 37, No. 2 (16/1/1940).
蔡伍蔡：“焦安统持桂广钱理”珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，pp. 66-68
陈陈陶：“宁兄广广新家察李孙对”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, Nos. 9-10, pp. 26-35.
陈陈陈：“张新兵兵广韩新广黄”，，梁朝王独》，Vol. 2, No. 3 (Feb. 1937), pp 18-
21.
陈陈江：“广广新张新李外独广”，，申南月七》，Vol. 3, No. 9 (1934).
陈陈陈：“最白梧梧区新张新广广”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Feb. 1937), pp. 25-
28.
陈陈陈：“’李张八’第第周广李同使群”，，广黄侯南》, December 9, 1935 to
February 4, 1936.
陈桂陈：，独粤八新两动》，，独陈独独》，No. 206 (21 June 1936).
陈桂陈：，八差新解为》，，独陈独独》，No. 218 (13 September 1936).
钱钱钱：“七侯军军新广黄兵府”，，侯党国独》，香香,：June 16, 1947, pp. 2-3.
大王：“李陈李新李李李无”，何天师南同编：，广党新中》, Vol. 4, pp. 1-10.
邓黄张：“拥护广广焦安统持大张”，，广广胡白广月七》，第4-5期(1937)
邓蒋侯：“张抗持党广张抗何民”，，七保旬七》，第19期(1934)， pp. 36-8
黄张国广广广国李何罗李：“地徐地党何罗大尹”，，南南张黄南南》，1931广9
月19-22南
艾艾：“广黄桂师路”，，莅八广安姓侯邓白李》，pp. 30-37
艾艾：“广黄救白地广”，同北，pp. 38-48
艾艾：“广黄桂中西”，同北，pp. 22-29
艾艾：“广黄蒋何韩新?”，同北，pp. 8-22
艾艾：“广黄闭张杨范广中?”，梁文夏两：，广广商卢白》，1935, pp. 25-30
傅俞张：“行用李广党用张抗韩新”，，珠江南南》，1937广6月1南
王白：“八林广西”，，梁朝王独》，Vol. 1, No. 3 (1936), pp. 18-20
“广广广党安土土地广广”，，创创月七》，Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 3-5
“广广张新广第”，，梁朝王独》，Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 47-62
八客：“李李李新陈”，何天师南同编：，广党新中》，Vol. 3, pp. 91-96
刘和：“宁兄焦安统持新家察”，珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，pp. 123-137
何熊严：“期不不新不广白”，珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，pp. 69-84
侯黄侯：“’游八新广广’视察白”，梁文夏两：，广广商卢白》，1935，pp. 38-45
胡胡：“亲亲中亲，仇亲中仇！”，，独陈独独》，No. 206 (21 June 1936).
胡胡：“南无东李”，，独陈独独》，No. 164 (1935)
黄天李：“新广广张西西”，，梁朝王独》，Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 34

368
黄天李：“广广白广广广广大恶”，，梁朝王独》，No. 4 (1936), pp. 2-4
黄黄黄：“贯贯焦安统持新大张”，珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，pp. 62-65
黄黄黄：“广兵府黄大省严讨广广张大正”，，创创月七》，Vol. 3, No. 12
(September 1936).
黄黄：“四世侯何动广张抗何动孙从’三兵兄新’广’三寓兄胡’”，，七保旬七》，No.
21 (1934), pp. 31-4.
黄季：“张抗大张桂钱焦三广广“，，中路月七》，Vol. 1, No. 5 (1937)
白亲：“粤八白广新潘石”，，黄国周南》，Vol. 13, No. 24 (June 1936).
江亢林：“广黄新孙对三广广，广广新孙对三张新”，，莅八广安姓侯邓白李》，p
p. 78-80.
金陈：“蔡伍蔡广八新蔡蔡”，，梁朝王独》，No. 5 (1936), pp. 13-5
孔五贵：“黄知期广青广何闭新努动”，，七保旬七》，No. 13 (1934), pp. 27-28
邝邝邝：“福广党新广广”，，黄国周南》，Vol. 5, Nos. 43-45.
雷邓：“广广福广新对广”，七福新国同编：，当党国黄姓侯邓白李》，Vol. 1,
1935, pp. 8-15
冷家：“粤八西蔡”，冷家两：，广广福广李独》，1935.
李文陈：“天天区新广十广第月游兵十工俞广广”，，创创月七》, Vol. 2, No. 3
(1935)
李张李：“广黄新统张白广广广广新李持”，，七保旬七》，Nos. 18-19 (1934)
李李李：“张抗家同陆民张心”，，福广中中》，Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 117-119
李李李：“宁兄地徐地党对世对广新对中”，，国江周七》，第3期(1931广12月1南)
李李李：“广黄心大余新救张”，，福广中中》, Vol. 1, Vo. 5, pp. 79-81.
李李李：“反日陈新第张”，，福广中中》, Vol. 2, No. 6, p. 78.
李李李：“广广创督张新新地张”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1937).
李李李：“恢韩我我新黄金侯党”，，李白两广广农农最白群独鼎李》, 1937, pp. 5-9
李李李：“张发我我张抗独陈新汪发”，，指南指》, Nos. 47-49 (1934).
李李李：“张动广黄宁南统持汪广中新”，，梁朝王独》, Vo. 2, No. 5, pp. 34-35
李李李：“闭国五周广李同编邓清”，，李白两广广农农最白群独李》, 1937, pp. 15-
20
李李李：“宁南统持郑第西白”，同北，pp. 1-4.
李李李：“五五五十清”， ，五五七广七》 (1933), p. 1.
李李李：“陶尹五公广梧蒙知侯新新新汪发”，，孙大五统广梧蒙知五周广李同特
七》，广梧：1932, pp. 78-81
李李李：“宁“黄郑南讨正”新国独”，广华广黄黄知广陈编编商：，黄郑广查新南讨
正李外国独》，师南地刘师南广游期期(1932?)
李李李：“解解黄知第解地吴努动”，，李五五五最白邓白李》，1935.
李李李：“四黄从李党孙从我我中马新师路”，同北
李李李：“汪发持贺精精”，同北
李李李：“广南同刘第西新广黄新救张”，同北
李李李：“辟辟倒独推新程对亲”，同北
李李李：“韩新广华张抗心我我复张新张军”，同北
李李李：“努动努努白生努钱张大动努”，同北
李李李：“粤八广俞统南剿剿”，.同北
李李李：“我新大张 - 焦安统持”，广第持周七同编：，焦安统持新公独广钱焦 -
李李李群独李》，1938
李李李：“当马我我何闭新努动”，，李唐德白白群独李》，八林：1941
李李李：“古军新持差”，同北
李李李：“焦安统持新大张广钱焦”，珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，pp. 26-41
李李李：“李七长三八林广李桂北大编邓孙清”，，新新七侯》，No. 5 (1926), p. 8

369
李李李：“李李李新广原大张”，，虞广世傅桂广华文党》，No. 1 (1928), pp. 68-81
李李李：“李李李独统持攘贺”，，文清》，Vol. 2, 北何：1938
李李李：“张抗韩新广焦安统持”，，梁朝王独》，Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 22-
29；李，东徐东刘》，Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan. 1937), pp. 17-23.
李李李：“李五五五邓白清”，，广广大胡周七》, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1932), pp. 4-5.
李李李：“张广广新李顾李古军何闭新努动”，，创创月七》, Vol. 3, No. 5 (1936),
pp. 1-3.
李李李：“我我当我持统南广黄大张”，，中路月七》, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1936), pp. 1-2.
李李李：“青广广黄余白吕”，，广广大胡周七》, Vol. 6, Nos. 4-5, pp. 1-3.
李李李：“广黄新中西广我我新张军”，，广保保七》, No. 4 (1936), pp. 50-54
李李李：“新团广黄动努钱广焦安统持”，，广保保七》, Nos. 18-9, pp. 273-4.
李李李：“安闭统持”，，鼎张大张月七》, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May 15, 1936).
李李李：“六张魏动广广黄张抗新新”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, No. 8, pp. 47-49
李李李：“焦统才心广黄复张新师路”，王王张两：，张广广桂广广》，1933
李李李：“统持贺权新攘超理”，，珠江南南》, 15/12/1937
李李李：“统南广黄新兵党南讨”，谢广孟两大编：，统持侯期黄剿广俞李钱》，1
992, pp. 290-292
刘林李：“广广中马最广心第解为新白广”，，群群》, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 14-17
陆陆：“广广鼎广汕商卢白”，，南南张黄南南》, 23/02/1936.
罗南陈：“焦安统持一钱从”，珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，1937, pp. 105-107
莫莫：“珠江北珠张抗傅卢新”，，梁朝王独》, No. 4, 1936, pp. 4-8
莫事张：“广广新张新”，，福广中中》, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 15-20.
N. Fierce：“黄张兵府黑关新广广”，，徐关周南》, No. 165 (July 28, 1926).
潘王潘：“五广广新广黄统张魏动”，广黄文党福广川编编：，统持五广马桂广黄
》，pp. 1-20
潘李桂：“广广新张新”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 21-3.
齐熊刘：“两粤福福刘广黄统张”，，独陈独独》, No. 213 (9 August 1936)
覃覃李：“第期要要期威要才统广黄”，
七福新国同编：，当党国黄姓侯邓白李》，1935
张毕李：“焦安统持”，珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，pp. 115-118
北何大王南：“胡白白胡虞军新两广”，，大王南》，16 May 1936
同独：“广广新侯差大张”，，珠江南南》，22 July 1937.
同独：“张李鼎六 - 统南广黄广”，，广黄侯南》，January 4, 1936.
舍舍：“陈立统持李统持钱焦广桂关白广”，，创创月七》, Vol. 3, No. 10 (1936)
侯时：“广广剿生国新李共李广三”，何天师南同编：，广党新中》, Vol. 2, pp. 316-
322
宋宋宋：“鼎广广广广新李顾”，，创创月七》，Vol. 2, No. 3 (1935)
王陈：“广广桂张新李外地张”，，黄国周南》，Vol. XI, No. 17 (30 April 1934)
王王刘：“陈侯督公张新新地张”，，梁朝王独》，Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 23-25.
魏张郑：“柳梧区新广十广工俞南讨”，，创创月七》, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1934)
文范：“八广桂王新桂福”，，同编新国》，Vol. 6, No. 32 (1934)
文傅：“广广广左关桂广兵广广”，努动周南》, No. 40 (1923).
白问：“每广每关新李陈李”，何天师南同编：，广党新中》, Vol. 4, pp. 10-15
“广袁福福马李李李白白白广张胡陈新张西年李”，，广广文新中中》, No. 19, p.
237.
吴查：“古军广广新潘对”，，群群》, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1931), pp. 1-12.
萧朝韦；“’七十’刘’张新’新新新公独”，，七保旬七》, No. 21, pp. 35-37.
筱汇：“’六张’汪马李’六张’汪军”， ，天文台》, 2 June 1937.
筱筱：“白陆卢伍”，，黄国周南》, Vol. XIII, Nos. 12, 13, and 14 (30 March, 6 April,

370
and 13 April 1936).
黄陈：“西广广新张新黄王”，，独陈独独》, No. 96 (1934), pp. 12-13.
徐天张：“广广白广广华桂白广”，，鼎张大张月七》, Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2 (1936).
雅群：“李陈李党粤新”，何天师南同编：，广党新中》, Vol. 3, pp. 85-91.
晏衡黄：“五广广新广黄第农福广”，广黄文党福广川编编：，统持五广马桂广黄
》，pp. 413-417
佚姓：“期不’焦安’焦统”，，黄国周南》, Vol. 10, No. 20 (22 May 1933).
广韦龙；“我我新使新”，，七保旬七》, Nos. 16-7, pp. 14-15.
土严：“新广广新兵党路汉”，，同编新国》，Vol. 6, No. 28 (1934).
章王陶：“四广广焦安统持大张孙新”，珠江南南同编：，焦安统持》，1937, pp.
85-94.
张马张：“广广广宁安统持白广”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, No. 11, pp. 55-58.
张张张：“关兄广广新创关”，，梁朝王独》, Vol. 2, No. 6, pp. 2-4.
张箬和：“宁兄两广两动何闭新对地”，，独陈独独》, No. 207 (28/6/1936).
赵李韦：“我新为黄”，，创创月七》, Vol. 3, No. 12 (September 1936)

II. 李李李刘汉广历新中中

１、正江

柴陈编：，：.： .李两》，桂北：广黄文新师南同，1988.
蔡伍蔡：，蔡伍蔡地罗》，香香：1946；察察哈：黑龙江侯张师南同，1982广郑
商
陈陈雷：，陈陈雷李李李》，台桂：罗白文胡同，1967
陈王陈：，苦邝李》，香香：香香大胡师南同，1979
陈陈陈：，陈陈陈地罗》，台桂：罗白文胡同，No. B45, 1974.
陈鼎陈、陈吕陈两编：，雷邓广张黄李兵 - 雷邓
(区南)白白白白白李》，台桂：广广中中吉白党新中中中，1989.
程熊程：，兵政李李》，南南：广广侯张师南同，1983
程熊程：，李李李白白新李广》，桂北：文新中中师南同，1980
程熊程：，兵何秘广》，香香：南粤师南同, 1987
程熊程：，白白白罗》，香香：南粤师南同, 1989
吕存胡同编李：，朱第第中黄剿广俞王平韦路新 -
广袁福福广张胡陈》，香香：大东大正王五, 1978
大地师南同编商：，广袁福福鼎李》，香香：1962
第第七李钱编国农农编编：，第第七李钱》，广梧：程程文党福无要军同, 1949
冯冯期：，我中对地新蒋蒋李》，香香：文党文何同,
1949；香香：七五广党东刘同1975广郑商
龚黄：，我广川七》，香香：南徐师南同, 1954.
顾贺陶：，顾贺陶李李李》，广黄同编孙胡吉广，桂北：广华正差，1985
广广七区兵党李编：，广广新新李李李》，南南：广广侯张师南同，1959
郭努郭：，张世历新白广新广党 -
广袁福福广解李李新李李》，载吕存胡同编李：，朱第第中黄剿广俞王平韦路新 -
广袁福福广张胡陈》，香香：大东大正王五，1978
何何何：，八广统持广台台傅韩》，台桂：黎李文党福无王五，1972.
胡胡胡：，胡胡胡李李李：1901-1936》，尹成：第程侯张师南同，1985
黄黄黄、朱朱鲁编：，潘李何白白白白白李》，台桂：广广中中吉白党新中中中

371
，1992
黄黄陈：，五五李李》，杭梧：王韦师南同, 1945
蒋李黄：，王风广新南静》，台桂：1967
蒋李黄：，中广吕新桂苗》，台桂：中广正差, 1976
蒋广中：，广袁广月白》，载大地师南同编商：，广袁福福鼎李》，1962
蒋宋华黄：，广袁福福李李李》，同北
李金满：，广袁福福亲历白》，台桂：罗白文胡同，1972.
李李李：，戎马白戎：皖皖广陈 - 李李李李李李》，台桂：广安大正王五, 1975
李永程、宋宋陈编广：，广桂七李钱：1924-1930广》，香香：大东大正王五, 1978
李秀文：，我广李李李》，八林：漓江师南同, 1986.
鲁鲁：，独张胡陈白白》，载吕存胡同编李：，朱第第中黄剿广俞王平韦路新 -
广袁福福广张胡陈》，香香：大东大正王五, 1978广，pp. 309-385.
莫文莫：，李李川七七》，南南：广广侯张师南同, 1979.
广黄兵川文新中中中中农农编两编：，陈南五鼎济原亲历白》，桂北：广黄文新
中中师南同，1987
广黄兵川文新中中中中农农编两编：，傅俞张白平》，桂北：广黄文新师南同，1
985.
广黄兵川文新中中中中农农编两编：，广袁福福亲历白》，桂北：广黄文新师南
同，1986.
广黄兵川文新中中中中农农编两编：，七.七福福 -
土黄张国寓广统南持党亲历白》，桂北：广黄文新师南同，1986.
广黄兵川文新中中中中农农编两编：，八.张鼎韦凇统持 -
土黄张国寓广统南持党亲历白》，桂北：广黄文新师南同，1987.
广黄兵川文新中中中中农农编两编：，围围围围川七长东亲历白 -
土黄张国寓广新李李》，桂北：广黄文新师南同，1990
千余梁：，七五广新李历》，香香：镜南师南王五, 1986.
邱黄朱：，大别和八广统持桂李李》，香香：1970
和广广兵川文新中中中中农农编编：，阎阎和统党和广新钱》，太土：和广侯张
师南同，1981
申王张：，广袁福福李钱》，桂北：广华正差，1979.
宋孙宋：，鹰鹰寓七》，桂北：广黄文新师南同，1986
唐唐唐、李李李：，李李李李李李》，香香：南粤师南同, 1987
万黄文：，八新国国李》，八林：广广师范胡吉历新新，1983
徐徐李：，徐徐李白白白白白李》，陈吕陈、陈鼎陈两白白白李，台桂：广广中
中吉白党新中中中，1983
何唐田邓：，张胡陈广广袁福福》，桂北：广华正差，1980
张黄张：，我新李李》，香香：李南月七师南同, 1980.
张张张：，李李李》，香香：1987
张党广：，张党广李李李》，桂北：文新中中师南同，1985.
郑宋袁两广：，广黄大新新何陈侯期国国李》，桂北：广黄同编孙胡师南同，198
5
广黄侯张兵党川商编编广黄农农编文新中中中中农农编编：，广广新新李李李》
，桂北：广华正差，1962
广广中中吉白新中编：，白白白白白白白白李》，台桂：广广中中吉白党新中中
中，1984
邹鲁：，李顾李》，郑重：1943
朱胡范：，我广张新第五广》，桂北：新团师南同，1990.
左胡白：，白鼎五广国国东白》，香香：钟祖师南同，1954

372
２、文新中中

蔡伍蔡：“李李五李路七三回反蒋回回李李”，，文新中中两陆》, No. 59
巢夏、黄梦广：“八林’焦安统持’亲历白”，，文新中中两陆》， No. 40, pp. 181-90.
陈陈：“两广六张福福军公李李”，，罗白文胡》, Vol. 53, No. 3.
陈大文：“统持马八新广剿生国新关新”，南南文新中中两陆》， No. 3 (1987).
陈大文：“关兄’程八川川保’"，，南南文新中中两陆》， No. 6 (1988).
陈大文：“八新广广黄编新关新”，，南南文新中中两陆》， No. 5 (1988).
陈李陈：“两广福福期以贵梧新统南广黄七李福”，，贵梧文新中中两陆》，No. 23
(1986).
陈陈陈：“新八新四新巢广湘从李师新新滇七师保”，，广广文新中中两陆》， No.
3, pp. 45-50.
陈陈陈：“南粤广俞亲历白”，，广梧文新中中两陆》，No. 37, pp. 100-22.
陈陈白：“广广福广中中编新尹陈刘团广”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 4, pp. 73-
86.
陈师张：“新八新广广广胡白七”，，广广文新中中两陆》， No. 13, pp. 183-193.
陈陈：“新八新新新新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 3, pp. 51-58.
陈陈：“新八新刘西两军白”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 4, pp. 47-53.
陈陈：“张李第八广粤八持党广汪黄一一新广一李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》，N
o. 5, pp. 53-57.
陈陈：“新八新广宋李文”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 9, pp. 75-90.
陈陈：“新八新七李新尹侯期亲历李广”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 12, pp. 11-
68.
陈陈：“新八新统党关我中大督新广广’禁禁’”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 2, pp.
71-82.
陈陈、尹尹尹、赖赖赖：“新八新新新新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 1, pp.1-
34.
程郑程：“南粤刘平李李宁白”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 35, No. 4.
程熊程：“八新广八林文党吴”，，广广南南》，20 November 1980.
程熊程：“白白白广蒋蒋李桂以”，，侯精》东刘，No. 6, 1985, pp. 49-64
程熊程：“白白白广两广福福”，，胡中独政》，No. 2, 1987, pp. 77-78; and No. 4,
1987, pp. 80-82.
程熊程：“两广福福”，，广广文新中中》，No. 22, pp. 47-56.
程熊程：“西西八新秘年兵党新新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 7, pp. 136-150.
程熊程：“我中知韦新白白白1931-1932”，，胡中独政》, No. 3, 1986, pp. 59-63; and
No. 6, 1986, pp. 63-7.
戴黄：“何何郑八新鲁新张两”，，桂南文新中中两陆》，No. 5 (1964).
邓陈期：“刘湘广蒋蒋李新刘黄李广”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 5.
邓贺周：“刘南福广新八新”，，广广文新中中》，No. 14, pp. 149-154.
冯冯：“新八新新新百百新年新李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 6, pp. 96-109.
冯冯：“自中”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 6.
冯冯：“夏夏罗陈”，，广广文新中中》，No. 15, pp. 4-13.
冯冯：“韦韦韦新陈”，，广广文新中中》，No. 16, pp. 113-118.
冯冯：“广广航以胡保”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 1, pp. 68-82.
冯冯：“广广航以胡保广广”，，广广文新中中》，No. 35 (1992).
冯冯：“我中知韦新新八新刘团南邓反黄大张广广”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No.
5, pp. 46-52.
傅军中：“白白白广广广胡白七”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 12, pp. 183-5.
甘甘甘：“程康川七编编新新新百百”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 33.

373
耿刘：“广广新新侯期新广广”，，白党新中中》，No. 4, 1958, pp. 89-106.
何千里：“张李第八广我党党白白白从东桂商一李第”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 52
(1964).
何何黄：“新八新广东桂七桂以”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 4, pp. 27-36
何俞俞：“王王王新秘年新新生动”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 12, pp. 137-149.
何俞俞：“广黄黄张国新新同刘编李两”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 1, pp. 35-46.
何俞俞：“广黄黄张国广广国兵中中中”，，广广文新中中》，No. 15, pp. 40-44
侯陈侯：“李白七李李新李李李新李李李王王王桂李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》
，No. 12, pp. 150-160.
胡陈张：“胡陈张地罗”，，白党新中中》，No. 2, 1981; and No. 2, 1983.
黄路黄：“蒋八党蒋鸦年新张两”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 3, pp. 59-61
黄梦广：“新八新新巢广湘兵何冯阎反蒋持党”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 3,
pp. 35-44
黄徐陈：“黄张国八新国国李”，，胡中独政》，No. 4, 1986, pp. 68-70; No. 5, 1986,
pp. 68-70, 67; No. 6, 1986, pp. 68-9; No. 5, 1987, pp. 80-4; No. 6, 1987, pp. 76-9; No. 1,
1988, pp. 74-5; No. 4, 1989, pp. 94-5; and No. 1, 1990, pp. 111-3.
黄徐陈：“张李第李广’刘西’新李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 9, pp. 1-44
黄徐陈：“八新李外反动新兵党新新“，，文新中中两陆》，No. 7, pp. 119-129
黄黄苗：“我中对地新郭唐我“，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 52, No. 4.
黄黄苗：“发秘莫神新刘黄联”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 54, No. 4.
黄黄苗：“张张张刘潘李桂”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 53, No. 5.
黄黄陈：“张李第八广粤八持党”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 3.
黄黄陈：“我广蒋蒋李刘八新新关新”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 7.
黄黄陈：“旧八新新新以”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 16.
黄黄陈：“第张第兵福马新秘年反剿编编”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 45.
黄黄陈：“滇八持党”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 2.
黄黄陈：“新八新新新新广两广统张李大新新桂北”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No.
6, pp. 1-95.
黄黄陈：“’第张第’福福马军我亲事李历新李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 7,
pp. 1-42.
黄黄陈：“新八新广鸦年禁“，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 4, pp. 1-26.
黄黄陈：“新八新新新新“，，文新中中两陆》，No. 52 (1964).
黄黄陈：“阻攻叶贺南东七新持党“，，文新中中两陆》，No. 24.
黄侯我、黄卢：“莫师新新新钱焦余韦杰群同刘”，，新新李李李》，No. 8 (1982),
pp. 78-109
黄黄马：“我张胡李胡总余长新张段李李”，，桂桂文新中中》，No. 18 (1987), pp.
48-51.
黄黄黄：“八八李八李”，，李苗》，1964-1965
黄黄黄：“八江陆大同胡闭桂蒋”，，李苗》，No. 205 (1966).
黄黄黄：“广广广广广广广广广广广广广李广”，，李苗》，1962 - 1963.
黄黄黄：“南南第第中围吴亲历白”，，李苗》，No. 46 (June 1, 1959).
蒋傅蒋：“宁五李路七广’福福福福’新宁努”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 59.
阚李莫：“张张张广八新关新和桂系内部的纷争”，《广东文史资料选辑》，No. 4
(1962), pp. 86-100.
阚李莫：“陈陈陈、李李李、白白白张动两广’六张福福’李李”，，广东文新中中两
陆》，No. 1 (1961), pp. 86-102.
孔期虞：“广袁福福李李李”，，国新中中费特》，No. 11, 1982.
赖唐：“蒋蒋李权行俞李倒八我国”，，广东文新中中两陆》，No. 10.
赖赖赖：“广袁福福广新八新七李”，，广广文新中中》，No. 17, pp. 155-157

374
赖赖赖：“蒋蒋李广李陈李李党李李白陈”，，广东文新中中两陆》，No. 31 (1981)
赖赖赖：“’六张’福福团广马军新八新袁事张事新两事冷事”，，广广文新中中两陆
》，No. 4, pp. 152-160.
蓝蓝蓝：“四八唐持党从蒋八持党”，，桂桂文新中中》，No. 18, pp. 29-43.
李梁颜：“八新肃桂三广广解桂马军新救黎“，，白党新中中》，No. 6, 1958, pp.
121-140.
李李黄：“胡李胡陶陶三桂桂新统党广胡胡“，，何陈文新中中》，No. 11 (1983),
pp. 2-27.
李陈李：“李陈李新陈历”，，广东文新中中两陆》，No. 26.
李余李：“地党七马广南南刘广广新差第”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 3, pp.
152-60.
李我桂：“关兄李陈李关关新八新新余新年新李李”，，广广文新中中》，No. 14,
pp. 33-43.
李李李：“桂北新最军张持”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 33, No. 1.
李李：“广广新张新”，，广广文清》，No. 9 (April 1980).
李张李：“桂北马白白白三八林新生动”，，广广文新中中》，No. 14, pp. 149-154.
李张李：“李李广广福广中中编”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 4, pp. 87-98.
李张李：“白白白三桂平、唐和生动新年新李李”，，广广文新中中》，No. 21, pp.
84-87.
李正吴：“广广新新侯期广广新陆七广李胡汇刘陆七广胡汇”，，广广文新中中两
陆》，No. 10, pp. 38-42.
李第莫、陈陈：“新八新桂新中邓新两世西新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 1,
pp. 91-101.
李李：“新八新刘 ：.：. 三广广新李党”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 2, pp. 1-21.
李李：“新八新新黄张广胡十中”，，广广文新中中》，No. 15, pp. 138-157
李李：“广广福广中中编新对七福”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 4, pp. 110-120.
李黄王：“我中知韦新何何何”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 36.
梁王梁：“悼同王王王谢谢白白白”，，广广文清》，No. 10 (1980), pp. 43-45
梁余梁：“第五路七郑第李第”，，广广文清》，No. 9, pp. 30-32; and No. 10, pp. 13-
15.
梁梁：“广广国兵中中中”，，南南文新中中》，No. 1 (1986).
梁梁：“新八新李新新张新兵兵李外钱广”，，南南文新中中》，No. 4 (1987)
梁胡卢：“八七广李新桂桂 -南南七保”，，广广文清》，No. 57 (1992), pp. 13-18.
廖吕天：“新八新韩新侯期新广广银黎原新白”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 1,
pp. 104-124.
廖吕天：“广广银黎新中”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 2, pp. 35-70
林林航：“广广新’无游’”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 3, pp. 170-200
林林：“广南福福侯蒋蒋李西权行我倒陈陈陈新张两”，，广广文新中中》，No.
17, pp. 164-8.
林伍华：“蒋汪年余倒八新马蒋军蒋”，，广东文新中中两陆》，No. 8 (1963), pp.
43-49.
林张陈：“两广’张福福’广五李路七张王三八恢韩新李李”，，广东文新中中两陆》
，No. 3 (1961), pp. 150-5.
林黄林：“’张黄福福’马军新粤差”，，广梧文新中中两陆》，No. 37, pp. 51-59
刘刘：“两广’六张’福福”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 3；或，广广文新中中》，No.
29
刘梁李：“胡李胡陶陶关朝马军”，，桂桂文新中中》，No. 28 (1989).
刘矢陆：“八林李余农七保李李”，，广广文清》，No. 11 (1981), pp. 48-50
刘伍李：“两广六张福福广广曾王石新张段李两”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 50, No. 2;

375
或，桂南文新中中两陆》，No. 29 (1988).
刘刘筱：“第五路黔七第第新八新新余李陈”，，广广文新中中》，No. 15, pp. 53-
59.
刘新：“李李黄张新新七第八七”，，桂南文新中中两陆》，No. 6.
刘张郭：“解桂马广广师广汉广易军广广”，，广广文新中中》，No. 15, pp. 158-
166.
刘刘陈：“李李李要李李李”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 63 (1979), pp. 53-61
刘黄联：“李李我三八新工俞侯新对七福”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 73.
刘黄联：“广袁福福新李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 9, pp. 49-56
刘黄联：“白白白逼蒋关台马军”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 9, pp. 75-90
龙韦：“统持马军我新对广李李”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 17.
龙魏何：“广袁福福侯八新新桂王”，，广广文新中中》，No. 17, pp. 155-157
吕广周：“俞俞俞李李李倒八反蒋李李”，，广东文新中中两陆》，No. 4.
卢毕卢：“胡李胡陶陶统党桂桂新救广”，，何陈文新中中》，No. 2 (1981).
卢毕卢：“胡李胡陶陶三八新广新新广”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 52 (1964)
陆陆：“统持马军广广国国”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 11 (1981), pp. 1-9
路桂路：“蒋八持党广胡陶回回新李李”，，何陈文新中中》，No. 11, pp. 75-86.
杨郭黄：“张李第李广粤八持党年新李李”，，广东文新中中两陆》，No. 19 (1965),
pp. 151-6.
罗黄程：“鼎五广党马期新广广以七”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 15, pp. 14-20.
罗罗群：“广南反蒋新李李”，，广梧文新中中两陆》，No. 37, pp. 80-99.
罗李罗：“两广’六张’福福广何何事事两第事法”，，桂南文新中中两陆》，No. 5
(1963).
马程七：“广广新新七张鲁李陈”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 8, No. 1;
或，广广文清》，No. 63.
宓虞：“我三蒋蒋李事我新侯我”，，浙江文新中中两陆》，No. 23 (1982).
莫莫莫：“解桂马解新八新三广广新反动解广年新李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》
，No. 2, pp. 22-34.
莫莫莫：“第七七三桂北广对中郑大持龙新李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 3,
pp. 17-27.
倪黄倪：“王王王三七保新秘年新新”，，广广文新中中》，No. 13, pp. 178-182
彭王彭：“张知邓心怎怎当北桂桂广大省新”，，桂桂文新中中》，No. 18, pp. 52-
54.
彭侯黄：“何何郑八新鲁刘何蒋定八李李”，，桂南文新中中两陆》，No. 5.
覃华沈：“卢张罗陈”，，广广文新中中》，No. 21, pp. 1-17.
刘黄：“两广福福马军新李李”，，李苗》，No. 172 (September 1, 1964), pp. 14-15.
宋宋宋：“王王王广新八新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 12, pp. 115-136.
粟李唐：“白健王李广近福”，，广广文清》，No. 60 (1993).
孙孙：“滇七广黔滇围川七长东亲历白”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 62.
唐唐唐：“撰西，李李李李李李》新郑第”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 47, No. 4－5
汤唐：“川七长东广新白白白“’桂湘八我保’李两”，，广广文新中中》，No. 17, pp.
160-163.
唐白唐：“关兄桂北马军对七福新李李“，，桂南文新中中两陆》，No. 6 (1963)
唐孙唐：“何何广八新何何刘团新年新李李“，，桂南文新中中两陆》，No. 5
陶陶：“李李桂北广新五中持龙”，，文新中中两编》，No. 34
(1988)，桂北：桂北侯张师南同, 1988, pp. 130-143.
涂涂涂：“胡李胡陶陶胡持何陈兵差广新八新李李一一”，，广广文新中中两陆》
，No. 6, pp. 110-21.
王余王：“贵梧桐桐新七李广新八新七李新关新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 9,

376
pp. 91-103.
王余王：“桐桐新统党贵梧新李李”，，贵梧文新中中两陆》，No. 2 (1963), pp. 1-
34.
王王侯：“白广袁福福马军新对七福”，广黄兵川编：，广袁福福亲历白》，桂北
：广黄文新师南同，1986.
韦韦尹：“西八福”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 31, Nos. 2-6; and Vol. 32, Nos. 1-6.
韦韦尹：“蒋西’六张魏动’”，，罗白文胡》, Vol. 37, No. 1.
韦韦尹：“台台周贺权广孙覃黄寓七”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 38, No. 3.
韦韦尹：“程熊程、马马何、王王王”，，罗白文胡》，ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1.
吴广：“李李龙梧新张刘川八七福陈马军”，，川黑红红》，No. 19 (1980), pp. 248-
270.
吴广：------. “龙梧新张刘川八七新福陈”，新新李李李》，No. 2 (1980), pp. 56-75.
吴广、林青：“川七七川八七五指发李李李王刘福红”，，新新李李李》，No. 7
(1982), pp. 99-115.
吴广、黄侯我、陆秀陆：“广广新新新北傅李新张页”，，新新李李李》，No. 5
(1982), pp. 1-13.
谢郭广：“八新特军新新：广广广兵府大省督王广广广”，，广广文新中中两陆》
，No. 12, pp. 208-239.
谢郭广：“我中知韦新闭关王王王不新对七福”，，广广文新中中》，No. 13, pp.
174-77.
许阎闭：“’福福侯张兵府’魏动”，，广东文新中中两陆》，No. 1 (1961).
晏韦唐：“围围长东川七新李广李外回回”，广黄兵川编：，围围围围川七长东亲
历白》
严严：“第五八五李两七新福李闭第李李”，，桂桂文新中中》，No. 18, pp. 44-47.
严严、吴陈吴：“胡陶’闭第’新七福陈的”，，何陈文新中中》，No. 11, pp. 39-41.
杨张：“黄钟钟反白白白生动广陈”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 3, pp. 99-105.
杨王黄、梁梁：“新八新新黄张新新七第七七新新新新”，，南南文新中中》，No.
8 (1988).
尹尹赖：“李李李师大桂平黎广新马马军军”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 18
尹尹尹：“第七七广马广湘李外三桂北广新对世郑大持龙”，，广广文新中中两陆
》，No. 3, pp. 1-16.
尹尹尹：“李李李新余李李”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 7, pp. 104-145
尹尹尹：“新八新钱动三何陈新不解广第七七新关新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，N
o. 5, pp. 38-45.
尹侯广：“福福福福广我党党李陈李陈陈陈福广广从李金一西李李”，，广东文新
中中两陆》，No. 1.
邕邕 (张张张)：“蒋李第张中广广李两”，，李苗》，No. 62 (February 1, 1960), pp.
2-6.
虞虞虞：“新八新新张新新新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 13, pp. 164-173
虞虞虞：“新八新新以沈刘罗新李李”，，广广文新中中》，No. 16, pp. 119-121
虞虞虞：“我中知韦新白白白”，，广广文新中中》，No. 17, pp. 203-218
虞虞虞：“新八新广改新李新秘年新新:
广黄黄张国新新青广新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 1, pp. 47-58.
虞虞虞：“八东地区地党七生动广广李地徐桂两救新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，N
o. 3, pp. 161-168.
袁袁长：“蒋八三五持区兵工徐第新李党李李”，，桂桂文新中中》，No. 18, pp.
98-101.
韦广罗：“特世使新”，，新新新中中》，No. 10.
韦广罗：“’六张魏动’马军我国三南南生动新年新”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No.

377
9, pp. 45-48
张鲁何：“张八七反蒋广新桂北李衡衡持龙”，，广东文新中中两陆》，No. 19, pp.
157-162.
张张张：“分剿、李粤、护国”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 33, No. 1.
张傅张：“新八新新第五鼎七”，，广广文新中中两陆》，No. 3, pp. 28-34.
张张白：“何何权行蒋八一一用何桂南兵均”，，桂南文新中中两陆》，No. 5
(1963).
张张张：“蒋李最大蒋蒋黄王亲 - 俞俞俞”，，李苗》，No. 112 (1 March 1962)
张张张：“蒋梁梁梁桂不，闲白广广李两”，，李苗》，Nos. 307-309 (April and May
1970).
张文刘：“李李李倒八要蒋刘倒蒋回回李李”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 52.
张文刘：“龙龙持龙年新李李”，，广广文新中中》，No. 14, pp. 140-8.
张胡陈：“广袁福福西西李”，载五马第载：，张胡陈独罗》，香香：星李大正王
五, 1986, pp. 381-91.
招陆伍：“鼎五广党新梧梧鸦年国张商”，，广广文新中中》，No. 17, pp. 237-240
周周：“李李编编编编”，，文新中中两陆》，No. 52.
周黄筱：“贵梧七李新广第”，，贵梧文新中中两陆》，No. 1 (1962), pp. 1-43

３、白白白李

1).
“冯冯白白白白白李”（冯白白朱八新郑第寓广，朱1910－1920广党广广杨范广侯
期胡兵，随军随随李、黄、白新余，李历八新新川世新新李程，曾张广广航以胡
保保长、广广我滇宁广督督、八七师长、白七长李广广地徐胡农两第中），广广
南南, October 15, 1992.
2).
“韦李胡白白白白白李”（韦白白1940广党侯年张广广新容长，朱八新广桂黎兵侯
农），广广南南October 16 and 17, 1992.
3).
“黄徐陈白白白白白李”（黄白白兄1930广党从1940广党曾张白白白新西第秘正，
朱八新蒋张李党党），北何, December 8, 1992.
4).
“谢刘谢白白白白白李”（谢白白黄白白兄1930广党从1940广党曾张白白白新西第
秘正，兄统持广福华黄中胡，1950广党李黄），桂北, October 29, 1992.
5).
“赖赖赖白白白白白李”（赖白白朱黄黄七保第第期胡白，李陈李桂李新广李，193
6广两广福福马张中广东，兄两广福福侯要徐八新，军朱八新桂广桂寓广，广广地
徐黎兵区长桂），广广南南, October 14, 1992.

III. 胡邓刘外其何关中中

１、胡邓

，白白白北寓七李同胡七》，台桂（师南同期期）：1966
陈载唐：，归归- 李李李广毛魏东周陈广李事》，桂北：解桂七文联师南同，1990.
陈李韦：，广党广黄兵府》，长李：吉林文新师南同, 1991
陈蒋保：，七李别罗》，香香：刘陈师南同, 1966.

378
陈蒋保：，黑黑李》，香香：刘陈师南同, 1966.
陈十中编：，黄张新新七持新黄第》，4宗，台桂：文何师南同, 1972
陈刘退：，七地兵均》，香香：鼎郑正生, 1979.
程程两：，刘群李》，广梧：陈蒋正差, 1955.
丁韦丁、孙孙孙：，南北兵府新南新》，郑梧：河南侯张师南同, 1987
董卢傅：，蒋五统罗》，台桂：胡白正差, 1958
傅傅胡：，张胡陈新兵党白戎》，沈衡：辽南大胡师南同, 1988
江宇张第：，蒋五统秘李》，台桂：广广南南同推广师南.，1976.
管南、张蒋张广：，缄缄 50 广广 张胡陈石汉孙白 -
南邓NHK白亲胡白李》，沈衡：辽南侯张师南同, 1992.
广广兵川文新中中中中农农编编：，广广文新中中两陆》（1978广军改朱，广广
文新中中》），南南：广广侯张师南同, 1963- .
贵梧七李新中中编、贵梧广同编孙胡吉历新中中中邓：，贵梧七李新》，贵衡：
贵梧侯张师南同, 1987.
黄滇李新兵差编：，桂北持新》，台桂：广华大马编农编, 1967.
黄滇李新兵差编：，剿肃持新》，台桂：广华大马编农编, 1967.
郭伍汪：，白党广黄新尹》，香香：香香广文大胡师南同, 1982.
郭伍汪：，广华张黄新福南刘》，台桂：广广中中吉白党新中中中, 1979.
郭郭商大编：，黄张国李新李党新》，北何：北何侯张师南同, 1992.
何路何：，广黄编会新独》，台桂：胡白正差, 1966.
何黄炳两编：，陈陈陈白白李同李》，香香（师南同期期），1957.
胡胡冯大编：，桂北持新》，台桂：白何师南同, 1974.
胡胡冯大编：，统南持新》，台桂：白何师南同, 1974.
黄陶莫：，八新邓张》，八林；漓江师南同, 1988.
池田陈编：，统南持党广广黄张大》， 桂北：退钱师南同, 1989.
姜周陈编邓：，张黄七福新陈第》，桂北：广华正差, 1991.
江南(刘李陈)：，龙韦罗》，台桂：天陈师南同, 1987.
江北闭：，兵何秘国》，香香：刘陈师南同, 1966.
蒋蒋新、李陈冯：，和广王阎阎和》，郑梧：河南侯张师南同, 1989.
蒋韦严：，鲍罗伍广何陈兵均》，台桂：1963.
金家倪、刘青刘：，石桂广新福安：蒋独广黄新陆再保团新》，香香：广文大胡
师南同, 1993.
七福孙胡吉七福历新中中李：，广黄统南持党新》，桂北：解桂七师南同, 1991
，戡两持新》，4宗，台桂：黄滇李新兵差, 1963.
雷王雷：，鼎五广动两广黄》，香香：张满师南同, 1955
李陶李：，广区大张广张黄广黄新省福》，广七陈刘独文，南北大胡, 1992.
李陈李：，闭新新关广同编徐蒙魏动 1901-
1911》，台桂：广广中中吉白党新中中中，1992.
李韦陈：，四联剿从闭国》，台桂：1966
梁钱杨：，蒋李李党李两》，香香：张郑师南同, 1954.
刘健闭、王余马、徐梁王大编：，广黄黄张国新》，南北：江苏江江师南同, 1992.
罗香林：，客余鲁北考》，桂北：广黄华中师南王五, 1989.
陆群刘、李何程：，李李李》，南南：广广侯张师南同, 1992.
陆马田、苏正两编邓：，陆卢伍罗》，南南：广广张抗师南同, 1987.
，陆七张桂北寓白王白白卢陆李》，台桂：1967.
马马王、胡冯何、张陈、杨冯杨邓：，广黄黄张国新尹》，沈衡：辽南大胡师南
同, 1992.
谢广孟两大编：，统持侯期黄剿广俞李钱》，郑重：郑重师南同, 1992.
莫陈莫、陈福胡大编：，新八新新》，南南：广广侯张师南同, 1991.

379
莫虞期：，护法魏动新》，南南：广广侯张师南同, 1990.
牟袁虞：，太平天黄》，北何：北何侯张师南同, 1959.
庞载刘：，广广同编特精》，香香：1950
庞载刘：，控控八新特军》，广梧,：1950.
庞载刘：，闭中八新》，广梧：1950.
乔陈、杨清韦：，刘湘》，桂北：华夏师南同, 1987.
邱钱邱大编：，广黄兵国新》，太土：和广侯张师南同, 1991.
广黄广剿国新中中编编：，统南张抗统张持汉广第第中黄剿广俞》，桂北：广黄
文新师南同, 1989.
申程韦：，李李李新张白》，郑梧：河南侯张师南同, 1992.
新广白、桂贺陈、朱福编邓：，南北黄张兵府新福陈》，郑梧：河南侯张师南同,
1987.
五马第载 (王傅王)：，张胡陈独罗》，香香：星李大正王五, 1986.
宋李、刘刘陆大编：，张大国李广广剿广俞新》，沈衡：辽南大胡师南同, 1991
陶王陶：，桂北七李统党侯期新白》，桂北：鼎郑正生, 1957.
田陈田：，桂北七李新白》，台桂：文何正生, 1965.
退中白亲邓：，陆江南》，香香：曹华师南同, 1962.
王王张：，蒋蒋李罗》，桂北：李陈南南师南同, 1989.
王蒋白、杨大杨：，福福福福》，福梧：福福侯张师南同, 1983.
王永王：，陈陈雷安罗》，桂北：广黄文新师南同, 1987.
吴湘湘：，第第中广南持党新》，台桂：综广月七同, 1973.
谢邓正、牛刘牛：，蒋蒋李广广南地徐钱动李》，郑梧：河南侯张师南同, 1990
薛傅马编：，艰苦福黄新五广》，台桂：中广正差, 1971.
矢土矢吉：，矢郑随笔 - 黄李》，香香：掌第月七师南同, 1974.
赖莫、张同新大编：，广黄黄张国新尹》，察察哈：黑龙江侯张师南同, 1991
杨莫杨：，蒋蒋李罗》，桂北：新团师南同, 1989.
杨张侯：，回共新西编? - 持侯黄剿西战钱李》，八林；广广师范大胡师南同,
1992.
杨林陈：，邓邓邓》，广梧：广东侯张师南同, 1986.
陶刘 (程熊程)：，李蒋关新广广黄》，香香：张满师南同, 1954.
胡彭：，蒋国亢何》，华广新华正生, 1949.
章马章：，吴胡吴罗》，台桂：罗白文胡同, 1968.
张同新：，黄张国新七李国持新陈》，察察哈：黑龙江侯张师南同, 1982.
张同新：，蒋汪广俞新黄张兵府》，察察哈：黑龙江侯张师南同, 1988.
张汪文大编：，广华张黄新尹》，郑梧：河南侯张师南同, 1985.
张冯法：，广黄广党新》，台桂：华东师南同, 1977.
郑杨郑：，广南甲甲持党》，桂北：广黄青广师南同, 1957.
郑余王：，广广白百广特广新》，南南：广广侯张师南同, 1981.
广剿广广张抗地党区农农编国新中中东李农农编编：，广剿广广国新大福白》，
南南：广广侯张师南同, 1989.
广剿广广国保邓正编西新：，阎阎和独罗》，桂北：广剿广广国保师南同, 1991
，广黄大福白》 (A Chronology of Twentieth-Century China, 1904-1949), 5
宗，桂Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries,
Washington, D. C.编陆师南, 1973.
广黄新胡编编：，广南甲甲持党》，北何：北何侯张师南同, 1957.
周广：，八新解对》，北何：七星正宇, 1949.
朱李余：，张黄兵何民秘》，香香：王宇师南同, 1964.

２、独文

380
曹傅宋：“新八新’焦安统持’独广独”，，广广同编孙胡》，No. 3, 1987, pp. 133-
147.
曹傅宋：“试独新八新’焦安统持’新公独广钱焦”，广七未刘独文，桂北，广黄侯张
大胡，1988.
曹傅宋：“试独新八新三统南持党广新历新地三”，，广广师范大胡胡南》，No. 3,
1989, pp. 62-70.
曹傅宋：“八七统持广独”，，广广国保胡南》，No. 2, 1988, pp. 52-58.
曹傅宋：“新八新广皖南福福”，，袁安新胡》, No. 1, 1991, pp. 8-12, and p. 25.
曹曹文：“独统持黄期我国广八新新广俞关新”，，胡中独政》， No. 1, 1990, pp.
96-101.
曹曹文：“独统持马解新八新新’骑兄兵党’”，，胡中独政》，No. 1, 1991, pp. 100-
105.
曹曹文：“新八新新新土蒋新中”，，同编孙胡余》，No. 12, 1990, pp. 62-66.
陈李陈、乔韦白：“七李王余王新军台”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第3陆（昆李
：韦南侯张师南同，1985）, pp. 318-325.
陈梁黄：“蒋蒋李解为两广福福新徐指刘兵陈”，，历新原原》，No. 2, 1983.
陈矢平：“试独统持马黄张国兵府新黄滇福广”，，南北大胡胡南》，No. 1, 1987.
陈游创：“台台周傅翁侯以”，，侯张南南》，1985广8月28南，p. 5.
雷创石：“新八新七李桂新中邓新新尹”，，冯林师胡胡南》，No. 1, 1984.
朱韦唐：“宁白党南邓七黄大张张潘对潘新对中刘熊考”，，统南持党中中》，No.
1, 1992, pp. 13-25.
崔万苗：“南邓白李广新台台周桂持”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 35, No. 4.
邓蒋陈：“八林反蒋第第广持汉新新尹张潘李外俞行”，，同编孙胡余》，No. 5,
1990, pp. 47-51.
范同区：“试独周广尹李外宁贵梧新统党”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第张陆（
尹成：第程侯张师南同, 1982），pp. 182-202.
范刘程：“桂北马解广南七李新一一刘北北”，，桂南师大胡南》，No. 3, 1985, pp.
68-72, and p. 78.
西陈章：“试独南邓’华桂分党’兵陈新新尹“，，统南持党中中》，No. 3, 1993, pp.
44-56.
桂吕李：“张胡陈蒋蒋李三’安安’广’袁李’白广北新分问”，，统南持党中中》，No.
1, 1992, pp. 44-51.
桂贺陈：“张李第七广黄张国广广特别农农编对中”，，白党新中中》，No. 3,
1988.
耿韦刘：“七七福福军胡胡宁南桂王新改福”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1992, pp.
186-98.
顾关林：“简广地徐钱动李广广剿新简期关新”，，广剿国新中中》，No. 1, 1988.
顾何何：“新八新七李三第张第兵福广新俞行”，，新林》，No. 3, 1990, pp. 50-1,
and p. 42.
郭大陶：“四’李张八’从’八张鼎’黄张国兵府宁南兵兵新邓福”，，历新中中》，No.
4, 1984.
郭苗林：“陈独广南全广’地党’潮北刘’废督推兵’呼江”，，广南七李新中中广七》
，第3陆 (昆李：韦南侯张师南同, 1985), pp. 48-67.
郭程广：“李李李新’焦安统持’独”，，广广大胡胡南》，No. 1, 1989, pp.87-93.
郭程广、罗黄南：“’两广福福’马军新八新兵党桂王新福党”，，广广大胡胡南》，
No. 1, 1985, pp. 90-94.
贺新吴：“独李张八福福军新广黄统张白广”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1994
侯雅韦：“新八新桂新中邓新新尹刘张潘”，，胡中独政》，No. 2, 1983.

381
胡胡闭：“’第安地地’广新八新”，，江广大胡胡南》，No. 3, 1990, pp. 53-57
胡周韦：“贵梧七李统党侯期新同编李陈广广”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第1陆
(尹成：第程侯张师南同，1982), pp. 218-258.
华雷两：“地徐钱动李广广袁福福”，，东桂师范大胡胡南》，No. 6, 1986, pp. 25-
31.
黄黄陈：“新八新’鼎地鼎三’兵兵刘’广广福广尹广’广独”，，胡中独政》，No. 5,
1989, pp. 83-89.
黄李陆：“广广群大新统南李党“，，广广南南》，1985广9月12南，p. 3.
黄李陆：“李陈李关关新八新新余陈独“，，冯林师胡胡南》，No. 1, 1984.
黄李陆：“独孙广和张李第张广第八定陆桂持”，，广广同编孙胡》，No. 3, 1986,
pp. 52-67.
黄李陆：“台台周编持刘新八新三编持广新俞行”，，广广同编孙胡》，No. 1,
1988, pp. 1-21.
黄李陆：“张李第第广八柳编持广独”，，广广同编孙胡》，No. 3, 1987, pp. 148-
170.
黄李陆：“持马广广新统南广新魏动”，，广广南南》1985广7月11南，p. 3
黄李陆：“试独李李李黄黄陈中汪统张广广新土蒋”，，南南师吉胡南》，No. 2,
1982, pp. 33-41.
黄李陆、韦李潘：“独新八新新新尹李外统张广广新历新地张”，，白党新中中》
，No. 1, 1985, pp. 101-124.
李司李桂：“黄张兵府新’袁李安安’兵兵李外政生”，池田陈编：，统南持党广广黄
张大》，桂北，1989, pp. 62-79.
简缄：“关兄军为王王王原”，，广广同编孙胡》，No. 2, 1982.
金汪林：“独长吴统持”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1992, pp. 127-44.
陈吉匡、杨郑杨：“第程七李广鸦年”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第3陆
(昆李：韦南侯张师南同, 1985), pp. 250-62.
广新夏：“试独闭傅郭新广新广广侯张大新张”，，历新中中》，No. 11 (1957), pp.
57-77.
广新夏：“关兄七李新新中中”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第3陆
(昆李：韦南侯张师南同, 1985), pp. 1-17.
平黄重、姜天鹰：“独统持马解黄张国南北兵府新统南评军”，，韩复胡南》，No.
5, 1987.
李路东：“新八新权行兵差福党张潘钱动”，，广广大胡胡南》，No. 2, 1988, pp.
94-101.
李静桂：“李李李独尹”，，张黄原原》，No. 1, 1986, pp. 100-104.
李静桂：“两广福福新理精黄新”，，历新原原》，No. 4, 1985, pp. 117-126.
李梁、卢余黄：“独新八新四’反蒋统南’从“’蒋统南’新兵兵桂福”，，广广同编孙胡
》，No. 2, 1987, pp. 110-118.
李张李：“华桂福福军黄张国兵府宁南兵兵新福党”，，张黄原原》，No. 1, 1989.
林唐兵：“天保七桂胡保桂中中: 1912-
1924”，台桂：黄陈兵党大胡未刘独文，1980.
刘黄唐大编：“张黄侯精广罗：白白白”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 25, No. 6.
刘黄唐大编：“张黄侯精广罗：黄黄陈、白白白”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 43, No. 1.
刘黄唐大编：“张黄侯精广罗：黄黄黄”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 28, No. 3.
刘黄唐大编：“张黄侯精广罗：李李李”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 42, No. 4.
刘黄唐大编：“张黄侯精广罗：李李李”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 50, No. 5.
刘黄唐大编：“张黄侯精广罗：廖廖”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 29, No. 1.
刘黄唐大编：“张黄侯精广罗：夏夏”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 36, No. 5.
刘程：“白党七李兵党新新鲁”，，胡中中中》，No. 6, 1990.

382
刘程南：“统南张抗统张持汉新生精：第五持区统南青广胡白七新”，，青广魏动
胡七》，No. 2, 1987, pp. 74-5.
刘刘黄：“试独黔新七李新试何理刘试蒋理”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第3陆
(昆李：韦南侯张师南同, 1985), pp. 326-338.
娄清娄：“马何王广统南广新魏动”，，统南持党中中》，No. 2, 1993, pp. 56-68.
陆大陆：“李张八福福军黄张兵府广川兵工福无广独“，，统南持党中中》，No. 2,
1993, pp. 102-116.
卢余黄：“独蒋八持党广李李李新反论倒八“，，河池师胡胡南》，No. 2, 1988, pp.
76-80.
陆陆陆：“陈独第张中蒋八持党“，，张黄原原》，No. 1, 1986, pp. 79-85.
罗郑钱：“新八新李李李三冯林新余新独“，，冯林师胡胡南》，No. 1, 1984.
罗韦莫、王刘蔡：“试独广黄剿生国广’两广福福’”，，广广同编孙胡》，No. 4,
1988, pp. 194-216.
马黄马：“张第八韦凇统持广独”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1992, pp. 110-126.
莫莫：“独陆卢伍七李兵均”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第1陆
(尹成：第程侯张师南同, 1982).
莫莫：“’滇八持党’年独”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第3陆
(昆李：韦南侯张师南同, 1985), pp. 68-80.
莫莫：“七李新广邓特东刘新旧八新新军军中中”，，胡中独政》，No. 2, 1985.
彭彭：“张李第七广新汪八桂党：四黄张国陈汉特别重国李新自从西石共”，，江
陈独政》，No. 1, 1991, pp. 59-62.
齐福胡：“鼎世南邓’广黄费’广’华桂分党’”，，统南持党中中》，No. 3, 1992, pp.
190-204.
邱钱邱：“独广黄青广国新统南广黄大张”，，统南持党中中》，No. 4, 1992, pp.
35-50.
卢贺荣、赵唐：“广剿’逼蒋统南’兵陈徐指新新尹”，，白党新中中》，No. 3, 1988,
pp. 280-290.
萨邓李：“太平北持党马五广以罗黄宁广南持党新桂王刘兵兵”，，统南持党中中
》，No. 2, 1994, pp. 38-50.
陈陈邵：“统持马桂徐胡侯广，独陈独独》：1932-
1937”，台桂：黄陈兵党大胡未刘独文，1979.
沈舍：“四华从从编编从李张八福福 -独1921-
1931广南邓宁华兵兵新邓福”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1991, pp. 16-43.
李郑：“广广胡白七三袁安统南生动广陈”，，袁安广农国保胡南》，No. 1, 1988,
pp. 91-93.
李胡石：“独统南持党侯期广剿广八新新统张持汉”，，荷魏师吉胡南》，No. 4,
1987, pp. 1-10.
苏叶刘：“蒋八持党广广广新新归左地新新尹“，，厦厦大胡胡南》，No. 3, 1985,
pp. 118-122.
谭谭刘：“八新广皖南福福”，，广广师范大胡胡南》，No. 3, 1990, pp. 97-102
唐林林：“独宋重黄新反蒋统南大张李外广广剿新关新”，，统南持党中中》，No.
2, 1993, pp. 69-87.
唐唐唐：“广袁福福六张福福五五周广”，，罗白文胡》，Vol. 50, No. 2.
唐唐：“新八新广广广新无”，，广广师范大胡胡南》，No. 3, 1989, pp. 71-77
佟卢、解胡解：“华桂福福心李张八福福新陶清 -
独南邓七黄大张日陈华桂新评余”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1991, pp. 86-100.
汪汪贺：“统持广期蒋八广兵桂党桂张西”，，历新十胡》，No. 12, 1986, pp. 17-18.
王李王：“广黄中中胡白桂中中, 1890-
1942”，台桂：黄陈兵党大胡未刘独文，1982.

383
王苗苗：“试独黄张国全李宁统南新期同桂王”，，北何师范大胡胡南》，No. 4,
1986, pp. 90-100.
王刘蔡、张莫：“两广福福广广黄剿生国逼蒋统南徐指新新尹”，，广剿国新中中
》，No. 2, 1990, pp. 37-41.
王青和、邓胡联：“两广福福刘平解为土蒋黄新”，，同编孙胡余》，No. 6, 1989,
pp.53-57.
王清王：“陈独统持侯期蒋八桂以新一一李党”，，胡中独政》，No. 1, 1990, pp.
102-104.
王清王：“试独统持侯期地徐钱动李广蒋蒋李李新新一一李党”，，白党新中中》
，No. 6, 1980, pp. 206-25.
王亢：“李张八福福军苏郑宁广南北北新期广九兵兵”，，统南持党中中》，No. 2,
1994, pp. 26-37.
吴林璋、范福华：“第张中滇八持党新理精李蔡蔡”，，韦南师范大胡胡南》，No.
5, 1985, pp. 23-8.
吴载杨：“朱七福扩张要军新贵梧广兵”，，广南七李新中中广七》，No. 3
(昆李：韦南侯张师南同, 1985), pp. 354-371.
吴潘平：“独宋李文新宁南秦硬桂王 1931-1933”，，统南持党中中》，No. 2, 1992,
pp. 54-69.
吴天夏：“蒋蒋李广李张八福福”，，统南持党中中》，No. 2, 1992, pp. 41-53.
伍文伍、谭谭刘：“西新八新广第张第兵福”，，广广师范大胡胡南》，No. 3,
1984.
吴唐陈：“独广李李李熊西张潘新张游新中”，，胡中独政》，No. 3, 1983.
吴唐陈、李何程：“李李李新张白”，，广广大胡胡南》，No. 2, 1983; and No. 1,
1984.
吴刘才：“大新新广新新八新试中”，，胡中独政》，No. 3, 1986.
夏潮：“试独’两广福福’”，，白党新中中》，No. 3, 1986.
夏夏炳、黄贺朱：“八新七李三广东”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第2陆
(贵衡：贵梧侯张师南同, 1983).
谢邓正：“独地徐钱动李”，，同编孙胡余》，No. 1, 1991, pp. 36-41.
谢邓正：“广南七李新尹新郑第杨刘”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第3陆
(昆李：韦南侯张师南同, 1985), pp. 18-31.
谢邓正、王韦康：“广南七李新中中广新对世白广”，，广南七李新中中广七》，
第1陆 尹成：第程侯张师南同, 1982), pp. 25-33.
谢黄新：“中所’何蓝川保’- 兼独’袁李安安’”，，统南持党中中》，No. 3, 1993, pp.
57-74.
熊李李：“’何蓝川保’桂之中”，，统南持党中中》，No. 3, 1992, pp. 205-216
徐徐党两：“独新八新新统持徐陈李外钱焦”，，广广同编孙胡》，No. 3, 1983, pp.
119-132.
薛余尹：“独蒋八持党”，，厦厦大胡胡南》，No. 4, 1982, pp. 11-19.
薛余尹：“李李李唐白唐桂持”，，国新中中》，No. 5, 1985, pp. 64-73.
杨张侯：“七七福福马李分广以李知地分李统南广新大张新两同刘福党”，，统南
持党中中》，No. 2, 1992, pp. 70-91.
杨天李：“胡陈张新七福倒蒋年余李胡蒋刘解”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1991,
pp. 101-140.
杨贺李：“广南七李新新北西”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第1陆
(尹成：第程侯张师南同, 1982), pp. 34-42.
俞唐华：“新独李黄白从李白黄新广俞”，，广广同编孙胡》，No. 1, 1987.
俞广俞：“李张八福福侯期新张胡陈刘蒋蒋李”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1991,
pp. 42-63.

384
广李韦：“广程统持广独”，，统南持党中中》，No. 4, 1993, pp. 129-48.
广李韦：“广黄差李统持综独”，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1991, pp. 64-85
袁吕陈、李徐陶：“独蒋八一一新生白刘张潘”，，广广师范大胡胡南》，No. 2,
1990, pp. 82-89.
袁袁雅：“新八新侯期新广广广广兵均福广”，，胡中独政》，No. 5, 1989, pp. 90-
94.
曾尹贵：“独李李李新统持熊西”，，桂桂同编孙胡》，No. 8, 1987, pp. 53-59,
and p. 42.
曾尹贵：“蒋独李李李新统持熊西”，，胡中独政》，No. 4, 1988, pp. 88-92, and p.
45.
张广程：“两广福福新编“，，党梁》东刘，No. 2, 1991, pp. 36-39.
张八罗：“独张胡陈寓七广北郑剿统南新韦路“，载广黄广剿国新中中编编：，统
南张抗统张持汉广第第中黄剿广俞》，pp. 294-331.
张广尹：“统南持党马广黄心期统张新抗? -
广刘大广白白商与“，，统南持党中中》，No. 1, 1993, pp. 33-35.
张七张：“独第五虞李黄广新黄张地地“，，白党新中中》，No. 1, 1993.
张蓝张：“李李李逼蒋统南新历新地三何舍努分李保”，，新探》东刘，No. 4,
1987, pp. 31-36
张蓝张：“两广福福广用朱侯知新张两”，，纵纵》东刘，No. 3, 1987.
张蓝张：“广黄剿生国广八新三张动广第统持广新广俞”，，同编孙胡费特》，No.
5, 1990, pp. 83-89.
张张：“独李李李统张广广”，SZDXXB, No. 1, 1991, pp. 123-129.
张李唐：“统持侯期黄七全广广尹农师事对潘李黄精新分中”，，统南持党中中》
，No. 3, 1993, pp. 144-169.
张罗刘：“陈独王天钟”，，广南七李新中中广七》，第1陆
(尹成：第程侯张师南同, 1982), pp. 203-217.
张张秦：“独鼎五广党新广广张新”，，冯林师胡胡南》，No. 1, 1984.
赵万陶、李青：“统南持党广新八新”，，新胡月七》，No. 6, 1990, pp. 77-82
郑唐卢、田周田：“黄张国李新新广新广南北兵府三广黄统党新福陈”，，广剿国
新中中》，No. 5, 1988, pp. 78-85.
郑蒋东：“’张第李’魏动三广广”，，广广南南》1984广12月9南， p.3
朱唐新：“独福福福福、两广福福、广袁福福新关新”，，胡中独政》，No. 5,
1992, pp. 36-41.
朱朱鲁：“朱朱鲁独：陆马田苏正两编邓，陆卢伍罗》”，台桂：，广黄广党新正
独两陆》，No. 7 (June 1991), pp. 1-47.
朱朱鲁：“张李鼎五广党广广新动农广郑福”，，广广中中吉白党新中中中李七》
，No. 17B (December 1988), pp. 307-353.
朱朱鲁：“我黄五法广党党新世原中中: 广广五法新黄期广党党, 1907-
1937”，台桂：，孙从川广胡南》，No. 1, 1991, pp. 16-33.
朱朱鲁：“我黄白党张大兵党新世原中中: 广广广新胡关张大, 1907-1937”，
台桂：，兵党孙胡独广》（台台大胡兵党新），No. 1 (March 1990), pp. 89-124
朱朱鲁：“白党广广新广费福广”，，广广中中吉白党新中中中李七》，No. 18
(1989), pp. 115-62.
朱朱鲁：“白党广广特广新福新, 1662-
1937”，，广广中中吉白党新中中中李七》，No. 19 (June 1990), pp. 1-43.
朱朱鲁：“广广新新马军新广广十中”，广广三广广南南提石新李同广广新新89周
广广编新独文，October 1991, 32 pp.
朱朱鲁：“广广广桂北”，台桂：，广党广黄七福新独独》，No. 6 (April 1980)
朱朱鲁：“广广总广统持李杨”，台桂：，广黄七福新独独》，No. 1 (September

385
1987).
朱莫七两：“新八新广广张新广独”，，广广师范大胡胡南》，No. 3, 1988, pp. 82-
88.
朱涂新、沈矢李：“独邹黄本新统南广黄大张”，，统南持党中中》，No. 2, 1992,
pp. 92-107.

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Vishryakova-Akimova, Vera Vladimirovna. Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-
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3. THESES AND ARTICLES

Asiaticus. "China's Advance from Defeat to Strength", Pacific Affairs, Vol. X, No. 3
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Bedeski, Robert Edward. "Li Tsung-jen and Demise of China's `Third Force'", Asian
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Chan, Hansu. "Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War? Canton Demands Resistance to Japan",
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Chen, Han-seng. "Agrarian Reform in China", Far Eastern Survey, February 25, 1948, pp.
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Ch'en, Jerome. "Defining Chinese Warlords and Their Factions", Bulletin of the School of
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Ch'en T. S. "General Pai: Chinese Patriot", Asia and Americas, Vol. 42, No. 12 (December
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Ch'ien, Tuan-sheng. "The Role of Military in the Chinese Government", Pacific Affairs,
No. 21, 1948, pp. 239-51.
"China's Leaders and Their Policies, Massages to the Chinese People", China
Reconstruction, No. 2 (October 1936).
Deal, David. "Tenancy in Kwangsi Province", Chinese Republican Studies Newsletter, Vol.
6, No. 1 (October 1980), pp. 6-9.
Dirlik, Arif. "The Ideological Foundation of the New Life Movement: A Study in
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Dorrill, W. F. "The Fukien Rebellion and the CCP: Case of Maoist Revisionism", The
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Fei Hsiao Tung. "An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes", in Fei
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pp. 124-157.
Field, F. V. "The Chinese Army: Political Composition and Geographical Distribution",
Amerasia, Vol. I, No. 6 (August 1937).
Fincher, John. "Political Provincialism and the National Revolution", in Mary C. Wright
(ed.), China in Revolution: The First Phase. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp.
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Fitzgerald, John. "Did the National Revolution Succeed or Fail? A Point of Difference in
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Fung, Edmund S. K. "Anti-Imperialism and the Left Guomintang", Modern China, Vol. 11,
No. 1 (January 1985), pp. 39-76.

392
------. "Nationalist Foreign Policy, 1928-1937", in Fung, Edmund and Hong, David (eds.),
Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949. Lanham
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Groff, G. W. and Lau, T. C. "Landscaped Kwangsi", National Geographic Magazine, No.
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Hanson, Haldore. "Chiang Kai-shek's Army", Asia, June 1939, pp. 360-362.
Ho, Ping-ti. "The Geographical Distribution of Hui-Kuan in Central and Upper Yangtze
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Hoh, Chi-hsiang. "Southwest China--A Political, Social and Economic Survey", The China
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"Huang Shao-hung", in Boorman, Howard L. and Richard C. Howard (eds.), Biographical
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Hutchings, Graham. "The Troubled Life and After-Life of a Guangxi Communist: Some
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"Kwangsi Educates Tribespeople", China at War, Vol. V, No. 2 (September 1940), pp. 57-
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"Kwangsi's Militia Corps", China at War, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), pp. 18-21.
"Kwangsi Rebuilds Highways", China at War, Vol. VI, No. 4 (April 1941), p. 59.
"Kwangsi Relief Women", China at War, Vol. IV, No. 1 (February 1940), pp. 76-77.
"Kwangsi: Province of Spartans", People's Tribune, No. 5 (1933), pp. 27-32.
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Lang, Olga. "The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XII, No. 1
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395