LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
INTRODUCTION legal profession and support t he activities of the integrated bar.

1. Banogan v. Zerna 19. In re Galang

2. Ledesma v. Climaco 20. In re Arthur M. Cuevas
3. Cui v. Cui 21. Samaniego v. Ferrer
4. Alawi v. Alauya 22. Arnobit v. Arnobit
23. St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land 24. Advincula v. Macabata
and promote respect for law and legal process.
CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
5. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against
6. Chua v. Mesina opposing counsel.
7. Soriano v. Dizon
8. Stemmerik v. Mas 25. Reyes v. Chiong
9. De Ysasi III v. NLRC 26. Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro
10. Cordon v. Balicanta 27. Alcantara v. Pefianco
28. Camacho v. Pagulayan
CANON 2 – A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and 29. Torres v. Javier
convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and 30. Linsangan v. Tolentino
effectiveness of the profession.
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
CANON 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, practice of law.
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
31. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.
11. In re Tagorda 32. Cayetano v. Monsod
12. Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo 33. Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio
13. Canoy v. Ortiz 34. Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. CIR
14. Linsangan v. Tolentino 35. Aguirre v. Rama
36. Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana
CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
administration of justice.
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in and judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve highest
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and 37. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon
assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. 38. Rivera v. Corral
39. Johnny Ng v. Alar
CANON 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the 40. Fudot v. Cattleya Land
discharge of their official duties. 41. Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan

15. Suarez v. Platon CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
16. Ramos v. Imbang in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
17. Catu v. Rellosa
18. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan 42. Berbano v. Barcelona
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 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

43. Sebastian v. Bajar 69. Angalan v. Delante

44. Hegna v. Paderanga 70. Santon-Tan v. Robino
45. Plus Builders v. Revilla 71. Somosot v. Lara
46. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez
CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of
CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from law.
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court. 72. Briones v. Jimenez
73. Pena v. Aparicio
CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.
AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER
47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio
48. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao 74. Manalang v. Angeles
75. Garcia v. CA
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his 76. Santiago v. De los Santos
dealings and transactions with his clients.
CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
49. Hilado v. David
50. Nakpil v. Valdes 77. Sesbreno v. CA
51. Hornilla v. Salunat 78. Bautista v. Gonzales
52. Northwestern University v. Arquillo 79. Gamilla v. Marino
53. Quiambao v. Bamba 80. Pineda v. De Jesus
54. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio 81. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui
55. Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez 82. Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA

CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
that may come into his possession. even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated.

56. Licuanan v. Melo 83. Regala v. Sandiganbayan

57. Posidio v. Vitan 84. Pfleider v. Palanca
58. Lemoine v. Balon 85. Mercado v. Vitriolo
59. Re: Atty. Maquera 86. Genato v. Silapan
60. Reddi v. Sersbio 87. Hadjula v. Madianda
61. De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag 88. Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.
62. Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya
63. Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II Canon 22 – A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances.
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence in him. 89. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA
90. Venterez v. Cosme
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. 91. Santero v. Vance
92. Francisco v. Portugal
64. Hernandez v. Go 93. Metrobank v. CA
65. PANELCO v. Montemayor 94. Doronila-Tioseco v. CA
66. Sps. Adecer v. Akut 95. Sesbreno v. CA
67. Belleza v. Macasa
68. Overgaard v. Valdez SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT
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Justice Hofilena
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

127.In Re: Undated Letter of Louis Biraogo

96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza
97. Santos v. Llamas CANON 5 – Equality
98. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo
99. Vda. de Barrera v. Laput CANON 6 – Competence and diligence
100.Barrientos v. Daarol
101.Berbano v. Beltran 128.Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc.
102.Tabas v. Malicden 129.Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc v. Judge William Simon P. Peralta
103.Sesbreno v. CA 130.Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
131.Danilo David S. Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 132.Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez
133.Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag
CANON 1 – Independence

104.Libarios v. Dablos
105.Go v. CA
106.Sabitsana v. Villamor
107.Tan v. Rosete
108.Dimatulac v. Villon

CANON 2 – Integrity

109.Fernandez v. Hamoy
110. Dawa v. De Asa
111. In re judge Marcos
112. Lachica v. Flordeliza
113. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana
114. Olga v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero

CANON 3 – Impartiality

115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan

116. Pimentel v. Salanga
117. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.
118. Oktubre v. Velasco
119. Sandoval v. CA
120.The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican, etc.

CANON 4 – Propriety

121.J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas

122.Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp v. Katalbas-Moscardon
123.Rizalina v. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante
124.Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay v. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr.
125.Concerned lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10
Malolos City
126.Venancio Ino, Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay, etc. Judge Alejandro Canda
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 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
BANOGAN V. ZERNA
Facts:
The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way
back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was
filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended
petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on
March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the
petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion
for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came to
us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. The respondent court
dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it
had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had
operated against the petitioners.
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and
executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the
private respondents. The said judgment would become so only “after one year from
the issuance of the decree of registration.” If anyone was guilty of laches, it was the
private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land
registered in their the pursuant thereto.
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9,
1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by
the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before
it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court.
It is shown that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine
they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not
only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their
position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
Issue:
W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.
Held:
YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that
litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts
should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greater
awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this
Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from
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Justice Hofilena
commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so,
where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way
some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to
achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the
same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the
law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be
condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express
its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to
circumvent or violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist
in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should
advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law
or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve
the attention of the courts.
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before
the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge
denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases.
Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election
registrar, which was still denied.
Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?
Held:
No. The respondent judge’s denial was proper. It was observed that there is
no real conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The
appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in
fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same
way, all lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community
that the proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment of
his fees.
CUI V. CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by
the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired
corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them.
(embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being
the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona
Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in
favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was
embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either
the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother
Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not
complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age
may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate
descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should
be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of
the Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law
school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder
to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
“successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved by the Secretary of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all
of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to
the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio
was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact,
that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that
required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his
previous disbarment were wiped out.
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ALAWI V. ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City,
They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa &
Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint
against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of "attorney,"
which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have
a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is
often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of
Attorney
Held:
He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine
bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted
to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
CANON 1
RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case
against Atty Kho, a former clerk of court of an RTC, after an audit by the former found
that the latter failed to remit P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho stated that these amounts were stored in
the court’s safety vaults, as his usual practice. The audit team advised him that he
should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Kho
complied with the directives.
Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with his
common-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending out to court employees
money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the interest
earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA Circular because he kept
the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then recommended that its
report be docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Atty. Kho is liable.
HELD:
YES. OCA recommendations VALID.
RATIO:
Dishonesty Conduct
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure
to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It
diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if
committed for the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was
nevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary
funds.
Unlawful conduct
Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the
Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer’s
responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the
law. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging
in unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not
essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which
specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
CHUA V. MESINA
Facts:
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Justice Hofilena
Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses’ legal counsel and adviser upon
whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building
(Burgos Property) owned by Mesina’s family, and another property (Melencio
Property), also owned by Mesina’s family where the Chua spouses constructed their
house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesina’s
mother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she
obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina
convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation in
consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq.
m.
The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs.
Mesina’s bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was
thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as “Felicisima M.
Melencio,” in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the
amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it.
Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be
executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment
of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again
appears therein as “Felicisima M. Melencio,” in favor of complainants wherein the
purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses “in the redemption
of the MESINA properties,” Mrs. Mesina was found to have “an existing balance” due
the spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised
respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit “acknowledged such obligation” to be
his and undertook to settle it within two years.
Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencio
property.
Not long after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February
1986, one Tecson filed an Affidavit dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua,
Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for
Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his
complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property
and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to
their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant,
to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not
reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated “to evade payment
of capital gains tax.” Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9,
1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated.
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge
against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a
deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs.
Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveying to “Felicisima M. Melencio” the Melencio
property for P85,400.00.A new title was accordingly issued in the name of “Felicisima
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
M. Melencio,” the owner’s copy of which was entrusted to complainants. Tecson
subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 alleging that
his filing of the criminal complaint “arose out of mere misunderstanding and
difference” with herein complainants and their co-respondents and he had no
sufficient evidence against them.
Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses and told them that
he would borrow the owner’s copy of Mrs. Mesina’s title with the undertaking that he
would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio
property in complainants’ favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written
undertaking dated May 2, 1990.
In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died “in the early part of 1991.” Despite
respondent’s repeated promises “to effect” the transfer of title in complainants’ name,
he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was
being offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina
Hsia thus filed a complaint against Mesina for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and
Reconveyance of Real Property.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?
HELD
This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to
promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party
but the government is aggravating.
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another
document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that
complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed
dishonesty.
Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua
spouses, into turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon the
misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his
mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure
of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is
a much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade
at “arms length.”
In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, Canon 1,
Rules. 1.01 and Rules 1.02.
SORIANO V. DIZON
Facts:
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Justice Hofilena
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the
grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated
Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself
(treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver,
binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi
din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the
victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving
moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals…”
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not
only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to
wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he
is bound to “obey the laws of the land.” The liabilities in question have been sitting for
4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful
person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.
STEMMERIK V. MAS
FACTS:
Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its
beauty. He consulted Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that
he could legally buy such properties. Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property
that he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted all
of the necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he went
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
back to Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found the
owner of the big piece of property and stated the price of the property is P3.8M.
Stemmerik agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly drawing up
the necessary paperwork.
When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property registered in his
name, Atty Mas can’t be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed another
lawyer, and to his horror, was informed that aliens couldn’t own Philippine Lands and
that the property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT case
against Atty MAS in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD
ruled that Atty Mas abused the trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommended
that he be disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted such recommendations.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.
HELD:
YES! Disbarred.
RATIO:
Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying
Philippine Lands. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a
fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross
ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were
void and illegal.
Deceitful Conduct
By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire
real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was
alienable, respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not give due regard to
the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant.
Illegal Conduct
By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for
the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal
in nature.
DE YSASI III V. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in
April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of
daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such other
tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on
the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
8 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City
with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November,
1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep
sinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was
confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from
December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took
care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation.
However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the
latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the
sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not
he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and
other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.
Held:
The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay
petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification
or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1)
whole year.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that
"(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement."
Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent
their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes
in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all
reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between
their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to
avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their
avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains
to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On
the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated
the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least entertained the
thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.
CORDON V. BALICANTA
FACTS:
Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from her
husband with the help of Atty Balicanta. Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to
form a corporation to develop the real properties inherited. Such corp. was formed,
and the properties were registered in the corp.’s name. Atty Balicanta was the one
who single-handedly ran the corp.’s affairs, by being it’s Chairman, President,
General Manager, and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number of acts:
1) made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to
sell/mortgage properties; 3) transferred title of some of the properties to other people.
And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta also made the following acts:
1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as collateral; 2) Sold the
Corp’s right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestral
home of the Cordon’s and sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicanta
did not account for the proceeds coming the sales and dispositions.
The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the
properties and to account the proceeds of the loan. When such demands were
unheeded, The Cordons terminated Balicanta’s services and filed a complaint for
disbarment against the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report,
recommended for Balicanta’s disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governors
resolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such conduct.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Balicanta be disbarred1.
HELD: YES! Disbarred.
RATIO:
Deceitful Conduct
The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought
of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He
started his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board,
Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from
assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He also entered
into dishonest transactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors
reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own
personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Side Doctrine:
1
By virtue of Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this
resolution is automatically elevated to the SC for inal action.
9 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.”
CANONS 2 & 3
IN RE: TAGORDA
Facts:
Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to
the last election, he admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containing
the fact that he was a candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela & offering
services as notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.).
He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his home
municipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to
make known to the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including
his services to handle land registration cases for P3/every registration).
Issue:
W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising
Held:
Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements,
or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations is
unprofessional. His acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigating
circumstance of his youth and inexperience, he is therefore suspended.
The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or
obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
It is also unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly,
solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and
integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in incenting
to strife otherwise peaceful citizens).
ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO
FACTS
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which
reads: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the
Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She
claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases
and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve
separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements
were also published.
 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for
investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for
1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the
advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should
not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the
prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
HELD
Yes!
The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the
primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary
consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be
primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.
Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he
erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct ---
he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list
where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose
--- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a
lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar.
CANOY V. ORTIZ
Facts:
A complaint was filed on April 2001 by Canoy against Atty. Ortiz, accusing
him for misconduct and malpractice. It is alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for
Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documents and records to Atty.
Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful
visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the process of the case. On April 2000,
Canoy was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in
1998 for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.
Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the
case.
Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and low-
income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the
period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes his
failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of
Bacolod City, “he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local
government official and as a practicing lawyer.”
10 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Issue:
W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?
Held:
Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month.
Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes
fidelity to his client’s cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed to him. He owes his entire devotion to the interest of the client. His
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under Canon 18.04, the
relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present need
for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and
should not be left in the dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant for
failing to inquire the status about the case as this is one of the lawyer’s duties.
The adoption of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz as
councilor does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer
to withdraw his legal service if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office
since councilors are not expressly prohibited to exercise their legal profession.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan,
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino
with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal
representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their
claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To
support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with
Linsangan. Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719