Aris (Phils.) Inc. vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 905501.
August 05, 1991] HELD:
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of
petitioner, aggrieved by management’s failure to attend to their
complaints concerning their working surroundings which had
become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance
conference. Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint
for illegal dismissal against petitioner with NLRC of NCR. After due
trial, Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10)
days from receipt private respondents to their former respective
positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up,
without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited
backwages of six (6) months. Private respondents filed a Motion For
Issuance of a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No.
6715. Petitioner and complainants filed their own Appeals.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution alleging
that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending
appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time
of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be
given retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect to Section 12
thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of
an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right
to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of
reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is
constitutional.
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. The validity of the
questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the
foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is
a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the
right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to
regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent
police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of the
citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the
preservation of corporate profits. Then, by and pursuant to the
same power, the State may authorize an immediate
implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed
to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in
favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival
or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its
family.
Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC can validly be
given retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in
character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it
under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect. There are no vested rights in rules of
procedure. A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases
pending at the time of its enactment.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 14560, 36 SCRA 394 (November
19, 2001)
Facts:
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking
official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA
7659..
2. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is
so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm.
That there was a clear violations of the fundamental rights
of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for
being vague.
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for
providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process.
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum
prohibitum.
Ruling:
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them. There is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessary result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a
statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with
reference to every other part.
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A.
7080
2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The
burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond
any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute a crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
other act alleged in the information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No.
7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it
 does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder that predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture
of corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so
deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche
of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money
to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn,
the very survival of people it governs over.
Note:
 A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against the specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
 The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such
exalted statute in the realm of constitutional law as it gives
life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.
 A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. The first may be “saved” by proper construction,
while no challenge may be mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
“vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value of all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify along attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the persons making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by
a statute draw with narrow specificity. The possible harm to society
in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terorrem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In
the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official
to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea
in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED
TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE
COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE
LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND
TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY
CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE
DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and
its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long
as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive
meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken
greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for
"pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9
that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1,
par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists
of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the
public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general
plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public
officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the
aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall
scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused
vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to
attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The
test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not
give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires
only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious
even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as
in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt
is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
In view of mens rea
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza
that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion — . . . Precisely
because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy
that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide
even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn,
the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this
context, no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes
like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction
and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect
this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by
People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history.
The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally
valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral
part of it.
In view of presumption of innocence
At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is
essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative
power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial.
Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with
mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted under
any and all given situations. The application of the law will depend
on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will
then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it
is the constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret,
construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true
meaning of legislative enactments.
A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used
in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for
which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends
that are sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly,
"plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation
which affects not just private parties or personal interests but the
nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a
crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if
possible, stopped permanently."
In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been subject to controversy
principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that
one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law
and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a
Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its
constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact,
not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a
means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped
from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had
earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him,
but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.
What is RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United
States federal law that provides for extended criminal penalties and
a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing
criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18
of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968. While its
intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who
were actively engaged in organized crime, its application has been
more widespread.
In view of facial challenge
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by
a statute drawn with narrow specificity.'
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.
In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J.
In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally
repugnant to the Constitution before this Court may declare its
unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear
showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
allows to be done. 40 To justify the nullification of the law, there
must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a
doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law
which are easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at
best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from
establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and
glaring conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional challenge to
the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to
the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of
constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof.
Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates
proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the
accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of over or
criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often
perceived to be the reality with respect to the crime of plunder —
that "the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth and
entirety, be discovered, by reason of the 'stealth and secrecy' in
which it is committed and the involvement of 'so many persons here
and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states and
territorial units."'
"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification
of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law
shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in
favor of constitutionality . . . To doubt is to sustain.'
In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural
due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal statute
should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to
its application. There are three distinct considerations for the
vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that
individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal
consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was
articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional
requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying
principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for
conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed.
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require
Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty the standards to
which an individual must conform his conduct, it is necessary that
statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective
conduct. And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the
standard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable on the person
found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to
death. Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness
required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher than that of other
laws.
It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a
"facial challenge" to the Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its
face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. Fr. Bernas,
for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law
that were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you
have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to
constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings
of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not
clear.
To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of
criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the
series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to
convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to
convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise punishable
under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable
offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being
inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently mala in se, even if
punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must
clearly be established together with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea,
R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and
imposes a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying
the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as
R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the
accused against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It
could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of
hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.

In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and
excitement, when the desire to do justice is tarnished by anger and
vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections
accorded an accused may be taken away.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no
arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law which
deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other
procedures leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the
law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus,
an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or
life imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial
construction takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation
supplies its meaning.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural
due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due
process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and
uncertain. More explicitly — That the terms of a penal statute. . .
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions
of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process.
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. 9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be
definite to be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of
the due process clause, where its language does not convey
sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the
prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the
criminal intent is an important element of the criminal acts. Under
the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed. Equally
disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away
with the requirement that each and every component of the
criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself to proving
only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only
on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with
the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are
concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation
of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law
requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial
court may allow the specifications of details in an information to
validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information
cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even
the construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous
provision can supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law. The
right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with
which a complaint or information should be drafted. However, the
clarity and particularity required of an information should also be
present in the law upon which the charges are based. If the penal
law is vague, any particularity in the information will come from the
prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of Congress.
In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused
of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded on the Constitution
which even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override.
The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no
matter how socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must be
nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be
necessary for the prosecution to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the
enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1 (d) merely as means
and not as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally
infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As
a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove
beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which the defendant is charged. The State may not
specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With
more reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by
characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a "means"
of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the
burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must
be convinced of the existence of a "combination or series." As to
which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the Justices
need not be in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide
disagreement among them about just what the accused actually did
or did not do. Stated differently, even if the Justices are not unified
in their determination on what criminal acts were actually
committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the
law, still, they could convict him of plunder.
The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three
of the acts enumerated under Section 1(d) thereof." 33 But it can
very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three
times. And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the
deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends differently.
It defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining to "two or
more."
A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital
punishment on acts already punished with lesser penalties by
clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be
cured by judicial construction.
In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr.
Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this Court is not the
guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the
law. I vote to grant the petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but
because I look beyond today and I see that this law can pose a
serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone who may
come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this
Court, my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the
Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good conscience,
fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560.
November 19, 2001
FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received
billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or
criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for
him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8
separate Informations against petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was
denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists
to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558
on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information
for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2
and 4 of the Plunder Law which states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by
the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and
other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime
of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law,
indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the
offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that
will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the
key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to
due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of
terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Executive Secretary
Bills Must Originate EXCLUSIVELY from the House of
Representatives; Undue Delegation of Legislative Power; Equal
Protection Clause
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON
S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA;
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR
PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain
a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been
satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of
Discussions:
taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale
or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within
the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise
to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported
goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about
the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding
standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will
make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed
aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the
latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether
to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in
Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative
power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.
3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and
equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
1. Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law,
but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but
Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but
also to propose its own version even with respect to bills
which are required by the Constitution to originate in the
House. the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives
on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts,
the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected
to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws.
2. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
 nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature.
3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means
that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons
or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.”
Rulings:
1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue
bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives,
the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate
income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily,
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain
any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the
House revenue bill.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only
of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power
of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications
for the purposes of taxation has long been established.
Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be
raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection,
the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a
rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent
a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 94723. August
21, 1997)
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father
and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR.,
and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,respondents.
Ponente: TORRES, JR.
FACTS:
Respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed
and lured the 12-year old petitioner Karen Salvacion to go with him
in his apartment where the former repeatedly raped latter. After
the rescue, policemen recovered dollar and peso checks including a
foreign currency deposit from China Banking Corporation (CBC).
Writ of preliminary attachment and hold departure order were
issued. Notice of Garnishment was served by the Deputy Sheriff to
CBC which later invoked R.A. No. 1405 as its answer to it. Deputy
Sheriff sent his reply to CBC saying that the garnishment did not
violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely
incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a
court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia
legis. CBC replied and invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli are
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body, whatsoever. Central Bank of the Philippines
affirmed the defense of CBC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Sec. 8 of
RA 6426 amended by PD 1246 otherwise known as the “Foreign
Currency Deposit Act” be made applicable to a foreign transient.
HELD:
NO. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby
held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances.
RATIO:
[T]he application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to
a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that
“in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
“Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de
otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is
one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience. It would be unthinkable, that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a
device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here?
Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of
the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the
foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of
a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-
72873. May 28, 1987)
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
Ponente: CRUZ
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents.
One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute
sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro
Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after
the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently
enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part
of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to
petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking
the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed
the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having
been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although
there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of
the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art.
1088 of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial
court reinstated.
RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there,
[courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for
its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that
killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law
maker’s will.
Facts:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed
against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all
public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede.
There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170
(falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by
public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent
officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92
by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without
authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of
jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed
against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative
sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their
preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the
President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and
granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from
enforcing suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act
of 1898) has been divested of his authority
to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official
by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.
Held:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to
RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it
has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific
matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable,
as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well
settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not
favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent
application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a
clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,
every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have
known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose
preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at
that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it
became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of
R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the
extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already
prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the
Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.
Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 112099.
February 21,1995)
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF
PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR
NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents
Ponente: QUIASON
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two
administrative cases against respondent incumbent Mayor and
obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent
Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the
decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in
accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code
(LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary
directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing
the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with
grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC
(1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18
(1987).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.
RATIO:
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal
shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” As
worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion
to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed
decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing
officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the
appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6
of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct
language expressive of such intention.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the
new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless
an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of
the new and old laws.
Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992)
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground
that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA)
Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for
the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in
the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of
Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the
issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or
abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA,
on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the
Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its
entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on
petitioner’s claim for benefits.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute
of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent
in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention
to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of
statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against
inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in
pari materia.
Case Title: Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, petitioner v. Court of
Appeals and the People of the Philippines, respondents
G.R. No. 106560, August 23, 1996
Facts: The petitioner assail the decision of the public respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding them guilty as charged for
failure to proclaim a winning elected candidate.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7166 repeal section 231 of the Omnibus
Election Code saying that the winners should be proclaimed by the
Board of Canvassers.
Held: No, since R.A. 7166 neither expressly or impliedly repealed
section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code.
TATAD VS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
G.R. No. 124360 and 127867. November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.”
The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase
and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec.
of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining
when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to
determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are
considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso
to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title
one subject requirement of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.
3. Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade and unfair competition
Discussions:
1. The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror,
fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a
law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the
title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
2. Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
POEA, the Court states that:
“There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is
a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
3. A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in
one or more persons or companies, consisting in the
exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or
trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or
the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of
market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate
the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a
combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or
understanding between two or more persons, in the form of
a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of
association, for the purpose of unduly restricting
competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain
commodity, controlling its production, distribution and
price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade
without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of
trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end.
 mandates: “The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
Rulings:
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”
1. The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court
has adopted a liberal construction of the one title – one
subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b) providing for LIDASAN VS. COMELEC
tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180
FACTS
which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to RA No. 4790 entitled “ An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on in the province of Lanao del Sur ‘, was signed into law and came to
imported petroleum.[i][20] We shall, however, return to the light later that barrios mentioned in the body of that statue are
validity of this provision when we examine its blocking within the municipalities of the Province of Cotabato and not of
effect on new entrants to the oil market. Lanao del Sur only. Prompted by the coming elections, COMELEC
adopted its resolutions for the purposes of establishments of
2. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test
precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes. The
and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Office of the President recommended the COMELEC that the
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full
operation of the statue be suspended until “ clarified by correcting
deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless
legislation”. COMELEC stood by its own interpretion, hence this
of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end
motion by Bara Lidasan as a resident, taxpayer and a qualified voter
of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
of Parang Cotabato.
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus,
the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to
advance the date of full deregulation before the end of ISSUE
March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the Whether or not the title of the statue conforms with the
judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as constitutional requirement.
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable.
HELD
3. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly
violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180
No. The title of RA No. 4790 projects the impression that solely the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton.
Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent Province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. Such title did not inform the people in towns in
Cotabato and the province itself that part of their territory is being
taken away and added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur.
Transfer of sizable territory from one province to another is as
important as the creation of a municipality, yet, the title did not
reflect this fact. The legislative purpose is not expressed in the title,
hence RA No. 4790 is null void.
Lidasan vs. Comelec GR NO. L-280892 Petioner: BARA LIDASAN
Respondent: COMELEC FACTS: The Chief Executive signed the House
Bill 1247 which is now known to be Republic Act 4790, “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur”. Such new Municipality includes 21 barrios, 9 of which are from
Lanao del Sur, and the other 12 are from Cotabato. (From Lanao:
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung,
Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung and From Cotabato: Togaig,
Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan).
The Comelec, prompted by the coming election adopted the
resolution which provides for the barrios that will be included in
Lanao del Sur. Apprised by this happening, the Office of the
President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended
to the Comelec that the said resolution be suspended until clarified
by the correcting legislation. But the Comelec stood by its own
interpretation, and declared that the RA 4790 should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.
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This events triggered the original action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the
1967 elections. Affected by the implementation of RA 4790, Lidasan
now questions the constitutionality of the said Act. ISSUE: Is
Republic Act 4790 valid considering that such Act creates a
Municipality which includes barrios from another province. HELD:
RA 4790 is declared NULL and VOID. 1. Constitutional requirement
“no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”.
This provision imposes limitations upon the legislative power. a.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogenous subjects. b. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. These were
all not complied with because the title of the Act provides that it is
“An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur”.
The part which says “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects that
it is just Lanao del Sur which is affected by the creation of Dianaton,
where in truth it also affects barrios in two municipalities of
Cotabato. Therefore, the Court finds the title deceptive for the Act
has actually two purposes , and those are : 1. ) to create the
municipality of Dianaton allegedly from twenty-one barrios in the
towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a
province different from Lanao del Sur.
The title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full
impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato
itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao
del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill. Thus, the limitations on
the provision of one subject in a bill and the requirement as to the
language of the bill were violated.
Removal of the barrios of Cotabato included in the new municipality
of Dianaton will not treat the defects of the Act and shall still render
the Act unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent
of the invalid portion. DISSENTING OPINION Fernando, J. 1. The
subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton and it was
clearly embodied in the title. 2. The legislature is not required to
make the title of the act a complete index of its contents.
Paras vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996)
16APR
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Ponente: FRANCISCO
FACTS:
Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the
last regular barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. At least
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the
25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall,
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to
approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the
holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner
filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction,
insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code
(LGC) which states that “no recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election“.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to
SK elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post.
HELD:
NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and
academic.
RATIO:
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the
local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the
prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription
is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of
the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose
the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a
longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall
election.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one
referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.
By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of
the limitation stated under the same Section 74(b) now referred to
as Barangay Elections.
CONCURRING OPINION:
DAVIDE:
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an
election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage,
are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered
voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at
least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he
be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration
prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15
to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they
include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz.,
those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK
elections be considered a regular election (whether national or
local).
PARAS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169
Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City
in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A petition for his recall as
Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent
COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall
election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition,
COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16,
1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the
petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial
court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public
respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the
recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for
certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the
Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner
insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now
barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the
provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government Code.
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute deficiency, P367,994.00, and ESSOs earlier overpayment of
must be interpreted with reference to the context, that every part P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax credit). ESSO thus
of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, asked for a refund. The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals which
Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord ordered payment to ESSO of its refund-claim representing overpaid
with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that interest.
the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held
The Commissioner argued the tax credit of P221,033.00 was
that the “regular local election” refers to an election where the
approved only on year 1964, it could not be availed of in reduction
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.
of ESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year 1960; as of that year,
1960, there was as yet no tax credit to speak of, which would
reduce the deficiency tax liability for 1960. In support of his
CIR vs ESSO Standard Eastern (G.R. No. L-28502-03. April 18, 1989)
position, the Commissioner invokes the provisions of Section 51 of
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, the Tax Code.
vs.
ISSUE:
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents. Whether or not the interest on delinquency should be applied on
the full tax deficiency of P367,994.00 despite the existence of
Ponente: NARVASA
overpayment in the amount of P221,033.00.
FACTS:
HELD:
Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. It was
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of CTA was affirmed.
granted a tax credit by the Commissioner accordingly on 1964.
However, ESSOs payment of its income tax for 1960 was found to be RATIO:
short by P367,994.00. The Commissioner (of Internal Revenue)
The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as
wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together
early as 1960, the Government already had in its hands the sum of
with interest thereon for the period from 1961 to 1964. ESSO paid
P221,033.00 representing excess payment. Having been paid and
under protest the amount alleged to be due, including the interest
received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner subsequently
as reckoned by the Commissioner. It protested the computation of
acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the
interest, contending it was more than that properly due. It claimed
Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO That
that it should not have been required to pay interest on the total
acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four (4)
amount of the deficiency tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount
years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality.
of P146,961.00—representing the difference between said
The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the
moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the
payee admits the obligation to reimburse.The obligation to return
money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is
made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation
to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount
paid to him results from the mistake, not from the payee’s
confession of the mistake or recognition of the obligation to
reimburse.
A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead
to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction,
such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid
an unjust or absurd conclusion.
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.
Facts:
On May 9,1989, provincial governor of Cotabato requested the
Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation regarding
bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits and it was found out that the petitioner Cesario Ursua, a
Community Environment and Natural Resources officer was
involved in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and illegally-cut
logs in the area. So, a complaint was filed against him which was
initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On August 1 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner,
wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman to furnished him a copy of
the complaint and asked petitioner to bring that letter to the Office
of the Ombudsman since his messenger had to attend to some
personal matters which the latter complied. Before proceeding to
the office of the Ombudsman, he talked to Oscar Perez and the
latter advised him that he could sign his name if ever he would be
required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When he arrived
at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City, he was asked to sign
his name on a log book and instead of writing his own name, he
wrote “Oscar Perez”, afterwhich he proceeded to the Administrative
Division and hand in the letter to Loida Kahulugan, Chief of the
Administrative Division in order to get a furnished copy of the
complaint. Before petitioner left, he was greeted by an
acquaintance and from there Loida learned that the one who
introduced his name as Oscar Perez is actually the petitioner himself
so the latter reported the matter immediately to
the Deputy Ombudsman who ordered that petitioner be accordingly
charged.
On December 18,1990 petitioner without leave of court filed a
demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to
prove that his supposed alias was different from
his registered name was fatal to its cause. Petitioner contends that
no document from the civil registry was presented to show
the registered name of the accused which according to him was a
condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.The RTC
rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec.1 of
Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085. On May
31,1993, The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the said
petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the C.A. contending that he has
not violated C.A. No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085 as he never
used any alias name, he only used such name on one occasion with
an express consent of Oscar Perez himself.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has violated Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act
No.142 as amended by R.A.6085 or otherwise known as An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases.
Ruling:
No, the petitioner did not violateSec.1 of C.A No.142 as amended by
R.A. 6085. The court ruled that there is no evidence showing that he
had used or was intending to used that name in addition to his real
name. That name was used in an isolated transaction where he was
not even legally required to expose his real identity. While the act
may be covered by other provisions of law, it does not constitute an
offense within the concept of C.A. No.142
Section 1 of Commonwealth ActNo.142 provides that except as a
pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of a
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any
name different from the one which he was registered at birth in the
office of the civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first
time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the
Bureau of Immigration upon entry, or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court provided, that persons
whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and
who have not been baptized, have one one year from the approval
of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of
their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and
one or two surnames.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner CESARIO URSUA is acquitted of the crime charged.
Ursua vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996)
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ponente: BELLOSILO
FACTS:
Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and
used the same in receiving the copy of a complaint against him at
the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and reported to
the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be
accordingly charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of
violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085
otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some modification of
sentence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within
the prohibition of Commonwealth Act No. 142.
HELD:
NO. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
of the RTC was reversed and set aside and petitioner was acquitted
of the crime charged
RATIO:
[A]n alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be
used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions
in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No.
by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which 229 which requires an early warning device to be carried by users of
they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of
different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a delegation of legislative power.
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land
to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day
Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing rules and
forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142
regulations of the said instruction.
as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen
Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be
Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came
construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the
its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The
amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
Commission,"
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A.
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover, as
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are
the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory
is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified
set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

AGUSTIN V. EDU - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent
accidents on streets and highways, including expressways or limited
AGUSTIN V. EDU G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
FACTS: motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The
hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is
a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna
Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD
207.
ISSUE:
WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of
due process.
HELD:
NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police
power and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on
the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the
particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote
public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the nation.”
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this
country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of
legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions
thru P.D. No. 207 .
The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of
international morality.
Petition dismissed.
AGUSTIN vs EDU
Facts:
The letter of instruction providing for an early warning device for
motor vehicles is being assailed in the case at bar as being violative
of the constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioner contends
that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel
and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one‐sided,
onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so‐called early
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified
set of EWD's."
Held:
Petitioner’s contention is erroneous because the Letter of
Instruction was issued in the exercise of the police power which is
“nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty.” In the leading case of Calalang v. Williams,
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order for
the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’ This
doctrine was later reiterated again in Primicias v. Fugoso which
referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set
forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth
decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present
with the well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent
changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”
Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18
June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
 On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued
transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
 On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of
Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An
Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The
Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain
And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain
Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.”
 On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued
by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking
All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant
Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or
Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or
Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3
thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to
operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement
Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and
non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on
record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance
(when the executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued
existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of
PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the
Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot
have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since
only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section
4(2) of the Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise,
the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by
the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325, March 19,
1997 - Case Digest
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend
Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by people’s
initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said
people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The
proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all
elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 )
and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8
of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for
Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed
by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it
will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition.
Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed.b. Republic Act No. 6735
provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s
initiative was left to some future law.c. COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative.
Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to
the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision.e. Congress nor any government agency
has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on
amendments to the Constitution but, as worded, it does not
adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-
executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent
as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the
Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on
the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope.
Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope
of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national
law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized
exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the
President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3]
Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local
governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
 establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the
COMELEC
1987 Constitution.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi

DELFIN PETITION
judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority. In every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the
the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are
power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the
must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No.
power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No.
6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have
that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction
over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the
time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal
election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires
jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely
entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and
the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying
it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)
25APR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA
ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the
People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
(2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the
attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing
Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at
the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin
asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid
exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No.
6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and
inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not
fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence
in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are
declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A.
No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend
the Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only
after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The
only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing
of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to
issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its
election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained
or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent
Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under
any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not
assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was
nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors
to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin
petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and
cannot implement the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has
no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA
concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for
clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe
the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for
constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is
made permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only
the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having
intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the
constitutional mandate on people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide
has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I
cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate
to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing
for the majority, holds that:

(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion in entertaining the “initiatory” Delfin Petition.

(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to “be directly

proposed by the people through initiative,” there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is “incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.”

(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, “insofar as it prescribes rules and

regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void.”

I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory grounds above-mentioned only the eliminating all remarks made
petition can show the required number of signatures — in this case, about the action and conduct of the Acting Secretary of Justice, said
12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in
motions are hereby denied. Avance?C. J., Street and Ostrand, JJ.,
every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no
adhering tot he dissenting opinion heretofore promulgated, concur
government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the
Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition nevertheless in this resolution.
absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from
Eugenio v. drillon
the majority’s two other rulings.
Facts.

On May 10, 1972, Prospero Palmiano purchased on installment

basis from Florencio Eugenio and his co-owner/ developer Fermin

Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. The Delta
Village Homeowners' Association, Inc. complained to the

National Housing Authority for non-development of their

subdivision and the NHA rendere...d a resolution on January 17,
1979
ordering Florencio Eugenio to cease and desist from making furthur
sales of lots in said village or any project owned by him. Prospero
Palmiano filed a complaint case against against Eugenio because,
Eugenio sold a lot to the spouses, Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo.
Palmiano alleged that he suspended his payments because of the
failure to develop the village.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the
right of Eugenio to cancel the contract with private respondent
and dismissed Palmiano's complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA
and, applying P.D. 957, ordered Eugenio to complete the
subdivision development and to reinstatem Palmiano's purchase
contract over one lot, and as to the other. The Executive Secretary
Franklin Drilon, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and
denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit
and for having been filed out of time. Eugenio filed a Petition for
review before the Supreme Court.
In his Petition before this Court, Eugenio avers that the Executive
Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-
development of the E & S Delta Village justified Palmiano’s non-
payment of his amortizations. Eugenio avers that inasmuch as the
land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the
transaction.
Issue.
Whether or not the petition of the Executive Secretary did not
abuse his discretion and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive
effect so
as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in
1976.
Held.
The Court ruled that the Executive Secretary did not abuse his
discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to
cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
Stat Con relation:
The relation is that the statute was enacted to protect small lot
owners from abuses of subdivision and developers. The principle of
social justice was adhered by giving the law retroactivity effect.
People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January
28, 1980)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th
Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as
complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN,
MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
SUELLO, respondents.
Ponente: AQUINO
FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations
against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized
by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be
arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an
omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled)
on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the
land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree the
entry should be effected “with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the
decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the
order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic
Act No. 5440.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar
acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.
HELD:
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed.
RATIO:
[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to
apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in
rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by
the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the
decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban
communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule
of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which
is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio
INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November
13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the
Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961,
Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following
grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous
possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his
predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their
claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita
Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the
reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931;
2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as
lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed
outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED
on June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral
proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in
Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to
Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of
Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the
Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such
parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have
been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of
judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding
the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13,
1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the
reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the
institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the
petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and
what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or
remedied by its title.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs.ESSO STANDARD
EASTERN, INC.,
(Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent. G.R.
No. L-28329 August 17,
1975
FACTS:Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2,
issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and
operates a petroleum refining
plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387
which provides: "During the
five years following the granting of any concession, the
concessionaire may import free of
customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments,
supplies and accessories,"
respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax
(which it paid under
protest).Court procedures: The Collector of Customs on February
16, 1962, held that
respondent ESSO was subject to the payment of the special import
tax provided in Republic Act
No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest.
On March 1, 1962,
respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the
Commissioner of Customs
who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of
Customs. 3On July 2, 1965,
respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for
review of the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs. The Court of Tax Appeals, on September
30, 1967, reversed the
decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs and ordered
refund of the amount of
P775.62 to respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under
protest. Statutes subject of
construction :a. R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) – title, Art.
103, Art. 102, Art.
104;b. R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW), as amended by R.A. No.
2352 – title
ISSUE: WON the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent
ESSO from custom duties
granted byR.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) should embrace
or include the special
import tax imposed by R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW).
HELD: Yes. Petition denied
FACTS:
Private respondents (the companies) are engaged in the
manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products
throughout the Philippines. Private respondent, Institute of
Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a
corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and
maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry,
of which all the other private respondents are members.
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte
petition for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an
adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to
the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled
milk products.
The controversy arose when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
required the companies to withdraw from the market all of their
filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by
Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the order with a warning of action if they failed.
Section of the Tax Code is as follows:
Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which
the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale
in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
immediate containers, and in all the language in which such
containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction which restrained
the CIR from requiring private respondents to print on the labels of
their rifled milk products the words.
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for
prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction.
Respondent-companied therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade
Board desist from further proceeding from the action filed by the
Philippine Association of Nutrition for misleading advertisement,
mislabeling and/or misbranding. That petitoners' milk was not
labeled as an imitation of cow's milk.
Both cases was heard jointly.
Respondent court held to perpetually restrain the CIR and the Fair
Trade Board from requiring respondent-companies to print on the
labels on the filled milk products.
ISSUE: Whether respondent court was correct.
RULING:
Yes.
Section 169 of the Tax code has been repealed by implication. It was
enacted together with Sections 141 and 177, which were already
repealed. Through it, Section 169 became a merely declaratory
provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.
It was also apparent that Section 169 does not apply to filled milk.
Following ejusdem generis, the provision specifically stated
skimmed milk which implies a restriction in scope of the classes of
milk.
Vera v. Cuevas
Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale
and distribution of filled milk
products throughout the Philippines. The products of private
respondent, Consolidated
Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold
whereas those of private
respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand
"Liberty;" and those of private
respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby."
Private respondent, Institute of
Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a
corporation organized for the
principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the
standards of local filled milk
industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of
their filled milk products which
do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code
within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The
Section 169 talks of the inscription use of specific and

to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed
and all milk in whatever skimmed milk" in the text of

form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all
sold or put on sale in the milk, in whatever form, from

Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other
containers, and in all the words, the general clause is

language in which such containers are marked, with the words, restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar
"This milk is not suitable for rule of ejusdem generis that

nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from and CTA September 30, 1969CASTRO, J.
requiring the respondents to print

on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for
Facts:
nourishment for infants less

than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to
perpetually restrain from Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling
of centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being placed in
investigating the respondents related to the manufacture/sale of
containers known as jute bags. In 1957, It made two importations
their filled milk products.
of jute bags, free from customs duties and special import tax upon
Issue: the Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special import tax bond,
conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section
from the date of importation.
169 of the Tax Code.

Held:
However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647
were exported and only 25,000 were exported out of the 75,200
jute bags imported on the second shipment. In other words, of the
total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported
within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags
were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but
within three years from their importation.
Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's
extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6
which was to expire the following day, citing reasons for its failure
to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one
year. However, this request was denied by the Commissioner.
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of
the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their
importation, the Petitioner was required to pay the amount of
p28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax
due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later on
demanded the refund of the amount it had paid.
Issues:
a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with
discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section
23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.
b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous
or uncertain statute by the Executive Department or other
Administrative Agencies be given consideration? In the case at bar,
the Bureau of Customs.
Held:
a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the
superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing
at one year the period within which the containers therein
mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said
period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of
Customs Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate
confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and,
more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the
one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.
b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23
of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and
Customs Code) have not been the subject of previous judicial
interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial
respect for administrative construction (in the case at bar the
Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to
eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the
law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to
consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-
extendible., " would, initially, be in order.
 Only where the court of last resort has not previously
interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give
consideration to construction by administrative or executive
departments of the state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction
of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive
department or other agency charged with its administration or
enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect
from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in
determining the meaning of the law, especially when the
construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is
contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when
the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged
with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and
Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be
given controlling weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for
administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to
several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as
factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These
factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute.
Cecilio de Villa vs. CA [G.R. No. 87416. April 08, 1991]
Ponente: PARAS, J.
FACTS:
[P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145)
with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent
court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no
offense was committed since the check involved was payable in
dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to
Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine
Coin and Currency). A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the
nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs
against the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration of the said
decision was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied by the
Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the
case; and,
(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of
petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered by the Bouncing Checks
Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
HELD:
YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
RATIO:
For the first issue: The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case, subject
of this review, can not be questioned, as Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule
110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The information under
consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in
Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information
in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162
SCRA 191 [1988]).
For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal
principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is
that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil.
British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The
records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the
intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency
may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then
Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.
Cecilio de Villa vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 87416. April 8, 1991)
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z.
LORAYES, respondents.
San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
Ponente: PARAS
FACTS:
[P]etitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court with
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. After arraignment and after
private respondent had testified on direct examination, petitioner
moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: x x x (b)
That no offense was committed since the check involved was
payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value
of Philippine Coin and Currency). Accused’s motion to dismiss was
denied for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
his motion was subsequently denied by respondent court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not B.P. No. 22 covers foreign (currency) checks.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
RATIO:
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law
does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically,
the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts "SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for
may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify officer and
it. Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56);
provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though
Provided, That, in
payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the
Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or
coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn deputy
against current accounts in foreign currency.
director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the
[I]t is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual service for an
proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the
construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (citation omitted). unextendible period of one (1) year.
Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative to private
deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (citation
omitted). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine
that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever Constabulary and have
currency may be the subject thereof. Courts may avail themselves reached the age of fifty-six.
of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning. Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for the issuance of an ex

parte restraining order and/or injunction before the RTC of Makati.

NPC (NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION) vs DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine
National Police Under a
Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government",
took effect on January 2, 1991.
RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP
members. Section 39 reads:
They aver that the age of
retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be
applied to them since they are
also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:
"Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within
the transition
period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, the
following
members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired:
"a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of
the effectivity
of this Act.
"b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second
year of the
effectivity of this Act.
"c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year
of the
effectivity of this Act.
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth
year of the
effectivity of this Act."
Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former
members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted
as the Integrated
National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year
transition period provided in
Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously
retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of
Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for
the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed
by a writ of injunction. He
declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes
all members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of the
present members of the
Philippine National police before its creation and establishment, and
that Section 39 thereof shall
become operative after the lapse of the four-year transition period.
Thus, the preliminary
injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he observed,
among others, that it may have
been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as
the "INP" but the PNP Law
failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural
recourse of the court is to trace the
source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on
the same subject and to
investigate the antecedents involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all
members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its
present members and that
Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only
after the lapse of the four-year
transition period. component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
police, shall cease to be the
HELD:
national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be
From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears
establish and constituted
that the use of the term INP
pursuant to this Act."
is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute
could have just made a It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature
failed to define who the
uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National
police (PNP) for retirement members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the
legislature failed to
purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from
the PC and it cannot be categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec.
89 specifically in favor of the
construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the
PC. local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC
component of the INP was
Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law
failed to define who constitutes already retirable at age fifty-six (56).

the INP”, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the
effectivity of this Act,
the present National police Commisdion and the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated
National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary,
which is the nucleus of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease to be
a major service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National police,
which is the civilian
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have
belabored on the supposed
dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such
a situation, courts are not
without recourse in determining the construction of the statute
with doubtful meaning for they
may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body. In case of doubt as to
what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal
interpretation to the letter of the
law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section
89 of R.A. 6975 is
applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is
whether the classification is
valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform
to the following requirements:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People
vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
[1939]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued
on January 8, 1992 is
hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez
Facts of the Case:
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by
plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw
materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42
in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior
thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second
sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of
said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The
Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and
approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted
by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA
2609.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from
the payment of the margin fee.
Held:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct from
urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s contends that the bill
approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the
terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements
in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But
this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the
House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming
petitioner. Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a
nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the
provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from
Kilosbayan vs Morato holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration,
association, or joint venture.
Legal Standing
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories on
January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO 4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by

PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual
G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993 rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. commercial operation.
RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, 5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE 6. Term is 8 years.
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. 7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, responsible for the facilities.
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine 8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the
Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING equipment at P25M.
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA
invalid because:

4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.

5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.

Facts: 6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not

been approved by the President and it is not most advantageous to
1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the the government.
contract between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
 4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments 1. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.

0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in 1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
the prior contract. sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in
1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the
interest because no constitutional issues were
exception provided in EO No. 301.
actually involved.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former
Board of Directors of PCSO.
appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery not the same one litigated by the parties before in
equipment. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in
any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. parties are the same but the cases are not.
5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were 3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot
not parties to the contract. still apply. An issue actually and directly passed
upon and determine in a former suit cannot again
be drawn in question in any future action between
Issues: the same parties involving a different cause of
1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law
legal standing to sue. at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an
2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in instrument or transaction identical with, but in a
operating an online lottery is valid. form separable from the one dealt with in the first
proceeding, the Court is free in the second
proceeding to make an independent examination of
the legal matters at issue.

4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous

decision does not preclude determination of the
Rulings:
petitioner’s standing.
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
 5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here
no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners
are ‘real parties of interest’.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are
those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or are prejudiced in their
rights with respect to one of the contracting parties
and can show the detriment which would positively
result to them from the contract.
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial
interest. Questions to the nature or validity of
public contracts maybe made before COA or before
the Ombudsman.
2. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
1. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO
now bears all losses because the operation of the
system is completely in its hands.
2. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of
business judgment and the Court is not inclined to
review.
3. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by
law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is
discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
4. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change
their agreement. Petitioners state that this would
allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line
lottery system. The Court held that the claim is
speculative. In any case, in the construction of
statutes, the resumption is that in making contracts,
the government has acted in good faith. The
doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason
for denying power.
5. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO
does not have the power to enter into any contract
which would involve it in any form of
“collaboration, association, or joint venture” for the
holding of sweepstakes activities. This only
mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing in
any activities that would compete in their own
activities.
6. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement
which does not compete with their own activities.
The Court held that is also based on speculation.
Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of
technology would involve the PCSO and its
personnel in prohibited association with the PGMC.
7. O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to
contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials
and equipment and not on the contracts of lease.
Public bidding for leases are only for privately-
owned buildings or spaces for government use or of
government owned buildings or spaces for private
use.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The
motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
Real Parties in Interest
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment
and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of
ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net
receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to
employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon
the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25
million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid
because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still
violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public
bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the
law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the
Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors
of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their
moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because
they were not parties to the contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the
standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on
real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the
cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An
issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former
suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between
the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule
does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an
instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in
the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the
legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's
standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no
constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate
issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.
Kilosbayan vs. Morato (G.R. No. 118910. July 17, 1995)
25APR
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A.
RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO,
JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA
FACTS:
[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground
that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in
the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated
v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of
Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)].
Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint
venture which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the
prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public
bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301,
§1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is
advantageous to the government is vested in the Board of Directors
of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot purchase its
own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease
contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is
to further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court
as their forum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is
invalid.
HELD:
NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was
dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the SC held:
xxx
(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and
is not contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office;
(4) that under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a contract for the
holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association,
collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it
itselfholds or conducts such lottery; and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not
have to be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity.
RATIO:
E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of
supplies, materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of
lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found
in §§ 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned
buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned
buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not
require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can
be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be
thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option
to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a
contract of purchase and sale.
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint
venture agreement the present lease contract is “[more]
advantageous to the government.” The question is whether under
the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous contract that
could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements which
the PCSO could have made with other parties. Petitioners have not
shown that more favorable terms could have been obtained by the
PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with
the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PADILLA, concurring
I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this
case.
As to whether or not the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government, it should be stressed that the matter involves,
basically, a policy — determination by the executive branch which
this Court should not ordinarily reverse or substitute with its own
judgment, in keeping with the time honored doctrine of separation
of powers.
VITUG, concurring
I most humbly reiterate the separate opinion I have made
in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al., vs. Teofisto Guingona, Sr., etc., et al. (G.R.
No. 113375, promulgated on 05 May 1994).
Back to the core of the petition, however, the matter of the legal
standing of petitioners in their suit assailing the subject-contract
appears to me, both under substantive law and the rules of
procedure, to still be an insuperable issue. I have gone over
carefully the pleadings submitted in G.R. No. 118910, and I regret
my inability to see anything new that can convince me to depart
from the view I have expressed on it in G.R. No. 113375.
FELICIANO, dissenting
With very great respect, it is submitted that the above conclusion
has been merely assumed rather than demonstrated and that what
is in fact before this Court does not adequately support such
conclusion.
REGALADO, dissenting
I am constrained to respectfully dissent from the majority opinion
premised on the constitutional and procedural doctrines posed and
interpreted in tandem therein. I also regret that I have to impose on
the majority with this virtual turno en contra when I could have
indicated my disaccord by just joining Mr. Justice Davide in his
commendably objective presentation of the minority position. I feel,
however, that certain views that have been advanced require a
rejoinder lest they lapse into the realm of unanimous precedents.
DAVIDE, dissenting
I register a dissenting vote.
I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings
in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. (hereinafter referred to
as the first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of
the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the
PCSO (R.A.. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue
of locus standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease
involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the
salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare
decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people,
specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and stability of
the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to
endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and
weakens this Court’s judicial and moral authority to demand from
lower courts obedience thereto and to impose sanctions for their
opposite conduct.