BAYAN v.

ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

FACTS:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,
President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed
in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if
so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and
effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in
the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability
with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that
requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
 David v. Macapagal – Arroyo

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits
to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant)
petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP,
on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives
of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President
Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the
Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the
proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members
during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?

Ruling:

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated
by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or
military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court
also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials,
are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest”
and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there
is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under
which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.
Palaez v. Auditor General

FACTS:

In 1964, the president issue an executive order Nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 for the creation of 33 municipalities.
2. Vice president Pelaez instituted a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restraint the auditor
general as well as his representatives and agents from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the
executive order and or any disbursement by said municipality by alleging that the executive order is null and void for it was impliedly
repealed by RA 2370 and constitute undue delegation of power.
3. The petitioner argue that if the president cannot create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios since barrios are units of municipality.
4. Respondent on the otherhands argue that a municipality can be created without creating a new barrios by placing old barrios under
the jurisdiction of municipality.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Whether or not, the executive orders are valid.

DISCUSSIONS:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to
the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.

According to the supreme court,under RA 2370, barrios may not be created or there boundaries altered nor there names be changed
except by act of congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and
the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.
The supreme court further said that the authority to create municipal corporation is legislative in nature.

RULINGS:

Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would
necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
 Lagcao vs. Labra G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004 Eminent Domain
NOVEMBER 28, 2017

FACTS:
In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu
City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210
lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City
of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First
Instance.
On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in
favor of petitioners and affirmed by the CA.
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City,
rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and
issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus a
demolition order was issued. However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote
two letters] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site
for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days.
Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which
identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution. They allege
that it will benefit only a handful of people.
ISSUE:
What is Eminent Domain? Was this validly exercised in this case?

RULING:
It is where a local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent.
No, it has not been validly invoked in this case due to the fact that The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain should be a
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private
property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation
by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice
of petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal
occupants of their property but Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still
searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city
council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple.
The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the
Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
Gonzales v. Macaraig

FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino vetoed Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1990.
The reason cited by President Aquino was that both of these sections restrict or prevent the President, the Senate President, the Speaker
of the House, the heads of the constitutional commisions and the Chief Justice of the SC from restoring or increasing items of
appropriation recommended by the President, which recommendations have already been reduced or disapproved by Congress through
the assailed GAAs. In effect, these sections nullify the statutory and constitutional authority of the aforesaid officials to augment any
item in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential veto on Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the GAA for the fiscal year
1990 is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes, the presidential veto on Section 55 of GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1990 is
constitutional. These sections were vetoed because they violate Section 5(5) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which grants the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the heads of the Constitutional Commissions, and the CJ of the SC the
authority to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
appropriations.

This constitutional mandate, also known as the power of augmentation, finds statutory basis in Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, which
authorizes the President to use savings to augment any appropriation in the Executive Department.
Congress had the power to override the veto on both sections by having a 2/3 vote of approval by members of each House, but Congress
did not choose to do so. At the same time, Section 55 of GAA 1989 and Section 16 of GAA 1990 should not be construed as having
repealed PD 1177, mainly because implied repeals are frowned upon.