Persons and Family Relations

XI. ADOPTION
Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250 Error! Bookmark not defined.

*Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 2

*Bartolome v SSS, G.R. No. 19253, Nov. 12, 2014 3

Oribello v CA, G.R. No. 163504, Aug. 5, 2015 6

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 8

Landingin vs. RP, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006 8

Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9 9

Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518 12

In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, 454 SCRA 541 15

Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003 16

Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250

[TOPIC FROM OUTLINE]

[Complete Title]
[Date] [Case Number] [Ponente]
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

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 ADDITIONAL NOTES

*Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

Adoption, and Effects of a decree of adoption - on parental authority

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C.
CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES AND ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES, petitioners, vs. GINA CARREON
FAJARDO AND CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents
January 27, 1989 G.R. No. 79955 PADILLA
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted
child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

FACTS
● This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus over the person of Angeline Anne Cervantes, a minor, who was born to
parents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife.
● Angeline was offered for adoption by her natural parents to the sister and brother-in-law of her own mother, Zenaida
Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes.
● Affidavit of consent was executed by the natural parents and the appropriate petition for adoption was filed by the
Cervantes. The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo.
The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as
Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate."
● Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid
the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
● As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina took the child from her
"yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina
brought the child to her house in Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Gina
refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the
adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, however,
return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00.
● Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted a case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon
to the RTC testified that she had interviewed respondent Gina on 24 June 1987 in connection with the contemplated
adoption of the child. During the interview, said respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to have the
child adopted by the petitioners.
ISSUE

Should the adoption be dissolved and the child returned to the natural mother?

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 RULING
No. The Court held that in all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply
where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources
and moral as we]l as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.

It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina
Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with
co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop
into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another
child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For
a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect
the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be
morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the
natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a
married man, can most likely give her.

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A
decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted
child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

*Bartolome v SSS, G.R. No. 19253, Nov. 12, 2014

Adoption - Effects of a decree of adoption (Hereditary rights),Rescission of adoption

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
November 12, 2014 G.R. No. 192531 VELASCO, JR
Recit Ready Synopsis
Petitioner, Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. SSS and ECC
denied her petition on the basis that Bernardina is no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was
legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL (biological great grandfather). The ECC also reasoned that the petitioner would
not qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it were proven that Cornelio has already passed away. The dependent
parent referred to by the provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, the rights which previously
belongs to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be vested upon the adopting parent.

The Supreme court ruled in favor of Bernardina. Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that his adoptive father
died on October 26, 1987,14 or less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent,
Cornelio, has already passed away. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law.In
the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code

3
is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC
did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether
by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Also petitioner’s parental
authority over the adopted child was restored because of Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Family Code
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they
shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession
shall apply.

Civil Code
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

Domestic Adoption Act

Section 20. Effects of Rescission. - If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished.

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of employee’s
death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed,
not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to
physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged
natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years
of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental
defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.

Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended:

ART. 167. Definition of terms. - As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.

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 FACTS
1. John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as an electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,
on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's
Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).
2. Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.
3. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s
biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the
Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union.
4. The SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim. SSS
contends that Bernardina is no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
CORNELIO COLCOL (biological great grandfather).
5. The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the
SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision
6. In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to death
benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary.
7. ECC and SSS contends that it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
8. The ECC also reasoned that the petitioner would not qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it were
proven that Cornelio has already passed away. The dependent parent referred to by the provision relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, the rights which previously belongs to the biological parent of the
adopted child shall now be vested upon the adopting parent.
ISSUE

Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus,
entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Bernardina can be considered as secondary beneficiary and entitled to
benefits under ECP.

The term “parents” in Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code

The term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and
ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The
phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by
nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or
assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j) clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to
solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents
and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would
have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was
crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents - legitimate, illegitimate or
parents by nature or adoption.

Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority
over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In
addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision

5
to the deceased's legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner
can still qualify as John's secondary beneficiary.

Restoration of Custody

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two years old, petitioner's parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio's death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4)
years of age.

John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstances,
parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.

Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission. - If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished, (emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned. The manner
herein of terminating the adopter's parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested
rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in
favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself
at such a tender age.

The Court was guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 wherein the paramount
consideration is the best interest of the child, which we invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest
of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is
rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his formative years, and,
to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to
perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee's biological one.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Oribello v CA, G.R. No. 163504, Aug. 5, 2015

Adoption
BERLINDA ORIBELLO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER TENTH DIVISION), AND
REMEDIOS ORIBELLO, Respondents.
August 5, 2015 G.R. No. 163504 Bersamin, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis

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 Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS
Toribio Oribello owned several parcels of land. His first wife was Emilia. Their marriage was dissolved on 10 September
1981 pursuant to decision of Superior Court of California. On 10 March 1982, Toribio married petitioner in La Union. He
died
intestate.

On 27 May 1997, respondent filed an action for partition of Toribio’s parcels of land against petitioner alleging that she is
an adopted daughter of Toribio and Emilia per CFI Mindoro decision on 26 March 1974.

Petitioner denied that respondent is an adopted daughter averring that: (1) the decree of adoption was
fraudulently secured; (2) the adoption case proceedings and decree of adoption are void ab initio; and (3) that Alfredo's
[natural father of respondent] fraudulent scheme was shown by his filing of another petition for adoption in 1983 in RTC
Occidental Mindoro.

RTC dismissed the case, ruling that respondent is not a co-owner of the properties, on the ground that the adoption
decree was obtained thru fraud and machination and nullified the decision which has long been final and executory. On
appeal, respondent sought the reversal of the RTC judgment.

CA reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case to RTC for the second phase of a partition suit. The CA
pointed out that even if the adoption proceedings had suffered from infirmities, the RTC did not have the authority to annul
the adoption decree and to dismiss the complaint for partition for that reason; and that at any rate the petitioner still had
the
option either to file a petition for relief or an action for the annulment of the adoption decree in the appropriate court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the complaint for partition can be dismissed based on petitioner’s allegation that the adoption decree was
void.

RULING
NO. Validity of the adoption decree cannot be assailed in an action for partition. (Legarda book) “As a general rule, even
supposing that the first adoption case suffers from infirmities, the lower court is bereft of authority to annul the decree of
adoption which was rendered by the CFI of Occidental Mindoro, a court of equal rank.”

But the appeal has merit because the right of respondent to demand the partition was not substantiated by
preponderance of evidence. Toribio Orivillo, who legally adopted respondent, was not the same person as Toribio Oribello
whose property was the subject of her demand for judicial partition. It was not Toribio Oribello who testified in the
adoption proceedings, but rather a certain Toribio Orivillo, who was a person physically different from Toribio Oribello. CA
Decision is Reversed. RTC Decision Reinstated.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

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In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

[TOPIC FROM OUTLINE]

[Complete Title]
[Date] [Case Number] [Ponente]
Recit Ready Synopsis

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Landingin vs. RP, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006

[TOPIC FROM OUTLINE]

[Complete Title]

[Date] [Case Number] [Ponente]

Recit Ready Synopsis

8
 Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9

Requisites to be an adopter- Aliens as adopters

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
CLOUSE,
June 8, 1994 94147 Puno
Recit Ready Synopsis
This case is about a petition for adoption by the Spouses Evelyn and Alvin Clouse. Alvin is a natural born American
Citizen, and Evelyn is a former Filipino, naturalized as an American Citizen. Both fit the qualifications for adoption, and
later filed a petition to adopt Evelyn’s younger brother, Solomon. RTC granted this petition. OSG contends. The issue is
whether or not the spouses, who are aliens have the right to adopt under Philippine Laws.

The court ruled in the negative. Citing that there can be no question that private respondent Alvin is not qualified to adopt
Solomon as he is not under any of the special provisions of Art. 184. The court preempts Evelyn on the other hand by

9
saying that while she may argue, invoking art. 184 3a. By saying that the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her
favor alone without violating article 185, which clearly states that the rule by requiring that husband and wife must jointly
adopt, which is mandatory, in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

Article 184, paragraph (3) of the family code expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt,
viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

FACTS

· Alvin Clouse, a natural born citizen of the United States of America married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4,
1981 at Olongapo City.

· August 1988- Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of American in Guam

· The couple is deemed physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a
twelve year old minor, who has been living with them from 1981 to 1984, then from November 2 up to present
day, under their care and custody.

· Feb 21, 1990: spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Alcala, the younger brother of
Evelyn, filed a petition for adoption before the RTC of Zambales, published in a newspaper of general
circulation in Zambales and the City of Olongapo for three consecutive weeks.

· Simon’s biological mother consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educated

10
 her son.

· Mrs. Nila Pronda (social worker) who was assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended granting of petition for adoption.

· Lower court granted the Petition.

· Petitioner, through OSG appealed for relief.

ISSUE
W/N Respondent, who are aliens have the right to adopt under Philippine Laws.

RULING

No.

Under articles 184 and 185 of the Family Code, private respondents are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt,
viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by law. There is no question that Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon
under any of aforementioned exemptions. 1. He is not a former Filipino Citizen, but a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. 2. Solomon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. 3.
When spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition for adoption on 19990, Evelyn was no longer a Filipino citizen, but a
naturalized citizen of the US.

Can Evelyn find relief in Art. 184 3(a)

No, because the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185:

11
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

While PD 603 (now amended) provides that husband and wife “may” jointly adopt, EO 91, 1986
amended said provision and demands that both husband and wife “shall” jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. It
was so crafted to protect Filipino Children who are put up for adoption. The Family code reiterated this rule by
requiring that husband and wife “must” jointly adopt, except in the aforementioned cases. Joint adoption by husband and
wife is mandatory, in consonance with the concept of joint paternal authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. Article 185 is all too clear and caterogical and there is no room for interpretation, there is only room
for application

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518

Effects of a decree of Adoption - Parental Authority

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR
BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
June 3, 1992 G.R. No. 85044 FELICIANO, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
The petitioners in this case are contending that the natural parents not the adopting parents of Adelberto Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action.

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that
resulted in her death. In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition
was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident. Sps. Bundoc, claimed that Sps. Rapisura were the indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the successful petition for adoption was
filed.

Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, Sps. Bundoc,
parental authority has not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

Issue: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.

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No. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code in accordance with the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Thus,
Sps. Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action since they had custody over Adelberto Bundoc at the time of the
incident and as such are exercising parental authority over hthe child.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case
Art. 2176, NCC - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180, NCC - The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Art. 58, Child and Youth Welfare Code:

Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the Civil Code.

Art. 221, FC - Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Art. 35, Child and Youth Welfare Code:

Trial Custody — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the
courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the
legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents.

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad
already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.
FACTS

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that
resulted in her death.

The petitioners, adopting and natural parents of Jennifer Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the Sps.
Bundoc, natural parents of Adelberto, with whom he was living with at the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on
November 1982 after the tragic incident.

Sps. Bundoc, claimed that Sps. Rapisura were the indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted

13
to them from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, Sps. Bundoc,
parental authority has not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

Trial Court: Dismissed petitioner’s complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.

CA: Dismissed petition since the petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

ISSUE

WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents?

RULING
NO.

Under Art. 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the
child under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code.

Moreover, Art. 2180 of the Civil Code provides that the obligation imposed by Article 2176 (quasi-delicts) the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which
includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In this case, during the shooting incident, parental authority
over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages.

The Court did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.

Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. To hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged to Sps. Rapisura so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the US and had no
physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.

Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begun nor had been
completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto, and
as such, are the indispensable parties..

ADDITIONAL NOTES

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In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, 454 SCRA 541

Effects of a decree of adoption > On name

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner,
March 31, 2005 G.R. No. 148311 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
Issue in this case is Whether or not an illegitimate child may, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name

YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear surname of her father and her mother.
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption
Act and the Family Code provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie
can assert her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail."

Art. 189 FC. Adoption shall have the following effects:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use
the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except
that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be
exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives
FACTS
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the
child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname. Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
Garcia as her middle name. The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189
she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE
Whether or not an illegitimate child may, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name

RULING

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Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V
of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie
to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother
but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as “DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM”),
respondent.
July 14, 2003 G.R. No. 143989 VITUG, J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
In 1972, the court granted the petition of a childless couple to adopt the wife’s nephew. However, in 1999, the wife
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption. Prior to the institution of the case, specifically in March 1998,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption. The issue is whether the adoption, decreed in 1972, may still be rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552. The Court held that the action for rescission of the adoption decree could no longer be
pursued since the action was initiated after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force. But an adopter, while barred from
severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing
to an undeserving child, like dening to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him
from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines and how applied to the case

R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act)
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be
rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by
the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence;
or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

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Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.

FACTS
In 1971, Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom decided to file a petition for adoption of the latter’s nephew, Jose
Melvin Sibulo. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar of Naga City to
change the name “Jose Melvin Sibulo” to “Jose Melvin Lahom”.

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred that despite her pleadings and that of her husband, their adopted
son refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, and that said adopted son continued using his surname Sibulo
in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession.

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically in March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption
(see Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552).

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case, and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner
asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases
where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article
192 of the Family Code.

ISSUE
May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 8552? - NO.

RULING
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. It was months after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then,
the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. The Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force could no longer be pursued.

It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ISSUE #2: In the event that the decree of adoption may still be revoked or rescinded, has the adopter’s action
prescribed? - YES.

HELD: Even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule
under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the

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lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional
guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a “right,” the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege
that is governed by the state’s determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.
Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject
to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has
been exercised.

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