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GANDIONCO VS.

PENARANDA defendant spouses had to be established by final


judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not
G.R. No. 79284, 27 November 1987 been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the
present Civil Code, and the omission has been
uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent
An action for legal separation is aimed at the conjugal rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
rights of the parties, not to recovery civil liability

Facts: Sabalones VS CA
Facts :
On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gandionco filed before the 1. Samson Sabalones a diplomatic service
RTC of Misamis a complaint for legal separation on the assigned in different countries, left his wife for
ground of concubinage against her husband, Froilan 15 years.
Gandionco. She also filed a complaint against Froilan 2. Come back to Philippines in 1985 but not to
for concubinage before the MTC. his legitimate wife and children.
3. File an action for judicial authorization to sell
Froilan contended the civil action for legal separation conjugal property.
should be suspended in view of the criminal case for 4. In her answer, wife opposed the authorization
concubinage pending before the MTC. Judge and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
Penaranda denied Froilan’s motion. Froilan directly She alleged that the house in Greenhills was
appealed to the Supreme Court, citing Jerusalem vs. occupied by her and their 6 kids, and that
Zurbano, where the SC held that suspension of an they were depending for their support on the
action for legal separation would be proper if an rentals from another conjugal property
allegation of concubinage is made, as per Section 1, (building and lot in Forbes Park). She also
Rule 107 of the then Rules of Court on Criminal informed the court that despite her husband’s
Procedure. retirement, he had not returned to his
legitimate family and was instead maintaining
a separate residence with another woman
Issue(s):
 1. Whether or not RTC Judge Penaranda
and their 3 kids.
erred in not suspending the civil action for legal
5. Wife asked the court to grant legal separation
separation
and order the liquidation of their conjugal
properties, with forfeiture of her husband’s
pending the criminal case for concubinage before the share because of his adultery.
MTC. Held: Issue :
W/N a preliminary injunction can be issued by the Court
1. No, Judge Penaranda correctly continued the (despite joint administration of conjugal properties)
civil action for legal separation. Ruling :
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not
permanently installed the respondent wife as the
Froilan incorrectly invokes the suspension of civil
actions arising from the same offense charged in a administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It
criminal action that was already commenced. The has merely allowed her to continue administering the
properties in the meantime without interference from
governing rule now is Section 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil actions to the petitioner, pending the express designation of the
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the
Family Code.
contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule
111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
arising from the offense charged." It is so ordered.
Death Terminates Legal Separation Case

Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) specifically refers to civil


actions for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr
simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense." Facts:

The action for legal separation is not to recover civil Lucy filed a case for legal separation against Clemente
liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights on the ground of concubinage and an attempt by him
of the spouses and their relations to each other, within against her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a
the contemplation of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil Code. writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to
her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of exclusive property, then under the administration and
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by management of Clemente. Clemente opposed the
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code which
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is provides: "An action for legal separation shall in no
necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided since the filing of the petition” (now Art 58, Family
under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then Code). He manifested that if the motion were heard,
allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would
legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the become even more dim. Judge Vamenta granted the
requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of motion of Clemente and suspended the hearing of the
petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. enjoins that these should be determined by the court
Thus, Lucy filed a petition for certiorari. according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or
the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice
Issue: may be caused.

Does the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for


legal separation before the lapse of six months from the
filing of the petition preclude the court from acting on a
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for
as an ancillaryremedy to such a suit?

Held:
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong
No. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to FACTS:
the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for
expiration of the six-month period. more than 20 years when Lucita filed a complaint for
Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family
The court where the action is pending according to Code.
Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her
parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from husband William subjected her to physical violence
hearing the suit. That the law, however, remains like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her
cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power head against the concrete wall.and been violent
to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the towards their three children. He would scold them
following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the using his belt buckle to beat them. One day after a
petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several
to live separately from each other and manage their different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and
respective property. The husband shall continue to asked her to leave the house which she did.
manage the conjugal partnership property but if the Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior
court deems it proper, it may appoint another to were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente
manage said property, in which case the administrator Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she
shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian left her conjugal home also testified about her injuries.
and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal
the capital except in accordance with the orders of the separation which the CA affirmed
court." (now Art. 61, Family Code) William then filed this petition for review on certiorari
-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and
There would appear to be then a recognition that the that he never inflicted physical harm on her or their
question of management of their respective property children.
need not be left unresolved even during such six-month -He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and
period. An administrator may even be appointed for the her family in filing the complaint is to deprive him of his
management of the property of control and ownership over his conjugal properties with
the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from Lucita.
which the court suffers under the preceding article is -That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which
thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be warrant an exception to the general rule that questions
heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45
insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory of the Rules of Court.
injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. -The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita
There is all the more reason for this response from her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since
respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom their testimonies are tainted with relationship and
she accused of concubinage and an attempt against fraud and since Lucita abandoned the family home she
her life would in the meanwhile continue in the has also given a ground for legal separation and
management of what she claimed to be her therefore should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art.
paraphernal property, an assertion that was not 56 par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties have
specifically denied by him. given ground for legal separation
ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree
What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, on legal separation
thus possesses relevance: It is conceded that the HELD:
period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case
as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation is for her family to take control of the
between the spouses. The recital of their grievances conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her
against each other in court may only fan their already husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly
inflamed passions against one another, and the abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly
lawmaker has imposed the period to give them abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have
opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this been duly established. He can derive no personal gain
practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative from pushing for the financial interests of her family
policy, does not have the effect of overriding other at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and
provisions such as the determination of the custody of the companionship of her husband and children
the children and alimony and support pendente lite The assessment of the trial court regarding the
according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil credibility of witnesses is given great respect.
Code, now Art. 49, Family Code.) The law expressly Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and
label a witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights
credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him,
detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed
that their testimonies are not tainted with bias. adulterous acts?
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that
one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or
the said provision belief on the part of the injured party of its commission,
PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but
of legal separation this presumption may be rebutted by evidence. Single
voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties
BUGAYONG VS. GINEZ ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and
Facts: where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed
Benjamin Bugayong, a US Navy serviceman, married that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation
Leonila Ginez on 27 August 1949 in Pangasinan. They
lived together with their sisters in Sampaloc, Manila. BUSUEGO VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Sometime in July 1951, Ginez left the dwelling of her MINDANAO GR 196842
 9 October 2013
sister-in-law and wrote to her husband, informing him
that she had gone to live with her mother in Pangasinan The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the
and later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local determination of probable cause during a preliminary
college. investigation.
In July 1951, Bugayong received letters from Valeriana FACTS:
Polangco, his sister-in-law, and anonymous persons Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a
informing him of Ginez’s acts of infidelity. Allegedly, complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334 of the
Ginez wrote to Bugayong, informing him that another Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No.
man kissed her. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
In August 1952, Bugayong went to be with Ginez in Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of
Pangasinan. He asked her the truth of her adultery, but the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the
Ginez didn’t answer and simply packed up and left. Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo. Alfredo is
Bugayong took this an admission of Ginez’s adultery. the Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital. They
Despite this, Bugayong went looking for her. have 2 children. However, their marriage turned sour.
On 18 November 1952, Bugayong filed with the CFI of She saw photographs of, and love letters addressed to
Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Alfredo from, other women. She confronted her
Ginez, who moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming husband but he claimed ignorance of the existence of
that Bugayong had condoned Ginez’s adultery. such letters.
The CFI denied Ginez’s motion to dismiss, thus she An opportunity to work as nurse in N.Y. USA. Alfredo
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the opposed. Nonetheless, Rosa completed the
case to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law. requirements. However, before leaving, furious with
Issue(s):
 1. Whether or not Bugayong condoned Rosa’s pressing, Alfredo took his gun and pointed it at
Ginez’s adultery. Rosa’s temple. Alfredo was only staved off because
Rosa’s mother arrived at the couple’s house.
Held: Rosa went to the US and was eventually joined by her
1. Yes, Bugayong’s act of cohabiting with Ginez 2 children, Alfred and Robert. Robert eventually
despite knowing her infidelity amounts to returned to Davao City to study medicine. Sometime in
condonation. 1997, Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense living at their conjugal home. When Rosa asked
constituting a ground for legal separation. Alfredo, he said that Sia, nurse at the Regional
Article 97 of the Civil Code provides that adultery by the Hospital, was just in a sorry plight and was allegedly
wife is a ground for legal separation. Article 100 raped by Rosa’s brother-in-law so he allowed her to
provides that the innocent spouse may file a complaint sleep at the maids’ quarters.
for legal separation, provided there has been no
consent or condonation of the adultery. Article 102 In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo’s extra-
provides that an action for legal separation must be marital relationships. Robert and the housekeepers
filed within 1 year from and after the date the innocent executed a joint affidavit to support Rosa’s allegations.
spouse learned of the cause, but must be within 5 years Rosa and the other son Alfred flew to Davao without
from and after the date such cause occurred. informing Alfredo. She gathererd and consolidated
information of her husband’s sexual affairs. She also
The Court considered Bugayong’s line of conduct under averred that during the course of the marriage, Alfredo
the assumption that he really believed his wife guilty of physically and verbally abused her and her family.
adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In Alfredo denied all accusations. In their subsequent
August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained
his wife and after finding her they lived together as Alfredo’s culpability, and naturally, Alfredo claimed
husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he innocence.
says that he tried to verify from her the truth of the news
he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain his In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosa’s
purpose because his wife, instead of answering his failure to implead Sia and de Leon as respondents
query on the matter, preferred to desert him, probably cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosa’s complaint
enraged for being subjected to such humiliation. And ought to be dismissed for failure to implead his alleged
yet he tried to locate her, though in vain. Now, do the concubines as respondents.
Specifically to dispose of that issue, the Ombudsman as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
scheduled a clarificatory hearing where both Rosa and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. In
Alfredo were represented by their respective counsels. this regard, petitioner failed to demonstrate the
The office of the Ombudsman explained that the Ombudsman's abuse, much less grave abuse, of
position of Alfredo would just prolong the conduct of the discretion.
preliminary investigation since Rosa can just re-file her
complaint. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply in The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its
the preliminary investigation stage. Hence, the counsel Rules of Procedure. No information may be filed and no
for Rosa was directed to submit to this Office the complaint may be dismissed without the written
addresses of the alleged mistresses so that they could authority or approval of the ombudsman in cases falling
be served with the Order directing them to file their within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbyan, or of the
counter-affidavits. Rosa submitted an Ex-Parte proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
Manifestation on the last known addresses of Julie de
Leon and Emy Sia (alleged mistresses.) Notably, Rosa’s complaint contained not just the
Concubinage charge, but other charges: violation of
Ombudsman issued a Joint Order4 impleading Sia and Republic Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats. Upon the
de Leon as party-respondents in the complaint for Ombudsman’s perusal, the complaint was supported by
Concubinage and directing them to submit their affidavits corroborating Rosa’s accusations. Thus, at
respective counter-affidavits within a period of time. Sia that stage, the Ombudsman properly referred the
and de Leon did not submit their respective counter- complaint to Alfredo for comment. Nonetheless, while
affidavits. the Ombudsman found no reason for outright dismissal,
it deemed it fit to hold a clarificatory hearing to discuss
Alfredo opposed the Ombudsman’s ruling to simply the applicability of Article 344 of the Revised Penal
amend the complaint and implead the alleged Code, the issue having been insisted upon by Alfredo.
mistresses. He filed his Comment to the Provincial
Prosecutor praying for the dismissal of the complaint for Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the
failure to implead the two mistresses. complaint to respondent for comment and thereafter the
Ombudsman issued herein assailed Resolution, holding of a clarificatory hearing is provided for in
disposing of the procedural issues, which states that paragraph b, Section 2 and paragraphs d and f, Section
the short cut procedure would delay the proceedings is 4 of Rule II, which the Court have at the outset
misplaced, since Rosa could still amend her complaint underscored. The Ombudsman merely facilitated the
and re-file the case for the doctrine of res judicata will amendment of the complaint to cure the defect pointed
not apply. Alfredo filed a Motion for Reconsideration out by Alfredo. The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction,
excepting to the Ombudsman’s ruling on the automatic albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary
inclusion of Sia as respondent in the complaint and investigation of crimes involving public officers, without
their indictment for the crime of Concubinage. regard to its commission in relation to office, had long
been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman stood pat on its ruling, Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ.
declared that the Partial Motion for Reconsideration
was filed out of time. Alfredo now comes to us on The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of
petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as
in the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive
him and Sia for Concubinage. jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public
officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Ombudsman has full to investigate offenses involving public officers or
discretionary authority in the determination of probable employees is concurrent with other government
cause investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state
during a preliminary investigation. prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
RULING: Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
Yes. Therefore the Court sustain the Ombudsman’s investigating agency of the government, the
decision. investigation of such cases.

The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded
determination of probable cause during a preliminary from conducting any investigation of cases against
investigation. This is the reason why judicial review of public officers involving violations of penal laws but if
the resolution of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
power and duty to investigate and prosecute felonies Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in
and/or offenses of public officers is limited to a the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse stage.
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the
for that of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction
to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack Circular No. 95- 001 for the proper guidelines of their
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so respective prosecutors in the conduct of their
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a investigations.
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED.
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
2. Yes, death also abates the actions involving
property rights.
LAPUZ SY VS. UY Article 106 of the Civil Code implies the right to the
Facts: dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of
Carmen Lapuz and Eufemio Eufemio alias Eufemio Uy the absolute community of property), the loss of right by
married on 21 September 1934 civilly and canonically the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned
on 30 September 1934. On 18 August 1953, Carmen by the partnership or community, or his disqualification
filed a petition for legal separation, alleging she had to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well
discovered Eufemio cohabitating with a Chinese as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of
woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all
sometime in March 1949. Eufemio filed a counter-claim rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Carmen Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons
on the ground that he has a prior, subsisting marriage of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such
with Go Hiok according to Chinese law and customs. claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as
Unfortunately, before trial Carmen died in a car assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said
accident on 31 May 1969. Eufemio moved to dismiss rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished"
the petition for legal separation on two grounds: (1) the after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the
one-year prescriptive period provided in Article 102 0f Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action
the Civil Code had lapsed; and (2) Carmen’s death through a substitute of the deceased party.
abated the petition. Carmen’s father, Macario, opposed
the motion. MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON,
The Trial Court dismissed the case and Macario filed a Facts:
petition for review by certiorari before the Supreme Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for
Court. legal separation against her husband Alfredo Gozon.
Issue(s): Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of
1. Whether or not Carmen’s death before final both parties, Alfredo and Mario entered into Agreement
decree in an action for legal separation of Buy and Sell involving their conjugal property for the
abates the 
 action. 
 price of 18 million pesos. Mario pays the partial
2. Whether or not such an abatement applies if payment of the said price and he took the possession of
the action involves property rights. 
 the property.
Held: When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira
1. Yes, an action for legal separation is a purely and Mario, their property was dissolved and liquidated.
personal right as recognized by Art. 100 of the Civil Being the offending spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his
Code. share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their
child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to
An action for legal separation which involves nothing Elvira.
more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter
(there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is Dimensional Realty Inc. for 18 million pesos in his favor
purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines by Winnifred. And the IDRI paid it in full payment.
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal Malabon for specific performance and damages,
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal restraining order.
separation already rendered. Being personal in The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and
character, it follows that the death of one party to the IDRI is null and void for their attempt of commission or
action causes the death of the action itself — actio continuance of their wrongful acts, further alienating or
personalis moritur cum persona. disposing of the subject property. Also the agreement of
Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for the absence of
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for written consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights
divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property
cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the of this case.
spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article Issue:
244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon
has right to sell their conjugal partnership without the
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under consent of the other spouse, and share of the net
the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a profits earned by the conjugal partnership.
proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a Held:
dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a No,
personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the The absence of the consent of one of the spouse
contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the
abates the action, for the reason that death has settled conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who
the question of separation beyond all controversy and contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively
deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons participated in negotiating for the sale of the property,
of the parties to the action and of the subject- matter of that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still
the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost required by law for its validity. And the offending spouse
unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share
divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the in the net profits of the conjugal properties.
action. Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall be
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall 5. May the compromise agreement be nullified on the
have no right to any share of the net profits earned by ground that petitioner was not intelligently and
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, judiciously informed by his counsel of the consequential
which shall be forfeited in accordance with the effects of the agreement?
provisions of article
Held:
Maquilan v. Maquilan
1. No. The foregoing provisions of the law are
Virgilio and Dita were spouses. Their relationship inapplicable to the instant case. Article 43 of the Family
turned bitter when Virgilio discovered that Dita had a Code refers to a subsequent marriage that is
paramour. Virgilio filed a case of adultery against Dita terminated because of the reappearance of an absent
and her paramour. The two were convicted of the crime spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a
charged. Subsequently, Virgilio filed a Petition for decree of legal separation. The present case involves a
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and to be declared under the ground of psychological
Damages before the RTC, imputing psychological capacity.
incapacity on Dita. During the pre-trial, Virgilio and Dita
entered into a Compromise Agreement wherein they
agreed to partially separate their conjugal properties 2. Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly
without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially
declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC approved divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of
the compromise agreement. gains between the parties and does not deal with the
validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not
Virgilio, however, later filed an Omnibus Motion, praying among those that are expressly prohibited by Article
for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and 2035.
the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise
Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds
that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and 3. The contention that the Compromise Agreement is
judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the
the Compromise Agreement. The respondent Judge guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is
denied the motion. misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not
impose such disqualification.
Virgilio appealed, contending that the Compromise
Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of
prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
adultery or concubinage, from sharing in cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned
the conjugal property. Since the respondent was Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved
convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her is exactly such a separation of property allowed under
share should be forfeited in favor of the common child the law. This conclusion holds true even if the
under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code. proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage
was still pending. However, the Court must stress that
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to this voluntary separation of property is subject to the
disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of
in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise gains and other persons with pecuniary interest
Agreement is void, it never became final and executory. pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil
Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for
legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is 4. While the appearances of the Solicitor General
therefore void. He also argued that since the and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure
proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se
of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully
solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the concurs with the findings of the CA:
pendency of the case is also void.
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the
law in requiring the presence of the Solicitor General
Issues: and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal
separation and annulment or declaration of nullity of
1. Do Articles 43 and 63 of the Family code applies to marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of
the instant case? collusion between the parties and to see to it that their
evidence respecting the case is not fabricated. In the
2. Does Article 2035 of the Civil Code also apply to the instant case, there is no exigency for the presence of
instant case? the Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor
because as already stated, nothing in the subject
3. Does the Compromise Agreement circumvent the compromise agreement touched into the very merits of
law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the
the conjugalproperties? court to be wary of any possible collusion between the
parties. At the risk of being repetitive, the compromise
4. Does the absence of the public prosecutor nullify the agreement pertains merely to an agreement between
compromise agreement? the petitioner and the private respondent to separate
their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to
the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the
of marriage. law will not permit him to terminate it by his own
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the
parental home.
5. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds
the client. This is based on the rule that Arroya vs. Vazquez de Arroyo
any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his Facts:
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of Mariano and Dolores were married 1910. They lived
petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of an together with a few short intervals of separation. In
unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the 1920, Dolores left their common home and decided to
foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases live separately from Mariano. Mariano induced Dolores
where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives to return home but the latter refused. Hence, Mariano
the client of due process of law, or when its application filed a petition for permanent mandatory injunction
"results in the outright deprivation of one's property requiring the Dolores to return to the conjugal home
through a technicality." None of these exceptions has and live with him as a wife under pain of contempt. By
been sufficiently shown in the present case. way of defense, Dolores claimed that she was
compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on
the part Mariano. She in turn prayed for a decree of
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership,
AND WIFE and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent
separate maintenance. The trial court ruled in favor of
GOITIA VS. CAMPO-RUEDA Dolores.
Facts:
Eloisa Goitia y De La Camara and Jose Rueda we On appeal, the SC ruled that Mariano has done nothing
married in Manila on 7 January 1915. They lived to forfeit his right to the marital society of Dolores and
together for a month until Eloisa returned home to her that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to
parents. return to the common home and cohabit with
Eloisa claimed that Jose demanded that she “perform Mariano. The only question is whether it is within the
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs,” but province of the courts to attempt to compel one of the
she refused to perform any act other than legal and spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
valid cohabitation. Jose then beat her. Unable to the other.
convince Jose from desisting from his repugnant
desires, she left their conjugal abode and went back to
live with her parents. She then filed an action against Issue:
Jose for support outside of their conjugal home.
The trial court held that Jose cannot be compelled to May the court order Dolores to return to
support Eloisa except in his own house, except by the conjugal home under pain of contempt?
virtue of a judicial decree granting divorce or a
separation from him.
Issue(s):
 1. Whether or not Jose can be compelled to Held:
support Eloisa outside the conjugal home.
Held: No. It is not within the province of the courts of this
1. Yes, Article 49 of the Civil Code obliges Jose to country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
support Eloisa either by paying a pension or cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
supporting Eloisa in his own home. other. Cohabitation is a purely personal obligation - an
Marriage is something more than a contract, though obligation to do. To compel the wife to comply with such
founded upon the agreement of the parties. When once obligation would be an infringement of her personal
formed a relation is created between the parties which liberty.
they cannot change by agreement, and the rights and
obligations of which depend not upon their agreement
but upon the law. The spouses must be faithful to,
assist, support, and live with each other. Illusorio v. Bildner
The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by Facts:
her husband without fault on her part, may maintain an On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano
action against the husband for separate maintenance Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
when she has no other remedy, notwithstanding the period of 30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed
provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
person who is obliged to furnish support the option to Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when
satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio
and maintaining in his own home the one having the Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
right to the same. hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. They had six
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when children: Ramon, Erlinda Ilusorio Bildnera, Maximo,
the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of Sylvia, Marietta, and Shereen.
the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the Sylvia and Erlinda Ilusirio alleged that Potenciano
part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation stayed with their mother for five months in Antipolo City
is founded not so much on the express or implied terms starting 30 December 1997. During this time, they
of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal alleged that their mother gave Potenciano an overdose
duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of of 200mg (instead of 100mg) of Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in the US. single and that she intended to return to Cebu City after
Consequently, Potenciano’s health deteriorated. studying in the United States. On 22 August 1950, she
obtained a final and absolute decree of divorce from
On 25 February 1998, Erlinda filed before the RTC a Nevada on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely
petition for guardianship over the property and person mental in character.” Meanwhile, her parents filed a
of Potenciano, due to his advanced age, frail health, petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul Vicenta’s
poor eyesight, and impaired judgment. After Potenciano marriage.
did not return to Antipolo City after attending a On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
corporate meeting in Baguio City, Erlinda filed a petition Russell Moran, in Nevada and started a family. She
for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals. She became an American citizen on 8 August 1958. On 08
alleged that her children prevented her from visiting July 1955, Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation
Potenciano. Essentially, her petition for habeas corpus and a million pesos in damages against Vicenta and
was sought to compel Potenciano to live with her in her parents. The trial court freed Pastor from supporting
Antipolo. Vicenta and to acquire property to her exclusion, but
also awarded damages against Pastor in favor of
The CA dismissed Erlinda’s petition for habeas corpus Vicenta’s parents.
holding that there was no actual and effective detention Pastro appealed to the Supreme Court and claimed the
or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty, and that he was trial court erred for not declaring legal separation.
of sound and alert mind. Instead, the CA allowed Issue(s)
 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in not
visitation rights for Erlinda. declaring the legal separation of Pastor and Vicenta.
Erlinda Ilusirio Bildnera appealed before the Supreme Held:
Court, assailing the CA’s grant of visitation rights in 1. Yes, the trial court erred in no decreeing legal
favor of her mother. separation on the ground of adultery due to
Vicenta’s invalid subsequent marriage to Leo
Issue(s):
 1. Whether or not the CA erred in granting Moran.
visitation rights to Erlinda, who never even prayed for The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and
such right. Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved
under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
Held: absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on
1. Yes, the CA exceeded its authority when it 21 October 1950 from Nevada.
awarded visitation rights for Erlinda. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but She was then subject to Philippine Iaw and Article
the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the 15 of the Civil Code. The Civil Code of the Philippines,
husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he now in force, does not admit absolute divorce. Instead
is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
attached to the exercise of his right. separation and, even in that case, it expressly
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be severed"
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
to the man and womans free choice.
 Verily, marital divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent
rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling violation of the declared public policy of the state,
may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of especially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of
habeas corpus. the Civil Code.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant
TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
Facts: divorce court, primarily, because the policy of our law
On 24 February 1948, 27-year-old Vicenta Escano cannot be nullified by acts of private parties as per
exchanged marriage vows with 82-year-old Pastor Article 17 of the Civil Code.
Tenchavez without knowledge of her parents, before a There flows as a necessary consequence that in this
Catholic captain in a house in Cebu City. The marriage jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
was duly registered with the local civil registry. The two marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her
were deeply in love. They planned their marital future previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared
with the help of their friend and matchmaker, Pacita to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that
Noel. her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
Vicenta’s parents discovered the marriage and were of consortium and her desertion of her husband
disgusted. Rather than recelebrate in church, Vicenta’s constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for
mother was given a letter from San Carlos students which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
disclosing an amorous relationship with Pastor and indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Pacita. Vicenta thereafter would not agree to a new Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell
marriage and lived with her parents while Pastor Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not
returned to his job in Manila. Although they continued her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law,
correspondence, Vicenta and Pastor became estranged and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
by June 1948. A lawyer filed for Vicenta a petition to "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
annul her marriage, but she did not sign it, hence it was adultery."
dismissed without prejudice.
On 24 June 1950, Vicenta applied for a passport
without Pastor’s knowledge. She indicated she was