2018 Moscow–Constantinople

schism
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Emblem of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I

Monogram of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow

2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism
Date 15 October 2018–present
Also Orthodox Church schism of 2018
known as
Type Christian schism
Cause Decision of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate (11 October 2018)
 to:
1. grant autocephaly to Ukraine
in the future
2. reestablish a stauropegion
(church body responsible only to
the Ecumenical Patriarch) in
Kiev, Ukraine
3. revoke the "Letter of issue"
(permission) of 1686 which
authorized the Patriarch of
Moscow to ordain the
Metropolitan of Kiev[note 1]
4. lift the excommunications
which affected clergy and faithful
of two unrecognized Ukrainian
Orthodox churches (the UAOC
and the UOC-KP)
Participa Main: Ecumenical Patriarchate
nts Russian Orthodox Church

Minor: Ukrainian Orthodox

Church – Kiev Patriarchate
Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church
Ukrainian Orthodox Church
(Moscow Patriarchate)
Outcome 1. 15 October 2018: the Russian
Orthodox Church severed full
communion with the Ecumenical
Patriarchate
2. 15 December 2018: creation
after a unification council
conveyed by the Ecumenical
Patriarch of the Orthodox
Church of Ukraine
3. 28 December 2018: creation
by the Russian Orthodox Church
of two exarchates: the PEWE
and the PESEA
4. 5 January 2019: autocephaly
granted by the Ecumenical
Patriarchate to the Orthodox
Church of Ukraine (OCU)
5. 12 October 2019: the Church
of Greece became the first
 Autocephalous Orthodox church
after the Ecumenical
Patriarchate to recognize the
OCU (see here)
Part of a series on the
Eastern Orthodox Church

Mosaic of Christ Pantocrator, Hagia Sophia

Overview
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schism 15th-16th c. 1996 2018
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Related topics
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• 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism
• vte
The Moscow–Constantinople schism,[a] also known as the Orthodox
Church schism of 2018,[b][1] is a schism which began on 15 October 2018
when the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC, also known as the Moscow
Patriarchate) unilaterally severed full communion with the Ecumenical
Patriarchate of Constantinople.[2][3][4][5] This was done in response to a
decision of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of
Constantinople of 11 October 2018.
In its 11 October 2018 decision, the Holy Synod of Constantinople
confirmed its intentions to unilateraly grant autocephaly (independence) to
the Orthodox church in Ukraine in the future. The decision also stated that
the Holy Synod would immediately: reestablish a stauropegion in Kiev, i.e. a
church body subordinated directly to the Ecumenical Patriarch; revoke the
"Letter of issue" (permission) of 1686[c] that had given permission to the
Patriarch of Moscow to ordain the Metropolitan of Kiev;[note 1] and lift the
excommunications which affected the clergy and faithfuls of two
unrecognized Ukrainian Orthodox churches. Those two unrecognized
churches, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), were competing
with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) and
were considered "schismatics" (illegally segregated groups) by the
Patriarchate of Moscow, as well as by the other Orthodox churches.
In its decision of 15 October 2018, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox
Church barred all members of the Moscow Patriarchate (both clergy and
laity) from taking part in communion, baptism, and marriage at any church
controlled by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[3][4] Before that, in response to the
appointment of two exarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine, the
Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate had decided, on 14 September
2018, to break off participation in any episcopal assemblies, theological
discussions, multilateral commissions, and any other structures that are
chaired or co-chaired by representatives of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate.[6][7][8]
The schism forms part of a wider political conflict involving Russia's 2014
annexation of the Crimea and its military intervention in Ukraine, as well as
Ukraine's desire to join the European Union and NATO.[9][10] This schism is
reminiscent of the Moscow–Constantinople schism of 1996 over canonical
jurisdiction over Estonia, which was however resolved after less than three
months.[11]

Contents

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Further reading Background[edit]
Further information: History of Christianity in Ukraine and History of the
Russian Orthodox Church
History of Eastern Orthodoxy in Ukraine[edit]

Kievan Rus' in the 11th century

After the baptism of Rus'[note 2] these lands were under the control of the
Metropolitan of Kiev. Among the 24 metropolitans who held the throne
before the Mongol invasion, only two were of local origin and the rest were
Greek. Usually, they were appointed by Constantinople and were not
chosen by the bishops of their dioceses, as it should be done according to
the canon.[12] After the Mongol invasion, the southern part of Rus' was
heavily devastated and the disintegration of Kievan Rus' accelerated.
Metropolitan Kirill III, who occupied the throne for 30 years, spent almost all
of his time in the lands of Vladimir-Suzdal Rus' and visited Kiev only twice,
although earlier he had come from Galicia and had been nominated for the
post of Metropolitan by the prince Daniel of Galicia.[13] After the new Mongol
raid in 1299, Metropolitan Maksim finally moved to Vladimir in the north,
and did not even leave a bishop behind. In 1303 a new cathedra was
created for south-west Rus' in Galicia and the new Metropolitan was
consecrated by Constantinople,[14] but its existence ended in 1355 after the
Galicia–Volhynia Wars. In 1325, Metropolitan Peter moved to Moscow, thus
greatly contributing to the rise of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which
gradually conquered other Russian principalities in the northeast of the
former Kievan Rus'. Another part of Kievan Rus' gradually came under the
rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, which
entered into rivalry with Moscow. In particular, the Grand Dukes of Lithuania
sought from Constantinople a separate Metropolitan for the Orthodox who
lived in their lands. Although the Metropolitan in Moscow continued to retain
the title of "Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus'", he could not rule the
Orthodox outside the borders of the Grand Duchy of Moscow.
Constantinople twice agreed to create a separate Metropolitan for
Lithuania, but these decisions were not permanent, Constantinople being
inclined to maintain a single church government on the lands of the former
Kievan Rus'.[15]
Main article: 15th-16th century Moscow–Constantinople schism
In 1439, Constantinople entered into union with the Roman Catholic
Church. In Moscow, this decision was rejected outright, and Metropolitan
Isidor, consecrated by Constantinople, was accused in heresy, imprisoned,
and later expelled.[16] In 1448, the council of north-eastern Russian clergy in
Moscow, at the behest of prince Vasily II of Moscow, elected Jonah the
Metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' without the consent of the Patriarch of
Constantinople. In 1469 Patriarch Dionysius I stated that Constantinople
would not recognize any metropolitan ordained without its blessing.[17]
Meanwhile, the metropolis of Kiev (de facto in Novogrudok) stayed under
the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Moscow's de
facto independence from Constantinople remained unrecognized until 1589
when Patriarch of Constantinople Jeremiah II approved the creation of a
new, fifth Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. This decision was finally
confirmed by the four older Patriarchs in 1593.[18]
The Patriarch of Moscow became the head of "all Russia and Northern
countries",[19][d] and Chernihiv (now in Ukraine) was one of his dioceses.[20]
However, he had no power among the Orthodox bishops of the Polish–
Lithuanian Commonwealth, who remained under the rule of Constantinople.
At the same time, the Orthodox hierarchs of those lands were inclined to
the Union with Rome, despite the resistance of their parishes, who formed
the Orthodox brotherhoods (or fraternities) to keep their identity. On the way
from Moscow, Jeremiah II visited the lands of present-day Ukraine and
committed an unprecedented act, granting Stauropegia (direct
subordination to the Patriarch) to many Orthodox brotherhoods. This
provoked the anger of the local bishops and soon the Union of Brest was
proclaimed, which was supported by the majority of the Orthodox bishops of
the Commonwealth, including Metropolitan Michail Rogoza. Officially, the
Orthodox (but not the Eastern Catholic) Metropolis of Kiev in the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth was eliminated and re-established only in 1620,
in subsequent co-existence with Uniate Metropolis. That led to sharp
conflict and numerous revolts culminating in the Khmelnytsky uprising.[21]
In 1654, Russia entered the war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth;
it quickly occupied, for a while, the lands of present Belarus, and gained
some power over the Hetmanate pursuant to the Pereyaslav Agreement
(1654). The official title of Patriarch Nikon of Moscow was "Patriarch of
Moscow and all Greater, Lesser, and White Russia". However, the
Metropolitan of Kiev Sylvester Kossov had managed to defend his
independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. The Moscow government,
which needed the support of the Orthodox clergy, postponed the resolution
of this issue.[21]
In 1686, Ecumenical Patriarch Dionysius IV approved the new Metropolitan
of Kiev, Gedeon Chetvertinsky, who would be ordained by the Moscow
Patriarchate and thus transferred, albeit with certain qualifications, a part of
the Kiev ecclesiastical province to the jurisdiction of Patriarchate of Moscow
(the Russian Orthodox Church).[21]
In the 1924 Tomos (decree) of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which granted
independence to the Polish Orthodox Church, the previous transfer of the
Kyivan Church to the jurisdiction of Moscow (in 1685–1686) was declared
uncanonical.[22] In addition, the decree pointed out that the conditions of the
synodal "Act" of 1686 – which specified that the Russian Orthodox Church
was only to consecrate the Metropolitan of Kiev – were never adhered to by
the Patriarchate of Moscow.[23]
Post-Cold War, claims of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and
Russkiy Mir[edit]
The historical rivalry between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Russian
Orthodox Church intensified after the Cold War. Indeed, after the Cold War,
Moscow and Constantinople both emerged as "two centers of Orthodox
power".[24]
Claims of the Ecumenical Patriarchate[edit]
The Patriarchate of Constantinople claims that:[24][e]
1. The [Ecumenical] Patriarch had the right to establish a court of final
appeal for any case from anywhere in the Orthodox world.
2. The [Ecumenical] Patriarch had the exclusive right to summon the other
Patriarchs and heads of Autocephalous Churches to a joint meeting of all of
them.
3. The [Ecumenical] Patriarch has jurisdiction, ecclesiastical authority over
Orthodox Christians who are outside the territory of the local Orthodox
Churches, the so-called diaspora.
4. No new "Autocephalous" Church can come into being without the
consent of the Patriarch of Constantinople; this consent should express the
consensus of the local Orthodox Churches.
Russkiy Mir[edit]
Main article: Russian World
Russkiy Mir (literally "Russian world") is an ideology promoted by many in
the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church. "This ideology, concocted
as a reaction to the loss of Russian control over Ukraine and Belarus after
the fall of the Soviet Union, seeks to assert a spiritual and cultural unity of
the peoples descended from the Kievan Rus, presumably under Russian
leadership."[25][26] Patriarch Kiril of Moscow also shares this ideology; for the
Russian Orthodox Church, the Russkiy Mir is also "a spiritual concept, a
reminder that through the baptism of Rus, God consecrated these people to
the task of building a Holy Rus."[27]
On 31 January 2019, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow declared concerning the
religious relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and Ukraine:
"Ukraine is not on the periphery of our church. We call Kiev 'the mother of
all Russian cities.' For us Kiev is what Jerusalem is for many. Russian
Orthodoxy began there, so under no circumstances can we abandon this
historical and spiritual relationship. The whole unity of our Local Church is
based on these spiritual ties."[28][29]
1996 schism over Estonia[edit]
Main article: 1996 Moscow–Constantinople schism
The Moscow–Constantinople schism of 1996 began on 23 February 1996,
when the Russian Orthodox Church severed full communion with the
Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople,[30] and ended on 16 May 1996
when the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate
reached an agreement establishing parallel jurisdictions.[31][32] The
excommunication was in response to the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
decision on 20 February 1996 to reestablish an autonomous Orthodox
church in Estonia under the Ecumenical Patriarchate's jurisdiction.[33][34][35]
The 1996 schism has similarities with the schism of October 2018: both
schisms were caused by a dispute between the Russian Orthodox Church
and the Ecumenical Patriarchate concerning the canonical jurisdiction over
a territory in Eastern Europe over which the Russian Orthodox Church
claimed to have the exclusive canonical jurisdiction, such territory being a
part of the former Soviet Union, which upon its collapse had become an
independent state (Ukraine in 2018, Estonia in 1996). The break of
communion in 1996 was made by Moscow unilaterally, as in 2018.[11]
September 2018: Russian Orthodox synod's
"retaliatory measures" and the aftermath[edit]
Further information: Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine
§ Ecumenical Patriarch's legates in Ukraine and reactions of the Russian
Orthodox Church
On 14 September 2018, in response to the appointment of two exarchs
(deputies of the Ecumenical Patriarch) in Ukraine, Daniel (Zelinsky) [ru] and
Hilarion (Rudnyk), and in response to the Ecumenical Patriarchate's plans
to grant autocephalous status to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the Holy
Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church held an extraordinary session to
take "retaliatory measures" and decided:[6][7]
1. To suspend the liturgical prayerful commemoration of Patriarch
Bartholomew of Constantinople.
2. To suspend concelebration with hierarchs of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople.
3. To suspend the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in all
Episcopal Assemblies, theological dialogues, multilateral commissions and
other structures chaired or co-chaired by representatives of the Patriarchate
of Constantinople.
4. To adopt a statement of the Holy Synod concerning the uncanonical
actions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Ukraine.
A statement was released the same day explaining the situation and the
sanctions taken to protest against the Ecumenical Patriarch's behavior.[36]
On the same day, Metropolitan Hilarion clarified the situation in an
interview, stating that this decision is not a rupture of Eucharistic
communion and does not concern the laity, but nonetheless added:[37]
But we refuse to concelebrate with hierarchs of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople since every time they mention the name of their Patriarch
during the liturgy while we have suspended it. [...]
We do not think, of course, that all this will finally shut the door for dialogue,
but our today's decision is a signal to the Patriarchate of Constantinople
that if the actions of this kind continue, we will have to break the Eucharistic
communion entirely. [...]
[A]fter the breaking-off of the Eucharistic communion, at least a half of this
300-million-strong population will no longer recognize him as even the first
among equals.
On 23 September 2018 Patriarch Bartholomew, during a Divine Liturgy he
was celebrating in the Saint Fokas Orthodox Church declared that he "had
sent a message that Ukraine would receive autocephaly as soon as
possible, since it is entitled to it"[38][39]
On 30 September 2018, in an interview to Izvestia Daily published on the
official website of the Moscow Patriarchate's Department for External
Church Relations, Metropolitan Hilarion commented: "The Russian Church
does not need to fear isolation. If Constantinople continues its anti-
canonical actions, it will place itself outside the canonical space, outside the
understanding of church order that distinguishes the Orthodox Church."[40]
On 2 October, Patriarch Kirill of the ROC sent a letter to all the
autocephalous Orthodox churches to ask them to hold a "Pan-Orthodox
discussion" concerning the question of Ukraine's autocephaly.[41][42][43][44]
On 5 October, the Metropolitan Pavel, head of the Belarusian Orthodox
Church (exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church), announced there
would be a meeting of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church on
15 October in Minsk. He said that "The situation with the Orthodox Church
in Ukraine will be on the agenda of the meeting".[45] This meeting had been
announced previously on 7 January 2018 and was at the time "most likely
to take place in mid October."[46]
On 9 October, Metropolitan Hilarion, chairman of the Department of
External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church warned that "if
the project for Ukrainian autocephaly is carried through, it will mean a tragic
and possibly irretrievable schism of the whole Orthodoxy." He added that
ignoring sacred canons shakes up the whole system of the church
organism. Schismatics in other Local Churches are well aware that if
autocephaly is given to the Ukrainian schismatics, it will be possible to
repeat the same scenario anywhere. That is why we state that autocephaly
in Ukraine will not be "the healing of the schism" but its legalization and
encouragement.[47]
Autocephaly of the Eastern Orthodox church in
Ukraine[edit]
Main articles: Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and
Unification council of the Orthodox churches of Ukraine
On 11 October 2018 the synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate announced
that it would grant autocephaly to the "Church of Ukraine" in the future. In
the same decision the Holy synod announced that it will immediately:
reestablish a stauropegion (church body ruled directly by the Ecumenical
Patriarch[48]) in Kiev, revoke the legal binding of the letter of 1686,[c][note 1] and
lift the excommunications which affected clergy and faithful of two Ukrainian
Orthodox churches (the UOC-KP and the UAOC).[49] Those two churches,
the UOC-KP and the UAOC, were competing with the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) and were considered
"schismatics" (illegally segregated groups) by the Patriarchate of
Moscow,[4][50][51][52] as well as by the other Orthodox churches.[53][54] This
decision led the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church to break full
communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate on 15 October 2018, which
marked the beginning of the 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism.[55][56]
Support for the grant of autocephaly had been expressed by the Ukrainian
President and the Verkhovna Rada in June 2018,[57] and before that by the
Rada in June 2016.[58]
On 15 December 2018, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) was formed
after a unification council between the UAOC, the UOC-KP, and two
bishops of the UOC-MP;[citation needed] Epiphanius was elected primate of the
OCU during this unification council.[59][60] Most of the hierarchs of the UOC-
MP ignored the council and over half of them had sent invites back to the
Ecumenical Patriarch.[61][62][63]

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (left) handing the tomos of autocephaly to

Metropolitan Epiphanius (right), January 6, 2019
On 5 January 2019, Bartholomew I, the Ecumenical Patriarch of
Constantinople, signed the official decree (tomos) that granted autocephaly
(independence) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and officially established
the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. On 6 January, after a Liturgy celebrated
by Metropolitan Epiphanius and Patriarch Bartholomew, Partriarch
Bartholomew read the tomos of the OCU and then gave it to Metropolitan
Epiphanius.[64][65] On 8 January 2019, the tomos was brought back to
Istanbul so that all the members of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate could sign the tomos.[66] The tomos was signed by all members
of the Holy synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on 9 January
2018.[67][68][69][70] The tomos, signed by all members of the Holy synod of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate, was brought back to Ukraine on the morning of 10
January 2019.[71][72][73][74]
Right after the granting of the tomos of autocephaly to the OCU (6 January
2019), a leadership conflict arose within the OCU.[75]
Break of communion with the Ecumenical
Patriarchate by the Russian Orthodox Church[edit]
On 15 October 2018, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church,
meeting in Minsk, decided to cut all ties with the Constantinople
Patriarchate. This decision forbade for any member of the ROC (both clergy
and laity) joint participation in all sacraments, including communion,
baptism, and marriage, at any church worldwide controlled by
Constantinople.[3][4] At the time of the schism, the Russian Orthodox Church
had over 150 million followers, more than half of all Eastern Orthodox
Christians.[76] The same day, after the synod, a briefing for journalists was
given by Metropolitan Hilarion, chairman of the Department of External
Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, in which he declared
that "the decision on complete cessation of the Eucharistic communion with
the Patriarchate of Constantinople was taken today."[77]
The break of communion was done in response to a decision of the Holy
synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on 11 October 2018 which confirmed
the intention of moving towards granting autocephaly (independence) to the
Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and to immediately: reestablish a
stauropegion (church body ruled directly by the Ecumenical Patriarch[48]) in
Kiev, revoke the legal binding of the letter of 1686,[c][note 1] and lift the
excommunications which affected clergy and faithful of two Ukrainian
Orthodox churches.[49][78] Those two churches, the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev
Patriarchate (UOC-KP), were competing with the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) and were considered
"schismatics" (illegally segregated groups) by the Patriarchate of
Moscow,[4][50][51][52] as well as by the other Orthodox churches.[53][54]
Doctor in theology Cyrill Govorun [uk] of the UOC-MP argued that the break
of communion between the churches of Moscow and Constantinople did not
constitute a real schism (like the schism of 1054), but a "slit".[79] The
American Protestant magazine Christianity Today called the break of
communion between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Russian
Orthodox Church the "biggest schism since 1054" and "the biggest
Christian schism since the Protestant Reformation"[80]
On 17 October, Metropolitan Hilarion, head of the Moscow Patriarchate
Department for External Church Relations, was interviewed by the BBC
Russian Service; this interview was published on the official website of the
Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church
the very same day. Hilarion declared: "As of today, we have very clearly
stated: the fact that the Patriarchate of Constantinople has recognized a
schismatic structure means for us that Constantinople itself is now in
schism. It has identified itself with a schism. Accordingly, we cannot have
the full Eucharistic communion with it." Hilarion added that when members
of the Russian Orthodox of Moscow Patriarchate pay visits to the
monasteries on Mount Athos, they cannot participate in the sacraments (for
example, receive communion), and promised punishment to any priests
who participate in the divine services together with the local clergy. It is
known that Russia makes large donations to the monasteries on Athos (the
sum of $200 million was announced by a source close to the Moscow
Patriarchate[81] and confirmed by Hilarion). Hilarion hinted that "[h]istory
shows that when Athos is concerned over something, the monasteries on
the Holy Mountain do find ways to inform the Patriarch of Constantinople
about it" and called on Russian businessmen to switch donations to
Russian sacred places.[82][83]
On 29 December, during an interview to the channel Russia-24,
Metropolitan Hilarion declared the Patriarch of Moscow had informed during
the last meeting of the Supreme Diocesan Assembly of Moscow that that
faithfuls of the ROC could communiate in the territory of the Mount Athos,
but only in the Saint Panteleimon Monastery.[84] The territory of the Mount
Athos is under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Hilarion
declared the Saint Panteleimon Monastery "belongs to the Constantinople
Church, as do all monasteries on Mt. Athos, but we know that it was built
with Russian money by Russian monks and houses a Russian and
Ukrainian monastic brotherhood, all rites are performed in a Slavic
language and the laity who come there may take communion in it ... But not
in other Athos monasteries".[84][85][86][87]
Further escalation[edit]
Further information: Reactions of the Eastern Orthodox churches to the
2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism § Russian Orthodox Church and the
Ecumenical Patriarchate
Russian priests in Turkey[edit]
On 10 November 2018, Metropolitan Hilarion, heads of the Moscow
Patriarchate’s Office for External Relations said during a TV program on
Russia-24 that the ROC had no choice but to "send priests of the Russian
Orthodox Church" to Turkey, "[a]nd this will continue as long as the
Patriarch of Constantinople is in schism". He said the ROC did not do so
before because Turkey is a territory of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but that
the ROC now does because the Ecumenical Patriarchate is in schism.[88][89]
On 12 November 2018, it was reported that the first priest was sent by
Patriarch Kirill to Istanbul (Turkey) "at the request of Russian believers who
live in Turkey".[90] On the same day, the Russian Orthodox Church
announced a divine liturgy had been held on 11 November in Istanbul and
would be regularly held. The ROC also reported the words of the priest who
had led the divine liturgy who said that after the 15 October 2018 decision
of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, numerous Russian Orthodox believers of
Turkey had asked the Moscow Patriarchate to provide them with "pastoral
care".[91] On 14 December the Ecumenical Patriarchate published an
announce of Metropolitan Sotirios of Pisidia in which he condemned the
plans of the ROC priest to celebrate a Divine Liturgy in Belek (Turkey) with
the help of the Russian consulate and without the permission of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate, which has canonical jurisdiction over this
territory.[92]
On 30 December, Interfax reported that the ROC was building a church on
the territory of the embassy of Russia in Ankara.[93]
Dissolution of the AROCWE[edit]
Main article: Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox churches in Western Europe
§ Dissolution and its aftermath
On 27 November 2018 the Ecumenical Patriarchate decided to dissolve the
Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox churches in Western Europe (AROCWE)
"thereby entrusting its faithful to the Hierarchs of the Ecumenical Throne in
Europe".[94][95][96] ROC officials responded with a reminder of the 2003
proposal of Alexy II to move to the Moscow Patriarchate.[97] This decision
was made without any official requests from the hierarchs of the diocese
and caused confusion.[98] On 15 December Pastoral Assembly of AROCWE
decided to call an extraordinary General Assembly, scheduled for 23
February 2019. This General Assembly was to discuss the decision of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate to dissolve the AROCWE.[99]
Creation of the PEWE and the PESEA[edit]
On 26 November 2018, Metropolitan Hilarion declared that the ROC would
send a priest in South Korea and declared the plans "to create a full-fledged
parish", because until the 1950s in Korea was a Russian Spiritual Mission
whose faithful were in the 1950s transferred to the Ecumenical
Patriarchate's jurisdiction. The priest was scheduled to be sent by the end
of the year.[100]
On 28 December 2018, in response to the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
actions in Ukraine,[101] the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church
decided to create the Patriarchal Exarchate in Western Europe (PEWE), the
Spanish-Portuguese diocese, as well as the Patriarchal Exarchate in South-
East Asia (PESEA).[102][103][104][105][106][107] On the same day, in an interview with
Russia-24 channel,[108] Metropolitan Hilarion, head of the Synodal
Department for External Church Relations of the ROC, declared the ROC
"will now act as if they [Constantinople] do not exist at all because our
purpose is missionary, our task is to educate, we are creating these
structures for ministerial care about our flock, there can be no such
deterring factors here", and that the ROC will take charge of the Orthodox
faithfuls of its diaspora instead of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[109][110]
7 January 2019 Christmas liturgy[edit]
On 7 January 2019, during the festive Christmas liturgy in the Cathedral of
Christ the Savior, Patriarch Kirill of the ROC did not mention a single name
of the primates of other local Orthodox Churches, with whom the ROC is in
canonical communion. Such commemoration[note 3] is demanded by a church
charter and is a centuries-old tradition. In contrast to this, the head of the
newly created Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epiphanius,
solemnly listed the names of all the primates, including the "Most Holy
Patriarch of Russia Kirill".[111][112][113] Epiphanius later told he had done this
after the Ecumenical Patriarch had instructed him to do so, and that Filaret
had instructed him (Epiphanius) not to mention Kirill.[75]
Arrest of bishop Guedeon[edit]
On 13 February 2019, bishop Guedeon (Kharon) [ru] of the UOC-MP, who
had went to the United States to complain about pressures made by the
Ukrainian state against the UOC-MP, was arrested by the SBU when he
came back to the Kiev airport for "promoting Russia’s military aggression
against the country and holding a second passport, reportedly
American."[114][115][116] On 14 February, after having been interrogated during
the night of 13 February, the bishop was sent back to the Frankfurt airport
where he came from.[114][117] Guedeon cannot enter on the territory of Ukraine
for three years as he is being charged of "anti-Ukrainian activities". The
bishop has also been stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship.[114][117][118] On 19
September 2019, the District Administrative Court of Kiev [uk] overturned
this deprivation of citizenship.[119][120]
Further protestations by the ROC[edit]
On 26 February, during the first 2019 session of the Holy Synod of the
Moscow Patriarchate,[121] the Holy synod adopted a statement saying that
the granting of the tomos by the Ecumenical Patriarchate "to the so-called
"Orthodox church of Ukraine," created artificially by a merger of two
schismatic organizations, deepened the division between Orthodox
Christians in Ukraine and worsened ever more considerably the inter-
confessional relations." The ROC also blamed the action of the Ukrainian
parliament regarding the UOC-MP.[122][123]
On 7 October 2019, the ROC officialy released a comments by the
Secretariat of the Biblical and Theological Synodal Commission of the
Russian Orthodox Church. "The document discusses the problems of
apostolic succession among schismatic «hierarchs», the limits of
application of the oikonomia principle, issues of the lack of legitimacy of the
OCU, the distortion of the role of the first bishop in the Orthodox Church,
and explains the suspension of Eucharistic communion."[124][125]
On 17 October 2019, the Holy synod of the ROC reacted to the anounce
that the Church of Greece had recognized the OCU. The Holy Synod
stated: "If the Ukrainian schism is really recognized by the Greek Orthodox
Church and its Primate — either in the form of a joint service, liturgical
commemoration of the leader of the schism or sending official letters to
them — it will be a sad testimony to the deepening division in the family of
local Orthodox Churches. [...] We cease the prayer and Eucharistic
communion with those bishops of the Greek Church who have entered or
will enter into communion with representatives of the Ukrainian non-
canonical schismatic communities. [...] the Holy Synod of the Russian
Orthodox Church authorizes his Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all
Russia to stop the commemoration of the name of His Beatitude
Archbishop of Athens and the entire Greece in the diptychs if the Primate of
the Greek Church begins to commemorate the head of one of the Ukrainian
schismatic groups during divine services or takes other actions indicating
the recognition of the Ukrainian schism."[126][127][128] On the same day, the ROC
announced that its Holy Synod would not be blessing pilgrimages to Greek
dioceses whose hierarchs are in communion with representatives of the
OCU.[129][130]
Reactions[edit]
International community[edit]
See also: Orthodox Church of Ukraine § Reactions from states
• Russia: On 12 October 2018, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, "held
an operational meeting with the permanent members of the Security
Council" (the Security Council of Russia) that discussed "a wide range
of domestic and foreign policy issues, including the situation around
the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine", according to Putin's press
secretary Dmitry Peskov.[131][132] On 31 January 2019, concerning
Ukraine Putin declared that the Russian authorities "consider any
 interference in church affairs absolutely unacceptable." Putin added:
"We have respected and will respect the independence of church
affairs, especially in a neighboring sovereign country. And yet we
reserve the right to respond and do all we can to protect human
rights, including the right to freedom of religion".[133]
• Ukraine: Ukraine's president, Petro Poroshenko, enthusiastically
welcomed Constantinople's October decision,[134][135] and presented the
Ukrainian Church's independence as part of Ukraine's wider conflict
with Russia, and Ukraine's desire to integrate with the West by joining
the European Union and NATO.[9][10][136] On 28 November 2018,
Ukrainian President Poroshenko declared that the Kerch Strait
incident was provoked by Russia in order to force Ukraine to declare
martial law and therefore to prevent Ukraine from receiving its tomos
of autocephaly.[137][138]
• United States: The Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, urged all sides to
respect the independence of "Ukraine's Orthodox community",
reiterating the United States' "strong support for religious freedom and
the freedom of members of religious groups".[139]
• Belarus: the President of Belarus, the country in which the synod of the
Russian Orthodox Church took place, met members of the synod of
the Russian Orthodox Church on 15 October 2018 after the ROC's
decision to sever communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[140][141]
• Montenegro: On 21 December 2018, the Montenegrin President said the
State of Montenegro had the responsibility to consolidate the
autocephaly of the unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox
Church.[142][143][144] On 11 June 2019, Montenegrin President said he
hoped for a "Ukrainian scenario" so that the Montenegrin Church
could be recognized as autocephalous.[145]
Reactions of the Eastern Orthodox churches[edit]
Main article: Reactions of the Eastern Orthodox churches to the 2018
Moscow–Constantinople schism
Numerous Orthodox churches took position concerning the question of the
canonical jurisdiction over Ukraine, whether before or after this schism.
Canonical issues[edit]
The schism has its root in a dispute over who between the Patriarchate of
Moscow and the Patriarchate of Constantinople has canonical jurisdiction
over the See of Kyiv (Kiev) and, therefore, which patriarchate has canonical
jurisdiction over the territory of Ukraine. "[T]he principal argument proposed
[concerning the granting of the ecclesiastical status of autocephaly to
Ukraine by the Ecumenical Patriarchate] is that Ukraine "constitutes the
canonical territory of the Patriarchate of Moscow" and that, consequently,
such an act on the part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate would comprise an
"intervention" into a foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction."[23] The Patriarchate of
Moscow's claim of canonical jurisdiction is based mostly on two documents:
the Patriarchal and Synodal "Act" or "Letter of Issue" of 1686, and a 1686
Patriarchal Letter to the Kings of Russia. Both those documents are
reproduced in the "Appendix" section of a study published by the
Ecumenical Patriarch called The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian
Church – The Documents Speak.[23] The Church of Constantinople claims
the Church of Constantinople has canonical jurisdiction over the See of Kyiv
and that the documents upon which the Russian Orthodox Church bases its
claim of jurisdiction over said See of Kyiv do not support the ROC's claim.
On 1 July 2018, the Patriarch Bartholomew said that Constantinople was
the Mother church of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and declared that
Constantinople never ceded the territory of Ukraine to anyone by means of
some ecclesiastical Act, but only granted to the Patriarch of Moscow the
right of ordination or transfer of the Metropolitan of Kiev on the condition
that the Metropolitan of Kiev should be elected by a Clergy-Laity Congress
and commemorate the Ecumenical Patriarch. [It is written] in the Tomos of
autocephaly, which was granted by the Mother Church [Constantinople] to
the Church of Poland: "... original separation from our Throne of the
Metropolis of Kiev and of the two Orthodox churches of Lithuania and
Poland, which depend on it, and their annexation to the Holy Church of
Moscow, in no way occurred according to the binding canonical regulations,
nor was the agreement respected concerning the full ecclesial
independence of the Metropolitan of Kiev, who bears the title of Exarch of
the Ecumenical Throne..."[146]
The ROC considers this argument "groundles[s]".[36]
Ecumenical Patriarchate's claims[edit]
The Ecumenical Patriarchate issued a document authored by various
clerics and theologians called The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian
Church – The Documents Speak.[23] This document analyzes canonical
historic documents (namely the Patriarchal and Synodal "Act" or "Letter of
Issue" of 1686 and the 1686 Patriarchal Letter to the Kings of Russia) to
see if the claim over the See of Kyiv by the Patriarchate of Moscow is
canonical or not.[f]
The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church concludes that:[23]
Through the autocratic abolition of the commemoration of the Ecumenical
Patriarch by each Metropolitan of Kyiv, the de jure dependence of the
Metropolis of Kyiv (and the Church of Ukraine) on the Ecumenical
Patriarchate was arbitrarily rendered an annexation and amalgamation of
Ukraine to the Patriarchate of Moscow.
All these events took place in a period when the Ecumenical Throne was in
deep turmoil and incapable "on account of the circumstances of the time to
raise its voice against such capricious actions" [...] The Church of Ukraine
never ceased to constitute de jure canonical territory of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate.[...]
The Ecumenical Patriarchate was always aware of this despite the fact that,
"on account of the circumstances of the time", it tolerated the arbitrary
actions by the Patriarchate of Moscow. [...]
The Ecumenical Patriarchate is entitled and obliged to assume the
appropriate maternal care for the Church of Ukraine in every situation
where this is deemed necessary.
Constantin Vetochnikov, two PhD in theology, PhD in history and member
of the Collège de France,[154] who participated in Augustus 2016 to the 23rd
International Congress of Byzantine Studies in Belgrade where he made a
report on the subject of the transfer of the See of Kyiv,[155] and who helped
the Ecumenical Patriarchate on The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian
Church,[156] declared on 27 December 2016 that the transfer of the See of
Kyiv from the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the authority of the
Russian Orthodox Church "never took place".[157]
Later, Vetoshnikov made an analysis of the arguments of the Russian
Orthodox Church. He pointed out that, according to the strict dogmatic
approach (akribeia, ἀκρίβεια), the whole territory of Russia was originally
subjected to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. After Muscovy had gone into
schism in the 15th century, it received autocephaly according to a more
flexible approach (oikonomia, οἰκονομία) to heal this schism. The
Metropolitan of Kiev at the same time remained within the jurisdiction of
Constantinople. Then, also according to the oikonomia approach, the right
to ordain Metropolitans of Kiev was transferred to the Patriarch of Moscow.
This was not a change in the boundaries of the Moscow Patriarchate
eparchy, as it was issued by a document of a lower level (ekdosis,
ἐκδόσεως), which was used for various temporary solutions. For pastoral
reasons, the Ecumenical Patriarchate subsequently did not assert its rights
to this territory. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a split
among the Orthodox of Ukraine, and the Russian Church for 30 years failed
to overcome this split. And now, also for pastoral reasons, the Ecumenical
Patriarchate was forced to act in accordance with the principle of akribeia,
and so it decided to abolish the right to ordain Metropolitans of Kiev which
had been earlier transferred to the Moscow Patriarchate in accordance with
oikonomia.[158][159]
Arguments against the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
claims[edit]
On 20 August 2018, the pro-Moscow anonymous site Union of Orthodox
Journalists[160] analysed the Ecumenical Patriarchate's claim of jurisdiction
over Ukraine and concluded the See of Kyiv had been transferred to the
Patriarchate of Moscow. They added that even if the Ecumenical
Patriarchate decided to abrogate the 1686 transfer, the territory covered in
1686 by the See of Kyiv's territory was "a far cry from the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of today" and covered less than half of Ukraine's current
territory.[161]
In its 15 October 2018 official statement, the Russian Orthodox Church
gave counterarguments to the Ecumenical Patriarch's arguments.[50]
Metropolitan Hilarion, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate's Department
for External Church Relations, declared in an interview that
Constantinople's plan to "grant Autocephaly to a part of the Russian
Orthodox Church [...] that once was subordinate to Constantinople [...] runs
counter to historic truth". His argument is that the entire territory of Ukraine
has not been under Constantinople's jurisdiction for 300 years because the
Kiev metropolis that was incorporated into the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686
was much smaller (it did not include Donbass, Odessa and some other
regions) and therefore does not coincide with the present-day territory of
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[162] A similar argument was given on 13
November in a live phone interview to Radio Liberty by the Head of the
Information and Education Department of the UOC-MP, Archbishop
Clement.[163]
Archbishop Clement of the UOC-MP considers that "to revoke the letter on
the transfer of the Kiev Metropolis in 1686 is the same as to cancel the
decisions of the Ecumenical Councils of the 4th or 7th centuries."[164][165]
On 8 November 2018 the Union of Orthodox Journalists analyzed the same
documents as The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church (the
Patriarchal and Synodal "Act" or "Letter of Issue" of 1686 and the 1686
Patriarchal Letter to the Kings of Russia) and again concluded that the See
of Kiev had been "completely transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian
Church in 1686".[166]
Possibility of a pan-Orthodox synaxis on the question of
Ukraine[edit]
The possibility of a pan-Orthodox synaxis (consultative assembly or
conference) has been raised before and after the official break of
communion.
On 29 September 2018, Alexander Volkov [ru], the press secretary of the
Patriarch of Moscow, declared that the local Orthodox churches may initiate
a pan-Orthodox Synaxis on the issue of granting autocephaly to the Church
in Ukraine, however the problem was that the convening such a synaxis is
"a prerogative of the First among the Equals, that is, the Ecumenical
Patriarch". Volkov noted that
Others [sic] forms [of pan-Orthodox synaxis] exist, too [...]
There are the elders of the Church who can take this task upon themselves.
[...] If you look at the Diptychs [the table specifying the order of
commemorating the Primates of Orthodox Churches – TASS], the next in
line [after the Ecumenical Patriarch – TASS] is the Greek Orthodox
Patriarch of Alexandria. Or else, there is the so-called synaxis of the eldest
Patriarchs– of Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch[167]
On 7 November, answering the question "Who could, for instance, convene
a Pan-Orthodox Council and chair it?", Metropolitan Hilarion declared in an
interview, which was published on the official website of the ROC
Department for External Church Relations, that it was "obvious" that the
Ecumenical Patriarch could not chair a Pan-Orthodox Council since "the
most important problems in the Orthodox world are linked with precisely his
[Ecumenical Patriarch] anti-canonical activity".[168]
On 4 December, in an interview, when asked about the fact that convoking
a pan-Orthodox council was "according to the canons" a prerogative of the
Ecumenical Patriarch, Metropolitan Hilarion replied:
which canons ? [...] I believe those canons do not exist, the Ecumenical
councils were not convoked by the Ecumenical Patriarch, they were
convoked by the emperor. The fact the Patriarch of Constantinople has
been given the right to convey councils in the 20th century is the result of a
consensus reached by the local Orthodox churches. It is not at a personal
initiative that the council is convoked, but only with the consent of all the
local churches. We had, until recently, the first among equals, that is the
Patriarch of Constantinople, who convoked the councils in the name [...] of
the local Orthodox churches. Now, the unifying element is no more the
Patriarchate of Constantinople which, so to speak, autodestroyed itself. It is
its decision. [...] We have to think about the future: who will convoke the
councils, will it be the Patriarch of Alexandria, or another Patriarch, or else
we will generally not have a council? Whatever. The Patriarch of
Constantinople, as long as he stays in schism, even if he convokes a
council the Russian Orthodox Church will not take part in it.[169]
In an interview published on 21 February 2019 in the Serbian magazine
Politika,[170] the Ecumenical Patriarch said: "As for the provision of
autocephaly with the consent of other Orthodox Churches, this did not
happen, because it is not a tradition in our Church. All the Tomoses of the
autocephaly that were granted to the newly created autocephalous
churches (Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Athens, Warsaw,
Tirana and Presov) were provided by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and this
was not preceded by any agreement or negotiation at the Pan-Orthodox
level."[171]
Thus far, Patriarch John X of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of
Antioch,[172][173] Patriarch Irinej of the Serbian Orthodox Church,[173]
Archbishop Chrysostomos II of the Church of Cyprus,[174] the Polish
Orthodox Church primate Metropolitan Sawa (Hrycuniak),[175] the Orthodox
Church in America primate Metropolitan Tikhon,[note 4][176] Archbishop
Anastasios, primate of the Albanian Orthodox Church,[177][178][179][180][181] three
hierarchs of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitans Gabriel of
Lovech, John of Varna and Veliki Preslav, and Daniel of Vedin),[182] and the
holy synod of the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia[183]
have expressed their desire for a pan-Orthodox synaxis or pan-Orthodox
council over the question of Ukraine in various statements. On 12
November 2018, the synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church published a
communiqué in which they requested the convocation of a Pan-Orthodox
Synod.[184][185]
In 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch declared, in a letter to Patriarch John X
of Antioch, that he (the Ecumenical Patriarch) would not convene a pan-
Orthodox council on the question of Ukraine.[186][187][188]
See also[edit]
Christianity
portal
Eastern Orthodoxy
• Bulgarian schism
• 15th-16th century Moscow–Constantinople schism
• 1996 Moscow–Constantinople schism
• Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine
• Unification council of the Orthodox churches of Ukraine
• Phyletism
Politics
• Russian irredentism
• Russian nationalism
• Ukrainian nationalism
Notes[edit]
Explanatory notes
1 ^ Jump up to: a
 b c d This letter led to the Russian Orthodox Church establishing de
facto its jurisdiction over the Ukrainian Orthodox church.
2 ^ Rus' is a region inhabited by East Slavs who were once ruled by princes from the
Rurik dynasty. This term refers to the Middle Ages, in contrast to the more
recent (15th century) term "Russia". See also: Names of Rus', Russia and
Ruthenia.
3 ^ In Greek, it is called "diptych".
4 ^ Autocephaly for the Orthodox Church in America was granted by the Russian
Orthodox Church in 1970 and is not yet fully recognized by all the other
Orthodox churches (including the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople).
Complementary information
a ^ Russian: Раскол между РПЦ и Константинопольским; Ukrainian: Розкол між
РПЦ і Константинопольським, transl. ROC–Constantinople split
b ^ Russian: Раскол Православной церкви; Ukrainian: Розкол Православної
церкви, transl. split of the Orthodox Church.
c ^ Jump up to: a
 b c The letter can be found here: "Patriarchal Letter to the Kings of
Russia", THE ECUMENICAL THRONE AND THE CHURCH OF UKRAINE –
The Documents Speak (September 2018), pp. 35–39 (English translation
based on the text published in: Собрание государственных грамот и
договоров, хранящихся в государственной коллегии иностранных дел
[Collection of state documents and treaties kept in the Collegium of Foreign
Affairs], Part Four, Moscow, 1826, 514–517).
d ^ In Russian: Патриарх Московский и всея России и северных стран
e ^ See also this article on the OrthodoxWiki.
f ^ The date of publication of The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church –
The Documents Speak is unknown, but the earliest online version[citation needed] can
be found on 28 September 2018 on the website of the Greek Orthodox
Archidiocese of America[147] in PDF in English[148] as well as in Greek.[149] In
September 2018, the Holy Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy and Malta issued a
 translation[150][151] which was on 17 October published on the official Italian
website of the Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox churches in Western
Europe.[152] The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church was translated
in Ukrainian as of 6 October 2018.[153]
References[edit]
1 ^ "Moscow Weighs Up the Consequences of Orthodox Church Schism". The
Independent. 16 October 2018. Retrieved 18 October 2018.
2 ^ Meyendorff, John. "Eastern Orthodoxy". Encyclopædia Britannica Online.
Retrieved 23 May 2019.
3 ^ Jump up to: a
 b c "Statement by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church
concerning the encroachment of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on the
canonical territory of the Russian Church | The Russian Orthodox Church".
mospat.ru. 15 October 2018. Retrieved 16 July 2019. “To admit into
communion schismatics and a person anathematized in other Local Church
with all the 'bishops' and 'clergy' consecrated by him, the encroachment on
somebody else’s canonical regions, the attempt to abandon its own historical
decisions and commitments – all this leads the Patriarchate of Constantinople
beyond the canonical space and, to our great grief, makes it impossible for us
to continue the Eucharistic community with its hierarch, clergy and laity. From
now on until the Patriarchate of Constantinople’s rejection of its anti-canonical
decisions, it is impossible for all the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church to
concelebrate with the clergy of the Church of Constantinople and for the laity
to participate in sacraments administered in its churches.”
4 ^ Jump up to: a
 b c d e "Журналы заседания Священного Синода Русской
Православной Церкви от 15 октября 2018 года | Русская Православная
Церковь" [MINUTES of the meeting of the Holy Synod of the Russian
Orthodox Church of 15 October 2018]. mospat.ru (in Russian). 16 October
2018. Retrieved 16 July 2019.
5 ^ MacFarquhar, Neil (15 October 2018). "Russia Takes Further Step Toward Major
Schism in Orthodox Church". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331.
Retrieved 26 January 2019.
6 ^ Jump up to: a
 b "MINUTES of the Holy Synod's held on 14 September 2018 | The
Russian Orthodox Church (MINUTE No. 69)". mospat.ru. 14 September 2018.
Retrieved 29 October 2018.
7 ^ Jump up to: a
 b "JOURNALS of a Meeting of the Holy Synod of the Moscow
Patriarchate on September 14, 2018". synod.com. 14 September 2018.
Retrieved 29 October 2018.
8 ^ "Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the
uncanonical intervention of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the canonical
territory of the Russian Orthodox Church | The Russian Orthodox Church".
mospat.ru. 14 September 2018. Retrieved 16 July 2019.
9 ^ Jump up to: a
 b Seddon, Max; Olearchyk, Roman (14 October 2018). "Putin
 Fuffers Crimea Blowback with Orthodox Church Schism". Financial Times.
London. Retrieved 20 October 2018. “But both sides acknowledge the
canonical dispute is a proxy for a wider battle over Kiev's independence from
Moscow. ... Speaking in front of Kiev's oldest church on Sunday, Mr
Poroshenko cast "autocephaly", or autonomy for the Ukrainian church, as part
of Kiev's broader push for integration with the west through EU and Nato
membership while withdrawing from agreements with Russia”
10 ^ Jump up to: a
 b Volodomyr Shuvayev (19 October 2018). "How Geopolitics
Are Driving the Biggest Eastern Orthodox Schism in a Millennium". Stratfor.
Agence France-Presse. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
11 ^ Jump up to: a
 b Van Boom, Jason (21 October 2018). "Moscow–
Constantinople Split Highlighting Estonia's Role in Orthodox Church". ERR.
Retrieved 1 November 2018.
12 ^ Shubin 2004, pp. 39–41.
13 ^ Shubin 2004, pp. 87–88.
14 ^ Shubin 2004, p. 94.
15 ^ Rowell 1994; Sysyn 1991, p. 4–5.
16 ^ Shubin 2004, pp. 124–129.
17 ^ Shubin 2004, pp. 130–132.
18 ^ Shubin 2005, pp. 17, 35.
19 ^ Bodin 2015, p. 16.
20 ^ Shubin 2005, p. 26.
21 ^ Jump up to: a
 b c Magocsi 1996, pp. 255–256; Zhukovsky 1988, p. 359.
22 ^ 1924 Tomos of Ecumenical Patriarchate – Holy Greek Pan Orthodox
Autocephalous Archdiocese Canada and America with Holy Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Archdiocese in Exile (Blessings of Kiev).
23 ^ Jump up to: a
 b c d e "THE ECUMENICAL THRONE AND THE CHURCH OF
UKRAINE – THE DOCUMENTS SPEAK – Theological and Other Studies –
The Ecumenical Patriarchate". patriarchate.org. 18 October 2018. Retrieved
27 October 2018.
24 ^ Jump up to: a
 b Bilge, Aslı. "MOSCOW AND GREEK ORTHODOX
PATRIARCHATES: TWO ACTORS FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF WORLD
ORTHODOXY IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA" (PDF). www.esiweb.org.
Turkish Policy Quarterly. Retrieved 6 December 2018.
25 ^ Antiochenus, Petrus (5 December 2018). "'Precedence' of 'Our People' in
Orthodoxy: Patriarch Bartholomew's 21 October Speech". Orthodox Synaxis.
Retrieved 6 December 2018.
26 ^ Payne 2015; Wawrzonek, Bekus & Korzeniewska-Wisznewska 2016.
27 ^ Petro, Nicolai N. (23 March 2015). "Russia's Orthodox Soft Power".
www.carnegiecouncil.org. Retrieved 6 December 2018.
28 ^ "Russian patriarch likens Kiev for Russian Orthodoxy to Jerusalem for global
Christianity". TASS. 31 January 2019. Retrieved 2 February 2019.
29 ^ "Слово Святейшего Патриарха Кирилла на встрече с делегациями
 Поместных Православных Церквей 31 января 2019 года | Русская
Православная Церковь". mospat.ru (in Russian). 31 January 2019.
Retrieved 2 February 2019.
30 ^ "Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church 8 November
2000 : Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. Retrieved 1 November 2018.
31 ^ "Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church 8 November
2000 : Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. Retrieved 28 October 2018.
32 ^ "CNEWA – The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church". cnewa.org. Retrieved
1 November 2018. “On May 16 both Holy Synods formally adopted the
recommendations made at the Zurich meeting. The agreement provided for
parallel jurisdictions in Estonia, and allowed individual parishes and clergy to
join either the Estonian autonomous church under Constantinople or the
diocese that would remain dependent on Moscow. For its part, Constantinople
agreed to a four-month suspension of its February 20th decision to re-
establish the Estonian autonomous church. Moscow agreed to lift the
penalties that had been imposed on clergy who had joined the autonomous
church. Both Patriarchates agreed to work together with the Estonian
government, so that all Estonian Orthodox might enjoy the same rights,
including rights to property. As a result of this agreement, full communion was
restored between Moscow and Constantinople, and the name of Ecumenical
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33 ^ "Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church 8 November
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34 ^ "communiqué of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the autonomy of the
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35 ^ Steinfels, Peter (28 February 1996). "Russian Church Breaks Off From
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36 ^ Jump up to: a
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37 ^ "Metropolitan Hilarion: The decision to suspend the liturgical mention of the
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38 ^ "Patriarch Bartholomew says he won't back away from his intention to grant
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39 ^ Panagiotisandriopoulos (23 September 2018). "Φως Φαναρίου :
ΟΙΚΟΥΜΕΝΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΤΡΙΑΡΧΗΣ: "Η ΟΥΚΡΑΝΙΑ ΘΑ ΛΑΒΕΙ ΤΟ
ΑΥΤΟΚΕΦΑΛΟ ΔΙΟΤΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑ ΤΗΣ"". Φως Φαναρίου. Retrieved 28
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40 ^ "Metropolitan Hilarion: Isolation need not to be feared | The Russian
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41 ^ Патриарх Кирилл обратился к предстоятелям поместных церквей из-
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48 ^ Jump up to: a
 b Zhukovsky 1993.
49 ^ Jump up to: a
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50 ^ Jump up to: a
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51 ^ Jump up to: a
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53 ^ Jump up to: a
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54 ^ Jump up to: a
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55 ^ "Russian Orthodox Church 'rupturing' ties with the Constantinople over
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56 ^ Sherwood, Andrew Roth Harriet; correspondent, religion (15 October 2018).
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57 ^ Olszański 2018, p. 1.
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62 ^ Panev, Jivko (14 December 2018). "56 hiérarques de l'Église orthodoxe
d'Ukraine ont retourné au Phanar la lettre d'invitation au " concile de
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63 ^ "Архієреї УПЦ продовжують повертати у Стамбул запрошення на
"Собор"". Українська Православна Церква - Синодальний інформаційно-
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64 ^ "Ukraine receives Tomos officially and forever". risu.org.ua. 6 January 2019.
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65 ^ "Ecumenical Patriarch hands tomos of autocephaly over to leader of
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66 ^ "Що з підписами під томосом і чому його повертають до Стамбула".
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ΤΟΥ ΤΟΜΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΑΥΤΟΚΕΦΑΛΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΚΡΑΝΙΑΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΜΕΛΗ ΤΗΣ
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71 ^ "Tomos returns to Ukraine, brought to Rivne – Poroshenko". Interfax-
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72 ^ "Tomos returns from Istanbul to Ukraine". interfax-religion.com. 10 January
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73 ^ Томос повернувся в Україну. Інформаційне агентство Українські
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76 ^ Peter, Laurence (17 October 2018). "Orthodox Church Split: Five Reasons
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78 ^ "Statement by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning
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15 October 2018. Retrieved 26 October 2018. “the report of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople published on October 11, 2018, about the following decisions
of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople: confirming the
intention ‘to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church; opening a
‘stauropegion’ of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Kiev; ‘restoring in the
rank of bishop or priest’ the leaders of the Ukrainian schism and their followers
and ‘returning their faithful to church communion’; ‘recalling the 1686 patent of
the Patriarchate of Constantinople on the transfer of the Metropolis of Kiev to
the Moscow Patriarchate as its part.”
79 ^ Govorun, Cyrill (17 October 2018). "Why This Is Not a Schism?".
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80 ^ Casper, Jayson (6 January 2019). "From Russia, Without Love: Ukraine
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81 ^ "Прихожан РПЦ ограничили в посещении Афона. Россияне могли
потратить на него $200 млн". 16 October 2018. Retrieved 31 August 2019.
82 ^ "Metropolitan Hilarion: The fact that the Patriarchate of Constantinople has
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83 ^ Голубева, Анастасия; Рейтер, Светлана (16 October 2018). ""Мы и без
них проживем". Интервью митрополита Илариона после решений
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84 ^ Jump up to: a
 b "Митрополит Иларион: Верующих канонической
Украинской Православной Церкви пытаются силой загнать в созданную
на Украине новую раскольничью структуру | Русская Православная
Церковь" [Metropolitan Hilarion: they try to force believers of the canonical
Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the new schismatic structure created in
Ukraine]. mospat.ru (in Russian). 4 January 2019. Retrieved 18 July 2019.
“Митрополит Иларион: Наши православные верующие могут ездить на
Афон, могут молиться в афонских монастырях, могут прикладываться к
иконам, к святым мощам. То, что сейчас, к сожалению, невозможно, –
это причащаться в афонских монастырях. Но вот Святейший Патриарх
на последнем Епархиальном собрании города Москвы, когда ему был
задан прямой вопрос, можно причащаться на Афоне в русском
Пантелеимоновом монастыре, ответил, что, с его точки зрения,
мирянам там причащаться можно. Думаю, что это говорит, прежде
всего, о том, что мы воспринимаем Пантелеимонов монастырь как
русскую обитель. Он принадлежит, конечно, к Константинопольской
Церкви, как и все афонские монастыри, но мы знаем, что этот
монастырь строился русскими монахами на русские деньги, там русское
и украинское монашеское братство, там богослужения совершаются на
церковнославянском языке. Те миряне из Русской Православной
Церкви, которые будут посещать этот монастырь, могут причащаться
там Святых Христовых Таин. Но в других афонских монастырях они, к
сожалению, не могут причащаться.”
85 ^ Rukhshan, Mir (29 December 2018). "Russian Orthodox Church Believers
May Take Communion On Mount Athos -Metropolitan Hilarion". UrduPoint.
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86 ^ "Интерфакс-Религия: Мирянам РПЦ разрешили причащаться в
русском Пантелеимоновом монастыре на Афоне". interfax-religion.ru. 29
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87 ^ Sautreuil, Pierre (3 January 2019). "Le Patriarche Kirill autorise ses fidèles à
communier sur le Mont Athos" [Patriarch Kirill allowed his faithfuls to receive
communion on Mount Athos]. La Croix (in French). Retrieved 5 January 2019.
88 ^ "Митрополит Волоколамский Иларион: Проект "автокефалии" на
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Интервью / Патриархия.ru". Патриархия.ru (in Russian). Retrieved 16 June
2019.
89 ^ "Русская линия / Новости: Митрополит Волоколамский Иларион: В
ситуации разрыва с Константинополем, у нас нет иного выхода, кроме
как направлять священников Русской Православной Церкви в Турцию".
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90 ^ "Patriarch Kirill sends priest to Istanbul to care for Russian believers after
severance of relations with Constantinople". Interfax-Religion. 12 November
2018. Retrieved 11 January 2019.
91 ^ "Divine services to be celebrated on regular basis at the historical church in
the territory of the Russian Consulate General in Istanbul | The Russian
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92 ^ "COMMENT BY METROPOLITAN SOTIRIOS OF PISIDIA REGARDING
THE CELEBRATION OF THE DIVINE LITURGY AT BELEK BY A RUSSIAN
PRIEST WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE RUSSIAN CONSULATE IN
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93 ^ "При посольстве РФ в Турции построят храм в память об Андрее
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94 ^ "IT'S OFFICIAL: ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE DISSOLVES RUSSIAN
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95 ^ "ΑΠΟΚΛΕΙΣΤΙΚΟ: Το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο κατήργησε την Εξαρχία
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97 ^ "Russian Church reminds Constantinople's Russian parishes in Western
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98 ^ "Communiqué of the Council of the Archdiocese of 30th November 2018 |
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99 ^ "Communiqué of the Council of the Archdiocese of 15th December 2018 |
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100 ^ "Russian Church sends a priest to South Korea because of the break with
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101 ^ "Russian Orthodox Church Synod forms patriarch's exarchates in Europe,
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102 ^ "Patriarchal Exarchates established in Western Europe and South-East Asia
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103 ^ "ЖУРНАЛЫ заседания Священного Синода от 28 декабря 2018 года
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105 ^ "Russian Orthodox Synod decides to set up exarchates in Western Europe
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l'Église orthodoxe russe décide de créer l'Exarchat patriarcal en Europe
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110 ^ "Митрополит Иларион: Верующих канонической Украинской
Православной Церкви пытаются силой загнать в созданную на Украине
новую раскольничью структуру | Русская Православная Церковь"
[Metropolitan Hilarion: they try to force believers of the canonical Ukrainian
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mospat.ru (in Russian). 4 January 2019. Retrieved 18 July 2019. “Сейчас мы
отовсюду вышли и теперь будем создавать наши приходы и епархии, те
или иные структуры в дальнем зарубежье без всякой оглядки на
Константинополь. Мы будем действовать так, как будто их не
существует вообще, потому что наша задача – миссионерская,
просветительская. Мы создаем эти структуры для пастырского
окормления наших верующих, и здесь не может быть подобного рода
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ΚΥΡΙΛΛΟΣ ΔΕΝ ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙ ΠΙΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΡΘΟΔΟΞΟΥΣ
ΠΡΟΚΑΘΗΜΕΝΟΥΣ / Ο ΚΙΕΒΟΥ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΙΟΣ ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ
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129 ^ "Russian Orthodox Church will not bless pilgrimages to Greek dioceses
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130 ^ "Интерфакс-Религия: РПЦ не благословит паломничество в епархии
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Euromaidan Press. 14 October 2018. Retrieved 16 October 2018. “the
Synod ... of the Ecumenical Patriarchate ... gave further confirmation that
Ukraine is on the path to receiving church independence from Moscow. ...
Although President Poroshenko triumphantly announced that in result of the
meeting Ukraine had received the long-awaited Tomos, or decree of Church
independence – a claim circulated in Ukraine with great enthusiasm, this is not
true. ... Constantinople's decision will benefit other jurisdictions in Ukraine –
the UOC KP and UAOC, which will have to effectively dismantle their own
administrative structures and set up a new Church, which will receive the
Tomos of autocephaly. ... Right now it's unclear which part of the UOC MP will
join the new Church. 10 out of 90 UOC MP bishops signed the appeal for
autocephaly to the Ecumenical Patriarch – only 11%. But separate priests
could join even if their bishops don't, says Zuiev.”
136 ^ "Statement by the President of Ukraine regarding the decision of the Holy
Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate". Official website of the President of
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142 ^ "Montenegro to seek autocephaly for country's Orthodox Church".
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144 ^ rtcg.me (21 December 2018). "Identitet se brani angažovanjem, a ne
zabranom ulaska u CG". RTCG – Radio Televizija Crne Gore – Nacionalni
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147 ^ "The Ecumenical Throne and the Church of Ukraine". goarch.org. 28
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148 ^
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and+the+Church+of+Ukraine+%28ENGLISH%29.pdf/8c509846-38e4-4610-
a54e-30121eec77ef
149 ^
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and+the+Church+of+Ukraine+-+Greek.pdf/
150 ^ "IL TRONO ECUMENICO E LA CHIESA DI UCRAINA PARLANO I TESTI"
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151 ^ Yfantidis, Evangelos. "IL TRONO ECUMENICO E LA CHIESA Di UCRAINA
– PARLANO I TESTI". ortodossia.it (in Italian). Retrieved 3 December 2018.
152 ^ "IL TRONO ECUMENICO E LA CHIESA DI UCRAINA – PARLANO I
TESTI". esarcato.it. 17 October 2018. Archived from the original on 3
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153 ^ "Canon lawyers of Constantinople lay out arguments in favor of canonical
affiliation of Ukraine to Ecumenical Patriarchate". risu.org.ua. 6 October 2018.
Retrieved 27 October 2018. “The Kyiv Orthodox Theological Academy of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate translated into Ukrainian the
study The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church”
154 ^ "KONSTANTINOS VETOCHNIKOV
Ingénieur d'études
(Bibliothèque
Byzantine du Collège de France)
Curriculum vitae [Résumé]" (PDF).
155 ^ Vetochnikov, Konstantinos (August 2016). "La "concession" de la métropole
de Kiev au patriarche de Moscou en 1686 : Analyse canonique". Les
Frontières et les Limites du Patriarcat de Constantinople (in French): 744–784
– via Academia.edu.
156 ^ "THE ECUMENICAL THRONE AND THE CHURCH OF UKRAINE – THE
DOCUMENTS SPEAK – Theological and Other Studies – The Ecumenical
Patriarchate". patriarchate.org. Retrieved 31 October 2018. “Finally, we
convey our fervent gratitude to the erudite scholar, Mr. Konstantinos
Vetochnikov, who placed his invaluable knowledge on the issue of this
publication at the disposal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”
157 ^ "The See of Kyiv never transferred to Moscow, Constantin Vetochnikov
says". risu.org.ua. 27 December 2016. Retrieved 30 October 2018.
158 ^ Vetoshnikov, Constantin (28 November 2018). "Константин Ветошников:
Ответ на аргументы представителей РПЦ о «полной передаче» Москве
юрисдикции над Киевской митрополией в 1686 г. – интернет-
издательство Церквариум". cerkvarium.org. Retrieved 9 September 2019.
159 ^ "Ответ на аргументы представителей РПЦ о "полной передаче"
Москве юрисдикции над Киевской митрополией в 1686 г – Константин
Ветошников". esxatos.com. Retrieved 4 December 2018.
160 ^ Goble, Paul A. (18 January 2016). "Moscow Patriarchate beefs up its staff
for hybrid operations against Ukraine-- EUROMAIDAN PRESS". Euromaidan
Press. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
161 ^ Aleksandrov, Kirill (20 August 2018). "Will Constantinople bring Kiev
Metropolia into its fold?". spzh.news. Retrieved 12 November 2018.
162 ^ "Constantinople's annulment of 1686 decision counter to historic truth —
Moscow Patriarchate" (in Russian). TASS. 15 October 2018. Retrieved 2
December 2018.
163 ^ "Hierarch: Phanar – separatists who are trying to divide church Ukraine".
spzh.news. 13 November 2018. Retrieved 2 December 2018. “'We are talking
about the Kiev Metropolis of the XVII century, which occupied a third of the
current territory of Ukraine. And then how can they claim entire Ukraine? And
if we are talking only about the Kiev Metropolis of the XVII century, then they,
obviously, suggest dividing our country into some kind of "old" and "new"
territories. This is a clear appeal to separatism,' said the bishop.”
164 ^ "Arch. Clement: There is no direct subordination between UOC and
Phanar". spzh.news. 3 October 2018. Retrieved 3 November 2018.
165 ^ В УПЦ МП ответили на заявление представителя Константинополя о
церкви. RT на русском (in Russian). 2 November 2018. Retrieved 3
November 2018.
166 ^ "The very same Letter: Did Constantinople transfer the Church of Ukraine?".
spzh.news. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
167 ^ "Russian Church awaiting initiative from local Church on pan-Orthodox
assembly". TASS. 28 September 2018. Retrieved 28 October 2018.
168 ^ "Metropolitan Hilarion: Patriarch of Constantinople claims power over history
itself | The Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. 7 November 2018.
Retrieved 22 November 2018.
169 ^ Orthodoxie.com, Entretien avec le métropolite Hilarion (Alfeyev) de
Volokolamsk, retrieved 5 December 2018 (14 minutes, 31
seconds)
Orthodoxie.com (6 December 2018), Entretien avec le métropolite
Hilarion (Alfeyev) sur la situation actuelle au sein de l’orthodoxie, retrieved 27
May 2019 (same interview but without the French dubbing)
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Politika Online. Retrieved 5 April 2019.
171 ^ "No Pan-Orthodox approval needed to issue the Tomos, Patriarch
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Orthodox Council | The Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. 15 October
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the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia held its session the
 day before yesterday, and members of the Synod charged me with a duty to
appeal to representatives of all the Local Orthodox Churches with a request to
convene a pan-Orthodox meeting over the Ukrainian issue. Until all the
developments in the Ukrainian church life are discussed and a conciliar
decision is taken, our position will remain unchanged.”
184 ^ "Position of the Serbian Orthodox Church on the Church Crisis in Ukraine
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темы Украины | Русская Православная Церковь". mospat.ru (in Russian).
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Crosses: Borders, Educations, and Religions in Northern Europe. Religion and
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Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-0830-5.
Olszański, Tadeusz A. (2018). "'An Independent State Needs an Independent
Church': The Fight for Canonical Independence for Ukrainian Orthodoxy" (PDF).
OSW Commentary. No. 272. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies. Retrieved 18
January 2019.
Payne, Daniel P. (2015). "Spiritual Security, the Russkiy Mir, and the Russian
Orthodox Church: The Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on Russia's
Foreign Policy Regarding Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia". In Hug, Adam
(ed.). Traditional Religion and Political Power: Examining the Role of the Church in
Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova (PDF). London: Foreign Policy Centre.
pp. 65–70. ISBN 978-1-905833-28-3.
Rowell, S. C. (1994). Lithuania Ascending: A Pagan Empire Within East-Central
Europe, 1295–1345. Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought: Fourth
Series. 25. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-
45011-9.
Shubin, Daniel (2004). A History of Russian Christianity. Volume I: From the Earliest
Years Through Tsar Ivan IV. New York: Algora Publishing. ISBN 978-0-87586-289-7.
——— (2005). A History of Russian Christianity. Volume II: The Patriarchal Era
Through Peter the Great, 1586 to 1725. New York: Algora Publishing. ISBN 978-0-
87586-348-1.
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Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries". In Hosking, Geoffrey (ed.). Church, Nation
and State in Russia and Ukraine. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1–
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Further reading[edit]
Antiochenus, Petrus (6 November 2018). "The Trump Administration, Ukrainian
Autocephaly, and Secular Governments". Orthodox Synaxis. Retrieved 18 December
2018.
Denysenko, Nicholas E. (2018). The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of
Separation. DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press. ISBN 978-0-87580-
789-8.
Воссоединение Киевской митрополии с Русской Православной Церковью.
1676-1686 гг. Исследования и документы [The Reunification of the Kiev
Metropolis with the Russian Orthodox Church. 1676-1686: Research and
Documents] (in Russian). Presentation online; prepublished documents in 2018:
Orthodox Encyclopedia. 2019.
Sotiropoulos, Evagelos, ed. (May 2019). The Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ukraine
Autocephaly: Historical, Canonical, and Pastoral Perspectives. Order of saint
Andrew the Apostle, Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos and St. Vlassios (5 September 2019).
"Proposal for Dealing with the Ukrainian Issue". Orthodoxia.info. Retrieved 7
September 2019.

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