Aytona vs Castillo

THE FACTS

This case settles the limitations to the appointment power of the President.

On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona
as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, Aytona took his office.

On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office;

and on December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing,
and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia (which in effect,
withdrawing the appointment of Aytona 2 days earlier) after December 13, 1961.

On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim

Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their office, although Castillo
informed Aytona of his title thereto; and some unpleasantness developed in the premises
of the Central Bank. However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona was definitely
prevented from holding office in the Central Bank.

So, Aytona instituted a quo warrant proceeding challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the
powers of Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had
qualified for the post, and therefore, the subsequent appointment and qualification of
Castillo was void, because the position was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the
appointment of Aytona had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal.

As it turned out, President Garcia on December 29, 1961, all in all, submitted about three
hundred fifty (350) “midnight” or “last minute” appointments.

THE ISSUE

Whether President Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad
interim appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees had already
qualified?

THE RULING

Yes. Because an outgoing President is prohibited conduct “midnight appointments” and

that President Macapagal had every right to revoke such appointments made by his
predecessor.
 Aytona vs Castillo

In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and
other reasons:

(1) the outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new
President opportunity to consider names in the light of his new policies, which were
approved by the electorate in the last elections;

(2) these scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit
of the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments;

(3) the appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust, because they were issued only
upon the condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a
recall or revocation by the incoming President, with the result that those deserving of
promotion or appointment who preferred to be named by the new President declined
and were by-passed; and

(4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a
desire on the part of the outgoing President merely subvert the policies of the incoming
administration.

Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, he has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments,
he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his
selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by
thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. Where, however, as in this case,
the Commission on Appointments that will consider the appointees is different from that
existing at the time of the appointment2and where the names are to be submitted by
successor, who may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly
careful in extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350
appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such “double care” which was
required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the contention
that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision
granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court
resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2,
cancelling such “midnight” or “last-minute” appointments.

Petition dismissed.