PERSONS QUICK NOTES

ART. 2
Laws providing for its own effectivity (It means that this law has set another date when it
shall take effect, contrary to the 15-day period. Executive Order 209 or Family Code of the
Philippines provides that the Code shall take effect one [1] year after the completion of its
publication.)
15 days after publication means on the 15th day (RA No. 7659 was published on December
16, 1993 took effect on December 31, 1993, not January 01, 1994.)
After 15 days following such publication means on the 16th day (RA No. 7691 was
published on March 30, 1994 and took effect on April 15, 1994.)
EO NO. 200 states that a law may either be published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. (The previous ruling was that if a law is not silent, it shall
take effect even without being published in the Official Gazette. But this then violates the
doctrine “ignorantia legis non excusat.” A law must be published, even if it is not silent.)
Effective immediately upon approval. (This means that a law may take effect EVEN BEFORE
OR AFTER the 15-day period if the law provides “SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY
UPON ITS APPROVAL.”)
Note: The 15-day period is the standard, but it is not absolute.
“Laws” defined in Article 2.
1. Presidential Decrees and Executive Orders
2. Administrative Rules and Regulations pursuant to valid delegation [excluded:
interpretative, internal, letters of instruction]
3. Monetary Board Circulars to fill in details of Central Bank Act [excluded: circulars of
general policy]

Other exclusions: Municipal Ordinances and Supreme Court decisions.

Tanada v. Tuvera, GR No. L-63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect."
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by
the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
KREIZEL B. SIDE NOTE: This then gave birth to EO No. 200 where
then President Corazon Aquino amended the Art 2. Of Civil Code.
The law can now be published in the Official Gazette OR in a
newspaper of general circulation.

446 De Roy v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 80718, 29 January 1988

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special Division of the Court of Appeals in the Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy,
et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied
petitioner's motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be
filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny
the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply
to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette
as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in
such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
KREIZEL B. SIDE NOTE: The petitioners’ motion has been denied for
lack of merit. The resolution provides that “no motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration” may be filed. Although
this was not published in the Official Gazette, the petitioners’
counsel is liable to be kept abreast of the Supreme Court decision.
ART. 3
Ignorance of law vs ignorance of fact. (No excuse vs may excuse a party from legal
consequences of conduct.)
Mistake of fact. Mistake as to difficult questions of law is mistake of fact. A lawyer cannot be
disbarred for an honest mistake or error of law.

ART. 4 Prospective Application of Laws

1. Exception to the General Rule (Laws may be given retroactive effect)

(a) If provided in the law itself

(b) Procedural law

 Statutes regulating the court procedures to ACTIONS PENDING
AND UNDETERMINED at the time of passage. No vested right
may attach or arise from procedural laws.
 Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedy which DO NOT
CREATE OR TAKE AWAY VESTED RIGHTS, but ONLY
OPERATE IN FURTHERANCE OF THE REMEDY OR
CONFIRMATION OF RIGHTS ALREADY EXISTING.

(c) Penal law if favorable to the accused

(d) Curative and repealing statutes

 Enacted to cure defects in a prior law
 Enacted to validate legal proceedings, instruments, or acts of
public authorities, which would otherwise be void for want of
conformity with certain legal requirements
 The curative and repealing statutes’ purpose is to give
validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws.

(e) Creating new rights

 Provided that it HAS NOT PREJUDICED ANOTHER ACQIUIRED
RIGHT OF THE SAME ORIGIN.

(f) Interpretative statutes

2. Exception to the exception. A statute will NOT be given retroactive effect if:

(a) Ex post facto laws. It becomes such if they:

 Refer to criminal matters
 Be retroactive in its application
 Prejudicial to the accused

(b) Penal laws not favorable to the accused

  If the retroactive effect of law aggravates, instead of mitigates the
penalty, it shall be DENIED.

(c) Substantive laws impairing vested rights

Valeroso v. People, GR No. 164815, 22 February 2008

We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegal possession of a
firearm.
THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Valeroso is found
guilty of illegal possession of firearms. Although claiming he was framed and that he has a
license to own firearms, the trial judge still found him guilty. He is sentenced with penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense
on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, 81 during
the pendency of the case with the trial court.
THE AMMENDED SECTION 1 of PD NO. 1866 READS:
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed... :Provided, That no other crime was
committed.
Penal laws, especially when referring to criminal acts, shall not have a retroactive application,
LEST IT FAVORS THE ACCUSED. In this case, the amended PD. No. 1866 mitigated the
sentence to Valeroso.
Thus, the amendment favors him, but as the sentence term is already light in the original
decision and correctly falls under the category of prision correccional, the Court of Appeals
decision is AFFIRMED.

PNB v. Office of the President, GR No. 104528, 18 January 1996

May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of
individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought
from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", is not applicable to the mortgage
contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This
is the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the Decision dated
March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249,
signed by the Executive Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, "by authority of the President."
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc.
(represented by spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase
agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of
the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly
complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in
question.
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.
While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be
plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from
scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic
financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law — as an
instrument of social justice — must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its
disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and
therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking and
ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual
status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could
not have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers.
On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the
attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was
precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very
essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who
may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed "unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers."
As the Solicitor General, in his comment, argues:
"Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the
vigorous regulation which P.D. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will
be translated into a feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of the State
cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the fortunate accident of
having been constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957. Indeed, it would be illogical in
the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the fraudulent practices
and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally
perpetrated precisely because P.D. 957 cannot be applied to existing antecedent
mortgage contracts. The legislative intent could not have conceivably permitted a loophole
which all along works to the prejudice of subdivision lot buyers (private respondents)."
Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only on the
strictly legal issues involved in this case but also to take another look at the larger
issues including social justice and the protection of human rights as enshrined in the
Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but
within the context of existing social, economic and political conditions, law being merely
a brick in the up-building of the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state
bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for the implementation of state
policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These consideration are obviously far
more weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the acquisition of any specific
property. Thus, as the country strives to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to
achieve dreams of "NIC-hood" and social well-being for the majority of our countrymen, we hold
that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country, which has in recent years made record
earnings and acquired an enviable international stature, with branches and subsidiaries in key
financial centers around the world, should be equally as happy with the disposition of this case
as the private respondents, who were almost deprived and dispossessed of their very homes
purchased through their hard work and with their meager savings.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby DENIED,
petitioner having failed to show any REVERSIBLE ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No costs.
KREIZEL B. SIDE NOTE: The letter of the law must always be upheld,
but more importantly, it is the spirit of the law that always prevails
above all else.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., GR No.

168129, 24 April 2007
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision dated February 18,
2005 and Resolution dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Division) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 76449.
The Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., herein respondent, is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. It is classified as “health care services
provider.”
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 273,
amending the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (Presidential Decree No. 1158) by
imposing Value-Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of goods and services. This E.O. took effect
on January 1, 1988. DAETcC
Before the effectivity of E.O. No. 273, or on December 10, 1987, respondent wrote the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), petitioner, inquiring whether the services it provides to
the participants in its health care program are exempt from the payment of the VAT.
On June 8, 1988, petitioner CIR, through the VAT Review Committee of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that respondent, as a provider of
medical services, is exempt from the VAT coverage. This Ruling was subsequently
confirmed by Regional Director Osmundo G. Umali of Revenue Region No. 8 in a letter dated
April 22, 1994.
Meanwhile, on January 1, 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716 (Expanded VAT or E-VAT Law)
took effect, amending further the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Then on January 1,
1998, R.A. No. 8424 (National Internal Revenue Code of 1997) became effective. This new Tax
Code substantially adopted and reproduced the provisions of E.O. No. 273 on VAT and R.A.
No. 7716 on E-VAT. aTEADI
The BIR sent respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency in its payment of the
VAT and documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable years 1996 and 1997.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising these two issues: (1) whether
respondent's services are subject to VAT; and (2) whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88
exempting respondent from payment of VAT has retroactive application.
We note that these factual findings of the CTA were neither modified nor reversed by the Court
of Appeals. It is a doctrine that findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular
expertise on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding, and conclusive upon
this Court, more so where these do not conflict with the findings of the Court of Appeals. 9
Perforce, as respondent does not actually provide medical and/or hospital services, as provided
under Section 103 on exempt transactions, but merely arranges for the same, its services are
not VAT-exempt
In its Resolution dated March 23, 2003, the CTA found that there is no showing that respondent
"deliberately committed mistakes or omitted material facts" when it obtained VAT Ruling No.
231-88 from the BIR. The CTA held that respondent's letter which served as the basis for the
VAT ruling "sufficiently described" its business and "there is no way the BIR could be misled by
the said representation as to the real nature" of said business.
In sustaining the CTA, the Court of Appeals found that "the failure of respondent to refer to itself
as a health maintenance organization is not an indication of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to
make false representations." As "the term health maintenance organization did not as yet have
any particular significance for tax purposes," respondent's failure "to include a term that has yet
to acquire its present definition and significance cannot be equated with bad faith."
The rule is that the BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal
would result to the prejudice of the taxpayer, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76449. No costs.

KREIZEL B. SIDE NOTE: If amendments to the law are in conflict

with the present cases, the court will always favor the accused and
the weak and consider the burden on taxpayers.

ART. 5 Acts Contrary to Mandatory or Prohibitory Provisions are Void

1. Exceptions

(a) The law makes the act valid BUT punishes THE VIOLATOR

(b) The law itself authorizes its validity

(c) The law makes the act only voidable

(d) The law declares the nullity of an act but recognizes its effects as
legally existing

ART. 6 Waiver of Rights

Waiver is “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim, or privilege…”
1. Elements of Rights
 Subject
o Active Subject (Entitled to demand enforcement
of the right)
o Passive Subject (Duty-bound to suffer its
enforcement
  Object
o Things and services
 Efficient Cause
o Fact that gives rights to the legal relation
2. Kinds of Rights
 Civil
o Personality rights (sometimes called human
rights)
o Family rights
o Patrimonial rights (the only civil right that can be
waived)
 Real right (or the power belonging to a
person over a specific thing, without a
passive subject individually determined
against whom such right may be
personally exercised)
 Personal right (or the power belonging to
a person to demand of another, as a
definite passive subject, the fulfillment of
prestation to give, to do, or not to do)
 Political
o Participation of persons in the government of the
State
3. Requisites
 Actually have the right which he renounces
 Must have knowledge of its existence
 Must have the capacity to make the renunciation
 Renunciation must be made in a clear and unequivocal
manner
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.
4. Exceptions
 Waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs;
 If the waiver is prejudicial to a third party with a right
recognized by law
 Alleged rights which really do not yet exist, as in the
case of future inheritance
 If the right is a natural right, such as right to be
supported
D.M. Consunji vs. CA, GR No. 137873, April 20

D.M. Consunji seeks the reversal of the CA decision questioning the admissibility of the
police report as evidence of the negligence of the petitioner, the applicability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the presumption of negligence under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, and that the respondent was not precluded from recovering damages under
the Civil Code.
There is no dispute that appellee's husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellant's construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control
of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the
appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. . . . .
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in
her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner
to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant
who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; 41 otherwise, the
defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before
the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her
husband's death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this
case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner's
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a
resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining
corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of
government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of
law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact
nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits
from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after
the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on
November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her
when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified
that she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent
cannot claim ignorance of this Court's ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
AaSHED
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a person's ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the
laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against
her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate
the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from
Exhibit "K" that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension
from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit
"K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount
she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages
awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court
for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC,
payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from
the trial court's award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims
to prevent double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to
private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other
respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

2001 Cui v. Arellano University, 2 SCRA 205

Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff,
and dismissing defendant's counterclaim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.
"There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered
into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public
policy.
It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of
public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which in its object, operation, or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare, to sound morality, or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139;
Heding vs. Gallagher, 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University
understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted
this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a
contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our
Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools
because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in
Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to
declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights.'
The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 33, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarships are
awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its
prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme
designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution. Thus conceived it is
not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has
this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have
received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships
to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind
of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University.
The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not
require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they
transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United
States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions
scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda value but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an
established interest or a first lien."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be
entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest
thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as
the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.

ART. 7 Repeal of Laws

1. Kinds of Repeal
(a) Express

 Contained in a special provision of a subsequent law.

When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby
revived unless expressly so provided.
If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the
proper step is to express it. The repeal shall identify or
designate the laws to be abolished.
(b) Implied (not favored)

 Takes place when the provisions of the subsequent

law are incompatible with those of an earlier law and
there is no express repeal. When a law which impliedly
repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall
thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides
otherwise.
They are not favored because they rest only on the
presumption that because the old and the new laws are
 incompatible with each other, there is an intention to repeal the
old. There must be a plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable
repugnancy between the two; if both laws can by reasonable
construction stand, both will be sustained.
Mecano v. COA, GR No. 103982, 11 December 1992
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two
acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the
extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration
of this Court.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new
Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old
Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of
Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related sickness,
injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees' Compensation Program under
P.D. 626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on
account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the government.
As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing
ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing,
and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the
subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if,
by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as
a repeal of the earlier.
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the
recovery of benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld.
The second sentence of Article 173, of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly
provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 669 of the Revised Administrative Code xxx whose benefits
are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is
hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.

2. Effects (of declaration of unconstitutionality)

 Doctrine of operative fact. The existence of the law prior
to the determination of unconstitutionality as an operative
 fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored, or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the
void law or executive act but sustains its effects.
Further, it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law but is resorted to only as a matter
of equity and fair play.
3. Sec. 444, Local Government Code
 Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Sangguniang Bayan
4. General vs Special Laws
 When there is a conflict between a general law and a
special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect
must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A
special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication. It is basic in
statutory construction that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to
have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that “a special statute, provided for a particular
case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the
cases embraced in the special law.
 General Law Enacted Prior to Special Law: If the
general law was enacted PRIOR to the special law, the
latter is considered the exception to the general law.
Therefore, the general law, in general remains good law,
and there is no repeal, except insofar as the exception or
special law is concerned.
 General Law Enacted After Special Law: If the general
law was enacted AFTER the special law, the special law
remains unless:
(1) There is an express declaration to the contrary; or
(2) There is a clear, necessary and irreconcilable conflict;
or
(3) Unless the subsequent general law covers the whole
subject and is clearly intended to replace the special law
on the matter.
ART. 8 Judicial decisions form part of the law of the land
• Doctrine of stare decisis
The doctrine is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. The doctrine, however, does not mean blind adherence to precedents.
If the doctrine is found to be contrary to law or erroneous, it should be
abandoned.

• Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet

The interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. Judicial decisions of SC are authoritative and precedent-setting while
those of inferior courts and Court of Appeals are merely persuasive.

ART. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of silence,

obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

ART. 10. In case of doubt in interpretation or application of the laws, it is

presumed that the lawmaking body intended for right and just to prevail.
ART. 11. Customs contrary to law, public order, or public policy shall not be
countenanced.
ART. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to rules of evidence.
ART. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days, and nights, it shall be
understood that the years are of 365 days each; months, of 30 days; days, 24
hours; and nights, from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed according
to the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included.
ART. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory
upon those who live or sojourn in the Philippines, subject to the principles of
public international law and treaty stipulations.
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to status, condition, or legal
capacity of persons shall be binding upon all citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the laws of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
amount of successional rights and to the order of succession and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever the nature of the
property may be and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
ART. 17. Forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country where they are executed.
When acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by the Philippines laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
and conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
ART. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special
laws, their deficiency shall be supplied for by this Code.