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Chinese IR Sino-centrism tradition and its

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Lu Peng

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THE PACIFIC REVIEW, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1461681

Chinese IR Sino-centrism tradition and its influence on the

Chinese School Movement
Lu Peng
Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, China

ABSTRACT
The Chinese School Movement, which aims to create a Chinese theory of international
relations, has developed over the last 30 years. It is usually portrayed as an ongoing
effort by Chinese scholars to provide a theory that accounts for anomalies within
Western IR theories. Despite its academic potential, the movement has made
extremely slow progress in theory building. This slow progress is attributed to the
prevalence of the Sino-centrism in Chinese IR which assumes the superiority of
Chinese international experience in knowledge making and evaluation. This
epistemological tradition rises, falls, and resurges in Chinese IR disciplinary history and
finds its latest expression in the Chinese School Movement, which turns it into a
pseudo-scientific enterprise. Under its influence, the Chinese School Movement is
constantly applauded by Chinese IR scholars despite the difficulty in yielding scientific
output. The most urgent task for Chinese scholars is therefore not to further
strengthen the Sino-centrism tradition by searching for a unique Chinese
understanding of international relations but to deconstruct it for better
communication between Chinese and Western IR scholars.

KEYWORDS Sino-centrism tradition; Chinese School Movement; Chinese IR history

Introduction: the Chinese School Movement

The Chinese School of International Relations (IR) theory, which has developed over
the last 30 years, represents a collective effort by Chinese scholars to establish a non-
Western theory of IRs. This collective enterprise, referred to here as the Chinese School
Movement, can be divided into two waves of scholarship. The first wave emerged in the
mid-1980s and focused mainly on the formulation of an IR theory with Chinese charac-
teristics (Zhao, Zhao, & Chu, 1987). The second wave which formed in the early 2000s
represents a more ambitious effort to develop a Chinese School of IR theory (Mei, 2000;
Qin, 2005a, 2006, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Ren, 2000, 2013; Su, 2013, 2014; Yan, 2009, 2014,
2015, 2016). While the scholarship of the first wave received relatively short shrift by
Western IR scholars (Callahan, 2001; Chan, 1999; Song, 2001), the explicit focus on theory
development characterizing the second wave has received considerable attention from
both Chinese and Western IR theorists (Acharya & Buzan, 2017; Kristensen, 2015;

CONTACT Lu Peng lupeng@fjnu.edu.cn

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 L. PENG

Kristensen & Nielsen, 2013; Shambaugh, 2011; Wang & Buzan, 2014; Zhang, 2012, p. 167;
Zhang & Chang, 2016).
This paper discusses the evolution of the Chinese School Movement and accounts for
the slow progress of theory construction. A rich scholarship has attributed the failure to
formulate a Chinese theory of IR to (1) the inability to construct viable alternatives to
Western-oriented concepts (Pan, 2012), (2) the opposition of Chinese scholars to the sci-
entific method (Su, 2005, pp. 27–28; Yan, 2011c, p. 252), and (3) the continued influence
of Chinese culture which values pluralism to universalism and pragmatism to fundamen-
talism (Wang & Han, 2016, pp. 95–102). While these factors partially explain the ‘lack of a
theoretical core’ in Chinese IR (Qin, 2007, pp. 322–329; 2010a, pp. 39–41), the existing
scholarship has failed to account for the ways in which Sino-centrism undermines the-
ory development. The author argues that the influence of Sino-centrism, an epistemo-
logical position with a strong bias toward a Chinese-centered perspective of IRs, has
undermined the effort to establish a theoretical entity. Consequently, the Chinese
School Movement has become a pseudoscientific enterprise that has not yielded scien-
tific output.
The first section of this paper discusses the academic potential of the Chinese School
Movement. The second section turns to Sino-centrism as an epistemological position
which underpins the knowledge making and evaluation practices preferred by Chinese
IR scholars. The third section accounts for the extent to which Sino-centrism has influ-
enced Chinese IR and specifies the historical turning points which coincide with its rise,
fall, and resurgence in Chinese IR scholarship. Events such as the nationwide critique of
Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations in the 1990s did not account for the changes
in the academic tradition (though it might have influenced the evolutionary process to
some degree). Instead, underneath the evolution of Sino-centrism is a complex social
mechanism that deserves the full attention of a second article.1 The fourth section dis-
cusses the ways in which Sino-centrism has undermined efforts to establish a theoretical
entity and concludes that the most urgent task for the Chinese School Movement is not
to further legitimize Sino-centrism, but to deconstruct this tradition for more efficient
communication between Chinese and Western IR.

The academic potential of the Chinese School Movement

The Chinese School Movement is typically seen as a critical reflection on Western theo-
ries of IRs (Kim, 2016, p. 64; Qin, 2005a; Ren, 2016, pp. 68–70). This interpretation argues
that the movement holds the promise of resolving the shortcomings of Western theo-
ries of IR and describes an academic enterprise that has gone through an extensive pro-
cess of learning from Western IR and has entered a more advanced stage of theoretical
innovation (Qin, 2010a, pp. 33–34). As a scientific enterprise, the Chinese School Move-
ment may provide invaluable insight into empirical questions regarding the rise of
China while holding the promise of developing a theory that deepens our understand-
ing of non-Western powers more broadly. The academic value of the Chinese School
Movement is thus fourfold.
First, the Chinese School Movement creates knowledge that contributes to our
understanding of China’s international practices (Zheng, 2011). While the rise of China
as a world player is a primary concern among scholars in the West, scholars differ greatly
on the extent to which China is likely to emerge as a challenger to the existing interna-
tional order (Buzan, 2010, 2014; Goldstein, 1997; Ikenberry, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2010;
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 3

Nye, 2011; Pumphrey, 2002; Schweller & Pu, 2011). Chinese IR scholars have engaged in
efforts to develop a non-Western theory that provides Chinese insight into the rise of
China (Qin, 2010b, 2014; Shi, 2007; Wang, 2005a; Wang, 2013). Hence, disagreements on
the extent to which China is likely to challenge world order can be at least partially
addressed by the Chinese School of IR theory.
Second, the Chinese School Movement focuses on the development of ‘grand the-
ory’, as defined by Chris Brown (2013, pp. 483–485). The focus on theory development is
welcomed by Western scholars of IR, particularly those who are concerned with the ten-
dency of the field to move away from theory development to hypotheses testing and
data collection (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2013, p. 428). Hence, as discussed in this paper,
the Chinese School Movement has not retreated from the development of theory com-
monly described as a ‘discipline-wide phenomenon’ (Dunne, Hansen, & Wight, 2013,
p. 406).
Third, the Chinese School Movement supports the call for non-Western IR theories
(Acharya & Buzan, 2007, 2010; Makarychev & Morozov, 2013; Shani, 2008; Shilliam,
2010). Hedley Bull’s, 1972 publication expressed concerns with the validity of Western
experience-oriented theories to account for a predominantly non-Western world system
(1972, 55). In a later publication, Bull predicted a potential ‘revolt against the West’,
which he described as ‘the struggles of non-Western people to throw off the cultural
ascendency of the Western world so as to reassert their identity’ (1984, p. 217). Onuf
and Lu (2007) also raise the concern that the internationalization of IR is a one-direc-
tional process of knowledge transfer from the West to the Rest. To change the nature of
the knowledge transfer process, Onuf and Lu emphasize that Western and non-Western
scholars need to work together.
Finally, the Chinese School Movement has raised theoretical questions largely
ignored by the existing scholarship. Is ‘anarchy what states make of it’, as Wendt (1992)
argued, or is anarchy an outcome of Western practices? If anarchy is defined by Western
practices, will non-Western international experience such as the ancient East Asian trib-
ute system be better suited to mitigate anarchy than Western experience such as the
balance of power? (Kang, 2007, 2010; Paltiel, 2011). Does the non-Western experience
offer an alternative narrative of the power transition in the Asia Pacific which inevitably
implies the rise of a non-Western power (Wang, 2017, pp. 64–70)? Would the rise of a
non-Western power threaten the existing world order in the same way as the rise of
Western powers? These questions point to the necessity of going beyond mainstream
or Western-oriented theory for new theoretical insight.

Sino-centrism as an epistemological position

Despite the academic potential, the Chinese School Movement has achieved ‘nothing
that merits such a title’ (Yan, 2011c, p. 252). The slow theoretical progress that character-
izes the Chinese School Movement challenges the influential models of scientific discov-
ery, including Popper’s (1963) naive falsificationism, Lakatos’ (1968) sophisticated
falsificationism, and Kuhn’s (1996) model of paradigm shifts. None of these models can
explain why Western IR paradigms have been replaced by a Chinese alternative which
does not exist at all and why this paradigm shift only takes place in Chinese IR. As the
author argues in this paper, the slow progress of the Chinese School Movement and the
specific knowledge mode are explained by the continuous influence of Sino-centrism
on the knowledge practices of Chinese scholars. In the following part of this paper, I will
4 L. PENG

clarify the meaning of Sino-centrism, the key concept, before accounting for the evolu-
tion of Sino-centrism and its influence on the Chinese School Movement.
Traditional Sino-centrism refers to an ontological position observed in the ancient
Chinese worldview. In its most extreme expression, China is located at the center of the
world where it is seen as the only legitimate actor. The core ideas of traditional Sino-cen-
trism are best captured by Liang Qichao, a prestigious Chinese intellectual of the late
nineteenth century, who once wrote, ‘what around us are small barbarian tribes with
neither culture nor polity, and hence not qualified to be a country…therefore our coun-
try was the only kind in the thousands of years’ (Quoted in Ma, 1994, p. 209). This onto-
logical bias has served as the foundation of ancient Chinese worldview with the most
notable example being the concept of tianxia (all under the heaven), later proposed as
an indispensable pillar of traditional Chinese wisdom that successfully governed the
ancient East Asian tribute system (Zhang, 2009; Zhao, 2009).
Sino-centrism in its traditional form was upheld by the Chinese until the late nine-
teenth century despite repeated military defeats by Western powers. For example, West-
ern diplomats were not allowed to leave their residence during the wedding ceremony
of the Chinese Emperor in 1872 because they were still viewed as barbarians unsuitable
to appear in national celebrations (Wang, 1940, p. 21). However, in the early twentieth
century, the view that China was the only legitimate world actor was replaced by one
that portrayed China as an uncivilized country marginalized by Western powers (Wang,
2005b). The May Fourth Movement of 1919 which proposed a replacement of Chinese
culture with Western science and democracy (Schwarcz, 1985) effectively eliminated the
last vestige of traditional Sino-centrism.
Recent scholarship has applied the ontological implications of Sino-centrism to Chi-
na’s foreign policy. This application rests on the assumption that China occupies a
unique position in the modern world (Agnew, 2010; Forsby, 2011; Tang & Qi, 2008). In
this sense, the modern concept of Sino-centrism parallels the concept of ‘exceptional-
ism’ that has been observed in international practices of both China (Callahan, 2012;
Zhang, 2013) and Western powers (Holsti, 2010). In this paper, Sino-centrism refers to an
epistemological inclination which prefers Chinese to non-Chinese experience in knowl-
edge making and evaluation. Under the influence of Sino-centrism, Chinese IR scholars
take for granted the superiority of Chinese experience in producing academic knowl-
edge. Sino-centrism is thus an epistemological bias as demonstrated by the academic
practices of Chinese IR scholars. This epistemological position may result in traditional
or modern Sino-centric ontological positions depending on how strongly Sino-centrism
has influenced the knowledge making process.

Sino-centrism in pre-1949 Chinese IR

Prior to 1949, IR in China was mainly led by Chinese scholars who earned doctorates in
the West (Yuan, 1961) and returned to China where they taught at prestigious universi-
ties. Despite their Western training, many of those who returned to China remained criti-
cal of Western IR and began to adopt the field of study to account for Chinese
experience in IRs. Xu Dunzhang at Nankai University, a Ph.D. from the University of Wis-
consin, published an extensive analysis of Western IR in which he replaced the term ‘IR’
with the ‘Science of International Studies’. His contributions to Chinese IR focused on
redefining the purpose of research, the subject of investigation, and the research meth-
odology (1934, pp. 65–72). Similarly, Zhang Zhongfu at Peking University (PKU), a Ph.D.
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 5

from John Hopkins under the supervision of Westel Willoughby, studied the Opium
War from a Chinese perspective which held both parties accountable for the war
(1933).
Critical reflections on Western IR scholarship opened the door for Sino-centrism prior
to 1949, but Chinese scholars diverged on how to incorporate Chinese experience. One
group of scholars sought inspiration from modern Chinese history, while a second group
aimed to establish the superiority of ancient Chinese experience. For example, Wang
Huachang at the National Tsinghua University (NTHU) maintained a close relationship
with his dissertation advisor Quincy Wright at the University of Chicago. Wright was
invited to Tsinghua University in 1929 where he offered IR-relevant courses in collabora-
tion with Wang. Their respective understanding of the expansion of international society
illustrated the differences between a Western and Chinese perspective of IRs. From a
Eurocentric perspective which can be traced back to nineteenth century historians and
international jurists (Kayaoglu, 2010, pp. 197–204), Wright understood the expansion of
international society as a process of extending advanced civilization from the West to
the Rest. Wright’s account focused on how to protect weak states and govern ‘barbarian
areas’ (NTHU, 1929, pp. 130–131). By contrast, from a Chinese perspective, Wang viewed
the expansion of international society from the perspective of weaker states and
observed a process of ‘aggression’ from the West and the ‘struggle’ of the Rest (NTHU,
1929, p. 130). Wang thus provided space for Chinese experience by focusing on the
interactions between those who invaded and those who were invaded.
A second group consisted of scholars highlighting the value of ancient Chinese diplo-
matic experience and scholars arguing for its superiority in the formulation of academic
knowledge. Lui Daren, for example, studied ancient Chinese diplomatic practices and
argued that the strategies of hezhong lianheng (unite vertically and horizontally) and
yuan jiao jin gong (befriend distant countries while attacking those nearby) had ‘incom-
parably high academic value in understanding international relations’ (1941, p. 2). Some
scholars even claimed that ancient Chinese experience was more relevant for under-
standing international practices than Western experience. Wu Benzhong, for example,
suggested that Chinese international public law is more effective in terms of maintain-
ing international peace than modern international law. Discussing the League of
Nations, Wu stated that:
‘China [has] known the principle of international public law thousands of years ago…
our ancestors and the glorious emperors made use of religion, the support of the mass,
and the use of military force to maintain the dignity of international treaties. This is sub-
stantially different from the League of Nations, which is feeble and incapable to prohibit
the ferocious Japan’ (1934, p. 2).

Sino-centrism in Chinese IR during the Mao Era (1949–1976)

In contrast to the sporadic influence of Sino-centrism prior to 1949, it gradually became
the dominant epistemology in the Mao era. During a brief period in the 1950s, however,
one observes a temporary decline in Sino-centric scholarship. In this period, its weaken-
ing influence is attributed to the effort to silence Western influences, on the one hand;
and the subsequent adoption of a Soviet-oriented IR scholarship, on the other hand.
Throughout the 1960s, however, Sino-centrism returned as the anchor of Chinese IR
and it maintained a dominant position until the mid-1980s when it was challenged by a
new generation of Chinese IR scholars.
6 L. PENG

The decline of Sino-centrism in the early 1950s is explained by the effort to sideline
Western IR in conjunction with the adoption of a Soviet-oriented scholarship. The cam-
paign to eliminate Western influence resulted in the abolishment of university courses
on Western countries; the removal of textbooks written by IR scholars trained in the
West; and, the dismissal of Chinese scholars with a Western degree (Lu, 2014, p. 148).
Inadvertently, the silencing of Western influence resulted in the weakening of Sino-cen-
trism, as serious academic reflections on Western IR scholarship had been the driving
force of Sino-centric scholarship before 1949.
The dominance of the Soviet IR was quickly established as observed in the institu-
tional changes adopted by Chinese universities in the early 1950s. The Department of
Political Science at Peking University implemented a Marxist program with focus on the
Soviet Union and socialist countries (PKU, 1949). At the same institution, the Soviet-ori-
ented curriculum required professors to study classical Marxism and its Russian version
for teaching purposes (PKU, 1950). Similarly, the textbooks adopted by Renmin Univer-
sity were mainly Chinese translations of Soviet publications on IRs (Renmin, 1953; Su &
Wang, 1956). Hence, by the mid-1950s, the elimination of Western scholarship and the
implementation of a Soviet-oriented IR scholarship had effectively sidelined the influ-
ence of Sino-centrism.
With the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-centrism gradually reestab-
lished its dominant position in Chinese IR in the 1960s. In the transition period,
books edited by scholars associated with the Chinese Foreign Affairs College (CFAC)
relied upon Russian and Chinese communists to make sense of the world (CFAC,
1957, 1958). In the early 1960s, however, Chinese experience gradually replaced the
Soviet view, as seen in the university curriculum which consisted of publications
based on quotations and texts issued by the Chinese communist party (CFAC, 1963,
1964; Institute, 1960). In 1961, the Department of Political Science at Fudan Univer-
sity created two mandatory courses on foreign policy entitled ‘Our Country’s Foreign
Policy’ and ‘Chairman Mao’s Works on International Relations’ (Fudan, unpublished,
pp. 186–187). Similarly, the Department of Political Science at PKU modified the
undergraduate curriculum by implementing courses on Mao Zedong Thought and
on China’s foreign policy (Du & Sui, 2000, 55). Over time, the Chinese international
experience displaced the Russian international experience in Chinese IR. Sino-cen-
trism thus returned and held sway throughout the Mao era.
The dominance of Sino-centrism was further strengthened when the CCP estab-
lished academic departments of International Politics at the PKU, Fudan University
and Renmin University in 1964. These departments reflected the ruling party’s con-
cern with international politics and were designed to fulfill the needs of the com-
munist leadership (Zhao, 2004, p. 142). The main objective of the IR department at
PKU was to promote the party’s proletarian world revolution strategy. The PKU pro-
gram was thus designed ‘to cultivate qualified personnel in scientific research and
teaching with focus on revolutionary movements in Asia and Africa in general and
in India and the Arab region in particular’ (PKU, 1965, p. 10). Similarly, Fudan Uni-
versity was tasked with disseminating the ideology of the party and students were
required to adopt ‘proletarian viewpoints’ by studying Marxism and Mao Zedong
Thought (Fudan, unpublished, p. 188). In this period, the experience of Chinese
communists became the only source of knowledge and Sino-centrism became the
dominant epistemological position in Chinese IR.
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 7

Sino-centrism in contemporary Chinese IR

In the mid-1980s, a new generation of Chinese IR scholars began to challenge the domi-
nance of Sino-centrism in Chinese IR scholarship. Younger scholars who sought to learn
from Western IR theories met stark opposition from established scholars who firmly
upheld the superiority of Chinese communist experience in theoretical studies. Despite
the support of established scholars, Sino-centrism quickly, albeit temporarily, lost
its dominance. The generational conflict continued to dominate Chinese IR until the
mid-1990s when the two generations found common ground. Since the mid-1990s,
Sino-centrism has gradually regained its dominant position in Chinese IR scholarship.
The younger generation of Chinese IR scholars turned to Western IR for theoretical
inspiration in the mid-1980s. This generation translated essential publications in
Western IR into Chinese and introduced Western IR scholarship to their colleagues and
students. After visiting Harvard University in the early 1980s, Ni Shixiong, then a junior
scholar in the IR Department at Fudan University, published 26 articles in leading
Chinese IR journals dedicated to Western theories of IR. Although many junior scholars
refrained from openly embracing Western IR in this period, their articles published years
later demonstrated that they had been inspired by Western IR. Many of these publica-
tions argued that Chinese IR scholarship underwent a process of learning from Western
IR theories in the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (Ni & Xu, 1997, pp. 11–12; Qin, 2010a,
p. 29; Wang, 1999, p. 77; Wang, 2004, p. 139; Wang, 2006a, p. 8; Wang, 2006b, p. 126; Yu
& Chen, 1999, pp. 14–15). The willingness to learn from Western theories indicated their
recognition of the superiority of Western scholarship and the disposition to introduce
Western international experience in Chinese academic practices. Thus, Sino-centrism
lost control over junior Chinese IR scholars.
To counterbalance Western influence, the then head of the China Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, Li Huichuan, made a statement to a group of young scholars in 1981
which stressed that works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Zedong were essential for evaluating
Western IR theories (Li, 1999, p. 37). The effort to secure the authority of the party culmi-
nated in the 1987 Shanghai Conference on IR theory, the first of its kind in Chinese IR
history. The Shanghai Conference aimed ‘to make Marxism the guiding light in the con-
struction of an IR knowledge system with distinctive Chinese features’ (Zhao et al., 1987,
p. 3). The first wave of the Chinese School Movement was formally initiated (He, 1992;
Li, 1988, 1999; Liang, 1994, 1997). In the first stage of its development, the Chinese
School Movement solely relied upon the Chinese communist experience to theorize IRs.
Sino-centrism was thus maintained largely due to senior Chinese IR scholars’ academic
practices in the 1980s.
In the mid-1990s, the disagreements between the two generations were muted
when Chinese IR scholars found common ground and developed a shared understand-
ing of Chinese IR. This consensus was formed largely in response to Huntington’s 1993
publication ‘The Clash of Civilizations’. Over a period of two years, Chinese scholars pub-
lished around 40 articles on Huntington’s thesis (Wang, 1995a, p. 51). From a Chinese
perspective, the most moderate argument was that Huntington provided an alternative
to materialistic approaches to IRs. Even to the moderate Chinese reviewer, however, the
argument that Chinese and Western civilizations would inevitably clash was not
accepted (Wang, 1995b, p. 7). Chinese scholars questioned the foundations of the argu-
ment which, according to one review, led Huntington to an ‘arbitrary conclusion’ based
on ‘relative, partial, and constantly changing reasons’ (Liu, 1994, p. 49). A second point
8 L. PENG

of criticism concerned the applicability of Huntington’s thesis. One scholar made the
point that ‘Huntington’s theory is theoretically untenable, practically incompatible with
the real world, and politically harmful’ (Jin, 1995, p. 9).
Chinese IR scholars established three criteria for evaluating Huntington’s thesis: eco-
nomic interest, the source of knowledge, and the identity of knowledge makers. These
criteria were, respectively, derived from the orthodox Marxist doctrine, a perspective
that focused on the academic value of non-Western experience, and a third perspective
on teleological concerns of knowledge makers. From the orthodox Marxist perspective,
Huntington exaggerated the role of ideological factors by failing to account for material-
istic interests in IRs (Feng, 1994, pp. 51–52; Shi, 1993, pp. 48–49); the second perspective
highlighted the academic value of non-Western experience in theorizing IRs and criti-
cized Huntington’s ignorance of a peace-oriented Chinese civilization (Hu, 1994; Tang,
1994, pp. 19–46); and from the third point of view, Huntington’s analysis of post-Cold
War IRs reflects American IR scholars’ deep concern with cultural/ethnic conflict ‘in their
own society’ (Wang, 1995a, p. 68) and ‘the impact of such conflicts on the world’ (Wang,
1995c, p. 263).
Despite the different evaluation criteria, Chinese scholars unanimously denounced
Huntington’s understanding of post-Cold War IRs. The nation-wide critique of Hun-
tington’s thesis triggered increasing skepticism of Western theories of IR which even-
tually resulted in the return of Sino-centrism. In the late 1990s, Chinese IR scholars
started focusing on identifying the source of knowledge and discerning the teleolog-
ical concerns of knowledge makers in their evaluations of Western IR. In the years
that followed, this mode of knowledge evaluation was widely observed in the dis-
course of Chinese IR (Ni & Guo, 1997, p. 13; Yang, 1999, p. 19; Ye, 2002, p. 32; Zhu &
Zhu, 1998, p. 23). Ye Zicheng and Pang Xun pointed out that ‘despite their different
origins, Western IR theory and diplomatic thought are in close correlation with West-
ern scholars’ generalization and analysis of Western history’ (2001, p. 25). Wang Yiwei
argued that Western IR theories reflected the thinking of Western powers because a)
the ‘Western (mainly European) international history” is the source of Western IR the-
ories and b) “serving the vested interests of Western countries’ is Western IR schol-
ars’ primary concern in regard to knowledge making (2002, pp. 4–7). Adhering to
Robert Cox’s tenet that theory is always for someone and for some purpose, Li Bin
understood American IR in terms of U.S hegemony (2003, p. 70). Qin Yaqing sup-
ported Li Bin’s teleological interpretation of IR theories. He argued that ‘such purpo-
siveness is more demonstrated unconsciously’. From this perspective, Western IR
theorists, including those pertaining to American IR and the English School, are
unconsciously relying on Western background knowledge when theorizing about IRs
(Qin, 2005a, pp. 170–174).
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Chinese scholars became increasingly skepti-
cal of the validity of Western IR theories, as they viewed these as academic knowledge
based on Western experience that served Western national interest. Senior Marxist
scholars continued to criticize Western IR theories for their ideological nature. Likewise,
junior scholars who adhered to Western IR theories in the 1980s began to question the
utility of Western perspectives. From the perspective of Chinese IR scholars, Western IR
theories failed to adequately account for Chinese experience and were increasingly
seen as exotic knowledge systems with limited applicability to China’s case. American
IR theories were considered particularly unreliable and harmful to the development of
Chinese IR because of their dominant position in academia (Pang, 2000; Wang, 1998;
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 9

Wang, 2003a). The increasing skepticism of Western IR theories resulted in Chinese

scholars returning to Chinese experience for academic inspiration. Sino-centrism was
thus further strengthened at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Sino-centrism in the Chinese School Movement

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Chinese IR scholars began to seek alternatives to
Western IR theories. In 2000, the effort to create a Chinese School of IR was headed by
Ren Xiao (2000) and Mei Ran (2000) whose works initiated the second wave of the Chi-
nese School Movement. The second wave differs from the first wave in several respects.
First, while the Chinese School Movement during the mid-1980s advocated a Marxist-
oriented IR theory with Chinese characteristics, the most recent version has sought to
develop a culture-oriented theory rooted in ancient and modern Chinese experience.
Second, in contrast to the first wave which was politically tainted, the incorporation of
academic terminology in the second wave has made it popular among Chinese academ-
ics. Hence, Chinese IR scholars who distanced themselves from the first wave have
embraced the scholarship produced by the second wave (Wang, 2003b, p. 11). Since the
second wave focuses on Chinese cultural and historical experience, it leads to the re-
establishment of Sino-centrism as the dominant epistemological position in Chinese IR.
Scholars of the second wave have adopted the two non-Marxist perspectives devel-
oped during the nation-wide critique of Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ to evaluate
Western IR theories. The underlying assumption is that Western IR theories have failed
to account for Chinese experience because of insufficient knowledge of Chinese histori-
cal/cultural experience on the part of Western scholars and a concern with national
interest, or a combination of both factors. Therefore, Chinese scholars have turned to
theoretical perspectives predominantly based on Chinese experience. At the very begin-
ning of the second wave, Sino-centrism is justified in a prudent and defensive tone. Mei
Ran explains that:
If we do independent and comprehensive research without mentioning words like ‘Chinese
School’, others may still use the American frameworks to measure our works. They may conclude
that our research is unqualified, or they may even pay no attention to our works because they
think we have failed to use American concepts, methodology, and theories to study the core
problems. (2000, p. 65)

With time, Chinese scholars have become confident in the applicability of Chinese expe-
rience and hence declared their adherence to a Sino-centric scholarship. The adherence
to Sino-centrism is observable in a more ambitious and determined tone as to ‘gradually
substitute, displace, and block concepts from the West with Chinese concepts’ to build
up ‘the Chinese social science language system’ (Su, 2014, p. 36).
Based on the increasing Sino-centrism inclination, Chinese scholars have developed
two approaches to Chinese School of IR theory: one draws on ancient Chinese thought
to theorize modern IRs while a second approach borrows from ancient Chinese logic to
reconstruct the Chinese way of making sense of the modern world (Lu, 2018, pp. 77–
90). While the approach rooted in Chinese thought has led to ‘moral realism’ (Yan, 2014,
2015) and the Shanghai School of IR theory (Ren, 2015; Su, 2013), the Chinese logic
approach has resulted in the relational theory of international politics (Qin, 2015, 2016a,
2016b). Unfortunately, none of these theories are original theoretical inventions: moral
realism modifies structural realism with ancient Chinese thought on morality; relational
theory reifies the ‘practice turn’ of constructivism with relationality-oriented Chinese
10 L. PENG

model of social practices; and, with Ren Xiao’s empirical studies of the tribute system as
the only exception (2013), the Shanghai School justifies the Chinese version of Marxism
with ancient Chinese thought on harmony. These Chinese IR theoretical achievements
are thus at best Chinese modifications of Western theories suffering from an inconsis-
tent internal logic caused by the effort to reconcile Western theoretical frameworks and
ancient Chinese experience (Lu, 2018, p. 91).
Under the influence of Sino-centrism, the second wave of the Chinese School Move-
ment has risked exaggerating the uniqueness of Chinese experience at the cost of his-
torical accuracy. Qin Yaqing, for example, denounces ‘the taxonomical thinking and
conflictual dialectics characteristics of the Western thought process’, which, according
to Qin, follows the Western ‘either-or logic’. Qin has suggested adopting the Chinese
‘both-and logic’, which he states is ‘less taxonomy-sensitive’ (2010b, pp. 132–138). How-
ever, based on my discussion of Sino-centrism in Chinese IR history, Chinese IR scholars
have been more inclined to accept the Western ‘either-or logic’ than the Chinese ‘both-
and logic’ in knowledge practices. They often reject Western experience-based knowl-
edge whereas embrace Chinese experience-based knowledge because of the source of
knowledge and the identity of the knowledge maker.
Qin Yaqing’s second effort to identify the uniqueness of the Chinese experience
similarly encounters the issue of historical accuracy due to the influence of Sino-cen-
trism in his work. For example, he diagnoses the absence of Chinese IR theory with
the lack of the sense of ‘international-ness’ of traditional Chinese thought. From this
perspective, Qin observes that ‘when the first professorship was set up in Aberystwyth
immediately after the World War I, the Chinese still believed that 'Half of The Analects
is enough to govern the whole world’ (2010a, p. 37). This analysis neglects that
Chinese intellectuals started learning from Western civilization in the mid-nineteenth
century (Qin, 2010c). It is important to note that Qin’s argument is at odds with his
previous research which demonstrates that the late-Qing intellectuals such as Kang
Youwei and Yan Fu formulated modern Chinese ideas by actively learning from the
West in the late nineteenth century (2006, p. 10). Thus, the historical inaccuracy of this
statement cannot be a result of ignorance, but the negative influence of Sino-centrism
on knowledge practices, which encourages Chinese scholars to run the risk of creating
unique Chinese experience at the cost of both historical accuracy and logical
consistency.
Under the influence of Sino-centrism, the second wave of the Chinese School Move-
ment has become political sensitive. Chinese IR scholarship has tended to speak in Chi-
na’s favor because the ‘core problematic’ of Chinese IR theoretical studies is defined in
terms of the peaceful integration of China into international society (Qin, 2005a, p. 175,
2005b, p. 69). One notable example is Qin Yaqing’s effort to bring Chinese philosophical
traditions into theoretical studies. In debates with Barry Buzan on the possibility of the
peaceful rise of China (Buzan, 2010; Qin, 2010b) and with Yan Xuetong on the change
and continuity of China’s international strategy (Qin, 2014; Yan, 2014), Qin upgraded his
‘procedural constructivism’ which emphasized ‘the independent ontology of social pro-
cesses’ (2009, p. 6) to ‘the relationality theory of world politics’ that highlighted the role
of the zhongyong dialectic in the Chinese interpretation of the international studies
(2015, p. 9, 2016a, pp. 39–41, 2016b, pp. 25–27). In effect, Qin changed the strategy of
defending China’s peaceful rise from emphasizing the ongoing interaction between the
rising power and the hegemon to arguing the continuity of China’s peaceful rise strat-
egy due to the non-conflictual Chinese way of thinking.
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 11

Similarly, Yan Xuetong’s efforts to construct an IR theory with ancient Chinese

thought takes on a political tone. Once an outspoken critic of the Chinese School Move-
ment’s Sino-centrism inclination (2006, p. 1), Yan gradually succumbed to Sino-centrism,
as he turned to ancient Chinese experience for original theoretical ideas about modern
IRs (2009) and became a leading figure of the second wave. Rooted in ancient Chinese
thought, Yan proposed ‘moral realism’ which encourages China to compete with the U.
S for wangdao, humane authority (2011a), which is ‘the highest form of world leadership
based on both material strength and morality’ (2014, p. 163). Yan thus answers Qin Yaq-
ing’s highly politized core problematic on China’s peaceful rise based on unique Chinese
experience, though the original concern of moral realism is the shift of world power cen-
ter in the international system (2012, p. 4, 2015, p. 3, 2016, pp. 1–2).
Despite differences in the research agenda, the first and the second wave of the Chi-
nese School Movement are both underpinned by Sino-centrism. To the scholars of the
first wave, Western IR theories were based on capitalist experience and should therefore
be replaced by IR theory based on Chinese socialist experience. To the scholars of the
second wave, Western IR theories were based on Western historical and cultural experi-
ence and thus needed to be replaced by IR theory based on Chinese experience. In
both waves, Chinese experience enjoyed a superior position in academic practice, as it
falsified Western IR theories and justified the expectation of Chinese IR theory. Similarly,
both waves attempted to replace Western experience-based IR theories with a Chinese
experience-based IR theory. In the early 2000s, one observes Chinese IR scholars from
different theoretical orientations embrace Sino-centrism, though they justified their
epistemological choice from different perspectives. Sino-centrism thus became the
dominant epistemological position of Chinese IR once again.

Conclusion
Sino-centrism has influenced the historical development of Chinese IR (Graph.1).
Although only occasionally visible in Chinese IR prior to 1949, it became the dominant
influence of Chinese scholarship with the founding of the PRC and in the Mao era.
Sino-centrism declined in the mid-1980s due to a generational split among Chinese
scholars, but its influence resurged in the mid-1990s when the older and younger gen-
erations of scholars found common ground in a nation-wide critique of Huntington’s
‘Clash of Civilizations’. In company with the increasing skeptical attitude towards West-
ern IR, Sino-centrism regained its dominance over Chinese IR at the turn of the
twenty-first century.
The Chinese School Movement represents the most recent expression of Sino-cen-
trism and has played an indispensable role in the continuity of the Sino-centric tradition.
The first wave of the movement maintained the influence of Sino-centrism in Chinese IR
in the 1980s when junior scholars turned to Western IR. The second wave accelerated
the resurgence of Sino-centrism at the turn of the twenty-first century. As observed in
Chinese evaluations of Western scholarship, the two stages of the Chinese School Move-
ment cannot be completely separated. The first stage of the movement has been under-
mined by its political stigma and the second wave is applauded for its academic image.
Similarly, the Chinese School Movement is not isolated from knowledge practices in his-
tory of Chinese IR because of the shared epistemological inclination in evaluating non-
Chinese experience. Therefore, the Chinese School Movement is deeply rooted in the
evolution of Chinese IR dating back to the late 1920s and should not be treated as an
12 L. PENG

academic phenomenon solely stimulated by the rise of China in the 1990s (Wang, 2013,
p. 5) or a ‘mooted’ call for non-Western theory (Acharya & Buzan, 2017, p. 20).
Under the influence of Sino-centrism, it is very difficult for the Chinese School Move-
ment to be a scientific enterprise in a strict sense. Therefore, the movement cannot gen-
erate meaningful scientific output regardless how hard Chinese scholars have worked
and how efficiently the image of reliable Chinese IR theory has been constructed. This
explains the anomalies brought about by the movement to models of scientific knowl-
edge. In fact, other than arriving at the consensus on the necessity of developing a non-
Western theory rooted in Chinese experience (Lu, 2010, pp. 103–105), the Chinese
School Movement has not achieved real theoretical breakthrough. Indeed, the three Chi-
nese ‘-isms’ proposed recently by leading Chinese IR scholars are at best Chinese refor-
mulations of Western IR theories instead of original Chinese theoretical innovations.
Therefore, the Chinese School of IR is still a discipline without its own theory (Qin,
2010a, p. 35; Wang & Han, 2013, p. 24).
Finally, the Sino-centrism tradition is responsible for not only the poverty of theoreti-
cal studies in contemporary Chinese IR (Su & Peng, 1999), but also the poverty of Chi-
nese IR since its birth in the late 1920s. Due to the negative influence of the Sino-
centrism tradition on knowledge making, Chinese IR scholars need to investigate the
mechanism with which this epistemological bias is constructed and maintained, and
then explore how to deconstruct instead of further legitimize it for real theoretical
achievement in the future. Only by doing so, Chinese and non-Chinese international
experience can be equally employed in Chinese international studies and a Chinese the-
oretical understanding of IRs can go beyond its Chinese social and historical boundaries
for universal meaning and recognition.

Graph 1 Evoluon of Chinese IR Sino-centrism Tradion

Strong

Weak

30S 40S 50S 60S 70S 80S 90S 00S 10S 20S

Chinese IR Sino-centrism tradion

Note
1. For a thorough discussion of the mechanism of Sino-centrism, please refer to ‘East or West, Chinese
Experience is the Best—A Social Interpretation of the Chinese IR Sino-centrism Tradition’
(forthcoming).

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Nick Onuf, James Cotton, Sun Jianzhong, Li Yi, Christina Faegri and the two
anonymous reviewers for their valuable insights and feedback. Any remaining errors are the author’s own.
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 13

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Lu Peng is a professor of Political Science at Fujian Normal University, China. He was a research fellow of
the Collaborative Innovation Centre of South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University in 2014-2017. He
received his PhD degree from the Australian National University. His research interests include Chinese IR
history, Chinese IR theory, and China’s foreign policy.

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