Ieee Guide For Abnormal Frequency Protection For Power Generatin

ANSI/IEEE C37.
106-1987
An American National Standard
IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency

Protection for Power Generating Plants
Sponsor
Power System Relaying Committee
of the
IEEE Power Engineering Society
Cosecretariats
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

National Electrical Manufacturers Association
Approved March 22, 1984

Reaffirmed June 18, 1992
IEEE Standards Board
Approved September 12, 1986

Reaffirmed November 2, 1993
American National Standards Institute
© Copyright 1987
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc
345 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017, USA
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise, wihtout the
prior written permission of the publisher.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. Downloaded on June 17,2014 at 03:41:02 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE Standards documents are developed within the Technical Committees of the IEEE Societies and the Standards
Coordinating Committees of the IEEE Standards Board. Members of the committees serve voluntarily and without
compensation. They are not necessarily members of the Institute. The standards developed within IEEE represent a
consensus of the broad expertise on the subject within the Institute as well as those activities outside of IEEE which
have expressed an interest in participating in the development of the standard.
Use of an IEEE Standard is wholly voluntary. The existence of an IEEE Standard does not imply that there are no other
ways to produce, test, measure, purchase, market, or provide other goods and services related to the scope of the IEEE
Standard. Furthermore, the viewpoint expressed at the time a standard is approved and issued is subject to change
brought about through developments in the state of the art and comments received from users of the standard. Every
IEEE Standard is subjected to review at least once every five years for revision or reaffirmation. When a document is
more than five years old, and has not been reaffirmed, it is reasonable to conclude that its contents, although still of
some value, do not wholly reflect the present state of the art. Users are cautioned to check to determine that they have
the latest edition of any IEEE Standard.
Comments for revision of IEEE Standards are welcome from any interested party, regardless of membership affiliation
with IEEE. Suggestions for changes in documents should be in the form of a proposed change of text, together with
appropriate supporting comments.
Interpretations: Occasionally questions may arise regarding the meaning of portions of standards as they relate to
specific applications. When the need for interpretations is brought to the attention of IEEE, the Institute will initiate
action to prepare appropriate responses. Since IEEE Standards represent a consensus of all concerned interests, it is
important to ensure that any interpretation has also received the concurrence of a balance of interests. For this reason
IEEE and the members of its technical committees are not able to provide an instant response to interpretation requests
except in those cases where the matter has previously received formal consideration.
Comments on standards and requests for interpretations should be addressed to:
Secretary, IEEE Standards Board

345 East 47th Street
New York, NY 10017
USA
Foreword
(This Foreword is not a part of ANSI/IEEE C37.106-1987, IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating
Plants.)
This standard is the result of the valuable input of not only the listed working group members who had this status at the
time of its approval, but those also who are listed as past members of the working group. One who deserves special
recognition is C. M. Shuster, who served as the first working group chairman and thus gave early guidance on the
format and substance of the proposed guide.
Preparation of the guide began in 1978 shortly after the publication of a report by the National Electric Reliability
Council (NERC) in July 1978. The title of the report was “Underfrequency and Undervoltage Relay Applications to
Large Turbine-Generators.” The guide thus responds to concerns and issues raised by the NERC report.
Some of the more important subjects that came under working group discussion and were accorded a place in the guide
were:
1) Generator over-/underfrequency capabilities

2) Turbine over-/underfrequency capabilities with a need to establish operating limits of turbine blades during
abnormal frequency operation
3) Components of the power plant that may be frequency sensitive
4) Generator/turbine underfrequency protection relay schemes
5) Coordination of generator/turbine protection schemes with existing system load shedding schemes
6) Generator/transformer volts/hertz protection
7) Special underfrequency considerations in nuclear power plants
The Accredited Standards Committee C37 on Power Switchgear had the following membership when it reviewed and
approved this document:
W. E. Laubach, Chair
C. H. White, Secretary
W. N. Rothenbuhler, Executive Vice-Chairman of High-Voltage Switchgear Standards
S. H. Telander, Executive Vice-Chairman of Low-Voltage Switchgear Standards
D. L. Swindler, Executive Vice-Chairman of IEC Activities
Organization Represented Name of Representative

Association of Iron and Steel Engineers J. M. Tillman
Electric Light and Power Group D. O. Craghead
R. L. Capra
D. A. Ditzler
K. D. Hendrix
J. H. Provanzana (Alt)
D. E. Soffrin (Alt)
D. T. Weston
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers H. W. Mikulecky
M. J. Beachy (Alt)
G. R. Hanks
R. P. Jackson (Alt)
C. A. Mathews
E. W. Schmunk
iii
Organization Represented Name of Representative
C. A. Schwalbe
C. E. Zanzie
National Electrical Manufacturers Association C. A. Wilson
T. L. Fromm
R. A. McMaster
R. O. D. Whitt
Tennessee Valley Authority R. C. St. Clair
Testing Laboratory Group L. Frier
W. T. O'Grady
R. W. Seelbach (Alt)
US Department of the Army Corps of Engineers H. K. Snyder
US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation R. H. Auerbach
US Department of the Navy, Naval Construction Battalion Center R. L. Clark
Western Area Power Authority G. D. Birney
At the time this guide was completed, the Working Group on Generating Plant Abnormal Frequency Protection had the
following membership:
C. J. Pencinger, Chair
J. Berdy T. L. Kaschalk E. T. Sage

J. J. Bonk L. E. Landoll H. S. Smith
D. C. Dawson J. R. Latham R. C. Stein
R. J. Fernandez G. R. Nail R. D. Stump
S. E. Grier G. C. Parr F. Von Roeschlaub
R. W. Haas J. W. Pope
Past members who have contributed review and comments are:
D. C. Adamson J. A. Imhof J. E. Waldron

W. A. Elmore C. M. Shuster F. Wolf
C. H. Griffin W. M. Strang R. C. Zaklukiewicz
The following persons were on the balloting committee that approved this document for submission to the IEEE
Standards Board:
R. F. Arehart R. W. Dempsey R. W. Hirtler

C. W. Barnett R. E. Dietrich S. H. Horowitz
E. A. Baumgartner J. B. Dingler F. B. Hunt
J. L. Blackburn W. A. Elmore T. L. Kaschalk
J. J. Bonk E. J. Emmerling D. K. Kaushal
J. R. Boyle R. J. Felton J. L. Koepfinger
B. Bozoki R. J. Fernandez B. L. Laird
H. J. Calhoun A. T. Giuliante L. E. Landoll
D. M. Clark S. E. Grier J. R. Latham
G. A. Colgrove C. H. Griffin H. Lee
D. H. Colwell R. W. Haas J. R. Linders
D. Dalasta R. E. Hart W. R. Lund
iv
G. J. Marieni J. W. Pope W. H. Van Zee
A. J. Mcconnell G. D. Rockefeller D. R. Volzka
F. N. Meissner B. D. Russell C. L. Wagner
R. J. Moran E. T. Sage J. E. Waldron
J. J. Murphy J. E. Stephens J. W. Walton
G. C. Parr A. Sweetana E. J. Weiss
R. W. Pashley E. F. Troy J. A. Zulaski
A. G. Phadke J. R. Turley
A. C. Pierce E. A. Udren
When the IEEE Standards Board approved this standard on March 22, 1984, it had the following membership:
James H. Beall, Chair

John E. May, Vice Chair
Sava I. Sherr, Secretary
J. J. Archambault Daniel L. Goldberg John P. Riganati

John T. Boettger Donald N. Heirman Frank L. Rose
J. V. Bonucchi Irvin N. Howell Robert W. Seelbach
Rene Castenschiold Jack Kinn Jay A. Stewart
Edward Chelotti Joseph L. Koepfinger * Clifford O. Swanson
Edward J. Cohen Irving Kolodny W. B. Wilkens
Len S. Corey George Konomos Charles J. Wylie
Donald C. Fleckenstein R. F. Lawrence
Jay Forster Donald T. Michael *
* Member emeritus
CLAUSE PAGE
1. Introduction and Scope .......................................................................................................................................1
2. References...........................................................................................................................................................1
3. Steam Generating Plant—Abnormal Frequency Operation................................................................................2
3.1 General Background .................................................................................................................................. 2

3.2 Generator Over-/Underfrequency Capability............................................................................................. 2
3.3 Turbine Over-/Underfrequency Capability ................................................................................................ 4
3.4 Power Plant Auxiliaries—UnderfrequencyConsiderations ....................................................................... 7
3.5 Underfrequency Protection Methods for Steam Turbines ......................................................................... 8
3.6 Coordination with System Load Shedding Scheme................................................................................. 13
3.7 Generator-Transformer Overexcitation.................................................................................................... 17
3.8 Generator-Transformer Volts/Hertz Protection ....................................................................................... 19
4. Nuclear Generating Plant—Special Consideration...........................................................................................22
4.1 General Background ................................................................................................................................ 22

4.2 Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)/Underfrequency Considerations............................................................. 22
4.3 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)/Underfrequency Considerations....................................................... 22
5. Combustion-Turbine Underfrequency Operation .............................................................................................23
5.1 General Background ................................................................................................................................ 23

5.2 Combustion-Turbine Underfrequency Capability ................................................................................... 24
5.3 Underfrequency Protection Philosophy, Relay Settings, and Guidelines ................................................ 24
5.4 Underfrequency Protection Considerations for Combined Cycle Generating Units ............................... 24
6. Bibliography......................................................................................................................................................25
Annex ............................................................................................................................................................................26
vi
An American National Standard
IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency

Protection for Power Generating Plants
1. Introduction and Scope
This guide has been prepared to assist the protection engineer in applying relays for the protection of generating plant
equipment from damage caused by operation at abnormal frequencies including overexcitation. Emphasis is placed on
the protection of the major generating station components at steam generating stations, nuclear stations, and on
combustion-turbine installations. Consideration is also given to the effect of abnormal frequency operation on those
associated station auxiliaries whose response can affect plant output.
The guide also presents background information regarding the hazards caused by operating generation equipment at
abnormal frequencies. It documents typical equipment capabilities and describes acceptable protective schemes.
Recommended methods for coordinating the underfrequency protective scheme with system load shedding schemes
are also included. Sufficient information is provided to apply suitable coordinated protection for given specific
situations.
2. References
[1] ANSI C50.13-1977, American National Standard Requirements for Cylindrical-Rotor Synchronous Generators.1
[2] ANSI/IEEE C57.12.00-1980, IEEE Standard General Requirements for Liquid-Immersed Distribution, Power, and
Regulating Transformers.2
[3] BAUMAN, H. A., HAHN, G. R., and METCALF, C. N. The Effect of Frequency Reduction on Plant Capacity and
on System Operation. AIEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-74, Feb 1955, pp 1632–1637.
[4] BUTLER, O. D. and SWENSON, C. J. Effect of Low Frequency and Low Voltage on Thermal Plant Capability and
Load Relief During Power System Emergencies—Effect of Reduced Voltage and/or Frequency Upon Steam Plant
Auxiliaries. AIEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-72, Feb 1955, pp 1628–1632.
[5] Electric Power Research Institute. RP 764—Research in Long-Term Power System Dynamics. Final Report No EL
367, prepared by General Electric Company, Feb 1977 and Final Report No EL 983, vols I and II, prepared by General
Electric Company, July 1982.
1ANSI publications can be obtained from the Sales Department, American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018.
2ANSI/IEEE publications can be obtained from the Sales Department, American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New York, NY
10018, or from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Service Center, Piscataway, NJ 08854.
ANSI/IEEE C37.106-1987 IEEE GUIDE FOR ABNORMAL FREQUENCY
[6] Electric Power Research Institute. RP 745—Development of Short-Term and Mid-Firm Simulation Techniques for
Large Interconnected Power Systems. Final Report No EL 596, prepared by Arizona Public Service and Arizona State
University, June 1979.
[7] Electric Power Research Institute. RP 849—Determining Load Characteristics for Transient Performances. Final
Report No EL 849, vols I–III, prepared by University of Texas at Arlington, May 1979; Final Report No EL 850, vols
I–IV, prepared by General Electric Company, Mar 1981; Final Report No EL 851, vol 1, prepared by Institut de
Recherche de l' Hydro Quebec, Nov 1980; and Final Report No EL 851, vol II, prepared by Institut de Recherche de
l' Hydro Quebec, Mar 1981.
[8] HOLGATE, R. The Effect of Frequency and Voltage. AIEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol
PAS-74, Feb 1955, pp 1637-1646.
[9] KEARNS, K. D., ROSSI, C. E., and GEETS, J. M. The Effects of Electrical System Underfrequency Transients on
Pressurized Water Reactors. Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, vol 15, no 2, Nov 12, 1972, p 828.
[10] SCHROEDER, T. W. Steam Plant Operation at Reduced Voltage and Frequency. Electric Light and Power, vol 29,
Aug 1951, pp 70–74.
[11] SMAHA, D. W., ROWLAND, C. R., and POPE, J. W. Coordination of Load Conservation with Turbine
Generator Underfrequency Protection.IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-99, May/June
1980, pp 1137–1145.
[12] UDREN, E. A. Load-Shedding and Frequency Relaying.Applied Protective Relaying, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, 1979, chap 21, p 2.
3. Steam Generating Plant—Abnormal Frequency Operation
3.1 General Background
There are two major considerations associated with operating a steam generating station at abnormal frequency. They
are
1) Protection of equipment from damage that could result from operation at abnormal frequency
2) Prevention of a cascading effect that leads to a complete plant shutdown as long as limiting conditions are not
reached during abnormal frequency operation
The major components of a steam plant that are affected by abnormal frequency operation are the generator and unit
step-up transformer, the turbine, and the station auxiliaries. In this section, the effect of abnormal frequency operation
on the various station components is discussed and various protective schemes are presented.
3.2 Generator Over-/Underfrequency Capability
While no standards have been established for abnormal frequency operation of synchronous generators, it is
recognized that reduced frequency results in reduced ventilation; therefore, operation at reduced frequency should be
at reduced kilovoltamperes (kVA). Figure 1 shows typical recommended maximum continuous loading at various
frequencies for 2-pole or 4-pole cylindrical rotor generators as published by two manufacturers.
2 Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved
PROTECTION FOR POWER GENERATING PLANTS ANSI/IEEE C37.106-1987
Figure 1—Generator Capability Versus Frequency
In view of reduced generator capability and expected increased loading during underfrequency conditions, the short-
time thermal capability of a generator could be exceeded. Operating precautions should be taken to stay within the
short-time thermal rating of the generator rotor and stator. The permissible short-time operating levels for both the
stator and rotor for cylindrical rotor synchronous generators are specified in ANSI C50.13-1977 [1] 3 and are shown in
Fig 2.
The underfrequency limitations on the generator, however, are usually less restrictive than the limitations on the
turbine, which are discussed in the next section.
Overfrequency is usually the result of a sudden reduction in load and, therefore, corresponds to light-load or no-load
operation of a generator. During overfrequency operation, machine ventilation is improved and the flux density
required for a given terminal voltage is reduced. Therefore, operation within the allowable overfrequency limits of the
turbine will not produce generator overheating as long as operation is within rated kilovoltamperes and 105% of rated
voltage.
3The numbers in brackets correspond to those of the references listed in Section 2; when preceded by B, they correspond to the bibliography in
Section 6
Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved 3
Figure 2—Generator Short-Time Thermal Capability
3.3 Turbine Over-/Underfrequency Capability
A turbine blade is designed to have its natural frequencies sufficiently displaced from rated speed and multiples of
rated speed (that is, the rated fundamental frequency and its harmonics) to avoid a mechanical resonant condition that
could result in excessive mechanical stresses in the blade. Excess stress can occur if the system damping is insufficient
to overcome the excitation stimulus produced by turbine steam flow. For a resonant condition, the vibratory stress can
be 300 times greater than the stress during nonresonant operating conditions.
Figure 3 is a Campbell diagram for a particular blade design that illustrates how a change in turbine speed can produce
excitation frequencies that coincide with the natural frequency of that blade. With sufficient stimulus, the mechanical
stresses produced in the blade can be potentially damaging and can lead to destructive failure after a period of time.
The number of natural frequency bands plotted is generally limited to those for which the turbine would likely produce
a sufficient level of stimulus to cause excessive stresses. The curves labeled 1 through 6 indicate the points where the
frequency is an integral multiple (that is, a harmonic) for a given turbine speed. The rated speed line illustrates that this
blade design does not have natural frequencies that coincide with 60 Hz or any harmonics up through the sixth.
However, speed deviations from rated speed would eventually cause an intersection with one or more of the natural
frequency bands at some multiple of the changed operating speed. Point A illustrates such a condition, and the
magnitude of stress in the vicinity about point A for a given stimulus will follow that of a typical resonance curve, as
shown in Fig 4.
Figure 3—Typical Tuned Blade Campbell Diagram
Figure 4—Typical Resonance Curve
The peak stress at resonance is limited only by system damping, which may be extremely low. Manufacturers have
determined that it is economically impractical to design long low-pressure turbine blades with sufficient strength to
withstand stresses due to mechanical resonance for all steam flow stimuli. Therefore, operation at frequencies other
than rated or near rated speed is time-restricted to the limits shown for the various frequency bands published by each
turbine manufacturer for various blade designs.
Figure 5—Steam Turbine Partial or Full-Load Operating Limitations During Abnormal Frequency
The abnormal frequency limits are generally based on worst-case conditions because
1) The natural frequencies of blades within a stage differ due to manufacturing tolerances
2) The fatigue strength may decline with normal operation for reasons such as pitting corrosion and erosion of
the blade edges
3) The limit should also recognize the effect of additional loss of blade life incurred during abnormal operating
conditions not associated with underspeed or overspeed operation
Figure 5 illustrates the most restrictive time limitations at various frequencies for operation of all the large steam-
driven turbines of five of the world's turbine manufacturers. Figure 6 is a composite representation developed from the
capability curves in Fig 5, using the most restrictive limits of the five manufacturers. The blank areas between 59.5
and 60.5 Hz are areas of unrestricted time operating frequency limits, while the dotted areas above 60.5 Hz and below
59.5 Hz are areas of restricted time operating frequency limits. Operation outside these areas is not recommended.
This curve was developed as a composite in order to evaluate the performance of different relay schemes. It is not
meant to be used as a standard of performance for steam turbines. It is recommended that the manufacturer be
consulted in order to obtain the applicable curve of the turbine to be studied.
Time spent in a given frequency band is cumulative but independent of the time accumulated in any other band. For
each incident, the first ten cycles in a given frequency band are not accumulated since some time is required for
mechanical resonance to be established in the turbine blading. For example, the composite curve indicates that
operation between 58.5 and 57.9 Hz is permitted for ten minutes before turbine blade damage is probable. If a unit
operates within this frequency band for one minute, then nine more minutes of operation within this band are permitted
over the life of the blade.
The abnormal frequency capability curves are applicable whenever the unit is connected to the system. These curves
also apply when the turbine generator unit is not connected to the system, if it is operated at abnormal frequency while
supplying its auxilliary load. During periods when the unit is being brought up to speed, being tested at no-load for
operation of the overspeed trip device, or being shut down, blade life will not be significantly affected if the
manufacturer's procedures are followed.
Figure 6—Steam Turbine Partial or Full-Load Operating Limitations During Abnormal Frequency
(Composite Worst-Case Limitations of Five Manufacturers in Fig 5)
3.4 Power Plant Auxiliaries—UnderfrequencyConsiderations
The ability of the steam supply system to continue operating during an extended period of underfrequency operation
is a function of the margin in capacity of the auxiliary motor drives and shaft-driven loads.
The most limiting auxiliary equipments are generally the boiler feed pumps, circulating water pumps, and condensate
pumps, since each percent of speed reduction causes a larger percent loss of capacity [3], [4]. The critical frequency at
which the performance of the pumps will affect the plant output will vary from plant to plant. However, tests and
experience have shown that the plant capability will begin to decrease by 57 Hz [4], and that frequencies in the region
of 53 to 55 Hz [3], [4], [8] are critical for continued plant operation due to the reduction in the output of the pumps.
In general, other plant auxiliaries have less influence on plant capability. For example, induced draft fans usually have
a design margin to accommodate an underfrequency condition of approximately 54 Hz before plant output is affected
[10]. Tests [4], [10] indicate little influence from other auxiliaries for modest underfrequency conditions (3 Hz), but at
more severe underfrequency conditions (6 Hz) the loss of capability becomes significant. Consequently, the minimum
safe frequency level for maintaining plant output is dependent on each plant and the equipment design and capacity
associated with each generating unit. However, as stated earlier, the turbine limitations, as shown in Figs 5 and 6,
indicate it is generally prohibitive to operate the turbine below 57 Hz. The effects of operating at below rated voltage
on the performance of station auxiliary equipment are not covered in this guide.
3.5 Underfrequency Protection Methods for Steam Turbines
Section 3.3 of this guide describes the capability of steam turbines during abnormal frequency operation. This section
will describe possible protection methods for preventing turbine operation outside the prescribed limits. The
discussion will be limited to underfrequency protection. Overfrequency relay protection is generally not applied
because governor runback controls or operator action are counted upon to correct the turbine speed. However, during
an underfrequency operation, it may not be possible to restore system frequency due to control limitations and
overload conditions.
3.5.1 System Load Shedding
If system load shedding is provided, then it is considered as the primary turbine underfrequency protection.
Appropriate load shedding can cause the system frequency to return to normal before the turbine abnormal limit is
exceeded.
It is now common practice to drop load by automatic underfrequency relays in order to maintain a load-to-generation
balance during a system overload [11]. The amount of load shed varies with coordinating regions and individual utility
practices from 25-50% or more. The frequency trip points and number of steps also vary. Two examples of typical
schemes are given in the Appendix, Tables (A.1) and (A.2).
3.5.2 Need for Turbine Protection
In designing underfrequency load shedding systems, it is necessary to make assumptions about the degree to which a
normally interconnected system may break up into islands during a major disturbance. On strongly interconnected
systems, these assumed islands may be as large as an entire region or system. Load shedding is then provided to permit
frequency recovery in each island for the maximum expected generation deficiency.
If unforeseen circumstances occur, it is possible that a system may break into islands different from those assumed in
the load shedding design. These islands may not contain sufficient load shedding within their boundaries to permit
frequency recovery. If the system design is such that this type of islanding is possible, underfrequency protection of
turbine generators should be considered as a means to reduce the risk of steam turbine damage in the islanded area. In
addition, if it is credible that the load shedding system may fail (as could occur on a system sensing frequency at a
central location and using communication channels for tripping), turbine generator frequency protection could provide
backup protection against such a failure.
Generator underfrequency tripping should be considered as the last line of defense, as it is very likely to cause an area
blackout. This risk should be weighed against the risk of possible turbine damage, conceivably to the point of failure,
if backup protection is not provided.
3.5.3 Protective System Philosophy
As examples, two schemes are described in 3.5.5 for abnormal frequency protection of steam turbine generators.
Philosophy common to both schemes is presented in this section.
A turbine underfrequency protection scheme should be adaptable in order to be able to protect turbines with different
operating frequency limits. It should also be flexible enough to be adjusted in case underfrequency operating limits are
revised by turbine designers due to new technological discoveries and improved materials applications. The protective
system should have a level of security consistent with other relays applied for generator protection. In most power
systems in North America, the probability of an underfrequency event is low; therefore, most of the time, the relay
system will be called upon to restrain from tripping during normal frequency operation. Station operation information
in the form of alarms for an underfrequency condition is also important. Depending on training and experience, an
operator might not react properly to an alarm, and an automatic protective scheme should be considered.
3.5.4 Criteria for Underfrequency Protection
The following design criteria are suggested as guidelines in the development of an underfrequency protection scheme:
1) Establish trip points and time delays based on the manufacturer's turbine abnormal frequency limits
2) Coordinate the turbine generator underfrequency tripping relays with the system automatic load shedding
program
3) Failure of a single underfrequency relay should not cause an unnecessary trip of the machine
4) Failure of a single underfrequency relay to operate during an underfrequency condition should not jeopardize
the overall protective scheme
5) Static relays should be considered as their accuracy, speed of operation, and reset capability are superior to
the electromechanical relays
6) The turbine underfrequency protection system should be in service whenever the unit is synchronized to the
system, or while separated from the system but supplying auxiliary load
7) Provide separate alarms to alert the operator for each of the following:
a) A situation of less than the nominal system frequency band on the electrical system
b) An underfrequency level detector output indicating a possible impending trip of the unit
c) An individual relay failure
3.5.5 Turbine Underfrequency Protection Relay Schemes
Ideally, based on the turbine capabilities, a number of underfrequency relays and timers would be required to fully
protect the turbine. To avoid unnecessary generator trips during a disturbance from which the system could recover,
and to minimize stresses on the turbine, a protection scheme providing five or six frequency bands is desirable. The
ideal protection system would accumulate time spent in each underfrequency band and preserve it in a nonvolatile
memory.
Two protective schemes are presented here that provide different levels of protection and utilize the turbine abnormal
frequency capability to different degrees.
Scheme 1 provides more complete protection and allows full utilization of the abnormal frequency capability of the
turbine, but is more complicated than Scheme 2.
3.5.5.1 Scheme 1
A multisetpoint scheme with frequency band logic and accumulating counters (see Fig 7, block diagram).
Protective Scheme 1 is designed to closely follow the turbine manufacturer's limit curves for underfrequency
operation. This scheme can be applied where it is desired to fully protect the turbine and allow as much
underfrequency operation as possible before tripping.
Protection Scheme 1 takes into account the following factors in its application:
1) It utilizes six underfrequency setpoints in addition to supervision steps and takes into account the cumulative
time spent in each underfrequency band (multistage underfrequency relays can be used to reduce the number
of relays required if desired).
2) Scheme 1 accumulates the time spent in each underfrequency band independently and stores it in a
nonvolatile memory.
3) A time delay of ten cycles (in addition to relay operating time) should occur before accumulation begins to
allow the underfrequency blade resonance to be established to avoid unnecessary accumulation of time.
4) When the time for a particular band is used up, an output is given that can be used for alarms or tripping.
5) All frequency steps are supervised so that two static relay steps in series are required for an output.
6) All outputs are event recorder monitored.
7) Where possible, units are tripped to station service load if the turbine and boiler limits allow. Each machine
should be reviewed for its capability to operate during a full-load rejection. In general, units with drum type
boilers are more capable of continued operation after full-load rejection than are units with once-through
boilers. Units with once-through boilers may be tripped sequentially to prevent turbine overspeeding. In any
case, the unit manufacturer should be consulted before any tripping scheme is implemented.
3.5.5.2 Application Example—Scheme 1 (See Fig 8)
The following is an application example showing Scheme 1 applied to protect a turbine that has the generalized turbine
abnormal frequency operating limits shown in Fig 6.
The settings are selected based upon the following criteria:
1) The frequency set points are set equal to or slightly higher than the steps of the turbine abnormal frequency
operating limits
2) The time delay setpoints are set equal to or slightly lower than the steps of the turbine blade time restricted
operating limits
3) The settings are modified in some cases to provide coordination with the load shedding scheme
The dotted line in Fig 8 represents the characteristic of the relay setting, whereas the solid line represents the turbine
abnormal frequency operating limit for time-restricted operation.
The sample setting shown provides some margin under the turbine damage limit for the trouble-free operation curve
and maintains coordination with the system load shedding curve. Counter accumulation times for each band during a
system frequency excursion are also shown.
Table 1 summarizes the frequency and timer settings used in this example for Scheme 1.
Figure 7—Protection Scheme 1—Block Diagram
Figure 8—Application Example—Scheme 1
3.5.5.3 Scheme 2
A four-setpoint scheme—two alarms, a slow trip, and a fast trip (for a block diagram, see Fig 9).
Scheme 2 is a simple protection system using two frequency steps. It may be considered for applications where it is
deemed acceptable to have less than full time versus frequency relay protection for the turbine. Extremely low
probability of underfrequency occurrence and high reliance on the system load shedding program are factors that
would be evaluated in considering use of Scheme 2.
Protection Scheme 2 takes into account the following factors in its application:
1) For severe frequency decays (below 58.5 Hz), automatic relay action is taken. For less severe frequency
decays (59.5-58.5 Hz), the system operator will be relied on to take corrective action.
2) The protection engineer should consider an acceptable percentage of available abnormal frequency operating
time (Fig 6) for the turbine.
3) Scheme 2 does not accumulate time for multiple underfrequency events. Therefore, this scheme does not
protect for multiple underfrequency events whose sam is greater than the turbine abnormal frequency
capability.
4) If the frequency relay timer is set for 50% of the abnormal frequency capability, one event using 50% of the
capability will cause a relay operation.
5) Two static relays must operate for a trip output.
Table 1—Frequency and Timer Settings for Scheme 1

Frequency Band
(Hz) Time Delay Comments
60.0–59.5 — Continuous operation allowed.
Continuous underfrequency alarm.

59.5 and below 1.5 s Time delay to avoid spurious
alarms.
59.5–58.8 50.0 min* Alarm “underfrequency limit

58.8–58.0 9.0 min* exceeded.” These bands may
58.0–57.5 1.7 min* trip or alarm depending on
57.5–57.0 14.0 s* individual utilities’ practices.
57.0–56.5 2.4 s* For “alarm,” the operator has
56.5 and below 1.0 s* these respective times to shed load
or isolate the unit (based on the
limits of Fig 6).
*Indicates total accumulated time set on accumulating timer.
3.5.5.4 Application Example—Scheme 2 (see Fig 10)
3.5.5.4.1 Turbine Protection
The generalized abnormal frequency turbine limits given in 3.3 (Fig 6) apply to this example. In the following
example, the frequency relay timer setting is adjusted for 50% of the allowable time in the given frequency band.
The dotted line in Fig 10 represents the characteristic of the relay setting, whereas the solid line represents the turbine
damage limit for trouble-free operation.
Table 2 summarizes the frequency and timer settings used in this example for Scheme 2.
3.6 Coordination with System Load Shedding Scheme
3.6.1 Introduction
An underfrequency relaying scheme that protects a steam turbine from the effects of underfrequency should coordinate
with other underfrequency protection schemes used on the connected system. Most large systems now have a load
shedding scheme operated by underfrequency relays. Such a scheme will increase the likelihood of recovering from
such a disturbance if properly applied.
The modern steam turbine usually is a sufficiently large part of the system generation such that tripping during a
recoverable underfrequency condition could prevent system recovery. Therefore, the turbine underfrequency
protection scheme should not operate until the automatic load shedding scheme has operated to maintain the system
frequency at an operable level.
3.6.2 Requirements
In order to coordinate a steam turbine underfrequency protection scheme with a system automatic load shedding
scheme, the following information is required:
1) A frequency response characteristic of the system for the conditions to be considered, including the effects of
the automatic load shedding scheme used
2) A time-frequency characteristic of the proposed turbine underfrequency scheme
3.6.3 System Frequency Response
While the approximate frequency response characteristic of a small islanded system is relatively easy to determine
from information on generator inertia constants and load generation imbalance, a precise determination requires
correct modeling of the loads, turbine and boiler control, etc. For a large interconnected system, modeling of loads,
turbine and boiler control, area load-frequency controls, and spinning reserves are difficult to include in a simple
representation of the system. The system load may vary with frequency, as well as voltage, which is also affected by
imbalance of load and generation. The generation inertia constants may vary throughout the mix of steam-turbine,
hydro, and combustion-turbine generators in the island under consideration. If the system has islanded, each island
will probably have a different mixture of the above types of generation.
Figure 9—Protection Scheme 2—Block Diagram
The islanded system frequency response is determined primarily by the system inertia constant and the magnitude of
the internal overload, which is affected by the automatic load shedding scheme of each of the systems included in the
island. The smaller the inertia constant, the faster the frequency decline for a given overload. Newer generating units
may have inertia constants of 2 or 3, since the trend in turbine generator design is toward larger outputs with smaller
rotor masses. Older generators with massive rotors had inertia constants as large as 10.
Large generating units with smaller inertia constants will tend to dictate the composite system inertia constants, as may
be seen from the following equation [12]:
H 1 MVA 1 + H 2 MVA 2 + …H n MVA n
H system = -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
MVA 1 + MVA 2 + …MVA n
where subscripts 1,2,…n refer to individual generating units within the system.
MW – s
H in ------------------- on machine base
MVA
MVA1, … etc
machine base
A system's frequency response characteristic can be determined by using a transient stability type of computer
program capable of determining system voltage and frequency during a disturbance caused by a sudden imbalance of
load and generation. Such a program should be used very carefully with full awareness of the effects of the modeling
used with the program.
Figure 10—Application Example—Scheme 2
Table 2—Frequency and Timer Settings for Scheme 2

Frequency
Band (Hz) Time Delay Comments
No relay action—turbine can operate

60.0–59.5 — continuously.
59.5 None Frequency recorder alarms.
System operator must shed load or isolate the

59.5–58.5 — unit within 30 min (based on limits of Fig 6).
58.5–57.0 5.0 min These bands may trip or alarm

57.0 and below 1s depending on individual utilities’ practices.
For “alarm,” the operator has these respective
times to shed load or isolate the unit (based on
the limits of Fig 6).
A utility should identify the condition or conditions of overload or loss of generation from which it can reasonably
expect to recover. A load shedding scheme can then be applied to optimize the system frequency response.
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has sponsored several research programs to determine the methods and
tools for simulating a system time versus frequency characteristic. Programs were developed that provide time versus
frequency characteristics for various types of systems with various mixes of generation and load imbalance. These
programs are lisited in [5], [6], and [7].
3.6.4 Turbine Protection Time-Frequency Characteristic
When a scheme for turbine underfrequency protection is determined and relay setting tentatively determined, a time
versus frequency curve can be drawn for the scheme (see Figs 8 and 10).
3.6.5 Coordination
The system frequency response should be compared with the turbine protection characteristic to determine if
coordination between the two exists. For example, in Fig 8 the relay characteristic is a series of frequency bands. In
order to trip, the system frequency must remain inside a particular band (that is, below the pick-up point) in excess of
the time setting for that particular band. In Fig 8, the 57.5–58.0 Hz band is set at 1.7 minutes. The frequency remains
below 57.5 and 58.0 Hz for 0.012 minutes; therefore, the relay would not trip on this incident alone. However, the time
in a band may be cumulative depending on the scheme used and the previous history may have stored sufficient time
such that this incident could cause the relay to trip. Precaution should be taken to assure that the turbine protection
frequency relay has sufficient associated time delay to prevent tripping on a recoverable swing. The protection
engineer should decide how much margin is necessary. This may be influenced by whether the relay scheme trips the
turbine or alarms. There has not been sufficient experience with these turbine protection schemes to determine the
required margin by experience, so one should rely on judgment at this time.
If there is insufficient margin between a recoverable swing and tripping a turbine for a projected system frequency
response, there are several options available:
1) Modify the load shedding scheme by increasing the number of steps or the amount of load to be shed. This
should change the frequency response sufficiently to allow the desired margin to be obtained.
2) Modify the turbine protection scheme to take additional risk of loss of blade life for the turbine.
3) Accept that, for worst-case conditions, coordination is not possible for the degree of turbine protection
desired.
Options 1 or 2 could be employed to add margin to the scheme. The user should decide what is the most important for
his application and make a decision accordingly. In general, option 2 would be the least desirable compromise to make.
The best choice would be to go as far as possible or practical with option 1 before having to resort to options 2 or 3.
3.7 Generator-Transformer Overexcitation
Overexcitation of generators and transformers may result in thermal damage to cores due to excessively high flux in
the magnetic circuits. Excess flux saturates the core steel and flows into the adjacent structure causing high eddy
current losses in the core and adjacent conducting materials. Severe overexcitation can cause rapid damage and
equipment failure.
Since flux is directly proportional to voltage and inversely proportional to frequency, the unit of measure for excitation
is defined as per unit voltage divided by per unit frequency, volts/hertz (V/Hz). Overexcitation exists whenever the per
unit volts/hertz exceeds the design limits of the equipment; for example, a large steam-turbine generator designed for
a voltage limit of 1.05 per unit at rated frequency will experience overexcitation whenever the per unit volts/hertz
exceeds 1.05. Should the voltage exceed 105% at rated frequency, or the frequency go below 95% at rated voltage,
overexcitation will exist.
3.7.1 Generator-Transformer Overexcitation Limitations
The manufacturer's volts/hertz limit should be obtained individually for the transformer and the generator. The
transformer and generator volts/hertz limits are generally in the form of curves (Fig 11). Some generator
manufacturers recommend protective relay settings instead cf a capability curve.
It should be noted that the limiting condition for the generator step-up transformer (GSU) is the voltage at the high-
voltage terminals in accordance with paragraph 4.1.6 of ANSI/IEEE C57.12.00-1980 [2]. This paragraph states that
transformers shall be capable of operating continuously at full load, with a secondary (highside GSU) voltage and
volts/hertz no greater than 105%, a power factor of 80% or higher and frequency at least 95% of rated values. At no
load it shall be capable of operating continuously with a voltage and volts/hertz no greater than 110% of rated values.
The full-load operating requirement can be demonstrated by the following example. The low-voltage terminals of the
GSU must have the ability to operate at any voltage that results from subtracting the voltage drop across the leakage
reactance vectorially.
Transformer rating: 806.4 MVA @ 0.8 p.f.

lagging VH = 500 kV
VL = 22.8 kV
Generator rating: 24 kV
NOTE — In this example, the transformer low-winding voltage rating is 95% of the generator voltage rating.
Figure 11—Overexcitation Limitations (No-Load Conditions—Various Manufacturers)
1 per unit load at 0.8 p.f. lagging with VH = 105% yields the following percent current at rated MVA load:
The low-side voltage VL = 113.18% of the 22.8 kV rating.
This is (22.8)(113.18%)/24 = 107.52% on the generator rating.
The calculated voltage of 107.52% exceeds the generator-rated voltage limitation of 105%. Therefore, the high-side
voltage, VH, must be limited to approximately 102%.
This calculation demonstrates that the no-load transformer operating requirement of 110% is more stringent than the
113.18% full-load requirement calculated above. Volts/hertz protection should be based on the 110% over-voltage limit.
Note that the transformer over-excitation limitation curves in Fig 11 asymptotically approach the 110% volts/hertz limit.
The limit curves should be modified to reflect differences, if any exist, in equipment voltage ratings resulting in a
single volts/hertz limit for the generator-transformer unit connected scheme. To determine the generator-transformer
volts/hertz limit, the curve for the generator step-up transformer (GSU) should be plotted on the generator voltage
base, together with the generator limits.
Assume that the generator volts/hertz limit curve for manufacturer 2 and the transformer volts/hertz limit curve for
manufacturer 5 describe the volts / hertz capability of the unit connected scheme in the previous example. Since, in this
example, the transformer low-voltage rating is 95% of the generator voltage rating, the transformer curve must be
lowered by a factor of 0.95 and replotted on the generator volts/ hertz limit curve as shown in Fig 12.
Figure 12—Dual-Level Volts/Hertz Setting Example
3.8 Generator-Transformer Volts/Hertz Protection
Volts/hertz protection needs generally arise from different situations than those for which turbine underfrequency
protection is provided. Turbine-generator shutdown with the automatic voltage regulator left in service, sudden load
rejection with the automatic voltage regulator out of service, and manual excitation adjustment during startup with
faulty metering are events that support the need for volts/hertz protection. The following recommendations show
volts/hertz protection schemes that provide protection for both the generator and transformer on unit connected
schemes. The more commonly employed methods are discussed.
3.8.1 Volts/Hertz Limiter or Regulator
One approach to providing overexcitation protection is to use a volts/hertz limiter that is available with the automatic
voltage regulators used on some generators. The volts/hertz signal is combined with the voltage regulator signal to
limit generator field current to hold the generator output voltage to safe volts/hertz values. For example, a limiter set
for a maximum volts/hertz of 105% will maintain this value for all frequencies below 1/1.05 of normal frequency.
For frequencies above 1/1.05 per unit of normal frequency, the voltage regulator will maintain the set value of voltage.
The limiter is usually supplemented with volts/hertz relaying that can initiate protective action after a time delay by
tripping the machine. This provides protection should the voltage regulator malfunction or be out of service.
3.8.2 Volts/Hertz Protection
Some manufacturers recommend that the volts/hertz protection should be in service at all times. Some users disable
the volts/hertz protection when the unit breakers are closed since system load should limit the volts/hertz to an
acceptable level. When the unit breakers are closed, the decision to trip or not should be based on system design and
operating considerations. Any system conditions such as opening of remote breakers that can cause an excessive volts/
hertz condition on the transformer or generator would require that the relay be connected to trip to avoid damage.
3.8.2.1 Dual-Level Volts/Hertz Protection
The dual-level volts/hertz protection scheme employs two separate volts/hertz relays and two timers. These are
connected such that relay A initiates timer A, and relay B initiates timer B.
Please refer to Fig 12 for a dual-level volts/ hertz setting example. The settings for the two relay steps should be
derived using the following recommendations.
Relay A. The level detector pickup for relay A should be set in the range of 1.07–1.10 per unit volts/hertz on the
generator voltage base. The time delay for relay A should be selected in conjunction with the relay B level detector
pickup to provide coordination with the minimum limit curve.
Relay B. The level detector pickup for relay B should be set in the range from 1.18–1.20 per unit volts/hertz. The time
delay for relay B should be in the range of 2–6 seconds to prevent transient voltage and frequency excursions from
causing unnecessary unit tripping. It should be recognized that the actual level of volts/hertz would be in excess of the
trip setting, hence the time setting should be kept low, as indicated, to provide adequate protection.
If manufacturers’ recommended relay settings are available for a given installation, these settings should be verified
against the limit curves and applied to the dual-level protection scheme. This example shows the appropriate setting for
the combination volts/hertz limit curve for the generator and step-up transformer.
Relays A and B should trip the generator breaker and the generator field through separate lockout relays for
redundancy. The need to trip the turbine will depend on whether the unit is on-line or off-line when the overexcited
condition occurs, the type of unit, and the boiler design. If the unit is off-line at the time over-excitation occurs, it is
only necessary to trip the generator field. However, manufacturers’ tripping recommendations should be followed,
when available.
For units that can operate under the control of a dc regulator (manual control), the relaying should be so designed that
it initiates tripping with no intentional time delay when a condition occurs that causes the volts/hertz ratio to exceed
1.10 per unit. This action will assist in preventing machine damage for very high volts/ hertz conditions that result from
having rated field current on the generator at no load.
3.8.2.2 Volts/Hertz Connection Details
Typical volts/hertz relays are single-phase devices. Complete and redundant protection should include the following
considerations:
1) Connect one set of relays to voltage transformers that supply the voltage regulator. A second set should be
connected to a different set of voltage transformers, such as those used for metering. Battery supplies should
be separated.
2) Operators should recognize conditions of a voltage transformer fuse failure. Sensing of all three phase
voltages may be necessary.
3) Avoid having a voltage balance relay (device 60) block all protection.
4) Provide alarm and inhibit circuits that prevent exceeding a safe level of excitation when a unit is off-line.
3.8.3 Inverse Characteristic Volts/Hertz Protection
A volts/hertz relay with an inverse characteristic can be applied to protect a generator or transformer, or both, from
excessive volts/hertz. A minimum operate level of volts/hertz and time delay can usually be set to provide adequate
protection for the generator-transformer combined volts/hertz characteristics, as discussed in 3.7.1. The
manufacturer's volts/hertz limitations should be obtained if possible, and used to determine the combined
characteristic.
One version of the inverse characteristic volts/hertz relay has a separately set volts/ hertz unit with an adjustable
definite time delay. This unit can be connected to trip or alarm and extend the ability of the relay characteristic to
match the volts/hertz characteristic of a generator-transformer combination.
The generator manufacturer's tripping recommendations should be followed if available. Most manufacturers are now
recommending that the unit be tripped with no additional time delay by the volts/hertz relay.
Figure 13 shows an example of a volts/hertz relay with an inverse characteristic set to protect a typical generator-
transformer combination.
Figure 13—Volts/Hertz Setting Example
4. Nuclear Generating Plant—Special Consideration
This section presents guidelines associated with protection of nuclear generating plants during abnormal frequency
conditions. The material presented deals mainly with the underfrequency considerations that affect operation of the
nuclear steam system. The turbine generator considerations for a nuclear plant are, in general, the same as described
in Section 3 and no further discussion is included here. In general, the main effect of frequency changes on a nuclear
steam system is that output of electrical pumps in the system will vary with frequency. This will cause various coolant
flows in the system to change. In some cases, reduced flows in parts of the system may be detrimental to equipment,
and safeguards should be considered. The boiling water reactor (BWR) and the pressurized water reactor (PWR) are
analyzed separately because their responses to abnormal frequency operation differ.
4.2 Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)/Underfrequency Considerations
Some boiling water reactor (BWR) units employ nonseismically qualified motor-generator sets to supply power to the
reactor protection systems. To ensure that these systems have the capability to perform their intended safety functions
during a seismic event for which an underfrequency condition of the motor-generator sets or alternate supply could
damage components of these systems, redundant underfrequency relays are provided. This protection is installed
between each motor-generator set and its respective reactor protection system bus, and between the alternate power
source and the reactor protection system buses. Operation of either or both of the underfrequency detectors associated
with a reactor protection system bus will cause a half-scram of the unit. If one or both of the underfrequency detectors
operate on each of the reactor protection system buses, a full scram of the unit occurs.
There are several factors that should be considered in the setting of the underfrequency relays for BWR units:
1) The tolerance characteristic of the underfrequency relay

2) The slip characteristic of the motor-generator (MG) sets
3) The characteristics of the power system load shedding schemes
A combination of a plus tolerance on the underfrequency relay and a relatively high slip of the motor-generator sets
may make coordination with the load shedding schemes difficult to attain. As an example, an underfrequency relay
with a 2% tolerance and a motor-generator set with a 1% slip characteristic would require an underfrequency setting
of less than 57 Hz to obtain coordination with a load shedding program that limits the decline in frequency to 58 Hz
for typical islanding conditions.
4.3 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)/Underfrequency Considerations
The fundamental effect of abnormal system frequency on a nuclear generating plant employing a pressurized water
reactor (PWR) is to the reactor coolant flow rate. The flow rate of the reactor coolant is proportional to the reactor
coolant pump speed, which varies with the power system frequency.
PWR design requires that the coolant flow rate through the reactor core be proportioned to the rate of heat production
in the reactor. This prevents the actual heat flux in the reactor from reaching the critical heat flux level, at which point
fuel rod cladding damage would occur due to localized steam bubble or void formation at the cladding surface. The
measure of this critical heat flux to the actual heat flux (measured or calculated) is called the departure from nucleate
boiling ratio, or DNBR. Historically, PWR design called for minimum DNBRs of approximately 1.3, but newer design
ratios on some reactors are smaller.
If the power system frequency at a nuclear generating plant collapses, the reactor will be tripped automatically when
limiting reduced coolant flow conditions exist. Sufficient coolant can then be delivered to the reactor core by the
reactor coolant pumps driven by motors with huge flywheels that are sized to coast down at a rate consistent with the
reactor core design.
When the reactor trips, normally the generator synchronizing breakers are tripped and the reactor core is shut down—
but the reactor coolant pump motors remain connected to the power system. If the power system frequency decays at
a rate greater than the designed “freewheel” coast down rate of the flywheel, the reactor coolant flow rate will be
forced down by the decaying system to the point where the plant's DNBR may not be maintained. This is one of the
more serious impacts that underfrequency can impose on a PWR plant.
One solution that was proposed for this condition was to automatically separate the reactor coolant pumps from the
power system if the system frequency rate of decay exceeds the flywheel's coast down rate.
To accomplish this, however, it is required that the switchgear supplying the reactor coolant pumps meet all the
requirements of Class 1E equipment in a nuclear power plant; this is difficult and costly to achieve. The preferred
approach is to apply an underfrequency relay to trip the reactor at a frequency such that the DNBR does not go below
a minimum specified level during the time the control rods are lowered and the coolant pumps are coasting down.
Since the coast down is related to the system frequency decay rate, a determination of the maximum system decay rate
must be made.
It is recognized by the electric utility industry that the frequency rate of decay in most power systems will probably not
exceed 5 Hz/s. Regardless, it should be noted that the frequency decay rates calculated by methods excluding practical
limits of generator loading or system damping are conservatively high.
In most power systems that are left isolated and overloaded, system voltage will decline along with system frequency.
This effect will result in the rate of decay of system frequency being less than the freewheel coast down rate of the
reactor coolant pumps. Where this condition can be shown to exist, it has been determined that the requirement to
include underfrequency tripping of the reactor is not necessary.
In summary, the following parameters should be considered when applying underfrequency protection to a PWR plant:
1) The designed DNBR of the plant

2) The size of the coolant system with respect to the reactor core
3) The rating of the core with respect to loading
4) The maximum rate of power system frequency decay that may be encountered
5) Coordination with power system load shedding schemes
6) System voltage conditions that exist at the time of a system frequency decline
As may be expected from examination of the listed parameters, a joint effort of the manufacturer and the utility
engineer is required to arrive at an underfrequency setting that assures adequate reactor core protection. But it is
generally considered the customer's responsibility to ascertain that the manufacturer's plant design specifications are
adequate to cover worst-case underfrequency conditions on the utility system.
5. Combustion-Turbine Underfrequency Operation
The underfrequency limitations for combustion-turbine generators (CTGs) are similar in many respects to the
limitations for steam-turbine generators. There are, however, certain differences in the design and application of CTGs
that may result in different protective requirements. These differences are emphasized in the following subsections.
5.2 Combustion-Turbine Underfrequency Capability
While manufacturers should be consulted for their specific recommendations, CTG underfrequency capability for
continuous operation generally ranges from 57–60 Hz as limited by the turbine blades.
CTGs have a unique operating control requirement that, to some extent, protects the turbine generator during
underfrequency conditions. A combustion turbine may lose air flow if an attempt is made to maintain full output
during underfrequency conditions. Loss of air flow would result in eventual unit trip on blade over-temperature. In
general, CTGs are equipped with a control that automatically unloads the unit by reducing fuel flow as speed
decreases. This control has the overall effect of protecting the blading from damage and the generator from
overheating during underfrequency operation of the unit.
5.3 Underfrequency Protection Philosophy, Relay Settings, and Guidelines
5.3.1 Protection Philosophy and Relay Settings
One reason that combustion-turbine generators are installed is for peak shaving purposes because of their fast startup
capability. Another important application of fast startup is its potential for aiding in the prevention of system collapse
and in system restoration following such a collapse. Underfrequency protection philosophy should reflect these
applications and, therefore, may be substantially different from the philosophy for larger, steam-driven units.
Underfrequency conditions will occur when part of a system has become islanded with insufficient local generation.
This generation may contain a mixture of CTGs and steam units. If the proportion of CTGs is negligible, no general
recommendations for underfrequency protection can be made, and the user should tailor the protection to the specific
application of each unit. If the proportion of CTGs is significant, the premature loss of these units may result in the loss
of the island. In this case, every effort should be made to keep the CTGs in operation for as long as frequency
conditions permit the steam units to operate.
This should not present a problem since CTGs, in general, have a greater capability than steam units for
underfrequency operation, particularly if the control system includes a load-runback feature. These factors suggest an
underfrequency protection scheme with a single trip setpoint at or below the lowest underfrequency trip setpoint for
the steam units in the vicinity.
Temporary frequency variations may well occur during system restoration following a blackout. The importance of
quick restoration would seem to outweigh the risk of some turbine blade damage during this period, and consideration
should be given to a facility for manual defeat of the protection under this condition.
5.3.2 Protection Guidelines
The following guidelines should be considered when applying underfrequency protection to combustion turbines:
1) Use one underfrequency relay per unit supplied by the unit voltage transformer.
2) If added security is desired, supervise tripping with a second underfrequency relay. This relay may be
common to several units.
3) Be aware of existing underfrequency protection provided by the manufacturer in the unit's control system.
Coordination of settings and trip logic may be required to avoid interference with external protection.
5.4 Underfrequency Protection Considerations for Combined Cycle Generating Units

In a combined cycle generating installation, which is a combination of a combustion-turbine unit and a steam-turbine
unit, each unit would be subjected to the same underfrequency limitations as discussed in the respective sections for
these types of units. A recommended approach for protecting a combined cycle installation is to provide separate
underfrequency protective schemes for each unit of the combined cycle installation. The method used for protection of
each unit could follow the method described in the specific section of this guide. That is, the steam-turbine unit would
follow the recommendations in Section 3 and the combustion-turbine unit would follow recommendations in Section 5.
6. Bibliography
[B1] BALDWIN, M. S., ELMORE, W. A., and BONK, J. J. Improve Turbine-Generator Protection for Increased
Plant Reliability. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-99, May/June 1980, pp 982-989.
[B2] BALDWIN, M. S. and SCHENKEL, H. S. Determination of Frequency Decay Rates During Periods of
Generator Deficiency. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-95, Jan/Feb 1976, pp 26-36.
[B3] BERDY, J., BROWN, P. G., and GOFF, L. Protection of Steam Turbine Generators During Abnormal Frequency
Conditions. General Electric Company, 1974, Protective Relaying Conference, Georgia Institute of Technology.
[B4] DALZIEL, C. F. and STEINBACH, E. W. Underfrequency Protection of Power Systems for System Relief, Load
Shedding-System Splitting, AIEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-78, Dec 1959, pp 1227-
1238.
[B5] HAHN, R. S., DISGUPTA, S., BAYTCH, E., and WILLOUGHBY, R. D. Maximum Frequency Decay Rate for
Reactor Coolant Pump Motors.IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol NS-26, Feb 1977, pp 863-870.
[B6] HOHN, A. and NOVACEK, P. Last-Stage Blades of Large Steam Turbines. Brown Boveri Review, vol 59, Jan
1972, pp 42-53.
[B7] HOROWITZ, S. H, POLITIS, A., and GABRIELLE, A. F. Frequency Actuated Load Shedding and Restoration,
Part 2—Implementation. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-90, 1971, p 1460.
[B8] IEEE Committee Report. The Effect of Frequency and Voltage on Power System Load. Presented at the IEEE
Winter Power Meeting, New York, NY, Jan 30-Feb 4, 1966.
[B9] IEEE Committee Report. Survey of Underfrequency Relay Tripping of Load Under Emergency Conditions.
IEEE Transaction on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-87, Mar 1968, pp 1362-1366.
[B10] LOKAY, H. E. and BURTNYK, V. Application of Underfrequency Relays for Automatic Load Shedding. IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-78, Mar 1968, p 776.
[B11] LOKAY, H, E., and THOITS, P. O. Effects of Future Turbine Generator Characteristics on Transient Stability.
IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-90, Nov/ Dec 1971, pp 2427—2431.
[B12] MALISZEWSKI, R. M., DUNLOP, R. D., and WILSON, G. L. Frequency Actuated Load Shedding and
Restoration, Part 1—Philosophy. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-90, 1971, p 1452.
[B13] MERRIAN, M. M. and VANDEWALLE, D. J. The Effect of Grid Frequency Decay Transients on Pressurized
Water Reactors. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol PAS-95, Jan/Feb 1976, pp 269-274.
[B14] NARAYAN, V. Monitoring Turbogenerators in the Underfrequency Range. Brown Boveri Review, vol 67, Sept
1980, pp 530-534.
[B15] NARAYAN, V., SCHINDLER, H., PENCINGER, C., and CARREAU, D. Frequency Excursion Monitoring of
Large Turbo-Generators. IEE (London) Conference on Developments in Power-System Protection, Publication No
185, 10-12, June 1980, pp 45-48.
[B16] SOMM, E. and STYS, Z. S. The Development of Last-Stage Blades for Large Steam Turbines. Proceedings of
the American Power Conference, vol 38, 1976, pp 581-589.
[B17] WARNER, R. E., DILLMAN, T. L., and BALDWIN, M. S., Off-Frequency Turbine Generator Unit Operation.
American Power Conference, Apr 1976.
ANSI/IEEE C37.106-1987
Annex
(This Appendix is not a part of ANSI/IEEE C37.106-1987, IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating
Plants, but is included for information only.)
Table A-1 —Typical Load Shedding Scheme with 3 Steps

Frequency Trip Point Fixed Time Delay
Step (Hz) Percent of Load Shed (Cycles) on Relay*
1 59.3 10 6
2 58.9 15 6
3 58.5 As required to arrest
decline before 58.2 Hz
*Auxiliary relay and breaker time should be added to obtain tripping time.
Table A-2 —Typical Load Shedding Scheme with 6 Steps

Frequency Trip Point Fixed Time Delay
Step (Hz) Percent of Load Shed (Cycles) on Relay*
1 59.5 10 6
2 59.2 10 6
3 58.8 5 6
4 58.8 5 14
5 58.4 5 14
6 58.4 5 21
*Auxiliary relay and breaker time should be added to obtain tripping time.

Ieee Guide For Abnormal Frequency Protection For Power Generatin

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Ieee Guide For Abnormal Frequency Protection For Power Generatin

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

ANSI/IEEE C37.

An American National Standard

IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

Approved March 22, 1984

Approved September 12, 1986

Comments on standards and requests for interpretations should be addressed to:

Secretary, IEEE Standards Board

1) Generator over-/underfrequency capabilities

Organization Represented Name of Representative

J. Berdy T. L. Kaschalk E. T. Sage

Past members who have contributed review and comments are:

D. C. Adamson J. A. Imhof J. E. Waldron

R. F. Arehart R. W. Dempsey R. W. Hirtler

James H. Beall, Chair

J. J. Archambault Daniel L. Goldberg John P. Riganati

3. Steam Generating Plant—Abnormal Frequency Operation................................................................................2

3.1 General Background .................................................................................................................................. 2

4. Nuclear Generating Plant—Special Consideration...........................................................................................22

4.1 General Background ................................................................................................................................ 22

5. Combustion-Turbine Underfrequency Operation .............................................................................................23

5.1 General Background ................................................................................................................................ 23

IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency

1. Introduction and Scope

3. Steam Generating Plant—Abnormal Frequency Operation

3.1 General Background

3.2 Generator Over-/Underfrequency Capability

2 Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved

Figure 1—Generator Capability Versus Frequency

Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved 3

Figure 2—Generator Short-Time Thermal Capability

3.3 Turbine Over-/Underfrequency Capability

4 Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved

Figure 3—Typical Tuned Blade Campbell Diagram

Figure 4—Typical Resonance Curve

Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved 5

6 Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved

3.4 Power Plant Auxiliaries—UnderfrequencyConsiderations

Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved 7

3.5 Underfrequency Protection Methods for Steam Turbines

3.5.1 System Load Shedding

3.5.2 Need for Turbine Protection

3.5.3 Protective System Philosophy

8 Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved

3.5.4 Criteria for Underfrequency Protection

3.5.5 Turbine Underfrequency Protection Relay Schemes

Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved 9

3.5.5.2 Application Example—Scheme 1 (See Fig 8)

The settings are selected based upon the following criteria:

10 Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved

Figure 7—Protection Scheme 1—Block Diagram

Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved 11

Figure 8—Application Example—Scheme 1

12 Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved

Table 1—Frequency and Timer Settings for Scheme 1

60.0–59.5 — Continuous operation allowed.

Continuous underfrequency alarm.

59.5–58.8 50.0 min* Alarm “underfrequency limit

3.5.5.4 Application Example—Scheme 2 (see Fig 10)

3.5.5.4.1 Turbine Protection

3.6 Coordination with System Load Shedding Scheme

Copyright © 1987 IEEE All Rights Reserved 13

3.6.3 System Frequency Response