CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

VI. Penalties - General Principles

A. Definition; General Restrictions; Constitutional Restrictions

B. Theories Justifying Penalties

C. Classifications

CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES

Article 25. Penalties which may be imposed. - The penalties which may be imposed according to this Code,
and their different classes, are those included in the following:

Principal Penalties

Capital punishment: Death.

Afflictive penalties: Reclusion perpetua,

Reclusion temporal, Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, Perpetual or temporary special
disqualification, Prision mayor.

Correctional penalties: Prision correccional, Arresto mayor, Suspension, Destierro.

Light penalties: Arresto menor Public censure.

Penalties common to the three preceding classes: Fine, and Bond to keep the peace.

Accessory Penalties: Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification, Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be
voted for, the profession or calling, Civil interdiction, Indemnification, Forfeiture or confiscation of
instruments and proceeds of the offense, Payment of costs.

Article 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. - A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an
alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty,
if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.

D. Duration and Effect (Art. 27-45)

E. Application

PEOPLE vs ALFREDO BON - G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006

FACTS: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon (appellant), charging him with the
rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial. The
rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and
BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them.

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further considered the qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being
the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted
rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which
ended the imposition of death penalty. The proximate concern as to the appellant is whether his penalty
for attempted qualified rape which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of
consummated rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: What is the properly penalty for the crimes convicted?

HELD: The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be
affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death
sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.

Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that the penalty to be imposed
upon the principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.

The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is the prescribed
penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and
to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination
of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death
is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for
attempted rape.

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a
maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the
penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have
affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the
problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion
temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty,
does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed,
appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.

The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion
perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in
this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right,
of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and
frustrated felony.

Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason
of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to
the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices. In
the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two
degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his
penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.

Republic Act 9346 June 24, 2006 “AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN
THE PHILIPPINES”

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No.
Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A.
No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees,
insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Indeterminate Sentence Law or Republic Act 4103, as amended by Republic Act 4225

Application: Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same.

Coverage:
Section 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or
life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those
who are habitual delinquents; to those who have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those
who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof;
to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced
by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof.
Section 3. There is hereby created a Board of Pardons and Parole to be composed of the Secretary of
Justice who shall be its Chairman, and four members to be appointed by the President, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments who shall hold office for a term of six years: Provided, That one member
of the board shall be a trained sociologist, one a clergyman or educator, one psychiatrist unless a trained
psychiatrist be employed by the board, and the other members shall be persons qualified for such work by
training and experience. At least one member of the board shall be a woman. Of the members of the
present board, two shall be designated by the President to continue until December thirty, nineteen
hundred and sixty-six and the other two shall continue until December thirty, nineteen hundred and
sixty-nine. In case of any vacancy in the membership of the Board, a successor may be appointed to serve
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the respective members.

Conditions of Parole
Section 6. Every prisoner released from confinement on parole by virtue of this Act shall, at such times and
in such manner as may be required by the conditions of his parole, as may be designated by the said Board
for such purpose, report personally to such government officials or other parole officers hereafter
appointed by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence for a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining
portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence as herein provided. The officials so designated shall keep such records and make
such reports and perform such other duties hereunder as may be required by said Board. The limits of
residence of such paroled prisoner during his parole may be fixed and from time to time changed by the
said Board in its discretion. If during the period of surveillance such paroled prisoner shall show himself to
be a law-abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippine Islands, the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence may issue a final certificate of release in his favor, which shall entitle him to final
release and discharge.

Three-fold rule: Article 70 RPC

Article 70. Successive service of sentence. - When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall
serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall
be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may
be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the
penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the
penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale: 1. Death, 2. Reclusion perpetua, 3.
Reclusion temporal, 4. Prision mayor, 5. Prision correccional, 6. Arresto mayor, 7. Arresto menor, 8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification, 10 Temporal absolute disqualification. 11. Suspension from public
office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling, and 12. Public censure.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence
shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of
those imposed equals the same maximum period. Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty years.

SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT: Article 39 RPC

Article 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in
the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate
of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under
confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue
for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six
months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed
fifteen days, if for a light felony.

3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such
penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules,
shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall
not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA
5465, April 21, 1969).

GRADUATION OF PENALTIES: ARTICLE 61 RPC

Article 61. Rules for graduating penalties. - For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according
to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as
principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall
be observed:

1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees
shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed
in Article 71 of this Code.

2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more
divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.

3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the
maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of
the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the
proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective
graduated scale.

4. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different
divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately
following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty
prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned
respective graduated scale.

5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four
preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those
guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices
and accessories.

ACCESSORY PENALTIES: Article 25, 30-37, 40-45. RPC

F. COMPUTATION OF PENALTIES: Article 28. RPC
Article 28. Computation of penalties. - If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the
temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have
become final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of
liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities
for the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the
day on which the defendant commences to serve his sentence.

G. EXECUTION and SERVICE: Article 78-79; PD 603, as amended by RA 9344; Article 81-88. RPC.

Article 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of
a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other
circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.

In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the
institutions in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the
work to be performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations
of the convicts among themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.

The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into
different departments and also for the correction and reform of the convicts.

Article 79. Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity. - When a convict
shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said
sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second
paragraph of circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases.

If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall
have prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while the
convict is serving his sentence.

RA 9344 otherwise knows as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006."

Article 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The death sentence shall be executed with
reference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution.
The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as
possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under sentence during electrocution as well as during the
proceedings prior to the execution.

If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution.

Article 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit. - The court shall
designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be
communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after
the expiration of at least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval
between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such
assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the
religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of
his family or persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property,
or of the care of his descendants.

Article 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The death sentence shall not be inflicted
upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor
upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40.

Article 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same. - The execution shall take place in
the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests
assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the
physician and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director of
Prisons may authorize.

Article 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial. - Unless claimed by his
family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the
execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the
purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the
remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at government
expense, granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the
friends of the latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with
pomp.

Article 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor.
- The penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto
mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative
Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future.
Article 87. Destierro. - Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or
places designated in the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250
and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.

Article 88. Arresto menor. - The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the
house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides
in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem
satisfactory to it.

PROBATION LAW: PD 968, as amended by Republic Act 10707

Definition of Terms: Section 3. Meaning of Terms. As used in this Decree, the following shall, unless the
context otherwise requires, be construed thus: (a) "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant,
after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision
of a probation officer; (b) "Probationer" means a person placed on probation; (c) "Probation Officer" means
one who investigates for the court a referral for probation or supervises a probationer or both.

Purpose: Section 2. Purpose. This Decree shall be interpreted so as to: (a) promote the correction and
rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment; (b) provide an opportunity for
the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence;
and (c) prevent the commission of offenses.

Grant of Probation, Manner and Conditions

Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the
execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal
has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waver of
the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

Section 5. Post-sentence Investigation. No person shall be placed on probation except upon prior
investigation by the probation officer and a determination by the court that the ends of justice and the best
interest of the public as well as that of the defendant will be served thereby.

Section 7. Period for Submission of Investigation Report. The probation officer shall submit to the court the
investigation report on a defendant not later than sixty days from receipt of the order of said court to
conduct the investigation. The court shall resolve the petition for probation not later than five days after
receipt of said report.

Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the defendant may be
allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed in the criminal case; Provided, That, in case where no bail
was filed or that the defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow the release of the defendant
on recognize the custody of a responsible member of the community who shall guarantee his appearance
whenever required by the court.

Section 10. Conditions of Probation. Every probation order issued by the court shall contain conditions
requiring that the probationer shall: (a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his
supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of said
order; (b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said
officer.

The court may also require the probationer to: (a) cooperate with a program of supervision; (b) meet his
family responsibilities; (c) devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment
without the prior written approval of the probation officer; (d) undergo medical, psychological or
psychiatric examination and treatment and enter and remain in a specified institution, when required for
that purpose; (e) pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training; (f) attend or reside in a facility
established for instruction, recreation or residence of persons on probation; (g) refrain from visiting houses
of ill-repute; (h) abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess; (i) permit to probation officer or an
authorized social worker to visit his home and place or work; (j) reside at premises approved by it and not
to change his residence without its prior written approval; or (k) satisfy any other condition related to the
rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of
conscience.

Section 12. Modification of Condition of Probation. During the period of probation, the court may, upon
application of either the probationer or the probation officer, revise or modify the conditions or period of
probation. The court shall notify either the probationer or the probation officer of the filing such an
application so as to give both parties an opportunity to be heard thereon.

The court shall inform in writing the probation officer and the probationer of any change in the period or
conditions of probation.

Criteria of Placing an Offender in Probation

Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In determining whether an offender may be placed
on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents, environment,
mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community resources.
Probation shall be denied if the court finds that: (a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that
can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or (b) there is undue risk that during
the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or (c) probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed.

Disqualified Offenders

Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those: (a) sentenced
to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years; (b) convicted of any offense against the
security of the State; (c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and (e) who are already serving
sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.

Period of Probation

Section 14. Period of Probation. (a) The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not more than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period shall
not exceed six years; (b) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation shall not be less than nor to be
more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment as computed at the rate established,
in Article thirty-nine of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Termination of Probation

Section 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report
and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer
upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is
deemed terminated.

The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspend as a
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted.

The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order.

Exception: Republic Act 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of 2003

Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court,
cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
Section 57. Probation and Community Service Under the Voluntary Submission Program. – A drug
dependent who is discharged as rehabilitated by the DOH-accredited Center through the voluntary
submission program, but does not qualify for exemption from criminal liability under Section 55 of this Act,
may be charged under the provisions of this Act, but shall be placed on probation and undergo a
community service in lieu of imprisonment and/or fine in the discretion of the court, without prejudice to
the outcome of any pending case filed in court.

Such drug dependent shall undergo community service as part of his/her after-care and follow-up program,
which may be done in coordination with nongovernmental civil organizations accredited by the DSWD,
with the recommendation of the Board.

Section 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be
exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this act subject to the following conditions:

(1) He/she has complied with the rules and regulations of the center, the applicable rules and
regulations of the Board, including the after-care and follow-up program for at least eighteen (18)
months following temporary discharge from confinement in the Center or, in the case of a dependent
placed under the care of the DOH-accredited physician, the after-care program and follow-up schedule
formulated by the DSWD and approved by the Board: Provided, That capability-building of local
government social workers shall be undertaken by the DSWD;

(2) He/she has never been charged or convicted of any offense punishable under this Act, the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or Republic Act No. 6425, as amended; the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; or any special penal laws;

(3) He/she has no record of escape from a Center: Provided, That had he/she escaped, he/she
surrendered by himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, within one (1) week from the date of the said escape; and

(4) He/she poses no serious danger to himself/herself, his/her family or the community by his/her
exemption from criminal liability.

Section 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. –
Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation,
even if the sentence provided under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on probation,
or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision and
rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination with the
Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of
the probation, the Board shall submit a written report to the court recommending termination of probation
and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the court shall issue such an order.

The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may be determined by
the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board and shall apply only to violators of
Section 15 of this Act. The completion of the community service shall be under the supervision and
rehabilitative surveillance of the Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall
render a report on the manner of compliance of said community service. The court in its discretion may
require extension of the community service or order a final discharge.

In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64 of this Act.

If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the Center by the
accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the sentence to be served.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (REPUBLIC ACT 9344)

VII. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES

TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

2. By service of the sentence;

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;

4. By absolute pardon;

5. By prescription of the crime;

6. By prescription of the penalty;

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS (G.R. No. 102207; Sept 2, 1994)

FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio
respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused
does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court ’ s decision in People vs
Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme Court’s decision
in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before the final judgment is
rendered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability.

RULING: The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the
Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred
before the final judgment. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will
be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further,
the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.
In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability
will only survive if death came after the final judgment of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the
Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary
on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminalliability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based
solely on the act complained of.

PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES

Article 90. Prescription of crime. - Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal
shall prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the
application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by
RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966).

Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES

Article 92. When and how penalties prescribe. - The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as
follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;

3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which
prescribes in five years;

4. Light penalties, in one year.

Article 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. - The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with
which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of
the period of prescription.

PRESCRIPTION OF VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL PENAL LAWS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES

RA 3326 or AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL

ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment
for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two
years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by
imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years.
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the law
not included in the Penal Code.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

CASE: BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ vs.HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as
the Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

For resolution is petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration1 assailing the Decision dated September 23, 2005,
the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July
12, 2004 and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the
filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which
were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of
prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the
presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal
Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new
informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its
preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted
the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also
interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new
docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that
considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For
Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from
the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for which petitioner are being
charged have already prescribed.

Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the
previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution5 dated February 10, 2004 which
reads:

Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ

Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 143618-41, entitled
"Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.)" promulgated
on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court on June 8, 2000 which, among
others, denied the accused’s motion to quash the informations in these cases; that in particular the
above-mentioned Decision ruled that the herein informations may be quashed because the officer who
filed the same had no authority to do so; and that the said Decision has become final and executory
on November 29, 2002, these cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the archives.

The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan6 where
petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which
denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T.
Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000.7 In annulling
and setting aside the aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held that:

In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as in Pecho v.
Sandiganbayan where the wording of the certification in the information was found inadequate, or in
People v. Marquez, where the required certification was absent. Here, the informations were filed by an
unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation.
An invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.8

In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioner ’ s Motion to Quash and directed the
dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because the informations were filed by an unauthorized party,
hence void.

In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus: SEC. 6. Order
sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. – An order sustaining the
motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on
the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i)10 of this Rule.
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the same facts. Indeed,
we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals11 that: In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint
or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient
because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained,
its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the
information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar in petitioner’s subsequent prosecution.
x x x.12

Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant cases was not
a violation of petitioner’s right to be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases
investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those cases which have already been
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record keeping. It is usually
written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case. This
Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for reference. In fact,
after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos.
28031-28049 x x x.13

Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-referred preliminary
investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan14 when we categorically declared
therein that: The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated the
reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No.
105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that the right to a preliminary
investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioner ’ s right was violated when the
preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over
the said cases. It bears stressing that our directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its
objective of affording petitioner his right to due process.15

Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first resolve the question of whether
this Court may validly take cognizance of and resolve the aforementioned issue considering that as we have
said in the assailed Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations against
the petitioner"16and that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to
determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed."17 We reconsider our stance and shall rule
in the affirmative.

Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before he enters his plea, move
to quash the complaint and information18 on the ground that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished,19 which ground includes the defense of prescription considering that Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally extinguishes criminal liability.
Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well invoke
the defense of prescription.

Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases have prescribed? We
held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that: In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense
charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the
time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.21

Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of
Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of
Foreign Affairs.

Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years.
Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador22 that: It appears however, that
prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The
longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by
B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the
accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on
January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.23

Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall
prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the
period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years: As to when these two periods
begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of prescription of offenses
defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides: SEC. 2. Prescription shall
begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the rule on the
running of the prescriptive period as follows:
 In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment" may be
either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2
may be read as:

"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law; and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;" or as: "Prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and until institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment." (Emphasis supplied)25

Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the discovery
thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco
I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.

In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto26 this Court already
took note that:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution
that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could
not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no
person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the
prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.27

However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the
prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.

We disagree. Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender
from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be
interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription
unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could
the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be
filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the
time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later
wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think
 should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been
called to the omission.28

The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as well as
the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman directed petitioner to
file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already prescribed.

Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person." However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner
to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.

In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted without jurisdiction and/or grave
abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its competence.30
This Court, in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to remove the possibility of any
misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioner ’ s cases in the Sandiganbayan to
take"31declared invalid – the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses
ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction
of said offenses.32

In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the informations filed with the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 considering that the same were subscribed and filed by
the PCGG. In granting petitioner’s plea, this Court held, thus:

Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured by conducting
another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for
criminal proceedings.34

Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and
by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no
proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.

Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or
initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case of People v.
Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of
preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the case of
Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the
Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could
not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.

However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the offenses charged against the
petitioner could not have prescribed because the latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April
27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on May 8, 1987, citing
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he term of prescription should not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago."

Mr. Justice Carpio argues that – Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to
[special laws], unless the latter should x x x provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the
supplementary application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in
Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run only after petitioner returned to this
jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.

There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as
the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the
Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are
silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled,
with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.

He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the Majority Opinion and argues
that – The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the simple
expedient of escaping from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being
a fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x.

To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the
balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of the State’s ability to investigate
and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should not
encourage individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of special laws to leave
Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion unfortunately
chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice.

With all due respect, we beg to disagree.

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is
supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his
Dissenting Opinion that – There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC
applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v.
Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the
special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus
well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.

However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws,
by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a
particular matteras evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting Opinion:

In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant can be sentenced with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,38 this Court applied the rules on the service of sentences provided
in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations
of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar rules under the special
law.

In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Revised Penal Code to
define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein although it referred to the same
terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the absence of the accused
from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive period is more apparent than real.

Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as early as December
4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines "special acts" as "acts defining and penalizing violations
of the law not included in the Penal Code".

Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,40 this Court
was categorical in ruling that –

The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for
offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive
period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2
of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running
of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as
a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -

Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.41

Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the Philippines as a ground for the
interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act
No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the legislature made its
intention clear and was thus categorical that –

SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code – All violations of any provision
of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty persons and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)

According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called "gap" in Act No.
3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No.
3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases where the accused is
absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would supplement Act No. 3326.
This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.

While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special laws,
however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of "special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10
of the RPC.

In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to interpret the term "special laws"
mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the Revised Penal
Code, as referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the Penal Code of the
Philippines. Thus –

This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is used in article 7 of the
Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the meaning
applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally used? x x x It is confidently contended
that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) is not used with this general
signification: In fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a general law.
A careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to
signify "special laws" in the general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply says,
in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the
crime) is not subject to the provisions of said code.43

Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the same result would
obtain. A conflict will arise from the contemporaneous application of the two laws. The Revised Penal Code
explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the
prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article
91 because it specifically and directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to
special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary
rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal provisions must prevail over general ones.

The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reservations about the effects of ruling that the absence of the
accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. Our duty, however,
is only to interpret the law. To go beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law is certainly
beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already explained –

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could
the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be
filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the
time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later
 wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think
should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been
called to the omission.44

Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor of the
accused only relates to the following issues: (1) retroactive or prospective application of laws providing or
extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony committed vis-à-vis the
applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the
aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to support the Majority Opinion ’ s conclusion that the
prescriptive period in a special law continues to run while the accused is abroad.

We take exception to the foregoing proposition.

We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally provides the
authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs while the accused is outside of Philippine jurisdiction.
The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the old but still relevant
case of People v. Moran,45 this Court extensively discussed the rationale behind and the nature of
prescription of penal offenses –

"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of limitation in
criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes
of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as
an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there
is no intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is
therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it
is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor,
surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no longer the
subject of prosecution.' The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly
applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence;
that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a
citizen and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the
proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed
in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and notification by
the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to
it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must
be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State,
but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory,
 of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing
such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks
imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal
trials the best evidence that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal
construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State.
Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply be implied nor
derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly and expressly sanctioned
by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof,
the accused.

The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on prescription. The exceptions to
the running of or the causes for the interruption of the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily
implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating or may only be tolled for reasons
explicitly provided by the law.

In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:

It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of
crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said legal principle takes into
account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the
part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed the
nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as follows:

The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be
at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth
he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.
Hence, it is that statues of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not
only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because
the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that
time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods
in which it destroys proofs of guilt.47

In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant case, were not
interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the alleged
offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on
May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985
prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.

Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged
offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner
for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and
Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal Case
Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857 – 04-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Article 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. - Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

1. By conditional pardon;

2. By commutation of the sentence; and

3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.

Article 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. - Any person who has been granted
conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein
otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the
pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be applied to him.

Article 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. - The commutation of the original sentence for another of
a different length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.

Article 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall
entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:

1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each
month of good behavior;

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
eight days for each month of good behavior;

3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
fifteen days for each month of good behaviour.
Article 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall
be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances
mentioned in Article 58 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe to in said article.

Article 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant
allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.

PERSON CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES

Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.

Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from criminal liability established
in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or
insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age,
who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also
attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever
the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be
made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.

Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. - In
default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such
goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.

Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.

RULE 111 of the Rules of Court: Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information,
the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)

Civil Code of the Philippines

Chapter 2: Human Relations: Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Book 4: Obligations and Contracts: Article 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
(1092a)

WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES

Article 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103
of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

Article 105. Restitution; How made. - The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible,
with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.

The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who has
acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may be liable to
him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person in the
manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.

Article 106. Reparation; How made. - The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into
consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured
party, and reparation shall be made accordingly.

Article 107. Indemnification; What is included. - Indemnification for consequential damages shall include
not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason
of the crime.

Article 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for consequential
damages and actions to demand the same; Upon whom it devolves. - The obligation to make restoration
or reparation for damages and indemnification for consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the
person liable.

The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the
person injured.

Article 109. Share of each person civilly liable. - If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony,
the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond.

Article 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony;
Preference in payment. - Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals,
accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among
themselves for their quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.

The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the
accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories.

Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom
payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective
shares.

Article 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. - Any person who has participated gratuitously
in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of
such participation.

EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY

Article 112. Extinction of civil liability. - Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this
Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Law.
Article 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. - Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided
in the next preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting
from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty,
pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.