d.

Primary/Strict Liability

Aquino

 There is strict liability if one is made liable independent of fault, negligence or intent after
establishing certain facts specified by law.
 It can be committed even if reasonable care was exercised and regardless of the state of mind of
the actor at that time.
 Liability without fault. A case is one of strict liability “when neither care nor negligence, neither
good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor ignorance will save the defendant.” (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 1968 Ed., p. 1968).
 The traditional bastion of strict liability includes liability for conversion and for injuries caused by
animals, ultra-hazardous activities and nuisance (American law).

Largo

 Thus, the concept of liability without fault, or strict liability torts (also referred to as strict
liability in torts) is now generally limited to acts which, though lawful, are so fraught with
possibility of harm to others that the law treats them as allowable only on the terms of insuring
the public against injury (74 Amjur 2d, at 631-632).
 The rule of strict liability is said to be applicable in situations in which social policy requires that
defendant make good the harm which results to others from abnormal risks which are inherent
in activities that are not considered blameworthy because they are reasonably incident to
desirable industrial activity. The basis of liability in such cases is the intentional behavior in
exposing the community to the abnormal risk (Ibid.).
 Under the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the liability is "strict" in the sense that it is
unnecessary to prove the defendant's negligence (63 Amjur 2d, at p. 723).

i. Possessor & Owners of Animals (Art. 2183)

Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
(1905)

Aquino

 “x x x the spirit of Article 1905 is clear and explicit by its own terms. Therein is published the
fault or negligence of one of who being able and duty bound to prevent the consequences of
the use of animals, does not prevent it, for not adopting convenient and adequate means of
precaution, or because, even exercising them, he could not attain said results, the risk may
occur in their use being imputed to him, inasmuch as in making use of them, he voluntarily
accepts, by reason of this act, the responsibilities arising from the consequences of the same.
 “By virtue thereof, provided the damage that is caused is a consequence of the natural use of
the animal causing it, independent of all extraneous intervention or of whatever cause not
imputable to the possessor or to the person who makes use of it, these should bear said
consequence, repairing the damage caused, there having been no negligence or lack of care,
because having his possession said animal, or in using it, they already know to what they may
be exposed.” (12 Manresa, 4th ed., 572-574, cited in Francisco, Torts and Damages, pp. 79-80).

 In English law, the owner or possessor of non-domesticated animals known as animals ferae
naturae, was subject to strict liability if the animals attacked a person. The owners or possessors
of domestic animals are liable only if they knew or had reason to know that the animal had
vicious properties. On the other hand, Article 2183 by the Civil Code, does not admit of the
distinction under English law. The Civil Code provision, is therefore, applicable whether the
animal is domestic, domesticated or wild. (See Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
74431, November 6, 1989).

 The Court of Appeals ruled that the owner and Pelagia are both liable under Article 2183 of the
Civil Code because they exercised joint control over the dog. The question of ownership is
inconsequential under Article 2183. Even if the dog really belonged to another, Pelagia was
still liable not only because the dog was kept on her premises with her knowledge and
consent but also because she made use thereof (Milagros Ibardo v. Pelagia Nava et al., CA G.R.
No. 28587-R, January 8, 1963, 3 CAR2s 37).

CASES:

 Vestil v. IAC, G.R. No. 74431

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos
Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for
"multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to
"vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as
the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils
rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it
was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge
Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed
the complaint.
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or
of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs
to the property.

RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held
responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that
is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his
heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to anyone,
including himself.

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of
the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person
to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice
weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly,
her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the
dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and
until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners
offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them
only casually.

ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit
Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof.

RULING:
 On the contrary, the death certificate declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had
nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need
not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog
bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia,
a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-
pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness
became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr.
Tautjo.

On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison
v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of
the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia
is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death
certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be
expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the
Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter that, as the petitioners also contend, the
dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak
only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she
was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on
the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he
who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
such animal may cause.

We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only
as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2, 026.69, as prayed for
in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents
the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which
they are entitled.

 MARGARITA AFIALDA VS BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, G.R. No. L-2075 [November
29, 1949]

Facts of the Case:

Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos
at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while he was tending the animals, he was gored by
one of them and consequently died of his injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder sister
 who depended on him for support, filed the action for damages. The complaint was dismissed
by the trial court upon granting a motion to dismiss filed by spouses Hisole. Subsequently, the
plaintiff had taken the present appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when damage is caused to the
animal’s caretaker.

Ruling of the Court:

Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages
caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner
would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. In
the case at hand, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was
paid for his work as such. Thus, it was his business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and
for which he must take the consequences. Deceased does not fall within the ambit of
“stranger”, which is significant for the claim for damages under the said article.

Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come under Article 1905 of the
Civil Code but under the labor laws, i.e. Workmen’s Compensation Act. The complaint
contained no allegation as to constitute liability under the Civil Code or the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. Hence, it alleges no cause of action.

The order appealed from was affirmed.

ii. Owners of Motor Vehicles (Art. 2184)

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor
vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)

Aquino

 Solidary liability is imposed on the owner of the vehicle not because of his imputed liability
but because his own omission is a concurring proximate cause of the injury. This rule was first
laid down in Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. 374, 376-377 [1914]), where the Supreme Court
explained that the owner who was present is liable if the negligent acts of the driver are
continued for such a length of time so as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile and permits his driver to continue in violation of the law by the performance of
 negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the
driver to desist therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. (see: Caedo v. Yu Khe
Thai, No. L-20392, Dec. 18, 1968; Malayan Insurance v. CA, No. L-36413, Sept. 26, 1988).

 In Marcial T. Caedo et al. v. Yu Khe Thai et al (G.R. No. L-20392, December 18, 1968) the
Supreme Court explained that the basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him,
reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
Nevertheless, the test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great
degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of
diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and
instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed
with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers
posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a
negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age
and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and
infirm person who is not similarly equipped. The law does not require that a person must
possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his negligence,
within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught
with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional
drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers’ services, would
be effectively prescribed.

CASES:

 CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several
members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car
of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a
moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s
driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down
behind the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by the
caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of the caretela’s left wheel wrenching
it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming
 vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the
collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and
members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver and
owner of the Cadillac car. There was no question that defendant’s driver was negligent and
liable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was solidarily
liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.

RULING:
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the causative
factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the
master’s liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master
and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in
order to prevent injury or damage.

Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course
which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do
not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning.
There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely
on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela
when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not
constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that
distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela on its
left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The
time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was
that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the
situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence
required by law to prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was not liable.

 CARTICIANO VS. NUVAL, Carticiano vs Nuval, G.R. No. 138054, September 28, 2000

FACTS:
Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus, Cavite. He was driving his father’s
Ford Laser car. On the same date and time, defendant Nuval’s owner-type Jeep, then driven by
defendant Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to Parañaque. When the two
 cars were about to pass one another, Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center
island of the highway an occupied the lane which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing. Zacarias’ Ford
Laser collided head-on with Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias
suffered multiple fracture. He underwent a leg operation and physical therapy. Nuval offered
P100,000.00 as compensation for the injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to accept it. Plaintiffs
filed a criminal suit against Darwin and a civil suit against defendants for damages. Trial court
ruled infavor of plaintiffs. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: W/N employer Nuval can be held liable.

RULING: Petition granted.

RATIO: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for damages caused
by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in the
case at bar show that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given him when the
collision occurred. That he had been hired only to bring respondent’s children to and from
school must be rejected. True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no convincing
proof was presented showing that it was his only task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s vehicle.
Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the vehicle owner
equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper selection of
employee as a defense. Respondent failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged this
burden.

 Alfredo Mallari, Sr. and Alfredo Mallari, Jr. v. CA and Bulletin Publishing Corp., G.R. No.
128607 January 31, 2000

Bellossillo, J.

FACTS:
The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr. collided with thedelivery
van of Bulletin along the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Mallari Jr.
testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on
the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of Bulletin coming from the
opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The collision occurred after Mallari Jr.
overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The impact caused the jeepney to
turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel
Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.

Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and
Mallari Jr., and also against Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance
Co. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of Israel was caused by
 the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery
van.

ISSUE:
WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel

HELD: Yes.
The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while
traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41,pars.
(a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot
do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special
necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive
on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the
opposite direction comes into view.

Mallari Jr. already saw that the Bulletin delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and
failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning
mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook 2 vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway.
Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel was the sole
negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove
his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the
Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation.
Mallaris failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against Mallari
Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for
the payment of damages sought by the passenger. (See Arts. 1755, 1756 and 1759 for the
rationale of common carrier’s liability.)

iii. Manufacturers & Processor (Art. 2187)

Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall
be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)

Aquino
 Product liability law is the law which governs the liability of manufacturers and sellers for
damages resulting from defective products. Liability for defective products may be based on
fraud, warranty, negligence, or strict liability. (Coca-Cola Bottler’s Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 227 SCRA 293 [1993]). All those theories may be used in this jurisdiction on the basis of
the provisions of the Civil Code, including Articles 33, 2176 and 2187.

 R.A. 7394: The Consumer Act of the Philippines

o An important development in product liability law is the passage of the Consumer Act of
the Philippines. As the title of the law indicates, it is a law that is meant to protect the
consumers by providing for certain safeguards when they purchase or use consumer
products.
o The law covers only consumer products and services, that is, “goods, services, and
credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes, which shall include but not limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics
and devices.” (Article 4, par. q).
o It should be noted that the above-enumerated special laws have penal provisions which
also give rise to civil liability ex delito following the general rule that a person criminally
liable is civilly liable. (Article 100, Revised Penal Code).

a. Civil Code
 Privity of contract is not required under Article 2187 because it expressly allows
recovery although no contractual relation exists.

 The use of the word “shall” indicates that the liability of the manufacturer and
processor is strict.

 Justice Trayor argued that the negligence should no longer be singled out as the basis of
plaintiff’s right to recover in cases of similar factual background. He opined that “it
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an
article that he placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection,
proves to have defect that causes injury to human being.” He supported his argument
with the following explanation:

“x x x Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that

responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufacturers can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others,
as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of the injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
 having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their
way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever
injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However
intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the
risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there
should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to
afford such protection.”

b. Consumer Act.
 The problem that is encountered in justifying strict liability under Article 2187 of the
Civil Code is not present in the strict liability provisions of the Consumer Act because
the language of the applicable provision is clear and unmistakable. In particular, Article
97 of the statute expressly provides for liability for defective products “independently
of fault.” The provision is broad enough to cover cases governed by Article 2187 of the
Civil Code.

 Strict liability even extends to services under Article 99 of the Consumer Act which
imposes liability for defective service “independently of fault.” Service under Article 99
means, “with respect to repair and service firms, services supplied in connection with a
contact for construction, maintenance, repair, processing, treatment or cleaning of
goods or of fixtures on land, or distribution of goods, or transportation of goods.”
(Article 4[bo]).

(1) Privity not Required

Privity of contract is not required under Articles 97 and 99 of the Consumer Act because
the responsibility of the manufacturers is owed to the consumer. Article 4(n) of the
Consumer Act defines a consumer as a natural person who is a purchaser, lessee,
recipient or prospective purchaser, lessor or recipient of consumer products, services or
credit. The term recipient is broad enough to cover any person who might use the
product even if he was not the one who purchased the same (e.g. a relative of the
purchaser who used the product may be considered a recipient and the purchaser
donated the product to another person, the latter may likewise be considered a
recipient of the product and is therefore a consumer as defined under the law)

(2) Persons Liable.

o Manufacturer
The strict liability under the Act is imposed on the manufacturer. A manufacturer is
“any person who manufactures, assembles or processes consumer products, except that
if the goods are manufactured, assembled or processed for another person who attaches
his own brand name to the consumer products, the latter shall be deemed the
 manufacturer. In case of imported products, the manufacturer’s representatives or, in his
absence, the importer, shall be deemed the manufacturer.” (Article 4[as], Consumer Act).

Thus, a supermarket that sells certain products using its own trademark, is considered
the manufacturer even if, in fact, it was produced by another person or entity.

o Seller

Ordinarily the tradesman or seller is not liable for damages caused by defective
products under the Consumer Act. He is liable only when:
a) it is not possible to identify the manufacturer, builder, producer or importer;
b) the product is supplied, without clear identification of the manufacturer, producer,
builder or importer; and
c) he does not adequately preserve perishable goods. (Article 98, Consumer Act).

It is provided, however, that “the party making payment to the damaged party may
exercise the right to recover a part of the whole of the payment made against the other
responsible parties, in accordance with their part or responsibility in the cause of the
damage effected.” (ibid.).

A seller under the Act means “a person engaged in the business of selling consumer
products directly to consumers. It shall include a supplier or distributor if:
(1) the seller is a subsidiary or affiliate of the supplier or distributor;
(2) the seller interchanges personnel or maintains common or overlapping officers
or directors with the supplier or distributor; or
(3) the supplier or distributor provides or exercises supervision, direction or control
over the selling practices of the seller.” (Article 4[bn]).

On the other hand, a distributor and a supplier are defined as follows

“a) Distributor means any person to whom a consumer product is delivered or sold for
purposes of distribution in commerce, except that such term does not include a
manufacturer or retailer of such product.

b) Supplier means a person, other than a consumer, who in the course of his business,
solicits, offers, advertises, or promotes the disposition or supply of a consumer product
or who other than the consumer, engages in, enforces, or otherwise participates in a
consumer transaction, whether or not any privity of contract actually exists between
that person and the consumer, and includes the successor to, or assignee of, any right or
obligation on of the supplier.’’
 Article 106 provides that “if the damage is caused by a component or part
incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the
person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable.” It may happen that
the manufacturer was not the one who actually manufactured all the components used
in the product. Usually, the manufacturer also gets components or parts from other
manufacturers. In such cases, the liability of the persons involved is joint.

(3) Reasons why Liability is Imposed on Manufacturers.

o See opinion of Justice Traynor quoted above.

o Legal writers likewise advance a number of rationales that are summarized in this wise:

A. The consumer finds it too difficult to prove negligence against the

manufacturer.
B. Strict liability provides an effective and necessary incentive to manufacturers
to make their products as safe as possible.
C. Res ipsa loquitur is in fact applied, in some case, to impose liability upon
producers who have not in fact been negligent; therefore negligence should
be dispensed with.
D. Reputable manufacturers do in fact stand behind their products, replacing and
repairing those which prove to be defective; and many of them issue
agreements to do so. Therefore, all should be responsible when injury results
from a normal use of a product.
E. The manufacturer is in a better position to protect against harm, by insuring
against liability for it, and, by adding the costs of the insurance to the price of
the product, to pass the loss on to the general public.
F. Strict liability can already be accomplished by a series of actions, in which the
consumer first recovers from the retailer on a warranty, and liability on
warranties is then carried back through the intermediate dealers to the
manufacturer. The process is time-consuming, expensive, and wasteful; there
should be a short-cut.
G. By placing the product on the market, the seller represents to the public that
it is fit; and he intends and expects that it will be purchased and consumed in
reliance upon that representation. The middleman is no more than a conduit,
a mechanical device through which the thing sold reaches the consumer.
H. The costs of accidents should be placed on the party best able to determine
whether there are means to prevent the accident. When those means are less
expensive than the costs of such accidents, responsibility for implementing
them should be placed on the party best able to do so.” (Prosser, Wade and
Schwartz, Torts, 1988 Ed., p. 721).
Largo

 The basis of products liability is the responsibility put upon one who sends goods outs into the
channels of trade for use by others.

 Products liability would thus appear to cover any liability of a manufacturer or other seller of a
product where personal injury or damage to some other property is caused by a defect in the
product, albeit product liability is generally not considered to cover instances where the product
does not measure up to buyer's expectations, or on claims based merely on "bad bargains" (63
Amjur 2d at p. 34).

A manufacturer is strictly liable for torts when an article he places on the market, knowing that
it is to be used without inspection for defect, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human being. This is also sometimes referred to as the "enterprise liability" (Ibid., at p. 722).

The doctrine relates only to defective and unreasonably dangerous products and does not make
a manufacturer or seller an insurer that no injury will result from the use of his products nor
does the doctrine mean that such a manufacturer or seller is liable for any harm to anybody
under the circumstances (Ibid., at p. 734).

 R.A. 7394: The Consumer Act of the Philippines:

o Article 97:
"Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for
redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting
from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection, formulas and handling
and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient
or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof."

A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking
relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:
a) presentation of product;
b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;
c) the time it was put into circulation.

A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been
placed in the market.

o Article 98:
The tradesman/seller is likewise liable, pursuant to the preceding article when:
a) it is not possible to identify the manufacturer, builder, producer or importer;
b) the product is supplied, without clear identification of the manufacturer,
producer, builder or importer;
 c) he does not adequately preserve perishable goods.

The party making payment to the damaged party may exercise the right to recover a
part of the whole of the payment made against the other responsible parties, in
accordance with their part or responsibility in the cause of the damage effected.

o Article 99:
The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to
consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient
or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof. The service is defective
when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the
relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:
a) the manner in which it is provided;
b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it;
c) the time when it was provided. A service is not considered defective because of
the use or introduction of new techniques.

o Article 100:
The suppliers of durable or non-durable consumer products are jointly liable for
imperfections in quality that render the products unfit or inadequate for consumption
for which they are designed or decrease their value, and for those resulting from
inconsistency with the information provided on the container, packaging, labels or
publicity messages/advertisement, with due regard to the variations resulting from their
nature, the consumer being able to demand replacement to the imperfect parts. If the
imperfection is not corrected within thirty (30) days, the consumer may alternatively
demand at his option:
a) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind, in a perfect state
of use;
b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating,
without prejudice to any losses and damages;
c) a proportionate price reduction

The parties may agree to reduce or increase the term specified in the immediately
preceding paragraph; but such shall not be less than seven (7) nor more than one
hundred and eighty (180) days. The consumer may make immediate use of the
alternatives under the second paragraph of this Article when by virtue of the extent of
the imperfection, the replacement of the imperfect parts may jeopardize the product
quality or characteristics, thus decreasing its value. If the consumer opts for the
alternative under sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph of this Article, and
replacement of the product is not possible, it may be replaced by another of a different
kind, mark or model: Provided, That any difference in price may result thereof shall be
 supplemented or reimbursed by the party which caused the damage, without prejudice
to the provisions of the second, third and fourth paragraphs of this Article.

o Article 101:
Suppliers are jointly liable for imperfections in the quantity of the product when, in due
regard for variations inherent thereto, their net content is less than that indicated on
the container, packaging, labeling or advertisement, the consumer having powers to
demand, alternatively, at his own option:
a) the proportionate price;
b) the supplementing of weight or measure differential;
c) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind, mark or model,
without said imperfections;
d) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating
without prejudice to losses and damages, if any.

o Article 102:
The service supplier is liable for any quality imperfections that render the services
improper for consumption or decrease their value, and for those resulting from
inconsistency with the information contained in the offer or advertisement, the
consumer being entitled to demand alternatively at his option:
a) the performance of the services, without any additional cost and when
applicable;
b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating
without prejudice to losses and damages, if any;
c) a proportionate price reduction.

Reperformance of services may be entrusted to duly qualified third parties, at the

supplier's risk and cost.

 Liabilities of Drug Store Owners/Persons engaged in Vending Drugs and Medicines by Retail

o The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. In a decision

which stands alone, the Supreme Court of Kentucky said: "As applicable to the owners
of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending drugs and medicines by retail, the legal
maxim should be reversed. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor.
That is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a purchaser or send to a
patient one drug for another, as arsenic for calomel, cartharides for or mixed with
snakeroot and Peruvian bark, or even on innocent drug, calculated to produce a certain
effect, in place of another sent for and designed to produce a different effect. If he does
these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged pretexts that it was
an accidental or an innocent mistake; that he had been very careful and particular, and
had used extraordinary care and diligence in preparing or compounding the medicines
 as required, etc. Such excuses will not avail him." (Fleet vs. Hollenkemp [1852], 56 Am.
Dec, 563.)
o Delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facie negligence,
placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under the circumstances
consistent with the exercise of due care. (See Knoefel vs. Atkins, supra) The druggist
cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate give instead to
the customer barium chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package labeled
"potassium chlorate," and expect to escape responsibility on a plea of mistake.

o The rule thus of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs;
Reason: The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arm’s length as in ordinary
transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent
death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar
learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser
anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a
compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist
warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.

o "Pharmacists or apothecaries who compound or sell medicines, if they carelessly label a

poison as a harmless medicine, and send it so labeled into the market, are liable to all
persons who, without fault on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine, in
consequence of the false label; the rule being that the liability in such a case arises not
out of any contract or direct privity between the wrong-doer and the person injured,
but out of the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature
dangerous to the lives of others." (Nat. Savings Bank vs. Ward [1879], 100 U.S., 195,
following Thomas vs. Wincheste [1852], 2 Seld. [N.Y.] 397.) In view of the tremendous
and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines,
we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall
sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake (Ibid.).

iv. Municipal Corporations (Art. 2189) (Sec. 24, R.A. 7160)

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not exempt from
liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property (R.A. 7160).

CASES:

 Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan171 SCRA 382 (Mar 21, 1989)

It is not necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over
the defective road or street.

Facts:
Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter, was about to board a tricycle along a sidewalk when she
accidentally fell into a manhole that was partially covered by a concrete flower pot leaving a
gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide and 150 cm deep. Florentina suffered a fracture on
her right leg and as result thereof, had to be hospitalized. Florentina averred that she suffered
mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She became incapable of
reporting for duty within quite some time and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and is no
longer her former jovial self. Florentina sued the City of Dagupan. The City contends that the
manhole is owned by the National and the sidewalk on which it is found is located in Perez Blvd.,
which was also under the supervision of the National Government. While the lower court held
the City of Dagupan liable, the appellate court reversed the ruling on the ground that no
evidence was presented to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over the
Boulevard, where the manhole is located.

Issue: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liable for damages?

Ruling: Yes. The City of Dagupan is liable for damages. The liability of public corporations for
damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians by reason of the defective condition of
roads is expressed in the Art. 2189 of Civil Code, which states: Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision. For liability to attach, it is not even necessary for the
defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In the case at
bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan City and is exercised
through the City Engineer. This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other
public works is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although
these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the
City of Dagupan and receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained
by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, cannot be used to exempt the city from liability. The charter only lays down general
rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to
the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works.

Damages were awarded against the City of Dagupan although the street involved is a National
Road. Exemplary damages were awarded to serve warning to the city or cities concerned to be
more conscious of their duty and responsibility to their constituents, especially when they are
 engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which
are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order to minimize or prevent accidents to the
poor pedestrians. The Court also explained that too often in the zeal to put up “public impact”
projects such as beautification drives, the end is more important than the manner in which the
work is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced
flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and
inviting accidents.

 City of Manila v. Teotico (G.R. No. L-23052)

Facts:
At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a loading and unloading zone, waiting for a
jeepney when one came along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney
and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole. The fall caused
Teotico’s head to hit the rim and break his eyeglasses and the broken pieces thereof to pierce
his left eyelid. Respondent was then brought to PGH to be treated of his injuries. Respondent
suffered contusions in various parts of his body and allergic eruptions caused by the anti-tetanus
injections administered to him required further medical treatment and payment of these
charges. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor,
city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the City of Manila was sentenced to pay the damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for damages.

Ruling: YES.

Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by
reason” — specifically — “of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control or supervision.” In other words, Article 2189 governs
liability due to “defective streets,” in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that “the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected
and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned” who “have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective
functions and duties as imposed upon them by law.” Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that
P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. At any rate, under Article 2189 of
the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
 roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either “control or
supervision” over said street or road.

 JIMENEZ vs CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:
Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that it was flooded with
ankle-deep water. As he turned around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered opening w/c
could not be seen because of dirty rainwater. A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the
uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a depth of1½ inches. His left leg swelled and he
developed fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked w/ crutches for 15 days and could not
operate his school buses. He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose
administration the Sta. Ana had been placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract.
TC found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with Asiatec

HELD: YES

RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, which City of
Manila is invoking in this case, establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City Of Manila
while Art 2189 NCC governs the liability due to “defective streets, public buildings and other
public works” in particular and is therefore decisive in this case. It was also held that for liability
under 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province, city or municipality over the
defective public building in question is enough. It is not necessary that such belongs to such
province, city or municipality. In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana public market
remained under the control of the City as evidenced by:

1. The contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that “prior approval” of the City is
still needed in the operations.
2. Mayor Bagatsing of Manila admitted such control and supervision in his letter to Finance
Sec. Virata (“The City retains the power of supervision and control over its public markets…)
3. City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market whose primary duty is to take
direct supervision and control of that particular public market
4. Sec. 30 of Tax Code “The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision,
administration and control over public markets…

It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably
safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could
have been taken during good weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole
could have been placed under the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should have seen
 to it that the openings were covered. It was evident that the certain opening was already
uncovered, and 5 months after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings that
during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water. Such acts were
not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of impending danger was evident.
Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle of the passageways
and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would not have
fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
Asiatec and City are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable.

 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA

FACTS:
MWSS entered into a contract for water service connections with KC Waterworks Service
Construction (KC).On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of
MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San
Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires. Only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact
that the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping of
pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires. Between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the
evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991
at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards the
direction of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. She was with prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa.
The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on
a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on
the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured. Consequent to the foregoing incident,
Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila a complaint for
damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal
officials. After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa
adjudging MWSS and theMunicipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her. CA affirmed
RTC with modification.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable

HELD: YES

RATIO:
Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189[8] of the Civil Code,
ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a
controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or
supervision thereof.
 At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.

We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, of the Local Government
Code, the phrases “regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
water, sewer, and other pipes”, and “adopt measures to ensure public safety against open
canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property”, are not modified by
the term “municipal road”. And neither can it be fairly inferred from the same provision of
Section 149 that petitioner’s power of regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned
applies only in cases where such activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind,
the municipality’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation
of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of
whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the
same is within its territorial jurisdiction.

Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported lack of knowledge of the
excavation and the condition of the road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30,
1988 when the accident occurred. It must be borne in mind that the obligation of the
[petitioner] to maintain the safe condition of the road within its territory is a continuing one
which is not suspended while a street is being repaired.

v. Building Proprietors (Art. 2190-2193)

Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)

Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;

(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;

(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;

(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place. (1908)

Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against
the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.
(1909)
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages
caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)

 RE: Art. 2193

Aquino
o It is also evident from the text of Article 2193 that the liability is absolute. It does not
indicate a presumption or admit proof of care. (Reyes and Puno, p. 165).

o Unlike Article 2183, the provision does not exempt cases involving force majeure.
However, there is an opinion to the effect that the same are still exempt in
extraordinary circumstances. (VI Caguioa).
Largo
o In US vs. Topino, 35 Phil. 901 (1916), the husband was regarded as the head of the
family. Even in the fairly recent case of People vs. Llamo, G.R. No. 132138, January 28,
2000, it was said that "[i]n this culture, the father is called "haligi ng tahanan," the pillar
of strength upon whom his children look to for moral guidance and material as well as
emotional support. The father is the "padre de familia," the head of the family who is
morally and socially obligated to protect his family and to ensure their well-being."

o But under the Family Code, the management of the household is now the right and the
duty of both spouses (Art. 71).

o In the case of a family consisting of unmarried brothers or sisters, it seems that the
head of the family is one on whom the family depends for lead support.

CASES:

 FELISA P. DE ROY v. CA, GR No. 80718, 1988-01-29

Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents
and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.

Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity
to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of... which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners
 filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987, but this was denied in the
Resolution of October 27, 1987.

Issues: Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision

Ruling:
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop
and, therefore, petitioners' prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last
clear chance", which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

 Dingcong vs Karaan 72 Phil 14

The term head of the family is not limited to the owner of the building and it may even include
the lessee thereof. The petitioner in Dingcong was a co-lessee of the property. He was made
liable for the act of a guest who left the faucet open causing water to fall from the second floor
and to damage the goods of Kanaan in the floor below. It should be noted however that
although Article 1910 of the Old Civil Code (now Article 2183) was cited, there was no finding
that the liability under the said Article is strict liability; Dingcong was held liable for his failure to
exercise diligence of a good father of a family.

Facts:
Jose Dingcong was the owner of a hotel in Iloilo. In 1933, a certain Francisco Echevarria rented a
room in the upper floor of the hotel. The room he rented was immediately above the store
occupied by the Kanaan brothers who are also tenants of the hotel. One night, Echevarria
carelessly left his faucet open thereby flooding his room and it caused water to drip from his
room to the store below. Because of this, the articles being sold by Kanaan were damaged.
Apparently also, the water pipes supposed to drain the water from Echevarria’s room was
defective hence the flooding and the dripping.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dingcong is liable to pay for the damages caused by Echevarria.

HELD:
Yes. Dingcong as proprietor is liable for the negligent act of the guest of his hotel (Echevarria). It
was not shown that Dingcong exercised the diligence of a good father in preventing the damage
caused. The pipe should have been repaired prior and Echevarria should have been provided
 with a container to catch the drip. Therefore, Dingcong is liable to pay for damages by reason of
his negligence.

vi. Architects & Engineers (Art. 2192 & 1723)

Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against
the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.
(1909)

Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable
for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by
reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor
is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects
in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of
the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily
liable with the contractor.

Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)