Lacanilao vs.
CA, 162 SCRA 563 new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman
Facts:
The CFI of Manila found the petitioner, a
policeman, guilty of homicide for the death of one
Ceferino Erese.
CA lowered the penalty merely by one period
applying Article 64, paragraph 2, of RPC,
appreciating as it did incomplete justification as a
mere generic or specific mitigating circumstance
lowering the penalty to the minimum period.
Accordingly, the penalty originally imposed by the
CFI of Manila was modified and lowered by the CA
to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to 12 and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
the maximum.
Issue:
WON CA erred in appreciating the
incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty as mere generic circumstance.
Held:
YES. The respondent Court erred. Incomplete
justification is a special or privileged mitigating
circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by
aggravating circumstances but also reduces the
penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law. We agree with the petitioner that the
governing provision is Article 69 of the RPC.
Consequently, Article 69 is applicable, for the
requirement 'That the majority of such conditions be
present" is immaterial since there are only two
conditions in order that the circumstance in No. 5 of
Article 11 may be taken into account.
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ,
petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his
official capacity as the Ombudsman, and
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman
gravely abused its discretion in recommending the
filing of 24 informations against him for violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the
Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned
cases which were previously dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10,
2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised
even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no
necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon
before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may
accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-
28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and
Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the
ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the
dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was
thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that
should it find probable cause in the conduct of its
preliminary investigation; that the filing of the
complaint with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of
the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989
interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence
of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until
2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that,
in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with
a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the alleged offenses of the
petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019
and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of
Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to
whether prescription should begin to run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised
Penal Code, which answers the same in the
negative, should be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether the offenses for which petitioner are being
charged have already prescribed.
RULING:
Yes.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense
charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the
time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.21
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section
7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of
Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985
during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during
his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department
of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses
punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years.
Significantly, this Court already declared in the case
of People v. Pacificador22 that:
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which
was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive
period for offenses punishable under the said statute
was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive
period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section
11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195,
does not apply in this case for the reason that the
amendment, not being favorable to the accused
(herein private respondent), cannot be given
retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on
January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6,
1976.23
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the
petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same
shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for
offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during
the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same
shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference
is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the
computation of prescription of offenses defined by
and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor
initiated the preliminary investigation of Criminal
Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by
requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-
affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have
already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its
right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject
of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before
the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-
231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS
AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who will propagate its ideology.
However, Under Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 states:
No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall
represent or allow himself to be represented as
being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization, and no political party, political group,
political committee, civic, religious, professional, or
other organization or organized group of whatever
nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such
candidate or in the filing of his certificate of
candidacy or give aid or support, directly or
indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or
against his campaign for election…
A petition for a declaratory relief was filed by Kay
Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized
and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation
created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and
duties thereunder to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional
Convention.
Issues: 1. Whether or not R.A. No. 6132 is an ex post
facto law.
2. Whether or not the R.A No. 6132 is
constitutional.
Held:
1. No. R.A. No. 6132 is not an ex post facto
law. Though Section 18 of R.A. No. 6132, provides
for a penalty clause, the penalty is imposed only for
acts committed after the approval of the law and not
those perpetrated prior thereto.
2. Yes. It does not violate freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of
assembly and equal protection clauses. It is
designed to prevent the clear and present danger of
the prostitution of electoral process and denial of the
equal protection of the laws.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE
CONDE, defendants-appellants.
Facts of the Case:
On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and
Engracio Liaco borrowed from Vicente Diaz-Conde
and Apolinaria R. De Conde the sum of P300. They
obligated themselves to pay the defendants 5% per
month, payable within the first ten days beginning on
January 1916.
On May 1, 1916, Act No. 2655 (Usury Law) took
effect.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants violated Act
No. 2655.
Held:
No. If a contract is legal at its inception, it
cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent
legislation. The obligation of the contract is the law
which binds the parties to perform their agreement if
it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or
public order. That law must govern and control the
contract in every aspect in which it is intended to
bear upon it, whether it affect its validity,
construction, or discharge.
In the present case, making Act No. 2655 applicable
to the act complained of which had been done before
the law was adopted, a criminal act, would give it an
ex post facto operation.
 An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an
action, done before the passage of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal. Ex post
facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its
retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant. The
decision of the lower court is revoked and the
complaint dismissed.
TUASON v REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CALOOCAN
GR No 70484
Facts: Spouses Tuason were retired public school
teachers. With funds from their retirement benefits
and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a
piece of land in the latter’s subdivision in Caloocan
City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel’s Torrens title was
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the
Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their
property. Some eight years thereafter, the Tuasons’
travails began. They woke up one morning to
discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer
the owners of the land they had purchased with their
hard-earned money, and that their land and the other
lots in the subdivision had been “declared open for
disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the
present bona fide occupants thereof.”
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day
after the declaration of martial law Mr. Marcos,
invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential
Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree
invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons’ vendor,
Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the
Government the land it had subsequently subdivided
into several lots for sale to the public. Said
Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that
Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price.
Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner
spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the
following imperious manner: order and decree that
any and all sales contracts between the government
and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled,
and those between the latter and the subsequent
transferees, and any and all transfers are hereby
declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against
the Government.
On the strength of this presidential decree, the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the
inscription on the Tuasons’ title, that their certificate
of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio
and considered cancelled as against the
Government and the property described herein is
declared open for disposition and sale to the
members of the Malacanang Homeowners
Association, Inc.
The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court
a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree
as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their
property in favor of a selected group, in violation not
only of the constitutional provisions on due process
and eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions of
the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of
Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that the Register of
Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory
inscription on their title and restore its efficacy.
Issue: WON the remedy of petition for certiorari was
proper
Decision: The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos
exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a
determination of facts, and applied the law to those
facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties
were in the premises. These acts essentially
constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of
jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to
hear or try and decide or determine a cause.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the
writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the
performance of what in essence is a judicial function,
if it be shown that the acts were done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with
judicial power, such power, as everyone knows,
being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law — the judicial
acts done by him were in the circumstances
indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The
acts were completely alien to his office as chief
executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope
of the legislative power that he had.
The Court has it in its power to treat the petition for
certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of
the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter.
It will also appear that an executive officer had acted
without jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not
granted to him by the Constitution or the laws — and
had furthermore performed the act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected.
BANEZ v CA
AYALA CORPORATION issued on 23 December
1987 BPI Check No. 707802 for P33,226,685.69
payable to PAL Employees' Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (PESALA). The check with the
words "FOR PAYEE'S ACCOUNT ONLY" written on
its face was delivered in trust to Catalino Bañez in
his capacity as President of PESALA. However, on
the same date, Bañez and his co-officers Romeo
Busuego and Renato Lim deposited the check in
their joint account with respondent Republic Planters
Bank, Cubao Branch, which was not an official
depositary bank of PESALA. Later, Bañez, Busuego
and Lim withdrew the amount and failed to account
for it to PESALA.
On 21 April 1992, aside from a criminal case for
estafa against its officers Bañez, Busuego and Lim,
PESALA sued Republic Planters Bank (RPB) for the
face value of the check and P500,000.00 as
damages for allowing the deposit and encashment
of the check despite the fact that it was a crossed
check payable only to the account of PESALA, to its
great prejudice and in violation of banking laws in the
country.1
On 14 March 1994 RPB moved for leave to file a
third-party complaint against Catalino Bañez,
Romeo Busuego, Renato Lim and Alberto Barican,
the latter as manager of RPB, Cubao Branch,
alleging that they were solely and exclusively
responsible for the loss of the value of the check
through their misrepresentation which led the bank originals thereof which they attached to their petition
to believe that they were authorized to deposit and constitute sufficient compliance with the
withdraw the amount. The motion was granted. requirements of Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 6, of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals8
Meanwhile on 6 April 1994 PESALA and RPB (by
since Revised Circular No. 1-88 issued by the
then known as PNB-RB)2 forged a compromise
Supreme Court itself allows either a clearly legible
agreement under which PNB-RB agreed to pay
duplicate original or certified true copy of the
PESALA P20,226,685.00. PESALA, in turn,
assailed decision, judgment, resolution or order to
undertook to assist PNB-RB in prosecuting the third-
be attached to the petition.9 Thus, petitioners posit
party defendants for the liability assumed by the
that Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 6, of the Revised Internal
bank. On 13 April 1994 the trial court approved the
Rules of the Court of Appeals should not be read in
compromise.
a "myopic" manner but, rather, liberally consistent
Upon the foregoing amicable settlement, third-party and in conjunction with SC Revised Circular No. 1-
defendant Lim moved to dismiss the third-party 88.
complaint on the ground that it could not stand on its
On the other hand, respondent PNB-RB argues that
own after the termination of the main complaint by
Revised Circular No. 1-88 cannot be successfully
compromise since the third-party complaint was but
invoked by petitioners since it pertains only to
an incident and a continuation of the main case.
requirements for petitions filed with the Supreme
Third-party defendants Bañez and Busuego, aside
Court, not with the Court of Appeals. In the latter
from adopting the ground invoked by defendant Lim,
case, its Revised Internal Rules, which mandate that
likewise moved to dismiss on grounds of lis
certified true copies of the questioned order must be
pendens, forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction and
attached to a petition in special civil actions for
cause of action.
certiorari, apply.
On 14 July 1994 the trial court deferred action on the
We had occasion to rule that the submission of a
motion to dismiss anchored on grounds of lis
duplicate copy of the questioned order of the trial
pendens and forum shopping, but denied the motion
court (bearing its seal) in a petition for certiorari
outright anchored on grounds of lack of jurisdiction
constitutes substantial compliance with the rule
and termination of the principal complaint.3 The
requiring submission of the certified copies of the
motion of third-party defendants to reconsider the
orders complained of. 10 However, a similar liberal
order was denied on 27 October 1994 since the
construction cannot be applied in favor of petitioners
compromise between plaintiff PESALA and third-
since courts suspend their own rules or except a
party plaintiff PNB-RB did not operate to
case from them only when substantial justice so
automatically dismiss the third-party complaint as
warrants, as when the merit of a party's cause is
the latter was actually independent of, and separate
apparent and outweighs consideration of non-
and distinct from, the plaintiff's complaint.4
compliance with certain formal requirements. 11 To
On 1 December 1994 petitioners Bañez and reiterate, a similar relaxation of procedural rules is
Busuego instituted a special civil action for certiorari not warranted in the case at bench due to the lack of
with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of merit of petitioners' cause.
discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the
Petitioners argue that the third-party complaint filed
Orders of 14 July and 27 October 1994 attaching
against them by PNB-RB should have been
duplicate original copies thereof. On 14 December
immediately dismissed in view of the prior dismissal
1994 the Special Fifth Division of the Court of
of the main complaint filed against PNB-RB by
Appeals, without necessarily giving due course to
PESALA. Since jurisdiction of the trial court over the
the petition, ordered respondents to comment
main action has been terminated, its jurisdiction over
thereon.5 However, on 31 January 1995, another
the third-party complaint necessarily ended as well
Resolution6 was issued by the appellate court, this
since the latter is but a continuation of, or ancillary
time through its Special Eleventh Division,
to, the main action.
dismissing the petition for failure of petitioners to
attach certified true copies of the questioned orders The above contention is devoid of merit. Petitioners
as required under Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 6, of the liken a third-party complaint to a cross-claim and
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. The then, by analogy, apply the ruling in Ruiz Jr. v. Court
motion for reconsideration was denied.7 Hence, this of Appeals 12 where the Court said that the
petition. dismissal of the complaint divested the cross-
claimants of whatever appealable interest they might
Two issues are presented before us: whether
have had before and made the cross-claim itself no
respondent Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
longer viable. 13
special civil action for certiorari for failure of
petitioners to attach certified true copies, as opposed A third-party complaint is indeed similar to a cross-
to duplicate originals, of the questioned orders; and claim, except only with respect to the persons
whether the earlier dismissal (by virtue of against whom they are directed. 14 However, the
compromise) of the main complaint warrants the ruling in Ruiz cannot be successfully invoked by
automatic dismissal of the third-party complaint filed petitioners. In Ruiz we declared that the dismissal of
in consequence thereof. the main action rendered the cross-claim no longer
viable only because the main action was
On the procedural issue, petitioners do not deny
categorically dismissed for lack of cause of action.
their failure to attach certified true copies of the
Hence, since defendants could no longer be held
questioned Orders dated 14 July and 27 October
liable under the main complaint, no reason existed
1994. However they contend that the duplicate
for them anymore to sue their co-party under the
cross-claim.
In sharp contrast thereto, the termination of the main
action between PESALA and PNB-RB was not due
to any finding that it was bereft of any basis. On the
contrary, further proceedings were rendered
unnecessary only because defendant (third-party
plaintiff) PNB-RB, to avoid a protracted litigation,
voluntarily admitted liability in the amount of
P20,226,685.00. Hence, the termination of the main
action between PESALA and PNB-RB could not
have rendered lifeless the third-party complaint filed
against petitioners, as it did the cross-claim in Ruiz
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, since it involved a finding of
liability on the part of PNB-RB even if it be by
compromise.
Petitioners allege that it would be an injustice to
them if they should be made to carry the burden of
contribution or indemnity for the liability voluntarily
assumed by respondent PNB-RB in the compromise
agreement to which they were never parties. But no
injustice will result. A continuation of the proceedings
with respect to the third-party complaint will not ipso
facto subject petitioners, as third-party defendants,
to liability as it will only provide the parties with the
occasion to litigate their respective claims and
defenses. Petitioners' assertion that they are not
liable for the obligation voluntarily assumed by PNB-
RB in the compromise is but a defense to resist the
third-party complaint which they can properly raise
in the course of the trial and prove by whatever
evidence they may have on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
questioned Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated 31 January and 22 February 1995 are
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SEBASTIAN v MORALES
Facts:
Private respondents are the heirs of the late
Guillermo Sarena, who died on June 27, 1986.
During his lifetime, Guillermo owned agricultural
landholdings, all located in Samon and Mayapyap
Sur, Cabanatuan City. In addition in the foregoing
properties, he was also the registered owner of a
parcel of agricultural land located at San ricardo,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of 4.9993
hectares, which was tenanted by Manuel Valentin
and Wenceslao Peneyra. The tenants tilling the farm
lots had already been issued emancipation parents
pursuant to PD No. 27. Private respondents filed an
application with DAR Regional office in San
Fernando, Pampanga, for retention of over 5
hectares under Sec. 6 of the CAR Law (RA no 6657).
On June 6, 1997, the DAR granted private
respondents’ application. Petitioner Sebatian moved
for reconsideration of the foregoing order before the
DAR Reginal Director. The DAR Regional Director
found that the order was in contrary to law for
violating Sec. 6 of RA 6657 and its IRR. He then
issued a new order dated Oct. 23, 1997, which
instead allowed private respondents to retain a
parcel of land with an are of 4.9993hectares,
covered by TCT No. 143564, located at San
Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Private respondets
then appealed the order of DAR Secreatry. The
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but
was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the dismissal by the CA of the petition is valid
and proper.
HELD:
No. Sec. 61 of RA No 6657 clearly mandates that
judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are
governed by the rules of court. The Rules direct that
it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial
review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for
certiorari under Ryle 65 rather than the mandatory
petition for review under Ryle 43, petitioners opted
for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the 4th
paragraph of Supreme Court Circular no. 2-90, and
appeal taken to the SC or CA by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. Therefore,
we hold that CA committed no reversible error in
dismissing CA-GR SP No 51288 for failure of
petitioners to pursue the proper mode of appeal.
Wherefore, the instant petition is DENIED. Affirmed
decision of CA.
JOSE v CA
Before us is a petition erroneously entitled as a
"Petition for Review on Certiorari" which should be a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On November 14, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City (Branch 22) rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. CEO-15709, entitled "Danilo Omega,
Plaintiff, versus, Criselda F. Jose, Defendant.", the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, based on the evidence thus
presented, this Court finds for the plaintiff. Judgment
is hereby rendered declaring the March 3, 1981
marriage between plaintiff Danilo Omega and
Criselda F. Jose, null and void ab initio. Custody
over the three children Joselyn, Danilo, Jr. and
Jordan, all surnamed Omega shall be entrusted to
plaintiff Danilo Omega.
"Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Manila with a
copy of this judgment. No costs. "SO ORDERED."1
The ground for declaring the marriage null and void
is psychological incapacity on the part of defendant
Criselda under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. During the trial, the counsel on record of
defendant Criselda was Atty. Margarito D. Yap of the
Cebu City District Office of the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO). However, defendant Criselda filed a
Notice of Appeal, dated December 7, 1994, on her
own, without the assistance of Atty. Yap.
The Judicial Records Division (JRD) of the Court of
Appeals sent a notice to pay docket fee, dated
August 3, 1995 to Atty. Yap which was received by
him.3 On October 24, 1995, the appellate court,
through the Former Sixteenth Division,4
promulgated a Resolution which reads as follows:
"For failure of the defendant-appellant to pay the
docketing fee in this case within the reglementary
period which expired on August 25, 1995, despite
receipt by his counsel on August 10, 1995 of this
Court’s notice dated August 3, 1995, this appeal is
hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule
50 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED."
On May 9, 1996, the Division Clerk of Court issued
the Entry of Judgment certifying that the above-
quoted Resolution had become final and executory
as of December 1, 1995.6 It is indicated at the
bottom of said Entry of Judgment that Atty. Yap and
the Special and Appealed Cases Division of the PAO
were sent copies of the Entry of Judgment.
On May 13, 1996, the appellate court received a
letter of even date from defendant-appellant Criselda
addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals inquiring about the status of her appeal and
claiming that she has not received any notice from
the appellate court.
The appellate court noted the explanation of the
clerk in the Civil Cases Section of the Judicial
Records Division (JRD) of said court that Atty. Yap
was sent the notice to pay docket fee because
Criselda had sent a copy of her Notice of Appeal to
Atty. Yap and that per the records of the case, Atty.
Yap was earlier sent a copy of the formal offer of
exhibits and duly received in his behalf, he filed the
comments and objections to the exhibits for the
plaintiff; he appeared at the hearings conducted by
the trial court.8
On October 28, 1996, Criselda through counsel filed
a Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus
Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal.9 On December
16, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued the following
Resolution:
"Considering that the Resolution dismissing this
appeal has become final on December 1, 1995 and
an Entry of Judgment has in fact been made on May
9, 1996, the Motion for Leave of Court to File
Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal and
the Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal
are hereby denied. SO ORDERED."
Criselda’s motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition on
the following ground:
"The public respondent Honorable Court of Appeals
committed grave error in denying the petitioner’s
Motion for Leave of Court to file Omnibus
Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal and the
Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal which
if not corrected, would deprive petitioner of her
constitutional right to due process and injustice
would be done to her."
On which basis, petitioner Criselda raises the
following issues:
"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO
APPEALED HER CASE BY HERSELF WITHOUT
COUNSEL WAS VALIDLY SERVED WITH NOTICE
TO PAY THE DOCKETING FEE AND NOTICE OF
THE RESOLUTION DISMISSING HER APPEAL
FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE DOCKETING FEE.
"II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT
TO FILE OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO
REINSTATE APPEAL AND THE OMNIBUS
MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL."12
After private respondent filed his Comment, parties
filed their respective Memoranda in compliance with
the Resolution of the Court dated December 14,
1998.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Based on the records, it appears that the PAO,
through Atty. Victor C. Laborte and Atty. Yap,
represented petitioner during the trial of the case.
Although petitioner herself personally filed the Notice
of Appeal, the fact remains that Atty. Yap or the PAO
has not filed any formal notice of withdrawal of
appearance in the trial court. Therefore, insofar as
the appellate court is concerned, Atty. Yap is the
counsel of record. As such, the appellate court did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion for leave of court to file omnibus
motions or motion to reinstate appeal.
Section 22, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court
presumed to represent client on appeal. – An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a
lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the
appellate court."
Payment of the docket and other legal fees within the
prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional, and failure of the appellant to conform
with the rules on appeal renders the judgment final
and executory.13
Indeed, the Court, in some instances, had allowed
liberal construction of the Rules of Court with respect
to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals on equitable consideration.14 In Buenaflor
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has enunciated the
following:
"The established rule is that the payment in full of the
docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified,
to wit: First, the failure to pay appellate court docket
fee within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of
the appeal; Second, such power should be used in
the exercise of the Courts’ sound discretion ‘in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair "play
and with great deal of circumspection considering all
attendant circumstances.
"Admittedly, this Court has allowed the filing of an
appeal in some cases where a stringent application
of the rules would have denied it, only when to do so
would serve the demands of justice and in the
exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction. This is
based on the rule of liberality in the interpretation of
the Rules to achieve substantial justice. It may be
recalled that the general rule is that the Rules of
Court are rules of procedure and whenever called for
they should be so construed as to give effect rather Petitioner failed to show that her appeal is extremely
than defeat their essence. meritorious that to deprive her of an appeal would
unduly affect her substantial rights.
"Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides: In other words, petitioner failed to show any
compelling reason to warrant the issuance of the writ
‘SEC. 6. Construction – These Rules shall be
of certiorari. The Court of Appeals committed no
liberally construed in order to promote their objective
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus
disposition of every action and proceeding.’
Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal. Its Resolution
"Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to dated October 24, 1995 dismissing petitioner’s
defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they appeal had become final and executory as of
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical December 1, 1995. WHEREFORE, the petition is
sense. The exception is that, while the Rules are DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner
liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the
rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the
exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed
on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the
Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal
perfected out of time where a stringent application of
the rules would have denied it, but only when to do
so would serve the demands of substantial justice,
and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
"The underlying consideration in this petition is that
the act of dismissing the notice of appeal, if done in
excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction, amounts to an
undue denial of the petitioner’s right to appeal. The
importance and real purpose of the remedy of
appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of
Appeals where this Court ruled that an appeal is an
essential part of our judicial system and trial courts
are advised to proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed
that every party-litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints
of technicalities."15
However, the Court finds no cogent reason to be
liberal in the present case for the following reasons:
Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Margarito Yap of the PAO
was properly sent by the appellate court a notice to
pay the docket fees. Atty. Yap or the PAO did not file
any formal withdrawal of appearance and therefore,
for all intents and purposes, the appellate court
correctly sent the notice to Atty. Yap. It is settled that
clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and
omission of their counsel.16
Moreover, under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears. Under Section 22 of the same Rule, an
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a
lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the
appellate court.
Petitioner failed to pursue her appeal for almost two
years. She herself filed the notice of appeal on
December 4, 1994 but thought of inquiring from the
Court of Appeals about her appeal only on May 13,
1996 (or after the lapse of one year and five months)
as to the status of her appeal.