I. THE ACCUSED MR. ANGAD AND MR.

DUSHYANT ARE NOT LIABLE TO

BE PUNISHED UNDER SECTION 107 OF RPC.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the charges against the accused are
falsely implicated by the prosecution. The accused has done no act which will amount to
abetment. Hence the allegation of the offence is baseless.

i.THE ACTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE OFFENCE OF ABETMENT.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Abettor” as “A person who instigates the commission of
a crime or advice and encourages others to commit it. The ingredients of abetment under
IPC1 are:

1. Instigating a person to commit an offence

2. Engaging in a conspiracy to commit it or

3. Intentionally aiding a person to commit it

In Corpus Juris Secondum, the meaning of the word ‘abet’ has been defined as meaning
to aid; to assist or to give aid; to command, to procure, or to counsel; to countenance; to
encourage, counsel, induce or assist to encourage or to set another on to commit.” An act
of an individual, which aids, helps or assist another to commit a crime, falls within the
offence of abetment. In the instant case, there was no act of any aid, assistance or
encouragement from the part of the accused.

In the instant case the gunmen have made confessions about the intentional aid provided
to them by AmarapalliRathore.

In order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown to have intentionally aided the
commission of the crime.In the instant case, the prosecution has miserably failed to
establish the substantive charge of the accused. When the substantive offence is not
established and the principal offender is acquitted, then the charge of abetment also fails

1
Indian Penal Code 1860
and the alleged abettor cannot be held guilty of the offence.

A line of Supreme Court rulings from FagunaKantaNath v. State of Assam 2 ,Jamuna

Singh v. State of Bihar3to Madan Raj Bhandari v. State of Rajasthan4were considered by
the Supreme Court on HaradhanChakrabarty v. Union of India5in which the accused was
set free from the offence of abetment because of the reason that the principal offender
was acquitted. The mere fact that Msamrapallirathore was a competitor of Bansuri will
not prove the fact that she was the abettor nor do the mere confessions amount to
abetment.

i.ii THERE CAN BE NO ABETMENT WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE AND INTENTION

Uttering the inducement accompanied by the required mens rea constitutes the crime of
abetment.“Mensrea” element is a sine qua non for offences including abetment under
RPC.It was laid down in Shrilal v. State6that in order to secure a conviction for abetment
of Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder this section, it is essential for the
prosecution to prove that the accused knew that the actual murderer did intent to commit
the murder. In the instant case, the accused Ms. Amarapalli lacked the intention to
commit the alleged offence. Prosecution has miserably failed to prove the alleged offence
against the principal accused. Ms. Amarapalli. The mere evidence that the prosecution
can rely on is the confessions made by the gunmen while they were in the police custody.

2AIR 1959 SC 673, (1959) Cr LJ 917 (SC)

3AIR 1967 SC 553,(1967)Cr LJ 541 (SC)

4AIR 1970 SC 436,(1969) 2 SCC 385

5AIR 1990 SC 1210

61953 MB 155(156):54 Cr LJ 995

i.ii CONFESSIONS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN EVIDENCE

These confessions cant be considered admissible because under section 25of the Indian
Evidence Act7 and section 162 of CrPC8 no confession to a police officer shall be proved
as against a person accused of any offense. Further it was held in Balamurugan v. state9
that the confession before the police could be considered admissible only on the grounds
that it is accompanied by separate evidence. There was no evidence that was provided by
the gunmen about such an aid of weaponry provided by MsAmarapalliRathore. In State
of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub10held that “In order to constitute [an attempt] first there
must be an intention to commit a particular offence, second, some act must have been
done which would necessarily have to be done towards the commission of the offence
and, third, such act must be ‘proximate’ to the intended result. The measure of proximity
is not in relation to time and action but in relation to intention. In other words, the act
must reveal, with reasonable certainty, in conjunction with other facts and circumstances
and not necessarily in isolation, an intention, as distinguished from a mere desire or
object, to commit the particular offence, though the act by itself may be merely
suggestive or indicative of such intention but that it must be, that is, it must be indicative
or suggestive of the intention”.11 However, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove the
same.

Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act12 also says that if an oral evidence is that of a
person who holds an opinion, the grounds of that opinion should be proved. And the
proviso to section 60 says that if the evidence involves the existence of a material thing

7
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
8
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
9
(1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 1461
10
(1980) 3 SCC 57

11
Id
12
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
the material thing should be produced for inspection. In the present case the prosecution
has failed to produce that the weaponry and show the court the grounds on which the
gunmen had confessed in front of the officers

II ACCUSED ARE NOT LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

Criminal conspiracy as defined under Sec.120A of IPC 13 consists of an agreement

between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means.The
elements of a criminal conspiracy are: Agreement between two or more persons by whom
the agreement is effected, and a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of
the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which that aim is to
be accomplished.

ii.i No Agreement or understanding between the accused

The provisions of Sec.120A and 120B of IPC14 states that the offence of conspiracy lies
not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in
attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme
or agreement between the parties is essential.

Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct

evidence of the same thus relying on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they
were done in reference to their common intention.For an offence under Sec.120 B the
intention must
proceed to an agreement.

In the present matter, conspiracy has been shown by the prosecution between Mr. Raga
Deva and Ms. Amarapalli Rathore to commit forgery when there never was an intention
to commit forgery. None of the events of the case depicts that the accused had agreed
over the intention to commit the forgery of the documents. Raga deva had just joined the
company and the prosecution has failed to show any evidence if the e mail id through
which the documents were sent were that that of raga deva’s and that the fact that the
details of the event and the design were found in Amarapalli’s computer can simply

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Indian Penal Code 1860
14
Id
prove that she’s a competitor who likes to stay updated about the happenings.

Thus it is also clear that at the prosecution has failed to show there was any event
showing Ms. Amarapali Rathore discussing the common design with raga deva and in the
absence of common design the offence of Criminal Conspiracy cannot take place. The
only time questions as to agreement could be derived was when the details of the event
and the design were found in the computer of Ms. Amarapalli Rathore. This can be
merely out of healthy competition and not with an intention to steal the jewelry and
therefore be said to reflect the intention/motive to commit a crime. In Nagaraja v. State of
Karnataka15 it was held that past enmity won’t amount to evidence to commission of the
crime.

Thus it is clear from the materials available on record that there was no common design
between all these accused to do any illegal act. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that no
conspiracy on part of the accused can be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

III THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE COMMISSION OF

DACOITY AND CRIMINAL TRESSPASS

Section 94 of the general exceptions provided under IPC 16 has not provided that the
offenses committed under a compulsion are a defense to criminal liability. Actus me
invitio factus non estmeus acts that is an act which is done by me against my will is not
my act, and hence I am not responsible for it.17

In the present case the prosecution has failed to prove the grounds on which robbery or
dacoity was committed with an attempt to cause death or grievous hurt under section 397
of or criminal trespass under Section 441 of IPC.18 There were no grounds on the basis of
which the confessions were given to the police officers. The prosecution must investigate

15
AIR (2008) 17 SCC 277
16
Indian Penal Code 1860
17
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol 3, 17 th Edn, 1830 p 27.
18Indian Penal Code 1860
as to what made the gunmen commit the said offences under IPC 19 because had the
offenses been committed under the provisions of Section 94 it would amount to an act
that is committed under the fear of grievous hurt or death. Therefore it is prayed that the
court directs the prosecution withdraw these charges since the grounds on which these
offenses were committed was not proved by the prosecution leaving a reasonable doubt
that they could be done under compulsion by some other person.

19Indian Penal Code 1860