AZNAR V.
DUNCAN which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by
Testator: Edward E. Christensen
Beneficiary and relationship: Lucy Duncan (daughter)
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in
the Philippines, died leaving a will executed in 1951. The will
was admitted to probate by the CFI of Davao in 1954. In that
same decision the court declared that Maria Helen Christensen
Garcia (Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. The
declaration was appealed to this Court, and was affirmed in its
decision in 1958.
The trial court approved the project submitted by the executor
in accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court
found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia
appealed from the order of approval, and this Court, reversed
the same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the
will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the
case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as provided by said law.
In 1964, the CFI of Davao issued an order approving the project
of partition submitted by the executor, where the properties of
the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy
Christensen Duncan (Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had
expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and
Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his
death. The said order was based on the proposition that since
Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of
Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the properties
passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate,
saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons,
which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and
distributed to the legatees.
The will of Edward E. Christensen stated that he had one child,
Maria Lucy Christensen (Lucy Duncan), and that he had no
living ascendants, and no other living descendants. He gave,
devised and bequeathed to Helen Garcia, who,
“notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is
not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time
adopted by me”, the sum of P3,600.00. He gave, devised and
bequeathed to Lucy Duncan all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of his property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which he may be possessed at my
death.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has
been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct
line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir
pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of
preterition, but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code,
1
any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the
same be fully satisfied." Appellant also suggests that considering
the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied
his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy
nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime, she
was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of
Article 918, which reads:
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the
cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not
proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code,
shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice
the person disinherited; but the devices and legacies and
other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent
as will not impair the legitimate.
Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and 918,
Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share
of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were
intestate.
ISSUE: Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should
pertain to Lucy Duncan and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or
whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir
should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the
legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate
HELD:
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the
will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him
as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the
properties.
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced
heir may be limited only to the completion of his legitime
(instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is it
necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by any title,"
as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir, that is,
a titulo de heredero? In other words, should he be recognized or
referred to in the will as heir? This question is pertinent because
in the will of the deceased Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia
is not mentioned as an heir — indeed her status as such is denied
— but is given a legacy of P3,600.00.
Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain. In each one of those cases the testator left to one who
was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but
without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative,
and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It was held that
Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the
institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the
legitime be completed.
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the
expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as may be
gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused
to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and
limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was
subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no
reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during
his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have
undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate
equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly
recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, is cited by
appellees in support of their theory of preterition. That decision
is not here applicable, because it referred to a will where "the
testator left all his property by universal title to the children by
his second marriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting
the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to them or, at
least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator did not
entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a
legacy of P3,600.00.
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted
of 399 shares of stocks in the Christensen Plantation Company
and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4) of said estate
descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the
owner of her share as of the moment of the death of the
decedent, she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the
fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing. These
include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The
contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her
according to the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it
would in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia
with respect to her legitime.
One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference
to it has been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the
institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy
Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. This
substitution results in effect from the fact that under paragraph
12 of the will she is entitled only to the income from said estate,
unless prior to her decease she should have living issue, in
which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the
property will go to the other relatives of the testator named in
the will. Without deciding this, point, since it is not one of the
issues raised before us, we might call attention to the limitations
imposed by law upon this kind of substitution, particularly that
which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil
Code), which means that the legitime must descend to the heir
concerned in fee simple.
Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964,
approving the project of partition as submitted by the executor-
appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is remanded with
instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated
in this decision, that is, by giving to oppositor-appellee Maria
Helen Christensen Garcia no more than the portion
corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4)
of the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges,
which shall not include those imposed in the will of the
decedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. Costs
against appellees in this instance.
NUGUID VS. NUGUID, ET AL
Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending
line—her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly
disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the
case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective
disinheritance.
2
The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from
those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the New
Civil Code “shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment
is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of heirs”, but
only “insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited”,
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172).
Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
illegally deprived.
Testator: Rosario Nuguid
Beneficiary and relationship:)
Contesting Party and relationship:
Witnesses: N/A
Delegate: N/A
Facts:
Rosario Nuguid, resident of QC, died on December 30, 1962,
single, without any children, legitimate or illegitimate. She was
survived by her Parents, and 6 Siblings. On May 18, 1963,
Remedios Nuguid (one of the siblings), filed with the CFI of
Rizal an alleged holographic executed by Rosario on November
17, 1951. The parents of Rosario entered their opposition to the
probate of the will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of
the deceased, oppositors—who are compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line—were illegally preterited
and that in consequence the institution is void.
CFI dismissed the probate on the ground that “the will in
question is a complete mullity and will perforce create intestacy
of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid”.
Issue:
Was there preterition?
Ruling:
*procedural aspect, no sense remanding the case to determine
the intrinsic validity, so might as well discuss the matter at this
level.
The will states that:
“Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do
hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I
may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid,
age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof,
I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen
hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID”
The provision that the Court must discuss in this case is Art. 854:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Although Rosario left no descendants, she did leave forced heirs
in her surviving parents. The will completely omits both of
them, they, in effect were deprived of their legitime, but not
expressly disinherited. This is clearly a case of preterition. The
will institutes a single, universal heir, and nothing more.
Preterition is the omission in the testator’s will of the forced
heirs or anyone of them because they are not mentioned in the
will. Disinheritance in a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his/her share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law.
The effects of preterition under Art 854 shall annul the
institution of heir. The said annulment is in toto, unless the will
states additional testamentary dispositions in the form of
devises of legacies. On the otherhand, in disinheritance, the
nullity is limited only to the portion of the estate that the alleged
heir was illegally deprived.
REYES VS. BARRETTO-DATU
The legal precept that “a partition in which a person was
believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall
be null and void” does not speak of children, or descendants,
but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or
intestate ones).
Facts:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their
lifetime they acquired a vast estate. When Bibiano Barretto died,
he left his share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto,
mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a
small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and
Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the
fishpond, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo.
In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix.
By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was
signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor
Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The distribution of the estate
and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith.
As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of
her share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates
of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to
complain of any irregularity in the distribution of the said estate
until the widow, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was
discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which,
she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as
her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all
her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone.
The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the
first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children
of Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the
daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband
Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed the same.
3
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria
Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now
falls back upon the fishpond, which was given in usufruct to his
widow Maria Gerardo.
The action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her
right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but
of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto,
for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the
estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity,
not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the
court based thereon as well.
The lower court declared the project of partition submitted in
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano
Barretto to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable)
because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs
(now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano
Barretto and Maria Gerardo, citing Article 1081 of the Civil
Code, viz:
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,
without being so, has been included, shall be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs
that since Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his
estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud
Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part.
Ruling:
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the
old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the
court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly
had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will
and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the
partition had between them could not be one such had with a
party who was believed to be an heir without really being one
and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept
(Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of
heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate
ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of
the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs
expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at
liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he
chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the
legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will
a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of
Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total
omission of a forced heir.
Appellee also contends that the judgment of distribution may be
set aside on the ground of fraud, since it was in the nature of a
judgment by compromise or confession. the defendant-
appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that
the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of
partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could
stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of
Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection
had been made. In fact, it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190,
section 640, in force in 1939, provided:

SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is thus
allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters
of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will,
so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if
any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of
estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country.
ESCUIN v. ESCUIN
DOCTRINES:
RIGHTS OF NATURAL CHILD DULY ACKNOWLEDGED.—
If a natural father dies under a duly executed will, his
recognized natural son who survives him, being his general
heir, ,is only entitled to one-third of his estate, which amount
constitutes his legal portion; but, if the natural father dies
intestate, his natural recognized son is entitled to the entire
estate. (Arts. 807, 842, 939, Civil Code.)
A person may die partly testate and partly intestate.
The natural father has the right to freely dispose by will of two-
thirds of his estate, and in case he exceeds this right by disposing
of the legal portion pertaining to his natural recognized son, or
by overlooking the right of the latter under the will, the
designation of heirs or the testamentary provision relative to the
legal portion of the general heir, shall be held void; nevertheless,
the other testamentary provisions referring to legacies and gifts
shall be considered valid, in so far as they are not illegal and do
not impair the legal portion of the recognized natural son, who
is the general heir of the testator.
FACTS:
On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los
Santos executed a will before a notary public of Sevilla, Spain,
stating therein that he was a native of Cavite, the son of
Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, the latter being
deceased; that he was married about six months previously to
Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and that he had no lawful
descendants; the testator, however, stated in clause three of his
will, that in case he had a duly registered successor, his child
would be his sole and universal heir; but that if, as would
probably be the case, there should be no such heir, then in clause
four he named his said father Francisco Escuin, and his wife
Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon his universal heirs, they to divide
the estate in equal shares between them.
The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899.
The lower court found that Emilio Escuin y Batac was the
recognized natural child of the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos,
had by Julia Batac; that the testator was also the natural son of
the defendant Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, and
was recognized by his father; and that the plaintiff minor, Emilio
Escuin y Batac, is one of the heirs of the late testator.
The late testator did not leave any legitimate descendants or
ascendants, but did leave a recognized natural child, the
4
appellant minor, and a widow; that the said minor, Emilio
Escuin y Batac, is the general heir of his natural father, the said
testator, who recognized him while living (art. 807, Civil Code),
and in the present case is entitled to one-third of his estate,
which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural child
(art. 842 of the said code) ; and for the reason that the minor was
ignored by his natural father in his will, the designation of heirs
made therein was, as a matter of fact annulled by force of law,
in so far as the legal portion of the said minor was thereby
impaired. Legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as
they are not illegal, for the reason that a testator can not deprive
the heirs of their legal portions, except in the cases expressly
indicated by law. (Arts. 763, 813, 814, Civil Code.)
ISSUE:
1. Whether there was preterition? YES
2. Did Emilio Escuin died intestate? NO
HELD:
1. YES. The testator wished to dispose of his property in his.will,
designating as heirs his natural father, Francisco Escuin, and his
wife, Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, altogether ignoring his
recognized natural child who is his general heir. In view thereof,
and for the reason that he exceeded his rights, the said
designation of heirs became void in so far as it impaired the
right of his general heir and deprived him of his legal portion;
the will, however, is valid with respect to the two-thirds of the
property which the testator could freely dispose of. (Arts. 763,
764, 806, 813, 842, Civil Code.)
2. Notwithstanding the fact that the designation of heirs is
annulled and that the law recognizes the title of the minor,
Escuin y Batac, to one-third of the property of his natural father,
as his lawful and general heir, it is not proper to assert that the
late Emilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate in order to
establish the conclusion that his said natural recognized child is
entitled to succeed to the entire estate under the provisions of
article 939 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as in accordance with the
law a citizen may die partly testate and partly intestate (art. 764,
Civil Code). It is clear and unquestionable that it was the wish
of the testator to favor his natural father and his wife with
certain portions of his property which, under the law, he had a
right to dispose of by will, as he has done, provided the legal
portion ,of his general heir was not thereby impaired, the two
former persons being considered as legatees under the will.
The above-mentioned will is neither null, void, nor illegal in so
far as the testator leaves two-thirds of his property to his father
and wife; testamentary provisions impairing the legal portion of
a general heir shall be reduced in so far as they are illegal or
excessive. (Art. 817, Civil Code.) The partition of the property of
the said
testator shall be proceeded with in accordance with the
foregoing legal bases.
LAJOM v. LEUTERIO
Testator: Maximo Viola
Proponent: Donato Lajom (asking to be declared as natural
child)
Contesting: Rafael Viola, et al. (legitimate children)
Doctrine: If the proceeding is an ordinary civil action to annul the
partition already made by the other heirs of certain properties,
the action cannot be converted into an intestate proceeding with
jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased.
Reason: In the ordinary civil action, the authority of the court is
limited to the properties described in the pleadings, hence, it
cannot order the collation and partition of properties which
were not included in the partition, which was the subject matter
of the action for annulment.
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for writ of certiorari and mandamus to set
aside orders of Judge Leuterio in an ordinary action for the
execution of judgment in G. R. No. L-6457, entitled "Donato
Lajom vs. Jose Viola, et al." (promulgated May 30, 1956). The
Court quoted the facts and proceedings of said case:
• Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. Judicial
proceedings of his testate estate were instituted in the
Court of First Instance. An agreement of partition and
distribution was executed by and between Jose P.
Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate
children of Maximo Viola and Juana Toura, whereby
the properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were
divided among themselves.
• Donato Lajom filed a complaint praying, among other
things, that he be declared a natural child of Maximo
Viola, impliedly recognized and acknowledged in
accordance with the laws in force prior to the Civil
Code, thereby being a co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael
Viola and Silvio Viola; that the agreement of partition
and distribution executed in 1935 by these three
legitimate children of Maximo Viola be declared null
and void and that there be a new partition with 1/7 of
the estate of Maximo given to him and 2/7 to each of
the other heirs.
• CFI of Nueva Ecija found in favour of Donato and
ordered the partition among Jose, Rafael and Silvio as
null and void and asked for the collation of properties
in question.
o Jose and Silvio were ordered to submit
liquidation of fruits and products of the 3
parcels of land that have come under their
administration
o Partition was ordered: 1/7 of said properties
and products to Donato and 2/7 each to Jose,
Silvio and Rafael.
• This decision of the CFI of Nueva Ecija was affirmed
by the SC.
2. The case was remanded to lower court where Donato filed a
motion for execution of judgement.
• Judge Leuterio claimed it wasn’t clear what the properties
of Maximo are because in the original complaint of
Donato, 75 parcels of land were enumerated while the
partition among Jose, Rafael and Silvio only
enumerated 47 parcels of land and now, Donato
enumerated 84 parcels of land.
• As starting point, he said that undoubtedly ½ of the 47
parcels belonged to Maximo (since conjugal property)
so “accordingly, the defendants, who are in possession
5
of each and every one of these 47 parcels, are hereby
ordered to deliver the same to the judicial
administrator to be hereinafter appointed, for his
administration until the final partition in accordance
with the decision of this Court.”
• Rafael filed a report of what he received under the
partition. Donato noticed that his report did not
contain the fruits of a Riceland with an area pf 215
hectares allegedly donated by Maximo to Rafael.
o Donato wanted Rafael to include (collate)
said Riceland to the redistribution of estate.
o Rafael objected saying that the riceland was
not mentioned or included in the complaint
filed in this case.
• Judge Leuterio sided with Rafael saying that only the
donations to Jose and Silvio were questioned in the
complaint and the decision’s dispositive portion only
ordered those 2 to collate. Properties donated to
Rafael had not been put into questioned and
therefore cannot be deemed to have been embraced
in the dispositive requiring collation.
Donato is now questioning said order of the Judge Leuterio.
ISSUE:
1. W/N properties not mentioned in the complaint of
Donato can be ordered to be collated – NO.
2. W/N Civil Case for annulment of partition became a
special proceeding – NO.
HELD:
1. The decision affirmed by this Court in G. R. No. L-6457
ordained the collation of the "properties in question". The
properties in question were described in an inventory attached
to petitioner's original complaint in case No. 8077 and did not
include the aforementioned riceland, with an area of 215
hectares. Indeed, Donato admits that he did not include, and
could not have included or mentioned it, in his complaint
because, at the time of its filing, he did not know of the existence
of said property. Hence, the same was not in question in case
No. 8077, and was not covered by the decision therein rendered
and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Case No.
L-6457.
The decision of Judge Leuterio did not direct collation of all
property but rather asked Donato to submit report to list
properties which he believes belong to Maximo and that the
other heirs can file and opposition thereto. Thus, it left the
question whether other properties should be collated or not
open for future determination. In any event, respondent Judge
was merely enforcing a decision that had already become
final. Any order directing what was not required in said
decision — and the same contained no pronouncement with
respect to the riceland adverted to above — would be in excess
of his jurisdiction and therefore, null and void.
2. It is next alleged that petitioner having been the victim of
preterition, the institution of heirs made by the deceased Dr.
Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077
was thereby converted into an intestate proceedings for the
settlement of his estate. This contention is clearly untenable.
There might have been merit therein if we were dealing with
a special proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of
a deceased person, which, in consequence of said preterition,
would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the
settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and
all properties of the deceased. But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an
ordinary civil action, and the authority of the court having
jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties
described in the pleadings, which admittedly do not include
the aforementioned riceland.
BALANAY, Jr. v. MARTINEZ
Doctrine: If there is preterition, if such will not lead to intestacy,
proceed with the probate.
Facts:
Testatrix – Mom; Leodegaria Julian
Petitioner – Son; Felix Balanay, Jr. (Hereinafter “Son”)
Respondent – Dad; Felix Balanay, Sr. (Hereinafter “Father”)
Respondent – Daughter; Avelina B. Antonio (Hereinafter
“Daughter”)
Statements in the will:
• Par. 2: that she was the owner of the “southern half” of
nine conjugal lots
• Par. 4: her desire that her properties should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband’s lifetime
and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the
fruits of her properties; the legitimes should be paid in
cash
• Par. 5: after her husband’s death, her conjugal lands
should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in her will. She devised and partitioned the
conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She
disposed of in the will her husband’s one-half share
of the conjugal assets.
The father opposed the probate because of the improper
partition of the conjugal estate. The son then presented an
affidavit where the father withdrew his opposition to the
probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its
probate. he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had
perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would
be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
The daughter opposed the probate inspite of the affidavit
because the testatrix should not be allowed to partition the
conjugal estate. she prayed that the will be declared void for
being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.
Atty. Montana alleged that he was the family lawyer and
assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal
assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He
prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the
proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding.
Ruling of the probate court:
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña,
adopted the position of Atty. Montana and the daughter that the
wil was void. it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted
the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and gave a
notice to creditors.
6
Issue: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity, and in declaring it void. No, the court did not
err.
Held: We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner’s authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
Main issue: Whether the court erred in voiding the will, and
converting the proceeding into a testate one. This was an error.
The preterited heir was the surviving spouse but this did not
produce intestacy. He also conformed to his wife’s will and
renounced his hereditary rights. It should have been probated.
Held: Based on Art. 792, the invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity
of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the
testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first
invalid disposition had not been made. Where some of the
provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts
will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without
defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries.
Re: Par. 2 – The statement of the testatrix that she owned the
“southern half” of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because,
although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate
and proindiviso. The illegal declaration does not nullify the entire
will. It may be disregarded.
Re: Par. 4 - The provision of the will that the properties of the
testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband’s lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080,
which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a
partition of his estate by an actinter vivos,
or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs. “A parent who, in
the interest of his or her family, desires to
keep any agricultural, industrial, or
manufacturing enterprise intact, may
avail himself of the right granted him in
this article, by ordering that the legitime of
the other children to whom the property is
not assigned, be paid in cash.
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal
estate (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his
one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to
one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she
had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the
other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period
of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be
divided during her husband’s lifetime would at most be
effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership.
Re: par. 5 – The father could validly renounce his hereditary
rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership but
insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his
hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate, it
should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and
752. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the
widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his
legitime should be respected.
The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be
given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the
legitimes. The distribution and partition would become
effective upon the death of the father. In the meantime, the net
income should be equitably divided among the children and the
surviving spouse.
By reason of the surviving husband’s conformity to his wife’s
will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, the father’s
one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife’s
estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition
made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to
the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory
heirs.
Although the division of the conjugal properties was contrary to
arts. 793 and 930 (see these provisions), the father had assented
to the testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, making the
partition valid.
PRETETITION: Comparison with the Nuguid case: This case
is different from the Nuguid case, where the testatrix instituted
as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was
intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in
the direct line. Article 854 says:
Art. 854. the preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.”
Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of
the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises,
total intestacy resulted. In this case, the preterited heir was the
surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and
renounced his hereditary rights. It results that the lower court
erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face
is intrinsically void, it is the probate court’s duty to pass first
upon the formal validity of the will. the very existence of a
purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the
supposed testator has willed that his estate should be
distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent
upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect
7
independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby.
Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will
render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence
over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will.
Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
practically his whole estate.
SOLANO v. CA
FACTS: On July 7, 1969, Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia
(GARCIAS), claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton
SOLANO, fi led an action for recognition against him. In his
Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. On February 3, 1970,
during the pendency of the suit, SOLANO died. Petitioner
ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered substituted for the
DECEDENT as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last
Will and Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his
death. The GARCIAS impugned the recognition of ZONIA as
an acknowledged natural child and that she be declared instead,
like them, as an adulterous child of the DECEDENT.
The Trial Court specified the legal issues as: 1) the question of
recognition of the GARCIAS; 2) the correct status of ZONIA,
and 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the
probated Will.
The Trial Court, while declaring that the plaintiffs GARCIAS
and the defendant ZONIA as the illegitimate children of the late
Dr. Solano under the class of ADULTEROUS CHILDREN,
nullifi ed the institution of Sonia Ana Solano as sole and
universal heir and ordered that the three (3) children shall share
equally the estate or one- third (1/3) each, without prejudice to
the legacy given.
ISSUE: Whether, in an action for recognition, the lower Court
has jurisdiction:
1) to declare ZONIA as an illegitimate child of SOLANO;
2) to order the division of the estate in the same action despite
the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 842; and
3) to declare null and void the institution of heir in the Last Will
and Testament of SOLANO, which was duly probated in the
same
Special Proceedings No. 842, and concluding that total intestacy
resulted.
HELD:
Re Illegitimacy of ZONIA:
The oral testimony and the documentary evidence of record
inevitably point to that conclusion that Zonia was also an
illegitimate child of the DECEDENT. Moreover, the Supreme
Court is bound by the fi ndings of fact of both the Trial Court
and the Appellate Court, particularly, the fi nding that the
GARCIAS and ZONIA are illegitimate children.
Re Division of estate in an action for recognition:
While it is true that the action below was basically one for
recognition, ZONIA defended the case not as a mere
representative of the deceased but also asserted rights and
defenses in her own personal capacity.
During the trial, ZONIA failed to object to the presentation by
the GARCIAS of their oral and documentary evidence to show
that ZONIA was also illegitimate and even cross-examined the
witnesses of GARCIAS. Thus, the litigation was converted into
a contest between the GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to
their correct status as heirs and their respective rights.
Re nullification of SOLANO’s will:
It should be recalled that SOLANO himself instituted the
petition for probate of the Will during his lifetime. With the Will
allowed to probate, the case would have terminated except that
it appears that the parties, after SOLANO’s death, continued to
fi le pleadings therein. The records further disclose that the
action for recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) and Spec. Procs. No.
842 were pending before the same Branch of the Court and
before the same presiding Judge. Further, it is settled that the
allowance of a Will is conclusive only as to its due execution and
that a probate decree is not concerned with the intrinsic validity
or legality of the provisions of the Will. Thus, the Trial Court
had jurisdiction to conclude that as a result of preterition, the
institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null and void
pursuant to Article 854. However, the Trial Court was wrong
when it held that the entire Will is void and intestacy ensues. It
is plain that the intention of the testator was to favor ZONIA
with certain portions of his property, which, under the law, he
had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her
favor should be upheld as to the one-half (1/2) portion of the
property that the testator could freely dispose of. Since the
legitime of illegitimate children consists of one half (1/2) of the
hereditary estate, the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right
to participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each.
ZONIA’s hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2)
or 4/6 of the estate, while the GARCIAS will respectively be
entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate. The
usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the properties
indicated in the Will is valid and should be respected.
The case of Nuguid v. Nuguid and Neri, v. Akutin which held
that where the institution of a universal heir is null and void due
to preterition, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate
succession ensues, is not applicable herein because in the
Nuguid case, only a one-sentence Will was involved with no
other provision except the institution of the sole and universal
heir; there was no specification of individual property; there
were no specific legacies or bequests. In the case at bar, there is
a specific bequest or legacy so that Article 854 merely annulled
the institution of heir.
ACAIN v. CA
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter.
Facts:
Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of the will of
the late Nemesio Acain on the premise that Nemesio Acain died
leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio,
Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and
Laura were instituted as heirs.
8
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June
25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents Virginia A. Fernandez, a
legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow
Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited.
Issue:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private
respondents have been pretirited.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,
the institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right
of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code
may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the
testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise,
even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is
not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same
thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A.
Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner.
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in
the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is
a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The
only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies
and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers
and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil
Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. No legacies
nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property
of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and
his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution
of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy
except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated
above, be respected.
EDROSO v. SABLAN
FACTS:
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his
death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son
named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his
father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on
July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease
the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his
mother, Marcelina Edroso.. Hence the hereditary title
whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership. Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that
is, two uncles of Pedro Sablan: Pablo and Basilio Sablan —
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of
two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if
granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." The Court of Land
Registration denied the registration and the application
appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Appellant’s Contention: (MARCELINA EDROSO)
(1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant
Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired
them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by
inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them
by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria
Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the
partition of hereditary property had between him and his
brothers. These are admitted facts.
The appellant also contends that it is not proven that the two
parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of
law, and that only property acquired without a valuable
consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law
to reserved.
Appellees’ Contention: (SABLAN BROTHERS)
Argue that the appellant’s defense was not alleged or discussed
in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first
instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property
in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code,
which establishes the alleged right required by law to be
reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of
the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their
right, admitting that it existed and that they had it"
RTC Ruling:
9
The trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake
of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that
in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lands which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved – YES.
RULING:
The hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title]. He who acquires by inheritance gives nothing
in return for what he receives and a very definite conclusion
of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree
of blood relationship.
Art. 811, Old Civil Code provides:
“The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the
latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve
what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property
proceeded.”
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from
him these two parcels of land which he acquired without a
valuable consideration – that is, by inheritance from another
ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by
operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the
claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree
and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling
that they partake of the nature of property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the
universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not
be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have
perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
[Art. 809, OCC.] In such case only the half constituting the legal
portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is
what by operation of law would fall to the mother from her son's
inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be
reserved.
Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress
who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's
inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The
law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired
by operation of law — that is, by intestate succession.
Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented
by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired
by the man's wish and not by operation of law. In this case, the
interested party has not proved that either of the lots became
Marcelina’s inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are
distinguished in the Civil Code.
Article 968 provides:
"Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower
contracting a second marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the
children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the
property he or she may have acquired from the deceased spouse by will,
by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer w/out a valuable
consideration."
From principles of jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme
Court of Spain, it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July,
1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by
article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been
able to institute, against the ascendants who must make the
reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that
articles 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage
against their father or mother who has married again. The
proceedings for assurance, under article 977, are: Inventory of
the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and
appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under
article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of
the value of what is validly alienated.
Article 199 of amended Mortgage Law: "The special mortgage
for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the
property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be
required by the persons who should legally represent them. In
either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property
must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set
forth in the preceding articles (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated
to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
The lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription
of the period for the exercise of this right of action by the persons
in whose favor the right must be reserved, but really the
commencement thereof, and enables them to exercise it at any
time, since no limit is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the
right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land
in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute
proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription
against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
“What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it
subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Old Civil Code?”
The person required by article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has,
moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a
condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express
provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property
reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one
who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although
a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while
he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in
whose favor the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property,
first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or
10
formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have
no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to
another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus
creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in
the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives
within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place
in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the
right is reserved should, after their right has been assured in the
registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee
simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and
void, for it is impossible to determine the part "that might
pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right,
because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by
law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for
it may disappear by his dying before the person required to
reserve it, just as it may even become absolute should that
person die."
No act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to
reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is
reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights
inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened
with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain
from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title
subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us
that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons
other than relatives within the third degree of the descendant
from whom he got the property to be reserved must be
prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the
law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by
some special accident of life, property that would otherwise
have remained therein."
“Can the heir of the property required by law to be reserved
himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited?”
YES. When the persons in whose favor the reservation must be
made agree thereto and provided that the right reserved to them
in the two parcels of land is recorded, as the law provides.
SIENES v. ESPARCIA
The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable
property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may
alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being
that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if
and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve.
Facts:
The land in question originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso
who had four children with his first wife and an only son named
Francisco with his second wife, Andrea Gutang. Lot 3368, one of
the properties left by Saturnino upon his death, was issued in
the name of Francisco. Francisco was a minor at the time so his
mother administered the property for him.
Unfortunately, Francisco died so his mother, as his sole heir,
executed an EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE
where she sold the property in question to appellants. However,
Cipriana and Paulina, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco,
had declared the property in their name and executed a deed of
sale in favor of the spouses Sienes.
Issue: Whether or not the land in question is reservable
property.
Ruling:
Yes. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law, and upon
Francisco's death, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to
reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came, if any
survived her.
In connection with reservable property, the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely:
(1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and
(2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came.
The Court held in connection with this matter that the reservista
has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life
usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the
same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting
only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists,
the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved
by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the
reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was
subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely
acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor
died without being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property.
When Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive.
Hence, the previous sale made by the former in favor of
appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property
subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the
sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition.
The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable
property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may
alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being
that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if
and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve.
In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive when Andrea
Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former
became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon
Andrea's death.
While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister
prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of
11
the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse
the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the
property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the
vendees — the Esparcia spouses did — not appeal therefrom.
FLORENTINO v. FLORENTINO
FACTS:
Encarnacion Florentino, together with some of her siblings,
nieces and nephews, filed a complaint in the CFI, against
Mercedes Florentino (half-sister) and her husband, alleging as
follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time
Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the marriage he begot 9
children, including petitioners; that on becoming a widower he
married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he
had 2 children, Mercedes (respondent) and Apolonio III of the
surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second
wife Severina Faz de Leon and the children first above
mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the
following 4th of March 1890.
On January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo executed
a will, instituting as his universal heirs his ten children, the
posthumous Apolonio III and his widow Severina; that he
declared all his property should be divided among all of his
children.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given
to Apolonio III, his posthumous son, the property marked with
the letters A-F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of
silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal
property and other objects.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumous son of the second
marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina, succeeded to
all his property described in the complaint; that Severina died
on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal
heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes; that, as such heir,
said daughter took possession of all the property left at the
death of her mother, Severina; that among same is included the
property which the said Severina inherited from her deceased
son, the posthumous Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as
a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased
had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described
in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties
mentioned in said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the
fruits of the reservable property described therein, either by
direct participation or by representation.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner,
asked the defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the
reservable property; that defendants have refused and do refuse
to deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years
Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, rent for the lands; that
thereby the plaintiffs have suffered. Wherefore they pray it be
declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property;
that the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same; that the
defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to
deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in question.
Defendants demurred, alleging, among others that said
property having been inherited by Mercedes from her mother
(Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is absolutely
inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant
Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the
possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother
Severina, said property had, while in the possession of her
mother, lost the character of reservable property — there being
a legitimate daughter of Severina with the right to succeed her
in all her rights, property and actions; that the application of
article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would
presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to
succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by
her legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a better
right than the plaintiffs; x x x
ISSUE: WON plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their
favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code; and WON
the same article is applicable to the question of law presented in
this suit
HELD:
It is necessary to determine whether the property enumerated
(A-F) of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property;
and if so, whether in accordance with the provision of the Civil
Code in article 811, Severina who inherited said property from
her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father
Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve
same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her
aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above-mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant,
or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit
the reservable property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely
for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve
and preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the
death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into
consideration the nature of the line from which such property
came) acquire the ownership of said property in fact and by
operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs (because
they are also such) — said property reverts to said line as long
as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the
ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios
(person for whom property is reserved), and are relatives,
within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the
reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property,
while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the
latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the
reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate
owner of his own property which is not reservable property and
which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the
Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the
third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the reservable
property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free
property, by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the
12
legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to
his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property
has now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto
at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged
within the third degree to the line from which such property
came.
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third
degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over
the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the
one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property
is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons
who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from
whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the
fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of
representation on the part of one alleging his right as
reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship,
nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law,
as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the
reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the
third degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the
reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III; the
posthumous son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to
wit, his three children of his first marriage — Encarnacion,
Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro
who are represented by their own twelve children respectively;
and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage.
All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumous
son, within the third degree (four of whom being his half-
brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they
are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are
his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the
other twelve are such by representation, all of them are
indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which
came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio
Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by
inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already
cited, the trial judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs
and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from
the complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely
inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant
Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from
whom the reservable property came and her mother, Severina
Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only
daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress;
that when she inherited the property left at the death of her
mother, together with that which came from her deceased
brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the
Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that
the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands
of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or expectation
on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property
of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into existence
because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such
property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that
article 811 of the Civil Code does not destroy the system of
legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to
apply said article in the instant case would be permitting the
reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate
which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes
Florentino, in violation of the precept of article 813 of the same
Code which provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs
of their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by
law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or
substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions
concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision
consists mainly in determining whether they property left at the
death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II,
was or was not invested with the character of reservable
property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de
Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of
their complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the
common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death
of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of
law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de
Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the
provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same
should not fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of person other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law
from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this
property was in fact clothed with the character and condition of
reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same
from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the
dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or
of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to
deliver or return it as such reservable property to her deceased
son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her
daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute
dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from
his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own
property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It
becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of
his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said
reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina could have disposed in her will of all
her own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes
Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in
her will concerning the reservable property received from her
son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the
13
rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews
of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch
as said property is not her own and she has only the right of
usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to
deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own
daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express
provision of law, that by operation of law all of the reservable
property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from
her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime
pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come
to be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina, her only
legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could
not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the
order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself
are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime
of Mercedes Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her
mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired;
and the application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case
in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes
Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the
reservable property, there being no lawful or just reason which
serves as real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's
other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the
reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present
living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find
any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not
be upheld and why they should not be granted equal
participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress,
her daughter Mercedes, the property received from the
deceased son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of
reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina,
therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same for the
relatives within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is
evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has been already
stated, the reservable property, left in a will by the
aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does
not form part of the inheritance left by her death nor of the
legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced
heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina
of her obligation to reserve the property which she received
from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of
reservable property, held before the reservatarios received
same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the
reservista Severina, took possession of the property in question,
same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise
true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And
there is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of
justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and
nephews, relatives within the third degree in accordance with
the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived
of portions of the property which, as reservable property,
pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine
announced by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911,
for the violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil
Code is not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of
Spain held that the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be
reduced or impaired and said article is expressly respected in
this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their
supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal
foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and was
under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being
relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same
came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of the
forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed part of the
legitime of the former; and that the said forced heiress, in
addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive
all of said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her
relatives within the third degree of certain portions thereof.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the
order of decision appealed from we should declare that the
aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina
from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property;
that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III
within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said
reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to
the remaining seventh part thereof.
PADURA v. BALDOVINO
Facts:
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime.
Gervacia Landing was his first wife, together they had a child,
Manuel Padura. With his second wife, Benita Garing, he had
two children, Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.
Agustin died on April 26, 1908, and left a last will and testament
which was duly probated in CFI Laguna. He bequeathed his
properties to his three children and to Benita Garing. Fortunato
was given 4 parcels of land, which is the object of this case.
Fortunato died unmarried on May 28, 1908, and no issue. The
parcels of land were inherited by Benita (the mother) subject to
the condition that the properties were reserved in favor of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came, in accordance with the applicable
provision of law, under a decree of the court dated August 25,
1916, in Land Registration Case No. GLRO No. 10818.
Candelaria then died on August 26, 1934, leaving her 4
legitimate children (appellants) as her heirs. Manuel then died
on October 6, 1940, surviving him are his 7 legitimate children
(appellees).
Benita (the reservista) died on October 15, 1952. Both appellants
and appellees took possession of the reservable properties.
On August 1, 1953, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in
Special Proceedings No. 4551, the legitimate children of the
deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were
declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the
reservable properties (the original reserveess Candelaria Padura
and Manuel Padura, having predeceased the reservista).
14
Appellants contend that the properties should be partitioned, ½
to appellants (1/8 each appellant) on the basis that they inherit
by right of representation from their respective parents, the
original reservees, and ½ to appellees (1/14 each appellee).
Appellees contend that the partition should be done equally, or
1/11 each because each are deemed as inheriting in their own
right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share.
.
Issue:
How should the reserve properties be apportioned among the
reservatarios when they are composed of whole blood and half
blood relatives?
Ruling:
The appellants are contending that the reservatarios nephews of
whole blood are entitled to 2x the share at is conforms Arts.
1006, 1008 of the Civil Code.
"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be
entitled to a share double that of the latter.(949)n
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall
succeed per capita or per stripes, in accordance with the rules laid down
for brothers and sisters of the full blood, (951)"
Reserva truncal is a special rule designed to assure the return of
the reservable property to the 3rd degree relatives belonging to
the line from which the property originally came. Upon the
death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to
those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus),
excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree. And
within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of
nephews.
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (811)"
Art 891 does not specify how much a full blood relative will get
vs a half blood. This is because 891 is merely concerned with
how to identify who are groups, and how to “group” or “class”
the so called reservatarios. To determine the amount each would
get, we must look at the ordinary rules of intestate succession,
in this case, Arts. 1006 and 1008, as stated by the appellants.
CHUA v. CFI
FACTS:
Jose Frias Chua married to Patricia S. Militar had three children,
namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia S. Militar
died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name
of Juanito Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving
any issue. Then Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow
Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first
marriage.
In Intestate Proceeding the lower court issued an order
adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot
No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Consolacion de la
Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito, his son in
the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo; and
P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio, his sons of the first marriage. TCT
was then issued in the names of Consolacion and Juanito.
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without
any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre
succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. Soon after,
Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship
adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son
Juanito as a result of which TCT over Lot 399 was issued in her
name. Thereafter Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving
no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except
her brother and sisters.
In the Intestate Proceedings for the estate of Consolacion, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio, child of the first marriage, and
Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first
marriage filed the complaint praying that the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias
but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's
death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that
the lot in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to
Article 891 of the New Civil Code.
The respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether there is reserva troncal in this case.
RULING
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil
Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from
which said property came.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property
may be impressed with a reservable character the following
requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired
by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister
by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an
issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by
operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present.
Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving
any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was
acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito
Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third
degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador
15
Chua and Remedios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of
the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners
herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first
requisite of reserva troncal — whether the property in question
was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias
Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the
respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the
property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la
Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a
consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest
and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this
Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not
subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil
Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's
conclusion that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva
troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, as explained
by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo
v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be
not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere
liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person
receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as
ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential
thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously,
from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any
prestation."
It is evident from the record that the transmission of the
property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second
marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by
means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the
amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre
and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias
Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court
in the Testate Proceeding. As long as the transmission of the
property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the
deceased himself and the property is given out of pure
generosity, it is gratuitous. It does not matter if later the court
orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay
the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This
does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the
property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject
to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February
27, 1952 without any issue. After his death his mother
Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso
share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that
the property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the
Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose
Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are
the petitioner herein.

It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-
half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito
Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11,
1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the
petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until
the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March
1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to
recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very
much in time to do so.
DISPOSITION: The decision appealed from is hereby set aside.
The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion
of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796
covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la
Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of
Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias
Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.
GONZALES v. CFI OF MANILA
DOCTRINE:
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the
death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property
in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no
part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir
receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the
strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third
degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the
property, if he has at the same time the right of a reservatario
(reserves).
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
FACTS:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason,
died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow,
Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named
Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y
Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son
Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F.
Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races (wiife of Benito) died intestate and
without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races
succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-
16
owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten
Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties,
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children
of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in
all).
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959, Mrs.
Legarda and her 6 surviving children partitioned the properties
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda
y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their
father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was
admitted to probate as a holographic will in the orde of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The decree of probate was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter
of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from
the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground
that said properties are reservable properties which should be
inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers
and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the
administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales
filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for
the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are
reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in
her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her
three daughters and her three sons .
Lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the disputed properties are reservable properties
under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811,
and
2. Whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of
them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her six children.
HELD:
1.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now article 891, which reads:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal
(1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title
property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister;
(2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant,
and
(3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line
from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved:
(I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)
from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
descendant;
(3) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate
succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante
de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or
reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation,
and
(3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence
of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant,
brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas
Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
***If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve.
Persons involved in reserve troncal
(1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property
was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title,
(2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the
property,
(3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained
the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and
(4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree
from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from
which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters.
Fourth degree relatives are not included.
Illustration 1
Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father
Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue.
His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the
hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and
Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the
prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the
Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was
reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law,
should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
Illustraion 2
Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of
a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter,
Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said
one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto
Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.
17
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second
wife and their six children. lt was held that the said one-
half portion was reservable property in the hands of
Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be
inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of
Maria and maternal aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who
belonged to the line from which said one-half portion
came
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the prepositus.
Illustraion:
Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother,
Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to
her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property
was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the
person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a
maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative
within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are
not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree.
Representative should be within the third degree from the
prepositus.
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship.
illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are
excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission
wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion
and succession.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely,
(1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and
(2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees
at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to
a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the
reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no
reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title
would become absolute.
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant
or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the
reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the
reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the
property be recognized by the purchaser .
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to
the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding
future inheritance.
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right
which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The
condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor.
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of
the descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to
the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally
stayed during the reservista's lifetime.
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are
the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the
right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can
compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property
even while the (reservista) is alive.
lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will,
so long as there are reservatarios existing.
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from
the descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista.
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law,
the owner of the reservable property."
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives
within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda
were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
2.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic
will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties
which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because
the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The
reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the
reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.
The reservees inherit the reservable properties from the
prepositus, not from the reservor.
18
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties
should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children
of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other
reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary
disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees
in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in
the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891.
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine
of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it
was ruled:
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the
death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property
in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no
part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for
the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable,
the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his
ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in
interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir
to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time
the right of a reservatario (reserves).
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in
question are not reservable properties because only relatives
within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and
that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena
Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the
reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a
family from securing, by some special accident of life, property
that would otherwise have remained therein".
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda
could not dispose of in her will the properties in question
even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the
third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by
operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena
Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the
reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the
heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservor.
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their
reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree
relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the
reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except
third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and
Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of
Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were
(and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third
degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable
character. The disposition of the said properties should be made
in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and
not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said
properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set
aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena
Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are
reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as
reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F.
Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should
pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED
DE PAPA v. CAMACHO
Testator: Faustino Diaz
Proponent: Francisca Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco, Nicolas
Tioco, Januario Papa (uncles and aunts)
Contesting: Dalisay Tongko Camacho, Primo Tongko,
Godofredo Camacho (grand-niece)
Doctrine:
The Purpose of Reserva Troncal – “To keep the property in the
family to which the property belongs.”
The stated purpose of the reserve is accomplished once the
property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of
origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its
application.
Upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable
property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but
only to those within the third degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus) which will have the right of
representation, excluding reservatarios of more remote degree
(Florentino v. Florentino).
SUMMARY: Faustino Dizon died intestate and without issue,
leaving his 1/2 share in the 7 parcels of land to his father,
Eustacio. Toribia (Faustino's sister) died intestate and her only
legitimate child Dalisay inherited, thus Dalisay owned 1/2 of
the 7 parcels of land as her inheritance from her mother.
Eustacio (Dalisay's maternal grandfather; Trinidad's father)
died intestate, survived only by Dalisay. Thus, Dalisay is
claiming the other 1/2 by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed
thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws
on intestate succession. However, her grandaunt and
granduncles oppose her claim, by virtue of their being also 3rd
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
The issue (W/N al relatives of the prepositus within the 3rd
degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the
reservable property upon the death of the reservista) has been
decided in a case where the SC declared the principles of
intestacy to be controlling. Reversion of the reservable property
being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
grandaunt and granduncles must be held without any right
thereto because, as aunts and uncles of Faustino (prepositus),
they are excluded from succession by his niece Dalisay,
19
although they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter. In case of intestacy, the CC provides that nephews and
nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first
cousins, etc.) from succession. Under the pertinent provisions,
brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab
intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow.
FACTS:
1. This case involves the application of Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserva troncal to determine:
a. Whether defendant Dalisay is entitled to the
entirety of 7 parcels of land in question, OR
b. Whether plaintiffs Francisca, Manuel and
Nicolas as uncles and aunts of Faustino are
reservatarios of ½ share of all the land
inherited by their brother-in-law Eustacio
from Faustino, and therefore each entitled,
along with Dalisay, to 3/4ths share of rentals
from tenants.
2. In the lower court, all the parties submitted a
"Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise” to
establish their family relationship and claims.
a. 7 parcels of land are involved: 4 from
Romana, 3 from Balbino Tioco.
i. Defendant Dalisay’s great-
grandmother Romana donated 4
parcels to plaintiff’s sister Toribia,
who died in 1915 and left such to
children Faustino and defendant’s
mother Trinidad.
ii. After Balbino died in 1928, 3 parcels
of land were given to Toribia, which
again devolved upon Faustino and
Trinidad.
b. Now that Faustino and Trinidad got 7 parcels
of land, they had ½ pro-indiviso shares. Both
shares went to Dalisay, but Faustino’s share
went to her through Dalisay’s grandfather
Eustacio under reserva troncal.
i. When Faustino died in 1937, he left
his ½ pro-indiviso share to his
father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the
property subject to a reserva troncal.
ii. In 1939 Trinidad died in 1939, and
her father Eustacio in 1965, both
 intestate, with their only descendant
Dalisay.
c. Defendant Dalisay owns ½ of the 7 parcels of
land as her inheritance from mother Trinidad.
What is disputed is the other ½ from Faustino.
3. The lower court declared plaintiffs and defendant
entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels
of land in dispute, in equal proportions [Fact 1(b)], thus
this appeal by Dalisay.
ISSUE: Whether all nearest relatives of descendant Faustino
(praepositus) within the third degree in the appropriate line
succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon
death of the inheriting ascendant (reservista) by the rules on
intestate succession—NO.
RULE: Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (811),
HELD:
1. Plaintiffs have no right to the reversionary property:
As aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon
(the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession
by his niece, defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-
Camacho, although they are related to him within the
same degree as the latter.
a. Plaintiffs excluded by other collaterals: In
case of intestacy nephews and nieces of the de
cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts,
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris where
Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil
Code were cited and applied.
i. Art. 1009: absence of brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to other
collaterals being called to succeed.
ii. Spanish Civil Code of 1889: Articles
952 and 954 of the Code of 1889
stated that brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab
intestato ahead of the surviving
spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or
widow. The present Civil Code of
the Philippines merely placed the
spouse on par with the nephews and
nieces and brothers and sisters of the
deceased, but without altering the
preferred position of the latter vis a
vis the other collaterals.
b. Plaintiffs would normally have been
excluded: Had the reversionary property
passed directly from the praepositus, there is
no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would
have been excluded by the defendant-
appellant under the rules of intestate
succession. There is no reason why a different
20
result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by
the interregnum of the reserva" i.e., the
property took a "detour" through an
ascendant-thereby giving rise to the
reservation before its transmission to
the reservatario.
2. Definition of reserva troncal: a special rule designed
to assure the return of the reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which
the property originally came, and avoid its dissipation
into and by relatives of the reservista. The stated
purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the
property devolves to the specified relatives of the line
of origin (Padura v. Baldovino)
a. Preference of reservatarios: Following the
order prescribed by law in legitimate
succession when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right
of the nearest relative, reservatario over the
property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should
return to him, excludes that of one more
remote.
i. Intestate succession within groups
of relatives in the same degree:
The reserva troncal determines the
group of relative reservatarios to
whom the property should be
returned; but within that group, the
individual right to the property
should be decided by applicable
rules of ordinary intestate
succession, since Art. 891 does not
specify otherwise. In the relations
between one reservatario and
another of the same degree Art. 891
becomes inapplicable; wherefore,
the shares of each in the
reversionary property should be
governed by ordinary rules of
intestate succession.
ii. Limited application: Given the
circumstance that the reserva being
an exceptional case, its application
should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of
the law. The restrictive
interpretation is the more
imperative in view of the new Civil
Code's hostility to
successional reservas and reversions,
as exemplified by the suppression of
the reserva viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812
and 968-980).
NOTES:
1. The right of representation: cannot be alleged when
the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which such
 property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the
Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are within the third degree of the person
from whom the reservable property came. Relatives of
the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.

2. Double share of immediate collateral of whole blood:

If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of
nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share
for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.
a. Proximity of degree and right of
representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule
that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half blood.
b. That nephews of whole blood should take a
share twice as large as that of nephews of half-
blood is in accordance with Article 1006, CC.
This was the ruling in Padura vs.
Baldovino, where Justice J.B.L. Reyes wrote
the opinion of the Court. In that case,
the reservatario was survived by 11 nephews
and nieces of the praepositus in the line of
origin, 4 of whole blood and 7 of half blood,
and the claim was made that all should get
reversionary property in equal shares.
3. Reservatarios: The reservable property is not part of
the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of it by
will as long as reservatarios exist.
The reservatario receives the property and acquires a
life interest in such as a conditional heir of the
descendant prepositus, said property merely reverting
to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime.
Reservatarios inherit from the descendant praepositus,
upon surviving the reservista, as heirs mortis causa
(Padura v. Baldovino).
4. Intestacy proceedings: These are not necessary to
determine the right of a reservatario where the final
decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the
name of the reservista over property subject to reserva
troncal identifies the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter's rights as such.
The reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, by
operation of law, the owner of the reservable property
(Cano v. Director of Lands).

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the

lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is
dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

21