At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1776, numerous conflicts erupted
Doctrine of Discovery
Johnson & Graham's Lessee
v.
McIntosh
21 U.S. 8 Wheat. 543 543 (1823)
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for review on certiorari
BRIEF
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823),[2] is a landmark decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court that held that private citizens could not purchase lands
from Native Americans. As the facts were recited by Chief Justice John Marshall, the
successor in interest to a private purchase from the Piankeshaw attempted to
maintain an action of ejectment against the holder of a federal land patent. (wikipedia
lol)
FACTS
When European explorers began arriving on the eastern shores of North America in
the sixteenth century, they found numerous long-established Indian societies, each
with their own governments, laws, and customs. Although the explorers asserted the
"doctrine of discovery" to claim control of lands they "discovered" for their rulers,
European colonists who later followed the explorers still had to deal with the
question of Indian land possessions. By 1532 Spain officially declared that Indians
held a certain right to land that foreign nations could not take simply through
"discovery." Actual possession of land occupied and used by American Indians could
only be gained by signing a treaty or by waging a "just war."
Prior to the Revolutionary War (1776–1783) while the thirteen American colonies
were still under British rule, the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indian tribes lived in the
Ohio Valley region to the west. During the period of European exploration, France
had claimed the region through discovery. A 1763 treaty ending the French and
Indian War (1754–1763) between France and Great Britain over North American
lands transferred claim to the region to Great Britain. A number of years later, in
1773 and 1775, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Graham, two individuals acting on their
own, purchased lands northwest of the Ohio River directly from the two tribes.
between tribes, the colonies, and their citizens. Many of the tribes were sympathetic
to the British. Attempting to establish claim and some control over the Ohio Valley to
its west, the state of Virginia passed a law proclaiming exclusive right to large tracts
of land. Included were the two parcels owned by Johnson and Graham. Consistent
with existing legal principles, the law recognized that the Indians held a right of
possession to continue living in the region until the lands could be purchased by
Virginia. The act also provided that all previous land transactions by Indians to
private individuals for their own use were not valid. Additionally, upon defeat, Great
Britain gave up its claim to the Ohio River area.
The newly established United States immediately began to address land ownership
issues on its frontier. It also needed a national policy for Indian relations as ruthless
conflicts continued among tribes and frontier populations. The 1787 Northwest
Ordinance established U.S. claim to the newly gained lands and recognized Indian
rights of possession to their existing holdings on those lands. The Ordinance
established how newly acquired lands from the British, not previously part of the
original colonies, would be governed. Individual state claims, such as Virginia's,
were no longer valid. The Ordinance stated that Indian "lands and property shall
never be taken from them without their consent." The U.S. Constitution, adopted in
1789, further recognized Indian nations as one of three types of sovereign
governments in the United States, the other two being the states and the federal
government. Article 1 of the Constitution gave Congress authority to "regulate
commerce with . . . the Indian Tribes" and Article VI recognized Indian treaties along
with acts of Congress as the "supreme law of the land."
Thomas Johnson purchased land from the Piankeshaw Indians in the Northwest
Territory in 1775. His purchase of a large plot in Illinois was then peacefully handed
down to his heirs until the year of 1818 when conflict arose. William McIntosh
purchased 11,000 acres of land within the boundaries of Johnson’s land from
Congress. Once the conflicting claims on the territory were realized, Johnson’s heirs
sued Mcintosh in the Illinois State Court in an effort to regain the land originally
appropriated to them. The District Court of Illinois ruled in favor of McIntosh for the
simplistic reason McIntosh’s title was valid because it was granted by a higher
authority (Congress). Johnson’s heirs chose to appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
May Indian tribes give a legally recognizable title in land to private individuals, such
that the title may be received by the private person and upheld against any claims by
courts of the United States?
ACTION OF THE COURT
District Court: In favor of Mcintosh
SC: Affirmed
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
 dismembering the government at his will. The grants made out of the two original
NO, the Indian tribes cannot give a legally recognizable title in land to private colonies, after the resumption of their charters by the Crown, are examples of this.
individuals.
SUPREME COURT RULING
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the decision of the District Court on the
Judgment affirmed with costs.
grounds that federal government had the “sole right” of negotiation with the Native
American nations. Therefore, Johnson’s purchase was void and the precedent was set
Indians did not have the right to sell land to individuals. McIntosh’s claim to the
Authority to grant land
land, deriving in Congress reigned superior to Johnson’s claim from an illegal
negotiation with Indian Tribes.
Chavez v. United States, 175 U.S. 552
No. 14
It has never been doubted that either the United States or the several states had
Argued October 17-18, 1899
a clear title to all the lands within the boundary lines described in the treaty,
Decided December 22, 1899
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to
extinguish that right was vested in that government which might U.S. Supreme Court
constitutionally exercise it.
JUSTICE PECKHAM

The exclusion of all other Europeans necessarily gave to the nation making the
discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing
settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a
right which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which by others all
assented.
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were
to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no
other power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were
in no instance entirely disregarded, but were necessarily to a considerable extent
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will to
whomsoever they pleased was denied by the original fundamental principle that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
NATURE OF CASE
Appeal
BRIEF
In Mexico, in 1831, a departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power
or authority to make a grant of lands, and the fact that the governor presided at a
meeting of the territorial deputation at the time such a grant was made, makes no
difference, as the power to make the grant was exclusively in the governor, and the
territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter.
FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Private Land Claims refusing to
confirm the title of the Nerio Antonio Montoya to some 5,000 acres of land in New
Mexico, about one league from the Manzano grant. The title is evidenced by a grant
by the territorial deputation of New Mexico, made in 1831, and the first question in
the case relates to the authority of that body to make the grant.

It is also contended that if the territorial deputation did not have the power to make
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants,
the grant, and that power rested with the governor of the department, his presence in
they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves, and claimed and exercised,
the territorial deputation as its ex officio president when the grant was made, and, so
as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil while yet in
far as the record shows, his not protesting but acquiescing in its action, was
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title
equivalent to and the same as a grant made by himself in his official character as
to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Thus has our whole
governor.
country been granted by the Crown while in the occupation of the Indians. These
grants purport to convey the soil as well as the right of dominion to the grantees. In
It is further stated that, by reason of the action of the governor in writing the letter
those governments which were denominated royal, where the right to the soil was not
dated December 22, 1831, and hereinafter set forth, that officer ratified and
vested in individuals, but remained in the Crown or was vested in the colonial
confirmed the grant, and in effect made it his own.
government, the King claimed and exercised the right of granting lands and of
It appears from the record that, on February 28, 1831, citizen Nerio Antonio
Montoya petitioned the honorable corporation of Tome, and asked it that it would
append to his petition its own report to the most excellent deputation, so that that
body should grant him the land described in the petition. The corporation of Tome,
on the 19th of March, 1831, granted the prayer of the petitioner, and adopted a
resolution which provided that his petition should "go before the most excellent
territorial deputation, which, as the authority competent, may accede to the donation
of the land prayed for by the said petitioner without injuring the pastures and
watering places for the passers-by."
The resolution was accordingly forwarded to the territorial deputation, and that body
on November 12, 1831. It ruled that "The foregoing record having been read and
approved, a petition of citizen Nerio Montoya, a resident of Valencia, in which he
asks for the donation, for agricultural purposes, of a tract of vacant land in the
Manzano within the limits of the Ojo de en Medio as far as the rancheria, was taken
up and the report of the respectable corporation council of Tome, in which it is set
forth that there is no objection to the concession of the said land, having been heard
it was ordered that it be granted."
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether the power to make the grant was exclusively in the governor, and the
territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter.
ACTION OF THE COURT
SC: Yes, the Governor has the sole authority to grant land.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
Various sections of the Mexican regulations of 1828 showed that Governors of the
territories were authorized to grant vacant lands within their respective territories
with the object of cultivation or settlement, and that the grants made by them to
individuals or families were not to be definitively valid without the previous consent
of the departmental assembly, and when the grant petitioned for had been definitively
made a patent, signed by the governor, was to be issued, which was to serve as a title
to the party. Various extracts from the law and regulations indicate very plainly that
the authority to initiate a grant of public lands existed in the governor alone, and not
in the assembly. In United States v. Vigil, 13 Wall. 449, it was held that departmental
assemblies (territorial deputations) had no power to make a grant. "These regulations
conferred on the governors of the territories, 'the political chiefs,' as they are called,
the authority to grant vacant lands, and did not delegate it to the departmental
assembly. It is true the grant was not complete until the approval of the assembly, and
in this sense the assembly and governor acted concurrently, but the initiative must be
taken by the governor. He was required to act in the first instance -- to decide
whether the petitioner was a fit person to receive the grant, and whether the land
itself could be granted without prejudice to the public or individuals. In case the
information was satisfactory on these points, he was authorized to make the grant,
and at the proper time to lay it before the assembly, who were required to give or
withhold their consent. They were in this respect an advisory body to the governor,
and sustained the same relation to him that the Senate of the United States does to the
President in the matter of appointments and treaties." It is, however, urged that the
record of the action of the territorial deputation in regard to this grant shows that the
governor and ex officio president of the deputation was present when the deputation
decided to make the grant as petitioned for, and that his being so present and attesting
the action of the deputation was equivalent to the making of the grant himself as
governor. We do not think so. He did not assume to make any grant whatever, and
certainly none in his character as governor. It does not even appear beyond doubt that
he was present when the deputation made the grant. His signature is perfectly
consistent with a mere authentication of the previous action of that body.
We cannot hold that, when the power was given under the laws of Mexico to the
governor to make grants of lands, he in any manner exercised that power, or
performed an act equivalent to its exercise, by presiding ex officio at a meeting of the
territorial deputation which made a grant of lands in conformity to a petition solely
addressed to it and by authenticating as president the action of the deputation in
deciding that the grant should be made.
The two positions, president of the deputation and governor, are separate and
distinct, and the action of a governor merely as president of the deputation, and of
the nature above described is not in any sense and does not purport to be his separate
and independent action as governor, making a grant of lands pursuant to a petition
addressed to him officially. As governor, he might refuse the grant upon a petition
addressed to himself, when as president of the deputation he might sign the record
authenticating its action in regard to a petition addressed solely to that body. And it is
obvious from the wording of the record that the president of the deputation was not
assuming to act as governor upon a petition addressed to himself, but only as the
president of the deputation. It might have been that he acquiesced in the assumption
by the deputation of the right to make the grant, but his act of signing the record
cannot be tortured into a grant or as the equivalent of a grant by himself. His
knowledge that another body had assumed to make a grant is not equivalent to the
making of the grant himself, and he was the person who alone had power to make it.
SUPREME COURT RULING
There is no proof of any valid grant, but, on the contrary, the evidence offered by the
plaintiff himself and upon which he bases the title that he asks the court to confirm,
shows the existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to make it, and
which therefore conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as
given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that possession of the
lands was taken. We cannot presume (within the time involved in this case) that any
other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the Montoya and of his
grantors up to the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not been
long enough to presume a grant. Affirmed.
G.R. No. 1413 March 30, 1904
ANDRES VALENTON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUEL MURCIANO, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
The findings of fact made by the court below in its decision are as follows:
First. That in the year 1860, the plaintiffs, and each one of them, entered into the
peaceful and quiet occupation and possession of the larger part of the lands described
in the complaint of the plaintiffs, to wit [description]:
Second. That on the date on which the plaintiffs entered into the occupation and
possession of the said lands, as above set forth, these lands and every part thereof
were public, untilled, and unoccupied, and belonged to the then existing Government
of the Philippine Islands. That immediately after the occupation and possession of
the said lands by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs began to cultivate and improve them in a
quiet and peaceful manner.
Third. That from the said year 1860, the plaintiffs continued to occupy and possess
the said lands, quietly and peacefully, until the year 1892, by themselves, by their
agents and tenants, claiming that they were the exclusive owners of said lands.
Fourth. That on or about the 16th day of January, 1892, Manuel Murciano,
defendant in this proceeding, acting on behalf of and as attorney in fact of Candido
Capulong, by occupation a cook, denounced the said lands to the then existing
Government of the Philippine Islands, declaring that the said lands every part thereof
were public, untilled, and unoccupied lands belonging to the then existing
Government of the Philippine Islands, and petitioned for the sale of the same to him.
Fifth. That before the execution of the sale heretofore mentioned, various
proceedings were had for the survey and measurement of the lands in question at the
instance of the defendant, Murciano, the latter acting as agent and attorney in fact of
said Candido Capulong, a written protest, however, having been entered against
these proceedings by the plaintiff Andres Valenton.
Sixth. That on the 14th day of July, 1892, Don Enrique Castellvie Ibarrola, secretary
of the treasury of the Province of Tarlac, in his official capacity as such secretary,
executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which said lands were sold and
conveyed by him to the defendant, Manuel Murciano, as attorney for the said
Candido Capulong.
Seventh. That on the 19th day of July, 1892, said Candido Capulong executed a
contract of purchase and sale, by which he sold and conveyed the said lands to the
defendants, Manuel Murciano.
Eight. That from the said 14th day of July, 1892, Manuel Murciano has at no time
occupied or possessed all of the land mentioned, but has possessed only certain in
distinct and indefinite portions of the same. That during all this time the plaintiffs
have opposed the occupation of the defendant, and said plaintiffs during all the time
in question have been and are in the possession and occupation of part of the said
lands, tilling them and improving them by themselves and by their agents and
tenants.
Ninth. That never, prior to the said 14th day of July,, 1892, has the defendant,
Manuel Murciano, been in the peaceful and quiet possession and occupation of the
said lands, or in the peaceful and quiet occupation of any part thereof.
Upon these facts the Court of First Instance ordered judgment for the defendant on
the ground that the plaintiffs had lost all right to the land by not pursuing their
objections to the sale mentioned in the sixth finding. The plaintiffs excepted to the
judgment and claim in this court that upon the facts found by the court below
judgment should have been entered in their favor. Their contention is that in 1890
they had been in the adverse possession of the property for thirty years; that,
applying the extra ordinary period of prescription of thirty years, found as well in the
Partidas as in the Civil Code, they then became the absolute owners of the land as
against everyone, including the State, and that when the State in 1892 deeded the
property to the defendant, nothing passed by the deed because the State had nothing
to convey.
Issue:
Whether during the years from 1860 to 1890 a private person, situated as the
plaintiffs were, could have obtained as against the State the ownership of the public
lands of the State by means of occupation. NO
Ruling:
No. The judgment was affirmed. Special laws which from the earliest times have
regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies not Partidas. Law 14, title
12, book 4 was the first of a long series of legislative acts intended to compel those
in possession of the public lands, without written evidence of title, or with defective
title papers, to present evidence as to their possession or grants, and obtain the
confirmation of their claim to ownership. While the State has always recognized the
right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of
time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State
remained the absolute owner.
In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Neither party can recover costs in this
belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the court.
kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands
not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was
not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had been in
the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants
of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a
time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed
prescription were to be protected.

It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length
of time should make the possessors the owners of the lands possessed by them
without any action on the part of the authorities. It is plain that they were required to
present their claims to the authorities and obtain a confirmation thereof. What the
period of prescription mentioned in this law was does not appear, but later, in 1646,
law 19 of the same title declared "that no one shall be ’admitted to adjustment ’
unless he has possessed the lands for ten years."

Another legislative act of the same character was the royal cedula of October 15,
1754 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San Pedro, 673). The wording of this
law is much stronger than that of law 14. As is seen by the terms of article 3, any
person whatever who occupied any public land was required to present the
instruments by virtue of which he was in possession, within a time to be fixed by the
authorities, and he was warned that if he did not do so he would be evicted from his
land and it would be granted to others. By terms of article 4 those possessors to
whom grants had been made prior to 1700, were entitled to have such grants
confirmed, and it was also provided that not being able to prove any grant it should
be sufficient to prove that "ancient possession," as a sufficient title by prescription,
and they should be confirmed in their holdings. "That ancient possession" would be
at least fifty-four years, for it would have to date from prior to 1700. Under article 5,
where the possession dated from 1700, no confirmation could be granted on proof of
prescription alone.

The royal order of November 14, 1876 (Guia del Comprador de Terrenos, p. 51),
directed the provincial governors to urge those in unlawful possession of public lands
to seek an adjustment with the State in accordance with the existing laws. The
regulations as to the adjustment (composicion) of the titles to public lands remained
in this condition until the regulations of June 25, 1880. This is the most important of
the modern legislative acts upon the matter of "adjustment" as distinguished from
that of the sale of the public lands.

The other articles of the regulations state the manner in which applications should be
made for adjustment, and the proceedings thereon.

Supreme Court Ruling:

G.R. No. L-2468 July 16, 1906
MAGDALENA CANSINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERVASIO VALDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Wade H. Kitchens, for appellants.
Isabelo Artacho, for appellees.
WILLARD, J.:
The decision in this case was announced on the 30th of April, 1906. The grounds of
that decision are as follows: The case is almost identical with the case of Valenton
vs. Murciano1 (2 Off Gaz., 434), decided on the 30th of March, 1904. The similarity
extends even to the dates and to the location of the land, for we judge from the
description of the property involved in this suit and the description of the property
involved in the case of Valenton vs. Murciano that they are two adjoining tracts of
land, one situated in the Province of Pangasinan and the other in the Province of
Tarlac, the boundary line between the two tracts of land.
In the case of Valenton vs. Murciano, the defendant bought the land from the
Spanish Government by a deed dated the 14th of July, 1892. In this case the plaintiff,
Magdalena Cansino, bought the property in question, as public lands of the State
from the Spanish Government and received a deed therefor on the 27th of October,
1893. In the former case the plaintiffs went into possession of the land in 1860 and
claimed ownership thereof by the extraordinary prescription of thirty years. In this
case some of the defendants testified that they went into possession in 1862 and they
claimed the ownership of this land by the same extraordinary prescription. In either
one of the cases did the occupants have any written title to the land.
In Valenton vs. Murciano we decided that title to lands such as were involved in that
case could not be acquired by prescription while they were the property of the State.
The decision in that case governs and controls this case and upon its authority
judgment in this case was affirmed.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.
Cariño, appellant,
vs.
Insular Government of the Philippines, appellee.
212 US 449
February 23, 1909
Ponente: Holmes, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Writ of Error
BRIEF
Cariño is an Igorot of the Province of benguet, where the subject land lies. For more
than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris on April 11, 1899, Cariño and his ancestors
had held the land as owners. His grandfather lived upon it and built fences sufficient
for the holding of cattle. His father had cultivated parts and uses parts for pasturing
cattle. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots and Cariño had
inherited and received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom.
No document of title had issued from the Spanish Crow, and although in 1893-1894
and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in
force, but to no avail. In 1901, Cariño filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the
mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however,
establishing only a possessory title.
One more thing to consider is that even if the applicant has title, he cannot have it
registered because the Philippine Commission Act No. 926 of 1903 exempts the
Province of Benguet, among others, from its operation. Said Act, however, deals with
the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc. and the perfecting
of titles begun under the Spanish law. Cariño claims that he now owns the land, and
is entitled to registration under the said Act.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether or not Cariño owns the land.
ACTION OF THE COURT
SC: The petition is GRANTED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
Prescription is mentioned in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, “Where such
possessors shall not be ableto produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
allow that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription”.
This begins with the usual theoretic assertion that, for private owenership, there must
have been a grant by competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing
that, for all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain times shall be
deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted. For uncultivated
land, thirty years.
Also, the applicant’s possession was not unlawful and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father was ever made. It is true that the language of
the law attributes title to those “who may prove” possession for the necessary time,
and that this means may prove in registration proceedings.
As a matter of fact, Cariño never was disturbed. In this regard, Cariño should be
granted of what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and
belief of those among whome he lived, was his property.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906
F. STEWART JONES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE INSULAR
GOVERNMENT,Defendant-Appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General, for appellant.
Brief:
On the 16th day of January, 1904 F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court
of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a certain tract of
land situatd in the Province of Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act No.
636. The Solicitor-General appeared in the court below and opposed the inscription
upon the ground that the property was public land. At the trial he objected to any
consideration of the case on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to register
land situated in that reservation. The objections were overruled and judgment
entered in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the Government
appealed to this court.
Facts:
The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction
throughout the Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which was approved August 31, 1904,
and which applied to pending cases, the court was deprived of jurisdiction over lands
situated in the Province of Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by which
the court was given jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land in all
cases coming within the provisions of Act No. 648. Act No. 648 provides in its first
section that - The Civil Governor is hereby authorized and empowered by executive
order to reserve from settlement or public sale and for specific public uses any of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands the use of which is not otherwise directed by
law.
The petitioner Jones, on the 1st day of May, 1901, bought the land in question from
Sioco Cariño, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to be recorded in the office of
the registrar of property on the 8th day of May of the same year. Prior thereto, and
while Sioco Cariño was in possession of the land, he commenced proceedings in
court for the purpose of obtaining a possessory information in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory information he caused to be
recorded in the office of the registrar of property on the 12th day of March, 1901.
The evidence shows that Sioco Cariño was born upon the premises in question; that
his grandfather, Ortega, during the life of the latter, made a gift of the property to
Sioco. This gift was made more than twelve years before the filing of the petition in
this case - that is, before the 16th day of January, 1904. Sioco's grandfather, Ortega,
was in possession of the land at the time the gift was made, and has been in
possession thereof for many years prior to said time. Upon the gift being made Sioco
took possession of the property, and continued in such possession until his sale to Supreme Court ruling:
Jones, the petitioner. Since such sale Jones has been in possession of the land, and is
now in such possession. For more than twelve years prior to the presentation of the The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance the
petition the land had been cultivated by the owners thereof, and the evidence is appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered in
sufficient, in our opinion, to bring the case within section 41 of the Code of Civil accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the cause be remanded to the lower
Procedure, and to show such an adverse possession thereof for ten years as is court for proper procedure. So ordered
required by the section. The evidence of Sioco Carino shows that what he did in the
way of presenting a petition to the Spanish Government in regard to a deed of the
land was done by order of the then comandante, and was limited to securing a
measurement thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the running of
the statute of limitations.

Issue/s of the case:

Whether Jones is entitled to the land. ( yes)

Action of the Court:

SC: The petition is granted.

Court Rationale:

There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations therein
mentioned to be submitted to Congress. But it is said that although as to Act No. 648
submission to Congress was not required, it is nevertheless void when applied to one
not a native of the Islands, because forbidden by this section; and that this section
limits the power of the Commission to declare possession alone sufficient evidence
of title to cases in which the claimant is native and in which the amount of land does
not exceed 16 hectares.

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
public land, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when
prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received
the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provision
of this chapter.

It is seen that this section does not exclude foreigners, nor is it limited to tracts not
exceeding 16 hectares in extent. To adopt the view that the power of the Commission
is so limited would require a holding that this section is void as to foreigners and as
to all tracts of land over 16 hectares in extent.
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
FACTS
A complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director
of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner
of the parcel of land; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing
the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
However, The Director of Lands in its reply denied each and every
allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question
was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and
control of that of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was
made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the
possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her,
with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit:
(1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff
and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in
this action;
(2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of
land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon;
and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the
Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and
(3) The denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the
land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the
sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same. After having been in
possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin
Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it.
Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its
price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered
thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property.
The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse arid
public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C),
wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered
judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the
complaint.
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question
through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase
thereof on August 15, 1914. Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed
an opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for
twenty-five years.
After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands
overruled the opposition of Valetin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By
virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued
the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela
Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do
so, she brought an action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace
court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case
being one of title to real property. Valentin Susi then brought this action.
ISSUE’s of the CASE
1. Whether Valentin Susi is the rightful owner of the land.
HELD
YES, The Supreme Court in their decision favoured Valentin Susi.
According to the SC there is, the presumption juris et de jure in paragraph (b) of Sec.
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all necessary requirements for grant
by the government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894,
with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII
of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin
Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874.
If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public
domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession
thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had
already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking
only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to
recover the possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.
Agricultural Land Defined
Mapa vs Insular GovernmentG.R. No. L-4195, Feb. 18, 1908
Facts:
The petitioner sought to register a tract of land about 16 hectares in extent located in
Ilo-ilo. From the evidence adduced, it appears that the land in question is lowland
and has been uninterruptedly, for more than 20 years, in the possession of the
petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the same
period up to the present as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses
declare the land is far from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and the
said land. The claim of the Attorney General seems to be that no lands can be called
agricultural land unless they are such by nature. He claims that it is not agricultural
land and therefore cannot be disposed of nor can be allowed for homestead. The
judgement was in favor of the petitioner but the government appealed. The decision
of the court was based upon Act 926 Sec. 54 par. 6 which provides that “All person
who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public
lands, as defined by the said Act, under bonafide claim of ownership except as
against the government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the taking effect of
this act, except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land
under the provisions of this chapter.”
Issue:
Whether the land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the
section above quoted. YES
Ratio:
From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland, and has
been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in the possession of the petitioner
and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period, and
up to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses declare
that the land is far from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and the said
land.
The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands" as
defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is found not only in section 54 above
quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems that the same construction
must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part of that law.
There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is to other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands."
say that no definition of the phrase "agricultural land" can be found in the act of To our minds, that is the only definition that can be said to be given to
Congress; the second, that there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that it acricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as
means land which in its nature is agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which
the act and that the phrase means all of the public lands acquired from Spain except are not timber or mineral lands.
those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below adopted this view, and held
that the land, not being timber or mineral land, came within the definition of The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and
agricultural land, and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No. 926 was any kind of crops raised thereon. Mineral and timber lands are expressly excluded,
applicable thereto. but it would be difficult to say that any other particular tract of land was not
agricultural in nature.
1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act
of the phrase "agricultural land." The Commission in enacting Act No. 926
expressly declared that such a definition could be found therein. The
President approved this act and it might be said that Congress, by failing to
reject or amend it, tacitly approved it. Moreover, if it should be said that
there is no definition in the act of Congress of the phrase "agricultural land,"
we do not see how any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No.
916, to which we have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the act of
Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be granted can not be
determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has the right to
sell in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, nor what lands it can
lease in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor the lands for
which it can give free patents to native settlers in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter IV, and it would seem to follow, necessarily, that none
of those chapters could be put into force and that all that had up to this time
been done by virtue thereof would be void.

2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has
defined agricultural lands as those lands which are, as the Attorney-General
says, by their nature agricultural. As has been said before, the word
"agricultural" does not occur in section 15. Section 13 says that the
Government "shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the
lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or
mineral land." This is the same thing as saying that the Government shall
classify the public lands other than timber or mineral lands according to its
agricultural character and productiveness; in other words, that it shall
classify all the public lands acquired from Spain, and that this classification
shall be made according to the agricultural character of the land and
according to its productiveness.

3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the

phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a careful consideration of
the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said
act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the
Government shall "Make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or
Actual Possession
CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.
G.R. No. L-13298
November 19, 1918
PONENTE: MALCOLM, J.:
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for review on certiorari
BRIEF
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1
(Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1,
of the Government.
FACTS
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in
Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory
information title to the land and was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero
was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner. Ramos instituted appropriate
proceedings to have his title registered. Director of Lands opposed on the ground that
Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government.
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest
land. It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at
least held this tract of land under color of title.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color
of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?
YES
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to
apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is
that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos
and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the
supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as
provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to
a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that
the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes. In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-
General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not
stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he
asked for registration. Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
SUPREME COURT RULING
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant
the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding
as to costs. So ordered.

ACTION OF THE COURT

Director of Lands and Director of Forestry: Rejected registration
SC: Affirmed

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE

Denial of Registration of Forest Land
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PAULINO ABELLA, ET AL., claimants;
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, petitioner-appellant.
G.R. No. L-25010
October 27, 1926
Ponente: JOHNSON, J.:
NATURE OF CASE
Appeal
FACTS:
This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears
from the record that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del
Rosario presented a petition in the Court of First Instance for the registration under
the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her appeal. In that
case, after issue joined and after hearing the evidence, the Honorable Vicente
Nepomuceno, judge, denied the registration of all of the northern portion of the land
included in her petition represented by Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in
that action, upon the ground that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes
than for agricultural purposes. From that judgment Maria del Rosario appealed.
Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo,
Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the name of
Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which
are the very lots which had been ordered registered in her name in the former action.
From that judgment she appealed to this court upon the ground that the lower court
committed an error in not registering all of the land included in her opposition in her
name.
Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of the land
included in the former case until the 26th day of April, 1921, when the Acting
Director of Lands presented the petition in the present case for the registration, under
the cadastral survey, of a portion of land located in the municipality of San Jose,
which included the very land claimed by Maria del Rosario in the former action. She
presented her opposition in the present action, claiming the very land which she
claimed in the former action. The only proof which she presented in support of her
claim in the present action was the proof which she had presented in the former
action. No proof was adduced in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree
showed that she was entitled to the registration of any other parcel of land than those
which had been conceded to her in the first action.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether registration of the the land of Maria del Rosario can be denied upon the
ground that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes than for agricultural
purposes.
ACTION OF THE COURT
CFI: No.
SC: Affirmed CFI.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
The Supreme Court after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the decision of the
lower court. In the course of that decision the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Moir, said: "We have examined the plans and all the evidence presented in
this case and are of the opinion that the trial court was correct in its declaration. The
fact that nearly all the northern property is forestry land is a further indication that
the applicant's possessory information title did not include the land running up to the
road to Bongabon, because all the papers which the applicant has regarding this
property call the land palayero."
Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the appellant herein present an
amended plan in that case, showing the particular part or parcel of the land in
question which she was entitled to have registered. We have no evidence before us
showing that order of Judge Nepomuceno was ever complied with.
In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents
some proof to show that the northern portion of the land in question is not forestry
land but that much of it is agricultural land. With reference to said motion for
rehearing, it may be said that all of the proof which is presented in support thereof
existed at the time of the trial and might, with reasonable diligence, have been
presented. It cannot, therefore, be considered now. It is not newly discovered
evidence. And moreover if it should be accepted it would not be sufficient to justify
the granting of a new trial.
After a careful examination of the entire record and the evidence adduced during the
trial of this cause as well as that adduced during the trial of the first cause, we are
fully persuaded that no error has been committed. Whether particular land is more
valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a
question of fact and must be established during the trial of the cause. Whether the
particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be settled in each
particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon
it, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral
purposes the particular land in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause the appellant made no
effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been
decreed in her favor, was more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes. For
all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-13756 January 30, 1919
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.
VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.
Facts:
In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the
appellants sought to register the three lots or parcels of land involved in this appeal,
which registration was opposed by the Director of Forestry. The trial court found that
lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small portion of lot 1154 and all
of lots 1158 were "forestry" lands, to which appellants had no title, and declared the
lots public lands, and refused registration of the parts of these lots to which
opposition had been filed by the Forestry Bureau.
The claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions and brought the case to
this court for review, setting up the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots
1104, 1154, and 1158 of the cadastral survey of Hinigaran were possessed
by Bibiano Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the
year 1880, and, after his death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were
planted and now exists and that these latter are not spontaneous plants
utilized by said heirs.
2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No.
1158 is rice and pasture land that was possessed as owner by Bibiano
Jocson during his lifetime and peaceably long before 1880, a possession
continued by his heirs who still enjoy the use of the land up to the present
time.
3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot
1158, there has existed since the year 1890, and still exists, a fish
hatchery which has been possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of Bibiano
Jocson, as owners, for more than 27 years, not counting the prior possession
of their predecessor in interest.
4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and
1154 are forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently proven by the sole and
absurd testimony of the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of
spontaneous growth and in not planted; and , as the photographs only refer
to small portions of the area of the lot, the court also erred in holding that
the whole lot was covered with firewood trees, while in fact but a very small
portion of it is covered with trees which protect the nipa plants and the fish
hatchery, it having been proven that a large part of the lot was sown with
rice and used as pasture land.
5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158,
covered by mangrove swamps, are agricultural land, and in not holding to
have been proven that these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they are
drained at low tide; errors committed with manifest violation of law and
disregard of the jurisprudence established by the Honorable Supreme Court
of the Philippine.
6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their
peaceable, public, and continuous possession for more than forty years, as
owners, including that held by their predecessors in interests, had acquired
by prescription lots 1104, 1154, and 1158, in conformity with act No. 190,
section 41, which, without exception, is applicable to the State as well as to
private parties, and by extraordinary prescription of thirty years.
7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and
appellants, in consideration of the possession they have had for more than
forty years, form the time of their predecessor in interest to the present time,
thus violating the legal provision whereby the holders of land who have
been in its possession for ten years prior to the enactment of the land law,
Act No. 926, by the United States Philippine Commission, are to be deemed
the absolute owners of such land, and to be presumed to have applied for the
same and to have complied with the Spanish laws and all the proceedings
required by the Royal Decrees on the composition of titles; and, therefore,
pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in question should be
adjudicated to the possessors thereof.
8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants,
the motion therefor being based on the ground that his findings of facts, if
there are any, are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence.
Issue:
Whether manglares [mangroves] are agricultural lands or timber lands. If they are
timber lands the claimants cannot acquire them by mere occupation for ten years
prior to July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them under the Public Land Act,
and no grant or title is necessary.
Ruling:
The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in
possession of all of those lots quietly, adversely and continuously under a claim of
ownership for more than thirty years prior to the hearing in the trial court. There is
not a word of proof in the whole record to the contrary. They set up no documentary
title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration are "mangles" with nipa
and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing on them, and that in 1890
on lot 1158 they constructed a fishpond (vivero de peces) which was later abandoned
as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part palay and part "mangles."
The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied
registration are public forest and cannot be acquired by occupation, and that all
"manglares are public forests."
In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands of
the Philippine Islands, and in mentioning forestry land the Act of Congress used the
words "timber land." These words are always translated in the Spanish translation of
that Act as "terrenos forestales." We think there is an error in this translation and that
a better translation would be "terrenos madereros." Timber land in English means
land with trees growing on it. The manglar plant would never be called a tree in
English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing
on it can not be called "timber land."
The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at two
places there were trees growing on this land, but the forester who testified for the
Government always calls these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which are
growing on the lands are of no value except for firewood. The fact that there are a
few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp does not change the general character
of the land from manglar to timber land.
That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber
lands" in the Act of Congress has been definitely decided by this Court in the case of
Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that case the court said:
Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented
substantially together, all being covered by one brief of the late Attorney-
General in behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting
historical and graphic citations he described that part of the marginal
seashore of the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their
characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they are mud flats,
alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various kindered
plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there.
These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exists naturally,
but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as for the useful nipa
palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet
we are of the opinion that they can not be so regarded in the sense in which
the term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The
waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and
they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what
remains."
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said that
the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classified the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that
are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they
are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code
of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in
possession of agricultural public lands under the conditions mentioned in the above
section of Act No. 926 on the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively presumed to have
a grant to such lands and are entitled to have a certificate of title issued to them.
(Pamintuan vs.Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep., 485.)
While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private acquisition
and ownership when it is fully proved that the possession has been actual, complete
and adverse, we deem it proper to declare that each case must stand on its own
merits.
One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few loads
of firewood from the lands occasionally. The possession must be more complete than
would be required for other agricultural lands.
The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and their
ancestors before that date, and they should have been declared the owners and title
should have been issued to them.
Supreme Court Ruling:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower
court, with instruction to enter a decree in conformity with this decision. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael
Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in
Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On
January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General
opposed the registration on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also
because he was an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot
located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the
applicant. The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of
title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public
domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940. The Solicitor General reiterates the
second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court, committed an error
in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act
(C.A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under
the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in
interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the
Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act
496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53
Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is
entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of
the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on
the nature or classifications of the sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant
immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration
of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or
acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of
registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits
provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest
should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The
condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been
in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it
may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their
predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and
void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such
pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It
is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the application
filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed,
without costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
GREGORIO REYES UY UN, appellant,
vs.
MAMERTA PEREZ and ISIDRO VILLAPLANA, appellee.
71 Phil. 508
April 18, 1941
Ponente: Imperial, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Certiorari
BRIEF
The appellant asks in his request for certiorari to review and revoke the decision
issued by the Court of Appeals declaring null the sale made by the Sheriff on
September 21, 1934 of the land in dispute.
FACTS
Martin Villaplana was a possessor of an agricultural land located in Guinayangan,
Province of Tayabas, from the time of the Spanish Government, and having
introduced in the improvements consisting of coconut trees.
On May 27, 1916, Martin Villaplana sold the land to his son Vicente Villaplana who
is married to Mamerta Perez. Later that year, Vicente requested the land as “Free
Patent”.
Vicente Villaplana conracted a debt amounting to P291.05 with Gregorio Reyes Uy
Un, and to satisfy the debt, the former sold the land to the latter. Thereafter, the
possession of the land was given Gregorio Reyes Uy Un by virtue of an order of the
Guinayangan Peace Court, Tayabas. However, a preliminary prohibition against the
possession of the land was advanced by Mamerta Perez and Isidoro Villaplana (son
of Vicente) and was subsequently issued.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether or not the the agricultural land was a public land?
ACTION OF THE COURT
SC: The petition is DENIED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
According to subsection (b) of Article 45 of Law No. 2874, open, contiguous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, intending in good faith to acquire property are entitled to the confirmation of
their rights and to the issuance of a certificate of title in accordance with the Law of
the Registry of Property. But until the title was issued, the persons occupying and
having in possession of the same did not have the juridical concept of being the real
owners of the land or that stopped belonging to the public lands of the State
susceptible of alienation.
As stated in Article 54 of the same law, it will not be possible to acquire legal title,
legal right or right by reason of equity on land of the public domain by prescription
or by possession or occupation as an owner, or by virtue of of any law in force prior
to the American occupation.
The fact that Vicente Villaplana requested on December 7, 1922 a gratuitous title of
the land is a fact that shows that in his feeling he had not acquired a perfect title of it
and that it remained public land of the State.
Needless to say, since the land was public property of the State and Vicente
Villaplana did not own it, it is obvious that the former did not acquire the domain of
the land. The sald was null and of no legal effect.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
Mindanao vs Director of Lands, GR No. L-19535, July 10, 1967
Brief:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City)
dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of
107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San
Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
Facts:
Appelllants, heirs of Pelagio Zara filed an application for registration of a parcel of
land on August 4, 1960. Their grounds were on the basis on provisions of Act 496
that their grandfather has been granted a Spanish Title and CA 141 Chap 8 Sec. 48,
that their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of
the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. Their application was
opposed by the Director of Lands and Vicente V. de Villa on the ground that parcel of
land had been included in the parcel of land applied for in registration by Vicente de
Villa in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 was adjudicated on September 30,
1949.
Issue:
Whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente
S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land precludes
a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on
the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years.
Supreme Court Ruling:
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private
oppositors-appellees.
Ratio:
A judgment in a land registration proceeding, that a tract of land is public land, does
not bar other persons from filing a subsequent land registration proceeding for the
judicial confirmation of their title to the same land under section 48 of the Public
Land Law, on the basis of a “composicion” title and continuous and adverse
possession thereof for more than thirty years. Their imperfect possessory title was
not disturbed or foreclosed by prior judicial declaration that the land is public land
since the proceeding under Sec. 48 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of
the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already
privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by
reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant