NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW

Excerpts from the 2015 Decisions of the Supreme Court

Compiled by
CARLO L. CRUZ

THE CONCEPT OF A STATE

Act of State

Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are governed by Sections 37 to 39 of the

PIA. We have stated that the power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or
under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people. (Rosas v. Montor, G.R. No. 204105,
October 14, 2015)

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon
such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. In the
Philippines, aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines on grounds and in
the manner provided for by the Constitution, the PIA of 1940, as amended and
administrative issuances pursuant thereto. (Rosas v. Montor, G.R. No. 204105, October 14,
2015)

Under Philippine immigration laws, exclusion is the authorized removal of an alien by

immigration officers, performing primary inspection, or by the immigration boards of
special inquiry, by secondary inspection, of any foreigner arriving in the Philippines
who, upon inspection and prior to entry or admission, is barred by immigration laws,
rules and regulations from entering or being admitted to the Philippines. When an alien
is excluded, he is immediately sent back to the country where he came from on the same
vessel which transported him, unless in the opinion of the Commissioner of Immigration
such immediate return is not practicable or proper. Under certain circumstances, when
an alien is excluded, Section 25 of the PIA of 1940 authorizes the alien's detention until
such time it is determined that he is qualified for entry and/or admission.

Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are governed by Sections 37 to 39 of the

PIA. We have stated that the power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or
under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people. (Rosas v. Montor, G.R. No. 204105,
October 14, 2015)

[Note: Having admitted that they knowingly entered the country with the use of fraudulent
passports and false representations when they arrived on December 7, 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh
should have been ordered arrested and formally charged with violation of Section 37(a)(9) in
relation to Section 45(c) and (d). Deportation proceedings should have been initiated forthwith
against these aliens… While the two Iranian nationals were initially held due to lack of entry

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visas, after their admission that they used fraudulent passports in entering the country, the filing
of a criminal action pursuant to Section 45 is proper, together with the initiation of deportation
proceedings. While both exclusion and deportation ultimately removes a person from our
territory, Section 45 imposes an additional penalty - deportation has an additional penalty in that
it imposes a fine. Indeed, that these aliens were released without undergoing deportation
proceedings as required by law is highly irregular. (Rosas v. Montor, G.R. No. 204105, October 14,
2015)]

STATE IMMUNITY

Estoppel

Respondents cannot plausibly shift the blame on what it perceived to be a bad bargain
on the previous administration by arguing that the latter was negligent in its actions or
that it entered into questionable transactions, for as can be gleaned, the negotiations and
agreement between BCDA and SMLI was (sic) authorized by the BCDA’s Board through
Resolution No. 2010-05-100. Acting as a collegial body, the BCDA’s Board could still
validly authorize its president to enter into transactions over the protestation of some of
its members through a democratic vote.

Respondents cannot also find solace in the general rule that the State is not barred by
estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As jurisprudence elucidates,
the doctrine is subject to exceptions, viz:

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except
[in rare] and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would
operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public.
They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those
special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its
citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to
limitations..., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individuals. (Republic v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 116111, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 366, 367)

Clearly, estoppel against the government can be invoked in this case. This is in view of
the fact that despite BCDA’s repeated assurances that it would respect SMLI’s rights as
an original proponent, and after putting the latter to considerable trouble and expense,
BCDA went back on its word to comply with its obligations under their agreement and
instead ultimately cancelled the same. BCDA’s capriciousness becomes all the more
evident in its conflicting statements as regards whether or not SMLI’s proposal would be
advantageous to the government. (SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development
Authority, G. R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015)

Here, despite BCDA’s repeated assurances that it would respect SMLI’s rights as an
original proponent, and after putting the latter to considerable trouble and expense,
BCDA went back on its word and instead ultimately cancelled its agreement with SMLI.
BCDA’s capriciousness became all the more evident in its conflicting statements as
regards whether or not SMLI’s proposal would be advantageous to the government. The
alleged dubiousness of the proceeding that led to the perfection of the agreement cannot

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also be invoked as a ground to cancel the contract for to rule that irregularities marred
the actions of BCDA’s former board and officers, as respondent-movant would have us
to believe, would be tantamount to prematurely exposing them, who are non-parties to
this case, to potential administrative liability without due process of law. (SM Land, Inc.
v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, G.R. No. 203655, September 7, 2015)

However, while petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, was admittedly
ornery in the prosecution of its case, it is nonetheless true that “[a]s a matter of doctrine,
illegal acts of government agents do not bind the State,” and “the Government is never
estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous, let
alone irregular.” This principle applies in land registration cases. Certainly, the State will
not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public domain just because its
agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their duties. Under the
Regalian doctrine, “all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.” (Republic v. Sps. Benigno, G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015)

SEPARATION OF POWERS

… the filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is "not subject to
judicial restraint[.]" (In The Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and
Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) And Reduction
of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)

Under the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by re-

enactment, the re-enactment of a statute, substantially unchanged (as in this case), is
persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction.
Accordingly, where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of
the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter
reenacts the provisions without substantial change, such action is to some extent
confirmatory that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose.

The Court cannot go against that legislative intent for it is the duty of this institution to
read what the law intends. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
(Securities and Exchange Commission v. Laigo, G.R. No. No. 188639, September 2, 2015)

CLT posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-honored principle of separation
of powers when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report. This contention is baseless…
the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined and
evaluated based on its probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly
why the taking of judicial notice of the Senate Report does not violate the republican
principle… That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was
conceded by the Court of Appeals. It did not allow the Senate Report to determine the

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decision on the case. (CLT Realty Development Corporation v. Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation,
G.R. No. 160684, September 2, 2015)

The powers of the Secretary in “national interest” cases are not set by metes and bounds.
Rather, the Secretary is given wide latitude to adopt appropriate means to finally resolve
the labor dispute. The doctrine of “great breadth of discretion” possessed by the
Secretary dates back to our earlier rulings which recognized the broad powers of the
former Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), which had jurisdiction over national interest
cases prior to the enactment of the Labor Code… In the Secretary’s exercise of such
broad discretion, the prevailing rule is that we will not interfere or substitute the
Secretary’s judgment with our own, unless grave abuse is cogently shown. And in
determining whether the acts of the Secretary constitute grave abuse of discretion, the
standard we apply is that of reasonableness. (University of the Immaculate Conception v.
Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, G. R. No. 178085-178086, September 14,
2015)

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII xxx, as well as to create
statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII xxx, does not result in an abnegation of the
Court’s own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under
Section 5 (5), Article VIII xxx. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own
sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the
procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting
provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not define, prescribe, and
apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari
jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129
which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress
interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every
court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as
may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)

Finally, while the drafters of the NBF saw the need for a law to specifically address the
concern for biosafety arising from the use of modem biotechnology, which is deemed
necessary to provide more permanent rules, institutions, and funding to adequately deal
with this challenge, the matter is within the exclusive prerogative of the legislative
branch. (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. 209271, December 8, 2015)

In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of discretion to
enact laws, such as RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud which, in this case, was through
the establishment of an updated voter registry. In making such choices to achieve its
desired result, Congress has necessarily sifted through the policy's wisdom, which this

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Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Whether RA 10367 was wise or
unwise, or was the best means in curtailing electoral fraud is a question that does not
present a justiciable issue cognizable by the courts. Indeed, the reason behind the
legislature's choice of adopting biometrics registration notwithstanding the experience
of foreign countries, the difficulties in its implementation, or its concomitant failure to
address equally pressing election problems, is essentially a policy question and, hence,
beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. (Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 221318, December 16, 2015)

DELEGATION OF POWERS

Administrative Bodies

…the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority and a body
corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated to provide policy
directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It has the power to issue subpoena,
to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without justifiable reason, to
administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and others, needed in its
examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order.
Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP
Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in determining whether administrative
sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which necessarily implies that
the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding
the same. A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-
judicial body exercising quasi-judicial functions, then its decision in MB Resolution No.
1139 cannot be the proper subject of declaratory relief. (Monetary Board v. Philippine
Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015)

…the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a
petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions. The authority of the petitioners to issue
the questioned MB Resolution emanated from its powers under Section 37 of RA No.
7653 and Section 66 of RA No. 8791 to impose, at its discretion, administrative sanctions,
upon any bank for violation of any banking law. (Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans
Bank, G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015)

Meanwhile, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas in its Resolution No. 796 dated
May 16, 2013, and now embodied in Monetary Board Circular No. 799, has effective July 1, 2013
reduced to 6%, from 12%, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of stipulation. Since
Chinabank demanded only the legal, not the stipulated, interest rate on the deficiency and
attorney’s fees due, the defendants will solidarily pay interest on their shares in the deficiency at
the rate of 12% from November 18, 1998 to June 30, 2013, and 6% from July 1, 2013 until fully
paid. (Sps. Sinamban v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. 193890, March 11, 2015)
Jurisdiction

The BID’s jurisdiction over deportation proceedings is not divested by mere claim of
citizenship, unless the claim of citizenship is substantial and supported by conclusive

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evidence, in which case, courts may intervene. (Go v. Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, G.R. No. 191810, June 22, 2015)

In Go, Sr., which was promulgated on September 4, 2009, the validity of the April 17,
2002 BI Decision that ordered the apprehension and deportation of petitioner Go was
already passed upon with finality. Therein, one of the issues presented for resolution
was whether the evidence adduced by petitioner Go and his father, Go, Sr., to prove
their claim of Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the BI of its
jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a
formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage. While petitioner Go and Go, Sr.
conceded that the BI has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien, they insisted
that judicial intervention may be resorted to when the claim to citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. They
posited that the judicial intervention required is not merely a judicial review of the
proceedings below but a full-blown, adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the rules
of evidence are strictly observed. The Court disagreed and opined that the jurisdiction of
the BI is not divested by mere claim of citizenship. (Go v. Bureau of Immigration, G.R. No.
191810, June 22, 2015 [reported in July 2015 cases])

…the revocation of registration of securities and permit to sell them to the public is not
an exercise of the SEC's quasi-judicial power, but of its regulatory power. A "quasi-
judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Although Section 13.1 of the
SRC requires due notice and hearing before issuing an order of revocation, the SEC does
not perform such quasi-judicial functions and exercise discretion of a judicial nature in
the exercise of such regulatory power. It neither settles actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, nor adjudicates private rights and
obligations in cases of adversarial nature. Rather, when the SEC exercises its incidental
power to conduct administrative hearings and make decisions, it does so in the course of
the performance of its regulatory and law enforcement function. (Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Universal Rightfield Property Holding, Inc., G.R. No. 181381, July 20, 2015)

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide
cases. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and
by the material allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It cannot be
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. That the employment contract of Basso was replete with
references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the US, do not
automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try
this case.
This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code, under Article
217, clearly vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
termination disputes to the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

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As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his
citizenship, when he filed his complaint against CMI. On the other hand, jurisdiction
over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process of service of
summons. We note that CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has,
in fact, voluntarily appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts.
Though a foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the Philippines and has
a local business address here. The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign
corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign
corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.

Considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter of this case, these tribunals may proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum, this
being an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
(Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. Basso, G.R. No. 178382-83, September 23, 2015)

Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law is the applicable
law. Basso, though a US citizen, was a resident here from the time he was hired by CMI
until his death during the pendency of the case. CMI, while a foreign corporation, has a
license to do business in the Philippines and maintains a branch here, where Basso was
hired to work. The contract of employment was negotiated in the Philippines. A purely
consensual contract, it was also perfected in the Philippines when Basso accepted the
terms and conditions of his employment as offered by CMI. The place of performance
relative to Basso’s contractual duties was in the Philippines. The alleged prohibited acts
of Basso that warranted his dismissal were committed in the Philippines.

Clearly, the Philippines is the state with the most significant relationship to the problem.
Thus, we hold that CMI and Basso intended Philippine law to govern, notwithstanding
some references made to US laws and the fact that this intention was not expressly
stated in the contract. (Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. Basso, G.R. No. 178382-83,
September 23, 2015)

Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten
rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted
and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be gleaned
that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid
two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs
which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and
Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the abovesaid two conditions. The
same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound
by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed,
it would be violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who
do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of
Elders/Leaders.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or

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among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise
between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging
to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under
the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while
most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same
ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be
located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the
RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this case. (Unduran v. Aberasturi,
G.R. No. 181284, October 20 2015)

Primary Jurisdiction

In fine, the Court agrees with the CA that it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH which
has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion activities as explained in the
foregoing discussion. As such, the DOH’s rulings, including its construction of RA 9211
(i.e., that it completely banned tobacco advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as
promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship), are declared null and void,
which, as a necessary consequence, precludes the Court from further delving on the
same. As it stands, the present applications filed by PMPMI are thus remanded to the
IAC-Tobacco for its appropriate action. Notably, in the proper exercise of its rule-
making authority, nothing precludes the IAC-Tobacco (Inter-Agency Committee-
Tobacco) from designating any of its pilot agencies (which, for instance, may even be the
DOH) to perform its multifarious functions under RA 9211. (Department of Health v.
Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc., G.R. No. 202943, March 25, 2015)

From the effectivity of the Pre-Need Code, it is the Insurance Commission (IC) that
“shall have the primary and exclusive power to adjudicate any and all claims involving
pre-need plans.” The transitory provisions of the Pre-Need Code, however, provide that
“[n]otwithstanding any provision to the contrary, all pending claims, complaints and
cases (referring to pre-need contract and trust claims) filed with the SEC shall be
continued in its full and final conclusion.”

The Pre-Need Code recognizes that the jurisdiction over pending claims against the trust
funds prior to its effectivity is vested with the SEC. Such authority can be easily
discerned even from the provisions of the SRC… Therefore, even prior to the transfer to
the IC of matters pertaining to pre-need plans and trust funds, the SEC had authority to
regulate, manage, and hear all claims involving trust fund assets, if in its discretion,
public interest so required. Accordingly, all claims against the trust funds, which have
been pending before it, are clearly within the SEC’s authority to rule upon. (Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Laigo, G.R. No. No. 188639, September 2, 2015)

Prior Resort

In stressing that the RTC is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the injunction case, the
Republic avers that it is the POEA which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide all pre-employment cases which are administrative in character involving or
arising out of violations of recruitment regulations, or violations of conditions for the
issuance of license to recruit workers, under Section 3(d) of Executive Order No. 247 (EO

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247) and as reiterated in Section 1, Rule I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules. On the other
hand, the remedy of an appeal/petition for review of an Order issued by the POEA in
the exercise of such exclusive jurisdiction is lodged exclusively with the DOLE Secretary
as provided under Section 1, Rule V, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules. Notably, however,
nothing in EO 247 and the 2002 POEA Rules relied upon by the Republic provides for
the grant to a recruitment agency of an injunctive relief from the immediate execution of
penalties for serious offenses (e.g., cancellation of license to operate, suspension of
license for a maximum period of 12 months). Conversely, they do not deprive the courts
of the power to entertain injunction petitions to stay the execution of a POEA order
imposing such penalties.

The Court thus agrees with the CA in holding that the RTC can take cognizance of the
injunction complaint, which “is a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the
defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the commission or continuance of a
specific act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act.” Actions for
injunction and damages lie within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691.

While “[w]ell-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge
of such agency,” it is not entirely correct to say that an action by an administrative
agency, such as in the case at bar, cannot be questioned in an injunction suit. It has been
held that “[c]ourts cannot enjoin an agency from performing an act within its
prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abused or exceeded its
jurisdiction.” Indeed, administrative decisions on matters within the executive
jurisdiction can be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law,
and in such cases, injunction may be granted. (Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Laigo, G.R. No. No. 188639, September 2, 2015)

After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints,
the Court notes that respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are members of
ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral
lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint
make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real
property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended
complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter
of the amended complaint based on allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.

Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case involves
members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall
have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs;
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the

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 parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For
this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP.

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying
provision that “no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.”

The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought
before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the
parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by
the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use
their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace
building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their
respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights. (Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284,
October 20 2015)

An administrative agency’s powers are limited to those expressly conferred on it or

granted by necessary or fair implication in its enabling act. In our constitutional
framework, which mandates a limited government, its branches and administrative
agencies exercise only those powers delegated to them as “defined either in the
Constitution or in legislation, or in both.” Notably, the powers granted to the HLURB
are focused on its regulation of real estate companies to ensure that the investing public
is protected from fraudulent real estate practices. These powers do not touch upon the
HLURB’s authority to intervene in the general corporate acts, e.g. the rehabilitation, of
those under its supervision. While it may be argued that the HLURB should be informed
of the financial rehabilitation of a real estate company, to enable it to intelligently and
meaningfully exercise its functions, the law is clear that the HLURB’s prior request for
the appointment of a receiver of real estate companies, is not a condition sine qua non
before the trial court can give due course to their rehabilitation petition. (Lexber, Inc. v.
Dalman, G.R. No. 183587, April 20, 2015)

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to
when the question is purely legal. This is because issues of law cannot be resolved with
finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would only be
an exercise in futility. Here, the question raised is purely legal, i.e., what law should be

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applied in the payment of retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was
no need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought.
(Carolino v. Senga, G.R. No. 189649, April 20, 2015)

On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when the
Cooperative filed a criminal case against petitioner without undergoing
conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative Code and the By-laws
of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or mediation is not a
pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner,
because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute. (Assistio v. People, G.R. No. 200465,
April 20, 2015)

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on
petition for review, under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:

Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate
a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly
with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA petition premature and
thus dismissible. (Catipon v. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015)

The issue on whether non-compliance with the clearance requirement with the HLURB
would result to (sic) the nullification of the entire mortgage contract or only a part of it is
purely legal which will have to be decided ultimately by a regular court of law. It does
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said
question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The
final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature
is to be or can be done. (United Overseas Bank of the Philippines v. The Board of
Commissioners-HLURB, No. 182133, June 23, 2015)

Appeals in Administrative Proceedings

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh
period rule" in Neypes does not apply. (San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group,
Inc. v. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015)

It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised
in the manner prescribed by law. This has been consistently held in relation to non-
observance by a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to offer a valid and
acceptable excuse for non-compliance. Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before
administrative bodies the general rule has always been liberality. Strict compliance with

11
the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law. Administrative
rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object to assist
the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective
claims and defenses… the liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is
subject to limitations imposed by the requirements of due process. Administrative due
process means reasonable opportunity to be heard… Where due process is present, the
administrative decision is generally sustained. Thus, while this Court allows liberal
construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair trial and expedite
justice, we are keenly aware that liberal construction has no application when due
process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases involving violation of
administrative rules of procedure is whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of
administrative due process. If the gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due
process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the
rules are liberally construed. (Besaga v. Sps. Acosta, G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015)

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contend that the petition
must be denied outright because the special civil action for certiorari cannot be used to
assail RR 2-2012 which was issued by the respondents in the exercise of their quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers.… respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. A respondent is
said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law
is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the
other hand, is “a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies xxx required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Before a tribunal, board, or
officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that
gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. Respondents do not fall within
the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
They issued RR 2-2012 in the exercise of their quasi-legislative or rule-making powers,
and not judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Verily, respondents did not adjudicate or
determine the rights of the parties… Revenue Regulation 19-86 was quasi-legislative in
nature because it was issued by the Secretary of Finance in the exercise of his rule-
making powers under Section 244 of the National Internal Revenue Code…while this
case is styled as a petition for certiorari, there is, however, no denying the fact that, in
essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of
the questioned rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for declaratory relief
over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction… although this
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice

12
of court forum. (Clark Investors and Locators Association v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No.
200670, July 6, 2015)

Administrative Rules

It is evident from the foregoing provisions that the rates of hazard pay must be at least
25% of the basic monthly salary of PWHs receiving salary grade 19 and below, and 5%
receiving salary grade 20 and above. As such, RA No. 7305 and its implementing rules
noticeably prescribe the minimum rates of hazard pay due all PHWs in the government,
as is clear in the self-explanatory phrase "at least" used in both the law and the rules.
Thus, the following rates embodied in Section 7.2 of DBM-DOH Joint Circular must be
struck down as invalid for being contrary to the mandate of RA No. 7305 and its Revised
IRR. (Cawad v. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015)

Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the
IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among members of the same
ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law
principle that an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the
provisions of the enabling law, the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR,
Rule III, Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules as null and void
insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to
include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. As the Court
held in Paduran v. DARAB, "[j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the
Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise
stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on
courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot.” In the abovesaid
exceptional cases where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the
same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the
requirement of certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in
the failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of the concerned
ICC/IP. (Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, October 20 2015)

Furthermore, considering that it is the NLRC that has interpreted its own rules on this
matter, the Court is inclined to accept such interpretation. The Court has held, "By
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters
falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those
matters." (Encinas v. Agustin, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 240, 266-267)
Moreover, the NLRC properly relaxed the rules on appeal bonds. (Smart
Communications, Inc. v Solidum, G.R. No. 197763, December 7, 2015)

Thus, under the current rule, the reckoning of the 120-day period has been withdrawn
from the taxpayer by RMC 54-2014, since it requires him at the time he files his claim to
complete his supporting documents and attest that he will no longer submit any other
document to prove his claim. Further, the taxpayer is barred from submitting additional
documents after he has filed his administrative claim.

On this score, the Court finds that the foregoing issuance cannot be applied retroactively
to the case at bar since it imposes new obligations upon taxpayers in order to perfect

13
their administrative claim, that is, [1] compliance with the mandate to submit the
"supporting documents" enumerated under RMC 54-2014 under its "Annex A"; and [2]
the filing of "a statement under oath attesting to the completeness of the submitted
documents," referred to in RMC 54-2014 as "Annex B." This should not prejudice
taxpayers who have every right to pursue their claims in the manner provided by
existing regulations at the time it was filed. (NOTE: See Section 246 of the Tax Code)
(Pilipinas Total Gas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No. 207112, December 8,
2015)

Publication of Administrative Rules

In this case, the DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real consequence more
than what the law itself had already prescribed. As previously discussed, the
qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW’s entitlement to hazard pay, the
rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the
basis of PHW’s status in the plantilla of regular positions were already prescribed and
authorized by pre-existing law. There is really no new obligation or duty imposed by the
subject circular for it merely reiterated those embodied in RA No. 7305 and its Revised
IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant the Revised IRR, the
validity of which is undisputed. Consequently, whether it was duly published and filed
with the UP Law Center – ONAR is necessarily immaterial to its validity because in
view of the pronouncements above, interpretative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH
circular herein, need not be published nor filed with the UP Law Center – ONAR in
order to be effective. Neither is prior hearing or consultation mandatory. (Cawad v. Abad,
G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015)

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the
ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR (University of the Philippines
Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register) is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is
a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication
requirements of the Administrative Code. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
211833, April 7, 2015)

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Article II

Incorporation Clause

In Mijares v. Rañada (495 Phil. 372), the Court extensively discussed the underlying
principles for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Philippine
jurisdiction:

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international
law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical

14
 formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding
result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of

foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert
with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted
principles of international law. As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread
practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and
enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is
no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a
widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the
imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and
enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory
or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines,
this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has
existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal
system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the
viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the
requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted
doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each
particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law
obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of
opinio juris in international practice.

This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and

requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the
procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
Rules of procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court, and could very well
be abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is
obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of the land, including
generally accepted principles of international law which form part thereof, such
as those ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.

It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of

competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to
certain conditions that vary in different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or final
order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment or
order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is the cause of action by
which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Guevarra, G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015)

In any case, we cannot consider the London awards as evidence of the construction cost
of the NAIA-IPT III. To do so in this case is to recognize Claim No. HT-04-248 and Claim

15
No. HT-05-269 when their recognition and enforcement have yet to be decided by this
Court in G.R. No. 202166. It is a basic rule that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of a foreign judgment or order. We can only recognize and/or enforce a foreign
judgment or order after a conclusive and a final finding by Philippine courts that: (1) the
foreign court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the case, (2) the parties were properly
notified, and (3) there was no collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (Republic of
the Philippines v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015)

Petitioners also argue that the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is an assertion of
their right to access to justice as recognized by international law and the 1987
Constitution. They justify the separate filing of the Motion as a right granted by Article
2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, independent
of "the power of the Public Prosecutors to prosecute [a] criminal case."

Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and
to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.

There is no need to discuss whether this provision has attained customary status, since
under treaty law, the Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to comply with its
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However,
petitioners went too far in their interpretation, ignoring completely the nature of the
obligation contemplated by the provision in an attempt to justify their failure to comply
with a domestic procedural rule aimed to protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit
that of the adverse party.
xxx.

The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish
a system of accessible and effective remedies through judicial and administrative
mechanisms. The present trial of Pemberton, to which petitioner, Marilou S. Laude, is
included as a private complainant, indicates that there is a legal system of redress for
violated rights. That petitioners chose to act on their own, in total disregard of the
mechanism for criminal proceedings established by this court, should not be tolerated
under the guise of a claim to justice. This is especially in light of petitioners' decision to
furnish the accused in the case a copy of her Motion only during the hearing. Upholding
human rights pertaining to access to justice cannot be eschewed to rectify an important
procedural deficiency that was not difficult to comply with. Human rights are not a

16
monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these rights. (Laude v.
Hon. Ginez, G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015)

Social Justice

As a final point, it bears to reiterate that while the Constitution is committed to the
policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed
that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management
also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple
fair play. Out of its concern for the less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more
often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is
in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
the applicable law and doctrine. (Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., G.R. No.
189255, June 17, 2015)

It is fundamental that in the interpretation of contracts of employment, doubts are

generally resolved in favor of the worker. It is imperative to uphold this rule herein.
Hence, any doubt or vagueness in the provisions of the contract of employment should
have been interpreted and resolved in favor of Naluis. (Centro Project Manpower Services
Corporation v. Naluis, G.R. No. 160123, June 17, 2015)

As a final note, it bears to reiterate that while the scales of justice usually tilt in favor of
labor, the present circumstances prevent this Court from applying the same in the
instant petition. Even if our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on
social justice and on the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute
will be decided in favor of the workers. (Hotel Employees' Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular
Hotel Davao, 645 Phil. 387, 420 (2010)) The law also recognizes that management has
rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. (Id.)
Stated otherwise, while the Court fully recognizes the special protection which the
Constitution, labor laws, and social legislation accord the workingman, the Court
cannot, however, alter or amend the law on prescription to relieve petitioners of the
consequences of their inaction. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, Jura subveniunt - Laws
come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleeping. (Magno v. Philippine National
Construction Corporation, GR. No. 87320, June 6, 1991) (Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM)
Nestle Philippines Inc. Chapter (Ice Cream and Chilled Products Division) v. Nestle Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 198675, September 23, 2015)

Youth

Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her
pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which
has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in
loco parentis), viz:

17
 Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the
same authority over the person of the child as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child

care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the
child. (n) (Rosaldes v. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014)

Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of age who
committed a crime and was found guilty, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence even if such child has reached 18 years or more at the
time of judgment… In People v. Sarcia, we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA
No. 8344 even if the minor therein was convicted of reclusion perpetua… In fact, the Court
En Banc promulgated on November 24, 2009, the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict
with the Law, which echoed such legislative intent… Although suspension of sentence
still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at
the time the judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only
until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No.
9344…The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to Section 38
of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40 is also no longer
applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the application of RA No. 9344 beyond the
age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law… Thus,
appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility
pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344. (People v. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21,
2015)

Ecology

Writ of Kalikasan

The question then is, can the validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan? We
answer in the affirmative subject to certain qualifications… the writ of Kalikasan is
principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude
that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the
writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only
allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at
least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an
ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the
petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum
with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This must be
so if we are to preserve the noble and laudable purposes of the writ against those who
seek to abuse it. (Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015)

Biotechnology is a multi-disciplinary field which may be defined as "any technique that uses
living organisms or substances from those organisms to make or modify a product, to improve
plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses." Its many applications include
agricultural production, livestock, industrial chemicals and pharmaceuticals. xxx.

18
On April 26, 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace, et al.) filed
a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). They alleged that the Bt talong field
trials violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that (1) the
required environmental compliance certificate under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1151 was not
secured prior to the project implementation; (2) as a regulated article under DAO 08-2002, Bt
talong is presumed harmful to human health and the environment, and there is no independent,
peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt talong for human consumption and the environment; (3)
a study conducted by Professor Gilles-Eric Seralini showed adverse effects on rats who were fed
Bt corn, while local scientists also attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human and animal
health; (4) Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species as highlighted by a research
conducted in the US which demonstrated that pollen from Bt maize was toxic to the Monarch
butterfly; (5) data from the use of Bt Cry1Ab maize indicate that beneficial insects have increased
mortality when fed on larvae of a maize pest, the corn borer, which had been fed on Bt, and hence
non-target beneficial species that may feed on eggplant could be similarly affected; (6) data from
China show that the use of Bt crops (Bt cotton) can exacerbate populations of other secondary
pests; (7) the built-in pesticides of Bt crops will lead to Bt resistant pests, thus increasing the use
of pesticides contrary to the claims by GMO manufacturers; and (8) the 200 meters perimeter
pollen trap area in the field testing area set by BPI is not sufficient to stop contamination of
nearby non-Bt eggplants because pollinators such as honeybees can fly as far as four kilometers
and an eggplant is 48% insect-pollinated. The full acceptance by the project proponents of the
findings in the MAHYCO Dossier was strongly assailed on the ground that these do not
precisely and adequately assess the numerous hazards posed by Bt talong and its field trial.

The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the normative
idea that governments are obligated to "foresee and forestall" harm to the environment.
In the following decades, the precautionary principle has served as the normative
guideline for policymaking by many national governments. The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, the outcome of the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, defines the rights of the people to
be involved in the development of their economies, and the responsibilities of human
beings to safeguard the common environment. It states that the long term economic
progress is only ensured if it is linked with the protection of the environment. For the
first time, the precautionary approach was codified under Principle 15, which reads:

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely

applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.
xxx.

Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of GMO research
worldwide, the Court finds all the three conditions present in this case - uncertainty, the
possibility of irreversible harm and the possibility of serious harm.

Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the country and grown by small-scale
farmers, majority of whom are poor and marginalized. While the goal of increasing crop

19
yields to raise farm incomes is laudable, independent scientific studies revealed
uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse
effects on the environment associated with use of GE technology in agriculture, and
serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country
like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination and
genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the crucial
stages of risk assessment and public consultation, including the determination of the
applicability of the EIS requirements to GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for
the application of the precautionary principle. There exists a preponderance of evidence
that the release of GMOs into the environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and
not just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of our people once the Bt eggplants
are consumed as food. Adopting the precautionary approach, the Court rules that the
principles of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the
concerned departments and agencies before allowing the release into the environment of
genetically modified eggplant. The more prudent course is to immediately enjoin the Bt
talong field trials and approval for its propagation or commercialization until the said
government offices shall have performed their respective mandates to implement the
NBF. (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. 209271, December 8, 2015)

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Article VI

Laws

Finally, it must be stressed that the primary protection accorded by the Pre-Need Code
to the planholders is curative and remedial and, therefore, can be applied retroactively.
The rule is that where the provisions of a statute clarify an existing law and do not
contemplate a change in that law, the statute may be given curative, remedial and
retroactive effect. To review, curative statutes are those enacted to cure defects, abridge
superfluities, and curb certain evils… A reading of the Pre-Need Code immediately
shows that its provisions operate merely in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
the right of the planholders to exclusively claim against the trust funds as intended by
the legislature. No new substantive right was created or bestowed upon the planholders.
Section 52 of the Pre-Need Code only echoes and clarifies the SRC’s intent to exclude
from the insolvency proceeding trust fund assets that have been established “exclusively
for the benefit of planholders.” It was precisely enacted to foil the tactic of taking undue
advantage of any ambiguities in the New Rules… "[I]t has been said that a remedial
statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was
enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to
those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so
direct.” With the Pre-Need Code having the attribute of a remedial statute, Legacy and
all pre-need providers or their creditors cannot argue that it cannot be retroactively
applied. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Laigo, G.R. No. No. 188639, September 2,
2015)

20
Residence

Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was
born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple of years, and
had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his
right of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to
Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad;, thus, his domicile had not been lost.
Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a
candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he
seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for
their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his
election is a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in canceling his COC.

We are not persuaded.

RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country,
can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. The
law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.

RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a
natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen. However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship seeks for (sic) an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes
material. Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225 provides:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall

meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991,provides,
among others, for the qualifications of an elective local official. Section 39 thereof states:

21
 SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or,
in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of
the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the
election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the
ground that the latter made material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he
is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceeding the day of
elections.

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

“dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually
the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.

Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes.
Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However,
he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, we
ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile
in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in
Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of
choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work
in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. (Caballero v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015)

Hence, petitioner’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove
that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished
Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made
it as such. (Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015)

Party-Lists

At the outset, We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide which of the feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. Indeed,
the COMELEC's jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well
established. This power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is
exercised by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement powers.

22
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple
reason that the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop were not
registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the elections held during the Cebu
meeting and the Paranaque conference pursuant to the said amendments, were valid.
(Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)

The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the two groups is
the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?

We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central Committee, whose

members remain as such in a hold-over capacity.

In Seneres v. COMELEC, the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by Buhay

Party-List through its President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground that his
term had expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied by analogy the default rule
in corporation law to the effect that officers and directors of a corporation hold over after
the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed.
Seneres ruled that the hold-over principle applies in the absence of a provision in the
constitution or by-laws of the party-list organization prohibiting its application.

In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop
and We do not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the
application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in accordance with corporation law, the existing
Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority to bind the
corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its members on 14
November 2011, since no successors had been validly elected at the time, or since. (Lico
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)

HRET

We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless
proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond
its purview.

The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from
the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list
representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC

23
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and
he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in
upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its
own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings
already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide
member of the party-list group sought to be represented.

The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by relying on the
rule that it can decide intra-party matters as an incident of its constitutionally granted
powers and functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when the
resolution of an intra-party controversy is necessary or incidental to the performance of
the constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC, the latter can step in and
exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party matter. The Lokin case, however, involved
nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the present case, the fact that
petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion from Ating Koop
removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is
circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on
the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is
given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity
of the title of the proclaimed winner.

In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of
Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects
his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a
bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a
continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether
elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire
tenure.

This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET jurisdiction
over the requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list organization. In Abayon v.
HRET, it was argued that the petitioners did not belong to the marginalized and under-
represented sectors that they should represent; as such, they could not be properly
considered bona fide members of their respective party-list organizations. The Court held
that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona fide
membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.

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Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of
petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to
sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible
by a writ of certiorari; the COMELEC should not have encroached into the expulsion
issue, as it was outside its authority to do so. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205505, September 29, 2015)

Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on
Elections. In that case, We upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC of petitioner
Reyes, even as she was already proclaimed winner in the elections at the time she filed
her petition with the High Court. In doing so, We rejected the argument that the case fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.

In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections, and took
her oath of office before the Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, the
Court ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a member of the House of
Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to assume office, the term of which would
officially start at noon of 30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo
Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 assailing the Resolutions ordering the cancellation of her
Certificate of Candidacy. In the present case, all three requirements of proclamation,
oath of office, and assumption of office were satisfied.

Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution disqualifying petitioner on

grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship and residency had become final and executory
when petitioner elevated it to this Court. It should be mentioned that when petitioner
Reyes filed her petition with the Court, the COMELEC En Banc had, as early as 5 June
2013, already issued a Certificate of Finality over its 14 May 2013 Resolution
disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no longer any pending case on the qualifications
of petitioner Reyes to speak of. Here, the question of whether petitioner Lico remains a
member of the House of Representatives in view of his expulsion from Ating Koop is a
subsisting issue.

Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the HRET to be a non-issue,

since the recourse of the petitioner to the Court appeared to be a mere attempt to
prevent the COMELEC from implementing a final and executory judgment. We said
that the petitioner therein took an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance, considering that
she sought remedy before the Court, and yet asserted that it is the HRET which had
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the question on the validity of petitioner Lico's
expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls within the jurisdiction of the
HRET, as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as party-list representative. (Lico v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)

Appropriations

It bears reminding that pursuant to Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law. Hence, the GAA should be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its contents and

25
stipulations. Also, the COA was correct when it held that the provisions of the GAA
were not self-executory. This meant that the execution of the GAA was still subject to a
program of expenditure to be approved by the President, and such approved program
of expenditure was the basis for the release of funds. For that matter, Section 34, Chapter
5, Book VI of the Administrative Code (Executive Order No. 292) states that –

Section 34. Program of Expenditure - The Secretary of Budget shall recommend

to the President the year’s program of expenditure for each agency of the
government on the basis of authorized appropriations. The approved
expenditure program shall constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal
period, subject to such policies, rules and regulations as may be approved by the
President.

The rules on National Government Budgeting as prescribed by the Administrative Code

are not idle or empty exercises. The mere approval by Congress of the GAA does not
instantly make the funds available for spending by the Executive Department. The funds
authorized for disbursement under the GAA are usually still to be collected during the
fiscal year. The revenue collections of the Government, mainly from taxes, may fall short
of the approved budget, as has been the normal occurrence almost every year. Hence, it
is important that the release of funds be duly authorized, identified, or sanctioned to
avert putting the legitimate programs, projects, and activities of the Government in fiscal
jeopardy. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. The Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)

The requirement of availability of funds before the execution of a government contract,

however, has been modified by R.A. No. 9184. The said law presents a novel policy
which requires not only the sufficiency of funds at the time of the signing of the contract,
but also upon the commencement of the procurement process… Worse, on July 22, 2013,
the DOTC issued the notice of award to JKG-Power Plates still without a corresponding
appropriation under GAA 2013 and, necessarily, without an allotment issued by the
DBM. This was contrary to the provisions of GPPB Circular No. 01-2009… All told, the
provisions of R.A. No. 9184 requiring a procuring agency to secure a corresponding
appropriation before engaging in the procurement process must be upheld. The law was
so enacted to protect the welfare of the prospective bidders and the general public.
Unless R.A. No. 9184 is amended or repealed, all future government projects must first
have a sufficient appropriation before engaging the procurement activity. (Jacomille v.
Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)

The Court holds that the first year of implementation of MVPSP was 2013 when the
notice of award was issued on July 22, 2013. The issuance of the notice of award ignites
the implementation stage of a project, and the procuring agency must ensure that funds
are fully allotted therein. An agency can only issue a notice of award once the DBM has
released a SARO or ABM for the full cost of the project. If the funds are not fully allotted
to the project at the time the notice of award was issued, then MYOA (Multi-Year
Obligational Authority) will guarantee that the DBM commits to recommend to
Congress the funding of the project until its completion. Thus, MVPSP is MYP (Multi-
Year Projects), which involves MYC (Multi-Year Contracts) and requires MYOA.
(Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)

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Based on the foregoing discussion, a procuring agency must ensure that it has a
sufficient appropriation for the project before commencing the procurement activity. If
the procuring agency believes that the project will not be given its full appropriation by
the time the notice of award is to be issued, then the procuring agency must also secure
the MYOA from the DBM at the start of the procurement process. Hence, the general
public will be assured that the government projects are adequately funded and their
implementation will not be delayed. These are the practices that must be instilled to
achieve effective fiscal governance. (Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)

The Court concludes that MVPSP did not follow the timelines provided in Sec. 37 of
R.A. No. 9184. As earlier recited, the project did not have the adequate appropriation
when its procurement was commenced on February 20, 2013, contrary to the provisions
of Sections 5a, 7 and 20 of R.A. No. 9184. The DOTC and the LTO likewise failed to
secure the MYOA before the start of the procurement process even though MVPSP is
MYP involving MYC. All these irregularities tainted the earlier procurement process and
rendered it null and void. (Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)

Since there was no appropriation for the purchase of the subject textbooks, the
respondent COA had reason to deny the money claim as Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution provides that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” (Daraga Press, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 201042, June 16, 2015)

Transfers of Appropriations

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies,

and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying
with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations
Acts; and

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive.

The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the
absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded
the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant
General Appropriations Acts. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)

Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted in the
suspension or stoppage of expenditures through the issuance of negative Special
Allotment Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the

27
original programs and projects is a clear indication that the program or project from
which the allotments were withdrawn has not been discontinued or abandoned.
Consequently, as we have pointed out in the Decision, "the purpose for which the
withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not yet cease to
exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible." In this regard, the
withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments remain unconstitutional. But then,
whether the withdrawn allotments have actually been reissued to their original
programs or projects is a factual matter determinable by the proper tribunal. (Araullo v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)

Also, withdrawals of unobligated allotments pursuant to NBC No. 541 which shortened
the availability of appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays, and those which were
transferred to PAPs that were not determined to be deficient, are still constitutionally
infirm and invalid. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any
savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects
of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the
latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to
only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own
Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority
to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which
are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as
the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287,
February 3, 2015)

The respondents posit that the Court has erroneously invalidated all the DAP-funded
projects by overlooking the difference between an item and an allotment class, and by
concluding that they do not have appropriation cover; and that such error may induce
Congress and the Executive (through the DBM) to ensure that all items should have at
least P1 funding in order to allow augmentation by the President.

At the outset, we allay the respondents’ apprehension regarding the validity of the DAP
funded projects. It is to be emphatically indicated that the Decision did not declare the
en masse invalidation of the 116 DAP-funded projects. To be sure, the Court recognized
the encouraging effects of the DAP on the country’s economy, and acknowledged its
laudable purposes, most especially those directed towards infrastructure development
and efficient delivery of basic social services. It bears repeating that the DAP is a policy
instrument that the Executive, by its own prerogative, may utilize to spur economic
growth and development.

Nonetheless, the Decision did find doubtful those projects that appeared to have no
appropriation cover under the relevant GAAs on the basis that: (1) the DAP funded
projects that originally did not contain any appropriation for some of the expense
categories (personnel, MOOE and capital outlay); and (2) the appropriation code and the
particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond with the program specified in the

28
GAA. The respondents assert, however, that there is no constitutional requirement for
Congress to create allotment classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to
create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President.

After a careful reexamination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we find merit in the
respondents’ argument.

Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the
object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House,
the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v. Ochoa,
we said that an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line
with the item-veto power of the President, must contain "specific appropriations of
money" and not be only general provisions, xxx.

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists
a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of
appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts
of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as
follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a

specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill.

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for
parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item

characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified
singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."
This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a
"specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly
veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund,
Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item"
appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed
that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or
values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its
own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-
item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may
even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses),
in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise
of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary

29
funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as
long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. xxx

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and
indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the
expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the
Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the
expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his
veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense
category belongs to.

Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or
activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may
be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item
in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings
may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent
not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility
allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable
contingencies.

Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP
projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally
accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation
cover and were validly augmented require factual determination that is not within the
scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, February 3, 2015)

To recall, the respondents justified the use of unprogrammed funds by submitting

certifications from the Bureau of Treasury and the Department of Finance (DOF)
regarding the dividends derived from the shares of stock held by the Government in
government-owned and controlled corporations. In the decision, the Court has held that
the requirement under the relevant GAAs should be construed in light of the purpose
for which the unprogrammed funds were denominated as "standby appropriations."
Hence, revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we
would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. We have even cautioned that the
release of unprogrammed funds based on the respondents’ position could be unsound
fiscal management for disregarding the budget plan and fostering budget deficits,
contrary to the Government’s surplus budget policy.

While we maintain the position that aggregate revenue collection must first exceed
aggregate revenue target as a pre-requisite to the use of unprogrammed funds, we
clarify the respondents’ notion that the release of unprogrammed funds may only occur
at the end of the fiscal year. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)

Tax Exemptions

The petitioner is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually,

solely and exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal

30
building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, are not
subject to real property tax and respondent City is not justified in collecting taxes from
petitioner over said properties. (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. City of
Lapu-Lapu, G.R. No. 181756, June 15, 2015)

… a tax amnesty, by nature, is designed to be a general grant of clemency and the only
exceptions are those specifically mentioned. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Puregold
Duty Free, Inc., G.R. No. 202789, June 22, 2015)

Laws on the Jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court

xxx the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application
for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the
exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2)
reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase “application for remedy” or the word
“findings” refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law.
The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the
ambiguity. xxx

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s extremely limited restriction
on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal – which is within the sphere of the
rules of procedure promulgated by this Court – can only be taken against final decisions
or orders of lower courts, and not against “findings” of quasi-judicial agencies. As will
be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it
cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings”
issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45
appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of
jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this
light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The
provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as
above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto (Fabian).

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1,
Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only
to a review of “judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;”
and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy
now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. (Note: see also Ruivivar v. Office of
the Ombudsman, 587 Phil. 100 (2008))

31
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 – attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that
the former provision is also unconstitutional and, perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
Ombudsman Act provisions are in pari materia in that they “cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the
Ombudsman. xxx.

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the
Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Article VII

Presidential Immunity

Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in
the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against
embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.” Therefore, former President Macapagal-
Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is
stricken off the title of this case. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon
Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises, and other Cetacean Species, Joined in and
Represented herein by Human Beings v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)

De Facto Officership

In any case, we cannot order the invalidation of respondent’s appointment in the present
proceedings. To do so would necessarily result in his removal from an office he has
physically possessed for almost nine (9) years. Respondent has been discharging the
duties of the City Assessor, at the very least, under a color of title to the position
especially since he possesses the qualifications for it. Analogous to a de facto officer,
respondent’s title to his office may only be attacked through a petition for quo warranto
filed by the Government or by the person claiming title to the office. (Abad v. De la Cruz,
G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)

Prohibited Appointments

Executive Order No. 2, in the light of Article VII, Section 15, is constitutional.

32
None of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal
letters) have been issued and (released) before the ban… An appointment can be made
only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to an occupied office. The
incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated, before
one could be validly installed to succeed him… Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2
considered as midnight appointments those appointments to offices that will only be
vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though the appointments are made prior to 11
March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the country
indirectly after the end of his term. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
203372, June 16, 2015)

This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the facts in all these cases show that “none
of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters)
have been issued (and released) before the ban.” The dates of receipt by the MRO
(Malacanang Records Office), which in these cases are the only reliable evidence of
actual transmittal of the appointment papers by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates
clearly falling during the appointment ban. Thus, this ponencia and the dissent both
agree that all the appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation of
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that

takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the
exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the
President signing an appointee’s appointment paper to a vacant office, the official
transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the
appointment paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.
(Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to
differentiate the exercise of the President’s appointing power outside, just before, or
during the appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President to exercise the
power of appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban, and
disallows (subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of
appointment during the period covered by the appointment ban. The concurrence of all
steps in the appointment process is admittedly required for appointments outside the
appointment ban. There is no justification whatsoever to remove acceptance as a
requirement in the appointment process for appointments just before the start of the
appointment ban, or during the appointment ban in appointments falling within the
exception. The existence of the appointment ban makes no difference in the power of the
President to appoint; it is still the same power to appoint. In fact, considering the
purpose of the appointment ban, the concurrence of all steps in the appointment process
must be strictly applied on appointments made just before or during the appointment
ban. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

33
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be
understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and
evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4)
receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence
of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made,
whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the
appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no
valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. And, unlike the dissent’s proposal,
there is no need to further distinguish between an effective and an ineffective
appointment when an appointment is valid. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid
appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were
transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit
that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. Petitioners have failed to
raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional.
Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be
evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months
before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term.
Release of the appointment paper through the MRO (Malacanang Records Office) is an
unequivocal act that signifies the President’s intent of its issuance. (Velicaria-Garafil v.
Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

The possession of the original appointment paper is not indispensable to authorize an

appointee to assume office. If it were indispensable, then a loss of the original
appointment paper, which could be brought about by negligence, accident, fraud, fire or
theft, corresponds to a loss of the office. However, in case of loss of the original
appointment paper, the appointment must be evidenced by a certified true copy issued
by the proper office, in this case the MRO. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R.
No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

An appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to

an occupied office. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment
validly terminated, before one could be validly installed to succeed him. (Velicaria-
Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those

appointments to offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though
the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to the intent
of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented

34
from continuing to rule the country indirectly after the end of his term. (Velicaria-Garafil
v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking

the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
(Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very evil
which we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of
acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision in the
breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire
appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. It is
relatively easy to antedate appointment papers and make it appear that they were issued
prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate the entire appointment
process up until acceptance by the appointee. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It

does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives. Nevertheless, the Civil
Service Commission has the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
professionalize the civil service. It may issue rules and regulations prohibiting local chief
executives from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.
Appointments of local chief executives must conform to these civil service rules and
regulations in order to be valid. (The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No.
202331, April 22, 2015)

Power of Control

As said in Velasco v. Commission on Audit, the grant or regulation of the grant of

productivity incentive allowance or similar benefits are in the exercise of the President’s
power of control over these entities. Not being under the President’s power of control,
the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group should be able to determine the
allowances or benefits that suit the functions of the office. (Maritime Industry Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)

Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, we have ruled that the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources can validly order the transfer of a regional office by
virtue of the power of the President to reorganize the national government. In
Constantino v. Cuisia, the Court upheld the authority of the Secretary of Finance to
execute debt-relief contracts. The authority emanates from the power of the President to
contract foreign loans under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution. In Angeles v.
Gaite, the Court ruled that there can be no issue with regard to the President's act of
limiting his power to review decisions and orders of the Secretary of Justice, especially
since the decision or order was issued by the secretary, the President's "own alter ego."
There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless
repudiated by the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary had
the same effect as approval by the President. The same would be true even without the

35
issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President, on 24 January 2006, specifically delegated to
the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by the TRB.
(Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015)

Preliminary Investigations

It is, moreover, necessary to distinguish between the constitutionally guaranteed rights

of an accused and the right to a preliminary investigation. To treat them the same will
lead to absurd and disastrous consequences.

All pending criminal cases in all courts throughout the country will have to be
remanded to the preliminary investigation level because none of these will satisfy Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations are conducted by prosecutors,
who are the same officials who will determine probable cause and prosecute the cases in
court. The prosecutor is hardly the impartial tribunal contemplated in Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. A reinvestigation by an investigating officer outside of the
prosecution service will be necessary if Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, were to be
applied. This will require a new legislation. In the meantime, all pending criminal cases
in all courts will have to be remanded for reinvestigation, to proceed only when a new
law is in place. To require Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to apply to preliminary
investigation will necessarily change the concept of preliminary investigation as we
know it now. Applying the constitutional due process in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
to preliminary investigation will necessarily require the application of the rights of an
accused in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This means that the
respondent can demand an actual hearing and the right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him, rights which are not afforded at present to a respondent in a preliminary
investigation.

The application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is not limited to those with pending
preliminary investigations but even to those convicted by final judgment and already
serving their sentences. The rule is well-settled that a judicial decision applies
retroactively if it has a beneficial effect on a person convicted by final judgment even if
he is already serving his sentence, provided that he is not a habitual criminal. This Court
retains its control over a case "until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes." Applying Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, to preliminary investigations will result in thousands of prisoners, convicted by
final judgment, being set free from prison. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos.
212140-41, January 21, 2015)

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in

GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory
law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations
without running afoul with the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed
in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary
investigations do not comply, and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and
obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial

36
evidence for a decision against the respondent in the administrative case. In preliminary
investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence
required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed
by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no
such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing
officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer
at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and
hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same public officer, like
the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements in
preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations
invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No
preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer,
outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving
sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their
conviction violated constitutional due process. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)

Pardoning Power

“WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office,…” - The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make
the pardon conditional. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights" as being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is
an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute
because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In
this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon,
and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to
make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment
nor to limit the scope of the pardon. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January
21, 2015)

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional

37
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January
21, 2015)

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. (Risos-
Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)

Probation

It was obvious then, as it is now, that the accused in Colinares should not have been
allowed the benefit of probation. As I have previously stated and insisted upon,
probation is not a right granted to a convicted offender; it is a special privilege granted
by the State to a penitent qualified offender, who does not possess the disqualifications
under Section 9 of P.D. No. 968, as amended. Likewise, the Probation Law is not a penal
law for it to be liberally construed to favor the accused.

In the American law paradigm, probation is considered as an act of clemency and grace,
not a matter of right. It is a privilege granted by the State, not a right to which a criminal
defendant is entitled. In City of Aberdeen v. Regan, it was pronounced that:

The granting of a deferred sentence and probation, following a plea or verdict of

guilty, is a rehabilitative measure and, as such, is not a matter of right but is a
matter of grace, privilege, or clemency granted to the deserving.

As such, even in the American criminal justice model, probation should be granted only
to the deserving or, in our system, only to qualified “penitent offenders” who are willing
to be reformed and rehabilitated. Corollarily, in this jurisdiction, the wisdom behind the
Probation Law is outlined in its stated purposes, to wit:

(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him

with individualized treatment;

(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which

might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and

(c) prevent the commission of offenses. (Maruhom v. People, G.R. No. 206513,
October 20, 2015)

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Article VIII

Jurisdiction

R.A. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government -
or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the government's direction - to restrain, prohibit or compel acts related to
the implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects. The rationale
for the law is easily discernible. Injunctions and restraining orders tend to derail the

38
expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure
projects; increase construction, maintenance and repair costs; and delay the enjoyment
of the social and economic benefits therefrom. Thus, unless the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, judges of lower courts who shall issue
injunctive writs or restraining orders in violation of the law shall be administratively
liable. The law is clear that what is prohibited is merely the issuance of provisional
orders enjoining the implementation of a national government project. R.A. 8975 does
not bar lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints that seek the
nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure project as
ultimate relief. (Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February
23, 2015)

Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to
avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court. Also,
this law covers only national government infrastructure projects. This case involves a
local government infrastructure project. For local government infrastructure projects,
Regional Trial Courts may issue provisional injunctive reliefs against government
infrastructure projects only when (1) there are compelling and substantial constitutional
violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and
irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of the injunctive
relief; and (5) when there are public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the
project while the action is pending that far outweighs (a) the inconvenience or costs to
the party to whom the project is awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from
the completion of the project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining
orders issued by trial courts should be strictly followed. No preliminary injunction
should issue unless the evidence to support the injunctive relief is clear and convincing.
(Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7,
2015)

There is nothing in Republic Act No. 8975 or in Presidential Decree No. 1818 that allows
the simultaneous availment of legal remedies before the Regional Trial Court and this
court. Republic Act No. 8975, even when read with Presidential Decree No. 1818, does
not sanction the splitting of a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the
ancilliary (sic – correct spelling: ancillary) remedy of a temporary restraining order from
this court. Petitioner’s reading of Republic Act No. 8975’s repealing clause, such that
only this court can issue injunctive relief, fails to persuade. (Dynamic Builders &
Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7, 2015)

In other words, the Regional Trial Court can issue injunctive relief against government
infrastructure projects, even those undertaken by local governments, considering that
the prohibition in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8957 only mentions national
government projects. These courts can issue injunctive relief when there are compelling
constitutional violations — only when the right is clear, there is a need to prevent grave
and irreparable injuries, and the public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the
project while the action is pending far outweighs the inconvenience or costs to the party
to whom the project is awarded. (Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v.
Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7, 2015)

39
In any event, the general rule of prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 does not
preclude lower courts from assuming jurisdiction when the ultimate relief prayed for is
to nullify a national government infrastructure project and its implementation. (Dynamic
Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7, 2015)

With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This
expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review
by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. In
the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, the Court ruled that the CTA likewise
has the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA’s exclusive
appellate jurisdiction,… No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case.
And as earlier discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in
a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the CTA. Thus, the CA correctly dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari before it for lack of jurisdiction. (CE Casecnan Water and Energy
Company, Inc. v. The Province of Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. 196278, June 17, 2015)

Section 7 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1125, as amended by RA9282, and Section 3, Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, as amended, explicitly provide that the
CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by
the RTC. (Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 209830,
June 17, 2015)

Section 4 of the NIRC confers upon the CIR both: (a) the power to interpret tax laws in
the exercise of her quasi-legislative function; and (b) the power to decide tax cases in the
exercise of her quasi-judicial function. It also delineates the jurisdictional authority to
review the validity of the CIR's exercise of the said powers xxx. The CTA is a court of
special jurisdiction, with power to review by appeal decisions involving tax disputes
rendered by either the CIR or the COC. Conversely, it has no jurisdiction to determine
the validity of a ruling issued by the CIR or the COC in the exercise of their quasi-
legislative powers to interpret tax laws… In this case, Petron's tax liability was premised
on the COC's issuance of CMC No. 164-2012, which gave effect to the CIR's June 29, 2012
Letter interpreting Section 148 (e) of the NIRC as to include alkylate among the articles
subject to customs duties, hence, Petron's petition before the CTA ultimately challenging
the legality and constitutionality of the CIR's aforesaid interpretation of a tax provision.
In line with the foregoing discussion, however, the CIR correctly argues that the CTA
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition as its resolution would necessarily
involve a declaration of the validity or constitutionality of the CIR's interpretation of
Section 148 (e) of the NIRC, which is subject to the exclusive review by the Secretary of
Finance and ultimately by the regular courts. In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, the
Court ruled that the CTA's jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes excludes the power to rule
on the constitutionality or validity of a law, rule or regulation… Verily, the fact that
there is no decision by the COC to appeal from highlights Petron's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies prescribed by law. Before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail of all administrative

40
processes afforded him, such that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first
before the court's power of judicial review can be sought, otherwise, the premature
resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. While there are exceptions to the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it has not been sufficiently shown
that the present case falls under any of the exceptions. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 207843, July 15, 2015)

Under Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No.
6734, entitled, "An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
amended", the Shari'a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari of decisions of the Shari'a District Courts. In Villagracia v. Fifth(5th)
Shari’aDistrict Court (G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 550), we said:

x x x We call for the organization of the court system created under Republic Act
No. 9054 to effectively enforce the Muslim legal system in our country. After all,
the Muslim legal system – a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal,
commercial, political, international, and religious laws is part of the law of the
land, and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.

The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari’a District Courts. It shall
also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final
and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this
court.

and

In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong (628 Phil. 252 (2010), we stated that:

x x x [t]he Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment
of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a
Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or petitions from
final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a
Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed
of Muslim CA Justices.

Notably, Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was
rendered on April 27, 2010. The CA's reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision
came from SDC which the CA has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to
follow the Tomawis ruling. However, we need not remand the case, as we have, on
several occasions, passed upon and resolved petitions and cases emanating from Shari’a
courts. (Lomondot v. Balindong, G.R. No. 192463, July 13, 2015)

In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity
in their issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and implementing the subject

41
circulars, respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending
parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The issuance and
enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH of the questioned joint
circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative
functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by them in their
exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative
agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the
branches of the government.

Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie against herein respondents’
issuances. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative
issuances illegal because petitions for certiorari seek solely to correct defects in
jurisdiction, and not to correct just any error committed by a court, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board, or officer thereby
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition since generally, the purpose of
the same is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain
the administration of justice in orderly channels. It affords relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction, the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law. (Cawad v. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015)

On the issue of whether or not the CA has certiorari jurisdiction over the resolution of the
Acting Secretary of Justice, affirming the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for
violation of provisions of the TCCP due to lack of probable cause, the Court rules in
negative.

The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction. However, with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282,
amending R.A. No. 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its
membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction, it is no longer clear which between the CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to
review through a petition for certiorari the DOJ resolution in preliminary investigations
involving tax and tariff offenses.

Apropos is City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo (G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014, 715
SCRA 182), where the Court en banc declared that the CTA has appellate jurisdiction
over a special civil action for Certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case, despite the fact that there is no categorical statement to that effect
under R.A. No. 1125, as well as the amendatory R.A. No. 9282…

Since the Court ruled in City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo that the CTA has jurisdiction
over a special civil action for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of the RTC in a

42
local tax case via express constitutional mandate and for being inherent in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction, it can also be reasonably concluded based on the same premise
that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ
resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses.

If the Court were to rule that jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing such DOJ
resolution lies with the CA, it would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies,
the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely
the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.
The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative intent, especially considering that
R.A. No. 9282 expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases
without mention of any other court that may exercise such power.

Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory R.A. No.
9282, let alone in the Constitution, that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial
power in the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law, to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, in relation to Section 5(5), Article VIII
thereof, vesting upon it the power to promulgate rules concerning practice and
procedure in all courts, the Court thus declares that the CA's original jurisdiction over a
petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation
involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily transferred to the CTA pursuant to
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282, and that such petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the
BOC's complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of the TCCP.
(Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, September 8, 2015)

Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office
of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is,
therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action. Unfortunately, the
commercial case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, i.e., Branch 276, instead of
being assigned to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
which is Branch 256. This error may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's
caption, i.e., "Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and
Damages," which, however, contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail over its
actual allegations that clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute… the Court
nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special
Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the
exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of
Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action
was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first
referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case;

43
thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated
Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.

Note that the procedure would be different where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over
the case has multiple special commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the
Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same as a commercial case, should proceed to
order its re-raffling among the said special branches. (Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc., G.R. No.
202664, November 10, 2015)

This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key
government institutions – namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and
the Judiciary – and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that
demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally
important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation
doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative
liability. As such, the Ombudsman’s direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this
Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed
issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is
justified. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

The issue being raised here is one purely of law and all the argument, pros and cons were
already raised in and passed upon by public respondent; thus, filing a motion for
reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. Likewise, as petitioner claims, the
resolution of the question raised in this case is of urgent necessity considering its
implications on similar cases filed and pending before the Sandiganbayan. As it appears,
there have been conflicting views on the matter such that the different divisions of the
anti-graft court issue varying resolutions. Undeniably, the issue is of extreme
importance affecting public interest. It involves not just the right of the State to
prosecute criminal offenders but, more importantly, the constitutional right of the
accused to bail. (People v. Valdez, G. R. No. 216007-09, December 8, 2015)

xxx the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application
for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the
exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2)
reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase “application for remedy” or the word
“findings” refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law.
The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the
ambiguity. xxx

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s extremely limited restriction
on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal – which is within the sphere of the
rules of procedure promulgated by this Court – can only be taken against final decisions
or orders of lower courts, and not against “findings” of quasi-judicial agencies. As will
be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it

44
cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings”
issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45
appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of
jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this
light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The
provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as
above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto (Fabian).

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1,
Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only
to a review of “judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;”
and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy
now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. (Note: see also Ruivivar v. Office of
the Ombudsman, 587 Phil. 100 (2008))

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 – attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that
the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
Ombudsman Act provisions are in pari materia in that they “cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the
Ombudsman. xxx.

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the
Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

At this stage, a review of the nature of a judicial claim before the CTA is in order. In
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. CIR (547 Phil. 332, 339 (2007)), it
was ruled -

xxx First, a judicial claim for refund or tax credit in the CTA is by no means an
original action but rather an appeal by way of petition for review of a previous,
unsuccessful administrative claim. Therefore, as in every appeal or petition for
review, a petitioner has to convince the appellate court that the quasi-judicial
agency a quo did not have any reason to deny its claims. In this case, it was
necessary for petitioner to show the CTA not only that it was entitled under
substantive law to the grant of its claims but also that it satisfied all the
documentary and evidentiary requirements for an administrative claim for
refund or tax credit. Second, cases filed in the CTA are litigated de novo. Thus, a
petitioner should prove every minute aspect of its case by presenting, formally

45
 offering and submitting its evidence to the CTA. Since it is crucial for a petitioner
in a judicial claim for refund or tax credit to show that its administrative claim
should have been granted in the first place, part of the evidence to be submitted
to the CTA must necessarily include whatever is required for the successful
prosecution of an administrative claim.

A distinction must, thus, be made between administrative cases appealed due to

inaction and those dismissed at the administrative level due to the failure of the
taxpayer to submit supporting documents. If an administrative claim was dismissed by
the CIR due to the taxpayer's failure to submit complete documents despite
notice/request, then the judicial claim before the CTA would be dismissible, not for lack
of jurisdiction, but for the taxpayer's failure to substantiate the claim at the
administrative level. When a judicial claim for refund or tax credit in the CTA is an
appeal of an unsuccessful administrative claim, the taxpayer has to convince the CTA
that the CIR had no reason to deny its claim. It, thus, becomes imperative for the
taxpayer to show the CTA that not only is he entitled under substantive law to his claim
for refund or tax credit, but also that he satisfied all the documentary and evidentiary
requirements for an administrative claim. It is, thus, crucial for a taxpayer in a judicial
claim for refund or tax credit to show that its administrative claim should have been
granted in the first place. Consequently, a taxpayer cannot cure its failure to submit a
document requested by the BIR at the administrative level by filing the said document
before the CTA.

In the present case, however, Total Gas filed its judicial claim due to the inaction of the
BIR. Considering that the administrative claim was never acted upon; there was no
decision for the CTA to review on appeal per se. Consequently, the CTA may give
credence to all evidence presented by Total Gas, including those that may not have been
submitted to the CIR as the case is being essentially decided in the first instance. The
Total Gas must prove every minute aspect of its case by presenting and formally
offering its evidence to the CTA, which must necessarily include whatever is required
for the successful prosecution of an administrative claim. (Pilipinas Total Gas v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No. 207112, December 8, 2015)

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

The hierarchy of courts must be respected. The doctrine with respect to hierarchy of
courts was designed so that this court will have more time to focus on its constitutional
tasks without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the lower courts’
competence. This court acts on petitions for extraordinary writs under Rule 65 “only
when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an
exception to the policy.” Consistent with these rules and doctrines, the remedy
contemplated by Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 is either an action
under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court or the proper action filed before this court.
However, direct resort to this court can prosper only when the requisites for direct
invocation of this court’s original jurisdiction are present. (Dynamic Builders &
Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbiterio, G.R. No. 17202, April 7, 2015)

… the Court stressed in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015) that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and that

46
it has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special
civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.
Recognized exceptions to the said doctrine are as follows: (a) when there are genuine
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when
the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression where
no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on the matter; (d) the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; (e) where exigency in certain
situations necessitate urgency in the resolution of the cases; (f) the filed petition reviews
the act of a constitutional organ; (g) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free
them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom
of expression; and (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or
the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered
as clearly an inappropriate remedy. Since the present case includes questions that are
dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice, as well as to avoid multiplicity of suits and further delay in its
disposition, the Court shall directly resolve the petition for certiorari, instead of referring
it to the CTA. (Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, September 8, 2015)

It must first be emphasized that trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked
upon with disfavor by the Court. Said rule is an important component of the orderly
administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons.
This doctrine was exhaustively explained in The Diocese of Bacolod, represented by the Most
Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra and the Bishop Himself in His Personal Capacity v.
Commission on Elections and the Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon
(G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015) in this wise:

xxx we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of
courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without
serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield
the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal
with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy.
xxx

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this
court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in
an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts
from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise
competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution.
To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into

47
 regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those
territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of
inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before
them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction,
which properly present the "actual case" that makes ripe a determination of the
constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national
in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level
would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before
the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the
determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature.
This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial
court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special
civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is
competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that
may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or
further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some
confusion of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first
instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court
promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.

However, in the same case, it was acknowledged that for exceptionally compelling
reasons, the Court may exercise its discretion to act on special civil actions for certiorari
filed directly with it. Examples of cases that present compelling reasons are: (1) those
involving genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time; (2) those where the issues are of transcendental importance, and the
threat to fundamental constitutional rights are so great as to outweigh the necessity for
prudence; (3) cases of first impression, where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide
the lower courts on such issues; (4) where the constitutional issues raised are better
decided after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of
the majority of those who participated in its discussion; (5) where time is of the essence;
(6) where the act being questioned was that of a constitutional body; (7) where there is
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could
free petitioner from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their
constitutional rights; and (8) the issues involve public welfare, the advancement of
public policy, the broader interest of justice, or where the orders complained of are
patent nullities, or where appeal can be considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
(Barroso v. Omelio, G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015)

The Court finds the second and fifth, and sixth grounds applicable in the case at bar.
Much has already been said of the "compelling significance and the transcending public
importance" of the primordial issue underpinning petitions that assail election
automation contracts: the success -- and the far-reaching grim implications of the failure-
of the nationwide automation project. So it is that the Court, in the growing number of
cases concerning government procurement of election paraphernalia and services, has
consistently exhibited leniency and dispensed of (sic) procedural requirements for
petitioners to successfully lodge certiorari petitions. Technicalities should not stand in
the way of resolving the substantive issues petitioners raised herein. On this same

48
ground of transcendental importance, the Court may opt to treat the instant petition as
one for certiorari under, not merely in relation to, Rule 65. (Querubin v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015)

Actual Case

Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing
laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the
filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is "not subject to judicial
restraint[.]" A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under
the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It
cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.
The petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for
this court’s determination. Petitioner has no legal standing. (In The Matter of Save the
Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) And Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)

The Court agrees with the OSG that the present controversy has been rendered moot by
the passage of GAA 2014. The essence of petitioner's case is that MVPSP was not
sufficiently funded under GAA 2013. Because of GAA 2014, however, the amount of
P4,843,753,000.00 had been appropriated by Congress to MVPSP before the contract was
entered into on February 21, 2014. By appropriating the amount of P4,843, 753,000.00 for
MVPSP, Congress agreed with the DOTC and the LTO that the said project should be
funded and implemented. Verily, the Court cannot question the wisdom of the
legislative department in appropriating the full budget of MVPSP in GAA 2014. Thus, it
is settled that MVPSP was adequately funded before the contract was signed by the
parties. Petitioner even admits, and the Court takes judicial notice, that the new vehicle
plates under MVPSP are being distributed by the LTO and released to new vehicle
owners… In the case at bench, the issues presented must still be passed upon because
paramount public interest is involved and the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. MVPSP is a nationwide project which affects new and old registrants of motor
vehicles and it involves P3,851,6.00,100.00 of the taxpayers' money. Also, the act
complained of is capable of repetition because the procurement process under R.A. No.
9184 is regularly made by various government agencies. Hence, it is but prudent for the
Court to rule on the substantial merits of the case. (Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381,
April 22, 2015)

However, the Court agrees with the Republic that while the case has indeed been
rendered moot, it can still pass upon the main issue for the guidance of both bar and
bench. It is settled that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Republic v. Principalia Management and
Personnel Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 198426, September 2, 2015)

In seeking to nullify the Memorandum dated November 17, 2006 and Letter Order No. 758,
petitioners allege that the creation of Special General Court Martial No. 2 violates their right to
due process under the Constitution and the Articles of War. For one, a Special General Court
Martial is not among those allowed by the Articles of War to be created. A special court martial

49
is different from a general court martial. They have different powers and functions. Further,
citing Articles 8, 9, 45, and 46 of the Articles of War, the petitioners pointed out that Lt. Gen.
Esperon, Jr. cannot be the accuser, appointing authority, witness, prosecutor and reviewer of the
findings of the Special General Court Martial No. 2 all at the same time.

Pending the resolution of this case, Special General Court Martial No. 2 rendered the
following various resolutions finding the petitioners not guilty of the charges against
them… Thus, this case has been rendered moot and academic by these various
resolutions.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, we described a moot and academic case as "one that ceases
to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value" and discussed that "[g]enerally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness."

Any resolution of the petitions to annul the Memorandum dated November 17, 2006 and
Letter Order No. 758, to restrain the Special General Court Martial and to order the
release of the petitioners from confinement would be of no practical value since as early
as 2009, Special General Court Martial No. 2 already absolved the petitioners of the
charges under the Articles of War, Special General Court Martial No. 2 has long been
dissolved and the petitioners were already released from confinement. (De Leon v.
Esperon, G.R. No. 176394, October 21, 2015)

While it may be that the project proponents of Bt talong have terminated the subject
field trials, it is not certain if they have actually completed the field trial stage for the
purpose of data gathering. At any rate, it is on record that the proponents expect to
proceed to the next phase of the project, the preparation for commercial propagation of
the Bt eggplants. Biosafety permits will still be issued by the BPI for Bt talong or other
GM crops. Hence, not only does this case fall under the "capable of repetition yet
evading review" exception to the mootness principle, the human and environmental
health hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically modified plant, a very popular
staple vegetable among Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest. (International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), G.R. 209271, December 8, 2015)

Locus Standi

This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require
that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly
allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation. (West
Tower Condominium Corporation v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 194239,
June 16, 2015)

The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, “claim” that they have the legal
standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also assert their right to sue for the faithful

50
performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor
and for their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand
that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international
instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of
stipulation pour autrui… The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects
should be given legal standing in actions before courts of law is not new in the field of
animal rights and environmental law… It had been suggested by animal rights
advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be
given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by
themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these
animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been
dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or
affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in
Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice
Douglas’s paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves
towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental
cases. Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action
before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including

minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or
obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court
shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action
and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their
interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in
the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Citizen
suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing
has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their
petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file
this petition. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, e.g., Toothed
Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises, and other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented herein by
Human Beings v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)

It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to
the filing of the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such
petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured by the number of persons who
signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive
environmental disaster. (West Tower Condominium Corporation v. First Philippine Industrial
Corporation, G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015)

51
… the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be
directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons
to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation. (West Tower Condominium
Corporation v. First Philippine Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015)

We have held that legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives
as legislators. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303) In this case,
there was no allegation of usurpation of legislative function as petitioner is suing in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Committee created pursuant to Section 62 of R.A. No.
9136. Such position by itself is not sufficient to vest petitioner with standing to institute
the present suit. Notably, the enumerated functions of the Committee under the
aforesaid provision are basically “in aid of legislation.”

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter
of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.” When the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere
fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

The privatization of power plants in a manner that ensures the reliability and
affordability of electricity in our country pursuant to the EPIRA is an issue of paramount
public interest. Petitioner has underscored the effect of the right to top provision in
preventing a competitive public bidding for the NPPC. While the alleged detrimental
result referred to the severe power shortage that occurred in only one region, PSALM
had admitted that the right to top provisions are also found in several other land lease
agreements.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we hold that petitioner possesses the
requisite legal standing to file this case. (Osmena v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation, G.R. No. 212686, September 28, 2015)

Nevertheless, the application of Sec. 58 of RA 9184 has to be qualified. It cannot, in all

instances, be the proper remedy to question the rulings of the heads of procuring entities
in procurement protests. As in the prior case of Roque v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 188456,
September IO, 2009, 599 SCRA 69), which similarly dealt with COMELEC procurement
of OMRs the Court held that only a losing bidder would be aggrieved by, and ergo
would have the personality to challenge, the head of the procuring entity's ruling in the
protest. (Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015)

The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The
provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and

52
direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature," and aims to
"further encourage the protection of the environment."

There is therefore no dispute on the standing of respondents to file before this Court
their petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus. (International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), G.R. 209271, December 8, 2015)

Constitutional Challenges

Finally, petitioners argue that the Visiting Forces Agreement should be declared
"unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the ... power of the Supreme Court[.]" They
advance this argument in the context of their Motion to place Pemberton under the
custody of Philippine authorities while the case is being tried, with their prayer in this
Petition phrased thus:

(b) Declare the VFA unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the constitutional

power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for practice before it, including
the Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]

The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of judicial review, provided the
matter is not raised collaterally. xxx. The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces
Agreement is not the lis mota of this Petition. xxx. First, this Petition is not the proper
venue to rule on the issue of whether the Visiting Forces Agreement transgresses the
judicial authority of this court to promulgate rules pertaining to criminal cases. Second,
the issues of criminal jurisdiction and custody during trial as contained in the Visiting
Forces Agreement were discussed in Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo, et al. xxx. In any case,
Pemberton is confined, while undergoing trial, in Camp Aguinaldo, which by
petitioners' own description is the "General Head Quarters of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines[.]" Their claim that the detention facility is under the "control, supervision[,]
and jurisdiction of American military authorities "is not substantiated. (Laude v. Hon.
Ginez, G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015)

At the outset, the Court passes upon the procedural objections raised in this case. In
particular, the COMELEC claims that petitioners: (a) failed to implead the Congress, the
Office of the President, and the ERB which it purports are indispensable parties to the
case; (b) did not have the legal standing to institute the instant petition; and (c)
erroneously availed of certiorari and prohibition as a mode of questioning the
constitutionality of RA 10367 and the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.

Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue pertaining

to the right of suffrage, the Court views the matter as one of transcendental public
importance and of compelling significance. Consequently, it deems it proper to brush
aside the foregoing procedural barriers and instead, resolve the case on its merits. xxx.
Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the policy on biometrics validation, as
provided under RA 10367 and fleshed out in the assailed COMELEC Resolutions,
should be upheld is one that demands immediate adjudication in view of the critical
preparatory activities that are currently being undertaken by the COMELEC with regard
to the impending May 2016 Elections. Thus, it would best subserve the ends of justice to

53
settle this controversy not only in order to enlighten the citizenry, but also so as not to
stymy the operations of a co-constitutional body. (Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015)

Subject to certain recognized exceptions such as (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable, which are not present in this case, the principle of immutability leaves the
judgment undisturbed as nothing further can be done except to execute it. (Go v. Bureau of
Immigration, G.R. No. 191810, June 22, 2015)

Operative Fact Doctrine

Relevantly, the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, being public officers,
further enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. This
presumption is necessary because they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of
the State, and because they act in the interest of the public as required by law.55
However, the presumption may be disputed. At any rate, the Court has agreed during
its deliberations to extend to the proponents and implementors of the DAP the benefit of
the doctrine of operative fact. This is because they had nothing to do at all with the
adoption of the invalid acts and practices. xxx The PAPs under the DAP remain effective
under the operative fact doctrine. As a general rule, the nullification of an
unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in cases
where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact
doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the
beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the
nullification of the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social and
economic services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of
nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and practices
under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by
applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot sustain the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, February 3, 2015)

It is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all. Applying this principle, the logical conclusion would be to order
the return of all the amounts remitted to FDCP and given to the producers of graded
films, by all of the covered cities, which actually amounts to hundreds of millions, if not
billions. In fact, just for Cebu City, the aggregate deficiency claimed by FDCP is ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY NINE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT PESOS AND FIFTY FOUR
CENTAVOS (159,377,988.54). Again, this amount represents the Unpaid amounts to
FDCP by eight cinema operators or proprietors in only One covered city.

An exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have

54
consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law… Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may have
already received the amusement tax incentive reward pursuant to the questioned
provisions of RA 9167, to return the amounts received to the respective taxing
authorities would certainly impose a heavy, and possibly crippling, financial burden
upon them who merely, and presumably in good faith, complied with the legislative fiat
subject of this case. For these reasons, We are of the considered view that the application
of the doctrine of operative facts in the case at bar is proper so as not to penalize FDCP
for having complied with the legislative command in RA 9167, and the producers of
graded films who have already received their tax cut prior to this Decision for having
produced top-quality films… In view of the declaration of nullity of unconstitutionality
of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167, all amusement taxes remitted to petitioner FDCP prior to
the date of the finality of this decision shall remain legal and valid under the operative
fact doctrine. Amusement taxes due to petitioner but unremitted up to the finality of this
decision shall be remitted to petitioner within thirty (30) days from date of finality.
Thereafter, amusement taxes previously covered by RA 9167 shall be remitted to the
local governments. (Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty
Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, June 16, 2015)

Without a doubt, the effectivity of Sec. 5, EO 80 and the privileges enjoyed by Puregold
and similarly situated enterprises were not put into question until this Court
categorically voided that provision in Coconut Oil on July 29, 2005. In other words,
without Our ruling in Coconut Oil, Puregold would have had continued to enjoy tax-free
importation of alcohol and tobacco products into the CSEZ. It cannot, therefore, be
gainsaid that the subject deficiency taxes first assessed by the BIR in November 2005,
just months after the promulgation of Coconut Oil, accrued because of such ruling.
Hence, with more reason, these deficiency taxes are encompassed by the remedial
measure that is RA 9399. A holding to the contrary, as proposed by the dissent, will only
perpetuate the nauseating, revolting, and circuitous exercise of governmental
departments limiting, offsetting, and ultimately cancelling each other’s official acts and
enactments. Consider: in Coconut Oil, this Court annulled Sec. 5 of EO 80; then, Congress
enacted RA 9399 to offset the full effect of such annulment by granting an amnesty; and,
now, the petition would have this Court nullify the amnesty in RA 9399 by withdrawing
the protection extended by the law to CSEZ operators from its liabilities for the period
prior to the promulgation of John Hay and Coconut Oil. It need not be emphasized that
stability and predictability are the key pillars on which our legal system must be
founded and run to guarantee a business environment conducive to the country’s
sustainable economic growth. Hence, this Court is duty-bound to protect the basic
expectations taken into account by businesses under relevant laws, such as RA 9399. For
this reason, this Court subscribes to the doctrine of operative fact, which recognizes that
a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
consequences of a void act prior to such declaration… Without a doubt, Our ruling in
Coconut Oil cannot be retroactively applied to obliterate the effect of Section 5 of EO 80
and the various rulings of the former CIR prior to the promulgation of our Decision in
2005. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Puregold Duty Free, Inc., G.R. No. 202789, June
22, 2015)

55
Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy

This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and
replacing it with the "Judiciary Support Fund." Funds collected from the proposed
Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall
determine how the funds will be used. Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress… The
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. Courts, therefore,
must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary Development Fund, used
to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a
quarterly basis. The financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website.
These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of lower courts and
guarantee credible compensation for their personnel. The reality is that halls of justice
exist because we rely on the generosity of local government units that provide
additional subsidy to our judges. If not, the budget for the construction, repair, and
rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the Department of Justice. As a result, our fiscal
autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined by low levels of budgetary
outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating expenses, and the reliance
on local government units and the Department of Justice. Courts are not constitutionally
built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it is a co-equal department to the
Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our arguments are legal, not political. We
are best when we lay down all our premises in the finding of facts, interpretation of the
law and understanding of precedents. We are not trained to produce a political
statement or a media release. Because of the nature of courts, that is - that it has to
decide in favor of one party, we may not have a political base. Certainly, we should not
even consider building a political base. All we have is an abiding faith that we should do
what we could to ensure that the Rule of Law prevails. It seems that we have no
champions when it comes to ensuring the material basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial
independence. (In The Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal
Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) And Reduction of
Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)

We must, however, differentiate the guidelines for the grant of allowances and benefits
to officials and employees of members of the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy
Group. The judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on
Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman are granted fiscal autonomy by the
Constitution. The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy
Group is an aspect of the members’ independence guaranteed by the Constitution. Their
independence is a necessary component for their existence and survival in our form of
government. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812,
January 13, 2015)

56
Allowing the President or his or her alter ego to dictate the allowances or benefits that
may be received by the officers and employees of the Constitutional and Fiscal
Autonomy Group will undermine their independence. This arrangement is repugnant to
their autonomy enshrined by the Constitution. As said in Velasco v. Commission on Audit,
the grant or regulation of the grant of productivity incentive allowance or similar
benefits are in the exercise of the President’s power of control over these entities. Not
being under the President’s power of control, the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy
Group should be able to determine the allowances or benefits that suit the functions of
the office. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January
13, 2015)

At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that the reversion to the General
Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations – savings included – pursuant to
Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code does not apply to the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on
Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The reason for this is that the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the CFAG –

x x x contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their

resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes
the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation
not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says
it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends
its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy
given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. x x x (Araullo v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)

En Banc

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration… In view of the contrasting opinions of
the members of the Third Division on the instant motion, and the transcendental
importance of the issue raised herein, the members of the Third Division opted to refer
the issue to the En Banc for resolution. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways v. Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015)

57
Respondent-movants, therefore, question the validity of the Court’s Third Division’s
rulings and postulate that a deliberation of the case by the Court en banc is warranted
under Sec. 4(2), Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

SECTION 4. xxx

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all
other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. (emphasis added)

In support of their contention, respondent-movants cite the 1953 case of Ykalina v. Oricio
(No. L-6951, October 30, 1953, 93 Phil 1076, 1079), which held that a presidential order
may either be in a written memorandum or merely verbal. They then argue that the
issuance of Supplemental Notice No. 5, effectively cancelling the Swiss Challenge of
petitioner’s duly accepted suo moto proposal, was pursuant to a verbal presidential order
or instruction. And pursuant to the constitutional provision, the challenge against this
presidential directive, so respondent-movants insist, is within the jurisdiction of Court
en banc, not with its divisions.

We disagree.

Respondent-movants’ interpretation of the antiquated 1953 doctrine in Ykalina is highly

distorted. In the said case, the Court, finding for respondent Ananias Oricio (Oricio),
sustained his appointment in spite of having been merely verbally made. As held:

While the appointment of an officer is usually evidenced by a Commission, as a

general rule it is not essential to the validity of an appointment that a
commission issue, and an appointment may be made by an oral announcement
of his determination by the appointing power.

Based on the Court’s reasoning, the presidential order that “may either be in a written
memorandum or merely verbal” adverted to in Ykalina should therefore be understood
as limited specifically to those pertaining to appointments. Current jurisprudence,
however, no longer recognizes the validity of oral appointments and, in fact, requires
the transmission and receipt of the necessary appointment papers for their completion.
(SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, G.R. No. 203655, September
7, 2015)

Here, it is well to recall that the President did not issue any said executive order or
presidential issuance in intimating to the BCDA that he wishes for the competitive
challenge to be cancelled. There was no document offered that was signed by either the
Chief Executive or the Executive Secretary, for the President, to that effect. The situation,
therefore, does not involve a presidential order or instruction within the contemplation
of Sec. 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, and, consequently, does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court en banc. Given the glaring differences in context, the doctrine in

58
Ykalina cannot find application herein, and cannot operate to divest the Court’s division
of its jurisdiction over the instant case. (SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development
Authority, G.R. No. 203655, September 7, 2015)

Venue

To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue

in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Unlike in a civil case where
venue may be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element
of jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him
except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that as it may, Section 5 (4), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a change of
venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are
serious and weighty reasons present, which would prevent the court of original
jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to
order a change of venue so as o prevent a miscarriage of justice. That private respondent
filed several criminal cases for falsification in different jurisdictions, which unduly
forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway places can hardly
be considered as compelling reason which would prevent the MCTC from conducting a
fair and impartial trial. (Navaja v. de Castro, G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015)

Rule-Making Authority

Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory R.A. No.
9282, let alone in the Constitution, that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial
power in the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law, to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, in relation to Section 5(5), Article VIII
thereof, vesting upon it the power to promulgate rules concerning practice and
procedure in all courts, the Court thus declares that the CA's original jurisdiction over a
petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation
involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily transferred to the CTA pursuant to
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282, and that such petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the
BOC's complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of the TCCP.
(Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, September 8, 2015)

In Spouses Fortaleza v. Spouses Lapitan (No. 178288, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 469, 480),
we reiterated the established doctrine that there are no vested rights to rules of
procedure. Spouses Fortaleza involved a case wherein the Justice assigned to complete
the records also decided the case on the merits, in alleged violation of the Court of
Appeals' internal two-raffle system. This procedural shortcut, according to Spouses
Fortaleza, evinced the appellate court's bias and prejudgment in favor of Spouses
Lapitan. We rejected their argument and ruled thus:

xxx

59
 [T]he two-raffle system is already abandoned under the 2009 IRCA. As the rule
now stands, the Justice to whom a case is raffled shall act on it both at the
completion stage and for the decision on the merits xxx

Corollarily, the alleged defect in the processing of this case before the CA has
been effectively cured. We stress that rules of procedure may be modified at any
time and become effective at once, so long as the change does not affect vested
rights. Moreover, it is equally axiomatic that there are no vested rights to rules of
procedure. Thus, unless spouses Fortaleza can establish a right by virtue of some
statute or law, the alleged violation is not an actionable wrong. At any rate, the
2002 IRCA docs not provide for the effect of non-compliance with the two-raffle
system on the validity of the decision. Notably too, it docs not prohibit the
assignment by raffle of a case for study and report to a Justice who handled the
same during its completion stage. (Pulumbarit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
153745-46, October 14, 2015)

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII xxx, as well as to create
statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII xxx, does not result in an abnegation of the
Court’s own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under
Section 5 (5), Article VIII xxx. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own
sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the
procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting
provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not define, prescribe, and
apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari
jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129
which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress
interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every
court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as
may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)

Administrative Supervision

In view of the above-quoted provision (Muslim Code, Article 81), it becomes apparent
that the Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court enjoys the privilege of wearing two
hats: first, as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and second, as Circuit Registrar
within his territorial jurisdiction. Although the Constitution vests the Court with the
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, this power must
be taken with due regard to other prevailing laws.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 3753 is the primary law that governs the registry of civil
status of persons. To ensure that civil registrars perform their duties under the law,
Section 18 of C.A. No. 3753 provides:

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 Section 18. Neglect of duty with reference to the provisions of this Act. – Any
local registrar who fails to properly perform his duties in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and of the regulations issued hereunder, shall be punished
for the first offense, by an administrative fine in a sum equal to his salary for not
less than fifteen days nor more than three months, and for a second or repeated
offense, by removal from the service.

The same Act provides:

Section 2. Civil Registrar-General his duties and powers. – The director of the
National Library shall be Civil Registrar-General and shall enforce the provisions
of this Act. The Director of the National Library, in his capacity as Civil
Registrar-General, is hereby authorized to prepare and issue, with the approval
of the Secretary of Justice, regulations for carrying out the purposes of this Act,
and to prepare and order printed the necessary forms for its proper compliance.
In the exercise of his functions as Civil Registrar-General, the Director of the
National Library shall have the power to give orders and instructions to the local
Civil registrars with reference to the performance of their duties as such. It shall
be the duty of the Director of the National Library to report any violation of the
provisions of this Act and all irregularities, negligence or incompetency on the
part of the officers designated as local civil registrars to the (Chief of the
Executive Bureau or the Director of the Non-Christian Tribes) Secretary of the
Interior, as the case may be, who shall take the proper disciplinary action
against the offenders.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it becomes apparent that this Court does not have
jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action against civil registrars. While he is
undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, a
review of the subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold Abdullah liable for
registering the divorce and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit Registrar of
Muslim divorces. It has been said that the test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense
and not the personality of the offender. The fact that the complaint charges Abdullah for
“conduct unbecoming of a court employee” (sic) is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule
that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
complaint. Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no
court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it. (Mamiscal v. Clerk of Court, A.M. No.
SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015)

Who, among the various agencies and instrumentalities of the government, is

empowered with administrative supervisory powers in order to impose disciplinary
sanctions against erring civil registrars? xxx.

It was only with the advent of the Local Government Code that the power of
administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to the municipal and city
mayors of the respective local government units. Under the “faithful execution clause”
embodied in Section 455(b)(1)(x) and Section 444(b)(1)(x) of the Local Government Code,
in relation to Section 479 under Article IX, Title V of the same Code, the municipal and
city mayors of the respective local government units, in addition to their power to
appoint city or municipal civil registrars are also given ample authority to exercise
administrative supervision over civil registrars. xxx.

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This authority of the Mayor to exercise administrative jurisdiction over Circuit
Registrars was also recognized generally, under Section 47(2) of the Administrative
Code of 1987, and specifically, under Rule 11 of Administrative Order No. 2, Series of
1993 of the OCRG, and the more recent Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2005 of the
same office, which applies specially to the registration of acts and events concerning the
civil status of Muslim Filipinos.

At this juncture, it should be remembered that the authority of the Mayor to exercise
administrative supervision over C/MCRs is not exclusive. The Civil Service
Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to
appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Under Section 9 of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the CSC is granted
original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases. xxx.

Consequently, it behooves the Court to also forward the subject complaint to the Office
of the Mayor, Marawi City and to the CSC for appropriate action. (Mamiscal v. Clerk of
Court, A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015)

The Judicial and Bar Council

The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and
screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However,
since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner
now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC’s constitutional
mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said
policy. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court’s
power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of
supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a
government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their
own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see
to it that the rules are followed. Following this definition, the supervisory authority of
the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and
procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court,

62
through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter
and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees

to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the
President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the
JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it
determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987
Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies
to effectively ensure its mandate.

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the
JBC’s principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay
down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

JBC’s ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given
this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to
ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year
requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner’s case is necessary and incidental to
the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and
selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has
the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant
to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be
observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to
ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is
freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is
shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified
applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience was an exercise of
discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been informed of
the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and
comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the
Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC’s powers, and will respect the
initiative and independence inherent in the latter. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

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Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the
ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR (University of the Philippines
Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register) is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is
a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication
requirements of the Administrative Code. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
211833, April 7, 2015)

Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-
level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have
been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws,
attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the
requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Here, the assailed JBC policy does not
fall within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from the publication
requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC
shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation,
because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their
staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the
qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to
these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential
applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would
be able to prepare for and comply with them. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R.
No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

Nonetheless, the JBC’s failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the
petitioner’s private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal
right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of
the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not
be used to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

Moreover, in view of Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council which
disqualifies from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post those with
pending criminal or regular administrative cases, the Court finds it necessary to
investigate whether petitioner declared in his application for appointment his pending
administrative case for grave misconduct and criminal cases for sexual harassment.
(Gonzales v. Serrano. G.R. No. 175433, March 11, 2015)

Judges

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As a consequence, the grant of rank at the same level as the grantees’ counterpart judges
or justices is not and cannot be a conferment of “judicial rank” and does not thereby
accord the grantees recognition as members of the Judiciary. For incumbent judges and
justices who had previous government service outside the Judiciary, it follows that the
grant of rank to them under their old executive positions does not render their service in
these previous positions equivalent to and creditable as judicial service, unless Congress
by law says otherwise and only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits. (Re:
Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His
Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission, A.M. No. 12-
8-07-CA, June 16, 2015)

To be sure, Congress can create and recognize ranks outside of the Judiciary that are
equivalent to the ranks it has created for the Judiciary, but again, this recognition does
not thereby create “judicial ranks” outside of the Judiciary, nor constitute the grantees of
these ranks as judges and justices. Technically, what Congress creates or grants are
executive ranks that are equivalent to judicial ranks. (Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member
III of the National Labor Relations Commission, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015)

Notably, even for those within the Judiciary itself, the recognition of “judicial rank” in
favor of those who are not justices or judges does not thereby make the grantee a justice
or a judge who is entitled to this formal title; the grantee may be entitled to the benefits
of the rank but he/she remains an administrative official in the Judiciary, separate and
distinct from the justices and judges who directly exercise judicial power, singly or
collegially. (Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to
Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations
Commission, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015)

On the part of the Judiciary, the disputed longevity pay also serves as a good example.
By its terms, longevity pay is peculiar to the Judiciary as discussed above. Significantly,
in all the cited laws that grant similarity of ranks, salaries, and benefits between
executive officials and their counterparts in the Judiciary, no mention at all is made of
longevity pay and its enjoyment outside the Judiciary. Longevity pay, of course, is not
unique as a feature of judicial life that is wholly the Judiciary’s own; there are other
benefits that the Judiciary enjoys – by law, by rule or by practice – that are not replicated
in the executive agencies, in the same manner that there are benefits in executive
agencies that the Judiciary does not share. In this sense, it approximates the absurd to
claim that the grant of the “same” benefits to executive officials with the “same” rank
should encompass all the benefits that the comparator judge or justice enjoys. (Re: Letter
of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services
as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA,
June 16, 2015)

To reiterate, for clarity and emphasis, if the Judiciary would recognize past service in the
Executive simply because of the equivalency of rank, salaries and benefits, the situation
would be legally problematic as it would have no way of knowing for itself if the
grantee would qualify (based on efficient and meritorious service) since the past service
would be with the Executive, not with the Judiciary. Of course, for this Court to simply

65
recognize that past executive service will be credited under Section 42 of BP 129
constitutes prohibited judicial legislation for going beyond the requirement that service
should be in the Judiciary. (Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for
Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor
Relations Commission, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015)

To recapitulate, the Court’s prior rulings treated longevity pay as part of the “salary” – a
ruling that, as explained, runs counter to the express and implied intent of BP 129. They
are erroneous because they introduced and included in the definition and composition
of “salary” under Section 41 an element that the law did not intend to include, either
expressly or impliedly.

Hence, the most compelling reason now exists to abandon the above-cited cases: they
were clear and grossly erroneous application of the law. In jurisdictional terms, they
involved an interpretation not within the contemplation of words expressed by the
statute; hence, they were gravely abusive interpretation that did not and cannot confer
any vested right protected by the due process clause. The worst approach the Court can
take now is to compound the problem by perpetuating our past mistakes and simply
burying our heads in the sand of past-established rulings.

The first decisive move for the Court is to declare, as it hereby declares, the
abandonment of our rulings on longevity pay in the cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela
Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga and to strike them out of our ruling case law, without,
however, withdrawing the grants to those who have benefitted from the Court’s
misplaced final rulings. Along these lines, the Court also hereby expressly declares that
it does not disavow the longevity pay previously granted to the retired justices and
judicial officials for services rendered outside the Judiciary. They may continue enjoying
their granted benefits as their withdrawal now will be inequitable.

With the same objective, those still in the service who are now enjoying past longevity
pay grants due to past services outside the Judiciary, shall likewise continue with the
grants already made, but their grants will have to be frozen at their current levels until
their services outside the Judiciary are compensated for by their present and future
judicial service. (Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to
Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations
Commission, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015)

In the present petition, the petitioner argued that: (a) the Sandiganbayan’s November 5,
2008 decision in Criminal Case No. 28326 was void because one of its signatories, Justice
Gregory Ong, was not a natural-born Filipino citizen per Kilosbayan Foundation v. Exec.
Sec. Ermita, and hence not qualified to be a Sandiganbayan justice; (b) the totality of
evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the petitioner’s
presumption of innocence; and (c) the Sandiganbayan denied her due process when it
issued its Order dated April 5, 2006, amending certain portions of the pre-trial order
without any hearing…the Court has long settled the issue of Justice Ong’s citizenship.
After the Court promulgated Kilosbayan, Justice Ong immediately filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 264, Pasig City, a petition for the amendment/
correction/ supplementation or annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth,

66
docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 11767-SJ. In its decision of October 24, 2007, the RTC granted
Justice Ong's petition to be recognized as a natural-born Filipino. Consequently, the RTC
directed the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila to annotate in the Certificate of
Birth of Justice Ong its (RTC’s) decision… Even without this ruling, we hold that Justice
Ong was a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency as a Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice. A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who
openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though
such appointment or election may be irregular. It is likewise defined as one who is in
possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent be not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are
as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned. (Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
185244, July 29, 2015)

Disciplining Authority

This disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor Joselito C. Barrozo
(respondent) is taken up by this Court motu proprio by virtue of its power to discipline
members of the bar under Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court… considering that
respondent’s conviction is a ground for disbarment from the practice of law under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Court through a Resolution dated
December 11, 2013 required respondent to comment on why he should not be
suspended/disbarred from the practice of law… Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, one of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of respondent’s
conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be answered is whether
direct bribery is a crime that involves moral turpitude… Clearly, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is a ground for the suspension or
disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an attorney. The Court is mindful that a
lawyer’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude does not automatically call for
the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment since it may, in its discretion,
choose to impose the less severe penalty of suspension. As held, “the determination of
whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion.” Here, however, the circumstances surrounding the
case constrain the Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the
OBC. (Re: Decision dated 17 March 2011 in Criminal Case No. SB-2836 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Joselito C. Barrozo”, A.C. No. 10207, July 21, 2015)

Decisions

Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction between a preliminary

injunction and a final injunction. Despite this, the RTC apparently confused itself. For
one, what it cited in its Decision were jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction
and/or mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ and not as a final injunction. At that
point, the duty of the RTC was to determine, based on the evidence presented during
trial, if Rev. Cortez has conclusively established his claimed right (as opposed to
preliminary injunction where an applicant only needs to at least tentatively show that he

67
has a right) over the subject area. This is considering that the existence of such right
plays an important part in determining whether the preliminary writ of mandatory
injunction should be confirmed. Surprisingly, however, the said Decision is bereft of the
trial court’s factual findings on the matter as well as of its analysis of the same vis-a-vis
applicable jurisprudence. As it is, the said Decision merely contains a restatement of the
parties’ respective allegations in the Complaint and the Answer, followed by a narration
of the ensuing proceedings, an enumeration of the evidence submitted by Rev. Cortez, a
recitation of jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or specifically, to
mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ, a short reference to the IPRA which the Court
finds to be irrelevant and finally, a conclusion that a final and permanent injunction
should issue. No discussion whatsoever was made with respect to whether Rev. Cortez
was able to establish with absolute certainty his claimed right over the subject area.

Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision,
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and
distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Pertinently, the Court issued
on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which requires judges to
make complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal
aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency
to generalize and to form conclusion without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.

Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to comply with the aforestated
guidelines.

In cases such as this, the Court would normally remand the case to the court a quo for
compliance with the form and substance of a Decision as required by the Constitution.
In order, however, to avoid further delay, the Court deems it proper to resolve the case
based on the merits. (Republic v. Cortez, G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015)

It is true that under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. However, petitioner must be reminded that what she assails
are interlocutory orders and it has already been ruled by this Court that the above
constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders because it refers only to
decisions on the merits and not to orders of the court resolving incidental matters. (Nicos
Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA
127, 132-133; Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon City, et al., 151-A Phil. 815, 827
(1973), cited in Ola v. People, G.R. No. 195547, December 2, 2015)

Periods for Decisions

The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within
12 months from the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself.
This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution…
Did the respondents incur any administrative liability for the delay? Although C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012
after the parties did not file their memoranda, it was the 13th Division of the CA

68
(composed of Justice Ybafiez as the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the
Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated the decision on
February 28, 2014, or nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers the query
in the negative, for, pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of
cases was the responsibility of the assigned Justice and the Members of the Division to
which he or she then belonged. Determining who should be administratively
accountable must consider the specific role each of the respondents played leading to the
resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the
liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 might devolve only on the
Members of the 13th Division who actually promulgated the decision. Justice Librea-
Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in rendering the
judgment. Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 108807 because the reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the
resolution by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the 15th
Division through CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, terminating her responsibility in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-Javier should also be exculpated because her
participation was limited to her acting as a special Member of the 16th Division in lieu of
Justice Paredes. Such substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular 16th Division, and
conformed to the procedure stated in Section 6(d), Rule I of the 2009 IRCA. The
constitution of the Special 16th Division was by virtue of CA Office Order No. 220-12-
ABR. Justice Ybanez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with
him when he was transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he was
administratively liable for the delay of eight months should depend on the relevant
circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to
excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within the reglementary period, the Court has
applied this rule by considering the causes of the delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas, the
Court relieved the respondent judge from liability because the delay had been caused by
the sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial courts. In Santos v. Lorenzo, the Court held that a delay of seven months
in deciding a case could be excused because of the heavy caseload of the trial courts in
the National Capital Judicial Region. In Lubaton v. Lazaro, the Court, in sparing the
respondent from the sanctions earlier imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of
the judge, the motivation of the complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively
heavy caseload of 3,500 cases, 1,800 of which involved detainees, leaving her only
Fridays for the study of her cases and the resolution of pending incidents and issuance
of the proper orders. The Court, in reversing the sanctions, observed that "it would be
unkind and considerate on the part of the Court to disregard respondent Judge's
limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule." The delay in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybafiez with
malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in
the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter
subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus,
Justice Ybafiez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His
explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted. (Re: Complaint dated
January 28, 2014 of Wenefredo Parreno, OCA IPI No. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015)

69
Under Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution, judges of the lower courts are
mandated to resolve or decide matters and cases within the reglementary period of
ninety (90) days. This mandate applies not only to the presiding judges assigned to each
court, but also to judges who are tasked to assist other judges in the resolution of cases.
(Office of the Court Administrator v. Retired Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, A.M.. No. MTJ-10-
1760)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Article IX-B

Career Executive Service

For a position to be considered as CES, two elements are required, namely: (a) The
position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section
7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987 or a position of equal rank as those enumerated
and identified by the CESB to be such position of equal rank; and (b) The holder of the
position is a presidential appointee.

There are also two requisites that must concur for an employee in the CES to attain
security of tenure, to wit: (a) CES eligibility; and (b) Appointment to the appropriate
CES rank. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No. 172902, October 21, 2015)

Moreover, the Court declared in Bacal (Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas v. Bacal, 400
Phil. 1115, 1135 (2000); see also General v. Roco, 403 Phil. 455, 462 (2001)) that the
distinguishing feature of the CES is mobility and flexibility in the assignment of
personnel, the better to cope with the exigencies of public service. Security of tenure in
the CES is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The guarantee of
security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to
which they may be appointed - a concept which is applicable only to first and second-
level employees in the civil service - but to the rank to which they are appointed by the
President. Within the CES, personnel can be shifted from one office or position to
another without violation of their right to security of tenure because their status and
salaries are based on their ranks and not on their jobs. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No. 172902,
October 21, 2015)

[Note: The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed
to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment
extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. (Achacoso v.
Macaraig, 272-A Phil. 201, 205-206 (1991), cited in Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No. 172902, October 21,
2015)]

It is undisputed that the position of NCC (National Computer Center) Director General
is a CES position equivalent to CESO Rank I… Equally uncontested is the fact that
petitioner is already CES eligible, but no President has yet appointed petitioner to any
CES rank (despite the previous recommendation of the CESB for petitioner's
appointment to CESO Rank I). Therefore, petitioner's membership in the CES is still

70
incomplete. Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his
membership in the CES, petitioner cannot successfully interpose violation of security of
tenure.

Petitioner's appointment to the position of NCC Director General could only be

construed as temporary, and he could be removed any time even without cause.... Even
assuming that petitioner was already conferred with a CES rank, his appointment would
be permanent as to his CES rank only but not as to his position as NCC Director General.
As member of the CES, petitioner could be reassigned or transferred from one position
to another from one department, bureau, or office to another provided that there would
be no reduction in his rank or salary and that his reassignment/transfer was not oftener
than every two years, among other conditions. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No. 172902,
October 21, 2015)

While it is true that the CSC is generally granted the authority to administer the civil
service, it should be borne in mind that Presidential Decree No. 1 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 created the CESB to be the governing board of the CES and
specifically conferred upon the CESB the authority to promulgate rules, standards, and
procedures on selection, classification, compensation, and career development of
members of the CES. Since there is no question that the position of NCC Director
General is a CES position, then it is just as beyond question that only a qualified member
of the CES may be appointed as NCC Director General. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No.
172902, October 21, 2015)

Secondment

A secondment is a movement of an employee from one department or agency to another

which is temporary in nature. It may or may not require the issuance of an appointment,
and may involve an increase in compensation and benefits. Acceptance of a secondment
is voluntary on the part of the employee.

Petitioner does not deny that he actually signed his conformity of his secondment
covered by a Secondment Agreement between the DFA and the NCC. Petitioner's
signature on the said agreement shows that he was not merely aware of, but that he
voluntary accepted his secondment from the DFA to the NCC and his temporary
appointment as NCC Director General. Petitioner only subsequently renounced the
same when there was already an apparent threat of his removal from the position of
NCC Director General given the change in the Presidency.

Furthermore, a secondment being temporary in nature, the payment of salaries of a

seconded employee shall be borne by the receiving agency and the seconded employee
shall be on leave without pay in his mother agency for the duration of his secondment.
Clearly, petitioner's contention that, upon his appointment and/or assumption of duties
as NCC Director General, he had effectively resigned from the DFA and that his position
at the DFA had already been extinguished, is untenable. (Seneres v. Sabido, G.R. No.
172902, October 21, 2015)

Appointments – Next-in-Rank Rule

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Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit. Both the
Constitution and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While those
who are next in rank to a vacant position may be given some preference, no one has a
vested right to a government position. Seniority and salary grades should be given their
due weight but should not trump the public interest. (Abad v. De la Cruz, G.R. No.
207422, March 18, 2015)

The Constitution adopts the merit system to ensure that those appointed in the civil
service are competent. This is to “eradicate the system of appointment to public office
based on political considerations and to eliminate . . . the element of partisanship and
personal favoritism in making appointments.” (Abad v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 207422,
March 18, 2015)

Positions in the career service are further grouped into three (3) levels. The first level
includes positions requiring less than four (4) years of collegiate studies. The second
level includes positions with duties requiring at least four (4) years of college work up to
the Division Chief level. The third level includes positions in the Career Executive
Service. Candidates for appointment to first and second level positions are generally
screened by the Personnel Selection Board. In local government units, the Personnel
Selection Board is headed by the local chief executive and is composed of members
appointed by the sanggunian concerned. The Personnel Selection Board of each local
government unit “assist[s] the local chief executive in the judicious and objective
selection of personnel for employment as well as . . . promotion[.]” The appointing
authority in local government units, therefore, is the local chief executive who must
assess the merits of the Personnel Selection Board’s recommendation. If heads of offices
or departments in a local government unit are appointed, majority of the members of the
sanggunian concerned must concur in the appointment. Finally, the appointment must be
submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation within 30 days from the
appointment’s issuance date. (Abad v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)

In promotions, the appointing authority must automatically consider the employees

next in rank as candidates for appointment. (Section 21, paragraphs (2) and (3) of the
Civil Service Law)… The reason behind the next-in-rank rule is to maintain the policy of
merit and rewards in the civil service. Since appointments in the civil service are based
on merit and fitness, it is assumed that the appointments of employees next in rank are
equally meritorious. Appointments that consider rank, salary grades, and seniority
promote progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service. Still, the next-in-rank rule is a
rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does not give employees
next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that position
become vacant. Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority. So
long as the appointee possesses the qualifications required by law, the appointment is
valid. (Abad v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)

To successfully protest the issuance of an appointment, the employee next in rank must
prove his or her status as a qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest shall be
dismissed. Being next in rank is a legal conclusion that would be the result of inference
from evidence properly alleged and proven. The burden of proof rests on the employee

72
alleging that he or she is next in rank. (Abad v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18,
2015)

Consistent with the next-in-rank rule, the appointing authority shall consider for
promotion qualified next-in-rank employees. However, there are instances when the
employees next in rank occupy positions whose salary grades are more than three (3)
grades lower than that corresponding to the vacant position. These instances should not
prevent the appointing authority from filling the vacancy, but whoever is appointed
must undergo a deep selection process and demonstrate his or her superior
qualifications and competence. This is to maintain the standard of merit and fitness for
appointment in the civil service. (Abad v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)

Concerted Activities

DCWD relies on Resolution No. 021316, which states:

Section 6. Permissible Concerted Mass Action. – A concerted ctivity or mass

action done outside of government office hours shall not be deemed a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action within the contemplation of this omnibus rules
provided the same shall not occasion or result in the disruption of work or
service.
xxx.

Notably, however, a prohibited concerted mass action is defined not in Sec. 6 of

Resolution No. 021316 but in Sec. 5 thereof. Thus:

Section 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass Action. - As used in this

Omnibus Rules, the phrase ‘‘prohibited concerted activity or mass action’’ shall
be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their employees organizations, with the
intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective
agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and
acts of similar nature.

The operative phrases are “any collective activity” and “work stoppage or service
disruption.” Without the intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the concerted
activity is not prohibited. The time and place of the activity are not determinative of the
prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it
is without any intent at work stoppage.

We cannot isolate the provision of Section 6 of the Resolution from definition of

prohibited activity in Section 5 thereof. It is erroneous to interpret the provisions in such
a way that an act not within the circumstances as defined under Section 5 can still be
regarded as prohibited if done within government hours. To subscribe to the argument
of DCWD would in effect expand the definition provided by Resolution No. 021316 on
what constitutes a prohibited mass action.

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It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on
CNA incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out
by the respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa “to be there” at the fun
run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that
they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government employees would be
deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. This, then, being the fact,
we have to rule against the findings of both the CSC and Court of Appeals that the
wearing of t-shirts with grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations. (Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G.R. No. 194192,
June 16, 2015)

Appeals

On the submissions that the decisions of a government agency, acting as Disciplining

Authority, are immediately executory upon receipt thereof, we need merely cite Section
37 of the Resolution No. 991936 which clearly provides that:

Section 37. Finality of Decisions. — A decision rendered by heads of agencies

whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or a fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary is imposed, shall be final and
executory. However, if the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty (30)
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary, the same shall be
final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal and no such pleading has been filed.

As distinguished by the law, if the imposed suspension exceeds thirty days or the fine
imposed is in an amount over thirty-day salary, the decision will only attain finality
after the lapse of the reglementary period in the absence of any motion for
reconsideration or appeal. Penalties within the 30-day threshold are immediately
executory penalties. (Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G. R. No. 194192, June 16,
2015)
We note that the Province filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals against the Civil
Service Commission’s Resolution that ordered the execution of the April 14, 2008
Resolution. The Province erred in filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals, as no
appeal may be taken from an order of execution. Instead, it should have filed a petition
for certiorari — the appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
(The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015)

As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service
Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of
Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. And under
Section 43, “decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities
and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or fine
in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper
within a period of fifteen days from receipt thereof.” “Commission Proper” refers to the
Civil Service Commission-Central Office.

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on
petition for review, under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:

74
 Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate
a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly
with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA petition premature and
thus dismissible. (Catipon v. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015)

Though the appeal before the CSC lacked a notice of appeal as required by CSC
Resolution No. 991936 or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), the Consolidated Memorandum filed by the private respondents was
enough to be considered as a sufficient compliance with the rules. The Memorandum
delineates the errors asserted against DCWD and the discussions supporting their
arguments. We find merit in the sufficiency of the Memorandum rather than strict
compliance in view of the constitutional right of every employee to security of tenure. A
more relevant consideration of public interest is accorded whenever the merits of a case
collide with rigid application of the rules. (Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G. R.
No. 194192, June 16, 2015)

Double Compensation

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect

compensation. Petitioner Maritime Industry Authority argues that the rule against
double compensation does not apply because National Compensation Circular No. 59 is
ineffectual due to its non-publication. Respondent Commission on Audit counters that
the disallowed allowances is tantamount to additional compensation proscribed by
Article IX(B), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. This is because these allowances are not
authorized by law. Republic Act No. 6758 deems all allowances and benefits received by
government officials and employees as incorporated in the standardized salary, unless
excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management. The
integration of the benefits and allowances is by legal fiction. The disallowed benefits and
allowances of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority’s officials and employees were not
excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management. Thus,
these were deemed already given to the officials and employees when they received
their basic salaries. Their receipt of the disallowed benefits and allowances was
tantamount to double compensation. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Article IX-C

Enforcement of Elections Laws

While this Court recognizes that the COMELEC should be given sufficient leeway in
exercising its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all election laws, it

75
demands equal recognition that it is the Court's constitutional duty to see to it that all
governmental actions are legally permissible. In so doing, the Court decides not only
with pragmatism in mind, but pragmatism within the fair bounds of law. Such is the
case in examining the COMELEC's apprehensions under the lens of the procurement
law, with heightened considerations of public accountability and transparency put to the
fore. With due deference to the COMELEC, it should be made to understand that this
Court does not stand to thwart the conduct of automated elections; but only steps in to
preserve its sanctity. After all, in a democracy, nothing is more vital than an unimpaired
vote. (Bishop Broderick S. Pabillo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216098, April 21,
2015)

Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather Stations,
Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as “other survey firms of similar
circumstance” to submit to COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys
published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of their “subscribers.”

We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or
pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed
pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation
in the exercise of police power and effects the constitutional policy of “guarantee[ing]
equal access to opportunities for public service[.]” Section 5.2(a)’s requirement of
disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners’ free speech rights nor violates the
constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts. (Social Weather Station v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)

However, it is evident that Resolution No. 9674 was promulgated in violation of the
period set by the Fair Election Act. Petitioners were also not served a copy of Resolution
No. 9674 with which it was asked to comply. They were neither shown nor served
copies of the criminal Complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13-222. Petitioners’ right to
due process was, thus, violated. As with all the other provisions of the Fair Election Act,
Section 5 is a means to guarantee equal access to the deliberative forums essential to win
an elective public office. Any reading of Section 5 and of its individual components, such
as Section 5.2(a), cannot be divorced from this purpose.

The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair Election Act is
a recognition that election surveys are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data.
Publishing surveys are a means to shape the preference of voters, inform the strategy of
campaign machineries, and ultimately, affect the outcome of elections. Election surveys
have a similar nature as election propaganda. They are expensive, normally paid for by
those interested in the outcome of elections, and have tremendous consequences on
election results. (Social Weather Station v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April
7, 2015)

Election surveys have been critiqued for amplifying the notion of an election as a “horse
race” and for reducing elections to the lowest common denominator of percentage
points or a candidate’s erstwhile share in the vote market rather than focusing on issues,
principles, programs, and platforms. Several possible, albeit conflicting, effects of
surveys on voter behavior have been postulated: First, there is the bandwagon effect

76
where “electors rally to support the candidate leading in the polls.” This “assumes that
knowledge of a popular ‘tide’ will likely change voting intentions in [favor] of the
frontrunner, that many electors feel more comfortable supporting a popular choice or
that people accept the perceived collective wisdom of others as being enough reason for
supporting a candidate.” Second, there is the underdog effect where “electors rally to
support the candidate trailing in the polls.” This shift can be motivated by sympathy for
the perceived underdog. Third, there is the motivating effect where “individuals who
had not intended to vote are persuaded to do so,” having been alerted of the fact of an
election’s imminence. Fourth, there is also the demotivating effect where “voters abstain
from voting out of certainty that their candidate or party will win[.]”Fifth, there are
reports of a behavior known as strategic voting where “voting is influenced by the
chances of winning[.]” Lastly, there is also the theory of a free-will effect where “voters
cast their ballots to prove the polls wrong[.]” (Social Weather Station v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)

However, “conformity pressures can suppress minority opinion.” The bandwagon effect
conjures images of an impregnable majority, thereby tending to push farther toward the
peripheries those who are already marginalized. Worse, the bandwagon effect foments
the illusion of a homogenous monolith denying the very existence of those in the
minority. This undermines the “normative conceptions of democracy” substituting the
democratic dialogue with acquiescence to perceived or projected orthodoxy. Surveys, far
from being a passive “snapshot of many viewpoints held by a segment of the population
at a given time,” can warp existing public opinion and can mould public opinion. They
are constitutive. Published election surveys offer valuable insight into public opinion not
just because they represent it but more so because they also tend to make it.
Appreciating this tendency to both entrench and marginalize is of acute relevance in the
context of Philippine political reality. This is the same reality that our policymakers,
primarily the framers of the Constitution, have seen fit to address. (Social Weather Station
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)

While it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners’ publication of election surveys), it

does not go so far as to suppress desired expression. There is neither prohibition nor
censorship specifically aimed at election surveys. The freedom to publish election
surveys remains. All Resolution No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards the
manner of publication, that is, that the disclosure of those who commissioned and/or
paid for, including those subscribed to, published election surveys must be made. (Social
Weather Station v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)

The petitioner explained that the prohibition stated in the aforementioned provisions impedes the
right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals. The petitioner then
requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow
private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their
vehicles and transport terminals.

The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 is not within the COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated power of
supervision or regulation… the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the COMELEC over franchises and permits to operate, though seemingly

77
unrestrained, has its limits. Notwithstanding the ostensibly broad supervisory and
regulatory powers granted to the COMELEC during an election period under Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Court had previously set out the limitations thereon.
In Adiong, the Court, while recognizing that the COMELEC has supervisory power vis-à-
vis the conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, nevertheless held that such supervisory power does not extend to the very
freedom of an individual to express his preference of candidates in an election by
placing election campaign stickers on his vehicle. In National Press Club v. COMELEC,
while the Court upheld the constitutionality of a prohibition on the selling or giving free
of charge, except to the COMELEC, of advertising space and commercial time during an
election period, it was emphasized that the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers
to the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is limited to ensuring
equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply among candidates…

In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory
and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section
4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory
powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for the operation,”
inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally
delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of
PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.
There is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to operate transportation
for the use of the public and the ownership per se of the vehicles used for public
transport. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April
14, 2015)

The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of election
campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the
operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate
in an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as such. Regulating
the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of an election campaign
material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a
regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

The dichotomy between the regulation of the franchise or permit to operate of a PUV
and that of the very ownership thereof is better exemplified in the case of commercial
advertisements posted on the vehicle. A prohibition on the posting of commercial
advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation on the ownership of the vehicle per
se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not have any
relation to its operation as a PUV. On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of
commercial advertisements on windows of buses, because it hinders police authorities
from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the franchise or
permit to operate. It has a direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a PUV, i.e., the
safety of the passengers. In the same manner, the COMELEC does not have the
constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by private persons.
The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public
commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals

78
may be required by local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit
only pertains to circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal as such.
The regulation of such permit to operate should similarly be limited to circumstances
affecting the operation of the transport terminal. A regulation of public transport
terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting of election
campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport
terminal and not merely the permit to operate the same. Accordingly, Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated power of
the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for
public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but
also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate
the PUV or transport terminal. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

In the same manner, the COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate
public transport terminals owned by private persons. The ownership of transport
terminals, even if made available for use by the public commuters, likewise remains
private. Although owners of public transport terminals may be required by local
governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to
circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal as such. The regulation of
such permit to operate should similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the
operation of the transport terminal. A regulation of public transport terminals based on
extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting of election campaign
materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport terminal and
not merely the permit to operate the same. Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation
utilities. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April
14, 2015)

Indeed, as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881, the term whatever should be not be read
strictly in conjunction with only either the term transfer or the term detail; nor should the
phrase transfer or detail whatever be read in isolation from the purpose of the legal
prohibition. Rather, consistent with our rules in reading provisions of law, the term –
whatever – as well as the phrase – transfer or detail whatever– should be understood within
the broader context of the purpose of BP 881. They should likewise be understood
within the context of all other laws that the COMELEC is required to administer and
enforce. This is the proper approach that anyone, including this Court, should take
when reading Section 261(h), as well as all other provisions of BP 881 and other election
laws. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)

From this perspective, we reiterate our observation in Regalado that any personnel
action, when caused or made during the election period, can be used for electioneering
or to harass subordinates with different political persuasions. This possibility – of being
used for electioneering purposes or to harass subordinates – created by any movement
of personnel during the election period is precisely what the transfer ban seeks to
prevent. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)

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Thus, it is immaterial whether or not the personnel action has in fact been actually used
for electioneering purposes or whether there has been any allegation in the complaint to
this effect. The mere existence of such plausibility for electioneering is the reason that
animated the legal prohibition against any personnel action, including transfers and re-
assignments, during the election period. To our mind, the interpretation that includes
any form of personnel action, such as reassignment, within the coverage of the phrase
precisely guards against any such electioneering and political harassment situations.
This interpretation also more vigorously enforces the aim not only of BP 881, but more
importantly of the Constitution to secure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. Thus, to reiterate and emphasize – the election law’s prohibition on transfer or
detail covers any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in
the same office or agency when made or caused during the election period… In sum, we
find the COMELEC’s exercise of its discretion – in ruling that reassignments fall within
the coverage of the prohibited transfers or details– to be well within its jurisdiction. To
reiterate in clear terms, the prohibition on transfer or detail whatever during the election
period under Section 261(h) of BP 881 covers any personnel action including
reassignments. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)

Under Section 261(h) of BP 881, a person commits the election offense of violation of the
election transfer ban when he makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any
official or employee of the government during the election period absent prior approval
of the COMELEC. By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the
offense and its exceptions. The elements are: (1) the making or causing of a government
official or employee’s transfer or detail whatever; (2) the making or causing of the
transfer or detail whatever was made during the election period; and (3) these acts were
made without the required prior COMELEC approval. As this provision operates, the
making or causing of the movement of personnel during the election period but without
the required COMELEC approval is covered by the prohibition and renders the
responsible person liable for the offense. Conversely, the making or causing (of the
movement of personnel) before or after the election period even without the required
COMELEC approval, or during the election period but with the required COMELEC
approval are not covered by the prohibition and do not render the responsible person
liable for this election offense. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211789-90,
March 17, 2015)

A critical point to consider in determining whether or not Aquino may be held liable
under this provision is the interpretation of the phrase made or caused and the extent to
which the prohibition (on transfer or detail whatever) applies to his case. Factually, it is
likewise imperative to consider the date when Aquino made or caused the reassignment
of the affected PHIC officers and employees…Retention of duties and temporary
discharge of additional duties do not contemplate or involve any movement of
personnel, whether under any of the various forms of personnel action enumerated
under the laws governing the civil service or otherwise. Hence, these subsequent orders
could not be covered by the legal prohibition on transfers or detail. Based on these clear
facts, Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment of the affected
PHIC officers and employees before the start of the election period. In this sense, the
evils sought to be addressed by Section 261 (h) of BP 881 is (sic) kept intact by the timely

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exercise of his management prerogative in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel
within its various offices necessary for the PHIC's efficient and smooth operation. As
Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell outside the coverage of the transfer prohibition, he
cannot be held liable for violation of Section 261(h). (Aquino v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)

As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was proclaimed winner of
the mayoralty race on May 14, 2013, not on May 15, 2013 as what erroneously appears
on the printed COCP… Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the 10-day
period ought to be reckoned from the date of proclamation and not from the date of
notice… knowledge of Garcia’s May 14, 2013 proclamation is attributable to Payumo
since he was represented by one Fernando Manalili (Manalili) during the canvassing
proceeding, as per (sic) the minutes prepared by the MBOC… The Court maintains the
general rule that the reglementary period for instituting an election period should be
reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from the date of notice. Absent any
circumstances analogous to the factual milieu of Federico, a relaxation of the rules will
not be warranted. (Note: In Federico v. COMELEC, “(1) there were actually two different
proclamations made by the MBOC, and (2) that the second proclamation was surreptitiously
made.) (Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015)

Registration of Voters

On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367 xxx.
Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voter sin order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and
updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a mere
procedural requirement which does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage."
This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC (AKBAYAN-Youth) (407 Phil. 618
(2001)), wherein the Court pronounced that the process of registration is a procedural
limitation on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the right of a citizen to vote
nevertheless remains conditioned upon it:

Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all
other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus,
as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:

xxx

As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily

conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among
others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to
exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration
Act of 1996.

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RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration" as "the act
of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter
before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including
the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the [ERB]." As stated in
Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to systematize the present method of
registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of
voters."

To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology, RA 10367, or the

assailed Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February 2013. xxx. “Biometrics refers to
a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual such as
voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features.”
(Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015)

Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the process of taking the
biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured."

The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation," which "refers to the removal of the

registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of
voters for failure to comply with the validation process as required by [RA 10367]."
Section 7 states:

Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the
last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act.

Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally

applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the law creates artificial class of
voters is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an "obedient group." If
anything, non-compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully results into prescribed
consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the
laws, which only works "against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality." (Kabataan Party-List v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015)

With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed
under RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which
the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the
limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's
Registration Act of 1996. Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this Court's
pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it was held that:

[T]he act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of

suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to
petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated
to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the

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 significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the
State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then
enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to
the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent and so far
removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the
Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of
any rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the
public good - the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
(Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015)

At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates that voter registration does not begin
and end with the filing of applications which, in reality, is just the initial phase that must
be followed by the approval of applications by the ERB. Thereafter, the process of filing
petitions for inclusion and exclusion follows. These steps are necessary for the
generation of the final list of voters which, in turn, is a pre-requisite for the preparation
and completion of the Project of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual elections. The
POP contains the number of registered voters in each precinct and clustered precinct, the
names of the barangays, municipalities, cities, provinces, legislative districts, and
regions included in the precincts, and the names and locations of polling centers where
each precinct and clustered precinct are assigned. The POP is necessary to determine the
total number of boards of election inspectors to be constituted, the allocation of forms
and supplies to be procured for the election day, the number of vote counting machines
and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget needed. More importantly, the
POP will be used as the basis for the finalization of the Election Management System
(EMS) which generates the templates of the official ballots and determines the voting
jurisdiction of legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and provinces. The EMS
determines the configuration of the canvassing and consolidation system for each voting
jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the constitutional body specifically charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, the COMELEC should be given
sufficient leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming elections. In fine, its
measures therefor should be respected, unless it is clearly shown that the same are
devoid of any reasonable justification. (Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015)

Party-Lists

In an action against prematurely allocating additional seats to certain party-list groups

proclaimed as initial winners in the 2013 automated elections, the Court ruled - An
incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation,
except where the election returns missing or not counted will not affect the results of the

83
election. It is clear from the foregoing that party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the
party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats depending
on their ranking in the second round. (Aksyon Magsasaka–Tinig ng Masa v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 207134, June 16, 2015)

Petition against the COMELEC for prematurely and erroneously allocating additional seats to
certain party-list groups proclaimed as initial winners in the 2013 automated elections.

An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent

proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the
board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none. However, this is true only
where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election…
In this case, COMELEC based its ruling on its national canvass reports for party-list. As
of May 28, 2013, AKMA-PTM garnered 164,980 votes and ABANTE KA had 111,429
votes. In Party-List Canvass Report No. 11 as of July 18, 2013, AKMA-PTM’s total votes
slightly increased to 165,784 votes while ABANTE KA had a total of 111,625 votes. There
was no significant change in the rankings as per the latest canvass and therefore
COMELEC had sufficient basis for proclaiming the initial winners on May 28, 2013 and
reserving only five buffer seats… party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-
list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats depending on
their ranking in the second round…BANAT declared unconstitutional the continued
operation of the two-percent threshold, as it was deemed “an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the ‘broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.’” Apparently, petitioner mistakenly assumed that the
statement in BANAT disallowing fractional seats insofar as the additional seats for the
two-percenters in the second round should also apply to those party-list groups with
less than 2% votes. But as demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share in representation may
never be filled up if the 2% threshold is maintained. In the same vein, the maximum
representation will not be achieved if those party-list groups obtaining less than one
percentage are disqualified from even one additional seat in the second round. (Aksyon
Magsasaka Partido Tinig ng Masa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207134, June 16,
2015)

Rules

Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto,
Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2)
of RA No. 9225. He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes
despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter
future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while
working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada…

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Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof
was not personally served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him
by registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as a
mode of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that private respondent violated Section 4,
paragraphs (1) and (4), Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright…

While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements, the
settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules
as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure…

Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he
represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public
office, therefore imbued with public interest, which justified the COMELEC's suspension
of its own rules. (Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22,
2015)

Certificates of Candidacy

Still, "automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process." Respondent
should also balance its duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly,
and peaceful" with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run
for public office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate. (Timbol v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)

The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's right of

suffrage should not be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny
due course to or cancel an alleged nuisance candidate’s certificate of candidacy without
providing the candidate his opportunity to be heard. (Timbol v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)

We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for
the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate
- the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. We
concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to
qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any
other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the
Local Government Code. Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the
misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. We, therefore, find no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for
material misrepresentation. (Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835,
September 22, 2015)

85
En Banc

Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the COMELEC, like the other
constitutional commissions, to decide all cases or matters before it by a “majority vote of
all its [m]embers.” When such majority vote cannot be mustered by the COMELEC en
banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules provides the mechanism to avert a non-
decision. Thus:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.– When the Commission en banc

is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case
shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in
appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in
all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

Verily, under the cited provision, the COMELEC en banc is first required to rehear the
case or matter that it cannot decide or resolve by the necessary majority. When a
majority still cannot be had after the rehearing, however, there results a failure to decide
on the part of the COMELEC en banc. The provision then specifies the effects of the
COMELEC en banc’s failure to decide:

1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the COMELEC, such

action or proceeding shall be dismissed;

2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed;
or

3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Legaspi v.

Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 216572, September 1, 2015)

The COMELEC en banc did not err when it dismissed the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-
323 (DC) when it was unable to reach a majority vote after the rehearing. Contrary to
what petitioner asserts, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is most definitely an action that was filed
originally before the COMELEC within the contemplation of the said provision. While
SPA No. 13-323 (DC) reached the COMELEC en banc only through a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Special First Division, its character as an original
case filed before the commission remains the same. Hence, the failure of COMELEC en
banc to decide in this case properly results in the application of the first effect of Section
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. (Legaspi v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 216572,
September 1, 2015)

Verily, when an election case originally filed with the COMELEC is first decided by a
division, the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration from that decision before
the en banc does not signify the initiation of a new action or case, but rather a mere
continuation of an existing process. The motion for reconsideration—not being an
appeal from the decision of the division to the en banc — only thus serves as a means of
having the election case decided by the COMELEC en banc. Under this view, therefore,
the nature of the election case as it was before the division remains the same even after it
is forwarded to the en banc through a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the failure of

86
the COMELEC en banc to decide a motion for reconsideration from the decision of a
division in an original election case would unquestionably bring to the fore the
application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. (Legaspi v.
Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 216572, September 1, 2015)

Part V of the COMELEC Rules, which is aptly titled “Particular Actions or Proceedings,”
is one of the nine major parts of the COMELEC Rules. It is composed of Rules 20 to 34 of
the COMELEC Rules, wherein each rule covers a specific “action or proceeding” that the
COMELEC can take cognizance of, thus:

COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE – PART V

PARTICULAR ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS

A. ORDINARY ACTIONS

 Rule 20 – Election Protests

 Rule 21 – Quo Warranto
 Rule 22 – Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases

B. SPECIAL ACTIONS

 Rule 23 – Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

Rule 24 – Proceedings Against Nuisance Candidates
Rule 25 – Disqualification of Candidates
Rule 26 – Postponement of Suspension of Elections

C. SPECIAL CASES

 Rule 27 – Pre-proclamation Controversies

D. SPECIAL RELIEFS

Rule 28 – Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Rule 29 – Contempt

E. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

Rule 30 – Injunction

F. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Rule 31 – Annulment of Permanent List of Voters

Rule 32 – Registration of Political Parties or Organization
Rule 33 – Accreditation of Citizens’ Arms of the Commission

G. ELECTION OFFENSES

Rule 34 – Prosecution of Election Offenses

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Evidently, what Part V actually discloses are the particular cases or matters that may be
considered as “actions or proceedings” for purposes of the COMELEC Rules. Notably,
all the actions or proceedings identified thereunder, save for the provisional remedy of
injunction, are all main cases cognizable by the COMELEC. Notable too is that a motion
for reconsideration from a decision of a division – which is but a part of a main case – is
not among those included in Part V. (Legaspi v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 216572,
September 1, 2015)

Appeals

Consequently, Rule 64, which complemented the procedural requirement under Article
IX-A, Section 7, should likewise be read in the same sense - that of excluding from its
coverage decisions, rulings, and orders rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its
administrative functions. In such instances, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the proper
remedy. As held in Macabago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 152163, November 18, 2002, 392
SCRA 178):

[A] judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC may be brought by

the aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65, as amended, except
as therein provided. We ruled in Elpidio M. Salva, et al. vs. Hon. Roberto L.
Makalintal, et al. (340 SCRA 506 (2000)) that Rule 64 of the Rules applies only to
judgments or final orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. The rule does not apply to interlocutory orders of the COMELEC in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions or to its administrative orders. In this
case, the assailed order of the COMELEC declaring private respondents petition
to be one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of a failure of
elections in the municipality and ordering the production of the original copies
of the VRRs for the technical examination is administrative in nature. Rule 64, a
procedural device for the review of final orders, resolutions or decisions of the
COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under Rule 65 from
administrative orders of said Commission issued in the exercise of its
administrative function.

As applied herein, recall that the instant petition revolves around the issue on whether
or not Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate in the bidding process for the COMELEC's
procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers. The case does not stem from an
election controversy involving the election, qualification, or the returns of an elective
office. Rather, it pertains to the propriety of the polling commission's conduct of the
procurement process, and its initial finding that Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate
therein. It springs from the COMELEC's compliance with the Constitutional directive to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
Specifically, it arose from the electoral commission's exercise of Sec. 12 of RA 8436,
otherwise known as the Automated Elections Law, as amended by RA 9369, which
authorized the COMELEC "to procure, in accordance with existing laws, by purchase,
lease, rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies, equipment, materials, software,
facilities, and other services, from local or foreign sources free from taxes and import
duties, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulation." The subject matter of
Smartmatic JV's protest, therefore, does not qualify as one necessitating the COMELEC's
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that could properly be the subject of
a Rule 64 petition, but is, in fact, administrative in nature. Petitioners should then have

88
sought redress via a petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under
Rule 65 to assail the COMELEC en banc's June 29, 2015 Decision granting the protest. As
a caveat, however, the writ will only lie upon showing that the COMELEC acted
capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the Decision, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Mere abuse of discretion will not suffice. (Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
218787, December 8, 2015)

Thus, under Sec. 58, the proper remedy to question the ruling of the head of the
procuring entity is through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The term "procuring entity" is defined under the RA 9184 as "any branch,
department, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including state
universities and colleges, government-owned and/or -controlled corporations,
government financial institutions, and local government units procuring Goods,
Consulting Services and Infrastructure Projects." This statutory definition makes no
distinction as to whether or not the procuring entity is a constitutional commission
under Article IX of the Constitution. It is broad enough to include the COMELEC within
the contemplation of the term. Hence, under the law, grievances relating to the
COMELEC rulings in protests over the conduct of its project procurement should then
be addressed to the RTC. (Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 218787,
December 8, 2015)

Election Period

As a general rule, the period of election starts at ninety (90) days before and ends thirty
(30) days after the election date pursuant to Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution
and Section 3 of BP 881. This rule, however, is not without exception. Under these same
provisions, the COMELEC is not precluded from setting a period different from that
provided thereunder. In this case, the COMELEC fixed the election period for the May
10, 2010 Elections at 120 days before and 30 days after the day of the election. We find
this period proper as we find no arbitrariness in the COMELEC’s act of fixing an election
period longer than the period fixed in the Constitution and BP 881. For one, the
COMELEC fixed the longer period of 120-days-before-and-30-days-after pursuant to
Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881. Also, Resolution No.
8737, through which the COMELEC fixed this alternate period of election, is valid as it
was issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s valid exercise of its rule-making power (under
Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution and Section 52[c] of BP 881). Too, Resolution
No. 8737 is valid as it complied with the publication requirement. Note that per the
record, Resolution No. 8737 was published twice – on December 31, 2009 in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and on January 4, 2010 in the Daily Tribune. (Aquino v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)

From this perspective, we reiterate our observation in Regalado that any personnel
action, when caused or made during the election period, can be used for electioneering
or to harass subordinates with different political persuasions. This possibility – of being

89
used for electioneering purposes or to harass subordinates – created by any movement
of personnel during the election period is precisely what the transfer ban seeks to
prevent. (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211789-90, March 17, 2015)

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Article IX-D

Jurisdiction

Nonetheless, expenditures of government funds by the Constitutional and Fiscal

Autonomy Group are still audited by the Commission on Audit on a post-audit basis.
(Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)

… we uphold the disallowance by the COA of the payment of the P5,000.00 as

healthcare maintenance allowance. The COA did not act without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
because it properly exercised its powers and discretion in disallowing the payment of
the P5,000.00 as healthcare maintenance allowance.

The COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose
for which they had been intended by law. The Constitution has made the COA "the
guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property,
including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations." Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete
discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and
audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond
what is sanctioned by law. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. The
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)

Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1597 (Further Rationalizing the System of

Compensation and Position Classification in the National Government) states that the
authority to approve the grant of allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits to
government employees, regardless of whether such endowment is payable by their
respective offices or by other agencies of the Government, is vested in the President. As
such, the precipitous release and payment of the healthcare maintenance allowance
benefits without any authorization from the Office of the President is without basis and
should be rightfully disallowed. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v.
The Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)

The increase in the salary of the petitioner was correctly disallowed because it
contravened the provisions of the SSL. In Mendoza (Mendoza v. COA, G.R. No. 195395,
September 10, 2013, 705 SCRA 306), the Court ruled that the salaries of GMs of LWDs
were subject to the provision of the SSL… Petitioner claims that R.A. No. 9286, being a
later law, repealed the SSL. The Court, however, notes that R.A. No. 9286 did not

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expressly repeal the SSL. Neither did R.A. No. 9286 impliedly repeal the SSL because
repeal by implication is not favored by law and is only resorted to in case of
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the new law and the old law. As
clearly pointed out in Mendoza, there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between R.A. No.
9286 and the SSL. It is conceded though that the board of directors has full discretion in
fixing the salary of the GM, but it is always subject to the limits under the SSL, unless the
charter of the LWD exempts it from the coverage of the said law. (Almadovar v.
Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan, Commission on Audit, G.R. 213330, November 16,
2015)

COA Circular No. 95-011, dated December 4, 1995, provides that in the event that the
need for the legal services of a private lawyer cannot be avoided or is justified under
extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, the written conformity and acquiescence of
the OGCC and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured. The failure to
secure the written concurrence makes the engagement of the private lawyer or law firm
unauthorized. (Almadovar v. Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan, Commission on Audit,
G.R. 213330, November 16, 2015)

Personal Liability and Refunds

Generally, the public officer’s good faith does not excuse his or her personal liability
over the unauthorized disbursement. This court said:

Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares that expenditures of government funds or uses
of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. The
public official’s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government
funds was made in violation of law. In this case, petitioner’s act of entering into a
contract on behalf of the local government unit without the requisite authority
therefor was in violation of the Local Government Code. While petitioner may
have relied on the opinion of the City Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to
buttress his good faith. It does not, however, exculpate him from his personal
liability under P.D. 1445.

However, with regard to the disallowance of salaries, emoluments, benefits, and

allowances of government employees, prevailing jurisprudence provides that recipients
or payees need not refund these disallowed amounts when they received these in good
faith. Government officials and employees who received benefits or allowances, which
were disallowed, may keep the amounts received if there is no finding of bad faith and
the disbursement was made in good faith. On the other hand, officers who participated
in the approval of the disallowed allowances or benefits are required to refund only the
amounts received when they are found to be in bad faith or grossly negligent amounting
to bad faith. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812,
January 13, 2015)

When a government entity engages the legal services of private counsel, it must do so
with the necessary authorization required by law; otherwise, its officials bind
themselves to be personally liable for compensating private counsel’s services. (The Law
Firm of Laguesma, etc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2015)

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The Court agrees with the COA decision in holding that the recipients of the healthcare
maintenance allowance benefits who received the allowance of P5,000.00 in good faith
need not refund the sum received. The recipients accepted the benefits honestly
believing that they were receiving what they were entitled to under the law. Similarly,
the Court holds that the TESDA officials who granted the allowance to the covered
personnel acted in good faith in the honest belief that there was lawful basis for such
grant. In view of these considerations, the Court declares that the disallowed benefits
approved and received in good faith need not be reimbursed to the Government. This
finds support in the consistent pronouncements of the Court, such as that issued in De
Jesus v. Commission on Audit, to wit:

Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala supports petitioners’

position on the refund of the benefits they received. In Blaquera, the officials and
employees of several government departments and agencies were paid incentive
benefits which the COA disallowed on the ground that Administrative Order
No. 29 dated 19 January 1993 prohibited payment of these benefits. While the
Court sustained the COA on the disallowance, it nevertheless declared that:

Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good

faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive
benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have
already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected
under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and
chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in
the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the
recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the
additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that
LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time
petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not
yet decided Baybay Water District, Petitioners had no knowledge that such
payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not
refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA.
(Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. The Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)

Petitioner DPI’s invocation of the equitable principle of quantum meruit must also fail.
The principle of quantum meruit allows a party to recover “as much as he reasonably
deserves.” However, as aptly explained by the respondent COA, the principle of
quantum meruit presupposes that an actual delivery of the goods has been made. In this
case, petitioner DPI failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the actual
delivery of the subject textbooks. Thus, the principle of quantum meruit invoked by
petitioner DPI cannot be applied. (Daraga Press, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
201042, June 16, 2015)

As a general rule, public officials who are directly responsible for the any illegal
expenditure of public funds are personally liable therefor… (T)he superior officer
directing, or the department head participating in the illegal or improper use or

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application or deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly and severally
liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for
the sum or property so illegally or improperly used, applied or deposited… (T)he
treasurer of the local government unit shall exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in supervising the accountable officers under him; otherwise, he shall be jointly
and solidarily liable with them for the loss of government funds or property under their
control… Clearly, therefore, public officials who are directly responsible for, or
participated in making the illegal expenditures, as well as those who actually received
the amounts therefrom – in this case, the disallowed CNA Incentives – shall be solidarily
liable for their reimbursement… By way of exception, however, passive recipients or
payees of disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits, and other allowances need not
refund such disallowed amounts if they received the same in good faith. Stated
otherwise, government officials and employees who unwittingly received disallowed
benefits or allowances are not liable for their reimbursement if there is no finding of bad
faith. (Silang v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213189, September 8, 2015)

In fine, Silang, the City Mayor, as well as the local Sanggunian members, as the
approving authority, together with the UNGKAT officers and members of the Board of
Directors who actively participated in the negotiations for the approval of the
disallowed incentives despite knowledge of UNGKAT’s non-accreditation at the time,
are solidarily liable to refund the disallowed benefits in this case, without prejudice to
any further finding of administrative liability as a consequence of their actions. This
pronouncement is also without prejudice to any finding pertaining to any other public
official or person who may be held liable for the return of such illegal disbursement but
were not impleaded in this case. (Silang v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213189,
September 8, 2015)

In Mendoza, the Court excused the erring officials therein from refunding the amounts
subject of the ND, to wit:

The salaries petitioner Mendoza received were fixed by the Talisay

Water District's board of directors pursuant to Section 23 of the
Presidential Decree No. 198. Petitioner Mendoza had no hand in fixing
the amount of compensation he received. Moreover, at the time
petitioner Mendoza received the disputed amount in 2005 and 2006,
there was no jurisprudence yet ruling that water utilities are not
exempted from the Salary Standardization Law.

Pursuant to de Jesus v. Commission on Audit, petitioner Mendoza received

the disallowed salaries in good faith. He need not refund the disallowed
amount.

In this case, the Court is of the view that the payment of the erroneous increase in
petitioner's salary was nonetheless made in good faith. The increase was computed in
accordance with the scale provided by the Office of the Philippine Association of Water
Districts, Inc., which also made an erroneous opinion that R.A. No. 9286 repealed the
SSL.

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Further, at the time the disbursement was made, no categorical pronouncement, similar
to Mendoza, that the LWDs are subject to the provisions of the SSL, had been issued.

Good faith, however, cannot be appreciated in petitioner's other disbursements.

Petitioner knowingly approved the payments to Atty. Esguerra and Atty. Operaria in
spite of the lack of the necessary approval by the government offices concerned. Further,
petitioner's failure to claim her excessive RATA after the NDs were issued does not
evince good faith because, at that time, CBC No. 18 and NBC No. 498 already provided
for the allowable RATA to be given to GMs of LWDs. (Almadovar v. Chairperson Ma.
Gracia M. Pulido-Tan, Commission on Audit, G.R. 213330, November 16, 2015)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Article X

Concept

LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy of
ensuring the autonomy of local governments was never intended by the drafters of the
1987 Constitution to create an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political
subdivision independent of a single sovereign state. “[M]unicipal corporations are
bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units of local self-government, but
as governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by establishing a municipal
corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its
right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any
power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was
granted.” LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature; they are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinate legislation.“ Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law
for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police
power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation…” (Ferrer v. Bautista,
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)

Local Autonomy

Apart from administrative autonomy, an equally vital facet of local governance under
the 1987 Constitution is fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v. Aguirre:

Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative

autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own
sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes
released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of
their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints
thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not.
Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of
proposals from both local and national officials, who in any case are partners in

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 the attainment of national goals. (Demaala v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
199752, February 17, 2015)

Local Taxation

Setting the rate of the additional levy for the special education fund at less than 1% is
within the taxing power of local government units. It is consistent with the guiding
constitutional principle of local autonomy. (Demaala v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
199752, February 17, 2015)

The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is inherent in the state. Provinces,

cities, municipalities, and barangays are mere territorial and political subdivisions of the
state. They act only as part of the sovereign. Thus, they do not have the inherent power
to tax. Their power to tax must be prescribed by law.

Consistent with the view that the power to tax does not inhere in local government
units, this court has held that a reserved temperament must be adhered to in construing
the extent of a local government unit’s power to tax. (Demaala v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 199752, February 17, 2015)

Of course, fiscal autonomy entails "working within the constraints." To echo the
language of Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, this is to say that the taxing
power of local government units is "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide." (Demaala v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 199752, February 17,
2015)

It is the 1% as a constraint on which the respondent Commission on Audit is insisting.

There are, in this case, three (3) considerations that illumine our task of interpretation:
(1) the text of Section 235, which, to reiterate, is cast in permissive language; (2) the
seminal purpose of fiscal autonomy; and (3) the jurisprudentially established preference
for weighing the scales in favor of autonomy of local government units. We find it to be
in keeping with harmonizing these considerations to conclude that Section 235’s
specified rate of 1% is a maximum rate rather than an immutable edict. Accordingly, it
was well within the power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan to enact an
ordinance providing for additional levy on real property tax for the special education
fund at the rate of 0.5% rather than at 1%. (Demaala v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
199752, February 17, 2015)

Accordingly, under the present Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a
prohibition by statute, the tax power of municipal corporations must be deemed to exist
although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines.

The basic rationale for the current rule on local fiscal autonomy is the strengthening of
LGUs and the safeguarding of their viability and self-sufficiency through a direct grant
of general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the
delegation to be absolute and unconditional. The legislature must still see to it that (a)
the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable
impositions; (b) each LGU will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources

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of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be
fair, uniform, and just… Taking the resulting scheme into consideration, it is apparent
that what Congress did in this instance was not to exclude the authority to levy
amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not
altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from the taxpayers in favor
of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing authority. This, to Our mind, is in
clear contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by LGUs shall
accrue exclusively to said LGU and is repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion
their resources in line with their priorities. (Film Development Council of the Philippines v.
Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, June 16, 2015)

In Pimentel v. Aguirre, fiscal autonomy was defined as “the power [of LGUs] to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes
released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and
local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof.” With the adoption of
the 1973 Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, municipal corporations were
granted fiscal autonomy via a general delegation of the power to tax. Section 5, Article
XI of the 1973 Constitution gave LGUs the “power to create its own sources of revenue
and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” This authority
was further strengthened in the 1987 Constitution, through the inclusion in Section 5,
Article X thereof of the condition that “[s]uch taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to local governments.” (Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon
Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, June 16, 2015)

In other words, per RA 9167, covered LGUs still have the power to levy amusement
taxes, albeit at the end of the day, they will derive no revenue therefrom. The same,
however, cannot be said for FDCP and the producers of graded films since the amounts
thus levied by the LGUs––which should rightfully accrue to them, they being the taxing
authority––will be going to their coffers. As a matter of fact, it is only through the
exercise by the LGU of said power that the funds to be used for the amusement tax
reward can be raised. Without said imposition, the producers of graded films will
receive nothing from the owners, proprietors and lessees of cinemas operating within
the territory of the covered LGU.

Taking the resulting scheme into consideration, it is apparent that what Congress did in
this instance was not to exclude the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing
power of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the income to be
received by the LGU from the taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead
of the taxing authority. This, to Our mind, is in clear contravention of the constitutional
command that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said LGU and is
repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.
(Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. No.
203754, June 16, 2015)

… the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for LGUs because
although the mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and long
established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the same is not all encompassing as it is

96
subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
viz.:

SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local governments.

…the LGUs’ power to tax is subject to the limitations set forth under Section 133 of the
LGC… (Batangas City v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Philippines, G.R. No. 187631, July 8, 2015)

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article XI

Liability

As a general rule, public officials who are directly responsible for the any illegal
expenditure of public funds are personally liable therefor… (T)he superior officer
directing, or the department head participating in the illegal or improper use or
application or deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly and severally
liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for
the sum or property so illegally or improperly used, applied or deposited… (T)he
treasurer of the local government unit shall exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in supervising the accountable officers under him; otherwise, he shall be jointly
and solidarily liable with them for the loss of government funds or property under their
control… Clearly, therefore, public officials who are directly responsible for, or
participated in making the illegal expenditures, as well as those who actually received
the amounts therefrom – in this case, the disallowed CNA Incentives – shall be solidarily
liable for their reimbursement… By way of exception, however, passive recipients or
payees of disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits, and other allowances need not
refund such disallowed amounts if they received the same in good faith. Stated
otherwise, government officials and employees who unwittingly received disallowed
benefits or allowances are not liable for their reimbursement if there is no finding of bad
faith. (Silang v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213189, September 8, 2015)

In fine, Silang, the City Mayor, as well as the local Sanggunian members, as the
approving authority, together with the UNGKAT officers and members of the Board of
Directors who actively participated in the negotiations for the approval of the
disallowed incentives despite knowledge of UNGKAT’s non-accreditation at the time,
are solidarily liable to refund the disallowed benefits in this case, without prejudice to
any further finding of administrative liability as a consequence of their actions. This
pronouncement is also without prejudice to any finding pertaining to any other public
official or person who may be held liable for the return of such illegal disbursement but
were not impleaded in this case. (Silang v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213189,
September 8, 2015)

In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint
must be filed during the incumbency of the erring official. The Court, however, is not

97
without remedy against any official or employee of the judiciary who committed
violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the
threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to
civil, criminal and administrative liability.

In the present case, since Judge Lampasa is no longer with the judiciary, the Court
agrees with the OCA that only the imposition of fine is appropriate. As to the amount of
imposable fine, we take into account the extant of the delay and the volumes of motions
and cases, ninety-four (94) criminal cases and ten (10) civil cases which she failed to
resolve. In these lights, a fine of P20,000 is in order. (Office of the Court Administrator v.
Retired Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1760, November 16, 2015)

We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or

be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
The respondent in the present case summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter,
i.e., to aid her brother and sister-in-law. There was no link between the respondent’s acts
and her official functions as a city prosecutor… The respondent’s actions, to my mind,
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, an administrative
offense which need not be related to the respondent’s official functions… we hold that
the Ombudsman correctly ruled that the respondent’s acts of seeking the assistance of
the SWAT and in riding on board a SWAT vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and not misconduct, since there is no nexus between these
acts and her official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image
and integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the
erring public officer or employee. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Castro, G.R. No. 172637,
April 22, 2015)

The Sandiganbayan

.. it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over cases which do
not involve a sequestration-related incident but an intra-corporate controversy… In the
case at bar, the complaint concerns PHILCOMSAT’s demand to exercise its right of
inspection as stockholder of PHC but which petitioners refused on the ground of the
ongoing power struggle within POTC and PHILCOMSAT that supposedly prevents
PHC from recognizing PHILCOMSAT’s representative (Africa) as possessing such right
or authority from the legitimate directors and officers. Clearly, the controversy is intra-
corporate in nature as they (sic) arose out of intra-corporate relations between and
among stockholders, and between stockholders and the corporation. (Abad v. Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation, G.R. No. 200620, March 18, 2015)

The controversy in the present case stems from the act of Chairman Sabio in requesting
the PSE to suspend the listing of PHC’s increase in capital stock because of still
unresolved issues on the election of the POTC’s and PHILCOMSAT’s respective boards
of directors. The act of Chairman Sabio in asking the SEC to suspend the listing of PHC’s
shares was done in pursuit of protecting the interest of the Republic of the Philippines, a
legitimate stockholder in PHC’s controlling parent company, POTC. The character of the
shares held by the PCGG/Republic, on whose behalf the PCGG Chairman is presumed
to be acting, is irrelevant to Chairman Sabio’s actions. Any shareholder, harboring any

98
apprehensions or concerns, could have done the same or posed the same objection. It
was an act that had no relation to any proceeding or question of ill-gotten wealth or
sequestration. The PCGG was merely protecting the rights and interest of the Republic
of the Philippines....it is clear that the dispute in the present case is an intra-corporate
controversy. As such, it is clear that the jurisdiction lies with the regular courts and not
with the Sandiganbayan… As the Court has already conclusively ruled, the RTC is co-
equal to the PCGG only in relation to cases falling under the latter’s function under the
applicable Executive Orders, specifically Section 2 of E.O. 14, and Section 26, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. Note that in this case, the acts complained of do not
pertain to the PCGG’s function under the aforementioned provisions of law and the
Constitution, i.e., it is not a case involving “the Funds, Moneys, Assets and Properties
Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates,
Dummies, Agents or Nominees, whether civil or criminal, xxx” nor can it be considered
an “[incident] arising from, incidental to, or related to” such cases. Rather, the PCGG,
acting as representative of the Republic, was exercising a duty of a stockholder to ensure
the proper and lawful exercise of corporate acts. Based on the foregoing, the
Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. (Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. Sandiganbayan 5th Division, G.R. No. 203023, June
17, 2015)

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861. With the advent of the 1987
Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI
thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No.
7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.

… within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in
Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. While the first part of Section
4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its
second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by
the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to
the general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”

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… a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod (People v. Sandiganbayan (Third Div.) et al.,
645 Phil. 53 (2010)), a department manager of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth) (Geduspan v. People, 491 Phil. 375, 380 (2005)), as cited in Lazarte,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., 600 Phil. 475, 497 (2009); Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 566 Phil. 224, 249 (2008); and Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),
536 Phil. 726, 731 (2006)), a student regent of the University of the Philippines (Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 566 Phil. 224, 249 (2008)), and a Head of the Legal Department and
Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant
Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) (Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), 536 Phil. 726, 731
(2006)) fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan… Petitioner (Regional Director of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6758) is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does
he hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A). (Duncano v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), G.R. No. 191894, July 15, 2015)

Respondents’ petitions for declaratory relief filed in the RTC asserted their claim of
ownership over the sequestered CIIF companies and indirectly the CIIF SMC Block of
Shares, in the following percentages: 11.03% (UCPB) and 11.01% (COCOLIFE).
Undeniably, these are related to the ill-gotten wealth cases (Civil Case Nos.0033-A and
0033-F) involving the issue of ownership of the aforesaid sequestered companies and
shares of stock, which have been tried and decided by the Sandiganbayan, and the
decision had been appealed to and finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177857-
58 (COCOFED and Lobregat, et. al’s ownership claim over the CIIF companies and CIIF
SMC Block of Shares) and G.R. No. 180705 (Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.’s claim over
UCPB shares under an Agreement with PCA)… it is clear that the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252.
(Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Dumayas, G.R. No. 210901, August 11,
2015)

The Ombudsman

Authority to Investigate

Verily, the Court has, in several cases, held that criminal cases which have been
dismissed without prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the order of dismissal
becomes final, or thereafter, by filing a new Information for the offense. The Court,
therefore, disagrees with Ciron’s view that a new complaint for preliminary
investigation had to be filed before the charges against her could be revived. Anent the
argument that a new preliminary investigation must be conducted, it is settled that the
same is only required in order to accord the accused the right to submit counter-
affidavits and evidence only in the following instances: (a) where the original witnesses
of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have
died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b)
where aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal
complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; (c) if under a new
criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a new
criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from being an

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accessory to that of a principal. Since none of the foregoing instances obtain in this case,
the Court holds that the OCP-Iriga, through Beltran and Contreras, need not conduct
another preliminary investigation before it can issue the Supplemental Resolutions and
subsequently, file the consequent Informations in court. In sum, the Ombudsman did
not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint against respondents since
the issuance of the Supplemental Resolutions and the filing of the new Informations
against Ciron even without a new complaint having been filed for preliminary
investigation were done in accordance with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. (Ciron v.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 194339-41, April 20, 2015)

Meanwhile, the Court disagrees on petitioner's contention that the issue of sexual
harassment is better addressed in the pending criminal case for sexual harassment
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, for to do so in an administrative
proceedings (sic) would be unfair, unjust and extremely unreasonable. It bears to stress
that administrative and criminal charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and
the trial court, respectively, are separate and distinct from each other even if they arise
from the same act or omission. This is because the quantum of proof required in criminal
cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required. Moreover, the purpose of the administrative proceedings is mainly
to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a
public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the
punishment of crime. Thus, even the dismissal of a criminal case does not necessarily
foreclose the administrative action against the respondent. (Gonzales v. Serrano. G.R. No.
175433, March 11, 2015)

While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the
Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature. In support of their
argument, petitioners cite Sales v. Sandiganbayan wherein it was held that since filing of a
motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper, an
Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation.

The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales as misplaced. A closer look into said case
would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to move for a reconsideration
or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation under the
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman before the filing of an Information. In contrast,
petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for reconsideration of the
adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed their “Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,” pursuant to Section 3 of the 2000
National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal) and Section 56 of the Manual for
Prosecutors. (Aguinaldo v. Ventus, G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015)

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals

Republic Act No. 6770

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 Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of
law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision,
the Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of
provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under
the first paragraph of the said provision is declared INEFFECTIVE until
the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor;

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is

PROSPECTIVE in effect;

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar

Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of
its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively
liable in the six (6) administrative complaints xxx and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's

comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch. (Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14,
RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to

delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation
is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the
Supreme Court) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.

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Generally speaking, “[i]njunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a
party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or
merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.” Considering the
textual qualifier “to delay,” which connotes a suspension of an action while the main
case remains pending, the “writ of injunction” mentioned in this paragraph could only
refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional
injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the office’s jurisdiction. The Office of the
Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception
only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Nonetheless, the
Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified
complaint for impeachment, if warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any
act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

xxx.

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of
procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the
appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court’s
judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction were thus provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute

temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature,
ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the
main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is
made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of
them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will
cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing
can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for
the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself,
but merely adjunct to a main suit. In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to
prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

xxx.

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The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its
inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry
its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court…

xxx.

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII xxx, as well as to create
statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII xxx, does not result in an abnegation of the
Court’s own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under
Section 5 (5), Article VIII xxx. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own
sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the
procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting
provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not define, prescribe, and
apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari
jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129
which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress
interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every
court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as
may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting

provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not
only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a
court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be
mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the
court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court’s acquired jurisdiction, through which
it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power,
especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court’s inability
to regulate what occurs during a proceeding’s course. As earlier intimated, when
jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court,
its exercise thereof should be unclipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power
contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court’s duly promulgated rules of
procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the
policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist
under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over
the same.

xxx.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court’s consent thereto, it remains that

104
the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of
belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA’s
certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended,
and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case. (Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14,
RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

xxx the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application
for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the
exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2)
reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase “application for remedy” or the word
“findings” refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law.
The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the
ambiguity. xxx

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s extremely limited restriction
on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal – which is within the sphere of the
rules of procedure promulgated by this Court – can only be taken against final decisions
or orders of lower courts, and not against “findings” of quasi-judicial agencies. As will
be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it
cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings”
issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45
appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of
jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this
light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The
provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as
above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto (Fabian).

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1,

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Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only
to a review of “judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;”
and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy
now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. (Note: see also Ruivivar v. Office of
the Ombudsman, 587 Phil. 100 (2008))

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 – attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that
the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
Ombudsman Act provisions are in pari materia in that they “cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the
Ombudsman. xxx.

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the
Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

Condonation Doctrine

The condonation doctrine – which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment
of liability as will be herein elaborated upon – is not based on statutory law. It is a
jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to the same position in 1955.
During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed
administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave
abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal
complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo
Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they
were committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for
disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case
reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue –
that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act
committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted
to American authorities and “found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part,
probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a
divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or

106
appointment condones the prior misconduct.” Without going into the variables of these
conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities xxx seems to incline toward the rule denying the right
to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which
we fully subscribe.
xxx.

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case
decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the
plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious re-examination.

xxx.

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was

decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to
public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision
in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2,
Article II which states that “[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and
in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service.” Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution’s silence on public
accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as
well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection
confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from
select US cases existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers
underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on
accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that “[p]ublic office is a public trust.”
Accordingly, “[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the
people.”
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and
adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in Article II that “[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.” Learning
how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the
Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a
constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution
strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,

107
 integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
xxx.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation
doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine
adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from – and
now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for
this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and
Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation

doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to
interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation… Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it
should be, as a general rule, recognized as “good law” prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should be respected… Indeed, the lessons
of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its
ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren
of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of
time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the
condonation doctrine. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November
10, 2015)

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor (577 Phil. 52, 72 (2008)), also clarified
that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them,
there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
217126-27, November 10, 2015)

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987Constitution, is
plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability
for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term
is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a
prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be
condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos (279 Phil. 920, 937 (1991)) to apply to
administrative offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency
may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases.
By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases,
it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment

108
 cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically
excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Article XII

Regalian Doctrine

However, while petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, was admittedly
ornery in the prosecution of its case, it is nonetheless true that “[a]s a matter of doctrine,
illegal acts of government agents do not bind the State,” and “the Government is never
estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous, let
alone irregular.” This principle applies in land registration cases. Certainly, the State will
not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public domain just because its
agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their duties. Under the
Regalian doctrine, “all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.” (Republic v. Sps. Benigno, G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015)

“The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.” “[P]ublic lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or
alienated them to private persons.” “Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.” (Republic v. Sps. Benigno, G.R.
No. 205492, March 11, 2015)

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is

109
alienable or disposable. To support her contention that the lands subject of her
application is alienable and disposable, respondent submitted certifications from the
DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land application or land
patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any
administrative title. Respondent’s reliance on the CENRO certifications is misplaced…
Rather, this Court stressed the importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy
of the original classification of the land approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. (Republic v. Lualhati, G.R. No.
183511, March 25, 2015)

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
classification and reclassification of such lands are the prerogative of the Executive
Department. The President may at any time transfer these public lands from one class to
another…While in 1955 the President – through Presidential Proclamation No. 209 –
declared particular lands in Baguio City as alienable and disposable, they may have
been re-classified by the President thereafter. This is precisely the reason why an
applicant for registration of title based on an executive proclamation is required to
present evidence on the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, such
as a certificate of land classification status from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resource (DENR), which only the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) and the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) are authorized to issue under DENR Administrative Order No. 38,
series of 1990 (DAO 38)… Thus, while judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No.
209 may be taken, the DENR certificate of land classification status or any other proof of
the alienable and disposable character of the land may not be dispensed with, because it
provides a more recent appraisal of the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable, or that the land has not been re-classified in the meantime. The applicable
law – Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 – requires that the property sought to
be registered is alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed; one way of establishing this material fact is through the DENR certificate of
land classification status which is presumed to be the most recent appraisal of the status
and character of the property. (Republic of the Philippines v. Dayaoen, G.R. No. 200773, July
8, 2015)

It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated may be the object of possession. The following cannot be
appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common
things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things specifically prohibited by law.

Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of
possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a
claim is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the proper object of
possession.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
Hence, “[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private

110
persons.” To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.

In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has
been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same.
Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be
appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the
Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez’ claimed right of possession has no leg to
stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an
owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the
property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place. (Republic v. Cortez, G.R. No.
197472, September 7, 2015)

Alienable Land

And, in order to prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable
public land, “the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the
Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification
and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.”
(Republic v. Sps. Benigno, G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015)

Therefore, even if the Office of the Solicitor General was remiss in the handling of the
State’s appeal, we nevertheless cannot allow respondents’ application for registration
since they failed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable public
land. Respondents cannot invoke Republic v. Vega to claim substantial compliance with
the requirement of proof of alienability; there is complete absence of documentary
evidence showing that the land applied for forms part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. Complete absence of proof is certainly not equivalent to
substantial compliance with the required amount of proof. (Republic v. Sps. Benigno, G.R.
No. 205492, March 11, 2015)

Mining Claims

Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of
the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became
effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the
terms and conditions prescribed by law… In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we stated that
mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that could not be impaired even by the
Government. Indeed, the mining patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the
disputed mineral lands that could not and should not be impaired even in light of their
past failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work obligations.

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(Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation v. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 207942, January 12, 2015)

Exploitation of Resources

… petitioners, being foreign corporations, are not entitled to Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSAs). In reaching its conclusion, this Court upheld with approval the
appellate court's finding that there was doubt as to petitioners' nationality since a 100%
Canadian-owned firm, MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), effectively owns 60% of the
common stocks of the petitioners by owning equity interest of petitioners' other majority
corporate shareholders… The application of the Grandfather Rule is justified by the
circumstances of the case to determine the nationality of petitioners… the use of the
Grandfather Rule as a "supplement" to the Control Test is not proscribed by the
Constitution or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The Grandfather Rule implements the
intent of the Filipinization provisions of the Constitution… The Grandfather Rule,
standing alone, should not be used to determine the Filipino ownership and control in a
corporation, as it could result in an otherwise foreign corporation rendered qualified to
perform nationalized or partly nationalized activities. Hence, it is only when the Control
Test is first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another
manner, if the subject corporation’s Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the
corporation is immediately considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort
to the Grandfather Rule disappears. On the other hand, a corporation that complies with
the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity requirement can be considered a Filipino corporation
if there is no doubt as to who has the "beneficial ownership" and "control" of the
corporation. In that instance, there is no need fora dissection or further inquiry on the
ownership of the corporate shareholders in both the investing and investee corporation
or the application of the Grandfather Rule. As a corollary rule, even if the 60-40 Filipino
to foreign equity ratio is apparently met by the subject or investee corporation, a resort
to the Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to the locus of the "beneficial
ownership" and "control." In this case, a further investigation as to the nationality of the
personalities with the beneficial ownership and control of the corporate shareholders in
both the investing and investee corporations is necessary. (Narra Nickel Mining and
Development Corporation v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation, G.R. No. 195580,
January 28, 2015)

As explained in the April 21, 2012 Decision, the "doubt" that demands the application of
the Grandfather Rule in addition to or in tandem with the Control Test is not confined
to, or more bluntly, does not refer to the fact that the apparent Filipino ownership of the
corporation’s equity falls below the 60% threshold. Rather, "doubt" refers to various
indicia that the "beneficial ownership" and "control" of the corporation do not in fact
reside in Filipino shareholders but in foreign stakeholders. As provided in DOJ Opinion
No. 165, Series of 1984, which applied the pertinent provisions of the Anti-Dummy Law
in relation to the minimum Filipino equity requirement in the Constitution, "significant
indicators of the dummy status" have been recognized in view of reports "that some
Filipino investors or businessmen are being utilized or [are] allowing themselves to be
used as dummies by foreign investors" specifically in joint ventures for national resource
exploitation. These indicators are:

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 1. That the foreign investors provide practically all the funds for the joint
investment undertaken by these Filipino businessmen and their foreign partner;

2. That the foreign investors undertake to provide practically all the technological
support for the joint venture;

3. That the foreign investors, while being minority stockholders, manage the
company and prepare all economic viability studies. (Narra Nickel Mining and
Development Corporation v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation, G.R.
No. 195580, January 28, 2015)

While petitioners are correct in asserting that Smartmatic JV ought to be at least 60%
Filipino-owned to qualify, they did not adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the joint
venture did not meet the requirement. Petitioners, having alleged non-compliance, have
the correlative burden of proving that Smartmatic JV did not meet the requirement, but
aside from their bare allegation that SMTC is 100% foreign-owned, they did not offer
any relevant evidence to substantiate their claim. Even the 2013 financial statements
submitted to Court fail to impress for they pertain to the financial standing of
Smartmatic Limited, which is a distinct and separate entity from SMTC. It goes without
saying that Smarmatic Limited's nationality is irrelevant herein for it is not even a party
to this case, and even to the joint venture.

Aside from the sheer weakness of petitioners' claim, SMTC satisfactorily refuted the
challenge to its nationality and established that it is, indeed, a Filipino corporation as
defined under our laws. As provided in Republic Act No. 7042 (RA 7042), otherwise
known as the Foreign Investments Act, a Philippine corporation is defined in the
following wise:

Section 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:

a) The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a

domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines;
or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least
sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned
and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other
employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine
national and at least sixty (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of the
Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino
stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stocks outstanding
and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of
the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of
Directors of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that
the corporations shall be considered a Philippine national.

In Narra Nickel Mining and Development, Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines, Corp. (G.R.
No. 195580, April 21, 2014), the Court held that the "control test" is the prevailing mode
of determining whether or not a corporation is Filipino. Under the "control test," shares
belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned
by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality. It is only when based

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on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, there is, in the mind of the Court,
doubt in the 60-40 Filipino-equity ownership in the corporation, that it may apply the
"grandfather rule.” xxx. Applying the control test, 60% of SMTC's 226,000,000 shares,
that is 135,600,000 shares, must be Filipino-owned. From the above-table, it is clear that
SMTC reached this threshold amount to qualify as a Filipino-owned corporation.
(Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015)

Service Contracts

This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed
under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words “service
contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in
that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4,
Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in
the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the martial law regime, to wit: xxx

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will
set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to
attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly
before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been
vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and
can withstand public scrutiny.

(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.

Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null
and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution. (Resident
Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins,
Porpoises, and other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)

As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself
be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils. This power cannot be taken lightly. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tanon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises, and other Cetacean Species,
Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)

Legislative Franchises

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In PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board, this Court enunciated: Congress has granted certain
administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of
certain public utilities… It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived
indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power
to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a
legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by
grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise
as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature... It is thus clear that
Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public
utilities. (Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015)

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Article XIII

Voluntary Arbitration

We also see no reason to obstruct the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator,
or to treat it any less than the reinstatement that is ordered by the Labor Arbiter.
Voluntary arbitration really takes precedence over other dispute settlement devices.
Such primacy of voluntary arbitration is mandated by no less than the Philippine
Constitution, and is ingrained as a policy objective of our labor relations law. The
reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same authority, force
and effect as that of the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter not only to encourage
parties to settle their disputes through this mode, but also, and more importantly, to
enforce the constitutional mandate to protect labor, to provide security of tenure, and to
enhance social justice. (Baronda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015)

Agrarian Reform

Clearly, Section 63 refers to the implementation of the CARL in its entirety, not just the
funding source. Indeed, R.A. 8532 specifically amended Section 63 of R.A. 6657, but it
does not follow that only Section 63 had been affected by the amendment. The fact that
Section 63 falls under the chapter on "Financing" only emphasizes its general
applicability. Hence, the phrase "until the year 2008" used in R.A. 8532 unmistakably
extends the DAR's authority to issue NOCs for purposes of acquiring and distributing
private agricultural lands. Finally, R.A. 9700 extended the acquisition and distribution of
all agricultural lands until 30 June 2014. The title alone of R.A. 9700 - An Act
Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Extending the
Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms,
Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise
Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, As Amended, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor - reveals that the CARP was indeed extended from 1998
to 2008 via R.A. 8532. Had there been no prior extension from 1998 to 2008, how else
could the CARP have been extended by R.A. 9700 until 30 June 2014? There could have
been an extension only if the program sought to be extended had not expired.
(Department of Agrarian Reform v. Woodland Agro-Development, Inc., G. R. No. 188174, June
29, 2015)

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Urban Dwellers

To note, the Summary Eviction IRR was issued pursuant to Section 28, Article VII of RA
7279, which equally provides for the situations wherein eviction or demolition is
allowed as crafted exceptions to the moratorium on eviction under Section 44, Article XII
of the same law.

Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be

discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the
following situations:

(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such
as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
be implemented; or

(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

Section 2 of the Summary Eviction IRR provides that only new squatter families whose
structures were built after the effectivity of RA 7279, otherwise known as the “Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992,” and squatter families identified by the local
government unit (LGU) as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates
shall be subject of summary eviction.

Under the Summary Eviction IRR, the term “summary eviction” has been defined as
“the immediate dismantling of new illegal structures by the local government units or
government agency authorized to [demolish] in coordination with the affected urban
poor organizations without providing the structure owner(s) any benefits of the Urban
Development and Housing Program.”

“New squatter” refers to individual groups who occupy land without the express
consent of the landowner after March 28, 1992. Their structures shall be
dismantled and appropriate charges shall be filed against them by the proper
authorities if they refuse to vacate the premises.

“Professional squatters” refers to individuals or groups who occupy lands

without the express consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income
for legitimate housing. The term shall also apply to persons who have previously
been awarded homelots or housing units by the Government but who sold,
leased or transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or in another
urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for
socialized housing. The term shall not apply to individuals or groups who
simply rent land and housing from professional squatters or squatting
syndicates.

“Squatting syndicates” refers to groups of persons engaged in the business of

squatter housing for profit or gain.

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…it bears noting that it is the Building Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the
authority to order the demolition of the structures under the NBCP (National Building
Code of the Philippines).

Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any building or structure is

found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its
repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health,
or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the
provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

PROCEDURE FOR ABATEMENT/ DEMOLITION OF DANGEROUS/ RUINOUS

BUILDINGS/ STRUCTURES

5. Procedure for Demolition of Buildings

The following steps shall be observed in the abatement/demolition of buildings

under this Rule:

5.1 There must be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the
building/structure is a nuisance, ruinous or dangerous.

5.2 Written notice or advice shall be served upon the owner and occupant/s of
such finding or declaration, giving him at least fifteen (15) days within which to
vacate or cause to be vacated, repaired, renovated, demolished and removed as the
case may be, the nuisance, ruinous or dangerous building/structure or any part or
portion thereof.

5.3 Within the fifteen-day (15) period, the owner may, if he so desires, appeal to the
Secretary the finding or declaration of the Building Official and ask that a re-
inspection or re-investigation of the building/structure be made.

As a final note, the Court exhorts that absent compliance with the laws allowing for
summary eviction, respondents cannot resort to the procedural shortcut of ousting
petitioners by the simple expedient of a summary demolition order from the Office of
the City Mayor. They have to undergo the appropriate proceeding as set out in the
NBCP and its IRR or avail of the proper judicial process to recover the subject property
from petitioners. In pursuing said recourse, it would also not be amiss for the parties to
await the final resolution of any pending case involving the subject property between
petitioners and Ernesto, before the appropriate government agencies, in order to avoid
any further complication on the matter. (Alangdeo v. City Mayor of Baguio, G.R. No.
206423, July 1, 2015)

Commission on Human Rights

We stress, at the outset, that the subsequent referral of the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate prosecutorial action rendered the issues raised in the
present petition moot and academic insofar as the CHR is concerned. Records disclose
that the CHR, through Chairperson Rosales and Commissioners De la Cruz and
Mamauag, issued an Order stating that it could no longer act on the petitioner’s Motion
to Dismiss since the case had been forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, no
practical relief can be granted to the petitioner by resolving the present petition since the

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proceedings before the CHR – the initiation of an investigation through the issuance of
the assailed Show Cause Order – had been terminated. (Quisumbing v. Rosales, G.R. No.
209283, March 11, 2015)

Human Rights

Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to obtain the concurrence
of the Public Prosecutor to move for an interlocutory relief in a criminal prosecution
cannot be excused by general exhortations of human rights. This Petition fails to show
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge. Furthermore, the
accused, while undergoing trial and before conviction, is already detained in the
Philippines in compliance with the obligations contained in the Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the
Philippines (Visiting Forces Agreement). (Laude v. Hon. Ginez, G.R. No. 217456,
November 24, 2015)

Petitioners also argue that the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is an assertion of
their right to access to justice as recognized by international law and the 1987
Constitution. They justify the separate filing of the Motion as a right granted by Article
2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, independent
of "the power of the Public Prosecutors to prosecute [a] criminalcase."

Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and
to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.

There is no need to discuss whether this provision has attained customary status, since
under treaty law, the Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to comply with its
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However,
petitioners went too far in their interpretation, ignoring completely the nature of the
obligation contemplated by the provision in an attempt to justify their failure to comply
with a domestic procedural rule aimed to protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit
that of the adverse party.

xxx.

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The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish
a system of accessible and effective remedies through judicial and administrative
mechanisms. The present trial of Pemberton, to which petitioner, Marilou S. Laude, is
included as a private complainant, indicates that there is a legal system of redress for
violated rights. That petitioners chose to act on their own, in total disregard of the
mechanism for criminal proceedings established by this court, should not be tolerated
under the guise of a claim to justice. This is especially in light of petitioners' decision to
furnish the accused in the case a copy of her Motion only during the hearing. Upholding
human rights pertaining to access to justice cannot be eschewed to rectify an important
procedural deficiency that was not difficult to comply with. Human rights are not a
monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these rights. (Laude v.
Hon. Ginez, G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015)

EDUCATION
Article XIV

Academic Freedom

The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, as well as

the causes for the termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the
educational system of private schools… It is thus within the authority of the Secretary of
Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of private schools based on their incompetence, inefficiency, or some other
disqualification. (Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226, January 28,
2015)

Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it
pertains to public and secular morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed
because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. (Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226,
January 28, 2015)

Thus, in Anonymous v. Radam, an administrative case involving a court utility worker

likewise charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct, applying the doctrines laid
down in Estrada, the Court held that:

For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral" behavior under

civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and
secular morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias, specifically those
colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on "cultural" values not
convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy
expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent
that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority. (Leus v.
St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015)

Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings

and doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is
strictly upheld and taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her

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pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church.
However, viewed against the prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct
cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced by
public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not
disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.

To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no
impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock,
gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a
disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. (Leus v. St.
Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015)

It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect
and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the
development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. Essentially, education must
ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and reverence. Under the rubric of
"right to education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school. Every citizen has a right to select a profession or, course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. The
PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it
certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal
rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the
minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each
cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor.
Throughout a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as
well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called
"Long Gray Line." (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R.
No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

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