RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

EVIDENCE CASE LIST 16) Uy v. Union Life Assurance Society, GR 9231, 6 January 1915* 1) De la Paz, Jr. v. IAC, GR 71537, September 17, 1987
17) People v. Tena, GR 100909, 21 October 1992* 2) Fulgado v. Court of Appeals, GR 61570, February 12, 1990 The evidence presented in order to prove the claim are the
RULE 128 18) Ormachea Tin-Congco v. Trillana, GR 4776, 18 March 1909* Sec. 9: Recalling witness
affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson. However, the
1) Reyes v. CA, GR 96492, 26 November 1992* 19) Kiel v. Estate of Sabert, GR 21639, 25 September 1924* 3) People v. Rivera, GR 98376, August 16, 1991
20) People v. Cabrera, GR L-37398, 28 June 1974* 4) Villalon, Jr. v. IAC, GR 73751 (Resolution), September 24, affiants were never presented before the court for cross-
2) Imperial Textile v. NLRC, GR 101527, 19 January 1993*
21) People v. Paragsa, GR L-44060, 20 July 1978 1986 examination. Despite this, the trial court admitted as
RULE 129
1) Sermonia v. CA, GR 109454 22) People v. Marra, GR 108494, 20 September 1994* 5) People v. Resabal, GR 26708, September 29, 1927 evidence the said affidavits.
2) Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans 23) People v. Sumayo, GR L-30713, 30 April 1976 Secs. 20 to 24
v. Disierto, GR 130817 (2001)* 24) US v. Evangelista, GR 8132, 25 March 1913* 6) Chua v. Court of Appeals, GR 88383, February 19, 1992 ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
3) City of Manila v. Garcia, GR L-26053, 21 February 1967* 25) US v. Pineda, GR L-12858, 22 January 1918* 7) Bunag v. CA, GR L-39013, February 29, 1988
AS EVIDENCE THE AFFIDAVITS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
4) Tabuena v. CA and Tabernilla, GR 85423, 6 May 1991* 26) People v. Abulencia, GR 138403, 22 August 2001* 8) Bartolome v. IAC, GR 76792, March 12, 1990
27) People v. de Jesus, GR L-39087 April 27, 1984* Secs. 21 to 22 AFFIANTS WERE NEVER PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT
5) Torres v. CA, GR L-37421, July 31, 1984*
28) People v. Salomon, GR 96848, January 21, 1994* 9) Lacsa v. Court of Appeals, GR 79597-98, May 20, 1991 FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION?
6) Baguio v. Vda de Jalagat, GR L-28100, 29 November 1971*
RULE 130 29) People v. Macapal, GR 155335, July 14, 2005* 10) Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. NLRC, GR 76595, May
Object Evidence 30) Orient Insurance Company v. E.P. Revilla, Judge of First 6, 1988 HELD: NO. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the
Sison v. People, GR 108280-83, 1995* Instance of Manila, and Teal Motor Co., Inc., GR 34098, 11) Spouses Zalamea v. Court of Appeals, GR 104235, November "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases
Admissibility of DNA Testing September 17, 1930* 18, 1993
even in a suppletory character." The same provision states
Agustin v. CA, GR 162571, 15 June 2005* 31) People us. Sandiganbayan, GR 115439-41, July 16, 1997* 12) Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, GR 119602,
32) Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385, 1947* [October 6, 2000] that "In the hearing, investigation and determination of any
Evidence in relation to RA 4200
33) Upjohn Co. v. United States - 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677, Sec. 33 question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits
Ramirez v. CA, GR 93833, 28 September 1995
Best Evidence Rule 1981* 13) People v. Monleon, GR L-36282, [December 10, 1976] may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".
1) People v. Tandoy, GR 80505, 4 December 1990* 34) People v. Ong, GR 137348, June 21, 2004* Sec. 34
2) People v. Tan, GR L-14257 (1959) 35) Ordono v. Daquigan, GR L-39012, January 31, 1975* 14) People v. Franco y Tianson, GR 118607, [March 4, 1997] 2. IMPERIAL TEXTILE v. NLRC | 101527 | 1993
3) Hutchison v. Buscas, GR 158554, 26 May 2005* 36) People v. Irang, GR L-45179, March 30, 1937* 15) Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, GR 85423, [May 6, 1991]
4) Rodelas v. Aranza, GR L-58509, 7 December 1982 37) Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 105938, September 20, 1996* 16) Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, GR 86062, [June 6, 1990]
Secondary Evidence Admissions and Confessions 17) People v. Java y Mercado, GR 104611, [November 10, 1993] Well-settled, is the rule that procedural technicalities do not
1) Ebreo v. Ebreo, GR 160065, 28 February 2006* 1) People v. Alegre, GR L-30423, 7 November 1979 18) People v. Yap y Boca, GR 103517, [February 9, 1994] strictly apply to proceedings before labor arbiters for they
2) Municipality of Victoria v. CA, GR L-31189 (1987)* 2) People v. Raquel, GR 119005, 2 December 1996* 19) Catuira v. CA, GR 105813, [September 12, 1994] may avail themselves of all reasonable means to speedily
3) Villa Rey Transit v. Ferrer, GR L-23893 (1968)* 3) People v. Serrano, GR L-7973, 27 April 1959* 20) Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
ascertain the facts of a controversy.
4) De Vera v. Aguilar, GR 83377, 9 February 1993* 4) People v. Yatco, GR L-9181, 28 November 1955* No. 92067, [March 22, 1991]
5) US v. Gregorio, GR L-5791 (1910) 5) People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, GR L-19590, 25 April 1968* 21) Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet
6) Alpuerto v. Pastor, GR 12794, 14 October 1918* Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 87434 (1992) FACTS: Angie Mendoza had been employed by Imperial
6) Magdayao v. People, GR 152881 (2004)*
7) Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, GR 28999 7) City of Manila v. Del Rosario, GR 1284, 10 November 1905* RULE 133 Textile. In the latter part of 1986, a new management group
(1977)* 8) People v. Encipido, GR 70091, 29 December 1986* 22) People v. Cruz, 134 SCRA took over the company. Mendoza who was on leave found
8) Gan v. Yap, GR L-12190 (1958) 9) People v. Endino, GR 133026, 20 February 2001* out about the changes and consequently wrote the widow
Parol Evidence Hearsay CASES PROPER of the former president. During the change of management,
1) Robles v. Lizarraga Ermanos, GR L-26173 (1927)* Sec. 36
1) People v. Damaso, GR 93516, August 12, 1992* Mendoza’s position that is of Personnel Manager was filled
2) PNB v. Seeto, GR L-4388 (1952)*
Sec. 37 up by a new comer.
3) Woodhouse v. Halili, GR L-4811 (1953)*
4) Inciong v. CA, GR 96405, 26 June 1996* 2) People v. Laquinon, GR L-45470, February 28, 1985*
5) Yu Tek v. Gonzales, GR L-9935 (1915)* 3) People v. Sabio, GR L-26193, January 27, 1981* RULE 128 In her letter, she stated that given her circumstances, it
6) Lechugas v. CA, GR 39972 (1986)* 4) People v. Agripa, GR 72244, May 8, 1992* would be proper to cease her employment. Thereafter,
7) Land Settlement Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation, GR 5) People v. De Joya, GR 75028, November 8, 1991* 1. REYES v. CA | 96492 | 1992 Mendoza filled a complaint for illegal dismissal. In its
L-17820, 1963* 6) People v. Devaras, GR L-25165, February 27, 1971*
Sec. 38 defense, Imperial Textile averred that Mendoza voluntarily
8) Pioneer Savings and Loan Banks v. CA, GR 105419, 29
7) Viacrusis v. CA, GR L-29831, March 29, 1972* Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even resigned and if she was terminated such termination was
September 1993*
9) Maulini v. Serrano, GR L-8844 (1914)* Sec. 39 in a suppletory character; hence, in the hearing, due to valid and just grounds.
10) Canuto v. Mariano, GR L-11346 (1918)* 8) People v. Alegado, GR 93030-31, August 21, 1991* investigation and determination of any question or
11) Cruz v. CA, GR 79962, 10 December 1990* 9) Ferrer v. Inchausti, GR 12993, October 28, 1918* Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective position
controversy in agrarian cases, affidavits and counter-
12) Madrigal and Mallari v. CA, (2005)* Sec. 42
affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence. papers. Imperial Textile then filed a Motion to Dismiss
13) Enriquez v. Ramos, GR L-18077 (1962)* 10) People v. Putian, GR L-33049, November 29, 1976
11) People v. Peralta, , GR 94570, September 28, 1994 alleging that private respondent’s position paper is
Testimonial Evidence
Sec. 44 FACTS: Juan Mendoza was the owner of Farm Lots devoted unverified and should be stricken off the record, and
1) People v. Castañeda, GR L-46306, 27 February 1979*
2) People v. Francisco, GR L-568, 16 July 1947* 12) Fortus v. Novero, GR L-22378, 29 June 1968 to the production of palay. The lots were tenanted and Complainant failed to appear despite notice, thereby
3) Lezama v. Rodriguez, GR L-25643, 27 June 1968* Sec. 46 cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of private depriving petitioner of its right to cross-examine her.
4) Razon v. IAC, GR 74306, 16 March 1992* 13) Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, GR 55960, November 24, 1988
respondent Eufrocina dela Cruz.
5) Reyes v. Wells, GR L-30587, 4 December 1929* Sec. 47
The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint without
6) Guerrero v. St. Clare Realty, GR L-58164, 1983* 14) Tan v. CA, GRL-22793, May 16, 1967
15) People v. Liwanag,G.R. No. L-27683, October 19, 1976 Julian died, Eufrocina succeeded Julian as bona fide tenant prejudice, on the ground that complainant’s absence
7) Abraham v. Intestate Estate of Ysmael, Recto-Kasten GR L-
RULE 131 of the subject lots. However, Olympio Mendoza, son of Juan deprived herein petitioner of the opportunity to cross
16741, 31 January 1962*
8) Lim v. CA, GR 91114, 25 September 1992* 1) Industrial Finance Corp. v. Tobias, GR L-41555, July 27, 1977 Mendoza, in conspiracy with Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao, examine her.
9) Krohn v. CA, GR 108854, 14 June 1994* 2) People v. Pajenado, GR L-27680-81, February 27, 1970 and Emilio Mananghaya, herein petitioners, prevented
10) Testate Estate of Fitzsimmons v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific 3) People v. Verzola, GR L-35022, December 21, 1977 The NLRC reversed LA’s decision stating that the
Eufrocina’s daughter Violeta and her workers from entering
Company, GR L-2016 (1949)* 4) Molina v. Court of Appeals, GR L-14524, October 24, 1960
and working on the subject premises. commission and the labor arbiter have the authority to
11) Goñi v. CA, GR L-27434, 23 September 1986* 5) Figui v. CA (ruling only), 233 SCRA
6) People v. Padiernos, GR L-37284, February 27, 1976 decide cases based on position papers and documents
12) Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523*
7) People v. Pablo y Dolloso, GR 91129, August 25, 1992 Consequently, private respondents then filed a complaint submitted by the parties without resorting to technical
13) Tongco v. Vianzon, GR 27498, 20 September 1927
14) People v. Carlos, GR 22948, 17 March 1925* RULE 132 against petitioners and Mendoza praying that the rules of evidence. The NLRC also held that herein petitioner
15) Barton v. Leyte Asphalt, GR 21237, 22 March 1924* Sec. 6: Cross Examination possession of the subject property be returned to her. was not denied due process because on the basis of the

E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST. Page 1

records of the case, an intelligent decision could be arrived
at without resorting to a formal hearing. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER IMPERIAL TEXTILE WAS DENIED DUE
PROCESS?
HELD: NO. It is a basic rule that it is not the denial of the
right to be heard but the deprivation of the opportunity to
be heard which constitutes a violation of the due process
clause.
There was sufficient compliance with the requirement of
due process as petitioner was given the opportunity to
present its case through a motion to dismiss and a position
paper filed with the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: WHETHER AN UNVERIFIED POSITION PAPER
WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT TO THE DECISION
RENDERED BY THE LABOR ARBITER.
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine*
ISSUE: WON THE LATE FILING OF PLAINTIFF(S)’ APPEAL IS
DETRIMENTAL TO THE DECISION RENDERED?
HELD: NO. The general rule is that the perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Failure to
conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be
reviewed final and unappealable.
The Court, however, held that in consideration of the merits
of this case, substantial justice could be rightfully invoked
by way of an exception. This is one such case where the
Court was convinced that substance should prevail over and
not be sacrificed for form.
RULE 129
1. SERMONIA v. CA | 109454 | 1994
The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is computed
from the time the crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents. The principle of
constructive notice which ordinarily applies to land or
property disputes should not be applied to the crime of
bigamy, as marriage is not property.
FACTS: On 26 May 1992, Jose C. Sermonia was charged with
bigamy before the RTC of Pasig for contracting marriage
with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior
marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and
subsisting. Petitioner moved to quash the information on
the ground that his criminal liability has been extinguished
by prescription. RTC denied motion to quash.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
the CA assailing that since the second marriage contract
was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public
record and thus constitutes notice to the offended party as
of 1975, and that prescription commenced to run on the
day the contract was registered.
For this reason, the information should have been filed on
or before 1990. He also holds that the second marriage
ceremony was held at Our Lady of Nativity Church in
Marikina and was open to inspection by any interested
party.
The prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does
not begin from the commission of the crime but from the
time of discovery by the complainant which was in July
1991. The CA dismissed the said petition hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES IN CASES OF
BIGAMY?
HELD: NO. The rule on constructive notice in civil cases may
be applied in criminal actions if the factual and legal
circumstances warrant, BUT, it cannot apply in the crime of
bigamy because a bigamous marriage is generally entered
into by the offender in secrecy in order to conceal his legal
impediment, that even though his second marriage may be
contracted in an open place, it may be done so in a place
and among people who do not know of his original
subsisting marriage.
ISSUE: WHETHER PRESCRIPTION COMMENCES AT THE
TIME OF REGISTRATION?
HELD: NO. The Court held that *See Stated Doctrine.* To
rule otherwise, then the prosecution of such offense would
be impossible and would encourage a fearless violation of a
social institution cherished and protected by law. Thus,
when Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy on 7 March 1976,
it was well within the reglamentary period as it was barely
a few months from the time of discovery on 10 October
1975.
2. PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON
BEHEST LOANS v. DISIERTO | 130817 | 2001
In cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019
committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that
ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the government as
the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations
at the time the questioned transactions were made, thus the
counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992, after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on
Behest Loans
FACTS: During Ramos' term of office, he issued the
following:
 Administrative Order No. 13 - Created the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans.
 Memorandum No. 61 - Expanded the functions of the
committee to investigate all non-performing loans
whether behest or non-behest loans.
In 1974, Apparel World Inc. applied for an Import Letter of
Credit with the Philippine National Bank in the amount of
DM15,000,000.00 (P40,660,114.86) for the importation of
machinery, equipment and accessories for a garment
factory. Less than a month later, PNB approved the loan
without collateral.
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee classified
Apparel's loan with PNB as a behest loan. Thereafter, in
1998, a complaint was filed with the Ombudsman for
violation of Section 3(e) and (g), R. A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The case was dismissed by the
Ombudsman due to prescription. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD ACCORDING
TO RA 3019 BEGINS TO RUN ONLY ON THE DATE OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* According to Act 3326,
the prescriptive period begins to run either at the time of
the commission of the offense or the discovery of its
commission. According to the Ombudsman’s decision, the
period of prescription began at the time of the commission
of the offense.
However, the Supreme Court held that it would have been
impossible for the State to know about the violations of RA
3019 on the date of its commission due to the fact that the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
‘beneficiaries of the loans.
OTHER DOCTRINES: Where the computation of the
prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal action
should commence from the discovery of the offense, the
Ombudsman clearly acts with grave abuse of discretion if he
dismisses outright the complaint—he should first receive
the evidence from the parties to resolve the case on its
merits and on the issue of the date of discovery of the
offense.
3. CITY OF MANILA v. GARCIA | 26053 | 1967
The charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to
take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal
board.
FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land,
forming one compact area in Malate, Manila, and covered
by Torrens Titles. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947,
defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's
knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class
materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent,
and without the necessary building permits from the city.
There they lived thru the years to the present.
Few years thereafter, defendants were given written
permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy
specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set
forth. For their occupancy, defendants were charged
nominal rentals.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though
not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this
school's expansion, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the
Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city
property, gave each of defendants to vacate and remove his
construction or improvement on the premises.
This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each
defendant for the payment of the amount due by reason of
the occupancy and to vacate. The city’s evidence on this
point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board.
That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had
been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962–1963 Manila
City Budget, for the construction of an additional building
of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the
hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But
then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously
revised his views. He there declared that there was need for
defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion. He
cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT MAY TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF ORDINANCES?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* elimination of the
certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could
well have taken—because he was duty bound to take—
judicial notice of Ordinance 4566.
MAIN DOCTRINE: Where the trial court during the trial
rejected a certain exhibit as inadmissible but in its decision
it relied on that same exhibit to support its holding, and no
motion for reconsideration was filed on that point, the
appellate court will not reopen the case solely for that
purpose, since a court may alter its ruling while the case is
within its power to make it conformable to law and justice.
4. TABUENA v. CA AND TABERNILLA | 85423 | 1991
Evidence not formally offered cannot be considered by the
Court unless it has been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and second, it has itself been incorporated in the
records of the case. – The mere fact that a particular
document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a
party.
Page 2

GR: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the
adjudication of cases pending before them of the contents
of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or actually pending before the same judge.
XPN: In the absence of objection, and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or
any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives
as read into the record of a case pending before it, when:
 With the knowledge of the opposing party, reference
is made to it for that purpose, by name and number
or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or
 When the original record of the former case or any
part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by
the court’s direction, at the request or with the
consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the
record of the case then pending
FACTS: An action for recovery of ownership over a parcel of
land was filed by one Emiliano Tabernilla Jr against Jose
Tabuena, herein petitioner. During the trial, the testimony
of Tabuena from a different but similar case was taken
judicial notice of the court, to the prejudice of Tabuena.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favour of Tabernilla
and ordered Tabuena to vacate the land. Tabuena appealed
to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Tabuena elevated the case to the SC contending that the
trial court and CA erred in taking judicial notice of his
testimony in a different case to his prejudice in the present
action for recovery of ownership over a parcel of land,
hence this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT AND CA ERRED IN
TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF TABUENA’S TESTIMONY IN A
DIFFERENT CASE TO HIS PREJUDICE IN THE PRESENT
ACTION?
HELD: YES, the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in
taking judicial notice of his testimony in another case. It is
clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when,
"in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the
opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of
the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original
or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn
from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of
the case then pending." These conditions have not been
established here.
On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware
that his testimony in another case was being considered by
the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial
and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no
opportunity to counteract.
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
5. TORRES v. CA | 37421 | 1984
An original complaint once amended ceases to be a public
record or a judicial admission. An adverse statement in the
original pleading must be adduced and offered in evidence.
FACTS: Margarita Torres was married to Claro Santillan, and
they had two children: Vicente and Antonina. Antonina
married and had six children. After the death of her
husband, Margarita cohabited with Leon without the
benefit of marriage, and they had a child, Macaria Torres.
Subsequently, Leon and Margarita were married, and
Macaria lived with and was reared by her parents.
Lot 551 had been leased temporarily by the Government to
Margarita who was the actual occupant of the lot. On
December 13, 1910, the Director of Lands issued to
Margarita a Sale Certificate over said lot, payable in 20
annual installments. 20 years before his death, Leon sold
and transferred in a notarial deed his rights and interest to
the ½ portion of the lot in favor of Macaria.
On June 6, 1953, about 22 years after the death of
Margarita and 20 years after the death of Leon, Vicente
Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot
551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name. A
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the
legal heirs of Margarita.
Santillan and the children of Antonina filed a case of forcible
entry against Macaria, alleging that the latter had entered
a portion of the lot without their consent, constructed a
house thereon and refused to vacate upon demand.
Paragraph 3 of the original complaint states: “the plaintiffs
and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs
and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza,
Cavite on December 20, 1931.”
However, Santillan et. al amended the complaint, the
underlined portion was deleted so that the statement
simply read: “That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and
nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza,
Cavite, on December 20, 1931.”
Macaria claimed to be a co-owner of the lot, being one of
Margarita’s daughters. She instituted an action for partition
of the lot, alleging that said lot was the conjugal property of
Margarita and Leon, and that she is their legitimated child.
The statement in the original complaint for ejectment,
according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation
and is controlling in the determination of her participation
in the disputed property. The Ejectment Case and the
Partition Case were jointly tried and decided. The CA
declared that herein petitioner Macaria Torres is not a
legitimated child by reason that no allegation was made to
represent her right.
ISSUE: WHETHER ADMISSIONS NOT REITERATED IN THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE DEEMED WITHDRAWN?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* The admission adverted
to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents’ original
complaint in the Ejectment Case reading: “the plaintiffs and
the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and
nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza,
Cavite on December 20, 1931.”
In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in
the same Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was
deleted so that the statement simply read: “That the
plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita
Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931;”
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place
of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and
ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The
original complaint no longer forms part of the record.
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she
should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended,
the original complaint lost its character as a judicial
admission, which would have required no proof, and
became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility
of which, as evidence, required its formal offer.
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, therefore, there can be
no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original
complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence.
6. BAGUIO v. VDA DE JALAGAT | 28100 | 1971
Courts may take judicial notice of the previous cases decided
with finality of a judgment in a case previously pending and
decided by it.
FACTS: Herein petitioner Gabriel Baguio filed for the
quieting of title to real property against Teofila Jalagat and
her minor children with the Court of First Instance. The
Jalagats filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
present complaint is barred by a previous judgment
rendered by the same court.
The previous case involved practically the same property,
the same cause of action, and the same parties, with
Melecio Jalagat (Teofila’s deceased husband and
predecessor in interest) as the defendant. The previous
case was terminated with the court dismissing Baguio’s
complaint.Acting on the motion and taking judicial notice of
its previous judgment, the lower court dismissed the
present complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Consequently, Baguio appealed the order of dismissal.
He claimed that for the ground of res judicatato suffice as a
basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the
complaint. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER A LOWER COURT MAY TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF SUCH PREVIOUS CASE DECIDED BY HIM
RESULTING IN THE JUDGMENT RELIED UPON?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* The law would lend itself
to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would
sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its
futility.
It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the
circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial
notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was
previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was
all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the
dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law.
In addition, appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a
remedy which under the law then in force could be availed
of. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to
mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and
the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did
reflect a little more on the matter.
RULE 130
OBJECT EVIDENCE
SISON ET AL v. PEOPLE | 108280-83 | 1995
The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima
facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or
by other competent witnesses, after which the court can
admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy.
Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can
testify to its exactness and accuracy
FACTS: This case stems from the great political polarization
after the EDSA Revolution of 1986 between the Cory
loyalists and Marcos loyalist. During a rally held by Marcos
loyalists which includes herein petitioner Romeo Sison,
allegedly beat and boxed one Stephen Salcedo a Cory
loyalist resulting to his death.
Thereafter, a criminal complaint for murder was filed
against Sison et al on the basis of pieces of evidence which
includes photographs taken during the mauling incident
which were subsequently published in various magazines
and newspapers. The trial court found Sison et al guilty of
murder. Hence this case.
Sison argues that the photographs taken and thereafter
published in different newspapers and magazines are
inadmissible in evidence because its competency, which
may only be proven by the testimony of the person who
Page 3

took the same, or by other competent witnesses, was never
duly proven before the trial court, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED?
HELD: YES. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs,
when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced.
The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however,
is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has
taken. *See Stated Doctrine.*
In this case, that the photographs are faithful
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when
appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan
identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their
presence thereat.
ADMISIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN v. CA | 162571 | 2005
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. In
Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled
that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to
overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born
during the course of a marriage
FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin
Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support
pendente lite before the RTC. In their complaint,
respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship and impregnated Fe.
Arnel, however, denied having sired Martin. Fe and Martin,
as a result moved for the issuance of an order directing all
the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DNA TESTING IS A VALID MEANS
TO PROVE PATERNITY?
HELD: YES. The Court have long believed in the merits of
DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the
past. The case of Wilson v. Lumb 181 Misc 2d 1033 (1999)
shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in
some instances, ordering the procedure has become a
ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County,
New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged
paternity to subsequently challenge his prior
acknowledgment.
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
In Rafferty v. Perkins 757 So. 2d 992 (Miss. 2000), the
Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results
showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course
of a marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having been
rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins
as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury
could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the
99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA
testing.
EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO RA 4200
RAMIREZ v. CA | 93833 | 1995
Section 1 of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought
to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private
communication.
FACTS: Socorro D. Ramirez and Ester S. Garcia had a
conversation wherein the latter allegedly insulted and
humiliated Ramirez in a manner which was offensive to
Ramirez’ dignity and personality. Without the knowledge of
Garcia, Ramirez recorded their conversation.
Thereafter, due to the alleged humiliation she suffered,
Ramirez filed a civil case against Gercia praying that the
latter be ordered to pay Ramiraz moral damages. In support
of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of
their conversation.
As a result of Ramirez’ recording of the event, Garcia filed a
criminal complaint against Ramirez alleging that the act of
secretly taping their conversation constituted a violation of
RA 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire-
tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes."
Ramirez, on the other hand, argues, RA 4200 does not apply
to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties
to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely
refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation
by a party other than those involved in the communication.
In relation to this, Ramirez avers that the substance or
content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF THE
RECORDING IS ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: NO. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private
communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as
a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
1. PEOPLE v. TANDOY | 80505 | 1990
The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of
the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is
only as to whether or not such document was actually
executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Presentation of the "buy-bust money" is not indispensable
to the conviction of the accused-appellant.
FACTS: On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. the Makati
Police Station dispatched its officers to conduct a buy-bust
operation at Barangay Singkamas, Makati. The target area
was a store along the said street, and an officer was to pose
as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any
pusher to approach. The other members of the team
strategically positioned themselves.
Soon, three men approached designated officer-buyer. One
of them was the accused-appellant, who said without
preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said
yes. The exchange was made then and there — two
rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills
marked ANU (Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. The police
conducted a body search of the accused-appellant and took
from him the marked money, as well as eight more
rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves. The arresting
officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation.
The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having
been informed of his constitutional rights. Microscopic,
chemical and chromotographic examination was
performed on the confiscated marijuana by the National
Bureau of Investigation, who later testified that the findings
were positive. The marijuana was offered as an exhibit.
The accused-appellant denied the allegations. The Trial
Court held him guilty and the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court. Accused-appelant raised in his petition that
the Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite lack of
evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-
buyer, and that the Court a quo erred in admitting in
evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a
xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust
money.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE APPLY TO THE
MARKED BILLS?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The marked money is not
an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of
secondary evidence, except in five specified instances. In
this case, the marked money was presented solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents.
Therefore, other substitutionary evidence, such as a Xerox
copy, is admissible without need for the accounting of the
original. Besides, the presentation at the trial of the buy-
bust money was not indispensable to the conviction of
Tandoy since the sale of the marijuana had been sufficiently
proven by the testimony of the police officers involved in
the operation, and the marijuana actually sold had been
submitted as evidence.
2. PEOPLE v. TAN | 14257 | 1959
The best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest
grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact.
Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and
on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals,
and have been held to be as much primary evidence as the
originals.
FACTS: Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and her co-accused were
charged with the crime of falsification of public documents,
in their capacities as public officials and employees, for
having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or
merchandise were purchased by Gonzales for distribution
to calamity indigents, in such quantities and at such prices,
and from such business establishments or persons as
written in said public documents. The truth was, no such
distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and as
supposedly purchased had ever been made.
The prosecution presented as evidence a booklet of
receipts from the Metro Drug Corporation in Magallanes,
Cebu City. Said booklet contained triplicate copies, the
original invoices of which were sent to the company’s
Manila office, the dupicates given to customers, and the
triplicates left attached to the booklet.
Page 4

One of the Metro Drug’s salesmen who issued a receipt
further explained that, in preparing receipts for sales, two
carbon copies were used between the three sheets, so that
the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out of the use
of the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing
of the originals.
The trial court judge, Hon. Bienvenido Tan, interrupted the
proceeding, holding that the triplicates were not admissible
unless it was proven that the originals were lost and cannot
be produced.
Another witness was presented, and he alleged that the
former practice of keeping the original white copies no
longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers,
while only the duplicates are submitted to the Manila
office. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIPLICATES OF THE RECEIPTS
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* The court reiterated the
Moran who is a foremost commentator on the Rules of
Court who stated the when carbon sheets are inserted
between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the
writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the
signature of the party to be charged thereby, produced two
facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signatures being
thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made
the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so
written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of
them may be introduced in evidence as such without
accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
3. HUTCHISON v. BUSCAS | 158554 | 2005
The rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the
document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the
instrument itself. Failure to adduce such in evidence or to
produce secondary evidence upon proof of loss or
destruction of the former is fatal to the cause of action.
FACTS: On October 1, 1987, the Spouses Ronald and
Valentine Hutchison bought from V.A. Development
Enterprises, Inc. a land in San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga, and
occupied said land after a title was issued in their names.
On August 2, 1989, Juanita Arrastia, the owner of the
adjacent lot, sold a portion of her land to Enrique Buscas, as
evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in favor of Buscas. Though
Buscas occupied said land, he failed to register his portion
in his name and title remained in the name of Arrastia.
On January 10, 1995, Buscas commissioned geodetic
engineer Narciso Manansala to survey his property. The
survey revealed that a portion of Buscas land was occupied
the Sps. Hutchison. Despite a demand latter to vacate sent
to the Sps. Hutchison, however, the latter refused and
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RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
insisted that the area was part of their land. A complaint for
accion reinvindicatoria was filed.
Buscas presented in evidence the Quitclaim Deed to prove
his title over the disputed area, as well as testified on the
survey conducted by Manansala. Another geodetic
engineer confirmed the first survey with a verification plan
and report which had been made as directed by the MTC
judge in the previous unlawful detainer case which had
been dismissed.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE QUITCLAIM DEED SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE BUSCAS OWNERSHIP OF THE DISPUTED AREA?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The law requires that the
party who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it.
Art. 434 of the New Civil Code provides that “to successfully
maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
proeprty, the person who claims a better right to it must
prove two things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and;
second, his title thereto.” In this case, Buscas failed to
establish both requirements.
A cursory reading of the Quitclaim Deed reveals that it
specified only the extent of the area sold. Annex “A” of the
Deed, where the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly
described and where the specific portion of the property
sold to Buscas was marked, was not presented at the trial.
The Deed itself failed to mention the metes and bounds of
the land subject of the sale.
Thefore, it cannot be successfully used to identify the area
Buscas was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. The
presentation of the Annex “A” is essential as what defines a
piece of land is not the size mentioned in the instrument
but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and
indicate its exact limits.
The surveys cannot be given evidentiary weight to prove
the identity of the land sold to Buscas and his ownership
thereof, as they merely relied on the self-serving statement
of Buscas that he owns the portion of the lot adjacent to
that of the Sps. Hutchison.
Moreover, the rules on evidence provide that where the
contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best
evidence is the instrument itself. Here, the identity of the
land claimed and Buscas’ ownership thereof are the very
facts in issue.
The best evidence to prove such is the Quitclaim Deed and
its Annex “A” where Buscas derives his title and where the
land from which he purchased a part was described with
particularity, indicating the metes and bounds thereof.
Failure to adduce Annex “A” in evidence or produce
secondary evidence after proof of the loss of the former is
fatal to his cause.
4. RODELAS v. ARANZA | 58509 | 1982
The photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.
FACTS: On January 11, 1977 appellant filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor.
The petition was opposed by the appellee Amparo Aranza
Bonilla on the grounds that lost or destroyed holographic
wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike
ordinary wills.
Trial Court dismissed the petition for the probate of the will
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and ruled that once the original copy
of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand
in lieu of the original.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL WHICH
WAS LOST OR CANNOT BE FOUND CAN BE PROVED BY
MEANS OF A PHOTOSTATIC COPY?
HELD: YES, It may be proven by photostatic copy. Pursuant
to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills
is the allowance of the will by the court after its due
execution has been proved. However, if the holographic will
has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available,
the will cannot be probated because the best and only
evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will.
It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of
the holographic will may be allowed because comparison
can be made with the standard writings of the testator.
The Court ruled that the execution and the contents of a
lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it
shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself
as material proof of authenticity. Perhaps it may be proved
by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting
of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court."
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or
destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.
SECONDARY EVIDENCE
1. EBREO v. EBREO | 160065 | 2006
Under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, before a
party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original of a deed or document, the party
has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the
loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the
original of said deed or document.
The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not
sufficient proof of the transfer of property.
FACTS: Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926, leaving behind
as his heirs his 5 children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and
Felipa. He also left behind an untitled parcel of land in
Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, which, pursuant to the
subdivision made by him, was subdivided into six lots,
identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F.
On September 11, 1967, Felipe’s heirs executed and
asigned a document entitled, “Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng
Lupa,” whereby they extrajudicially partitioned the
property, except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F.
They agreed that said Lot F would remain under the co-
ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of
Felipa, who had already died. However, the plaintiffs were
surprised to discover that Lot F was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Antonio Ebreo, Felino’s son.
The defendants alleged that, after the execution of the
partition agreement, Lot F was sold by the heirs to Santiago
Puyo, by virtue of which, the corresponding Real Property
Tax Declaration was transferred in the latter’s name.
The lot was allegedly subsequently sold by Puyo to Antonio
Ebreo, for which a new tax declaration was issued.
However, the deed of sale evidencing the alleged
transaction between the heirs and Puyo, which was claimed
to have been executed and ratified in 1968 before Atty.
Doroteo Chavez, was never presented.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS’ FAILURE TO PRESENT
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF THE LAND TO PUYO
FATAL TO THEIR CLAIMS?
HELD: YES. The defendants claim that the Deed of Sale
could not be presented because the copy on file with the
Office of the City Assessor was lost in the fire which
occurred in May 23, 1979. They presented the testimonies
of Antonio Pajilan, an employee at the City Assessor’s
Office, Felino Ebreo, and Asuncion Aguado, the
stepdaughter of Santiago Puyo.
However, the testimonies are at most secondary evidence
which are inadmissible considering that the defendants
failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3,
Page 5

Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish conditions
for their admissibility.
Under this rule, before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of
a deed or document, the party has to prove with the
requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or
unavailability of all the copies of the original of said deed or
document.
The offeror must prove:
a) The execution and existence of the original;
b) The loss and destruction of the original or its non-
production in court; and
c) Unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith
on the part of the offeror.
The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is
not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and
inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was
incumbent on the defendants to adduce in evidence the
original or a copy of the deed consistent with Sec. 3, Rule
130 of the Ruloes of Court.
2. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA v. CA | 31189 | 1987
Pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule, in lieu of a Deed of Sale
evidencing the sale of a parcel of land, a certificate issued
by the Archives Division of the Bureau of Records
Management in Manila which shows, the nature of the
instrument, the subject of the sale, the parties of the
contract, the consideration, the names of the witness and
the date of the sale is sufficient in proving the contents of
the same Deed of Sale.
FACTS: A parcel of land owned by one Gonzalo Ditching
deceased was inherited by his granddaughter Norma
Leuenberger, herein private respondent.Thereafter
Leuenberger discovered that a part of the land she
inherited was being utilized by the Municipality of Victorias,
herein petitioner, as a burial and cemetery ground.
This prompted Leuenberger to write to the Mayor of
Victorias demanding the payment of past rentals and
requesting the delivery of the parcel of land allegedly
illegally occupied by Victorias. The Mayor replied that
Victorias brought the land from Ditching but the Deed of
Absolute Sale was lost. This prompted Leuenberger to file a
complaint before the trial court for the recovery of
possession of the parcel of land occupied by Victorias and
was being utilized as a cemetery.
The trial court decided in favour of Victorias and dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court
and held that Victorias is liable for rentals and the return of
the parcel of land. Now, Victorias assails the decision of the
CA before the SC, it argues that a certificate in lieu of the
DAS, and as secondary evidence, is admissible in evidence
to prove the contents of the DAS which in turn evidences
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
the sale of the parcel of land by Ditching in favour of
Victorias, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE
ARCHIVES DIVISION OF THE BUREAU OF RECORDS
MANAGEMENT IN MANILA MAY BE ADMITTED AS
EVIDENCE IN LIEU OF THE DAS PURSUANT TO THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* It is beyond question that
the foregoing certificate is an authentic document clearly
corroborated and supported by:
(a) The testimony of the municipal councilor of
Victorias, Ricardo Suarez, who negotiated the sale;
(b) The testimony of Emilio Cuesta, the municipal
treasurer of said municipality, since 1932 up to the
date of trial on September 14, 1964, who personally
paid the amount of P750.00 to Felipe Leuenberger
as consideration of the Contract of Sale;
(c) Certificate of Settlement "as evidence of said
payment;"
(d) Tax Declaration No. 429 which was cancelled and
was substituted by Tax Declaration No. 3600
covering the portion of the property unsold; and
(e) Tax Declaration No. 3601 in the name of the
Municipal Government of Victorias covering the
portion occupied as cemetery.
3. VILLA REY TRANSIT v. FERRER | 23893 | 1968
The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence
when the original is in the custody of the adverse party are:
a) The adverse party’s possession of the original;
b) Reasonable notice to the adverse party to produce
the same;
c) Satisfactory proof of its existence; and
d) The failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce
the original in court.
However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce
secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual
possession of the adversary. Neither is it required that the
party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice
to produce it, admit having it in his possession.
FACTS: Jose Villarama, the operator of the Villa Rey Transit
bus company pursuant to Certificates of Public Convenience
granted to him by the Public Service Commission, sold two
of the CPCs to the Pangasinan Transportation Company,
with the condition that Villarama shall not, for 10 years,
apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the
buyer.
Three months later, the Villa Rey Transit Inc. was formed,
with Villarama’s wife and relatives as stockholders and
incorporators. VRTI bought 5 CPCs from Valentin Fernando,
two of which was levied pursuant to a writ of execution in
favor of Eusebio Ferrer, a creditor of Fernando.
The CPCs were sold at auction, of which Ferrer was the
highest bidder. Ferrer then sold the CPCs to Pantranco. VRTI
filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff’s sale in favor
of Ferrer and the subsequent sale of the CPCs to Pantranco.
Pantranco, on its part, alleged that Jose Villarama and VRTI
were one and the same; hence, the non-competition clause
in the abovementioned deed of sale executed by Villarama
is also binding to VRTI. As evidence, Pantranco presented
photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers, the
admissibility of which was assailed by Villarama on the
ground that the best evidence were the originals
themselves.
ISSUE: THE PHOTOSTATIC COPIES OF THE LEDGER ENTRIES
AND VOUCHERS OF VRTI SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
PANTRANCO’S ALLEGATIONS, AND THEREBY ARE
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. The photostatic copies of the ledger entries and
vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his
personal funds and transactions with those made in the
name of VRTI are very illuminating evidence. *See Stated
Doctrine*
Villarama himself admitted the previous existence of the
files of VRTI. He said that the originals were missing and that
VRTI was no longer in possession of the same. However, it
is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary
evidence to show that the original is in the actual
possession of the adversary.
It is enough that circumstances show that the writing is in
his possession or under his control. It is also not required
that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument,
upon notice to produce it, admit having it in his possession.
The party seeking its production may introduce a copy
thereof as in the case of loss because among the exceptions
to the best evidence rule is “when the original has been lost,
destroyed or cannot be produced in court. The original of
the vourchers in this case must be deemed to have been
lost, thus, secondary evidence are admissible.
4. DE VERA v. AGUILAR | 83377 | 1993
Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, therefore,
the proponent must first establish the former existence of
the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence, execution, loss, contents, although this order may
be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
FACTS: Marcosa Bernabe’s children mortgaged Bernabe’s
land. Upon maturity of the mortgage, the Spouses Mariano
and Leona Aguilar redeemed the property, and were able
to acquire a title to said property. The title in the name of
Bernabe, meanwhile, was cancelled.
Three years later, however, Bernabe’s heirs wrote to the
Spouses Aguilar, claiming that, as Bernabe’s children, they
were co-owners of the property and, hence, entitled to the
partition thereof.
They also claimed that the Sps. Aguilar had resold the
property to Bernabe. They filed a suit for reconveyance of
the lot and presented a Xerox copy of an alleged deed of
sale executed by the Sps. Aguilar, selling, transferring and
conveying back to Bernabe the disputed lot.
The trial court ruled in their favor. The Sps. Aguilar assailed
the admissibility of the Xerox copy of the deed of sale on
the ground that it was not the best evidence of the alleged
sale and, hence, should be excluded.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE XEROX COPY OF THE DEED OF SALE
PROPERLY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: NO. Under the Rules of Court, when the original
writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction,
or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or
by the recollection of witnesses.
*See Stated Doctrine* In this case, the trial court merely
ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged
deed of sale. Existence was sufficiently proved by the
xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.
Execution, meanwhile, may be established by the person or
persons who executed it, by the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was
present and saw it executed or who, after its execution saw
it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom
the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the
execution thereof.
However, the loss or destruction of the originals were not
proved. This may be done through the testimony of any
person who knew the fact of its loss or by anyone who had
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place(s) where papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody
the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or
who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to
satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. Also, all
duplicates of such document must first be accounted for
before using copies.
Since all the duplicates are parts of the writing itself to be
proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself
can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its
parts are unavailable. Here, the notary public testified that
there were 4 or 5 original copies of the alleged deed of sale.
The petitioners, however, failed to account for all these
copies. Therefore, secondary evidence cannot be admitted.
Page 6

5. US v. GREGORIO & BALISTOY | 5791 | 1910
In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is
indispensable that the judges and the courts have before
them the document alleged to have been simulated,
counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find,
pursuant to the evidence produced at trial, whether or not
the crime of falsification was actually committed.
In the absence of the original document, it is improper to
conclude, with only a copy of said original in view, that there
has been a falsification of a document which was neither
found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the
existence of such original may be doubted.
FACTS: Pedro Salazar filed a suit for the collection of a sum
of money against Eustaquio Balistoy. Judgment was
rendered in favor of the former, and Balistoy was ordered
to pay him P275.92, plus interest. Two rural properties
belonging to Balistoy were attached and set for sale at a
public auction on May 27, 1908.
Before the auction, Bernardo Gregorio requested the
deputy sheriff to exclude one of the properties from
attachment as he owned said property, having acquired it
by purchase from Balistoy in 1905, prior to the filing of the
complaint.
Gregorio presented to the sheriff a document, at the end of
which appears a memorandum stating that Balistoy bought
the land referred to from Luis Balistoy and subsequently
sold it to Gregorio. Salazar filed a complaint for falsification
against Gregorio and Balistoy for having simulated the
conveyance of the property in favor of Gregorio in order to
avoid its attachment and sale.
Salazar further alleged that, though the said memorandum
was dated February 1905, it was actually written in April
1908. However, the original document setting forth the
memorandum was not presented, and only a copy thereof
was produced in court.
ISSUE: WHETHER A PERSON BE CONVICTED OF
FALSIFICATION OF A DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE ORIGINAL
OF SAID FALSIFIED DOCUMENT?
HELD: NO. The issue in this case is whether the subject
memorandum was falsified, having been made to appear to
have been written on a date prior to the one when it was
actually prepared and simulating the sale to a third party of
a land, with the intent to defraud the creditor who, through
proper judicial process, solicited and obtained the
attachment and sale of said land.
Though the sheriff testified to having seen the original of
the document wherein the memorandum was written, or at
least the original memorandum of the conveyance, the
mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated private
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ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
document cannot legally produce the effect of suspending
the sale of said land inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient
proof of the right of Gregorio, being a mere copy of a
private document whose legality has not been proven.
He was not able to compare the copy of the memorandum
with that written on the original document, having only
seen the original for a few moments.
As the original document setting forth said memorandum
was not presented, but merely a copy thereof, and as it
could not be ascertained who had the original of said
document, nor the exact date when it was written, doubt
arises as to whether the original of the document really
existed at all and whether the memorandum is an exact
copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of said
original document. Consequently, Gregorio and Balistoy
cannot be convicted of its falsification.
6. MAGDAYAO v. PEOPLE | 152881 | 2004
As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should
not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in
nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear
showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court.
To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when
the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the
adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails
or refuses to produce the same in court.
FACTS: On September 16, 1993, Engr. Magdayao was
charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued to
Ricky Olvis a check dates September 30, 1991, in the
amount of P600,000.00, despite not having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank, the Philippine National
Bank, Dipolog Branch.
Olvis alleged that, upon learning that the check was
dishonored, Magdayao pleaded for time to pay the amount
by retrieving the check and replacing it with two other
checks.
Magdayao, however, reneged on his promise. Despite
repeated demands by Olvis, Magdayao failed to make good
the check’s value. As evidence for the prosecution, a
photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 was admitted by the
court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of Olvis.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PHOTOCOPY OF THE SUBJECT CHECK
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PRODUCE THE ORIGINAL DISHONORED
CHECK?
HELD: NO, it is admissible. While it is true that it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the
original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the
contents thereof, especially the names of the drawer and
endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof,
as well as the reason for such dishonor.
Under the Rules on Evidence, when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of the document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original thereof. This rule
requiring the production of the best evidence is to prevent
fraud.
If a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it
and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the
presumption is that the best evidence was withheld from
the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious
purpose which its production would expose and defeat.
In case the original is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, the latter must be given reasonable notice,
and if he still fails or refuses to produce the original in court,
only then may secondary evidence be presented.
In this case, Magdayao never produced the original of the
check, much less offered to produce the same. He
deliberately withheld the original of the check as a
bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to
adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do due
to numerous unjustified postponements.
NOTE; HOW NOTICE IS MADE: The mere fact that the
original of the writing is in the custody or control of the
party against whom it is offered does not warrant the
admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove
that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence
by giving notice to the said party to produce the document.
The notice may be in the form of a motion for the
production of the original or made in open court in the
presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces
tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has
sufficient time to produce the same.
When such party has the original of the writing and does
not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.
7. COMPANIA MARITIMA v. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION
| 28999 | 1977
The general rule is that an audit made by or the testimony
of a private auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of
the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like,
unless it is proved that there would be difficulty or
impossibility in producing the records in court and the
examination and analysis thereof.
FACTS: On August 11, 1952, the Compañia Maritima and
the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written
contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and
stevedoring work for Compañia Maritima’s vessels at Iligan
City.
The shippers and consignees paid the union only for the
arrastre work, but refused to pay for the stevedoring
service. The company argues that the accountants’ reports
are admissible in evidence because of the rule that “when
the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole”, the original
writings need not be produced. The same was contested
hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE AUDITOR’S REPORTS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AS PROOF OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDS, BOOKS
OF ACCOUNTS, REPORTS OR THE LIKE?
HELD: NO. The exception to the best evidence rule, which
states that “when the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole, the original writings need not be produced,” cannot
be applied in this case.
The voluminour character of the records on which the
accountant’s reports were based was not duly established.
Moreover, in order for said rule to be applied, the records
and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse
party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested
on cross-examination.
*See Stated Doctrine* The company failed to show the
difficulty or impossiblity of producing the records in court
and their examination and analysis as evidence by the
court.
NOTE: I.e. The Requisites for the given exception is for the
following to be established.
 Voluminous character of the document;
 Records and accounts should be made accessible to
the adverse party so that the correctness of the
summary may be tested on cross-examination; and
 A preliminary showing as to the difficulty or
impossibility attending the production of the
records in court and their examination and analysis
as evidence by the court
8. GAN v. YAP | 12190 | 1958
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
– In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself
must be produced. Therefore, a lost holographic will cannot
be probated.
FACTS: On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap
died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas
Page 7

Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the
City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these
proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a
petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly
executed by the deceased. Opposing the petition, her
surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased
had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her
lifetime.
The will itself was not presented and was instead
established by several witnesses. After hearing the parties
and considering their evidence, the Judge, refused to
probate the alleged will. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL BE PROBATED
UPON THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES WHO HAVE
ALLEGEDLY SEEN IT AND WHO DECLARE THAT IT WAS IN
THE HANDWRITING OF THE TESTATOR?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The court ruled that the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony
of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss
of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium
of proof.
Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and
probate a lost holographic will, the Court held think the
evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure
up to that “clear and distinct“ proof required by Rule 77,
sec. 6. 11.
PAROL EVIDENCE
1. ROBLES v. LIZARRAGA ERMANOS | 26173 | 1927
The rule against the admission of parol evidence does not
extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic
evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol
agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be
received, regardless of whether or not the written
agreement contains any reference to such collateral
agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity.
FACTS: As administratrix of the estate of her husband
Zacarias Robles, Sr., Anastacia de la Rama she leased the
hacienda “Nahalinan” to Zacarias Robles, Jr. for six years.
Robles, Jr., at his expense and without any right of
indemnity at the end of the term, made various
improvements and additions to the plant, such as new
hydraulic press, reconstruction of dwelling house, building
of camarins, reconstruction of ovens, and others. Anastacia
died, and three years before the lease was to expire,
Lizarraga Hermanos, a mercantile partnership, proposed to
buy all of the property belonging to the hacienda.
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
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ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
As Robles, Jr., still had over two years in his lease contract,
he was asked to surrender such last two years and permit
Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as buyer. Lizarraga
Hermanos agreed to pay him the value of all betterments
made on the hacienda and to buy from him all that
belonged to him personally on the hacienda.
However, no reference of such surrender of Robles’ rights
as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease should
end, nor of anything said concerning the improvements or
property of a personal nature, was placed in the instrument
of conveyance later executed. Robles, Jr., eventually filed a
complaint against Lizarraga Hermanos for the recovery of
compensation for improvements made by him on the
hacienda and the value of implements and farming
equipment supplied by him, as well as damages for breach
of contract.
As evidence, he presented a letter written by Severiano
Lizarraga to him, in which a reference is made to an
appraisal and liquidation. Lizarraga Hermanos, however,
assailed the admission of the letter as being prohibited
parol evidence.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE SUBJECT LETTER ADMISSIBLE AS
EVIDENCE APART FROM THE INSTRUMENT OF
CONVEYANCE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* The purpose of parol
evidence is to enforce an independent or collateral
agreement constituting an inducement ot the making of the
sale, or part of the consideration therefor.
There is no rule of evidence of wider application than that
which declares intrinsic evidence inadmissible either to
contradict or vary the terms of a written contract, such
being deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or
stipulations concerning its terms and the subject matter
which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the
absence of accident, fraud or mistake of fact.
In this case, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to
Lizarraga Hermanos only such interests in certain properties
as had come to the conveyors by inheritance, not those
which Robles, Jr. had acquired by lease or purchase, or
those that he had placed thereon by way of improvement.
The verbal contract established in this case is therefore
clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance,
and evidence of such is admissible under the doctrine above
stated. The written contract is complete in itself, the oral
agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to
the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals
with related matters.
NOTE: Parol evidence was used in this case and the two
subsequent cases to determine the motive of the parties for
their actions. In this case it was the motivation of the seller
to sell the same which involves the seller receiving
reimbursement for the improvements that the given seller
has made.
2. PNB v. SEETO | 4388 | 1952
Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection
with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parol
evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and
indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument
without impairing its credit is provable by parol.
FACTS: On March 13, 1948, Benito Seeto presented to the
Philippine National Bank at Surigao a check in the amount
of P5,000, payable to cash or bearer, and drawn by one Gan
Yek Kiao against the Cebu branch of the Philippine National
Bank of Communications.
After consultation with the bank employees, Seeto made a
general and unqualified endorsement of the check, which
was accepted by PNB’s agency, which paid Seeto the value
of the check therefore. Upon being presented to the
drawee bank for payment, however, the check was
dishonored for “insufficient funds.”
PNB demanded refund from Seeto. Seeto, however,
refused, claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the
check, the drawer had sufficient funds in the drawee bank,
and had not PNB delayed in forwarding the check until the
drawer’s funds were exhausted, the same would have been
paid. PNB alleged that Seeto gave assurances that the
drawer of the check had sufficient funds with the bank, and
that Seeto had made a general and unqualified
indorsement thereon.
As evidence, PNB presented two witnesses at the trial, who
testified that the check was cashed due to assurances given
by Seeto and the promise that he would refund the amount
paid by PNB should the check be dishonored.
ISSUE: WHETHER PAROL EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE
VERBAL ASSURANCES MADE BY SEETO BE ADMITTED AS
EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* If, therefore, the
supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that
the Seeto would refund the amount of the check if the
drawer had no funds, were the considerations or reasons
that induced the branch agency of PNB to go out of its
ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and
accept the check and to pay its face value, the same would
be provable by parol, provided, of course, that the
assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or
destroy the obligations attached by law to the indorsement.
However, in this case, there was no express obligation
assumed by Seeto that the drawer would always have
funds, or that he would refund the amount of the check
even if there was delay in its presentation. Therefore,
though the supposed assurances given were part of Seeto’s
obligation as an indorser, such assurances were discharged
by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check
for payment.
3. WOODHOUSE v. HALILI | 4811 | 1953
Fraud and false representation, being an incident to the
creation of a jural act, not to its integration, are not
governed by the rules on integration. The parol evidence
rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when
the validity of the instrument is put in issue by the pleadings.
FACTS: On November 29, 1947, plaintiff Woodhouse
entered into a written agreement with defendant Halili for
a partnership for the bottling and distribution of Mission
soft drinks, plaintiff to act as industrial partner or manager,
and the defendant as a capitalist.
The plaintiff was to secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise
for and in behalf of the proposed partnership and that the
plaintiff was to receive 30 per cent of the net profits of the
business.
Prior to the agreement, plaintiff had informed the Mission
Dry Corporation that he had interested a prominent
financier who was willing to invest in the bottling and
distribution of the said beverages, and requested, in order
that he may close the deal with him, that the right to bottle
and distribute be granted him for a limited time under the
condition that it will finally be transferred to the
corporation.
Pursuant to this request, plaintiff was given thirty days
option on exclusive bottling and distribution rights. Plaintiff
prayed for the execution of the contract of partnership;
accounting of profits and share thereof of 30 percent with
damages.
The Defendant on the other hand claims that the
defendant’s consent to the agreement, was secured by
false representation of plaintiff that he was the owner, or
was about to become owner of an exclusive bottling
franchise.
Such representation was false since the franchise had
already expired and was given to Halili himself, who claimed
his consent to the agreement was vitiated by fraud. As
evidence, Halili presented, among others, drafts of the
agreement prior to the final one, which drafts are presumed
to have already been integrated in the final agreement. The
prior drafts allegedy showed that Woodhouse presented
himself as the exclusive grantee of the franchise.
ISSUE: WHETHER PRIOR DRAFTS FALL UNDER THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST PAROL EVIDENCE?
HELD: NO. As the purpose of considering the prior drafts is
not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but to discover
Page 8

the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the contract. The factual issue
in this case is whether Woodhouse misrepresented himself
to Halili. Hence, his acts or statements prior to the
agreement are essential and relevant to the determination
of the issue.
Previous acts or statements are not being introduced as
evidence to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but
to prove how Woodhouse induced Halili to enter into it, to
prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with
which or by which he secured the other party’s consent
thereto. Such are expressly excluded from the parol
evidence rule.
Were parties prohibited from proving said representations
or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had
already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove
misrepresentation or fraud. Furthermore, the parol
evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be
introduced when the validity of the instrument is put in
issue by the pleadings.
NOTE: The main issue of the case is that of Partnership that
is whether a party may be compelled to enter into a
partneship, wherein the Court held that the law recognizes
the individual's freedom or liberty to do an act he has
promised to do, or not to do it as he pleases. This is a very
personal act of which courts may not compel compliance,
as it is considered as an act of violence to do so.
4. INCIONG v. CA | 96405 | 1996
For the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need
not be in any particular form or signed by both partes.
As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a
similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted
by parol or extrinsic evidence.
FACTS: Baldomero Inciong, Jr., along with Rene Naybe and
Gregorio Pantanosas, signed a promissory note in the
amount of P50,000.00, holding themselves jointly and
severally liable to the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Having failed to pay their obligation on the expiration date
of the note, PBC sent letters to both Inciong and Naybe,
demanding payment of the debt. When neither Inciong nor
Naybe respondend, PBC filed a complaint for the collection
of a sum of money against the three debtors, of whom only
Inciong was served summons.
In his answer, Inciong attempted to adduce evidence in
order to defeat the terms of the promissory note, claiming
that parol evidence may should be allowed as the note was
not a public deed but a mere commercial paper which did
not bear the signature of attesting witnesses.
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RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
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Inciong alleged that he was only persuaded by third parties
to act as a co-maker to the loan incurred by Naybe, who was
allegedly interested ina certain falcata logs operation
business but was unable to procure money to buy a
chainsaw to be contributed thereto. Inciong claimed he
only signed as co-maker for the loan of P5,000.00, not
P50,000.00, stressing that he indicated such in one of the
five copies of the blank promissory note which he signed.
He claimed that, through trickery, fraud and
misrepresentation, he was made liable for P50,000.00.
ISSUE: WHETHER A PROMISSORY NOTE FALL UNDER THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE?
HELD: YES. The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule
states: “When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.”
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written
agreement be a public document. What is required is that
such be in writing. *See Stated Doctrine.*
In this case, however, Inciong can adduce parol evidence to
prove a contemporaneous agreement that was the inducing
and moving cause of the written agreement. Inciong can
prove by alleging fraud that he agreed to a loan of only
P5,000.00. However, fraud must be established by clear and
convincing evidence, which Inciong failed to do.
5. YU TEK v. GONZALES | 9935 | 1915
Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the
essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence
is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all
in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
FACTS: Yu Tek & Co. and Basilio Gonzales entered into a
Purchase Agreement covering 600 piculs of sugar at any
place within the municipality of Santa Rosa for P3,000, to
be paid in advance. The validity of the Purchase Agreement
was from January 1, 1912 up to March 31, 1912 only.
It was also stipulated that failure of Gonzales to deliver the
600 piculs of sugar within 3 months would rescind the
contract, thereby obligating Gonzales to return the P3,000
to Yu Tek & Co., along with another P1,200 as indemnity for
loss and damages.
Gonzales failed to comply with his obligation. As a defense,
he claimed that the agreement between him and Yu Tek
required delivery of the sugar from his own plantation and
nowhere else. Yu Tek & Co., however, claimed that there
was no such restriction as to the source of the sugar to be
delivered. Gonzales was free to buy the sugar from the
market or raise it himself, so long as he complied with his
obligation.
ISSUE: WHETHER PAROL EVIDENCE BE ALLOWED TO
DETERMINE THE TRUE INTENT OF THE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN YU TEK & CO. AND GONZALES?
HELD: NO. This case appears to be one to which the rule
excluding parol evidence to add to or vary the terms of a
written contract is decidedly applicable. There is not the
slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to be
raised by the defendant.
*See Stated Doctrine.* In this case, Gonzales undertook to
deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time.
No restriction was placed as to matter of obtaining the
sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on the market
or raise it himself.
Though Gonzales owned a plantation and expected to raise
the sugar himself, he did not limit his obligation to his own
crop of sugar. Therefore, the condition which Gonzales
seeks to add to the contract by parol evidence cannot be
considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by
the writing itself.
6. LECHUGAS v. CA | 39972 | 1986
The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not
properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against
the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not
party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.
FACTS: Victoria Lechugas allegedly bought the subject
properties from Leoncia Lasangue, as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale which was registered with the Register of
Deeds. Lechugas claimed that the Lozas, by means of fraud,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered said
properties and appropriated the produce thereof for
themselves, refusing to surrender the same despite
demands.
The Lozas, however, deny that the properties which
Lechugas bought from Lasangue in 1950 was the same
subject land. They claimed that their predecessor, Hugo
Loza, had bought a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor,
and another adjoining land from one Emeterio Lasangue.
The remaining portion of the lot bought from Limor was
allegedly the one bought by Lechugas. This was
corroborated by Lasangue in her testimony, who, although
illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land sold to
Lechugas. Such testimony, however, was contrary to the
contents of the deed of sale executed between Lasangue
and Lechugas.
ISSUE: WHETHER PAROL EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ADMITTED TO DETERMINE THE LAND BOUGHT BY
LECHUGAS?
HELD: YES. The Parol Evidence Rule does not apply where
the controversy is between one of the parties to the
document and third persons. While the deed of sale was
executed between Lasangue and Lechugas, the dispute
over what was actually sold was between Lechugas and the
Lozas. Lasangue, therefore, is a stranger to the dispute and
is not bound by the rule.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies only as between parties to
the written agreement or their privies, and not to strangers.
It does not apply where either one of the parties between
whom the question arises is a stranger to the written
agreement and does not claim under or through one who is
party to it.
7. LAND SETTLEMENT DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. GARCIA
PLANTATION | 17820 | 1963
When operation of contract depends on occurrence of an
event which is a condition precedent, such may be
established by parol evidence.
Filing of action not premature where supposed agreement
of extension could have been proven in effective if the trial
court had admitted parol evidence of condition precedent
not complied with.
FACTS: LSDC filed a specific action case against Garcia
Plantation (Salud and Vicente Garcia) for the recovery of
P5,955.30, as unpaid balance of 2 tractors bought by
respondents. Salud was made a co-defendant because of
two promissory notes executed by her, whereby she
personally assumed the account of the company and her
husbad Vicente.
Defendants contended that it has been novated by a
subsequent agreement contained in a letter (Exh. L) sent by
Filomeno C. Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators of the
LSDC allowing an extension to pay (Until May 31, 1957).
Furthermore, since the complaint was filed on February 20,
1957, they claimed that the action was premature and
prayed that the complaint be dismiss. LSDC admitted the
genuiness of the letter but contended that the same did not
express the true and intent agreement of the parties,
thereby placing the fact in issue.
The parties requested for more time to settle the case but
the court ordered a trial on the merits. At the trial, the
defendant admitted defendant admitted the documentary
evidence of its debt.
When the plaintiff presented Atty. Lucido A. Guinto, Legal
Officer of the Board of Liquidators, to testify on the true
Page 9

agreement and the intention of the parties at the time the
letter was drafted and prepared, the lower court judge,
upon the objection of the counsel for defendants, ruled out
said testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence
under the parol evidence rule.
Since the court ruled out Atty. Guinto’s testimony, writer of
the letter in question, the plaintiff rested its case. The lower
court dismissed the case. CA certified the case to the SC.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING PAROL
EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. The lower court should have admitted the parol
evidence sought to be introduced to prove the failure of the
document in ques tion to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. It should not have improvidently
and hastily excluded said parol evidence, knowing that the
subject matter treated therein, was one of the exceptions
to the parol evidence rule.
When the operation of the contract is made to depend
upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is
a condition precedent, such may be established by parol
evidence.
Where the agreement extending time for payment of the
defendant’s accounts to a date subsequent to the filing of
the action to recover the said indebtedness, made
reference to a previous agreement, the trial court should
have admitted evidence of surrounding circumstances to
show that the supposed agreement to extend never
become effective by reason of failure of some collateral
condi tion.
Had the trial court permitted, as it should, the plaintiff to
prove the condition precedent to the extension of the
payment, the said plaintiff would have been able to show
that because the defendants had failed to pay a substantial
down payment, the agreement was breached and the
contract contained in Exhibit “L”, never became effective
and the extension should be considered as not having been
given at all.
So that, although the complaint was filed on Feb ruary 20,
1957, three months before the deadline of the exten sion
on May 31, 1957, there would be no premature institution
of the case.
8. PIONEER SAVINGS AND LOAN BANKS v. CA | 105419 |
1993
Parol evidence rule does not apply to prove conditions
subsequent in a deed of sale where such conditions were not
stated in the agreement.
FACTS: Herein plaintiff Bank acquired ownership over a
motor vehicle by virtue of a Deed of Sale, executed by and
between Finasia Investment and Finance Corporation and
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the plaintiff Bank. Subsequently, defendant Manuel Santos,
in his capacity as manager of plaintiff bank’s General
Services Department, was given the privilege to use and
possess the aforementioned vehicle coterminous with his
employment.
In a regular board meeting of plaintiff Bank held on June 28,
1984 at its principal office, the Board unanimously passed
Resolution No. 26, Series of 1984, authorizing any two
among the President, Arturo G. Eudela, and the two First
Vice Presidents to jointly sign any deed or contract involving
the sale, transfer or conveyance of bank’s assets or
properties, pursuant to the recommendation of the
Executive Committee.
Pursuant to said authority, the plaintiff bank, through its
President and First Vice President for a consideration of
P40,000.00 in cash actually received from defendant
Manuel Santos in the presence of a bank employee, sold
transferred and conveyed unto the defendant the
aforedescribed motor vehicle, free from all liens and
encumbrances. Said document of sale is duly notarized.
Sometime in August 1984, respondent Santos ceased to be
employed with petitioner bank. He took the car with him.
On 12 April 1985, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent Santos for recovery of the motor vehicle, with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin. In this
petition, the main contention of the petitioner is that there
was actually no consideration in the sale of the motor
vehicle to respondent Santos, and that such sale was part
of an underlying agreement between petitioner and
respondent Santos was that in the event private
respondent’s relatives failed to recover their time deposits
due to the bank’s closure, then private respondent could
keep the car as recompense. After trial, the lower court
rendered judgment in favor of respondent Santos. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DEED OF SALE OF THE VEHICLE TO
RESPONDENT SANTOS MAY BE PROVED OR ALTERED BY
PAROL EVIDENCE UNDER THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* In De la Rama vs.
Ledesma, the Court held that It is a well accepted principle
of law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal
agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid instrument.
‘While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to
explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at
all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
(Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384.)”
The Court find merit in the private respondent’s contention
that petitioner failed to produce any instrument or written
document which would prove that the deed of sale in
question was only a security for the time deposit
placements of respondent’s relatives in the petitioner bank.
The two (2) main witnesses for the petitioner, namely,
Messrs. Eudela and Pangilinan, were not mere employees
of the bank. They were bank officers; one being a lawyer,
and supposed to be steeped in legal and banking knowledge
and practices.
As such, they were expected to know the consequences of
their act of signing a document which outrightly transferred
ownership over the subject vehicle in favor of respondent
Santos. They could have incorporated in the deed of sale (if
such was the intention or agreement of the parties) a
stipulation that transfer of ownership and registration of
the vehicle in Santos’ name were conditioned on the failure
of his relatives to recover their time deposit placements in
petitioner bank.
No such stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale
which was an outright and unconditional transfer of
ownership of the motor vehicle to respondent Santos.
9. MAULINI v. SERRANO | 8844 | 1914
The purpose of the prohibition against parol evidence is to
prevent alteration, change, modification or contradiction of
the terms of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by
the use of parol evidence, except in the cases specifically
named in the section.
FACTS: Don Antonio Serrano loaned P3,000 to Padern,
Moreno & Co. in behalf of Don Fernando Maulini. The loan
was covered by a promissory note signed by F. Moreno in
behalf of his own behalf and in behalf of his partner Jose
Padern, payable to Serrano. Said promissory note was
indorsed by Serrano in favor of Maulini, who is the real
creditor.
Padern & Co. failed to pay at the time of the due date so
Maulini instituted an action against the the company and
Serrano for the collection of a sum of money. Serrano
presented parol evidence, claiming that he was merely
negotiating as agent in behalf of Maulini to loan money to
the company, and that he received no other consideration
for the said note other than a small amount for his services.
Hence, he could not be held liable as an indorser. As there
was no consideration, Serrano could not be deemed an
indorser. Maulini claimed that all parol evidence should not
have been admitted, the terms of the agreement having
been deemed reduced to writing.
The promissory note, as it serves as evidence that there was
a contract of indorsement, should be the only evidence
admitted to determine the facts and circumstances of the
case.
ISSUE: WHETHER PAROL EVIDENCE BE ADMITTED TO
SHOW THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* In this case, the evidence
offered was not for the purpose of varying, altering,
modifying or contradicting the terms of the contract of
indorsement admittedly existing between the parties, but
to deny that there ever existed any agreement whatever.
In other words, the purpose of the parol evidence was to
demonstrate that a relation of any kind whatever was
created or existed between him and the indorsee by reason
of the writing on the back of the instrument and that no
consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of any
kind whatsoever.
Where an indorser claims that his name was forged, it is
clear that parol evidence is admissible to prove that fact,
and, if he proves it, it is a complete defense, the fact being
that the indorser never made any such contract, that no
such relation ever existed between him and the indorsee,
and that there was no consideration whatever to sustain
such a contract.
In this case, while the indorser does not claim that his name
was forged, he does claim that it was obtained from him in
a manner which, between the parties themselves, renders
the contract as completely inoperative as if it had been
forged.
10. CANUTO v. MARIANO | 11346 | 1918
The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic
evidence to alter, vary or contradict a written instrument
does not apply to an agreement between the parties,
entered into subsequent to the time when the written
instrument was executed.
FACTS: Espiridonia Canuto and Juan Mariano entered into a
contract of sale with a right to repurchase over a parcel of
land for P360. Such right of repurchase was to expire on
December 4, 1914, one year after.
Two days before such expiration, Canuto begged an
extension of time to repurchase the land as she would only
be able to get the money to pay Mariano within the end of
the month. Mariano agreed to extend it till December 31,
as witnessed by Severino Pascual.
The following Sunday, Canuto went to the house of
Mariano, who promised to meet her at the house of an Atty.
Mercado the next afternoon. However, when Canuto went
to the meeting place the next day, Mariano didn’t show up.
Since then, Mariano has refused to carry out the alleged
oral agreement, insisting that the redemption period as set
in the deed of sale.
Page 10

ISSUE: WHETHER PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO SUCH
EXTENSION BE ALLOWED?
HELD: YES. The rule forbidding the admission of parol or
extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written
instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the
establishment by parol of an agreement between the
parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time
when the written instrument was executed,
notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of
adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether
abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the
writing.
Such parol evidence does not in any way deny that the
original agreement of the parties was that which the writing
purports to express, but merely goes to show that the
parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the
same, or to make a new and independent contract.
It is immaterial how soon after the execution of the written
contract the parol agreement was made. If it was in fact
subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable, it may be
proved and enforced.
11. CRUZ v. CA | 79962 | 1990
A deed is not conclusive of every fact stated therein. A
distinction should be made between a statement of fact
expressed in the instrument, which may be varied by parol
evidence, and the terms of the contractual act, which may
not be varied by such.
A receipt is merely a written admission of a transaction
independently existing, and is not conclusive. Hence, it does
not fall under the Parol Evidence Rule.
FACTS: Salonga filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money in the amount of P35,000, which Cruz allegedly
borrowed and of which loan only P20,000 had been paid.
Cruz also allegedly failed to comply with his part of a
“pakyawan” agreement, whereby Salonga would be given
an exclusive right to purchase the harvest of certain
fishponds being leased by Cruz.
Cruz, however, claims that the P35,000 had been received,
not as a loan, but as consideration for their “pakyaw”
agreement. It was Salonga who owed him money for
actually occupying the fishpond, but failing to pay rentals
for the 10-month period. Salonga denied this, claiming that,
aside from the P35,000 which he gave Cruz, he also paid
P28,000 as consideration for the “pakyaw” agreement,
which was evidenced by a receipt.
Cruz, as well as two other witnesses, testified that the
receipt explained the transaction behind the “pakyawan”
agreement. However, it was argued that, the receipt being
very clear in its language in its non-reference to the
transaction referring to the agreement, its tenor must not
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be clouded by any parol evidence which may be introduced
by Cruz.
ISSUE: WHETHER PAROL EVIDENCE MAY BE ADMITTED?
HELD: YES. The parol evidence rule is predicated on the
existence of a document embodying the terms of an
agreement. As the receipt only attested to Cruz’s receipt of
P35,000 from Salonga without even mentioning the
transaction which gave rise to its issuance, it is not and
could not have been intended by the parties to be the sole
memorial of their agreement.
At most, it can only be considered a casual memorandum
of a transaction between the parties and an
acknowledgement of the receipt of money executed by
Cruz in favor of Salonga. Usually, a receipt is merely a
written admission of a transaction independently existing,
and is not conclusive.
Besides, Cruz and his witnesses testified to show when and
under what circumstances the amount was received.
Though the word “pakyaw” does appear on the receipt,
such testimonies do not in any way vary or contradict the
terms of the receipt.
*See Stated Doctrine* While the former may be varied by
parol evidence, the latter may not. The Parol Evidence Rule
refers to the terms of the agreement or the contractual act.
In this case, the statement in the receipt is just a statement
of fact, a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of
payment made by Salonga. Its reference to the amount as
consideration of the “pakyaw” contract does not make it
part of the terms of the agreement.
Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to explain the
receipt, particularly with respect to the date when the
money was received. Besides, no objection was made by
Salonga when Cruz introduced evidence to explain the
circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the
instrument.
12. MADRIGAL AND MALLARI v. CA | 142944 | 2005
Even if the document appears to be a sale, parol evidence
may be resorted to if the same does not express the true
intent of the parties. Parol evidence becomes competent
and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth
and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of
a loan.
And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court
will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance
with the true intent of the parties at the time of the
execution of the contract.
FACTS: In order to finance his wife Fermina’s travel to the
U.S., Jose Mallari assigned to his son, Virgilio, a portion of a
residential property situated at Olongapo City, upon
assurance by the latter that Jose could remain in the
property and that his sister Elizabeth could continue
operating a store thereat.
Virgilio would occupy one of the rooms in the house
whenever he would go to Olongapo City on vacation, and
he would renovate the other room and reserve it for his
mother when she comes back from the U.S. It was also
agreed upon that the property would not be disposed of
without Jose’s consent and that Jose could redeem the
same as soon as he could.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, conveying to Virgilio
the said property for P50,000.00, though it was worth much
more at that time. Worse, the deed described the property
as a one-storey residential house sitting on a 135-square
meter lot, though it was actually a 2-storey residential
house sitting on a 340-square meter land.
Eight months later, without Jose’s knowledge, Virgilio, by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold the same property
for P50,000.00 to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime neighbor
of the Mallaris. Jose was shocked when Madrigal demanded
that he vacate said property.
Jose then filed agianst Virgilio and Madrigal a complaint for
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him
and his wife or for redemption of the property at a
reasonable price.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING PAROL
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE IS ACTUALLY ONE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine.* The Deed of Absolute
Sale cannot be viewed in isolation of the circumstances
under which the same was executed by Virgilio’s parents,
more so in the light of Jose’s disavowal of what the
document, on its face, purports to state.
It has been held that, even if the document appears to be a
sale, parol evidence may be resorted to if the same does not
express the true intent of the parties.
13. ENRIQUEZ v. RAMOS | 18077 | 1962
When the terms of an agreement has been reduced to
writing, it is to be considered as containing all that has been
agreed upon, and no evidence other than the terms there
can be admitted between the parties. However, this holds
true only if there is no allegation that the agreement does
not express the true intent of the parties.
FACTS: Plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale
with Pedro del Rosario over a land in QC for P600K, to be
paid within 2 years. Upon a performance bond, Del Rosario
was given possession of the land for development as a
subdivision.
He also undertook to pay for the subdivision survey, the
construction of roads, the installation of light and water and
the payment of whatever income tax may be required.
Unable to pay, and to avoid court litigation, a contract of
rescission was entered into. To release the performance
bond, Del Rosario’s partner, Socorro Ramos, was allowed to
buy 20 of the lots on condition that she assume the
payment of P50K as her share in the construction of roads
and other improvements required in the subdivision.
A new deed of sale was executed in consideration of
P235,056.00, of which an initial payment of P35,056 was
made, the balance secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over
the 20 lots and a ½ interest on a parcel of land in Bulacan.
Ramos failed to pay the balance. Ramos claimed that the
contract failed to mention certain important conditions
agreed upon, such as the plaintiffs’ promise to construct
roads in the lands to be subdivided for sale.
Such condition was allegedly a superfluity, there being an
ordinance in QC requiring the construction of roads in a
subdivision before lots therein could be sold, and said
ordinance was deemed part of the contract.
Ramos also claims that the true purchase price of the sale
was P185,000.00, not P235,056.00, the difference being the
voluntary contribution of Ramos to the cost of the
construction of the roads which plaintiffs allegedly assumed
to do.
ISSUE: WHETHER PAROL EVIDENCE REGARDING SUCH
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED?
HELD: YES. The construction of the roads was a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the terms of the deed of
sale for the reason that the subdivision regulations of QC
requires, as a matter of law, that the sellers of land therein
to be converted into subdivision lots construct the roads in
said subdivision before the lots could be sold.
The construction of roads in the prospective subdivision
must have been uppermost in the mind of Ramos for her
purpose in purchasing the property was to develop it into a
subdivision.
Such is proven by the execution by the plaintiffs of a so
called “Explanation” along with the deed of sale, stating
that P50K was advanced as Ramos’ contribution to the
construction of the roads. The document specifically states
that the P50K would be deducted from the purchase price
appearing in the deed of sale.
*See Stated Doctrine.* If there is and this claim is in issue in
the pleadings, the same may be the subject parol evidence.
Ramos has specifically pleaded in her answer that the
contract of sale in question does not express the true intent
of the parties with regard to the construction of the roads.
Page 11

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. PEOPLE v. CASTAÑEDA | 46306 | 1979
The fact that the martial and domestic relations between
her and the accused-husband have become so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace
and tranquility which may be disturbed, warrants the non-
application of the marital disqualification rule.
FACTS: On the basis of the complaint of his wife, Victoria M.
Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin Manaloto
was charged before the Court of First Instance with the
crime of Falsification of Public Document that Benjamin F.
Manaloto who allegedly forged the signature of his wife,
Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it
appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the sale
of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership.
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the
witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a
witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 regarding the Marital
Disqualification Rule.
It is the contention of the prosecution that forging the
signature of the wife on the part of the husband effectively
strains the conjugal relations and therefore serves as an
exception to the marital disqualification rule. Hence, the
wife may be allowed to testify against the husband.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE IS AN EXCEPTION TO
THE RULE ON MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION.
HELD: YES, the court ruled that the case is an exception to
the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a
crime committed by the accused-husband against the
witness-wife.
The act complained of as constituting the crime of
Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby
making it appear therein that said wife consented to the
sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she did not.
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. To rule,
therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a
conclusion which completely disregards the factual
antecedents of the instant case.
The exception applies to the instant case because the victim
of the crime and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the
wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act complained of
had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation.
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The Supreme Court have occasion to point out in previous
decisions that the identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
nonexistent. *See Stated Doctrine.*
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing
but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void
in the unhappy home.
2. PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO | 568 | 1947
Waiver of Disqualification – If one spouse imputes the
commission of a crime against the other, the latter may
testify against the former.
FACTS: Juan Francisco, who had been previously arrested
on charges of robbery, was detained in the municipal jail of
Mansalay, Mindoro. Upon asking permission from the chief
of police Pimentel, he was allowed to go with Sergeant
Pacifico Pimentel to see his wife.
While waiting at the foot of the stairs at the house of
Francisco, Pimentel heard a woman scream. Running
upstairs, he saw Francisco’s wife running out of the room
and holding her bleeding right breast.
Moments later, Pimentel saw Francisco lying down with his
1 ½ year old son, Romeo, on his breast. Francisco had a
wound on his belly, while Romeo was dead, with a wound
in the back.
Francisco confessed to the crime in an affidavit signed and
sworn to by him before the justice of the peace, stating that
he had lost his senses and tried to wipe out his family
because he remembered that his uncle had threatened to
order someone to kill him for being a shame and a dishonor
to the family.
This was corroborated by both Sergeant Pimentel and his
wife, Emilia Taladtad. Francisco later retracted his
statement and imputed the crime to his wife.
ISSUE: WHETHER EMILIA’S TESTIMONY AGAINST HER
HUSBAND HAVE MAY BE ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine*. The reasons why neither
a husband nor a wife shall be in any case a witness against
the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed by one against the other are:
1) Identity of interests;
2) The consequent danger of perjury;
3) The policy of the law which deems it necessary to
guard the security and confences of private life even
at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and
which rejects such evidence because its admission
would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and
4) The danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.
This rule, however, has exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses
committed by one against the other.
Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained
that there is no more harmony to be preserved, peace and
tranquility of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
In such a case, the security and confidences of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals
which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home. Moreover, in this case, the wife did not
testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution but only
after Francisco testified in his own defesne, imputing upon
her the killing of their son.
By all rules of justice and reason, this gave the prosecution,
which had therefore refrained from presenting the wife as
a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did
in the rebuttal, and the wife herself the right to testify, at
least, in self-defense, not of course, against being subjected
to punishment in the case in which she was not a defendant
but against any or all of various possible consequences
which might flow from her silence.
In giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness,
be held to have intended all such natural and necessary
consequences.
By his said act, the husband himself, exercising the very
right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of
their marital relations, must be taken to have waived all
objection to the latter’s testimony upon rebuttal, even
considering that such objection would have been available
at the outset. It is well-settled that the rule of marital
incompetency may be waived.
3. LEZAMA v. RODRIGUEZ | 25643 | 1968
Under the Rules on Evidence, a wife cannot be examined for
or against her husband without his consent, except in civil
cases by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other.
FACTS: Jose Dineros, as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant &
Cold Storage Co., filed an action for the annulment of a
judgment rendered against La Paz in favor of Marciano
Roque and the Spouses Lezama.
It was alleged that, due to the mismanagement by the
Lezamas, La Paz was placed under receivership, during
which, Roque brought an action against La Paz for the
collection of P150,000.00, which was supposedly loaned to
La Paz.
Dineros accused the Sps. Lezama of entering into collusion
with Roque in obtaining a judgment by default against La
Paz. The Sps. Lezama denied this, claiming that they did not
contest Roque’s complaint, knowing it to be a legitimate
obligation pursuant to a resolution of the board of
directors.
During trial, Dineros prayed for Mrs. Lezama to be issued a
subpoena to testify as a witness. Such subpoena indicated
that Mrs. Lezama was to do no more than testify as an
adverse party in the case and that she would be doing so as
secretary of the company who signed the minutes of the
meeting where her husband was authorized to negotiate
the loan.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE
APPLY IN THIS CASE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* The complaint charges
“fraudulent conspiracy” on the part of the Spouses and
Roque to make it appear that La Paz was indebted to Roque.
Mrs. Lezama was being called to testify as an adverse party
witness on the basis of her participation in the alleged
fraudulent scheme, which was as secretary of the company
who signed the minutes of the meeting during which her
husband was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan,
and who made the entry in the books of the corporation.
Evidently, Mrs. Lezama will be asked to testify on what
actually transpired during the meeting and will be asked
questions on the amtter of the veracity or falsity of the
entry in the books of the corporation.
Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or
beneficial to her interest, the inevitable result would be to
pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and
wife in this case are necessarily interrelated.
Testimony adverse to the wife’s own interests would tend
to show the existence of collusive fraud between the
spouses and would then work havoc upon their common
defense that the loan was not fictitious.
There is the possibility, too, that the wife, to soften her own
guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner
entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.
It is argued that, when the spouses are parties to an action,
there is no reason why either may not be examined as a
witness for or against himself or herself alone, and his or
her testimony could operate only agianst himself or herself.
Even if such view were accepted as an exception to the
marital disqualification rule, or even as a separate doctrine,
it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge
is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person
and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to
prove that charge.
Page 12

4. RAZON v. IAC | 74306 | 1992
It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence
which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but
has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to
object thereto.
FACTS: Respondent, as administrator of the estate Juan
Chuidian, filed an action for specific performance against
petitioner praying that the later be compelled to deliver the
stock certificate representing the share holdings of Juan
Chuidian in E. Razon, Inc. (ERI).
During trial, petitioner testified that:
o All the shares of stock in the name of stockholders
of record of the corporation were fully paid for by
defendant, Razon;
o Said shares are subject to the agreement between
defendants and incorporators;
o Petitioner distributed shares of stock previously
placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal
incorporators to some friends including Juan T.
Chuidian;
o The shares of stock were actually owned and
remained in the possession of Razon; and
o Thus, the stock certificate under the name of the
late Chuidian actually belongs to the petitioner with
the understanding that he shall remain in
possession thereof until such time as he was paid
therefor by the other nominal incorporators or
stockholders.
Trial court ruled that the real owner of the stocks is the
petitioner. On appeal, the IAC reversed the decision of the
trial court. CA ruled that petitioner is disqualified from
being a witness under the dead man’s statute (Section 20
(a) Rule 130). Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER DEAD MAN’S STATUTE DISQUALIFIES A
DEFENDANT FROM TESTIFYING AGAINST THE CLAIMS OF
AN ADMINISTRATOR IN RELATION TO A TRANSACTION
ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED DURING HIS LIFETIME?
HELD: NO. The reason for the rule is that if persons having
a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties
were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements
made by the deceased person, many would be tempted to
falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter
can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting
their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or
demands.
The purpose of the law is to ‘guard against the temptation
to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in
question on the part of the surviving party. The rule,
however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it
is applicable to a case against the administrator or its
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representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate
of the deceased person.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate
court is that of petitioner as defendant in an action
commenced by the administrator of the estate of the late
Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is
not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed
against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate.
ISSUE: WHETHER FAILURE TO OBJECT TO A TESTIMONY ON
THE GROUND OF DEAD MAN’S STATUTE RULE
CONSTITUTES AS A WAIVER TO OBJECT TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF SUCH TESTIMONY?
HELD: YES. Granting that the petitioner’s testimony is
within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have
waived the rule. It is also settled that the court cannot
disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent
under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the
failure of a party to object thereto.
Hence, granting that the petitioner’s testimony is within the
prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
5. REYES v. WELLS | 30587 | 1929
The testimony of another disinterested witness,
corroborated by two other witnesses, may be admitted to
show that the defendants did not deliver the money which
constituted the cause or consideration of said promissory
notes.
FACTS: Dr. John E. Rader, deceased, was a resident of the
municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, about the year 1922,
and owned in the municipality of Burgos, of said province,
a maguey stripping machine, an International truck, a shed,
and a lot. In order to get rid of them, he persuaded the
plaintiff, particularly Saturnino R. Guerrero, to buy them.
And as the latter pretended that he had no money with
which to purchase it and to exploit the business, the former
proposed to lend him P12,000 with the understanding that
Guerrero would execute two promissory notes for P5,000
and P7,000 in his favor, securing said notes by two other
mortgage deeds upon real property.
In view of this proposal, the plaintiffs subscribed a
promissory note for P5,000, dated June 12, 1922, and
another in the amount of P7,000 also dated June 14, 1922.
These two promissory notes were guaranteed by two
mortgage deeds exhibited herein as X, both drawn in favor
of John E. Rader. These two mortgage deeds were recorded
in the registry of deeds of the Province of Ilocos Norte.
After the execution of these two mortgages, it appears that
John E. Rader was only able to deliver P400 to Saturnino
Guerrero, saying that they could obtain the remainder as a
loan from John Northcott.
For this purpose, they came to Manila in the month of June,
1922, to solicit the money and also to arrange for the
purchase of the machine from Macleod & Co. Saturnino
Guerrero was presented by Rader to the manager of
Macleod & Co. as the purchaser of the machine in question,
and to this end Guerrero signed a promissory note for
P20,000 payable according to the periods and conditions
set forth therein.
Putting aside for the moment Saturnino Guerrero’s contract
wit Macleod & Co. for the purchase of the machine in
question, it appears that Rader and Guerrero went to the
office of the West Coast Life Insurance Company in order to
ask Northcott for the money promised by Rader.
But Northcott could not deliver to Guerrero more than P98
with which to pay the land tax, promising that as soon as he
received the money he had asked for from San Francisco,
California, he would deliver to Guerrero the P12,000
covered by the first two promissory notes subscribed
mortgages.
The plaintiffs allege that with the exception of the two
amounts of P400 and P98 already mentioned, the sums in
question in the promissory notes secured with mortgages
have not been paid either by Rader or by Northcott, and
therefore pray for the cancellation of the promissory notes
and mortgage deeds executed by the plaintiffs in favor of
said Rader and Northcott, and of their record in the registry
of deeds of Ilocos Norte.
The main contention of the appellant in this case is that the
plaintiff-appellee’ allegation that the promissory notes in
question have not been paid, is not supported by the
evidence, inasmuch as the only witness who testified upon
this point, that is, Saturnino Guerrero, is incompetent to
testify upon transaction had between himself and the
deceased John E. Rader and John Northcott, in accordance
with section 383 of the then Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: WHETHER SATURNINO IS INCOMPETENT TO
TESTIFY AS A WITNESS?
HELD: YES. However, *See Stated Doctrine* It is true that
Saturnino Guerrero, as an interested party in the case, is
incompetent to testify upon transactions had between
himself and the deceased Rader and Northcott but the
record shows that their is another witness, Eduardo
Bustamante, who has no interest in this case, and who
testified that he witnessed and heard the conversations
between Guerrero and Rader, and Northcott, respecting
the delivery of the money represented by the promissory
notes in question, and his testimony appears to be
corroborated, in so far as it refers to the conversations
between Guerrero and Rader, by Marcelino Benito and
Apolinar Pasion.
The testimony of said witness Eduardo Bustamante is
admissible to prove that the defendants never delivered the
money which was the consideration of said promissory
notes.
6. GUERRERO v. ST. CLARE REALTY | 58164 | 1983
It may be said that competency to testify established in Sec.
20(a), Rule 130, Rules of Court, affects only the persons
therein mentioned, and their assignors, persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.
Mere witnesses who are neither parties, nor their assignors,
nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not
included in the prohibition.
FACTS: The disputed parcel of land was originally owned by
Andres Guerrero as his share of the inheritance from his
parents. He entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina
Guerrero. In 1943, Andres Guerrero died and was survived
by his widow and their children who are the petitioners in
this case.
It was later on discovered by the heirs of Andres that
Manuel Guerrero was able to have the lot titled in his name
on the basis of a ‘Deed of Sale of Land’ purportedly
executed by Cristina Guerrero; that Manuel later on sold
the property to herein defendant Guerreros; that said
defendants caused to be notarized an "Articles of
Partnership" of St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd.,
constituting themselves as partners; and that they
eventually sold the same to St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd.
According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of
Manuel was fraudulently obtained and that the subsequent
deeds of sale were likewise fraudulent and ineffective since
the defendants allegedly knew that the property belonged
to Andres Guerrero.
During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was
presented as witnesses for the petitioners. She testified
that the money used for the illness of her mother was
obtained from Manuel by mortgaging the land as security
for the loans obtained.
This was objected to by the counsel of the defendants
based on Sec.23, Rule 130 (Dead Man’s Statute). The trial
court declared Laura and Jose Cervantes is disqualified from
testifying in the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE WITNESSES LAURA AND
JOSE CERVANTES WERE CORRECTLY DISQUALIFIED FROM
TESTIFYING IN THE CASE AND THEIR TESTIMONIES
Page 13

EXCLUDED ON THE BASIS OF SEC. 23 RULE 130, OF THE
RULES OF COURT?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* Laura Cervantes and Jose
Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither
are they assignors of the parties nor persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.
They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the
plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina
Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed
land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that
Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged
the property to Manuel Guerrero.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand
against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The
defendants Guerreros are not the executors or
administrators or representatives of such deceased. They
are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual
capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the
estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the
dead man’s statue.
7. ABRAHAM v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF YSMAEL, RECTO-
KASTEN | 16741 | 1962
When the party invoking the Dead Man’s Statute
extensively cross-examines the allegedly prohibited witness,
the prohibition under the Statute is deemed waived.
FACTS: Juan Ysmael obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham,
Sr., in the amount of P12,500.00 in Japanese currency, for
which the former executed a promissory note in favor of the
latter, promising to pay the loan wihtin 90 days, plus
interest. Alfonso’s wife, Florencia, affixed her signature at
the bottom of the note as a witness thereto.
Upon maturity of the note, and despite demands, however,
Ysmael failed to pay. Both Ysmael and Alfonso died, leaving
the note still unpaid.
In the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael,
Florencia and her sons filed a Reclamation demanding
payment of the amount represented by the note. Priscilla
Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, and during the
hearing before a commissioner, she objected to the
testimony of Florencio, invoking the provisions of the Dead
Man’s Statute.
ISSUE: WHETHER FLORENCIA’S TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE
BEEN REJECTED FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE DEAD
MAN’S STATUTE?
HELD: NO. It is true that the Dead Man’s Statute under the
Rules of Court provides that “parties or assignors of parties
to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
against an executor administrator or other representative
of a deceased person, or against such person of unsound
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mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind.”
However, in this case, the prohibition is deemed waived
when the counsel for Recto-Kasen extensively cross-
examined Florencia on the very matters subject o fthe
prohibition.
Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the counsel’s
lengthy cross-examination on the prohibition matter was
merely for the purpose of establishing the “motive,
prejudices and predilection” of the witness.
8. LIM v. CA | 91114 | 1992
The physician-patient privilege is not violated by permitting
a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to
a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical and mental condition of a patient whom he has
attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly
upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and
disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may
have concerning such patient.
FACTS: Juan Sim filed a suit for annulment against Nelly Lim
on the ground that the latter has been suffering from
schizophrenia before, during or and after the marriage. As
an expert witness, Sim announced his intention to present
Dr. Acampado, the Chief of the Female Services of the
National Mental Hospital.
Lim’s counsel opposed the introduction of said witness as
Dr. Acampado had examined and diagnosed Lim, and
hence, was bound by the physician-patient confidentiality
rule. Sim’s counsel, however, claimed that Dr. Acampado
was there as an expert witness and not to testify on any
information acquired during Lim’s examination.
The RTC judge allowed Dr. Acampado to testify, but the
latter was qualified by Sim’s counsel as an expert witness
and asked hypothetical questions. Dr. Acampado neither
revealed what illness she examined and treated Lim for nor
disclosed the results of Lim’s examinations and the
medicines prescribed.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The rule on the physician-
patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full
and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physicians
of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure
and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the
physician may form a correct opinion and be enabled to
safely and efficaciously treat his patient.
The requisites of the privilege are that:
1) The privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2) The person against whom said privilege is claimed is
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics;
3) Such person acquired the information while attend-
ing to the patient in his professional capacity;
4) Said information was necessary to enable him to act
in that capacity; and
5) Said information was confidential, and if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation of the patient.
Moreover, assuming that Dr. Acampado’s testimony is
privileged, the failure to seasonably object thereto
constitutes a waiver thereof.
9. KROHN v. CA | 108854 | 1994
A person not duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics, who wishes to testify on a document executed
by duly licensed medical practitioners is not barred by the
Physician-Patient Privilege.
FACTS: Ma. Paz Fernandez underwent psychological testing
to ease her mental strain. In 1973, she and her husband,
Edgar Krohn, with whom she had three kids, separated.
Krohn was able to obtain a copy of the Psychiatric
Evaluation Report signed by one Dr. Banaeg and one Dr.
Reyes. By virtue of such report, he was able to obtain a
decree nullifying his church marriage to Fernandez.
A voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership was
granted by the Pasig RTC, and in 1990, Krohn filed for the
annulment of his marriage with the Makati RTC. Krohn used
the contents of the aforesaid Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report in his testimony, to which Fernandez
objected on the ground of Physician-Patient privilege.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT
IS PROHIBITED AS EVIDENCE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE?
HELD: NO. *See Staed Doctrine* The person against whom
the privilege is being claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics, as he is simply
Fernandez’s husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners.
He is therefore not barred by the privilege, and neither can
his testimony be deemed a circumvention of the prohibition
as his testimony cannot have the same force and effect as a
testimony made by a physician who examined the patient
and executed the report.
HEARSAY ISSUE: Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in
objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the
ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before
the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on
privileged communications but never questioned the
testimony as hearsay.
It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel
waived his right to make such objection and, consequently,
the evidence offered may be admitted.
10. TESTATE ESTATE OF FITZSIMMONS v. ATLANTIC GULF
AND PACIFIC COMPANY | 2016 | 1949
The officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not
disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation
which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
FACTS: Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one
of the largest stockholders of Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Company of Manila when the Pacific war broke. As such
president he was receiving a salary of P3,000 a month.
Richard T. Fitzsimmons died. The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Company of Manila resumed business operation in March,
1945.
In due course the said company filed a claim against the
estate of Richard T. Fitzsimmons for the amount P63,868.67
which was based solely on the testimony of Santiago Inacay
and Modesto Flores chief accountant and assistant
accountant of the said company.
The company admitted that all the pre-war books and
records of the company were completely destroyed or lost
during the war which the testimony was later on
corroborated by Mr. Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel
Garmezy, vice-president, treasurer and president,
respectively, of the claimant company, to testify on the
status of the personal account of the deceased Fitzsimmons
with the company.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFICERS OF A
CORPORATION WHICH IS A PARTY TO AN ACTION
AGAINST AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR OF A
DECEASED PERSON ARE DISQUALIFIED FROM TESTIFYING
AS TO ANY MATTER OF FACT OCCURRING BEFORE THE
DEATH OF SUCH DECEASED PERSON
HELD: NO, they are not disqualified. *See Stated Doctrine*
Under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court:
Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind.
Page 14

The Supreme Court ruled that the statute does not
disqualify parties to a contract nor persons in interest, but
only parties to the action. To hold that the statute
disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers or
stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to
materially amending the statute by judicial interpretation.
It is concluded, therefore, that our statute does not exclude
from testifying a stockholder of a corporation, whether he
be but a stockholder, or whether, in addition thereto, he be
a director or officer thereof.
11. GOÑI v. CA | 27434 | 1986
While the privilege to invoke the Dead Man’s Statue was
available to the heirs of Villanueva, such protection was
effectively waived when their counsel cross-examined
Gaspar.
A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the
representative of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased's lifetime.
FACTS: The late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-
interest of petitioners, negotiated with Compania General
de Tabacos de Filipinas (TABACALERA) for the purchase of 3
haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce
Nombre de Maria owned by the latter.
Short of sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with
the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria
to one Joaquin Villegas. The TABACALERA did not agree to
the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas without a
guaranty. Thus, Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor, for
Villegas in favor of TABACALERA.
Either because the amount realized from the transaction
between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the
purchase price or in consideration of the guaranty,
Villanueva contracted or promised to sell fields of Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria to Gaspar Vicente.
This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by
Genaro Goni as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. Accordingly,
Vicente’s account was debited of P12,460.24 out of the
P13,807.00 paid being the amount actually needed to
complete the purchase price.
The difference was supposedly paid by Vicente to
Villanueva. Meanwhile, Villanueva was able to raise funds
to pay for the purchase price and so the TABACALERA
executed a formal deed of sale covering the 3 haciendas in
his favor.
The parties subsequently agreed to novate the contract or
promise to sell and agreed of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre
de Maria would merely be leased to Vicente and that the
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said rent to be deducted from the money advanced by him.
In 1951, Villanueva died.
Intestate proceedings were instituted and among the
properties included in the inventory were fields nos. 3, 4
and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Vicente
instituted an action for recovery of field no. 3 basing his
entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell.
During the trial, Vicente took the witness stand, testified on
facts occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision in favor of Vicente. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT VICENTE CAN TESTIFY ON
MATTERS OF FACT OCCURRING BEFORE THE DEATH OF
VILLANUEVA WHICH CONSTITUTES A CLAIM OR DEMAND
UPON HIS ESTATE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 130, SEC. 20?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* It must further be
observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against
respondent Gaspar. When Vicente thus took the witness
stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for
recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim.
Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring
before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not
having been brought by the estate or representatives of the
estate/deceased person.
The contract/promise to sell under consideration was
signed by Goñi as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. He was
privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of
such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny
any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with
respect to said contract.
The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section
20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has
the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of
the other because death has permanently sealed the
former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar.
12. BANCO FILIPINO v. MONETARY BOARD | 70054 | 1986
Sec. 21(e), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is not for the
protection of public officers but for the protection of public
interest. Where there is no public interest that would be
prejudiced the rule will not be applicable.
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Makati granted the
motion of Banco Filipino based on Section 1, Rule 27 for the
production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and
records which are claimed as needed by the Bank for the
preparation for the liquidation case.
In issuing the challenged order, the court considered the
documents sought to be produced as not privileged
because these constitute or contain evidence material to
the issues.
These materials are said to comprise of records of the
administrative proceedings conducted by the Monetary
Board’s officials and representatives from the inception of
and preparation of the challenged reports and the
resolution placing the bank under receivership and
thereafter under liquidation.
The Monetary Board and Central Bank filed a petition for
the reversal and setting aside of the same on the ground,
among others, that the tapes and transcripts of the
Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to
Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.
Banco Filipino, in its comment, asserted that respondents
cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the Central
Bank records because it is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality.
U.S. v. Nixon was cited, which states that when the ground
for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought
for use in a criminal case is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO
BE PRODUCED ARE PRIVILEGED?
HELD: NO. Respondents cite Section 21 (e), Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court which states: A public officer cannot be
examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when
the court finds that the public interest would suffer by
disclosure. However *See Stated Doctrine.*
Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced,
this invoked rule will not be applicable. The rule that a
public officer cannot be examined as to communications
made to him in official confidence does not apply when
there is nothing to show that the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure question.
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established
that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the
papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering
that petitioner bank was already closed as of January 25,
1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports,
and transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to our
economy.
Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state
secrets. Respondent's reason for their resistance to the
order of production are tenuous and specious. If the
respondents public officials acted rightfully and prudently
in the performance of their duties, there should be nothing
at all that would provoke fear of disclosure.
13. TONGCO v. VIANZON | 27498 | 1927
The Code of Civil Procedure in section 383 (7) provides that
"Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding,
or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of
such deceased person." The object' and purpose of this
statute is to guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the
part of the surviving party. The law was designed to aid in
arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the
truth.
The law does not apply and a witness is competent to testify
when the actions were not brought "against" the estate, nor
were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. The
authorities are cited and distinguished.
A waiver is accomplished when the adverse party
undertakes to crossexamine the interested person with
respect to prohibited matters.
FACTS: Marcelino Tongco uncle of the petitioner married
respondent Anastacia Vianzon in 1894. The uncle died in
1925 leaving his wife. But shortly before he died Marcelino
had filed claims in a cadastral case asking for titles to certain
properties in the name of his conjugal partnership.
Upon his death the niece of the deceased Josefa Tongco,
petitioner in this case, was named administrator of his
estate. The thing was, right after his death, his pending
claims resulted in a favorable corresponding decrees for the
lots previously claimed by him and were then issued under
his name.
His widow then began action manifesting to the court and
informing about the death of her spouse presenting a
motion for revision of the decrees of which she filed just
right in time within its one year prescription period. And so
the Court of First Instance ordered new decrees for the said
lots and certificates of titles were issued under the widow’s
name.
Josefa Tongco the administrator of Marcelino’s estate,
niece of the said deceased filed action against the widow
submitting a motion for a new trial and for recovery of
specified property and damages. The motion for a new trial
was denied by the CFI. Upon this decision the administrator
appealed to CA which merely affirmed the earlier decision.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
The issue in this case is that in the trial, counsel for the
administrator assailed the widow’s competency to testify as
witness and in support to this claim he thereby invoked
Section 383 of the then Code of Civil Procedures which
provides: “Parties or assignors of parties to an action or
Page 15

proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or
preoceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased
person… cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person..”
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WIDOW CAN BE ALLOWED TO
TESTIFY?
HELD: YES. The actions were not brought ‘against’ the
administrator of the estate, neither were they brought
upon claims ‘against’ the estate. The administrator in the
first case should have even enforced the demand ‘by’ the
estate as what conjugal partnership in law dictates.
The presumption in Civil Law is that all the properties of the
spouses are deemed that of a partnership property in the
absence of proof to the contrary that it belongs exclusively
to the husband or the wife.
And the widow in this case has even proved decisively and
conclusively exclusive ownership of the property in
question after her husband’s death.
14. PEOPLE v. CARLOS | 22948 | 1925
Where the spouse did not testify in the witness stand and a
communication between the spouses was not offered as a
means of impeaching such testimony, and where the spouse
against whom the communication is offered as evidence
does not give his consent, such marital communication is
deemed privileged. Hence, it is not admissible as evidence.
FACTS: On March 3, 1924, Dr. Pablo Sityar, of Mary Chiles
Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon Carlos’ wife
for appendicitis and certain other ailments. She was
eventually released from the hospital, but was required to
go several times to Dr. Sityar’s clinic to dress the wounds
caused by the operation.
During one of the visits, Carlos was sent by the doctor to
buy some medicine, and while out on such errand, Dr. Sityar
outraged his wife. Despite having been informed of the
incident, Carlos went back to the clinic to consult with the
doctor regarding some lung trouble. While confined at the
hospital, a letter was sent to him, demanding immediate
settlement of his wife’s account for professional services
rendered by Dr. Sityar.
Carlos was released from the hospital, but when, one day,
he went back to the clinic, he, without any prior quarrel
between him and Dr. Sityar, attacked the latter with a fan-
knife and stabbed him twice, killing the doctor. On trial,
Carlos claimed he killed the deceased, but invoked self-
defense.
Carlos was however convicted for murder, due to
premeditation, upon evidence in the form of a letter
allegedly written to Carlos by his wife two days before the
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commission of the crime, the letter revealing Carlos’s wife’s
fear that Carlos would resort to violence in dealing with the
accused.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE LETTER MAY BE DEEMED A
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, HENCE, NOT ADMISSIBLE
AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* If said documents of
communications were obtained from the addressee by
voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged for
otherwise, the privilege could by collusion be practically
nullified for written communications; but if they were
obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the
addressee’s consent, the privilege should cease.
HEARSAY ISSUE: In this case, the letter should be excluded
as such was written by Carlos’s wife. If she had testified at
the trial, the letter might have been admissible to impeach
her testimony. However, she was not put on the witness
stand, hence, the letter was not offered for the purpose of
impeaching such testimony.
If Carlos, by virtue of an answer or by other means, had
indicated his assent to the statements in the letter, such
letter might also have been admissible. However, such is
not the case here, there being no indication of acquiescence
or assent on his part.
The letter is therefore nothing but hearsay, and its
admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of
Carlos in the criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to
cross-examine.
15. BARTON v. LEYTE ASPHALT | 21237 | 1924
The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures
made by him to his attorney in the confidence of legal
relation, but when such a document containing admissions
of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches
the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
FACTS: In 1920, William Anderson, president and general
manager of Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., the owner of a
valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt
products known as the Lucio mine, addressed a letter to
Barton, authorizing him to sell the products of said mine in
Australia and New Zealand in accordance with a scale of
prices provided for in said letter.
Barton subsequently filed an action to recover damages,
claiming that there was breach of contract and asking for an
extension of the sales agency contract. During trial, he
offered as evidence a carbon copy of a letter written by him
to his lawyer, Atty. Frank Ingersoll, in which Barton stated,
among other things, that his profits from the San Francisco
contract would have been at the rate of 85 cents (gold) per
ton.
This was also subsequently offered in evidency by Leyte
Asphalt’s lawyer, to which Barton’s lawyer did not object so
long as the Leyte Asphalt’s lawyer explained where the copy
was secured. The latter explained that he received the
letter from previous lawyers of Leyte Asphalt without
explanation of the manner in which the document had
come into their possession.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE LETTER WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED
FOR BEING PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
CLIENT AND ATTORNEY?
HELD: NO. Assuming that the letter was covered by the
privilege, such privilege was lost when the letter came to
the hands of the adverse party, no matter how the latter
acquired possession of it.
*See Stated Doctrine* The privilege is a derogation from
the general testimonial duty and should be strictly
construed. It would be improper, therefore, to extend its
prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the
communications. One who overhears the communications,
with or without the client’s knowledge, is not within the
protection of the privilege.
The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously
reads or obtains possession of a document in original or
copy. When papers are offered in evidence, a court will take
no notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or
illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it take from a
collateral issue to try that question.
16. UY v. UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY | 9231 | 1915
Communications made by a client to his attorney for the
purpose of being communicated to others are not privileged
after they have been so communicated, and may be proved
by the testimony of the attorney.
FACTS: Uy Chico is the son of Uy Layco, who was conducting
a business under his own name. In 1897, Uy Layco died, and
Uy Chico and his brother took over the business and
continued it under the same name. Uy Chico eventually
purchased his brother’s share and continued the business.
Then, the business burned down. At that time, Uy Layco was
heavily indebted and his creditors petitioned for the
appointment of an administrator.
While the proceedings were ongoing, Uy Chico’s attorney
surrendered the policies of insurance issued by Union Life
Insurance Surety to the administrator of the estate, who
compromised with the insurance company for ½ their face
value.
Uy Chico filed the present action, claiming that the policies
and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of
Uy Layco and that he was not bound by the compromise
effected by the administrator of Uy Layco estate.
Union Life introduced evidence indicating that Uy Chico’s
attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator
with the understanding that such compromise was to be
effected.
Uy Chico did not object to the attorney’s testimony, despite
being asked, while on the witness stand, whether he wished
to do so. The attorney was called for that prupose, but Uy
Chico’s counsel formally withdrew the waiver and objected
to the attorney’s testimony.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ATTORNEY’S TESTIMONY
PRIVILEGED?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The rule applies to a
compromise agreement perfected by the attorney with the
authority and under the instructions of his client.
It is true that a lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the
confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall
not be permited in any court, without his client’s consent,
given in open court, to testify as to any facts imparted to
him by said client in professional consultation, or for the
prupose of obtaining advice upon legal matters.
The very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds
communications made between attorney and the client, is
that such communications made between attorney and
client are not intended for the information of the third
persons or to be acted upon by them, but for the purpose
of advising as to his right.
In this case, the testimony was to the effect that when the
lawyer delivered said policies to the administrator, he is
deemed to have understood that a compromise was to be
effected. The fact that Uy Chico made no objection upon
being informed of the surrender of the policies is sufficient
to show that Uy Chico agreed to be compromised.
17. PEOPLE v. TENA | 100909 | 1992
The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided. The reason for the rule is that: On a principle of
good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are
binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are
his conduct and declarations.
Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts
of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to
be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts
or conduct be used as evidence against him.
The rule provided in Section 25 (now Section 28, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court admits of certain exceptions, to be sure,
Page 16

one of which is found in Section 27, (now Section 30) of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which states: Section 30.
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his co-conspirator, it is necessary that:
(a) The conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself;
(b) The admission relates to the common object; and
(c) It has been made while the declaration was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy.
FACTS: Alfredo Altamarino Sr. was found dead in his own
residence, bore eight (8) Stab wounds and his personal
properties are missing. The Daughter of the victim sought
the help of the National Bureau of Investigation.
The NBI conducted their investigation. Mauban Police
Station Commander informed the NBI that suspicion as to
the authorship of the crime had shifted to a syndicate. This
syndicate was reportedly involved in the robbery at nearby
Municipalities and a member thereof was in detention
named Adelberto Camota. The NBI agents interrogated
Camota.
Sensing that Camota knew of the incident, the NBI agents
conducted polygraph examination on Camota, allegedly
with his consent. Alberto Camota executed an extrajudicial
confession in the presence of a lawyer, admitting
participation in the robbery-killing of Alfredo Almarino and
pointing to Solito Tena and three others as his companions
in the crime. Solito Tena pleaded not guilty.
Solito Tena with other accused was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide and was sentenced to a prison term of 20 years
of Reclusion Perpetua. Only Solito Tena appealed.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF
CAMOTA IS BINDING AGAINST OTHER CO-ACCUSED?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The judgment of
conviction was based chiefly on the extrajudicial confession
of accused Adelberto Camota which repudiated by Camota
in open court. Several factors bar the application of said
Section 30 to the case at bar.
More importantly, camota, instead of conforming his
extrajudicial confession in court, repudiated the same,
denied knowledge of the crime charged and denied
knowing accused-appellant Tena.
The extrajudicial confession of Camota thus being
inadmissible against his co-accused and being no evidence
independently of said confession, linking accused appellant
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Tena to the crime, the Court declared Tena not guilty of the
complex crime of Robbery with homicide with which he is
charged.
18. ORMACHEA TIN-CONGCO v. TRILLANA | 4776 | 1909
The existence in the hands of the creditor of an instrument
of credit, is evidence that the debt is still unpaid, unless the
contrary be fully proven.
An admission by a former partner, made AFTER he has
retired from the partnership, is NOT evidence against the
firm.
FACTS: On Jan. 15, 1904 Tin-Congco, presented an
amended complaint against Trilliana, alleging that the
plaintiff Tin-Congco and Luis Queco were engaged in a
business in Hagonoy, Malolos and that herein defendant
Trillana purchased from them merchandise in the value of
4,000 pesos.
2 years later, the partnership was dissolved and the
business was divided between the partners, all the debts of
the defendant were allotted to Tin-Congco. The debt is
proven by the documents signed by defendant or his agents
in favor of Ormachea or Ong Queco or agent Lawa in charge
of the business.
The 135 documents state the total debt of 5,500 pesos.
Defendant showed a document made by Jose R. Lopez Lawa
stating that Trillana has no outstanding debt with the
distillery.
ISSUE: WHETHER DEFENDANT IS ABSOLVED OF HIS
OBLIGATIONS?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine*
19. KIEL v. ESTATE OF SABERT | 21639 | 1924
A party to an action against an executor or administrator of
a deceased person, upon a claim against the estate of the
latter, is absolutely prohibited by law from giving testimony
concerning such claim or demand as to anything that
occurred before the death of the person against whose
estate the action is presented.
The act or declaration of a deceased person having
sufficient knowledge of the subject, against his pecuniary
interest, is admissible as evidence to that extent against his
successor in interest. The act or declaration of a deceased
person, done or made against his interest in respect to his
real property, is admissible as evidence.
The declarations of one partner, not made in the presence
of his co-partner, are not competent to prove the existence
of a partnership, between them as against such other
partner. The existence of a partnership cannot be
established by general reputation, rumor, or hearsay.
FACTS: Albert F. Kiel commenced to work on certain public
lands situated in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato,
known as Parang Plantation Company. In 1910, Kiel and P.S.
Sabert entered into an agreement to develop the
plantation. Sabert was to furnish the capital and Kiel was to
manage it.
It seems that this partnership was formed so that the land
could be acquired in the name of Sabert, Kiel being a
German citizen and not deemed eligible to acquire public
lands in the Philippines.
During the World War, Kiel was deported from the
Philippines. Five persons, including P.S. Sabert, organized
the Nituan Plantation Company, to which Sabert
transferred all the rights and interests of the Parang
Plantation Company. Kiel appears to have tried to secure a
settlement from Sabert.
At least in a letter dated June 6, 1918, Sabert allegedly
wrote Kiel that he had offered the following “to sell all
property that I have for P40,000 or take in a partner who is
willing to develop the plantation, to take up the K. & S. debt
no matter which way I will straiten out with you.”
But Sabert’s death came before any amicable arrangement
could be reached and before an action by Kiel against
Sabert could be decided. Hence these proceedings against
the estate of Sabert.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CLAIMS OF KIEL MAY BE ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine*
20. PEOPLE v. CABRERA | 37398 | 1974
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
FACTS: At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972
Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan, while on
a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt.
Carlos Palomares to proceed immediately to Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned
person who was found at the North Diversion Road
suffering from stab wounds.
This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis
de la Cruz. He gave an ante mortem statement, in which the
deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person
who hired his jeep but did not know the names of the three
men who stabbed him and took his money and jeep.
Defendant Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police. She
executed an extra-judicial confession, in which she pointed
to appellant Conrado Villanueva as the mastermind of the
robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of
appellant but the robbery and the killing of the deceased
were done by appellant and his two unidentified
companions.
Defendant Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado
Villanueva did not take the witness stand. The only
evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of
Conrado was the extra-judicial confession of his co-accused
Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the
continuing objection of appellant's counsel.
He reiterates his objection when the said extra-judicial
confession was being offered in evidence. Accused Rosario
Cabrera did not appeal. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF
CABRERA SHOULD BE ADMITTED AS AN EVIDENCE?
HELD: NO. It is true that the extrajudicial statement of
accused Cabrera does point to Condrado as the mastermind
and perpetrator, together with two persons whose
identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased
Luis dela Cruz and the taking of the jeep he was driving. But
said statement is obviously inadmissible against appellant,
who made timely objection thereto.
There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements
were made by her during the investigation conducted by
the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after
the date of the incident in question.
For this reason alone, that is, that said statement was not
made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy
between her and appellant, but after said supposed
conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in
the hands of the authorities, Section 27(Now 30) of Rule
130 cannot be availed of. *See Stated Doctrine*
There being no other evidence against appellant, the Court
have no alternative but to reverse the judgment appealed
from and to acquit him, as prayed for by his counsel as well
as counsel for the People.
21. PEOPLE v. PARAGSA | 44060 | 1978
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an
implied admission of the truth is applicable in criminal cases
provided:
1) That he heard and understood the statement;
2) That he was at liberty to interpose a denial;
3) That the statement was in respect to some matter
affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer;
4) That the facts were within his knowledge; and
5) That the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn
from his silence would be material to the issue.
Page 17

FACTS: Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12
½ year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes. The information alleged
that victim was alone in her house when the Benben
entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife, forced her to
lie in bed and there they had intercourse.
The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on
the door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified
that she had seen the accused exiting the house when she
came knocking. The victim did not reveal what happened to
her until 6 days after the incident. Accused interposed the
“Sweetheart defense”.
Defense claims in effect that there was no force or
intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita saw was not
the aftermath of a rape, but was rather consensual sexual
intercourse. Accused also presented witnesses claiming
that they were indeed sweethearts. The CFI convicted
Benben. CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIES A
CONVICTION.
HELD: NO. The Supreme court noted the absence of
intimidation considering that the act took place in the
daytime, in her house where she is surrounded by her
neighbors.
The victim could also have revealed the same the very
moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her
what the accused did to her upon entering the house
immediately after the intercourse took place and not 3 days
after.
Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of
the allegation that the victim and accused were
sweethearts. They did not bother to rebut the testimony of
the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the
accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that
they had had two previous sexual communications
previously.
As to this silence, the Supreme Court explained: *See Stated
Doctrine* These requisites of admission by silence all obtain
in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the
facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be
safely construed as an admission of the truth of such
assertion.
22. PEOPLE v. MARRA | 108494 | 1994
The law provides that the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein may be given in
evidence against him and, in certain circumstances, this
admission may be considered as part of the res gestae.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
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custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.
It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself
to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule (Sec. 12,
Article III of the Constitution) begins to operate.
FACTS: Samuel Marra was identified as the man who shot a
person and was approached by responding policemen while
he was eating at an eatery shortly after the shooting.
After a series of questions, the police learned that he was
Samuel Marra who was a security guard, that his tour of
duty was from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00 A.M.
The following day, that he was still on duty at around 2:30
in the morning of March 7, 1992, and that the firearm
issued to him was in his house.
Upon their request to see the firearm, they proceeded to
Marra's residence at Interior Nueva Street. When they
arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an
aparador and handed it to De Vera. De Vera also found five
live bullets and one spent shell.
Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of the gun, De Vera
asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter denied
ever having done so. Abruptly, De Vera asked him point-
blank why he shot Tandoc.
Marra at first denied the accusation but when informed
that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in self-
defense, firing at the victim only once. Marra was then
taken to the police station.
During trial, Marra invoked Section 12(1), Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides that "(a)ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice.”
ISSUE: WHETHER MARRA WAS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION WHEN HE ADMITTED THE KILLING BUT
INVOKED SELFDEFENSE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* Mara was not under
custodial investigation when he made the admission. There
was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make the
statements he said.
He could have refused to answer questions from the very
start. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein
they considered him as a particular suspect. Thus, there was
no violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution or
the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation.
23. PEOPLE v. SUMAYO | 30713 | 1976
Extrajudicial confession deemed given voluntarily where
said confession includes facts which could be known by
accused only.
Where the extra-judicial confessions of the accused are
consistent in many material details and manifest amazing
consistency and accuracy in the narration of events and of
facts which could not have been known to the police
investigators if the same were not voluntarily given by the
accused, such statements are admissible against the
accused on the doctrine of interlocking confessions.
FACTS: The deceased, Domingo Viernes, while driving a
taxi-cab was stabbed to death on the night of May 24, 1969,
in a robbery hold-up at Donada Street, Pasay City, for the
measly sum of P30.00.
Authorities of the Pasay City Police Department, responding
to a call reporting the robbery hold-up that night,
proceeded to the place of the incident at Donada Street,
Pasay City, in front of the North Philippine Union Mission of
the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
There they saw the victim lying flat on his back with blood
oozing from the mouth and left lower armpit which was
caused by a stab wound of about four inches in length. A
security guard had shone light to the incident where he
narrated that he saw people coming out of a taxi cab, and
the driver woulded. According to the autopsy report, the
cause of death of the victim was the stab wound at the left
side of the chest.
The persons accused were subsequently apprehended and
after a speedy trial were convicted of the crime of robbery
with homicide. The case was elevated to the present case
where defendants argue that their confessions were the
result of force and intimidation.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE GIVEN COFESSIONS ARE
ADMISSABLE AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. There is not a single indication nor evidence of
motive on the part of the police investigators that could
have induced them to resort to unlawful means in the
method of determining true facts, thereby deviating from
normal procedure in investigation and thus perverting the
quest for truth and justice.
The candid admission of the accused, who at the time he
testified could not have forseen that he would be acquitted,
that he voluntarily signed the statement and that he was
not maltreated, it being clear that this accused was
investigated together with the others on the same night
and in the same place, in the presence of other people, is
the most convincing argument that those statements were
really signed voluntarily by the accused. *See Stated
Doctrine*
NOTE: The case touches upon the doctrine of interlocking
confessions without explaining the same. Interlocking
confessions states that extrajudicial confessions
independently made without collusion which are identical
with each other in their essential details and corroborated
by other evidence against the persons implicated, are
admissible to show the probability of the latter’s actual
participation in the commission of the crime. (People v.
Mulit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008)
GR: An extrajudicial confession is not admissible against the
confessor’s co-accused. Said confession is hearsay evidence
and violative of the res inter alios acta rule.
XPN: It may be admitted in evidence against his co-accused
in the following cases:
1. In case of implied acquiescence of the co-accused to
the extrajudicial confession;
2. In case of interlocking confessions;
3. Where the accused admitted the facts stated by the
confessant after being apprised of such confession;
4. If they are charged as co-conspirators of the crime
which was confessed by one of the accused and said
confession is used only as corroborating evidence;
5. Where the confession is used as circumstantial
evidence to show the probability of participation by
the co-conspirator;
6. When the confessant testified for his co-defendant;
and
7. Where the co-conspirator’s extrajudicial confession
is corroborated by other evidence on record.
(Regalado, 2008)
24. US v. EVANGELISTA | 8132 | 1913
RIAA: PART II. Previous conduct may be received as evidence
to prove intent. On a trial for arson, the prosecution may
prove that the defendant had set fire to the building a few
days previous to the burning alleged in the information for
the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the
defendant.
FACTS: Appellant Ramon Evangelista was the tenant of a
building where he had a store for selling hats and other
articles on the ground floor, and living quarters for herself
and her boarders on the second floor. On June 2, 1912, fire
originated in the second floor of the same building in the
appellant’s living quarters.
On the trial for the case, not only evidence relative to the
June 2 fire were introduced, but also relative to an earlier
May 31 fire. The defense objected to the introduction of all
the evidence relative to the fire of May 31 as incompetent
and not the fire charged in the information. Ramona
Evangelista was convicted in the court of first instance of
the crime of arson.
Page 18

This is now an appeal to the SC. SC affirmed judgment
saying that there was no error in receiving the evidence as
to the fire occurring on May 31 to show intent.
ISSUE: WHETHER PREVIOUS CONDUCT MAY BE
PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* There was no error in
receiving the evidence as to the fire occurring on May 31 to
show intent. While it was not the fire charged in the
information, and does not by any means amount to direct
evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove
the intent of the accused in setting the fire which was
charged in the information.
In earlier cases, the court held that on a trial for arson, the
prosecution may prove that the prisoner had attempted to
set fire to the house on a day previous to the burning
alleged in the indictment, for the purpose of showing the
intent of the prisoner in subsequently setting fire to the
house. (People v. Shainwold)
Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific
crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts,
committed about the same time, for the purpose only of
establishing the criminal intent of the accused. (Kight v.
State) Evidence tending to show that defendant started the
former fire was admissible to prove intent. (People v.
Lattimore)
25. US v. PINEDA | 12858 | 1918
RIAA: PART II. As general rule, the evidence of other offenses
committed by a defendant is inadmissible. As one exception,
however, it is permissible to ascertain defendant's
knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence.
If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed
similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be
established. There is no better evidence of negligence than
the frequency of accidents.
FACTS: Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses,
presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr.
Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given
to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for
filling.
Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was
prepared and returned to Santos in the form of 6 papers
marked Botica Pineda Santos, under the belief that he had
purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for,
put two of the packages in water and fed the same to two
of his sick horses.
The two horses died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon,
took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science
for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not
potassium chlorate but barium chlorate.
At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the
drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate,
which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
(Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is poisonous;
potassium chlorate is not.)
A veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and
found that death was the result of poisoning. Trial Court
held Pineda liable. What the appellant is here relying on is
the maxim res inter alios acta, that as a general rule, the
evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is
inadmissible. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER EVIDENCE OF OTHER OFFENSES
COMMITTED BY A DEFENDANT IS INADMISSIBLE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* Appellant has confused
this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto.
The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense.
Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the
point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The
purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent,
and to fix his negligence.
26. PEOPLE v. ABULENCIA | 138403 | 2001
A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was
not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or
that the interview was conducted under circumstances
where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing
out of fear.
FACTS: Ten-year old Rebelyn Garcia’s naked body was
found floating in a creek in San Manuel, Pangasinan, with
marks of bruises, burns and injuries manifesting that she
was defiled and later drowned to death. Rebelyn was last
seen with Rolly Abulencia before she was found dead.
Abulencia surrendered to Mayor Felipe Sevilleja of San
Manuel, Pangasinan.
PO3 Randy Bergado, a PNP officer who was then in the
mayor’s house, was informed by Abulencia that “he had a
small girl companion that he accidentally bumped at the
Aburido bridge” and who “might have been dead because
the flow of the river is so fast.”
Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of DZWN Bombo
Radio, testified that on August 6, 1998, Abulencia admitted
to him in a taped interview made at the Municipal Jail
having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge.
Abulencia was charged with rape with homicide.
ISSUE: WHTETHER THE CONFESSION MADE TO THE RADIO
COMMENTATOR IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* Abulencia admitted
having raped Rebelyn when he was interviewed by Dennis
Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Radio. Mojares’
testimony lends support to the finding of guilty.
27. PEOPLE v. DE JESUS | 39087 | 1984
The phrase “unsound mind” which affects the competency
of the witness includes any mental aberration, whether
organic or functional, or induced by drugs or hypnosis.
Mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the fact to
be testified to occurred affects only his credibility.
Nevertheless, as long as the witness can convey ideas by
words or signs and give sufficiently intelligent answers to
questions propounded, she is a competent witness even if
she is feeble-minded.
FACTS: Clara Mina a feeble minded was raped by Rogelio De
Jesus in Claras house. While the rape was on going, Pastora
Simon the mother of Clara, who had already walked some
150 meters away from their house, when sensing it was
about to rain hurried back to the house to get cellophane
with which to shield her from the rain.
Upon her return to the house, she found Rogelio de Jesus
naked lying on top of Clara Mina whose legs were spread
apart. Seeing them in that position, she rushed to the
kitchen to get a club but Rogelio spotted her and ran away.
Rogelio denied that he had forced the Clara to have sexual
intercourse with him and that he only inserted his
forefinger inside the complainant's private parts. He
assailed the competence of Clara as a witness on the ground
that being a feeble minded she is not a competent witness.
ISSUE: WHETHER CLARA A FEEBLE MINDED IS A
COMPETENT WITNESS?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* Clara was feeble-minded
and had displayed difficulty in comprehending the
questions propounded on her is an undisputed fact.
However, there is no showing that she could not convey her
ideas by words or signs. It appears in the records that
complainant gave sufficiently intelligent answers to the
questions propounded by the court and the counsels. The
court is satisfied that the complainant can perceive and
transmit in her own way her own perceptions to others. She
is a competent witness.
In this connection, the Solicitor General properly stated that
complainant possesses such a low mental capacity, to the
extent of being incapable of giving consent, could be
gleaned from the fact, as testified to by her mother, that
she is unable to do the simple tasks of combing her hair and
bathing herself.
Thus, even granting it to be true, as counsel has insinuated,
that complainant had submitted to the sexual act without
resistance such cannot be construed as consent on her part,
so as to preclude it from being rape. Incapable of giving
consent, she could not thus consent in intelligently.
28. PEOPLE v. SALOMON | 96848 | 1994
A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified
from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses,
acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and
credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions
and the manner he can make them known to the court.
FACTS: Sylvia Soria, a 20-year old mental retardate, was
walking along the Maharlika Highway at Casabahan,
Gandara, Samar, Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge,
who were apparently waiting for her, accosted her and
forcibly took her to the ricefield some ten meters away.
There she was raped by Salomon with Conge's assistance.
On her way home, she met her brother Senecio, to whom
she related her ordeal. The two accused flatly denied the
charge against them. The two accused contended that the
testimony of Sylvia Soria is flawed because she is an insane
person who was confined at the National Mental Hospital a
few months before the alleged incident.
The appellants insist that their own version of the incident
is more plausible and should not have been rejected by the
trial court in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence in their favor.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SYLVIA’S TESTIMONY BEING A
MENTAL RETARDED IS SUFFICIENT TO DECLARE SUCH AS
INCOMPETENT?
HELD: NO, it is not sufficient. *See Stated Doctrine* As long
as the witnesse was able to communicate her ordeal clearly
and consistently her testimony may be considered. The
testimony of the offended party herself was especially
telling and credible despite the fact that she was somewhat
mentally deficient.
Although she was really of limited intelligence, the
complainant nevertheless did not forget the harrowing
experience she suffered during that frightful night in the
bushes when the three men seared her memory with the
lust they forced upon her.
Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to
ask her leading questions, but, "her testimony was positive,
clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition
did not vitiate her credibility.
The Supreme Court also believe, as it observed often
enough in many cases that a woman will not expose herself
to the humiliation of a rape trail, with its attendant publicity
Page 19

and the morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been
truly wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse.
29. PEOPLE v. MACAPAL | 155335 | 2005
Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A
mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of his or her testimony depends on the quality
of his or her perceptions and the manner he or she can make
them known to the court.
FACTS: One evening in June 1996 at Barangay Manapa,
Buenavista, Agusandel Norte. While LigayaSarino was
walking on her way home after she bought kerosene from
the nearby store of appellant's father, Jesus Macapal, Sr.,
appellant suddenly appeared and waylaid her. Holding both
her arms, appellant dragged her to an isolated grassy area
where he ordered her to lie down.
Although she wanted to shout, she froze with fear,
appellant having poked a knife at her abdomen and
threatened to kill her if she would shout or resist. Appellant
thereafter succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
On December 23, 1996, when the victim visited her sister
Vilma Sarino Salazar, Vilma noticed the victim's stomach
bulging, prompting her to inquire what happened. While
the victim initially refused to answer, she was later
prevailed upon to answer upon Vilma's insistence and
assurance that she would not be harmed.
The victim then revealed what their neighbor, herein
appellant, did to her. When Vilma asked her when the
incident happened, the victim answered 'when you just left
for Manila which was, by Vilma's account, on June 3, 1996.
It is further gathered from the evidence that Dr. Cheryl T.
Zalsos, a psychiatrist at the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center who conducted a psychiatric evaluation of the victim
on November 25, 1998, found that 'the patient is suffering
from Mental Retardation, mild to moderate characterized
by significantly sub-average intellectual functioning (IQ 70
or below) accompanied by significant limitations in
adaptive functioning, with an onset below the age of 18.
And the doctor opined that while the mental capacity of the
victim is comparable to that of a child between 9 to 12 years
old, she could testify in court but under closed door and
leading questions should be avoided 'as retarded people
may be suggestible and wish to please others.
It is gathered furthermore that when Dr. Benjamin B. Selim,
Jr., Medical Officer III of the Butuan Provincial Hospital,
examined the victim on January 13, 1997, he found her to
be in a pregnant state and that her hymen was not intact.
On the basis of the ultrasound examination, he opined that
she 'had conception probably third to the last week of June
1996.
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
ISSUE: WHETHER LIGAYA SARINO’S TESTIMONY IS
CREDIBLE DESPITE BEING MENTALLY RETARDATE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* In People v. Munar (131
SCRA 44, 46[1984]), although the complainant therein was
a 19-year old female, with a mental age of a 5-year old, the
Court still held that she was a competent witness. We
therein relied on the findings of the trial court that
complainant's answer were intelligible enough to be
understood.
The complainant therein could convey her thoughts by
words and signs. Furthermore, an examining physician from
the National Mental Hospital was presented in that case
who testified that the mental deficiency of the witness did
not prevent her from recalling painful experiences.
In People v. Gerones, (193 SCRA 263, 267 [1991]), the Court
found, upon close examination of the records, that the
victim managed to communicate her ordeal to the court
clearly and consistently.
The trial court found the victim therein to have the mental
capacity of a ten-year old. Hence, we declared that we were
convinced that a ten-year old girl could adequately narrate
facts which show that she had been raped.
The acceptance of a mental retardate's testimony,
therefore, as in the case of other witnesses, must still
depend on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the
quality of the person's perceptions and the manner he can
make them known to the court.
In the case at bar, albeit the victim's testimony was tainted
with inconsistencies, these are mere collateral and minor
matters which would not compel this Court from
discrediting her testimony, given her mental retardation.
In fact, testimonial discrepancies, which could have been
caused by the natural fickleness of memory, tend to
strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they negate
any suspicion of rehearsed testimony and do not destroy
the substance of the victim's testimony.
30. ORIENT INSURANCE v. REVILLA | 34098 | 1930
When a part of a writing is introduced in evidence by one
litigant, his adversary is entitled to use the other parts of the
same writing, so far as is relevant to the issues in the case.
To this end, the adversary party’s attorney has a right to
inspect the writing and to require its production in court.
FACTS: Teal Motor Co. filed a civil action to recover upon
two fire insurance policies issued by the Orient Insurance
Company upon a stock of merchandise, which was allegedly
destroyed by a fire.
As a defense, Orient claimed that, though it had sent notice
rejecting Teal’s claim, the latter failed to institute action
within three months from such notice, thereby forfeiting all
benefits under the terms of the contract. On the other
hand, Teal alleged that one E.E. Elser, a representative of
the company, expressly requested Teal to defer judicial
action as there were possibilities for an extrajudicial
compromise.
During trial, E.M. Bachrach, president of Teal Motor, said
that he received a letter from their attorneys, Attys.
Guevarra, Francisco and Recto, urging him to file the case.
Orient moved for the reading of said letter, however, upon
objection by Teal, the trial judge allowed only the reading
of the part on which Bachrach testified.
Orient tried again to have the whole letter read, but was
denied. Orient then procured a subpoena duces tecum
requiring the aforesaid attorneys to produce in court
certain papers, including the aforesaid letter. Upon motion
by said attorneys, said subpoena was quashed.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE READING OF THE WHOLE LETTER
VIOLATE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* According to Teal, the
other, unread, portions of the letter were privileged as they
were related to the terms of employment between
attorney and client. Irrelevant it might be, under certain
circumstances, it is not privileged.
On the other hand, assuming the matter contained in the
letter and withheld from the inspection of Orient was of a
privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the
introduction in evidence of part of the letter. Section 283 of
the Code of Civil Procedure makes no exception as to
privileged matter.
To this end, the adversary party’s attorney has a right to
inspect the writing and to require its production in court.
The introduction in evidence of part of a paper writing by
one party waives privilege as to the other parts of the same
writing.
31. PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN | 115439-41 | 1997
Confidential communications made by a client to his
attorney with a respect to a crime which the client intends
to commit in the future and for which said client sought the
attorney’s advice are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
FACTS: In 1976, Paredes, applied for and was granted a free
patent over a certain lot in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. In
1985, such patent was nullified through a court action
instituted by the Director Lands on the ground that Paredes
had made fraudulent representations to secure said patent.
A case for perjury was subsequently filed against him,
though it was later dismissed for having prescribed.
However, a preliminary investigation for the violation of the
Anti-Graft law was commenced before the Tanodbayan on
the ground that Paredes allegedly used his position as
Provincial Attorney to secure the patent.
The Tanodbayan issued a resolution recommending the
filing of charges against Paredes. A criminal case for
violation of the Anti-Graft Law was filed with the
Sandiganbayan, but the same was later dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
Gelacio, who initiated the perjury and graft charges against
Paredes, sought the investigation of Paredes, his counsel,
Atty. Sansaet, and one Honrada regarding alleged
falsification of public documents, among which are the
notice of arraignments and transcripts of stenographic
notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes
in the perjury case previously dismissed.
To evade liability, Atty. Sansaet revealed that said
falsification was made upon the isntigation and inducement
of Paredes, who contrived the scheme to dismiss the anti-
graft case. The Ombudsman rejected the governments’
motion for the discharge of Atty. Sansaet as state witness
and caused falsification charges to be filed against all the
defendants.
Another motion filed with Sandiganbayan for the discharge
of Sansaet as state witness was denied by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the proposed testimony
would fall under the Attorney-Client privilege.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PROJECTED TESTIMONY OF ATTY.
SANSAET COVERED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* There is a distinction
between confidential communications relating to past
crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to
be committed, by the client. If the client seeks his lawyer’s
advice with respect to a crime that the former has
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege
declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the
client’s consent.
The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not
attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to
commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of
which he seeks the lawyer’s advice.
Here, the testimony sought from Atty. Sansaet as state
witness are communications made to him by the physical
acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he
and Honrada, either with active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify or were in the process of
falsifying, the documents, which were later filed with the
Tanodbayan.
Page 20

32. HICKMAN v. TAYLOR | 329 U.S. - 495, 67 S. CT. 385 |
1947
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify
unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental
impressions of an attorney.
FACTS: Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff
in a suit in a federal district court against certain tug owners
to recover for the death of a seaman in the sinking of the
tug filed numerous interrogatories directed to the
defendants, including one inquiring whether any
statements of members of the crew were taken in
connection with the accident and requesting that exact
copies of all such written statements be attached and that
the defendant "set forth in detail the exact provisions of any
such oral statements or reports."
There was no showing of necessity or other justification for
these requests. A public hearing had been held before the
United States Steamboat Inspectors, at which the survivors
of the accident had been examined and their testimony
recorded and made available to all interested parties.
Defendants answered all other interrogatories, stating
objective facts and giving the names and addresses of
witnesses, but declined to summarize or set forth the
statements taken from witnesses, on the ground that they
were "privileged matter obtained in preparation for
litigation."
After a hearing on objections to the interrogatories, the
District Court held that the requested matters were not
privileged and decreed that they be produced and that
memoranda of defendants' counsel containing statements
of fact by witnesses either be produced or submitted to the
court for determination of those portions which should be
revealed to plaintiff. Defendants and their counsel refused
and were adjudged guilty of contempt.
ISSUE: WHETHER MATERIALS TAKEN IN ANTICIPATION OF
LITIGATION AND CONTAINING THE PERSONAL
RECOLLECTIONS AND THOUGHTS OF COUNSEL
PROTECTED FROM DISCOVERY?
HELD: YES. The appellate court reversed, describing the
materials as privileged work product under Fed. R. Civ. P.
26. On further appeal, the Court found Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 was
inapplicable because no depositions were involved with the
interrogatories.
However, petitioner's request, made without purported
necessity or justification, for materials that were prepared
by respondents' attorney in the course of legal
representation fell outside of the arena of discovery and
contravened public policy.
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: EVIDENCE CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
33. UPJOHN CO. v. UNITED STATES | 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.
CT. 677 | 1981
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice.
Sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and such
advice or advocacy depends upon a lawyer being fully
informed by the client.
The attorney-client privilege rests on the need for the
advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the
client's reasons for seeking representation.
FACTS: Responding to a claim that its foreign subsidiary
made illegal payments to secure a government business,
petitioner corporation initiated an investigation and sent
out a questionnaire to all of its foreign general and area
managers to determine the nature and magnitude of such
payments.
After petitioner disclosed such payments to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service
demanded a production of all the files relating to the
investigation.
Petitioner refused to produce the documents. The court
granted certiorari on a judgment from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that the
attorney-client privilege did not apply to communications
made by petitioner corporation's mid-level and lower-level
officers and agents.
ISSUE: WHETHER ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE APPLY TO
COMMUNICATION AMONG PETITIONER'S EMPLOYEES?
HELD: YES. Petitioner's low and mid-level employees'
information was protected by the attorney-client privilege
where it was necessary to defend against potential
litigation, and the work-product doctrine applied to tax
summonses.
The court rejected the "control group" test applied by the
lower appellate court, concluding that even low-level and
mid-level employees could have the information necessary
to defend against the potential litigation, and that Fed. R.
Evid. 501 protected any client information that aided the
orderly administration of justice.
The court rejected the lower appellate court's conclusion
that the work-product doctrine did not apply to tax
summonses, but remanded the issue because the work-
product at issue was based on potentially privileged oral
statements. The doctrine could only be overcome upon a
strong showing of necessity for disclosure, and
unavailability by other means.
34. PEOPLE v. ONG| 137348 | 2004
The Court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations
why confidential informants are usually not presented by
the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and
preserve their invaluable service to the police.
Another is the necessity to protect them from being objects
or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once
they become known. All these considerations, however,
have to be balanced with the right of an accused to a fair
trial.
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying
purpose. Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of the
communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an
informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the
identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who
would have cause to resent the communication, the
privilege is no longer applicable.
FACTS: Based on prosecution through the testimony of
SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, a confidential informant of the
Special Operations Division, PNP Narcotics Group, reported
to the Chief Inspector about the alleged illicit drug activities
of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming. As per order of
Chief Inspector, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-
bust operation.
Once, CI confirmed the meeting time and venue with the
drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages
rendered of one sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline
substance by the accused Ong and boodle money placed in
a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the
latter arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents
arrested co-accused De Ming.
The two accused were brought to the police office where
the corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were
prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug
substance, was referred to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
However, the appellants denied the story of the
prosecution.
The trial court convicted appellant as charged and imposed
on them the penalty of death. Upon automatic review,
appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?
HELD: NO. It is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made
the initial contact, and he was likewise the one who closed
the deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and
time of the meeting. Since only the CI had personal
knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the court held
that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the “poseur-buyer” but
merely the deliveryman. His testimony therefore on
material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing
alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the
appellants.
To determine whether there was valid entrapment or
whether proper procedures were undertaken by the police
officers, in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent
upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through
relevant, material and competent evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-
bust operation is incomplete. The confidential information
who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of
shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented
as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1
Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same and
not part of the buy-bust operation.
*See Stated Doctrine* In sum, there is no fixed rule with
respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The
problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls
for balancing the state interest in protecting the people
from crimes against the individual’s right to prepare his
defense. The balance must be adjusted by giving due weight
to the following factors, among others:
(1) The crime charged;
(2) The possible defenses;
(3) The possible significance of the informer’s
testimony; and
(4) Other relevant factors.
In the present case, the crime charged against the
appellants is capital in character and can result in the
imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to
prove all the material elements of the alleged sale of shabu
and the resulting buy-bust operation.
Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable. It
should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person
enjoy high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be
diminished except by a value of higher significance.
Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the
alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine hydrochloride
further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no
crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a
nagging doubt on whether the substance confiscated was
the same specimen examined and established to be
regulated drug.
As the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of
the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a valid
entrapment of the appellants must fail. In the case at bar,
the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is
incomplete.
Page 21

The confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how
the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was
perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony
was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal
knowledge of the same.
On this score, SPO1 Gonzales’ testimony is hearsay and
possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that
the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. To
impart probative value to these hearsay statements and
convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to render
nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness.
35. ORDONO v. DAQUIGAN | 39012 | 1975
When an offense directly attacks or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception
to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed
one against the other.
Thus, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the
rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a
crime committed by him against his wife the victim's
mother.
FACTS: Avelino Ordoño was charged in the municipal court
of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his daughter,
Leonora, on October 11, 1970.
In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the
mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein
she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th,
Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no
denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoño threatened
to kill Leonora and Catalina if they reported the crime to the
police.
Avelino invoked the marital disqualification rule found in
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that a
husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without
her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without
his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other
or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RAPE COMMITTED BY THE
HUSBAND AGAINST HIS DAUGHTER IS A CRIME
COMMITTED BY HIM AGAINST HIS WIFE WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE EXCEPTION FOUND IN THE MARITAL
DISQUALIFICATION RULE?
HELD: YES, it is within the exception. *See Stated Doctrine*
That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably
abominable and revolting crime with incestuous
implications, positively undermines the connubial
relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much
elucidation.
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36. PEOPLE v. IRANG | 45179 | 1937
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible
in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant
as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show
his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the
time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime.
FACTS: Seven armed men went to the house of the spouses
Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente. One of
them was armed with a gun, went up and approaching
Maximiana Vicente, wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck
herein the face with the butt of his gun, making her lose
consciousness momentarily.
When she regained consciousness he saw her husband
already dead. One of the assailants then said to her: "Bring
out the money and jewelry." Maximiniana Vicente turned
over to the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun
P70 in cash and jewelry valued at P200, which she has kept
in a trunk. During the short space of time that she was
turning over the money and jewelry, she looked at the
man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his
left eyelid.
That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assaulted
by malefactors who had been firing shots before arriving at
and going up the house. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one
of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid and was
dressed in a maong-colored suit. It was he who opened her
trunk.
Thereafter, a group of persons was presented to
Maximiniana and in it she identified Benjamin Irang as the
one who had struck her with the butt of his gun and
demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. Juana de la
Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his
pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men
who had gone up to her house that same night. The trial
court found him guilty of complex crime robbery with
homicide.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF JUANA DE CRUZ
IDENTIFYING ONE OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CASE IS
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE TO PROVE A SEPARATE CRIME
COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED?
HELD: YES. The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect
that her house, situated only about one hundred meters
from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that
same night by some malefactors with white stripes upon
their faces, and that one of them, with pockmarks on his
face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maong-
colored suit, who later turned out to be the herein accused-
appellant, opened her box, indirectly corroborates
Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the man of the same
description was the open who went to her house and
demanded delivery of her money and jewelry, having
recognized him later to be the herein accused-appellant.
*See Stated Doctrine* Thus, the judgment appealed from
was affirmed but modified as to amount of damages
awarded.
37. REGALA v. SANDIGANBAYAN | 105938 | 1996
The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client. However, there are certain exceptions:
1) Where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client’s name would implicate said client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice;
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability; or
3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case
against the attorney’s client unless, by revealing the
client’s name, the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
FACTS: A complaint was filed by the PCGG against Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth,
which includes shares of stocks in certain corporations.
Cojuangco’s co-defendants were Teodoro Regala, Edgardo
Angara, Avelino Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio Vinluan,
Victor Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta, Paraja Hayudini and
private respondent Raul Roco, all then partners of ACCRA
Law Firm. They all admitted that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the aforesaid corporations
by acting as nominees-stockholders of the same.
Due to Roco’s promise that he would reveal the identity of
the pricipal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder,
Roco was taken out of PCGG’s amended complaint. The rest
of the ACCRA lawyers then insisted that they, too, should
be granted the same treatment given to Roco, but the
Sandiganbayan denied their exclusion for not acceding to
the conditions set by PCGG, which included the disclosure
of the identity of its clients and the submission of pertinent
documents.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ACCRA LAWYERS ENTITLED TO
INVOKE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THIS CASE?
HELD: NO. Yes. As a matter of public policy, a client’s
identity should not be shrouded in mystery. *See Stated
Docctrine* The present case falls under the aforesaid
exceptions, and hence, attorney-client privilege may be
invoked.
In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one
of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the
right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it
amounts to self-incrimination, then the flow of information
would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically
nugatory.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
1. PEOPLE v. ALEGRE | 30423 | 1979
As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an
accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and
does not have probative value against his co-accused. It is
merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned.
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, a 57
year old spinster whose body was found in her home, which
was ransacked. Alegre rented a room in the house of Sajo.
One Cudillan was found with the jewelry of Sajo sometime
later. Cudillan executed two extrajudicial statements.
In the first, he admitted that he was involved in the murder
of Sajo. In the second, he identified appellants Alegre,
Comayas and Medalla. According to the second statement,
Cudillan went near the cell within the Office of the
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and identified
Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the
persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and
"Mario" in his declaration. During the trial, Sgt. Isla of the
Pasay police testified that when Cudillan identified the
appellants as the perpetrators, they just stared at him and
said nothing.
Cudillan later repudiated his statements, claiming they
were done in duress. The appellants each had their own
alibis. However, the trial court gave credence to the
testimony of Sgt. Isla and stated that the appellants should
have denied the charges when they were identified.
ISSUE: WHETHER CUDILLAN’S EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION BINDING ON THE APPELLANTS?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The extrajudicial
confessions of Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court
was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed
the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are
not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and
Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent
evidence of conspiracy.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE SILENCE OF THE APPELLANTS MAY
BE TAKEN AGAINST THEM?
HELD: NO. The Court stated that he settled rule is that the
silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure
or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against
him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating
question.
It has also been held that while an accused is under custody,
his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he
has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may
Page 22

not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of
silence would be illusory.
Hence, the silence of an accused (or in this case, the three
appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements
by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such
accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such
implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
confession of his participation in the commission of the
crime.
Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence
or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible
with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
2. PEOPLE v. RAQUEL | 119005 | 1996
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication
of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such
waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant
and is not admissible against his co-accused.
FACTS: The accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano
Raquel, as well as accused Amado Ponce, were held guilty
of the crime of robbery with homicide and were sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful
lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of
a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person
knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his
surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared
a hold-up and fired their guns at him. George Jovillano
responded to Juliet's plea for help.
He reported the incident to the police. The police came and
found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and
lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was
identified as Amado Ponce. Even the victim cannot identify
if it was the accused who entered their house. Trial court
rendered judgment against the accused.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION MADE
BY PONCE AGAINST THE OTHER ACCUSED SHOULD BE
ADMISSIBLE ON COURT?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The defense submits a
lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in
convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of
the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively
implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.
If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine
his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is
elementary that the same are hearsay as against said
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accused. That is exactly the situation, and the
disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon
the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused.
The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith
and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding
upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should
be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and
if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence
against him.
3. PEOPLE v. SERRANO | 7973 | 1959
The rule that "the act or declaration of a conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration"
applies only to the stand at the trial where the defendant
has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
While the testimony of accomplice or confederates in crime
is always subject to grave suspicion "coming as it does from
a polluted source", and should be received with great
caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless
admissible and competent.
FACTS: Eulogio Serrano, Cenon Serrano, Anastacio Reyes et
al. were charged for killing Pablo Navarro in conspiracy with
each other. The accused denied all allegations and
presented different alibis. During the trial of the case before
the lower courts, Anastacio Reyes was discharged to testify
as a witness for the prosecution. Reyes narrated before the
court the events that took place from the time he and his
co-conspirators plotted the killing up until the body of the
victim was hid.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE LONE TESTIMONY OF ANASTACIO
REYES IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN THE PARTIES?
HELD: YES. The appellants contend that in order that the
testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence
against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by
evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy
actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by
the admission was a privy to the conspiracy; and as there is
nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness
Anastacio Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in
finding that conspiracy has been established and in
convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of
their co-conspirator. The contention does not merit serious
consideration because *See Stated Doctrine*
4. PEOPLE v. YATCO | 9181 | 1955
The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator
refers to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of
its object and not to a confession made long after the
conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, the
confession of a co-accused may be inadmissible against his
co-accused for being hearsay but may nevertheless be
admissible against the declarant’s own guilt.
FACTS: In an amended information filed by the City
Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still
unknown, were charged with having conspired together in
the murder of one Jose Ramos.
During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the
prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty.
Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in
connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial
confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan
Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant
Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any
evidence on such confession on the ground that it was
hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other
accused Panganiban.
The lower court ordered the exclusion of the evidence
objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the
confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without
prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CONFESSION MADE IS ADMISSIBLE
AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of
evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being
hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between
them without the conspiracy being established by other
evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and
should have been admitted as such.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one
conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its
object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the
confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused,
nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged
confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not
yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier
was precisely for the purpose of identifying the
confessions), much less formally offered in evidence.
The prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their
confessions are formally offered in evidence.
Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also
applies to the confessions in question,it was premature for
the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the
ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
The Court see no need to discuss the question of the
admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions of
two or more accused for the purpose of establishing
conspiracy between them through the identity of the
confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions
are not before us and have not even been formally offered
in evidence for any purpose.
Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed
such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against
the parties who made them, and admit the same
conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the
prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant
evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.
At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of
the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the
admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under
the rules of evidence, should be excluded.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal
cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence
for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of
evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the
People can no longer appeal.
5. PEOPLE v. CHAW YAW SHUN | 19590 | 1968
Conspiracy must be proven by independent evidence other
than the confession.
The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the
other in the same case, must relate to statements made by
one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its
objects, and not to a confession made.
FACTS: The dead body of Hector Crisostomo, then officer of
Presidential Fact Finding Committee, was found inside his
car after successive gunshot wounds.
Upon examination of the car, a bag was found inside which
contained checks drawn by Victoria Alvarez in favor of
Page 23

Crisostomo, together with a receipt signed by Crisostomo
acknowledging payment.
Alvarez was then taken into questioning. Consequently, a
complaint for murder was filed against Alvarez and two
John Does. In the course of the proceeding, Alvarez
executed a handwritten confession pointing to George
Chua, Chaw Yaw Shun, Lim Bun Ping and Johnny Yao.
Chua was then brought to police headquarters where he
allegedly made a written statement, which admits that he
ordered the killing of Crisostomo. On trial, Chua pleaded
not guilty on the ground that he was maltreated and forced
to sign the statement. He further claims to have been
handcuffed, blindfolded and electrocuted.
ISSUE: WHETHER CONFESSIONS OF ALVAREZ MAY BE
TAKEN AGAINST CHUA?
HELD: NO. The Court noted in this case that confessions
made by Alvarez which points to Chua and others as co-
conspirators are inadmissible against them, as mere
confessions are insufficient as evidence. An independent
evidence which establishes conspiracy must be proved
other than the confession per se.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CHUA
MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST HIM?
HELD: NO. The admissibility of a confession must relate to
a statement made by another alleged co-conspirator. The
Court noted that conspiracy must be real and not
presumptive.
In this case, the Court noted the conflicting confessions
between Alvarez and Chua. Moreover, the allegation of
conspiracy all the more became weak based on the proof
that Chua's confession was taken forcibly beyond his
consent.
6. ALPUERTO v. PASTOR | 12794 | 1918
A private document legally recognized shall have, with
regard to those who signed it and their privies, the same
force as a public instrument.
The term “privies” denotes the idea of succession, not only
by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that
of succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos,
and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and
one subrogated to it will be privies.
FACTS: Juan Llenos was the owner of 3 parcels of land. Here,
a conflict arose between two parties concerning the
ownership of the said parcels of land.
Plaintiff Alpuerto based his claim to the parcels under a
contract of sale with pacto de retro. Whereas, Jose Pastor
laid his claim thereon due to his purchase of such at a public
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auction. It was also attested to by 2 subscribing witnesses.
On the other hand, Pastor argued that he was able to
purchase the same after the court, in a previous case to
recover a sum of money, ruled in his favor as against Llenos.
It was also established that Alpuerto was the son-in-law of
Llenos. During the case bet. Alpuerto and Llenos, the former
alleged that under Art. 1227 of the CC, Pastor was privy to
the sale between him and Llenos, and was, therefore,
bound by the same to deliver it to him.
In the present petition, Alpuerto prays that he be declared
to have the full and absolute ownership of the subject
properties. CFI favored plaintiff. Hence this case.
At the time of the supposed sale to Eladio Alpuerto there
had been pending for nearly two years, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, an action in which Jose Perez Pastor was
plaintiff and Juan Llenos was defendant. In this action the
plaintiff sought to recover from Juan Llenos a considerable
sum of money; and Eladio Alpuerto, as son-in-law of Juan
Llenos, was aware of this litigation from the beginning.
ISSUE: WHETHER ART. 1227 OR OTHER LAWS PROHIBIT
THE INTRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY OF AN ATTESTING
WITNESS/OTHER PERSONS PRESENT WHEN A PRIVATE
DOCUMENT IS EXECUTED?
HELD: NO. The said testimony was admissible, even against
3rd parties. The testimony of witnesses may be relied upon
for the purpose of proving that the private document was
in fact executed and delivered upon the dates therein
recited, and that plaintiffwent into possession under them.
Under Art. 1225, a document, which starts out as a private
document and never rises above that status, will be given
effect as such. *See Stated Doctrine*
That, if a party has a right under an instrument that’s
provable as a private document and, if it’s approved, it will
prevail from the true and proven date of its execution.
ISSUE: WHETHER PASTOR IS ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY?
HELD: YES. However, herein there are badges of fraud, such
as the fact that Alpuerto was Lleno’s son-in-law, and that,
at the time of the sale to Alpuerto, the case between Lleno
and Pastor was alreading pending, which gave rise to a
presumption of fraud. Since, the same wasn’t disproven by
Alpuerto, the Court justly awarded the lots in question the
favor of Pastor.
The Civil Code says that a transfer of property made by one
against whom a condemnatory judgment is presumed
fraudulent.
Circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to
Alpuerto was one in fraud of creditors. Hence, the deed
must be anulled and the property delivered to Pastor.
7. CITY OF MANILA v. DEL ROSARIO | 1284 | 1905
The evidence is inadmissible. The letter was executed only
after he had already transferred the land to Jacinto. Hence,
it is no longer binding on Jacinto.
Where one derives title to real property from another, the
declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation to the
property, is evidence against the former only when made
while the latter holds the title.
FACTS: The City of Manila filed an action to recover
possession of 2 lots (located in calles Clavel and Barcelona)
in the City of Tondo which were occupied by a Jacinto del
Rosario since Feb 23, 1893. At the hearing the City of Manila
introduced documentary and oral evidence.
Eduardo Timoteo testified that Calles Clavel and Barcelona
was formerly a part of plaza divisoria which belonged to the
Central Government (not the city) and that he did not know
to whom it belongs. Juan Villegas testified that the land in
question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria and
that all land included in it belonged to the city.
Sotera Roco testified that a certain Lorenzo del Rosario paid
100 pesos to her brother for the purpose of instituting a
possessory information as to the property abutting on Calle
Clavel. Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing
as to the ownership of the land. They simply testified as o
the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence
presented by the City of Manila.
A petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the Mayor
of Manila on Sept 26, 1891 and a letter written by Lorezo
del Rosario to the Municipal Board of Manila on Oct 9 1901
were presented
Lorenzo del Rosario admitted the authenticity of two
documents which contain an offer to the City of Manila to
purchase the land on Calle Clavel. He also admitted that he
signed the first document under the misapprehension that
the land belonged to the city, but that he had been
subsequently informed by the city officials that the land
does not belong to Manila but to Cipria Roco.
He also said that he signed the second document because
the President of the Municipal Board advised him to do so
in order to avoid litigation. His testimony was not
contradicted. The court ruled in favour of the City of Manila
and awarded $2,500 damages. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CITY OF MANILA IS ENTITLED TO THE
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE LAND?
HELD: NO. The evidence introduced does not prove
Manila’s claim of title to the land in question. Neither the
testimony of the witnesses nor the documentary evidence
introduced show that the city of Manila is the owner of the
land or that it has a right to its possession.
Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two
public instruments referred to as having been executed in
1900, tended to support the contentions of the defendant
rather than those of the plaintiff.
An offer of compromise is not admissible in evidence.
Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he
acquired ownership of the land. The second document was
signed after he had transferred the land to Jacinto del
Rosario.
Hence, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might
have made in the documents mentioned, they are not
binding upon the defendant, because, under section 278 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one derives title to real
property from another, the declaration, act, or omission of
the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against
the former only when made while the latter holds the title."
8. PEOPLE v. ENCIPIDO | 70091 | 1986
They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against
the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances
presented that persons other than the declarants
themselves participated in the commission of the crime
charged and proved.
They are what is commonly known as interlocking
confession and constitute an exception to the general rule
that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in
evidence only against the declarants thereof.
FACTS: Jose Lacumbes (deceased) was found dead by his
wife and children near the hut in their farm. Herein
appellant Brigido Encipido was charged with Murder for the
death of the deceased.
A review of the prosecution evidence presented begin with
the testimony of Felicisimo Alciso. This witness narrated
that he went to the hut of the deceased in order to get some
chickens which the latter had promised him but that, before
reaching the hut, he heard a gunshot.
He stopped and saw that the deceased was being tied and
subjected to fist blows. There were three persons who
mauled the deceased, while others stayed at a distance.
Then, somebody struck the deceased with the butt of a gun
causing the latter to fall to the ground. Encipido was behind
the deceased, while Manatad and De La Peña were on the
sides.
Two other prosecution witnesses supported testimony
Alciso. De La Peña, to the surprise of appellants' common
counsel testified in open Court that, although he belonged
to the group of "Commander Tanga," the latter, Manatad
and a third individual merely forced him to join, threatening
to kill him if he refused; that he was with the group; that he
was present when "Commander Tanga" and Manatad killed
Page 24

the deceased but that he was merely standing by; that the
duo were the first ones apprehended, and after them he
was also arrested by the CHDF.
In their defense, Encipido and Manatad denied having I
killed the victim and interposed the defense of alibi.
ENCIPIDO claimed that he was sawing lumber from morning
till 3:00 P.M. Manatad, for his part, also denied all
imputations against him, stating that he only came to know
Encipido in jail; that during the whole day, he was plowing
the field tenanted by his mother-in-law. RTC found herein
appellant for murder, hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION BY ACCUSED
DE LA PENA AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED IS ADMISSIBLE?
HELD: YES. Eyewitness Felicisimo Alciso positively Identified
appellant as among the group who led the deceased out of
his hut, with his hands tied behind his back, and thereafter
mauled him and hacked his neck
And although it was admittedly the first time that Alciso saw
the malefactors, it does not necessarily follow that he could
not have recognized their faces.
Encipido and De La Peña verbally acknowledged their guilt
before Station Commander Ortega and Municipal Mayor
Espina when they individually boasted that they had killed
the deceased so that the latter could no longer harm other
people with his witchcraft.
They admitted that they had beheaded the deceased. De La
Peña even showed the Mayor the deceased's dried ear
which he had severed. It is also to be noted that appellants'
extra-judicial confessions were independently made
without collusion, are Identical with each other in their
material respects and confirmatory of the other.
They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial
evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to
show the probability of the latter's actual participation in
the commission of the crime.
They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against
the others, it being clear from other facts and
circumstances presented that persons other than the
declarants themselves participated in the commission of
the crime charged and proved.
They are what is commonly known as interlocking
confession and constitute an exception to the general rule
that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in
evidence only against the declarants thereof.
Encipidos and De La Peña's extrajudicial acknowledgments
of guilt to the Municipal Mayor and the INP Station
Commander are not necessarily incredible for, in their
minds, they were not "confessing" but bragging of their
exploits" in the belief that they were saving the community
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from the witchcraft of the DECEASED and the evil doings of
some people.
There is no proof whatsoever that the extrajudicial
admissions in question were coerced or concocted by those
officials, who are responsible public officers and presumed
to have regularly performed their functions and against
whose impartiality nothing has been proven.
9. PEOPLE v. ENDINO | 133026 | 2001
A confession willingly, openly and publicly given in the
presence of newsmen through an interview does not form
part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police
officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy
and forgiveness from the public.
Hence, it is admissible in evidence. However, courts must
exercise caution and should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have been freely given.
FACTS: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the
evening of 16 October 1991, Gerry Galgarin, uncle of
accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning
lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the
chest. Aquino managed to free himself and tried to run
away, but Endino, who harbored ill-feelings towards Aquino
and the latter's girlfriend, Clara Agagas (whose love the two
men once shared), shot Aquino. Galgarin and Endino fled,
and Aquino expired shortly thereafter.
Galgarin was arrested and was interviewed by ABS-CBN
reporters, to whom he admitted his guilt while pointing to
Endino as the gunman and appealing for the latter to give
himself up to the authorities.
However, Endino disowned the confession, claiming that it
was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers.
He asserted that the videotaped confession was
constitutionally infirm and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the
Constitution.
The video footages, however, was admitted in evidence
upon a finding that Galgarin’s confession was made before
a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any
semblance of hostility towards him. Endino was convicted
of murder.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE VIDEOTAPED CONFESSION OF
GALGARIN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?
HELD: YES. The interview was recorded on video and it
showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does
not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given
to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit
sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he
had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have
easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all
likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of
television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the
recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is
prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution
must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them
beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an
offense on television.
Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed
rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system. In other words, courts should never presume that
all media confessions described as voluntary have been
freely given.
HEARSAY
SEC. 36
1. PEOPLE v. DAMASO | 93516 | 1992
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the
presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios
acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same
does not give such evidence any probative value.
The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence
admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not has no probative value. (People v. Valero,
L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675)
FACTS: A PC officer and some companions went to the
house rented by accused-appellant where they were
allowed entry into the house by the house help. upon
entering, they saw radio sets, pamphlets, Xerox copiers and
a computer machine. They asked and were granted
permission to look around by the persons inside the house.
In one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive
orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
among others. They confiscated the articles and brought
them to their headquarters for final inventory.
They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that
appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated therefrom.
A perusal of the facts shows that clearly, the testimonies are
hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on
their own personal knowledge. The Solicitor General,
however, argues that while the testimonies may be
hearsay, the same are admissible because of the failure of
counsel for appellant to object thereto. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER LACK OF OBJECTION TO HEARSAY
TESTIMONIES GIVES CREDENCE TO IT?
HELD: NO. The Court reiterated an earlier decision of it
where it held that *See Stated Doctrine.* It is unfortunate
that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the
persons who knew the appellant as the lessee and owner of
the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have
exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness.
Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which
could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the
house and the owner of the subversive items. To give
probative value to these hearsay statements and convict
the appellant on this basis alone would be to render his
constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
NOTE: Main issue of the case relates to violation against
unathorized search and seizures. The Court held that the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone
except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia
v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 695).
In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not
in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados,
his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it.
The Court find no evidence that would establish the fact
that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper, or if it
was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had
given her authority to open his house in his absence. The
prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has
such an authority.
SEC. 37
2. PEOPLE v. LAQUINON | 45470 |1985
The dying declaration of the deceased is not admissible as
an ante-mortem declaration when the deceased was in
doubt as to whether he would die or not. It may, however,
be admitted as part of res gestae when it is made immediate
after a startling occurrence.
FACTS: On the night of November 13, 1972, Barrio Captain
Samama Buat heard gunshots coming from the bank of a
river near his house. Moments later, Leocario Buat,
Samama’s brother arrived and told the latter that a man
was shouting for help at the bank of the river.
Samama proceeded to the place where the unidentified
man was, followed by Leocario who had called a barrio
Page 25

councilman. They found a man lying face down on the sand,
with his two hands tied behind his back. The man identified
himself as Pablo Remonde.
Samama Buat took Remonde’s ante-mortem statement,
whereby the latter pointed to Gregorio Laquinon as the one
who shot him. When asked whether he would survive,
Remonde answered, “I don’t know.” Samama also informed
Vice Mayor Biran about the shooting of Remonde.
Biran went to the scene of the incident and was also told by
Remonde that he had been shot by Laquinon. Remonde
died in the hospital 3 days later because of the bullet
wounds.
Laquinon denied the charges and claimed that it was one
Noli Cabardo who killed Remonde. Laquinon, a member of
the KM, only brought Remonde to Cabardo. Laquinon,
however, was found guilty of murder.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ANTE-MORTEM DECLARATION OF
REMONDE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR BEING
HEARSAY?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* The dying declaration of
Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration
since Remonde was in doubt as to whether he would die or
not. When asked whether he would survive, Remonde
answered “I don’t know.”
The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed
himself in extremis, “at the point of death when hope of
recovery is extinct,” which is the sole basis for admitting this
kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule.
It may be admitted however, as part of the res gestae since
the statement was made immediately after the incident
and deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to
concoct a story.
Moreover, the rest of the evidence presented shows that
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder qualified by treachery.
NOTE: For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence,
it must be shown that the deceased believed himself in
extremis, “at the point of death when hope of recovery is
extinct,” which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of
declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule.
3. PEOPLE v. SABIO | 26193 | 1981
That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration
was made will not alter its probative force since it is not
indispensable that a declarant expires immediately
thereafter.
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It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying
declaration admissible.
FACTS: Catalino Espina was found on the second floor of his
dwelling wounded on the forehead, from which injury he
died three days later. Paulino Fuentes, a policeman,
testified that he received a report that the victim was
hacked. He and another policeman proceeded to the
victim's house where he saw the latter lying on the floor,
wounded and bleeding on the forehead.
Patrolman Fuentes asked the victim who had hacked him
and the latter answered that it was "Papu" Sabio, son of
Menes. Patrolman Fuentes asked the victim why "Papu"
hacked him and the latter answered that "Papu" had
demanded money from him.
Patrolman Fuentes also asked the victim how much money
he had lost but the latter was not able to answer that
question. Sensing that the wound was serious since it was
bleeding profusely Patrolman Fuentes decided to take
down the statement of the victim.
He detached a leaf from a calendar and wrote down on it
the questions he propounded as well as the answers of the
victim. He then had it thumbmarked by the victim with the
latter's own blood as no ink was available.
Present at the time were Pedro Burgos, another police
officer, and Camilo Semilla, the grandnephew. Patrolman
Fuentes himself and Pedro Burgos signed as witnesses. The
accused imputed error on the part of the trial court for
admitting the evidence of the prosecution as an
Antemortem declaration of the victim.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE STATEMENT OF THE VICTIM
QUALIFIES AS A DYING DECLARATION OR AN ANTE-
MORTEM DECLARATION SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED?
HELD: YES. That statement of the victim is a dying
declaration. The following was considered to strengthen
the conclusion that the victim must have known that his end
was inevitable:
 The seriousness of the injury on the victim's
forehead which had affected the brain and was
profusely bleeding;
 The victim's inability to speak until his head was
raised;
 The spontaneous answer of the victim that "only
Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and
 His subsequent demise from the direct effects of the
wound on his forehead.
*See Stated Doctrine* Further, the fact that the victim told
his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the police, does
not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of
recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had
so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
4. PEOPLE v. AGRIPA | 72244 | 1992
ROC, R 130, Sec. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration
of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death.
FACTS: At about one o'clock in the morning of April 30,
1980, authorities who had come to investigate reports of a
stabbing in the house of Jose and Adelfa Agripa at barangay
Humapon in Legazpi City. On the floor awash with blood,
Jose was locked in a final embrace with his wife, who was
already dead.
Adelfa had sustained fifteen wounds and had expired due
to shock and massive hemorrhage. Jose himself had four
wounds in his body and was hardly alive. Because he
refused to release his hold on his dead wife, the couple was
rolled in a mat and rushed to the hospital.
A member of the investigating team took down the
following exchange between him and Jose, whom he
believed to be on the verge of death:
Q. What is your name please?
A. Jose Agripa.
Q. Who stabbed you?
A. I myself.
Q. Who stabbed your wife?
A. I myself.
Q. Why did you stab your wife?
A. Because of problems in the family.
Q. What do you think, will you die from your wounds?
A. No.
Q. Was it really your intention to kill your wife?
A. Yes, I want to die with her.
The statement was not signed by Jose. On Bermas's
request, it was witnessed by the barangay captain,
Salustiano Botin, who was present during the recorded
conversation. Jose survived to face prosecution for
parricide two months later.
In his defense, Jose gave a different version of the killing of
his wife. He said that he had gone to sleep early that night
but was awakened when he felt a stab wound in his
stomach. He could not see his assailant because it was dark.
He covered the wound with his right hand but there was a
second thrust that wounded him again almost in the same
place. Instinctively, he curled himself into a fetal position
with his hands at the back of his neck and asked, "Why did
you stab me?"
He received no answer but soon enough a third thrust sliced
through his left arm and pierced the right part of his chest.
It was then that he grabbed the fist of his attacker and the
two of them wrestled in the dark for possession of the
weapon. He could not recall what happened afterwards as
he must have fainted.
He said he also had no recollection of the statement he
supposedly made before he was brought to the hospital. He
recovered consciousness there only on May 4, 1980, and
was then told that his wife had tried to kill him.
His statements were corroborated by his 18-year old son,
Edwin, who testified that there was no quarrel between his
parents when his father went to sleep early that night of
April 29, 1980. His mother was in her usual angry mood,
however. After studying his lessons, he himself went to
sleep.
He was awakened later by the sound of a scuffle, and when
he turned on his flashlight he saw his mother stabbing his
father. Afraid to help his father, he woke up his two
brothers and rushed with them to their grandfather's house
to seek his help.
On their way out, they heard his father say, "Why did you
stab me?" Jose was convicted on July 18, 1985. The principal
evidence presented against him at the trial was the above-
quoted statement, which was offered as a dying declaration
or as part of the res gestae. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JOSE’S STATEMENT COUNTED
AS A DYING DECLARATION?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine.* The trial court correctly
rejected the above-quoted interrogation as a dying
declaration because it did not comply with all the
requirements of this particular exception to the hearsay
rule. The statement does not show that it was made by the
declarant under the consciousness of impending death.
RES GESTAE ISSUE: As the court sees it, Jose's statement,
while admissible as part of the res gestae, is not credible
evidence of his criminal liability. It is quite obvious that he
was not in full possession of his faculties when he made that
statement, which, significantly, he did not sign.
The Court notes that when the authorities came upon the
wounded couple, Jose refused to let go of his dead wife and
was rolled up with her cadaver in a mat to be brought to the
hospital. That was not the conduct of a rational man.
Moreover, Jose was himself suffering from four stab
wounds which could have cost him his life had he not been
treated immediately. Given the condition of his mind and
body at the time the statement was made, Jose could not
be expected to think clearly and to willingly make the
serious and damning confession now imputed to him.
Page 26

5. PEOPLE v. DE JOYA | 75028 | 1991]
Doctrine of Completeness – It has been held that a dying
declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To
be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must
recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the
subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given
fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say
as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
FACTS: Spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-
Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin
Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother,
Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St.,Baliuag,
Bulacan. In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia
Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Hermother Eulalia
Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the
television set.
Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. At 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighborby the
name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out
of the former's house to visit a friend. When Alvin reached
home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down
prostrate and drenched with her own blood.
He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her and
asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Eulalia Diamse held
his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these
words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away. Upon
seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo
is drenched in her own blood."
When she reached their house, she found her mother lying
prostrate in her own blood. Consequently, Herminia found
out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were
missing. The rightearring of her mother was likewise
missing.
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the ground
floor ransacked. Herminia found a beach walk step-in, more
or less one meter from where the victim was lying
prostrate. Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in
because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair
she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to
Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant.The trial court
convicted appellant.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DYING DECLARATION IS
ADMISSIBLE?
HELD: NO. It must be noted at once that the words "Si
Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence.
*See Stated Doctrine.*
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are
generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no
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weight, isthat since the declarant was prevented by death
or other circumstance from saying all that he wished to say,
whathe did say might have been qualified by the
statements which he was prevented from making. That
incompletedeclaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis
upon which dyingdeclarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the
deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin.
The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words
"Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person
who had thrust some sharp instrument through and
through her neck just below her ears.
But Eulalia herself did not sayso and we cannot speculate
what the rest of her communication might have been had
death not interrupted her. The Court is unable to regard the
dying statement as a dying declaration naming the
appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
6. PEOPLE v. DEVARAS | 25165 | 1971
Where the gravity of the wound did not diminish, the
admissibility of the dying declaration is not affected by the
fact that the declarant died hours or days later.
FACTS: around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of March 24,
1963, while, and her husband, Aniceto Gaspay, were lying
in bed in their house at Leyte, they heard appellant Enrique
Salve calling out from the outside asking flight for their
cigarettes.
Her husband opened the door at the lower basement,
apparently not suspecting anything as appellant was
related to him, being the first cousin of his wife, the witness.
Upon the door being opened by the deceased, the accused,
Felipe Ladoy, "hacked him with a long bolo on the head."
Then, according to her Enrique Salve and Refugio Devaras
followed and they helped each other in wounding her
husband, the three of them.
When asked what instrument was used in inflicting such
wounds, this was her answer: "The three of them were
using bolos." Specifically, the other injuries sustained by the
deceased were on the abdominal region and his upper arm.
They then pointed their bolos at the witness, searched her
body and were able to get the amount of P625.00 in cash
from a belt tied to her waist. Not satisfied, they likewise
took away a suitcase containing a Bulova watch valued at
P70.00, clothes belonging to the couple, as well as two
towels. All-in-all, the monetary loss sustained by them
amounted to P855.00.
The next morning, according to her, a patrolman, Servillano
Ramulte, investigated the matter, but as the victim was
already in a serious condition about to be taken to the
hospital, all that they could get from him, as mentioned
earlier, was a statement which he could not even sign
wherein he mentioned that appellant was, along with Felipe
Ladoy and Refugio Devaras, responsible for the robbery as
well as the wounds received by him.
The victim died the next day, March 26, 1963. She could
identify all the accused as there was at that time "a
lamparilla," at their window with enough light to enable her
to see who were the perpetrators, all of whom she had
known for sometime.
I.e. The next morning after being stabbed or 11 hours later,
as the victim was about to be taken to the hospital, a
patrolman was able to get his statement as to the identity
of the perpetrators. The victim was unable to sign the
statement and he died the next day.
Afterwards, herein accused in this case, Refugio Devaras,
Felipe Ladoy and Enrique Salve, were prosecuted for and
convicted the crime of robbery with homicide. The lower
court did not lend credence to appelant’s defense, relying
instead on the positive identification of the widow, the sole
eyewitness, as well as statement of the victim given the
next morning which while not amounting to an ante
mortem declaration, in its opinion, was considered as part
of the res gestae.
Appelant denies that there was proof beyond reasonable
doubt, specifically assailing likewise the admissibility of the
statement of the deceased as part of the res gestae. Hence
this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE STATEMENT IS PART OF RES GESTAE
HELD: NO. The statement was not part of the res gestae
because of the lapse of considerable time between the
commission of the offense and the taking of the statement.
However, the statement amounts to a dying declaration, as
it is a statement coming from a seriously wounded person
even if death occurs hours or days after it was inflicted if
there be showing that it was due to the wound whose
gravity did not diminish from the time he made his
declaration until the end came.
There is no need for proof that the declarant state "that he
has given up the hope of life.” It is enough if. from the
circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty that such
must have been his state of mind.
It is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead
inevitably to the conclusion that the time [of such
statement] the declarant did not expect to survive the
injury from which he actually died. Its admissibility is not
affected by death occurring hours or days afterwards.
SEC. 38
7. VIACRUSIS v. CA | 29831 | 1972
The legal provision regarding admissions adverse to the
interest of the one making the admission may be received in
evidence, not only against the third party who made it or his
successor in interest, but also against third persons.
FACTS: On June 8, 1936, Pedro Sanchez executed a deed
selling the subject lot to Anastacio Orais. Said deed was
registered. Sanchez sub-sequently executed another deed
selling a portion of the same lot to Balentin Ruizo, who in
turn sold it to Guillermo Viacrucis on October 10, 1945.
Orais made oral demands for Viacrucis to vacate said
portion and surrender it to him, but Viacrucis refused, and
instead executed a deed selling the said portion to his
brother-in-law Claros Marquez. The deeds of sale in favor
of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, have not been registered
with the Register of Deeds.
The Sps. Viacrucis and the Sps. Marquez insist that the
failure of Orais to bring the present action earlier
constituted an omission that “may be given in evidence
against him,” as provided in Sec. 22, Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court.
They also claim that when Orais had tried to obtain a loan
from the PNB, with OCT No. 243 as collateral security, and
PNB refused the offer on the ground that the land was not
his property, Orais said nothing, which should have been
considered an admission in silence, pursuant to Sec. 23,
Rule 130.
They also objected to the fact that the CA considered in
favor of Orais, allegedly in violation of Sec. 25, Rule 130, the
admission of Mrs. Beatriz Costelo, to the effect that,
although the land was physically in the possession of her
now deceased husband, he and she recognized Orais as the
owner of said land.
ISSUE: WHETHER ORAIS’S FAILURE TO BRING AN ACTION
AGAINST THE VIACRUCISES AND THE MARQUEZES AN
OMISSION FALLING UNDER THE COVERAGE OF SEC. 22,
RULE 130?
HELD: NO. The effect or import of the failure of Orais to file
the present action until November 15, 1960, is a matter
relevant to the issue of whether the sale attested to by
Exhibit B is simulated, as contended by petitioners herein,
or is a true and authentic sale, as Orais maintains.
The decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the
trial court and sustaining the claim of Orais, constitutes a
finding of fact, which is final in this proceeding for review
on certiorari.
Page 27

ISSUE: WHETHER ORAIS’S SILENCE WHEN THE PNB
REJECTED HIS OFFER OF COLLATERAL ON THE GROUND
THAT HE DID NOT OWN THE PROPERTY BEING OFFERED BE
DEEMED AN ADMISSION IN SILENCE?
HELD: NO. There is no competent evidence on whether or
not Orais had said anything in response to said statement.
Moreover, OCT NO. 243 was in the name of Pedro Sanchez,
and no matter how real the sale by the latter to Orais may
be, the bank would not accept the land in question as
security for said loan, unless and until OCT No. 243 shall
have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title issued
to Orais.
This could not take place before the filing of his loan
application because the owner’s duplicate of said OCT,
admittedly delivered by Sanchez to Orais, had been lost in
the possession of Orais’s counsel, to who Orais had turned
it over in connection with a criminal case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMISSION OF MRS. COSTELO
PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN ORAIS’S FAVOR?
HELD: YES. The said testimony of Mrs. Costelo, and this
recognition by the now deceased Pelagio Costelo, which
were confirmed by a public document, constitute a
declaration of the Sps. Costelo adverse to their interest,
which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Sec. 32 of Rule
130.
Petitioners have no reason to object to the consideration in
favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been
made in 1936, more than 5 years before their predecessor
in interest, Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais
and Costelo were the only parties who had any interest in
the object of said admission. *See Stated Doctrine.*
SEC. 39
8. PEOPLE v. ALEGADO | 93030-31 | 1991
The said provision on proof on pedigree contains three
requisites for its admissibility, namely:
 That there is controversy in respect to the pedigree
of any of the members of a family;
 That the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of
the person concerned existed previous to the
controversy; and
 That the witness testifying to the reputation or
tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must
be a member of the family of said person.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Alegado stands charged and
convicted of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court
of San Carlos City. Both parties presented two common
issues for the trial court's consideration, namely: (1)
whether the offended party was actually below 12 years old
at the time of the incidents; and (2) whether the accused
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had carnal knowledge of the offended party by means of
force and intimidation.
Alegado contends that the offended party's actual age at
the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not established
with certainty, hence, it was error on the part of the trial
court to convict the accusedappellant of statutory rape as
defined and penalized under paragraph 3, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE AGE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS
SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN THUS A COGENT REASON TO
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S VERDICT OF CONVICTION
UNDER PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 OF ARTICLE 335 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE?
HELD: YES. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather,
Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on
September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as
claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections
39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred and the names of the relatives. In the present
case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond
question. *See Stated Doctrine*
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar
considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being
put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather
relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon
reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case
was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said
tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
It is long-settled that the testimony of a person as to his age
is admissible although hearsay and though a person can
have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all
the knowledge a person has of his age is acquired from what
he is told by his parents, he may testify as to his age as he
had learned it from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition.
Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present
contrary evidence to dispute the prosecution's claim that
the victim in this case was below twelve (12) years old at
the time of the rape incidents under consideration, the
Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the victim in
these rape cases was under twelve years of age.
9. FERRER v. DE INCHAUSTI | 12993 | 1918
Testimony made by a witness regarding a declaration made
by someone deceased, when both the witness and the
declarant are members of the same family, is admissible as
evidence of family tradition.
Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and
inscriptions in public places as evidence of common
reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books
or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like,
as evidence of pedigree
FACTS: Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer claim that their
late mother, Rosa Viademonte, had the right to inherit from
Isabel Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the
latter’s four other children, and as Rosa’s only legitimate
heirs, Rafael and Maria Angelina are entitled to receive
Rosa’s that is, one-fifth of the estate left by Isabel.
According to them, Isabel was first married to Ramon
Martinez Viademonte, with Rosa as their daughter. Isabel
then married Jose Joaquin de Ynchausti, father of Isabel’s
other children. Rosa had allegedly been treated and
considered as Isabel’s daughter and that on one occasion,
Isabel remarked that Rosa’s father was Ramon.
It was also alleged that one of Isabel’s sons, Joaquin de
Inchausti dedicated a picture to Rosa in the following
manner: “To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa.”
College records of the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were
shown to use establish filiation.
The defendants, meanwhile, presented an entry in the
notebook of Ramon Viademonte Jr. stating that the Rosa’s
true name was Rosa Robles, born of unknown parents in
September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the
plaintiff, Joaquin also testified that one day he was assured
by his half brother Ramon that Rosa was not his sister but a
mere protégée, and that on one occasion, Ramon showed
him Rosa’s birth certificate taken from a parochial church.
A copy of said certificate was offered in evidence.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DIARY ACCOUNTS OF RAMON
VIADEMONTE, JR. AND JOAQUIN’S TESTIMONY
ADMISSIBLE?
HELD: YES. Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin
of the cause of action shows, in a manner which leaves no
room for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of
Isabel Gonzales and it follows that her children have no
right to a part of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales.
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now
dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring
to the said deceased is admissible as evidence of family
tradition, for they are members of the same family and
consequently the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the
same Rosa Matilde Robles mentioned in Exhibit 6 and
because she was born in 1952, in no manner could she be a
legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel
Gonzales, whose marriage was dissolved 1n 1936 by the
death of the husband.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DAYBOOK KEPT BY RAMON
VIADEMONTE, JR. IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR
BEING HEARSAY?
HELD: NO. Section 298, No, 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court)
provides that evidence may be given upon trial of
monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of
common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other
family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
SEC. 42
10. PEOPLE v. PUTIAN | 33049 | 1976
If such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately
after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the
exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued
in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res
gestae.
FACTS: This is an appeal convicting the accused guilty of
murder arising from a stabbing incident. No eyewitness was
presented to testify on the assault which resulted in the
victim's death. The accused did not testify in his own behalf.
The defense presented only one witness. He testified that
appellant Putian was in the dance hall when the victim was
stabbed outside that hall.
Meanwhile, the prosecution presented only two witnesses:
(1) The doctor who treated the victim at the hospital and
who testified on the nature of his wound and the cause of
his death and (2) the policeman who arrested the accused
and who took down the victim's ante-mortem statement
Identifying "Guirmo" Putian as his assailant. Panimdim's
statement was given sometime after the stabbing while he
was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic.
The trial court, in convicting Putian, regarded Panimdim's
ante-mortem statement as part of the res gestae. It
admitted Panimdim's statement as a spontaneous
statement made after the commission of a felony.
Appellant contends otherwise arguing it was not
spontaneous because it was "made several hours after the
incident". He claims that the requisite that the declarant
gave the statement before he had time to devise or contrive
was not present in this case. Appellant further contends
that because the statement is in narrative form, it is not the
statement contemplated in the rule.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE VICTIM'S STATEMENT CAN BE
CONSIDERED PART OF THE RES GESTAE?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* The victim's statement
was given sometime after the stabbing while he was
undergoing treatment at a medical clinic. He had no time to
Page 28

concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a malicious charge
against the accused.
Likewise, that the statement was in question-and-answer
form did not destroy the probative value of the statement.
Declarant's answers were spontaneous, candid,
straightforward, direct, brief, concise, natural and devoid of
any design or deliberation.
Further, although a declaration does not appear to have
been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure
and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible
as a dying declaration, it may still be admissible under the
res gestae rule. Trial court's decision is modified. Appellant
is convicted of homicide.
11. PEOPLE v. PERALTA | 94570 | 1994
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res
gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to
wit:
(a) The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence;
(b) The statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and
(c) The statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
FACTS: The lifeless body of Rosita Peralta was found in her
house in the early morning of March 2, 1982. Blood trickled
from her nostrils and mouth and there were nail marks and
bruises on her chin and neck. She had been strangled.
After investigation an information for parricide was filed
against Rosita's husband, Domiciano Peralta. The
prosecution witnesses were Dr. Wilfredo Galan, the medical
officer who performed the autopsy on Rosita Peralta;
Atanacia Ramos, her mother; and Judge Juan B. Paaño, Jr.,
who took Rosita's sworn statement. The defense presented
the accused himself and his daughter Siony.
Dr. Galan established the cause of death and declared that
it occurred at about half past four in the morning of March
2, 1982. Atanacia testified that at about 4:30 that morning,
her granddaughter Siony came to her house and frantically
told her that the accused was strangling his wife, Rosita. The
two rushed to the couple's house and, after unlocking the
door, found Rosita already dead. They immediately
reported the matter to the police, who eventually arrested
the appellant as the suspected killer.
For his part, Domiciano claimed that at the supposed time
of his wife's strangulation, he was at his place of work in
Maybayawas, Catagbacan, Goa, Camarines, Sur. He learned
of her death at 3:00 o'clock that afternoon and, later, that
he was suspected of her killing. That same day, he
proceeded to the Goa Police Station where he was made to
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sign a document, which turned out to be a confession.
Disclaiming it at the trial, he said that he signed it without
the assistance of counsel or full awareness of its contents.
Siony, the daughter, had earlier implicated her father in the
sworn statement she made at the preliminary investigation
of the case. She now appeared to testify on his behalf. She
swore on the stand that she did see someone strangling her
mother in the morning in question but insisted that she
could not identify that person. In effect, she said that the
culprit was not her father, thus contradicting her earlier
assertion that she saw him strangling her mother.
Judge Paaño affirmed the regularity of the preliminary
investigation he conducted and declared that Siony's
narration of the strangulation of her mother by the accused
was completely voluntary.
The trial court held in favor of the prosecution, and rejected
both the appellant's alibi and his daughter's change of
stand. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE STATEMENTS SIONY MADE TO HER
GRANDMOTHER WHEN SHE RUSHED TO INFORM HER OF
HER FATHER'S ATTACK ON HER MOTHER WAS PART OF
THE RES GESTAE?
HELD: YES. The statement she made to her grandmother
when she rushed to inform her of her father's attack on her
mother was part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
Res gestae means the "thing done." As held in People v.
Sanchez, it refers to those exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement.
*See Stated Doctrine* Siony rushed to Atanacia
immediately upon seeing her father strangling her mother
to death. Her spontaneous declaration to Atanacia was part
of the res gestae and is assumed to preclude the probability
of premeditation or fabrication.
Since the utterance was made under the immediate and
uncontrolled domination of the senses rather than reason
and reflection, and during the brief period when
consideration of self-interest could not have been fully
brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing
Siony's real belief as to the facts just observed by her.
In the case before us, Siony testified during the preliminary
examination conducted by Judge Paaño that the appellant
choked her mother to death. Her subsequent retraction
was an afterthought and has no probative value at all.
SEC. 44
12. FORTUS v. NOVERO | GR L-22378 | 1968
Baptismal certificates or parochial records of baptism are
not public or official records and are not proof of
relationship or filiation of the child baptized as they are not
kept by public officers, and are not proof of relationship or
filiation of the child baptized.
FACTS: Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the parcel of land
located in barrio Alpaye, Rosario, Batangas, with an area of
approximately 20,102 sq.m., subject of the petition for
summary settlement mentioned at the beginning of this
decision.
It was registered in her name under OCT No. 370. She had
only one child, a daughter by the name of Crisanta Ilagan,
married to Fermin Fortus. This couple had an only son, the
deceased Victorino Fortus.
As Crisanta Ilagan predeceased her mother, Ciriaca Angelo,
who died intestate sometime in the year 1930, the property
aforesaid passed on to Victorino Fortus as the lone surviving
heir of his grandmother.
Victorino Fortus and Julia T. Fortus were husband and wife
and that up to Victorino's death on January 8, 1954 they
were childless. It is similarly admitted that at the time of his
death, Victorino had been estranged from his wife for a
number of years and had been living maritally with another
woman named Felicidad Gonzales Pena.
That the property is now covered by transfer certificate of
title No. 6831 issued by the Registrar of Deeds of Batangas
is due to the fact that upon Victorino's death, his widow,
Julia T. Fortus, executed the required affidavit of extra-
judicial summary settlement and had it registered in
accordance with law.
By reason thereof, OCT No. 370 was cancelled and the
transfer certificate of title already referred to was issued in
Julia's name. In this connection, the Fortuses made the
claim Julia had "falsely represented the original owner
Ciriaca Angelo to be her grandmother." While this alleged
falsehood is unsubstantial, the Court observation that
Julia's statement contained no real falsehood, for, indeed,
Ciriaca was the grandmother of her husband and therefore
her own grandmother-in-law.
The claim of the Fortuses claims that they are Victorino's
legitimate half-brothers and sisters, being the legitimate
children of Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil who were
allegedly married sometime between 1902 and 1905. In
connection with this Exhibit "2" was introduced which was
their baptismal certificate of oppositor appellant Roman
Fortus.
The trial court dismissed their claims. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the same decision, hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATES ARE
CONSIDERED OFFICIAL RECORDS?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* Exhibit "2" is not an
evidence of legitimacy much less of marriage between
Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil. It is a baptismal certificate
and it does not serve as proof of relationship of or filiation
of the child baptized. "The record of baptism as a general
rule, in all documents, attest to the fact which give rise to
its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the
administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not
the truth of the statements therein made as to the
parentage of the child baptized." (Basa, et al. vs. Arquiza, et
al., 5 Phil. 187.)
"The aforementioned canonical certificate is conclusive
proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with
the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized
the child but it does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained in the said
certificate that concern the relationship of the person
baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that
their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown
by some of the kinds of proof recognized by law." (Adriano
vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 353)
SEC. 46
13. YAO KEE v. SY-GONZALES | 55960 | 1988
To establish a valid foreign marriage, the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence must be proven.
FACTS: Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17,
1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving
behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines
worth about P300,000. Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration and
alleged that (a) they are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died
intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao
Kee nor the filiation of her children to him.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee who alleged that she
is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19,
1931 in China and the other oppositors are the legitimate
children of the deceased with Yao Kee.
Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao
Kee and the other oppositors were legitimate children of Sy
Mat. On appeal, CA simply modified probate court’s
judgment and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales et al are natural
children of Sy Mat. They filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Page 29

ISSUE: WHETHER THE TESTIMONIES OF YAO AND GAN
CHING ENOUGH TO PROVE THE MARRIAGE OF YAO AND
SY?
HELD: NO. For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the
existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged
marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on
marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage
not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more
importantly, there is no showing that they are competent
to testify on the subject matter.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance
with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and
Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
SEC. 47
14. TAN v. CA | 22793 | 1967
Subsequent failure or refusal to appear at the second trial,
or hostility since testifying at the first trial, does not amount
to inability to testify. Such inability should proceed from a
grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the
witness is old and has lost the power of speech.
Where the witnesses in question are available, but they
refused to testify, they do not come within the legal purview
of those “unable to testify” contemplated in Sec. 47, Rule
130.
FACTS: At first, petitioners, thru their mother as guardian
ad litem, sued respondent Tan for acknowledgment and
support. The first civil case was dismissed on the ground
that parties have already come to an amicable settlement.
One year and eight months thereafter, petitioners, this time
thru their maternal grandfather as guardian ad litem,
commenced the present action before the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court for acknowledgment and
support, involving the same parties, cause of action and
subject matter.The case was again dismissed by reason of
res judicata and insufficiency of evidence.
On appeal, petitioners contends that the testimony of their
witnesses, who were unable to testify in the 2nd trial must
be admissible, applying Rule 130 Sec 41(now 47).
SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony
of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or
unable to testify, given in a former case between the
same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse
party having had an opportunity to cross-examine him,
may be given in evidence.
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Notably, the witnesses were subpoenaed by the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court a number of times. But, they did
not appear to testify. These witnesses were neither dead
nor outside of the Philippines.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES IN THE
FORMER TRIAL WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF THE RULE OF
ADMISSIBILITY INTENDED FOR WITNESSES OF THE CLASS
UNABLE TO TESTIFY?
HELD: NO. They cannot be categorized as witnesses of the
class unable to testify. The witnesses in question were
available. Only, they refused to testify. No other person that
prevented them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do
not come within the legal purview of those unable to testify.
*See Stated Doctrine*
15. PEOPLE v. LIWANAG | 27683 | 1976
The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the
right of the defendant to further cross-examine the
witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduced
and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to
the stand during the trial and again examined in the
presence of the appellant. There was no curtailment of the
constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses
face to face.
I.e inclusion of testimony of witnesses presented during
preliminary investigation as part of evidence for prosecution
not a violation of right of accused to meet witnesses face to
face.
FACTS: In June, 1942, the accused Silvestre Liwanag alias
Linda Bie, Nene, Bets, Apong Iro, Silver, Pet, Apong Pedro,
Agustin, and Seniong joined the "Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa
Hapon", more popularly known by its acronym
"Hukbalahap", an organization whose purpose, as its name
implies, was to resist the Japanese occupation forces in the
Philippines.
Sometime in 1948, the Communist Party of the Philippines
held a conference in the mountains of Norzagaray, Bulacan
in which the accused was nominated to the Central
Committee, which is the governing body of the Party. In that
conference, it was also agreed to change their name to the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB. Being a
member of the Hukbalahap and the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, the accused carried
over his membership to the HMB.
In the evening of June 21, 1960, a PC patrol led by then
Major Wilfredo Encarnacion captured the appellant and his
wife, Rosita Manuel, in their hideout at Barrio Kalungusan,
Orion, Bataan.
Thenceforth, the appellant was charged for violating the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as
the Anti-Subversion Act, in an information filed before the
Court of First Instance of Bataan. Pursuant to the provisions
of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1700, the preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Court of First Instance
of Bataan.
The appellant was present during said preliminary
investigation and was represented by counsel who
extensively cross-examined the witnesses for the
prosecution. Finding a prima facie case against the
appellant, the Court issued the corresponding warrant for
the arrest of the appellant and thereafter set the case for
trial.
The case was subsequently set for trial, and in the course
thereof, the prosecution moved that the testimony of the
witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation of
this case be adopted as part of the evidence in chief of the
prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to
the condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined
by counsel for the accused.
At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified
at the preliminary investigation were recalled and were
again cross-examined by counsel for the appellant. To
bolster their case, the prosecution presented three (3)
additional witnesses.
On March 28, 1967, the trial court rendered the appealed
decision finding the accused guilty of the crime of
subversion, as charged. For security reasons and upon
previous request, the decision was promulgated in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, since the
accused was then confined at the Fort Bonifacio Stockade,
Makati, Rizal.
Hence this appeal where appellant bases his claim that he
was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him when the trial court granted the
motion of the Fiscal that the testimony of the witnesses
presented during the preliminary investigation be adopted
and made part of the evidence for the prosecution.
ISSUE: WHETHER APPELLANT’S CONTENTION IS CORRECT?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* Here, the testimony
sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-
parte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by
question and answer during the preliminary investigation in
the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected
the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination.
The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the
right of the defendant to further cross-examine the
witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduced
and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to
the stand during the trial and again examined in the
presence of the appellant. Upon the facts, there was no
curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to
meet the witnesses face to face.
Page 30