TITLE: SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. petitioner, JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J.

ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M.
GONZALES, HONESTO M. ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, petitioners in-intervention, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent
G.R. NO. 163193 DATE: June 15, 2004
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J TOPIC: Sole and exclusive authority of Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and
Vice-President (NOT OF COMELEC)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing the results of the national and
local elections but there was a failure of the machines to read some ballots deferred which its implementation.
Later on, in 2002, the COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004
elections and issued an invitation to bid for the P2.5 Billion poll automation contract. The COMELEC awarded the
contract to Mega Pacific Consortium in a bidding and entered into a contract with the latter to implement the
project. The COMELEC likewise entered into a separate contract with Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI)
which pertains to the electronic transmission of results (Phaste III) of the respondent’s modernization program. By
reason of the case filed by the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP), the contract between
Mega Pacific Consortium and the COMELEC was nullified and Phase II of the AES shut down. Despite this, as
well as the validation scheme under Phase I of the AES apparently having encountered problems in its
implementation, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an electronic
transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions,
also dubbed as an unofficial quick count.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioners aver that there is no provision under RA 8436 which authorizes the COMELEC to engage in
the biometrics/computerized system of validation of voters (Phase I) and a system of electronic transmission of
election results (Phase III). And considering the failed implementation of Phases I and II, there is no basis at all
for the respondent COMELEC to still push through and pursue with Phase III.

In addition, the other petitioners-in-intervention point to several constitutional infractions occasioned by the
assailed resolution. They advance the view that the assailed resolution effectively preempts the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to canvass the votes for President
and Vice-President. Also, as there has been no appropriation by Congress for the respondent COMELEC to
conduct an unofficial electronic transmission of results of the May 10, 2004 elections, any expenditure for the said
purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC Resolution 6712 is void.
HOLDING
Yes. There is no constitutional and statutory basis for the respondent COMELEC to undertake a separate
and an unofficial tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically, for in conducting such unofficial
tabulation of the results of the election, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private organization and spends
public funds for the purpose. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the AES process is mutually dependent
upon the other; one cannot exist if the others do not. Since the court has already scrapped the contract for Phase
II of the AES, the COMELEC cannot as of yet implement the Phase III of the program. On the matters pointed out
by the petitioners-in-intervention, the assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an unofficial tabulation of
election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass
the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. By its very terms, the electronic transmission and
tabulation of the election results projected under Resolution No. 6712 is unofficial in character, meaning not
emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or government body. Thus, any disbursement
of public funds to implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and RA 9206, the 2003
General Appropriations Act. Neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the COMELECs

1
savings, if any, because it would be violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution for the power to
augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. In this case, no law has, thus, far been enacted
authorizing the respondent COMELEC to transfer savings from another item in its appropriation, if there are any,
to fund the assailed resolution.

2
JOSHUA REED C. LOPEZ
TITLE: EUSEBIO GARCIA vs. ERNESTO MATA, SEC. OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and
GENERAL MANUEL YAN, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
G.R. NO. L-33713 DATE: JULY 30, 1975
PONENTE: CASTRO, J TOPIC: A non-appropriation item may not be inserted in an
appropriation measure
– Art VI, sec 25(2)
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Garcia was a reserve officer who was reverted into inactive status. Since his reversion, he has
not received any emoluments from the AFP nor was he ever employed in the government in
any capacity. Relying on paragraph 11 of RA 1600 (General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year
1956-57), it states that ““… when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the AFP may be
called to a tour of active duty for more than 2 years…” and goes on to state that “reserve
officers with at least 10 years of active accumulated commissioned service shall not be
reverted to inactive status”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Relying on the said paragraph, he now petitions, among others, to compel the Sec. of National
Defense Mata et al., to reinstate him in the AFP and be paid the allowances due to him from
the time of his reversion. The court held that paragraph 11 relied on is unconstitutional and
therefore inoperative. Hence this petition for certiorari.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not Paragraph 11 is a “rider” in the General Appropriations Act of Fiscal
Year 1956-1957 (RA 1600)
HOLDING
(1) Yes. Paragraph 11 is thus invalid. Paragraph 11 relied on refers to the fundamental
governmental policy of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of
reserve officers in the AFP. It was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation
measure in violation of the Constitutional inhibition against “riders” to the GAA [now in Art
VI, sec 25(2)]. Petition is denied.
notes, if any:
The r
RED INK- OPTIONAL ISSUE AND FACTS

TITLE:
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. NO. 147387 DATE: December 10, 2003
PONENTE:CALLEJO, SR., J.: NATURE:
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title., the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law
before it becomes effective.

ISSUE/S:
1 whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider
2 whether or notSection 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
3 optional in notes
DOCTRINES | HELD:
1 NO, To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall
be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.34
1
RED INK- OPTIONAL ISSUE AND FACTS
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the
declaration of principles but also the objectives.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough
to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that
the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete
index of its content
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters
for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within
the range of judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of
the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the
same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal
the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election
laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
2 NO, The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining
to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed
it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the
office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them.
Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the
same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.
the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

RULING:

NOTES:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in
a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

2nd issue notes The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other

3rd issue The Effectivity Clause

Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take effect immediately upon its approval," is
defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without
its previous publication.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with
nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or
the limits of legislative power.57 No such transgression has been shown in this case.

2
RED INK- OPTIONAL ISSUE AND FACTS
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case

3
KATELC
BELGICA V. OCHOA-
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

Section 25, Special Purpose Fund November 19, 2013 Ponente: Perlas, Bernabe

FACTS, IKLIAN NA , since pang ilan na to:

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013,
six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the
pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission
on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated by the
foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

MAY OMIT: PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Petitioners seek that the annual "Pork Barrel System,"
presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF,
and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents: (Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De
Leon), in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for
them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds.

ISSUE: WON PDAF is Constitutional in accordance with Section 25, Art VI of the

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court declared that the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) is unconstitutional.
The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that
govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects,
are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members.

The Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional on the following
grounds:
(a)Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators have been authorized to
participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting” in violation of the separation of
powers principle. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.

(b) Non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate is lodged in Congress and
must be exercised only through legislation, Insofar as the 2013 PDAF Article has conferred unto
legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which
they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has violated the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power;

PINAKA ISSUE TO : (c) Checks and balances. Even without its post-enactment legislative
identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since
the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending. The safety of check and balance is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can
now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which
may be subject to the President’s power of item veto, in the process, denied the
President the power to veto items.

MAY OMIT:
(d) Public Accountability. the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate.

(e) Local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents.
TITLE: DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,
HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS,
M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L.
LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and
ROGELIO V. GARCIA, M.P. , petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE
BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. NO. 71977 DATE: 27 February 1987
PONENTE: J. Fernan TOPIC: Sec 25; Transfer of Funds Par. 5
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality
of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform
Decree of 1977." The petitioners raised the issue on the ground that: (1) Sec. 44 infringes upon the fundamental
law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public money; (2) fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which
the proposed transfer of funds are to be made; and (3) it allows the president to override the safeguards, form
and procedure prescribed by the constitution in approving appropriations. The Solicitor General questioned the
legal standing of the petitioners. Also filing a rejoinder to dismiss the petition on the ground that the abrogation of
Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution, (“No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, … may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”) allegedly rendered the petition moot and academic.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 44 of PD no. 1177 is unconstitutional based on the allegations raised by the
petitioners.
HOLDING
YES.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section
16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency
of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is
for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard
the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null
and void.
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary
cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitutional and which power this Court has exercised in many
instances.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, and ALEX L. DAVID, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III in
his capacity as Secretary of Interior and Local Government, HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD R. VALDEHUESA in her capacity as National
Treasurer, HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA in his capacity as Senate President and HON. JOSE C. DE VENECIA,
JR. in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
G.R. NO. 114809, DATE: May 5, 1994
PONENTE: PADILLA, J TOPIC: Sec 25(5), Art VI / unused funds
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioners claim that in the General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 1994, only P137.8M were appropriated by Congress
for the holding of the 1994 barangay elections. By early 1994, according to petitioners, Congress itself had made
an assessment that such appropriated sum would be insufficient to defray the cost of holding the said elections.

Petitioners allege that respondents, in order to augment the said appropriated amount, have threatened and are
about to effect a transfer or re-allocation of several amounts from the executive and legislative branches of gov’t
(DILG, CDFs, IRAs) to respondent COMELEC, docketed as “Barangay Poll Funds Found” as it has appeared in a
local newspaper.

Respondents then claim that said reports were mere unofficial proposals or suggestions made in the process of
searching for funds for the said elections but were later discarded by the proponents themselves. COMELEC never
planned to secure any funding from said departments or from any source for that matter which would be contrary
to the Constitution and the election laws. It alleges that it intends to source such fund from its own savings resulting
from unused funds.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the scheme of COMELEC of augmentation through unused funds is allowed under the 1987
Constitution.
HOLDING
YES. The Solicitor General defends the above COMELEC scheme as allowed by Sec. 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution., viz:

Art VI, Sec 25(5). No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, he states that there is legal basis for the issuance by COMELEC of an
appropriate directive requiring LGUs to appropriate funds to defray for the brgy elections. Under the Omnibus
Election Code, expenses for election expenses, except in brgy elections, shall be paid for or reimbursable by the
COMELEC. Funds needed by the Commission to defray expenses for the holding of elections shall be provided
upon request. In case of deficiency, the amount shall be augmented from the special activities funds in the GAA
and from those specially appropriated for the purpose in special laws. In the same code, while the COMELEC
answers for all election expenditures of LGUs, the latter shall have a share in the expenses for barangay officials.
Pursuant to the opinion of the Sec. of Justice, COMELEC issued a resolution promulgating the guidelines for the
sharing by LGUs in the expenses of the barangay elections. Hence, the actions of COMELEC regarding unused
funds are allowable under law.

There is actually no issue to be resolved in this case, as the claims of petition are of no merit.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondent.
G.R. NO. 113105 DATE: August 19, 1994
PONENTE: QUIASON, J. TOPIC: Sec. 25; Transfer of Funds; (par. 5,
Augmentation of pension fund using savings)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994 entitled "An Act
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines From January One to
December Thirty One, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Four, and for Other Purposes". GAA contains a special
provision that allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses,
provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.

Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the
ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves.

President signed the law but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that
the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and
Separation Benefits of the AFP.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
HOLDING
YES. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.

Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer
is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. The AFP Chief of Staff
may not be given authority.
notes, if any:
Article VI, Section 25 (5): “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”

1
TITLE: Sanchez v. COA
G.R. NO. 127545 DATE: April 23, 2008
PONENTE: Tinga, J TOPIC: Par 5, DILG, augmentation
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180 (R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the General Appropriations
Act of 1992. This law provided an appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside the amount of
P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability Building Program. On 11 November 1991, Atty. Hiram C. Mendoza
(Atty. Mendoza), Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local
Autonomy, informed then Deputy Executive Secretary Dionisio de la Serna of the proposal to constitute and
implement a "shamrock" type task force to implement local autonomy institutionalized under the Local
Government Code of 1991. The proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then
DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino, one of the petitioners herein, who consequently issued a memorandum for the
transfer and remittance to the Office of the President of the sum of P300,000.00 for the operational expenses of
the task force. An additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was requested. These amounts were taken from the
Fund.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Upon post-audit conducted by Department auditor Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the amounts were
disallowed for reasons stated in the 3rd Endorsement dated 25 May 1992. Finding no reason to deviate from the
findings of the Department Auditor, the COA affirmed the disallowance in its assailed COA Decision No. 96-654
10 dated 21 November 1996. It is worth noting at this juncture that while Commissioner Sofronio B. Ursal
(Commissioner Ursal) signed the assailed Decision, he nonetheless submitted a dissenting opinion stating that
the transfer of funds from the Fund to the Office of the Executive Secretary falls within the authority of the
President to augment any item in the general appropriations law as provided in Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution. Thus, he concludes that the transfer is deemed an act of the President. Further, the use of the Fund
by the task force to implement local autonomy falls within the purpose for which the Fund was created. However,
he adds that the individual disbursements made by the task force for such expenses as salaries, allowances,
rentals, food and the like should be audited by the Auditor for the Office of the President in accordance with
existing accounting and auditing rules.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is legal basis for the transfer of funds of the Capability Building Program Fund appropriated
in the 1992 General Appropriation Act from the Department of Interior and Local Government to the Office of the
President
HOLDING
No. The COA, in its Memorandum 21 dated 18 July 2005, reiterates its position that there is no legal basis for the
transfers in question because the Fund was meant to be implemented by the Local Government Academy.
Further, transfer of funds under Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI of the Constitution may be made only by the persons
mentioned in the section and may not be re-delegated being already a delegated authority. Additionally, the funds
transferred must come only from savings of the office in other items of its appropriation and must be used for
other items in the appropriation of the same office. In this case, there were no savings from which augmentation
can be taken because the releases of funds to the Office of the President were made at the beginning of the
budget year 1992.
The Court affirmed the ruling of COA. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It
has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: Araullo v. Benigno Simeon Aquino III
G.R. NO. 209287 DATE: July 1, 2014 and MR Feb 3, 2014
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J. TOPIC: Art VI Sec. 25 - Discretionary Fund; DAP
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Soon after the controversy of the Pork Barrel for the Congress, Senator Jingoy Estrada delivered a
privilege speech that revealed that some senators, including himself, received an additional 50M Php “incentive”
for voting in favor against the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato Corona.

DBM Secretary Abad clarified that the Disbursement Acceleration Fund (DAP) were funds released to the
Senators to ramp up economic expansion. He clarified that it was based on letters of funding and had already
been instituted since 2011. He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased
appropriations under Personnel Services; 2 (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased
from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support
faster-disbursing projects.

The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP's use of savings, namely: (1) Section 25 (5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in
the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38
(Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their
provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of
savings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The petitioners brought to the Court's attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure
— Withdrawal of Agencies' Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. 541, which was
issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of
government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing and current allotments.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP, violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar as:
• They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government
agencies as "savings" as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011,
2012 and 2013;
• They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the
Executive Department; and
• They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.
HOLDING
YES. The Court ruled in the affirmative.

The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and
the pooling of unreleased appropriations; and that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated allotments and
the retention of appropriated funds were akin to the impoundment of appropriations that could be allowed
only in case of "unmanageable national government budget deficit" under the GAAs, 157 thus violating the
provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of allotments.

The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the
pooling of unreleased appropriations were invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such
withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds cannot be considered as
impoundment.

The decision of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly
1
 construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to
the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management
will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict
interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of
their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress' power
of the purse.

Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is
viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and
the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as
long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated
from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25
(5), Article VI of the Constitution.

In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set
by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods
notes, if any:
Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 25. . . .
5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

2
JOSHUA REED C. LOPEZ
TITLE:PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC vs. PEDRO GIMENEZ
G.R. NO. L-23326 DATE: DECEMBER 18, 1965
PONENTE: REGALA, TOPIC: It is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to
J be briefly expressed in its title

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Commonwealth Act 186 establishes the GSIS and provides for both retirement and insurance
benefits of its members. RA 3836 entitled “An Act Amending Subsection (c), Section 12 of CA
No. 186, as Amended by RA No. 3096”, provides under sec 1 thereof a special retirement
grant to Senators or members of the House of Reps who are not members of the GSIS to be,
under sec 2, effective “upon its approval.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This is a petition to restrain the Auditor General from passing in audit the payment to any
former member of the Congress of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to RA 3836 as
its validity is being assailed. It is assailed here for reasons, among others, that the provision
for the retirement benefits of the members of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill in
violation of Art VI, Sec 26(1) of the Constitution.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the subject matter of RA 3836 is germane to that expressed in the title
HOLDING
(1) No. RA 3836 refers to members of Congress who are not members of the GSIS. To
provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter
which is not germane to CA 186 for the same establishes the GSIS and provides benefits
to its members
notes, if any:
The r
TITLE: INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. NO. L-31057 DATE: May 29, 1981
PONENTE: De Castro TOPIC: Discretionary Fund: Sec 26, paragraph 1
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner is a licensed forest concessionaire engaged in the purchase of manufactured oil and motor fuel used in
the operation of its forest concession, sawmill, planning mills, power units, vehicles, dry kilns, water pumps, lawn
mowers and in furnishing free water and light to its employees on which a specific tax was paid.

On December 22, 1964 Petitioner filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), a claim for refund of
P19,921.37 representing 25% of the specific tax paid on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its operations
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Republic Act No. 1435.

In a letter dated February 11, 1965, received by Petitioner on March 31, 1965, the CIR denied the Petitioner’s
claim for refund on the ground that the privilege of partial tax refund granted by Section 5 of Republic Act No.
1435 to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions is limited to a period of five (5) years
from June 14, 1956, the date of effectivity of said Act. Consequently, oil used in such concessions after June 14,
1961 is subject to the full tax prescribed in Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the respondent court and CTA ruled that the operation of a sawmill is
distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Section 5 of RA 1435 allowing
partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of
the P19,921.37 claimed, representing the 25% of specific tax paid, respondent court found out that only the
amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. Respondent court, however, did not allow the
refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, had
already prescribed. Hence, Petitioner was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 5 of RA 1435 is Unconstitutional.

HOLDING
No. Article VI, Section 21(1) of the 1935 Constitution provides: "No bill which may be enacted unto a law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the
imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a
partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and
fuel, is not, a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional

1
provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the
public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation.

notes, if any:

2
TITLE: VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION,
CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. NO. L-75697 DATE: June 18, 1987
PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J TOPIC: Sec. 26 - Requirements as to title of bills
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On September 1, 1986, Valentino Tio (Tio for brevity), on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of
other videogram operators adversely affected filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry. Following its promulgation is the annual tax of 5% and
30% on gross receipts payable to the local government. The petitioner’s grounds is that the imposition of
tax is a rider and is harsh and confiscatory, oppressive and/or unlawful restraint of trade. It is also alleged
that the imposition of taxes is invalid since the title of the bill said only for the creation of the Videogram
Regulatory Board, not for the imposition of taxes. This violates the One-Subject-One-Title Rule
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the imposition of taxes is invalid in the promulgation of PD No. 1987.
HOLDING
No. The constitutional requirement that “Every Bill shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which statute seeks to
achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the stature wishes to accomplish.
The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statutes are related and germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title , or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign with the general subject and
title. In the case at hand, the title may be read as only for the creation of the VRB, but the imposition of
taxes is a direct consequence of the act, to perform its purpose to regulate and rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the decree.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: BENJAMIN CAWALING v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 146319 DATE: October 26, 2001
PONENTE: TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and
the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto were filed by Petitioner Benjamin E. Cawaling invoking
his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon.

R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And
Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." was signed into law by Pres. Joseph
Estrada. Pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification. The Plebiscite City Board of
Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Petitioner instituted a petition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being
unconstitutional contending that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the
creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title
of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such
information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8806 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in the Constitution.
HOLDING

No. Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution provides that every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. In the case at bar, there is only
one subject embraced in the title of the law which is the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation
of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject
separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation is a logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. Hence, the title of R.A. 8806 cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect
of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this
consequence. It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent,
G.R. NO. 188179 DATE: January 22, 2013
PONENTE: SERENO, CJ. TOPIC: Sec. 26
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Section 12
(Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of R.A. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act.

Petitioner Henry R. Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section
26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the
political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official
ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns
the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for
an office other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the "one subject-one title" rule.
HOLDING
NO. It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of
a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong
presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail.

In the case, the court found that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling
reason that would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.
notes, if any:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall
be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that —

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as
to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end
and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The
title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title
is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In the case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House.

1
TITLE: REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION,
petitioners, vs. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. NO.197676 DATE: February 4, 2014
PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J TOPIC: one-subject requirement under
the Constitution; due process
FACTS OF THE CASE:
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law
on June 29, 2009 by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real estate service
sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners in
the country and requires that companies providing real estate services must transact with the duly-licensed real
estate brokers. The provisions in question are Sec 29: Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real
Estate Service and Sec 32: Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders' Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10- 124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42. And assailing that such is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No.
648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate
trade and business to the Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of subdivision owners and developers pursuant
to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate
developers' most basic ownership rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of
the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28 (a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial
distinctions exist between real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property
owners dealing with their own property. Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and
developing a "corps of technically competent, reasonable and respected professional real estate service
practitioners" is not served by curtailing the right of real estate developers to conduct their business of selling
properties. On the contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous effects on the real estate industry as the
additional cost of commissions would affect the pricing and affordability of real estate packages.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI, Section
26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;
(2) Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of real estate
developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process
HOLDING
No. R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines,
Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes." Aside from provisions establishing a regulatory system for the professionalization of the
real estate service sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own
properties. Henceforth, real estate developers are prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real
estate service practice without first complying with registration and licensing requirements for their business,
brokers or agents, appraisers, consultants and salespersons. The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject
requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject
and title.

No. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of property is caused
by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement
of engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties,
1
such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. Indeed, no right is absolute, and the
proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a
valid exercise of the police power of the State particularly when their conduct affects the execution of legitimate
governmental functions, the preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public morals.

2
JOSHUA REED C. LOPEZ
TITLE: Arroyo vs. De Venecia
G.R. NO. 127255 DATE: AUGUST 14, 1997
PONENTE: TOPIC: A legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance
MENDOZA, J, with the rules of the House – Art VI, Sec 16 (3).
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents charging violation of the Rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation
of the Constitution.

House Bill 7198 was transmitted by the House of Representatives to the Senate and
was thereafter approved with amendments. Upon being sent back to the House of
Representatives, Rep. Albano moved to ratify the bicameral conference committee
report. Deputy Speaker Daza approved Albano’s motion after apparently hearing no
objection thereto although petitioner Rep. Arroyo had in fact stood up and asked “What
is that, Mr. Speaker?” at the instant. Notably, Arroyo did not request to be recognized
in accordance to the House Rules. The Deputy Speaker then called the session
adjourned upon Albano’s motion notwithstanding the pending query of Arroyo
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioners aver these are violative of the Rules of the House and that RA 8240, the
law which evolved from HB 7198, is thereby null and void. Petitioners contend that the
Rules embody the “constitutional mandate” in Art. VI sec 16(3) that “each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings” and that consequently, violation of House rules
is a violation of the Constitution itself.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not R. A. 8240 is unconstitutional because it was passed in violation
of the Rules of the House
HOLDING
(1) No. Arroyo did not have the floor when he just stood up without being recognized,
so as a result, he was not heard. The Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioners’ allegations are true, it is clear that what is
alleged to have been violated in the enactment of RA 8240 are merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements.
Jurisprudence, both here and abroad, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with
its own rules. A legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance to
such.
notes, if any:
TITLE:

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondents.
G.R. NO. L-47421 DATE: May 14, 1990
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Manila Hotel Corporation, SC overruled Court of Tax Appeals
decision that caterer’s tax under RA 6110 is illegal because it was vetoed by Former President Marcos and
Congress had not taken steps to override the veto. SC ruled in this case that the law has always imposed a
3% caterer’s tax, as provided in Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax Code.

Presently, Manila Golf and Country Club, a non-stock corporation claims that it is exempt from the 3% on
gross receipts because President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law). President
Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A because according to him it would 1) shift the burden of taxation to the
consuming public and 2) restrain the development of hotels which are essential to the tourist industry. The
protestation of the club was denied by petitioners saying that Sec 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the
words “hotels, motels, resthouses.” House of Ways and Means concurred with petitioners stating that veto
message only seems to object with certain portions of 191-A and that can be gleaned by the reasons given
by the President.

ISSUE/S:
WON veto referred to the entire section or merely the tax on gross receipts of operators and proprietors of
eating places within hotels, motels and resthouses.

DOCTRINES | HELD:

RULING:
President does not have the power to repeal an existing tax. Therefore, he could not have repealed the 2%
caterer’s tax.
CTA agreed with respondent club that president vetoed only a certain part. CTA mentioned that President
can veto only an entire item, and not just words. The President intentionally only vetoed a few words in Sec
191-A. Assuming that the veto could not apply to just one provision but all would render the Presidential
veto void and still in favor of petitioner.
Inclusion of “hotels, motels, resthouses” in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are items. President has the right
to veto such item, that which is subject to tax and tax rate. It does not refer to an entire section. To construe
item as an entire section would be to tie his hands to either completely agree with a section he has
objections with or to disagree with an entire section where he only has a portion he disagrees with.
An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject
of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and
enumerates the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word "item" as referring to the
whole section would tie the President's hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of also
approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the
collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the President the power to
disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile (See Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v.
Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 55 LRA 882 [1901]).

1
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 2630 is set
aside. Section 191-A of RA No. 6110 is valid and enforceable and, hence, the Manila Golf & Country Club Inc. is liable
for the amount assessed against it.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:
Sec. 191-A. Caterer. — A caterer's tax is hereby imposed as follows:
(1) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors and other eating places, including clubs, and caterers,
three per cent of their gross receipts.
(2) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars, cafes and other eating places, including clubs, where distilled spirits,
fermented liquors, or wines are served, three per cent of their gross receipts from sale of food or refreshments and seven
per cent of their gross receipts from sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines. Two sets of commercial invoices
or receipts serially numbered in duplicate shall be separately prepared and issued, one for sale of refreshments served,
and another for each sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines served, the originals of the invoices or receipts
to be issued to the purchaser or customer.
(3) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other eating places which are
maintained within the preferences or compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse, cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night
or day club by means of a connecting door or passage twenty per cent of their gross receipts.
Where the establishments are operated or maintained by clubs of any kind or nature (irrespective of the disposition of
their net income and whether or not they cater exclusively to members or their guests) the keepers of the establishments
shall pay the corresponding tax at the rate fixed above. (Emphasis supplied)

2
KATELC

Gonzales v. Macaraig
191 SCRA 452 [1990] TOPIC: Sec. 27 General provision, Presidential Veto

NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, EDGARDO

J. ANGARA, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., ERNESTO F. HERRERA, JOSE D. LINA,
JR., JOHN OSMEÑA, VICENTE T. PATERNO, RENE A. SAGUISAG, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, MAMINTAL
ABDUL J. TAMANO, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, JOSEPH ESTRADA, SOTERO LAUREL, AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., SANTANINA RASUL, VICTOR
ZIGA, Petitioners, v. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., HON. VICENTE JAYME, HON. CARLOS
DOMINGUEZ, HON. FULGENCIO FACTORAN, HON. FIORELLO ESTUAR, HON. LOURDES QUISUMBING,
HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, HON. ALFREDO BENGSON, HON. JOSE CONCEPCION, HON. LUIS SANTOS, HON.
MITA PARDO DE TAVERA, HON. RAINERIO REYES, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. ROSALINA
CAJUCOM and HON. EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, Respondents.

PONENTS: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts: On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year (FY) 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain
items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional
provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for
consideration and approval.
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a
“General Provision,” were vetoed.
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section
55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and averred that the President’s line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to items and does not cover provisions; therefore, she exceeded her
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; when
the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation
of powers; the power of augmentation
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, counters that petitioners had a political
remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a “rider” because it is extraneous to
the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the President’s veto
ISSUE: WON the President has the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: YES. the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD.

The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision
without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate
that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations
Bill should relate specifically to some “particular appropriation” therein. The challenged
“provisions” fall short of this requirement
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions
inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of
his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that
“provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY
’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions”
that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.Consequently,
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) although labelled as “provisions,” are actually
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto
power.
TITLE: CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in
his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM in her
capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.
G.R. NO. 103524. DATE: 15 Apr. 1992
PONENTE: J. Gutierrez Jr. TOPIC: Sec. 27; Effects of vetoing
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. Congress passed SC and CA Justices Retirement Act which
fixed their pension to the salary the justices used to earn. Pension to Commission Members Act passed with
automatic readjusting pension features. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797
which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP.
PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of
officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through
HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA
were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this
petition.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not he veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;
HOLDING
YES. In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for
the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the above stated
pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the
Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy".
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested
power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power
is not absolute. The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads: "The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object." (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution) The OSG is correct when it states that the
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines,
provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or
nothing.
However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to
run the machinery of government and it cannot veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features.
The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for
this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto powers" to avoid inexpedient riders being
attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.
notes, if any:
Sec. 3-A of the RA
"SECTION 3-A.In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals is increased
or decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or
the retirement pension which a Justice who as of June twelve, nineteen hundred Fifty-four had ceased to be such
to accept another position in the Government or who retired as receiving at the time of his cessation in office.
Provided, that any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected
thereby".

1
TITLE: PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. NO. 166006 DATE: March 14, 2008
PONENTE: REYES, R.T., J TOPIC: purpose of taxation
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In 1985, then Pres. Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 which provided for the imposition of a capital recovery component
(CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. It provides that a capital contribution
component of not less than P10 per bag of fertilizer shall be collected by the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA)
until adequate capital is raised to make Planters Products, Inc. (PPI), a private corporation, viable. Pursuant to the
LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag it sold in the domestic market to the FPA.

After the 1986 Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of democracy,
Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid, but PPI refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil
questioned the constitutionality of the LOI for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid, and an unlawful
imposition that amounted to a denial due process of law. It alleged that the LOI solely favoured PPI who used its
proceeds to maintain its monopoly in the industry.

FPA countered that the LOI was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the
fertilizer industry, and that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage as the burden fell on the ultimate consumers.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the LOI constitutes a valid legislation pursuant to the exercise of taxation and police power for
public purposes.
HOLDING
NO, because it did not promote public welfare. Public purpose is the heart of a tax law. The law was an invalid
exercise of the State’s power of taxation inasmuch as it violated the inherent and constitutional prescription
that taxes be levied only for public purposes. It reasoned out that the amount collected under the levy was
remitted to the depository bank of PPI, which the latter used to advance its private interest.

To be sure, ensuring the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with
public interest. However, the method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will
promote the public welfare. The government's commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued
viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statute's impartiality. There is
no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like PPI, as identical with the general interest of the country's
farmers or even the Filipino people in general.

In short, the levy was not imposed to ensure the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. Rather, it was
exacted for the benefit of a private corporation, which is an unlawful exercise of the State’s power of taxation.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. LINGAYEN GULF ELECTRIC
POWER CO., INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. NO. L-23771. DATE: August 4, 1988
PONENTE: SARMIENTO, J TOPIC: Uniformity of tax; tax exemption not violative of
equal protection clause
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The respondent taxpayer, Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc., operates an electric power plant serving
the adjoining municipalities of Lingayen and Binmaley, both in the province of Pangasinan, pursuant to the
municipal franchise granted it by their respective municipal councils, under Resolutions Nos. 14 and 25 of June
29 and July 2, 1946, respectively. Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed against and demanded from the
private respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges for the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise
tax rate of 5% on gross receipts from March 1, 1948 to December 31, 1954 as prescribed in Section 259 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Respondent submits that R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional insofar as it provides for the payment by the
private respondent of a franchise tax of 2% of its gross receipts, while other taxpayers similarly situated were
subject to the 5% franchise tax imposed in Section 259 of the Tax Code, thereby discriminatory and violative of the
rule on uniformity and equality of taxation. Court of tax Appeals ruled in favor of respondent.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843, assuming it is valid, could be given retroactive effect so as to render
uncollected taxes in question which were assessed before its enactment.
HOLDING
Yes. A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it
is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike The Legislature has
the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptions have never
been deemed violative of the equal protection clause. It is true that the private respondents municipal franchises
were obtained under Act No. 667 of the Philippine Commission, but these original franchises have been replaced
by a new legislative franchise, i.e. R.A. No. 3843.
Given the validity of said law, it should be applied retroactively so as to render uncollectible the taxes in question
which were assessed before its enactment. The question of whether a statute operates retrospectively or only
prospectively depends on the legislative intent. In the instant case, Act No. 3843 provides that “effective … upon
the date the original franchise was granted, no other tax and/or licenses other than the franchise tax of two per
centum on the gross receipts … shall be collected, any provision to the contrary notwithstanding.” Republic Act
No. 3843 therefore specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law

Copy paste only from https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/cir-vs-lingayen-gulf-electric-g-r-no-l-

23771-august-04-1988/

1
TITLE: RUFINO R. TAN, petitioner, vs. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR., as SECRETARY OF FINANCE & JOSE U. ONG,
as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents
G.R. NO. 109289 DATE: October 3, 1994
PONENTE: VITUG, J TOPIC: (rule of taxation)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In this case, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 2-93,
promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. it is asserted that the enactment of Republic Act No.
7496 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
"Article VI, Section 26 (1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."
"Article VI, Section 28 (1) — The rule of the taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation."
"Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation "shall be
uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals
differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets,
however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No.
7496.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not R.A. 7496 violates the constitutional provision that taxation shall be uniform and equitable

HOLDING
No. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects
of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs.
Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3)
the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies
equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs.
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771). What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the
legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income
taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable
corporations. The Court certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate),
coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. This court cannot freely delve into those matters which, by
constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment. Of course, where a tax measure becomes so
unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for,
despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions. This stage, however, has
not been demonstrated to have been reached within any appreciable distance in this controversy before us.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: CIR V. CA
G.R. NO. 119761 DATE: August 29, 1996
PONENTE: VITUG. J. TOPIC: Sec 28. - Uniformity of Taxation
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Fortune Tobacco Corp. is a cigarette manufacturer in the Philippines. On a number of dates, the
Philippine Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark registration over "Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

Petitioner CIR initially had 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' classified as foreign brands since they were
listed in the World Tobacco Directory as owned by foreign companies. However, after a name change from
“Hope” to “Hope Luxury” and “More” to “Premium More”, they were removed from the foreign brand category.
“Champion” was also submitted as an original local brand after proof was given to the BIR. Excise taxes imposed
on all these brands.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
RA 7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad valorem or excise tax will be imposed on local brands
carrying a foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue Memorandum
Circular (RMC) No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the three brands
classifying them as local brands carrying a foreign name.

Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective. The CIR filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the CA, an appeal, which was also denied.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or Not the Revenue Memorandum Circular issued by the BIR was valid.
HOLDING
NO. The RMC was made to place the three brands as locally made cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to
thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions
applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as
bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the RMC, the brands were subjected to 45% excise tax. In
so doing, the BIR not only interpreted the law but it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due
observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" cigarettes
and, unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the submission of private respondent that the circular
should, be considered adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process following the Ang Tibay
doctrine, the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. In its decision, the CTA has keenly noted
that other cigarettes bearing foreign brands have not been similarly included within the scope of the circular.

Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and equitable.
Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on
equal footing both in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class must be taxed at the same rate and the tax must operate with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject may be found.

The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the Court of
Tax Appeals, is AFFIRMED.
notes, if any:

1
2
TITLE: SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS CORP., THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. NO. 158540 DATE: July 8, 2004
PONENTE: TINGA, J TOPIC: Delegated tax legislation
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation.

Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic

cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland
cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales
and employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition a
definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine whether to impose
a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. Tariff Commission’s report recommended that
no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of the gray cement. After reviewing the
report, then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II disagreed with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was
no serious injury to the local cement industry caused by the surge of imports. In view, the DTI requested an opinion
from the Department of Justice. Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating
that Section 13 of the SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commission's negative finding or
finding that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed. DTI then denied application for safeguard
measures against the importation of gray Portland cement. Subsequently, respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the
Tariff Commissions Report. On the other hand, petitioner filed its Comment arguing that the Court of Appeals had
no jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
WON the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission under the SMA is binding on the DTI Secretary.
HOLDING
YES. The court held that the Court of Appeals holding relied upon section 13 of the SMA, prescribes certain
limitations and restrictions, However, the most fundamental restriction on the DTI Secretary's power is contained
in Section 5 of the SMA “that there should first be a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission”. Section
5 plainly evinces legislative intent to restrict the DTI Secretary's power to impose a general safeguard measure by
preconditioning such imposition on a positive determination by the Tariff Commission. Such legislative intent should
be given full force and effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated
power “the power of taxation”, by nature and by command of the fundamental law, being a preserve of the
legislature. Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution confirms the delegation of legislative power yet ensures
that the prerogative of Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the executive exercise of this power.

This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by the Constitution itself. The
Constitution also grants the delegating authority, the Congress, the right to impose restrictions and limitations on
the taxation power delegated to the President. The restrictions and limitations imposed by Congress take on the
mantle of a constitutional command, which the executive branch is obliged to observe. The SMA empowered the
DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President, to impose definitive general safeguard measures, which basically are
tariff imposts of the type spoken of in the Constitution. However, the law did not grant him full, uninhibited discretion
to impose such measures. The DTI Secretary authority is derived from the SMA, it does not flow from any inherent
executive power. Thus, the limitations imposed by Section 5 are absolute, warranted as they are by a constitutional
fiat.
notes, if any: JUST FOR INFO
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the DTI Secretary is also DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. No Costs.

1
TITLE: SPOUSES RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR. and LOURDES CONSTANTINO and their minor
children RENATO REDENTOR, ANNA MARIKA LISSA, NINA ELISSA, and ANNA KARMINA,
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, and FILOMENO STA. ANA III, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE B.
CUISIA, in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank, HON. RAMON DEL ROSARIO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. EMMANUEL V. PELAEZ, in his capacity as Philippine
Debt Negotiating Chairman, and the NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. NO. 106064 DATE: Oct. 13, 2005
PONENTE: Tinga TOPIC: Section 28: Delegated Tax Legislation
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Financing Program was the culmination of efforts that began during the term of former President
Corazon Aquino to manage the country's external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented debt
strategy involving cooperation and negotiation with foreign creditors. Pursuant to this strategy, the
Aquino government entered into three restructuring agreements with representatives of foreign creditor
governments during the period of 1986 to 1991. During the same period, three similarly-oriented
restructuring agreements were executed with commercial bank creditors.

The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their
minor children who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred
that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan
“contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the
President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the
power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President.

The Constantinos argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation
requires that the President alone must exercise this power and that the requirement of prior
concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the
submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country.
Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.
HOLDING
Yes. Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution allows Congress, by law, to authorize the President to
"fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
1
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government." While the Court refused to uphold
the broad construction of the grant of power as preferred by the DTI Secretary, it nonetheless tacitly
acknowledged that Congress could designate the DTI Secretary, in his capacity as alter ego of
the President, to exercise the authority vested on the chief executive under Section 28(2), Article
VI. At the same time, the Court emphasized that since Section 28(2), Article VI authorized Congress to
impose limitations and restrictions on the authority of the President to impose tariffs and imposts, the
DTI Secretary was necessarily subjected to the same restrictions that Congress could impose on the
President in the exercise of this taxing power.
notes, if any:

2
TITLE: ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA , petitioner, vs. HON.
JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra;
GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS CF PATERNO MILLARE,
respondents.
G.R. NO. L-39086 DATE: June 15, 1988
PONENTE: PARAS, J TOPIC: Sec. 28 – Exemptions to the progressive
tax system
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of
Seizure” and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal
Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes
thereon. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the building
is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by
Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used
exclusively for educational purposes.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer
for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes.
HOLDING
NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the
phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided for in the Article VI, Section 22, Paragraph
3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the said
purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, While the second floor’s use, as residence of the
director, is incidental to education; the lease of the first floor cannot by any stretch of imagination be
considered incidental to the purposes of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the
property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly
arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not
because the second floor of the same is being used by the director and his family for residential purposes,
but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion
is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be return to the school
involved.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: REPUBLIC v. CITY OF KIDAPAWAN
G.R. No. 166651 DATE: December 9, 2005
PONENTE: TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:

On January 1992, then Pres. Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 853 which excluded certain
portions of the land embraced in the Mt. Apo National Park and declared the same as geothermal reservation
under the administration of the Mt. Apo Geothermal Reservation Area (MAGRA). The government through the
DOE entered into a service contract with PNOC-EDC, a government owned or controlled corporation created and
existing under the Corporation Code, to exclusively conduct geothermal operations within the MAGRA and
thereafter, PNOC-EDC built a 104-megawatt power plant within the MAGRA which produces electricity through
turbines using steam extracted from the MAGRA as fuel.

Subsequently, the City Treasurer of Kidapawan, Cotabato notified PNOC-EDC of its tax delinquency after
which, he issued a warrant of levy on the 701-hectare MAGRA for failure to pay real property taxes, covering the
tax period from 1993-2002. Thereafter, he sent a notice of sale of delinquent real property to PNOC-EDC
declaring that delinquent real property will be sold through public auction.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

PNOC-EDC filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order. The trial court found that PNOC-EDC is not exempt from paying the real
property taxes and that the MAGRA is part of the Mt. Apo National Park. Thus, it could not be sold at public
auction. However, the trial court ordered that the improvements on the subject land, not being in the nature of
public dominion, may be validly levied and sold at public auction to satisfy the payment of realty tax
delinquencies.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not PNOC-EDC is liable to pay the real property taxes.
HOLDING

Yes. PNOC-EDC is a government owned or controlled corporation conferred by law with corporate
powers. Under its charter, no tax exemptions were granted. Even if PNOC-EDC was awarded exemptions in its
charter, the same were withdrawn by the LGC. Section 234, paragraph (a) of the LGC exempts from real
property taxation properties of the government, provided the beneficial use of the property was not transferred to
a taxable person. Conversely, if the beneficial use has been transferred to a taxable entity, such as PNOC-EDC,
then the real property owned by the government, which in this case is the MAGRA, is subject to real property tax.
It is well to note that in real estate taxation, the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the
taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the
owner. Under the service contract entered into by the government and PNOC-EDC, the latter is both the
beneficial and actual user of the MAGRA.

notes, if any:

1
TITLE: JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, et al., Petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT,
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; et al., Respondents.
G.R. NO. 119775 DATE: October 24, 2003
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J. TOPIC: Sec. 28; Exemptions
FACTS OF THE CASE:
R.A. No. 7227 created and granted the Subic SEZ (Special Economic Zone) incentives ranging from tax and
duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a
liberalized financial and business climate.

R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation other Special
Economic Zones in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San
Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay.

On July 5, 1994, then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which established a SEZ on a portion of
Camp John Hay.

In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ
economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No. 7227, the
proclamation is merely implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of
business activity or investment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax
exemption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ.
HOLDING
NO. Nowhere in RA 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas, unlike
the grant under Section 12 which provides for tax exemption to the established Subic SEZ. The tax exemption
grant to John Hay SEZ contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
“No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress.”

Hence, it is the Legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, which has the full power to
exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its
power to tax. Therefore, the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay
SEZ is VOID for being violative of the Constitution.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS,
in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. NO. 144104 DATE: June 29, 2004
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J TOPIC: A claim for exemption from tax payments
must be clearly shown and based on language in the
law too plain to be mistaken
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on January
16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823. It is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Quezon Avenue
corner Elliptical Road, Central District, Quezon City, where erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot, is the Lung
Center of the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small
store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients
whom they charge for their professional services. The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also
renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients,
the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government. On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital
building of the petitioner were assessed for real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor
of Quezon City. Accordingly, Tax Declaration Nos. C-021-01226 (16-2518) and C-021-01231 (15-2518-A) were
issued for the land and the hospital building, respectively.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes with the City
Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The petitioner's request was denied, and a petition
was, thereafter, filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA, for brevity) for the
reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. The petitioner alleged that under Section 28, paragraph 3 of the
1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital
beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity
patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real property taxes.
The QC-LBAA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and holding the petitioner liable for real property taxes
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 and is exempt from real property taxes.
HOLDING
Yes, but it is not exempt from real property taxes. The petition is partially granted. The petitioner is a
charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is
a charitable institution entity or not, the elements which should be considered include the statute creating the
enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the
actual work performed, the character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use
and occupation of the properties. Even if the Court find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, it held, that
those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these
are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. A claim for exemption from tax payments
must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. It is plain as day that under the
decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the
building constructed thereon.

1
JOSHUA REED C. LOPEZ
TITLE: WENCESLAO PASCUAL vs. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS
et, al.
G.R. NO. L-10405 DATE: DECEMBER 29, 1960
PONENTE: TOPIC: Public funds may not be appropriated for any purpose other than
CONCEPCION, J a public purpose. The circumstance that the appropriation in furtherance
of a private purpose incidentally benefits the general public does not
justify the defect. (ART VI, SEC. 29)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Respondent Zulueta, a member of the Senate, was the owner of several parcels of residential
land situated in Pasig, Rizal, known as the Antonio Subdivision. Certain portions of the Antonio
Subdivision had been reserved for the projected feeder roads. For the “construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement” of said feeder roads, Congress passed RA
920, appropriating P85,000 therefor. After over 5 months subsequent to the approval and
effectivity of the Act, the projected feeder roads were donated by Zulueta to the Government.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioner Pascual, as Governor of Rizal, filed an action questioning the constitutionality of the
appropriation for the feeder road. The lower court held that the appropriation was clearly for a
private, not a public purpose.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the provision in RA 920 appropriating the said amount is
unconstitutional
HOLDING
(1) Yes. Under the express and implied provisions of the Constitution, the legislature is
without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is then
essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its
validity, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community may be promoted. Incidental benefit to the public or
to the state, resulting from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their (the private enterprise) aid by the use public
money.

In the case at bar, the property sought to be improved with public funds was private in
nature at the time the appropriation was made. Hence, the appropriation sought a private
purpose and is thus null and void. The circumstance that the roads were later donated to
the government did not cure such basic defect.
notes, if any:
The r
IN RED INK- OPTIONAL TO WRITE

TITLE:

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA), former SECRETARY JESUS B.

GARCIA, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), and GEN. FRANCISCO E. ATAYDE (RET.), in his capacity as the General
Manager of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SERGIO D. MABUNAY, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24 and
LANTING SECURITY AND WATCHMAN AGENCY, respondents.
G.R. NO. 126151 DATE: January 20, 2000
PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES, J.: NATURE:
FACTS:
In their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA), former Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and Gen. Francisco E. Atayde (Ret.) in his
capacity as the General Manager of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, assail the decision dated
August 30, 1996 of respondent Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 24, insofar as it ruled that under the laws and regulations, it is necessary for the Manila
International Airport Authority to contract for security services through public bidding. The petitioners
claim that the ruling interferes with "the absolute prerogative" of the petitioners to award security
services either through negotiated contract or public bidding.1âwphi1.nêt

Private respondent Lanting Security and Watchman Agency ("Lanting" for brevity) is a bonded security
agency, which entered into an Agreement with the Manila International Airport Authority to render
security services on a month-to-month basis to commence on April 31, 1987 renewable at the sole
option of the MIAA. The contract was renewed by MIAA from 1988 to 1995. In 1995, upon the
recommendation of the MIAA's former General Manager for the privatization of the Aviation Security
Services of MIAA, a subsidiary company, the Philippine Aviation Security Services Corporation
(PASSCOR) was formed, and the MIAA Board of Directors approved the award of security services in
favor of PASSCOR effective September 1, 1995. Having been informed that PASSCOR would take over
the operations and management of the security of the MIAA, and that the security services contract that
MIAA entered into with Lanting would be terminated by August 31, 1995, Lanting filed a complaint for
injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75048 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXIV, challenging the "highly irregular" awarding by MIAA of the security services
contract to PASSCOR without going through public bidding, as being not only contrary to law, but
likewise against public policy. The respondent Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary

1
IN RED INK- OPTIONAL TO WRITE

injunction ordering MIAA not to terminate the security services of Lanting and not to award the security
contract in favor of PASSCOR.

ISSUE/S:

Whether OR NOT the court a quo erred in ruling that under existing laws and regulations the contract
for security services should be awarded through public bidding.

DOCTRINES | HELD:
We hold that it did not. The petition must perforce be dismissed. Section 68 of R.A. 7845 which is the
General Appropriations Act for 1995, specifically refers to contracts for services related to the functions
and operations of the government and its agencies.

Petitioners' manifest reluctance to hold a public bidding and award a contract to the winning bidder smacks
of favoritism and partiality toward the security agencies to whom it awarded the negotiated contracts and
cannot be countenanced. A competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the
public the best possible advantages thru open competition. It is a mechanism that enables the government
agency to avoid or preclude anomalies in the execution of public contracts.

The General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1993 cannot be used by petitioners to justify their actuations.
An appropriations acts is primarily a special type of legislation whose content is limited to specified sums
of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Section 31 on the General Provisions
of the GAA of 1993 merely authorizes the heads of departments, bureaus, offices or agencies of the
national government to hire, through public bidding or negotiated contracts, contractual personnel to
perform specific activities or services related or incidental to their functions. This law specifically
authorizes expenditures for the hiring of these personnel. It is not the governing law on the award of the
service contracts by government agencies nor does it do away with the general requirement of public
bidding.

public bidding is the accepted method for arriving at a fair and reasonable price and it ensures that
overpricing and favoritism, and other anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized8 and we reiterate
that Section 68 of the General Appropriations Act has not dispensed with such requirement for contracts
for services awarded thereunder. Although the legislature in making appropriations under its exclusive
jurisdiction leaves largely to administrative discretion the choice of ways and means to accomplish the
object of appropriation, that administrative discretion may not transcend the statutes. WHEREFORE, the
petition is denied for lack of merit.

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IN RED INK- OPTIONAL TO WRITE

RULING:

NOTES:
Sec. 68. Service Contracts. — Departments, bureaus, offices or agencies of the National Government are hereby authorized to enter into
contracts with other government agencies, private firms or individuals and non-governmental organizations for services related or
incidental to their respective functions and operations, through public bidding or negotiated contracts whenever it is impractical or more
expensive for the government to directly undertake such functions and operations, subject to pertinent accounting and auditing rules and
regulations: PROVIDED, That the execution of the service contracts shall not operate to automatically abolish or render vacant any
existing occupied position in the contracting office or agency.

Bidding was introduced in the Philippines by the American Laws on Public Bidding until finally Act No. 22 (1900) of the Philippine Commission
was enacted which became the first law on public bidding in this jurisdiction. This was followed by several related Acts such as Act Nos.
74(1901), 82(1901) and 83(1901) culminating in the promulgation by President Quezon on February 3, 1936, of Executive Order No. 16
declaring as a general policy that public bidding must be the means adopted in the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment except
on very extraordinary cases and with his prior approval. These Acts and Executive Order as well as the rules and regulations promulgated
pertinent thereto were later incorporated in the Administrative Code and in subsequent Public Works Acts, although with slight modifications.
Up to the present, this policy and medium still hold both in procurement and construction contracts of the government, and the latest
enactment relative thereto is Presidential Decree No. 1594 (1978) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.4

3
KATELC
COMELEC v. Hon. Quijano - GR No. 151992, Sept 18, 2002
Topic; Sec. 29, Fiscal Power of Congress (inadequate fund for contract with Photokina)

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, COMELEC COMMISSIONERS

RESURRECCION Z. BORRA and FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., petitioners, vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 215 and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP., respondents.

PONENTE: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS: Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189 in 1996, otherwise known as the
"Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and computerization of the
voters' registration list and the appropriate funds therefor "in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters."
(COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 00-0315 approving in principle the Voter's
Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS) Project . VRIS Project envisions a
computerized database system for the May 2004 Elections.
MAY OMIT: The idea is to have a national registration of voters whereby each registrant's
fingerprints will be digitally entered into the system and upon completion of registration,
compared and matched with other entries to eliminate double entries. A tamper-proof and
counterfeit-resistant voter's identification card will then be issued to each registrant as a visual
record of the registration.
COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and installations of information
technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS Project. Private respondent Photokina
Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the
bidders.
However, under RA 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELEC’s
modernization project was only 1 Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the
Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was
only P1.2 Billion Pesos.
PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote several letters to the COMELEC requesting the
formal execution of the contract, but to no avail,PHOTOKINA filed with the RTC, Quezon City a
petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages.

ISSUE: WON a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project

HELD: NO. We rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the
COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINAs bid is beyond the amount
appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the
COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of
mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty
that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public
funds is concerned.
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Thus, in the execution of
government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require the various
agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.

MAY OMIT: The certificate signed by the proper accounting official shall be attached to and
become an integral part of the proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter
be available for expenditure for any other purpose until the obligation of the government agency
concerned under the contract is fully extinguished. The obvious intent is to impose such
conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract. We cannot accede to
PHOTOKINA's contention that there is already a perfected contract. This is a dangerous
precedent. On the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on
account of its bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under RA 8760, the only fund
appropriated for the project was P1 Billion Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds
(CAF) only P1.2 Billion Pesos was available. This contract being violative of the legal
requirements aforequoted, the same contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null and void by
virtue of Sec.87.'"
TITLE: VIRGILIO GASTON, HORTENCIA STARKE, ROMEO GUANZON, OSCAR VILLANUEVA, JOSE
ABELLO, REMO RAMOS, CAROLINA LOPEZ, JESUS ISASI, MANUEL LACSON, JAVIER LACSON, TITO
TAGARAO, EDUARDO SUATENGCO, AUGUSTO LLAMAS, RODOLFO SIASON, PACIFICO MAGHARI, JR.,
JOSE JAMANDRE, AURELIO GAMBOA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, PHILIPPINE
SUGAR COMMISSION, and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, respondents, ANGEL H. SEVERINO,
JR., GLICERIO JAVELLANA, GLORIA P. DE LA PAZ, JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS, intervenors.
G.R. NO. 77194 DATE: 15 Mar 1988
PONENTE: J. Melencio Herrera TOPIC: Sec. 29 (3); Special Funds
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Respondent Philippine Sugar Commission was formerly the government office tasked with the function of
regulating and supervising the sugar industry until it was superseded by its co-respondent Sugar Regulatory
Administration under Executive Order No. 18 on May 28, 1986. Although said E.O. abolished the PHILSUCOM, its
existence as a juridical entity was mandated to continue for three (3) more years "for the purpose of prosecuting
and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its
property and to distribute its assets."
Petitioners and Intervenors have come to this Court praying for a Writ of Mandamus. Respondents
PHILSUCOM and SRA, for their part, squarely traverse the petition arguing that no trust results from Section 7 of
P.D. No. 388; that the stabilization fees collected are considered government funds under the Government Auditing
Code; that the transfer of shares of stock from PHILSUCOM to the sugar producers would be irregular, if not illegal;
and that this suit is barred by laches.
P.D. No. 388, promulgated on February 2, 1974, which created the PHILSUCOM, provided for the collection
of a Stabilization Fund. Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 does provide that the stabilization fees collected "shall be
administered in trust by the Commission." However, while the element of an intent to create a trust is present, a
resulting trust in favor of the sugar producers, millers and planters cannot be said to have ensued because the
presumptive intention of the parties is not reasonably ascertainable from the language of the statute itself.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the stabilization fees collected from sugar planters and millers pursuant to Section 7 of
P.D. No. 388 are public funds.
HOLDING
NO. It is a special fund since the funds are deposited in PNB, not in the National Treasury. The
stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of the State to impose for the
promotion of the sugar industry. They constitute sugar liens. The collections made accrue to a "Special Fund," a
"Development and Stabilization Fund," almost identical to the "Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund" created
under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 567. The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is
levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily
in the exercise of the police power of the State.
The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them
state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose. Having been levied for a special purpose, the
revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the statute, "administered in trust"
for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, is to be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the essence of the trust intended.
The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special fund is emphasized by the fact that the funds are
deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out
only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO,
DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE A.
CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. NO. 177857-58 DATE: January 24, 2012
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J TOPIC: coco levy as public fund, Art IX-D, Sec. 2(1)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In 1971, RA 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Sec. 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a P0.55 levy on the sale of every
100kg of copra. Of the P0.55 levy of which the copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts, P0.02
was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers declared by the
Philippine Coconut Administration (PHILCOA) as having the largest membership.

The declaration of martial law in 1972 saw the issuance of several PDs purportedly designed to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund, such as issuances on the coco levy, its collection
and utilization, how the proceeds of the levy will be managed and by whom, and the purpose it was supposed to
serve. One fo these, the LOI 925 Series of 1979, made reference of the creation, out of other coco levy funds, of
the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) and entrusted the portion of the CIIF levy to UCPB for investment, on
behalf of coconut farmers, oil mills, and other private corporations. Thus, the LOI authorizes UCPB to invest through
CIIF the funds in private corporations.

Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was
converted into different assets and investments. In this case, the issue started when the fund was used to invest to
First United Bank (FUB), later renamed UCPB. A directive was later on issued by then Pres. Marcos for PCA to
distribute for free the said bank shares. Petitioners herein representing coconut farmers assail the anomalous
purchase of FUB using the funds of farmers.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the coconut levy is in the form of a public fund and therefore cannot be owned by private
individuals.
HOLDING
YES. Coconut levy funds are special public funds of the government; they are treated as special funds for a special
public purpose. They can only be used for the special purpose of accelerating the growth and development of a
vertical integration thereof that could make the coconut farmers participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth
and development, and cannot the balance thereof should revert back to the general public fund. Consequently,
their subsequent reclassification as a private funds to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities are
unconstitutional.

To recapitulate, Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on taxation, enjoins
the disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special purpose for which it was collected, the balance,
if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to be transferred to the general
funds of the government, thus:

“All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the
balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.”

notes, if any:

1
TITLE: FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARIWASA
MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents.
G.R. NO. 110571 DATE: October 7, 1994
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J TOPIC: Art. VI, Sec. 30 of the 1987 Constitution
FACTS OF THE CASE:
This is a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division sustaining the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments and, consequently, dismissing the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.

The case arose when the Board of Investments (BOI) granted the petitioner’s application to amend its BOI certificate
by changing the scope of its registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles”. Eventually, Private
respondent Mariwasa Mfg. Inc. filed an Motion of reconsideration of the said BOI decision. Soon rebuffed in its bid
for reconsideration, Mariwasa Mfg. Inc. filed a petition for review with respondent CA (pursuant to SC Circular 1-
91). CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision.

Petitioner filed a ‘motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order’ contending that CA does not have jurisdiction
over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the SC. Petitioner further argued that the B.P. 129
and SC Circular 1-91 cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for
appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226.

Mariwasa maintains that: whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O.
226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which
was promulgated four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted. Petitioner contends that EO 226 cannot be validly
repealed by 1-91 because E0 226 grants substantive right, which under the Constitution, cannot be modified.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
WON the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the case. (Where and in what manner appeals from decisions
of BOI should be filed?)
HOLDING
Yes. SC Circular 1-91 effectively repealed Article 82 of E.O. 226. The Court held that the Constitution now provides
in Art. VI, Sec. 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence."

This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily
burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national
aspects. Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from
the decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted
without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can
never be deemed to have amended BP Blg. 129, Sec. 9. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to
decide cases appealed to it from the BOI must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to be
exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.

The Court stated, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly appealed to this
Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of Sec. 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform
appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception
only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. That
in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as
required by the Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of
the BOI directly to the Supreme Court. The motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

1
TITLE: ANTONIO DIAZ and KOSUMO DABAW, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD AND DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO., INC., respondents
G.R. NO. 109698 DATE: December 5, 1994
PONENTE: BELLOSILLO, J TOPIC: (ERB to CA)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On 8 May 1987, the President promulgated E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to replace the
Board of Energy. Under Sec. 10 thereof, "[a] party adversely affected by a decision, order or ruling of the Board . .
. may file a petition to be known as petition for review with the Supreme Court." On 27 February 1991, the
Supreme Court promulgated Circular No. 1-91, par. (1) of which specifically provides that the proper mode of
appeal from any quasi-judicial agency, including ERB, is by way of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service. On 6 December
1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used by DLPC in its operation.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court assailing the decision of ERB
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In the
Supreme Court’s resolution of 8 September 1992, it referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of
Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition. On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that our resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to
disregard the above circular. In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, the instant recourse.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a party adversely affected by a decision, order or ruling of the Board may file a petition to be known
as petition for review with the Supreme Court|

HOLDING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition. It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted
without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it
cannot be deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the
Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994). If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals) by the wrong procedure, the only course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal. There is
no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to another (Quesada v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, 12 November 1990). Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court
promulgated Circular No. 2-90 dated 9 March 1990, Item No. 4 of which states that "[a]n appeal taken to either
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed". Paragraph
(d) of said Circular No. 2-90 also provides that "[n]o transfer of appeals erroneously taken to the Supreme Court
or to the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate jurisdiction will be allowed;
continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals will not be tolerated."
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: FABIAN V. DESIERTO
G.R. NO. 129742 DATE: September 16, 1998
PONENTE: REGALADO, J TOPIC: SEC. 30 - OMB TO CA
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent
Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED)
when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Respondent Agustin reportedly took advantage of his official position, charming the petitioner into
an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which the respondent gifted PROMAT
with projects and interceded for it concerning the same using his office.

However, Fabian and Agustin had a falling out, leading to an unpleasant and harsh relationship between
the two. When Petitioner tried to end the relationship, Agustin resisted and harassed and then threatened
petitioner with words of threat and violence.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Fabian then filed complaint seeking the dismissal of the respondent for violation of Sec. 19, RA No 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Sec. 36 of PD No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), charges referred to may be
subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.

Graft Investigator Benitez issued a resolution finding Agustin guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his
dismissal from his post and service. Respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved
the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year. When Agustin entered into a Motion of Reconsideration,
however, Ombudsman Desierto discovered that the former’s new counsel was his "classmate and close
associate" and inhibited himself. The case was the transferred to Respondent Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero who
eventually ruled in favour or Agustin.

Petitioner avers that the resolution initially issued while the respondents argue that the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution to promulgate its own rules or procedure. Fabian eventually
elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that as per Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the SC through a petition of certiorari.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or Not the Supreme Court may take cognizance of administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
HOLDING
NO. It is clear with Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated
therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts composing
the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.

Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.

The Constitution intended to vest in the Supreme Court a measure of control but strictly only over cases
under its appellate jurisdiction. To act otherwise would be a total disregard of the Constitutional provision
1
 and the spirit of legislation, enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, unnecessarily burdening the
same.
notes, if any:
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

2
TITLE: VICTORIANO B. TIROL, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Region VIII, represented by its
DIRECTOR, Leyte Government Center, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, respondent.
G.R. NO. 133954. DATE: August 3, 2000
PONENTE: TOPIC: Art. 6 Sec. 30. Any increases of jurisdiction of SC
should be with the advice and concurrence of the Court;
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner is the incumbent Regional Director of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) in Region
V. He was charged with the violation of RE 2019 Sec. 3(g) for entering into a contract alleged to be disadvantageous
to the gov’t. The charge was for the alleged overpricing of various school equipment for the Lalawigan National
High School. Consequently, region VIII of respondent COA audited the operations and accounts of Lalawigan
National High School. COA found that there was a malversation of public funds, citing the purchase of certain
supplies and equipment which is done through a negotiated contract and not through competitive public bidding
(contrary to COA Circular 85-55A). In the questioned purchase, the agency failed to ascertain the reasonableness
of the contract prices, resulting in an overprice purchase as compared to COA’s actual canvass of prices.

COA recommended the filing of both criminal and admin cases against persons liable, including petitioner and his
approval of the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV) for the purchase. Petitioner alleged that the documents were
previously reviewed by his subordinates and approved them only upon certification that everything was in order.
He claimed his approval to be a purely ministerial act. However, his co-respondents did not dispute the overcharging
and claimed it to be a purchase that is emergency in nature. It was held that the doubtful purchase did not qualify
as an emergency purchase. In an Information filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner and two co-respondents
were charged guilty for their overpriced purchases.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari which, according to him, the Office of the Ombudsman, erred in
concluding that he was culpably liable for alleged overpricing of the questioned purchase. Petitioner cited the cases
of Arias and Magasuci and further asserts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions
by public officers should apply in his favor.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the defense of good faith and regularity of performance of duty may be raised by the accused.
HOLDING
No. The court held, that the rulings in Arias and Magasuci are inapplicable to petitioner because the petitioners in
the said cases were indicted and submitted themselves to trial before the Sandiganbayan, which convicted them
for the offense charged. In Arias, the Court set aside the judgment against the petitioner because there was no
evidence that the Government suffered undue injury. And in Magsuci, the reversal by the Court of the judgment of
conviction was based on a finding that Magsuci acted in good faith and that there has been no intimidation at all
that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Acla. In both Arias
and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence on conspiracy, while in this case, there is only the claim of petitioner
that he acted in good faith and that there was no conspiracy.

Moreover, this case is an appeal under Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which has been declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto for increasing appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent. Also, there is no right of appeal available since
the Section mentions (Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989) only appeals from all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court DENIED the said petition and the
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman are AFFIRMED.
notes, if any: JUST FOR INFO
Par. 2 of the holding is the basis of the violation of Sec. 30 art. 6 of the Consti. Sec. 30 of article 6 provides that “No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.” In the case
at bar the case was an appeal under Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which has been declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto for increasing appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice
and consent, hence, it violated the said section of article 6 of the Phil. Consti.

1
TITLE: AMELIA CABRERA, petitioner, vs. MANUEL LAPID, FERNANDO BALTAZAR, REYNALDO
F. CABRERA and DIONY VENTURA, respondents
G.R. NO. 129098 DATE: Dec. 6, 2006
PONENTE: Tinga TOPIC: Sec. 30: OMB to CA
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The instant petition originated from a Complaint-Affidavit 3 filed in November 1995 by petitioner Amelia M. Cabrera
with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). In her three(3)-page affidavit, petitioner accused respondents of
violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. In her
Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan
over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. The fishpond operations commenced in
August 1995. A month later, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond
as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator
to dissuade respondents from destroying her property. Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the
destruction of petitioner's fishpond.

On 13 May 1996, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The dismissal
was based on the declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents
in the exercise of the police power of the State. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution. In the Order
dated 21 March 1997, the Ombudsman affirmed its 13 May 1996 Resolution.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the issuances of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 is valid.
HOLDING
Yes. The petitioner cannot avail Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. It is
provided that direct appeals are allowed in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to
the Supreme Court. Hence, the right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases. The provision does not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. However,
an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in
preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, its dismissal is nevertheless
warranted because petitioner failed to present, much more substantiate, any grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Ombudsman. A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed
petitioner's criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they
effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se.
Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act or of Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents.

1
TITLE: SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS,respondents.
G.R. NO. 125416 DATE: September 26, 1996
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J TOPIC: SECTION 30. No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advice and concurrence.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Republic Act No. 7227 entitled, “The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992” was enacted on
March 13, 1992, which also created the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). Section 12 of this law
required the contiguous towns, and cities of Subic to concur with the said RA. Hence, in April 1993 the
Municipal Council of Morong, Bataan passed Resolution No. 10 to join the SSEZ. May 24, 1993, the
private respondents, Garcia & Calimbas filed a petition wanting to annul Resolution No. 10. The Municipal
Council responded by promulgating Resolution No. 18, requesting Congress to amend certain provisions
of RA 7227 and that the Bases Conversion Development Authority and the Office of the President was
already acting favorably to their petition. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under
the LGC of 1991. COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof
is just a resolution and not an ordinance.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari against COMELEC contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848
alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment
of a national law.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its
Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or Municipal
Resolution No. 10, Series of 1993 of the Municipality of Morong, Bataan" considering that the subject of
the petition was an initiative and not a referendum?
HOLDING
Yes, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its Resolution
No. 2848. The court cannot pass upon a proposed initiative until the people have voted for it and it has
become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented
thereunder. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical
questions or cases. We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides that "(n)othing in
this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved
pursuant to this Act . . .." So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court. It passes upon errors of
law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as
well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or instrumentality" of government.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself,
akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence
the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the
exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate
guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.

There is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not
only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the
people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted by the electorate.
1
This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should upon thus
be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must
also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate,"
although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative."
notes, if any:

2
TITLE: Lambino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 166651 DATE: December 9, 2005
PONENTE: TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado (Lambino Group) with other groups, commenced gathering signatures
for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73
of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. The
Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article
XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

The Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative.
HOLDING

No. The initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The framers
of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown
to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because
the proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

.
notes, if any: