1.) US VS.

AH CHONG
G.R NO. 5272
MARCH 19, 1910

FACTS:
Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were
employed in the same place and usually slept in the same room. One night,
after the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to
open the door, and called out twice, “who is there?” He received no answer,
and fearing that the intruder was a robber, leaped from the bed and again
called out: “if you enter the room I will kill you” at that moment he was struck
by a chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he was being
attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the
intruder, who turned out to his roommate. Thereupon he called to his
employers and rushed back into the room to secure bandages to bind up the
wound. Defendant was charged with murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be held criminally responsible who by
reason of a mistake of facts.

RULING:
No. That, under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability,
provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient of
the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works on
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand conviction
under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases when, under
the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing
an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from which he
intended to commit. Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.
 2.) PEOPLE VS. BINDOY
G.R NO. 34665
AUGUST 28, 1931

FACTS:
The appellant was sentenced by the court of First Instance of
Occidental Misamis to the penalty of 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the amount of P1, 000 and to pay the costs. The crime charge against the
accused is homicide, according to the following information.

That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod,

Municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused
Bindoy offered a tuba to Tibay, Pacas wife and threatened to inflict injury
upon her if she will refuse. However, Pacas come to rescue his wife against
Bindoy who at that time carried a bolo. When Bindoy and Pacas struggling
with the bolo, Omamdam come to the rescue however, he was accidentally hit
in the chest by Bindoy who didn’t notice that the latter was behind him. The
trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide.

The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his
counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be
mitigated on the ground of accident, and if he was entitled of acquittal
according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:
Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8,
No. 8 of the Revised PenalCode. The witness for the defense, Gaudencio
Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were
actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let
go, the former pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very
moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the
chest, without Donato’s seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him.

The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later,
and asked him about his wound when he replied: “I think I shall die in this
wound” and then he continued: “please look after my wife when I die: see that
she doesn’t starve”, adding further: “this wound was an accident. Donato did
not aim at me, nor I at him: it was a mishap”. The testimony of this witness
was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidenced adduced by the fiscal.

The court searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which
it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we
deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos 15, Phil.,
to wit: “the attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial
fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving,
when possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under
investigation. In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in
completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the
introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of
the guilty person to indulge the criminal act”.

In view of the evidence before us, the court held, that the appellant is
entitled to acquittal according to Article 8, No.8 Penal Code. Wherefore, the
judgment appealed is reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby
acquitted with cost de officio.
 3.) BATACLAN VS. MEDINA
G.R NO. L-10126
OCTOBER 22, 1957

FACTS:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite. Shortly
after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus no.30 of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner, defendant Mariano Medina, under a
certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo Cavite, on its way
to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylor, there were
about 18, passengers; including the driver and conductor.

At about 2:00 o’clock that same morning, while the bus was running
within the jurisdiction of Imus Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zigzag until it fell into the canal or ditch on the right side of
the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus
the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while 4
passengers seated beside the driver named Bataclan, Lara, and the Visayan
and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
the overturned bus.

It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and
escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and
permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that
lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it
on fire. The same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed passengers
inside the bus were removed and duly identified, especially that of Juan
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name
and in behalf of her 5 minor children, brought the present suit to recover from
Mariano Medina a compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees in the total amount of P87, 150.

After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P19, 000
to the plaintiffs, plus P6, 000, as attorney’s fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was
host on fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals but latter court endorsed the appeal to us because of the
value involved in the claim in the complaint.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the proximate cause of death of Juan Bataclan is the
fire that burned the bus.
2.) Whether or not the carrier is liable.

RULLING:
No. When a vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with lighted torch was in response to
the call for help made not only by the passengers but most probably by the
driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about
2:30 in the morning) the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming
as they did from a rural area where contains and flashlights were not available,
they had to use a torch the most handy available; and what was more natural,
than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. The court held that
the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the
vehicle thru the negligence of the defendant and his agent.

Yes. The failure of the driver and the conductor to have cautioned on
taking steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus, constitute negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier under the
provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Article 1733, 1959 and 1963 thereof.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that damages awarded

by the trial court are increased from one thousand (P1, 000) Pesos to six
thousand (6, 000) Pesos, and from six hundred (P600) Pesos to eight hundred
(P800) Pesos for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney’s fees,
respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with cost.
 4.) SERRANO VS. PEOPLE
G.R N0. 175023
JULY 5, 2010

FACTS:
A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the
stabbing of Anthony Galang, the victim, by the herein petitioner, Giovannie
Serrano. During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the left side of his
stomach and was beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position,
Galang claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion
of his intestines showed. The victim received medical attention, stayed in the
hospital for one week and thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate.

The RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage
since the victim was stabbed on the left side of his stomach and that the victim
had to be referred from an infirmary to hospital for medical treatment. On the
other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the attempted
stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to
cause the victim’s death. It was observed that the attending physician did not
testify in court and that the Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary
issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the nature or gravity of the
wound”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide instead of
frustrated homicide.

RULING:
Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted
which must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound
inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without timely medical
intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be
fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm
of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should
be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be
attempted, not frustrated homicide.
 5.) US VS. BROBST
G.R NO.4935
OCTOBER 25, 1909

FACTS:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Masbate. The
defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were
engaged in work on a mine located in the Municipality of Masbate, where they
gave employment to a number of native laborers. Mann discharged one of
these laborers names Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back on the
premises, and told the defendant not to employ him again, because he was a
thief and a disturbing element with the other.

A few days after, on the morning of July 10, 1907, Saldivar, in company
with three or four others, went to the mine to look for work. The defendant
saw Saldivar and ordered him to leave, however, Saldivar made no move to
leave, and although the order was repeated, he merely smiled or grinned at the
defendant, whereupon the latter become enraged, took three steps towards
Saldivar, and struck him a powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side,
just over the lower ribs, at the point where the handle of Saldivar’s bolo lay
against the belt from which it was suspended. On being struck, Saldivar threw
up his hands, staggered and without saying a word, went away in the direction
of his sister’s house, which stood about 200 yards away, and about 100 feet
up the side of the hill. He died as he reached the door of the house.

The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime homicide, and
sentenced him to suffer six years and one day of prison mayor, and from this
the defendant appealed to this court.

The counsel of the appellant argue that the trial court erred to the
following: (1) that the evidence fails to sustain a finding that the deceased
came to his death as a result of injuries inflicted by the defendant and (2) that
even if it be a fact that the defendant, in laying his hand upon the deceased,
contributed to his death, nevertheless, since the defendant had a perfect right
to eject the deceased from the mining property, he cannot be held criminally
liable for unintentional injuries inflicted in the lawful exercise of this right.
ISSUE: Whether or not a death of Saldivar resulting from a blow of the
defendant was proven without reasonable doubt?

RULING:
Yes. That proof that a heavy blow with the closed fist, over the lower
left ribs, inflicted upon the person in apparent good health, was followed by
the death of that person in less two hours, sustains a finding that death resulted
from the infliction of the blow in the absence of proof of any intervening cause
and the circumstances being such as to afford no ground for reasonable doubt
that no extraneous cause did in fact intervene.

Where death results as the direct consequence of the use of illegal

violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured
person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of
criminal responsibility.

The judgment of conviction and the sentenced imposed by the trial

court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the cost of this instance against
the appellant.
 6.) MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R NO.11164
MARCH 21, 1916

FACTS:
The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a
constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his
motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government
ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent.
Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured
beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way
he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.

In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the

government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of
Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the
same.

This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First

Instance of the City of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14, 741,
together with the cost of the cause.

Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred: (1) in limiting
the general damages which was the plaintiff suffered to P5, 000, instead of
P25, 000 as claimed in the complaint and (2) in limiting the time when
plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing
the damage accordingly in the sum of P2, 666, instead of P6, 000 as claimed
by plaintiff in this complaint.

The Attorney General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial
court erred: (1) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff’s motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur, (2) in holding that the government of the Philippine Islands is liable
for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it
be true that the collision was due to negligence of the chauffeur, and (3) in
rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14, 471.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for
the damage caused by an agent?

RULING:
No. According to the paragraph5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and
the principle laid down in a decision among others, of the 18 th of May, 1994,
in a damage cause, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged, with some definite purpose
which give rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
commissions is imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility
in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the
trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment
of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of
the Civil Code (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911, 122 Jus. Civ., 146).

It is, therefore, evident that the state (the Government of the Phil.
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra,
and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent, therefore the Government of the Philippine Islands is not liable for
the damage caused by an agent.
 7.) SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO
G.R NO. L-46930
JUNE 10, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioner Sander was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the
special services director of the U.S Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo
City. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent
residence in the Philippines as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two
years ago. They were both employed as game room attendants in the special
department of the NAVSTA.

On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their

employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-
time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the
U.S Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for
reinstatement of their permanent full-time status. However, in a letter
addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report.

The private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo

City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8,
1976. The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations
that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that
judgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal
propriety rights. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners
were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to
dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts
complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties
and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the
doctrine of state immunity.

After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was
denied, on the ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that
their acts where official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the
allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and
in bad faith.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was
thereafter filed before this court, on the contention that the above narrated acts
of the respondents’ court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties
when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the
private respondents.

RULING:
Yes. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a
government functioning is being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers
and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the
mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from
suability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in
excess of his authority. These well settled principles are applicable not only
to officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertain
to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case. The acts for which
the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. The challenged orders acted on

March 8, 1977, August 9, 1977 and September 7, 1977, are set aside. The
respondent court is directed to dismiss Civil Case no. 2077-0. The temporary
restraining order of September 26, 1977, is permanent. No costs.
 9.) AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
G.R NO. L-26400
FEBRUARY 29, 1972

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot

No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1,
1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
property appears at the back of the Certificate without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the said lot, with an area of
6, 167 meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting

payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the
government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed
it in his 9th endorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said endorsement
was transmitted to Amigable’s counsel by the office of the President on
January 7, 1959.

On February 6, 1959, Amigable filed in the court of a quo a complaint,

which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants,
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of the 6, 167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in
the sum of P50, 000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages
in the sum of P25, 000.00, attorney’s fees in the sum of P5, 000.00 and the
cost of suit.

Within the reglamentary period of defendants filed a suit answer

denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the
following affirmative defenses, to wit; (1) the action was premature, the claim
not having been filed with the office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right
of the action for the recovery of any amount which might be due to the
plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against
the government, the claim for moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs had
no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not give its consent
to be sued; (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated
and sued the area involved in the construction of Margo Avenue, plaintiff had
no cause of action against the defendants.

On July 29, 1959 the court rendered its decision holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action for the recovery of possession
and ownership of the position of lot in question on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent. Accordingly, the complaint
was dismissed unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to us,
there being no question of fact involved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under
the facts of the case.

RULING:
Yes. Immunity of State from suit; Exception-where the government
takes away property from a private land owner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetuating as an injustice on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a compliant
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed
by the judgment, or after tender of the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it “have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the
judgment”.
 Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including
attorney’s fees, to which the appellant is entitled. No pronouncement as to
cost.
 10.) PALAFOX VS. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE
G.R NO. L-10659
JANUARY 31, 1958

FACTS:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of the First Instance of Ilocos
Norte quashing the case filed by appellants against the defendants, except as
far as Sabas Toralba, was concerned. It appears that Sabas Toralba was
employed as driver of the provincial Government of Ilocos Norte detailed to
the office if the District Engineer. On September 30, 1948, while driving his
foresight truck in compliance with his duties, he ran over Proceto Palafox,
father of appellants and the victim died as a result. Prosecuted for Homicide
through reckless in prudence, Sabas Toralba pleaded guilty and was
accordingly sentenced. Having reserved their right to file a civil action, the
heirs later began these proceeding against the employer province, the District
Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer and Sabas Toralba.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte be held liable for the death
of Palafox?

RULING:
No. This is under article 1903 of the Civil Code; but this ruling may not
be made, because the driver was not a special agent of the Government within
the scope of the article. (Merritt vs. Government of the Phil., 34 Phil., 311)
and the principles applies only to the insular, as distinguished from the
provincial or municipal governments. Appellants invoke the doctrine of
respondent superior as illustrated in the case of Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33
Phil., 508, concerning liability of municipal corporations for negligent acts of
their employees. It will be seen from the decision that if the negligent
employee was engaged in the performance of governmental duties, as
distinguished from corporate or proprietary or business functions-the
government is not liable.

The construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the

driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental
activities. Hence, the death of Palafox-tragic and deplorable through it may
be-imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary compensation.

Judgment affirmed, with cost against appellants.

 11.) THE MUNICIPALITY OF MONCADE VS. CAJUIGAN ET AL
G.R NO. 7048
JANUARY 12, 1912

FACTS:
This case comes before us on appeal from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Tarlac, the Honorable Julio Ilorente
presiding, condemning the defendants, the first as principal and the other three
sureties, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P 1, 855, together with penalties,
interest and costs.

The Municipality of Moncada and the defendant, Pio Cajuigan, entered

into a contract of lease whereby the plaintiff leased to his defendant certain
fish ponds situated within the jurisdiction of that municipality for the term
embracing July 1, 1908 to June 30, 1909, for which defendant agreed to pay
P 3, 710 in quarterly installments. By virtue of this lease, the fish ponds were
duly delivered into the possession of the defendant Cajuigan by the plaintiff,
and he for with began placing accessories necessary for the conduct of a
fishery. The lessee failing to meet his payments as provided in the contract of
lease, petitioned for and received an extension first until October 1, 1908, and
Second until November 30 of the same year.

The lease was declared rescinded by the Municipality Council on

November 30, 1908, and on or about the sixth day of the following month the
plaintiff, through its officials, entered the property and ejected the defendants
and his tenants.

Subsequently thereto and on February 15, 1910, this complaint filed by

the plaintiff, wherein judgment was asked against the defendant Pio Cajuigan,
as principal and Florentino Sagui, Juan Isla and Artero Alegado as sureties,
for the sum of P3, 710 together with penalties, interest and cost.

The defendants, after specifically denying all the allegations of the

complaint, alleged as a special defuse that the failure to pay the rents as
stipulated in the lease was not due to the fault of the defendant, but to that of
plaintiff, through its treasurer, agreed to accept on December 2, the amount
then due, but that when the tender was made, said treasurer refused to comply
with this agreement. The defendants asked by way of cross-complaint
damages in the sum of P9, 800 against the plaintiff for forcibly taking
possession of the leased premises and for the value of certain nets, corals, etc.
left in the fish ponds seized by the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lessee did on the 30th of November and the 2nd of
December try to pay the payment which he then owned.

RULING:
No. The trial court accepted as true testimony of the municipal
treasurer, and found as a fact that the lessee never did at any time offer to
make any payment. This finding of fact, we think, is supported the
preponderance of the evidence, the testimony of the municipal treasurer is
clear, direct, positive and convincing.

On the other hand, we have the testimony of the lessee, his sub-tenant,
and one of his bondsmen, all of whom testified that the lessee did offer the
treasurer the money if the lessee had gone there with his money on the 30 th of
November and treasurer would have unquestionably accepted it, or, even if
the treasurer had refused to accept it under the pretense that he was busy, the
lessee could have notified the municipal president, whose office was in the
same building, and demanded that the treasurer did not accept the money.

It is well settled that the term ‘preponderance of evidence’, is not meant

the mere numerical away of witnesses, but it means the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side. The preponderance of evidence
may be determined, under certain conditions, by the number of witnesses
testifying to a particular fact or state of fact.

The judgment appealed from hereby modified by allowing the plaintiff

to recover for five months’ rent, together with 20% penalties thereon, and
deducting from this amount P210, the amount of the actual damages caused
by the plaintiff’s trespass and thus modified, said judgment is affirmed with
cost against the appellant.
 12.) TORIO VS. FONTANILLA
G.R NO. L-29993
OCTOBER 23, 1978

FACTS:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui Pangasinan,
passed a resolution no. 159 whereby “it resolved to manage the 1959
Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22 and 23, 1959”. The
resolution no. 182 was also passed creating the “1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta
Executive Committee” which in turn organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council
appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for
the “zarzuela” and another for the “cancionan”. Jose Macaraeg supervised the
construction.

The program started at about 10:15 o’clock that evening with some
speeches, and many persons went up to the stage. The “zarzuela” then began
but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and
Vicente Fontanilla was near the stage and he was pinned underneath.
Fontanilla died in the afternoon of the following day.

The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-
defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Council of Malasiqui and
all the individual members of Municipal Council in 1959.

Answering the complaint, defendant municipality invoked inter alia the

principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of
its governmental functions from which no liability can rise to answer for the
negligence of any of its agents.

After trial, the Presiding Judge, narrowed the issue to whether or not
the defendants exercised due diligence in the construction of the stage. From
this findings he arrived at the conclusion that the Executive Committee
appointed by the Municipal Council had exercised due diligence and care like
a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a strong
stage enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces
beyond control of the committee on entertainment. Consequently, the
defendants were not liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla.
The complaint was accordingly dismissed. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered all the defendants-appellee to
pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,
000.00 by way of moral and actual damages P1, 200.00 as attorney’s fees; and
the cost.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a
Municipal Councilor under Section 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied
in the Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or
proprietary function of the municipality.
Whether or not the Municipal Councilors who enacted the ordinance
and created the fiesta committee liable for the death of Fontanilla?

RULING:
The court held that the holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the
Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the Municipality. Under Section 2282 of the chapter
on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code, and this provision
simply gives authority to the Municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it
does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a town fiesta even if
the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general
welfare of the public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town
fiesta.
The court held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality
of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The
legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing
as an ordinary private corporation with the Municipal Council acting as its
board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors or persons
composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for
damages for tort or negligence (culpa acquiliana) committed by the
corporation’s employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or
gross or wanton negligence on their part.
No. On these principles we absolve the Municipal Councilors from any
liability for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that said
petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the “Zarzuela”
stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform.
Premises considered. The Court affirmed in to-to the decision of the
Court of Appeals insofar as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned, and
the court absolve the Municipal councilors from liability and set aside the
judgment against them without pronouncement as to costs.