Cang v.

CA
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

FACTS: Private respondents spouses Clavano filed a petition for adoption of the
minor children of petitioner Cang and Anna Marie, who were then legally
separated. The petition bore the signature of one of the Cang children and Anna
Marie, alleging that the petitioner evaded his legal obligation to support his
children but petitioner asserts that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
because he did not have a written consent to the adoption.

ISSUE: (1) WON written consent of the natural parent to the adoption is a
requisite for its validity.
(2) WON the minors were deemed abandoned by their father.

HELD. (1) YES. Sec. 3 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the
written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption and the petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking.
(2) NO. Petitioner’s physical absence as he was in the US, without
financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.

Vda. De Jacob v. CA
G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999

FACTS: In the settlement of the estate of Alfredo Jacob, defendant sought to

intervene claiming his share of the estate presenting an order granting the
petition for adoption filed by Alfredo.

ISSUE: WON the defendant-appellee Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of
deceased Jacob.

HELD: NO. The burden of proving in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship. Pilapil failed to do so and the evidence presented
shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

Republic of the Philippines v. Fernandez

G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Moran and
the change of name of such minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph. The petitioner
objected to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petition for change of
name in a single proceeding.

ISSUE: WON the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of
the minor adoptee should be embodied in the petition for adoption.

HELD: The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter
a license to change the adoptee’s registered first name.__There being no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name, it would be procedurally
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name.
Republic of the Philippines v. CA and Wong
G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992

FACTS: Private respondent Maximo Wong filed a petition for the change of his
name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. which was his name prior to his adoption by Hoong
Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.

ISSUE: WON the change of name of Maximo Wong would run counter against the
effect of adoption.

HELD: NO. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of
relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name
which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object
of the proceeding. A change of name does not define or effect a change in one’s
existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not
alter one’s legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the
name.

Reyes v. Mauricio
G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010

FACTS: Respondents (Librada and her alleged daughter Leonida Mauricio)

alleged that they are the legal heirs of the Godofredo Mauricio, who was the
lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio Reyes, registered owner of the parcel
land subject of this case. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the
Kasunduan which was allegedly obtained through undue advantage of the
handicaps of Librada. Petitioner contends that Leonida had no legal personality
to file the present suit.

ISSUE: WON Leonida’s legal filiation may be questioned in the present action to
establish whether she has legal standing as a party.

HELD: NO. SC, in previous cases, held that legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, adoption
cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s
estate and that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in
a separate action brought for that.

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Honorato Catindig filed this petition for the adoption of his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie, praying herein that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be change to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia
be change to Catindig.
ISSUE: WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when her natural father subsequently adopts her.

HELD: YES. Notably, the law is silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. Considering the underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted
child, being a legitimate child, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and mother.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim
G.R. No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner was married to Primo Lim but was childless until they
simulated the birth of the minors Michelle and Michael and later deciding to
adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA No. 8552 to those
who simulated birth of a child; but during such time petitioner had already
remarried after the death of Primo.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

HELD: NO. Joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. The
petitioner having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
only petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, filed the petitions,
the trial court correctly denied the petitions for adoption.

Nery v. Sampana
A.C. No. 10196, September 9, 2014

FACTS: A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Sampana for failing to file
the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery
believe that the petition was already filed. Sampana’s contention was that he was
preapring the petition for adoption but did not file because he was waiting for
the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the Japanese embassy.

ISSUE: WON the certification of the qualification to adopt of the alien adopter, is
still required.

HELD: NO. Under Domestic Adoption Act, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification is waived.

Castro v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 188801

FACTS: Jose Casto filed a petition for adoption of his alleged illegitimate children
Jed and Regina Gregorio (respondents) and was granted by the RTC. Jose’s
estranged wife contends that they were not personally notified of the adoption
proceedings and that the Rosario’s affidavit of consent presented was fraudulent.

ISSUE: WON the adoption was not valid for failing to personally serve notice and
acquire jurisdiction over Jose’ wife.

HELD: YES. For the adoption to be valid, petitioner’s consent was required and
personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
their legitimate children to ensure substantive rights are protected. The trial
court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings,
it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

Bartolome v. SSS and Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

FACTS: John Colcol, an employee of herein respondent, figured into an accident

which resulted to his untimely death. Petitioner Petitioner Bartolomo, John’s
mother and allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits
under PD 626. The SSS and ECC denied the claim arguing that Cornelio, the
adoptive grandfather, is the qualified primary beneficiary.

ISSUE: WON the biological parent of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiary and thus entitled to receive the benefits.

HELD: YES. It was clearly established that petitioner was a dependent of his son
and dependent parents, are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate biological
or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance. Furthermore, as
evidenced by a death certificate, Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority
resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority.

Habeas Corpus
Ilusorio v. Bildner
G.R. No. 139789, July 19, 2001

FACTS: Erlinda Ilusorio filed a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
her husband in consortium alleging that Potenciano Ilusorio, her husband, is isck
and frail to handle their properties.

ISSUE: WON the petition for habeas corpus should be given due course.

HELD: NO. To justify the petition, the restraint must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral. The evidence shows that there was no
actual and affective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano’s liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ.
Serapio v. Sandiganbyan
G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner was one of the accused together with former President Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and several others in a criminal case for plunder and
was detained at Camp Crame for said charge. The petitioner filed a petition for
bail but before it could be resolved the petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner should be released from detention via writ of habeas
corpus.

HELD: NO. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court which had the jurisdiction to issue the same applies because
petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by
Sandiganbayan after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information
for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. A petition for habeas corpus is
not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right to bail.

Lacson v. Perez
G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001

FACTS: This is a case consolidating petitions assailing the declaration of a state of

rebellion by Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly
effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners allege that they are under imminent
danger of being arrested without warrant.

ISSUE: WON the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

HELD: NO. Instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. The writ is
not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a
matter that remains speculative up to this day.

Sangca v. The City Prosecutor of Cebu

G.R. No. 175864, June 8, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner Anisah Sangca filed the instant petition praying for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely Adam who was
detained in the Cebu City Jail for alleged violation of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. On petition for review before the
Department of Justice, Sec. Gonzales found no probable cause to hold Adam
liable for the offense charge and directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
withdraw the information. Judge Ingles granted the Motion to Withdraw
Information and ordered the release of the accused.

ISSUE: WON the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

HELD: NO. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and
secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. In the present case, records show
that Adam has been released upon order of the trial judge. Therefore, the
petition has become moot.

Mangila v. Judge Pangilinan

G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Anita Mangila and four others were charged with syndicated
estafa and after the Presiding Judge Pangilinan conducted a preliminary
investigation, an arrest warrant was issued for the arrest of Mangila and her
cohorts. Mangila was arrested and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenie
of the NBI. Mangila filed in the CA a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her
release from detention alleging that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority
to conduct the preliminary investigation and that the issuance of the warrant of
arrest was without sufficient justification.

ISSUE: WON the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

HELD: NO. The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to
have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. The function of habeas
corpus, where the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process,
does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it
was issued and the validity of the process upon its face.

Tujan-Militante v. Cada-Deapera
G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014

FACTS: Respondent filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of
habeas corpus where she demanded the immediate issuances of the special writ,
directing petitioner Tujan-Militante to produce before the court respondent’s
biological daughter minor Criselda Cada and to return to her the custody over
the child. The RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, however, the Sheriff
failed to personally serve so he left copies of the court’s processes at petitioner’s
Caloocan residence.

ISSUE: WON the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition
filed by respondent and WON it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and
the person of Criselda.

HELD: YES. According to the provisions of B.P. No. 129, it is indubitable that the
filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family
court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be
enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC –
Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. As to the issue of the service of
summons, such service is not required in a habeas corpus petition and by the
mere service of said writ, the court validly acquires jurisdiction over the person.