Dionisio vs Escano Case Digest

Carlos Dionisio v. Hon. Zosimo V. Escano

302 SCRA 411

Facts: Escano posted an advertisement for waitresses and singers to work at his restaurant at the RTC bulletin board.
He also conducted interviews for this in his sala. He was later caught when a reporter from “Hoy Gising!” taped an
interview which revealed that he intended to operate a drinking pub with scantily clad waitresses.

Held: SUSPENDED. Rules 2.00, 5.02 and 5.03 provide that a judge should avoid impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety. He should also refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely
on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with
lawyers and litigants. He should also manage financial interests so as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds
for disqualification. Finally, the halls of justice should not be used for unrelated purposes.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1459. February 17, 2000.]

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-342-RTJ)

VICTOR D. ONG, Complainant, v. JUDGE VOLTAIRE Y. ROSALES, Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 Tanauan,
Batangas, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a sworn letter complaint dated March 16, 1997, 1 complainant Victor D. Ong charged Judge Voltaire Y. Rosales of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 83, of Misconduct and Abuse of Authority relative to Civil Case No. C-041
entitled "Anunciacion Jayin v. Atty. Virginia Villaluz, Et Al., "for annulment of transfer certificates of titles covering parcels of
land with a total area of 98 hectares, more or less, situated in Talisay, Batangas. chanrobles v irt uallawl ibra ry:red

Complainant Victor D. Ong avers that in connection with the aforecited civil case, a compromise agreement 2 was entered
into in his behalf by his counsel, Atty. Abraham G. Espejo, and Atty. Gilbert M. Fabella, attorney-in-fact of plaintiff
Anunciacion Jayin. Judge Rosales prepared an Order 3 approving the compromise agreement and signed the same on
January 17, 1997, a copy of which was received by the complainant’s messenger. Complainant thought that everything was
settled. Later, he received word from Atty. Fabella requesting two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos as additional
compensation. Subsequently, he received notice from Judge Rosales that the court had not approved the compromise
agreement and his order approving the compromise agreement was not effective. chanroble s virtual lawlib rary:re d

Complainant avers that Judge Rosales and Atty. Fabella conspired with each other to the complainant’s prejudice.
Complainant inquires why Judge Rosales had allowed Atty. Fabella to repeatedly postpone the hearing of the case. He avers
that Judge Rosales abused his authority and made a sham out of court proceedings by rendering inoperative an order that he
had signed. Furthermore, complainant wants to know why respondent judge insisted he did not issue the order when the
same had his signature. Lastly, complainant claims that respondent judge’s actions can only erode the faith in the judicial
system of laymen like him. He requests for an investigation of Judge Rosales and then appropriate sanction, if the latter is
guilty. He also seeks investigation of Atty. Fabella by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

In his comment dated July 14, 1997, 4 respondent judge denied the allegations in the complaint. He explains that he was in
the process of signing the Order dated January 17, 1997 when he decided to call the parties to a hearing before approving
the compromise agreement considering that the plaintiff, who was reportedly out of the country, was obligated to pay
defendants a rather large amount of money. To ensure that her rights are amply protected, he directed the Acting Clerk of
Court to set the case for hearing. chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Respondent judge further explains that the Order dated January 17, 1997, was inadvertently removed from his desk by one
of his employees without his knowledge and without instructions for its release. It was prematurely released without his
initials on the first page. He said, he issued an Order in open court setting aside the Order dated January 17, 1997.

Additionally, contrary to allegations that respondent judge allowed the postponements to favor Atty. Fabella, respondent
judge avers that the record will show that even defense counsel failed to appear at various scheduled hearings, reflecting
that postponements were not all in favor of one party. Respondent judge denies the existence of a conspiracy between him
and Atty. Fabella, claiming that he does not know the latter personally nor has he met him outside the courtroom.

In its evaluation and recommendation report 5 dated February 5, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator found
negligence on the part of the respondent judge for the premature and highly irregular release of the questioned order, and
recommended that the judge be reprimanded.

Judges, by the very delicate nature of their functions, should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. 6 By
his own admission, respondent judge failed to live up to this standard. He explained in his comment that the Order dated
January 17, 1997 was removed from his desk by someone from among his staff and was released by one of his clerks to the
defendant’s representative who happened to be in the office. The respondent judge, however, hastily absolved his clerk of
any wrongdoing when he said that he was convinced that no member of his staff acted with malice. chan roble svi rtual|awl ibra ry

As correctly found by the Court Administrator, the premature release of the questioned order is highly irregular and the
respondent judge should be held responsible for such irregularity. It is unbecoming of a judge to lay the blame on, and then
immediately absolve, his subordinate. He cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of his subordinates. Proper and efficient
management of his court is his responsibility. 7

Anent the allegations, however, that the respondent judge had abused his authority and that he and Atty. Fabella had
conspired against complainant, this Court finds no evidence from the documents presented to sustain such allegations.
Complainant’s mere suspicion without proof cannot be the basis of disciplinary action. Likewise, the complainant failed to
prove his charge of misconduct against the respondent judge. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. 8 No act of the
respondent judge appears or has been established which can be considered here as misconduct in office. On this score, the
charge of misconduct against the respondent is, in our view, without sufficient basis. chanro blesvi rtual|awl ibra ry

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, as recommended, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND Respondent Judge Voltaire Y. Rosales,
with a stern warning that a repetition of negligence and irregularity abovecited or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena, J., on official leave.
MENESES vs. CA et al
G.R. No. 82220
July 14, 1995
FACTS: On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baños, Laguna,
issued to Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 OCT covering lots located in Los Baños,
Laguna.
Pablito acquired said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of
Rights executed in 1975 in consideration of Bautista’s “love and affection” for and “some
monetary obligations” in favor of Meneses. After the execution of said document, Meneses
took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his
own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired
the land from his aunt. He had been occupying the land since 1956.

On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of their land as far back as
1919 when their matriarch was issued an OCT covering a lot, with the Laguna de Bay as its
northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on 1973 under a TCT in
the names of her heirs, all surnamed Quisumbing.

The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area
which had gradually accrued to their property by the natural action of the waters of
Laguna de Bay. The CFI of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings’ title thereto.

In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of Calamba against Lorenzo and
Pablito Meneses, Darum and Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles
issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los
Baños, using his brother Pablito as a “tool and dummy,” illegally occupied their “private
accretion land” and confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector
Almendral, obtained free patents and OCTs to the land.
In 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the
Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as
owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots.
(The lots occupied by Meneses, as found by the court, are to be accretion lands forming
parts of the bigger accretion land owned by the Quisumbings. )

Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the to the CA, which affirmed in
toto the lower court’s decision.The defendants-appellants filed two MRs of the CA decision
but it was denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON
1. The lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the public domain

2. Conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the free
patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision CA is AFFIRMED

While the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners
are claiming here, the two cases refer to the same accretion lands northwest of the original
land owned by the Quisumbings.
1. The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains “falling directly
on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources.” Since the inundation of a portion of
the land is not due to “flux and reflux of tides” it cannot be considered a foreshore land. The
land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore
land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of
registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.

Additionally, the provision of the law on waters will govern in determining the natural bed
or basin of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:

Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes
by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in order to acquire
ownership of the alluvial formation as the law does not require the same.

2. As found by the CA, petitioners conspired in the approval and grant of the free patents
heirs Quisumbing. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People, which
held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
in the issuance of the same free patents and titles. In due course, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty as charged. The judgment of conviction
was affirmed.
NOTES:
1. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires
the concurrence of these requisites:

(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and

(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast).

2. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court. While it is the
appellate court’s duty to review the same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass
the test of reasonableness. The CA can only modify or change the amount awarded as
damages when they are palpably or scandalously and reasonably excessive.

3. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
 Rodolfo E. Parayno, et al. vs. Hon. Iluminado
Meneses, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 112684 April 26, 1994

RODOLFO E. PARAYNO, CLEMARTIN B. ARBOLEDA, EDUARDO R. PEREZ, CASIMIRO

C. CARANCHO, DIOSDADO T. SAMSON, MAXIMO G. SUMERA and MARCELINO M.
DELA CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ILUMINADO MENESES, Presiding Judge, Branch 49, Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, LORENZO M. MATEO, ARTURO ESTRADA,
NORMA LUSTINA and PABLO MERCADO,respondents.

Arnold A. Savella & Associates for petitioners.

Simplicio M. Sevilleja for respondents Mateo, Estrada, Lustina and Mercado.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

Petitioner Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The other
petitioners, namely, Clemartin Arboleda, Eduardo Perez, Casimiro Carancho, Diosdado Samson,
Maximo Sumera and Marcelino Dela Cruz, are members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality
who, along with Parayno, are the protestees in separate election protests now still pending with the
court a quo.

This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the orders, dated 22 October 1993 1 and 16 November
1993, 2 of respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses of Branch 49, Regional Trial Court, of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing the election cases and denying petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration thereof.

The mayoralty protest (docketed Case No. U-5346), involving Parayno, was originally raffled and
assigned to Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, presided over by Judge
Manuel Villanueva. The councilors' protest (docketed Case No. U-5347), involving the other petitioners,
was assigned to Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court, also sitting in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with
respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses presiding.

On 22 October 1992, a motion for the inhibition of Judge Villanueva was filed by petitioner Parayno,
which the court promptly granted. After the records of Case No. U-5346 were thus forwarded to
Executive Judge Romulo Abasolo, the latter, in an order, dated 26 October 1992, directed the
assignment of the case to Branch 46 of the court but only after its presiding Judge, Hon. Roger
Domagas, agreed to hear and try the case. Claiming impropriety in the assignment of the case, petitioner
Parayno assailed before this Court the order of the Executive Judge. The Court issued a temporary
restraining order and promptly remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The
appellate court set aside the questioned order of 26 October 1992, and it directed the Executive Judge
to instead include the case in the regular raffle for re- assignment.

The case was thereupon re-raffled to Branch 49, where the councilors' protests were then pending. The
Committee on Revision in Case No. U-5346 (the mayoralty protest) terminated its work on 07 October
1993 but prior to the submission of its report, a "Motion to Use Revision Committee Report Blank
Form" was filed by protestant Lorenzo Mateo (herein private respondent). In the afternoon of 21
October 1993, while the revision of ballots in Case No. U-5347 (councilors' protest) was in progress,
private respondent Mateo, the Revisor for the protestants-councilors in the Revision Committee,
manifested: 3

. . . . I would like also to make of record that the Trial Presiding Judge of Branch 49 is the same Trial
Judge of this Electoral Protest Case U-5346, Parayno versus Mateo (sic) and therefore the Protestant
look at it that there seems to be a certain degree of greater sympathy of the Trial Presiding Judge to the
Protestee. . . . (Verceles Transcript of Stenographic Notes, Civil Case No. U-5347, revision of Ballots on
October 21, 1993, 1:45 p.m., pp. 6-7)

The following day, respondent judge issued the assailed order inhibiting himself from further hearing
the two cases. The motion for a reconsideration of the order was denied by the judge.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We see merit in the petition.

Section 1, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, or creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel,
or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The underlying reason for the above rule is obviously to ensure that a judge, sitting in a case, will at all
times be free from inclinations or prejudices and be well capable to render a just and independent
judgment. A litigant, we often hear, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of a judge. 4 Due
process requires it. Indeed, he not only must be able to so act without bias but should even appear to so
be. 5Impartiality is a state of mind; hence, the need for some kind of manifestation of its reality. 6

Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from sitting in a
case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, 7 or for just and valid reasons. 8 It is not
enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge. No less than imperative
is that it is the judge's sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor. 9

We take note that the electoral protests here involved have remained unresolved for quite some time
now. Any further delay in the disposition of the cases, particularly election protests where public
interest is heavily involved, 10 cannot be countenanced.

All told and given the circumstances, we view the call for judge's inhibition, and his acceding thereto,
in this particular instance to be bereft of legal basis and improper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the respondent Judge are SET ASIDE
and he is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the election protests at bar. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

 Nida Alejo, et al. vs. The Hon. Judge Erlinda
Pestano-Buted, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 154150-51 December 10, 2007

NIDA ALEJO, FRANCISCA ALEJO and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ERLINDA PESTAÑO-BUTED, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 40, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, ARTHUR SERNA and JONG
LINSANGAN, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamusseeking to nullify and set
aside the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija dated June
26, 2002 in Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The facts, as culled from the record, are as follows:

In an Information dated March 6, 2002, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1316-P, State Prosecutor Phillip
I. Kimpo of the Department of Justice charged Arthur Serna, Jong Linsangan, Ricardo Peralta alias
"Ric," Crisanto dela Cruz, Joey Cena, Jonny Diozon alias "Johnny," one alias "Boy" and twenty (20)
John Does with kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The Information reads:

That on or about October 7, 2001, at Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with ARTHUR SERNA acting as the mastermind in contracting, thru JONG LINSANGAN, his
personal driver and long-time friend, a criminal gang from Bongabon called the "Red Vigilante Group
(RVG) composed of the herein accused and headed by RICARDO PERALTA, alias "RIC," did then and
there, by force and intimidation, and with the use of firearms, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take,
carry away and detain up to the present JULIO ALEJO and his son JULIUS against their will and
consent thereby depriving them of their liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom for their release in
the original amount of P5 million and later reduced to P3 million, which amount, however, could not
be paid by the victims’ family, all to the damage and prejudice of the two victims and their family in
such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In another Information, also dated March 6, 2002, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1317-P, the same
accused in Criminal Case No. 1316-P were charged with robbery committed as follows:

That on or about October 7, 2001, at Bongabon, Nueva Ecija and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, and armed with different kinds of firearms and caliber, with intent of gain and by means of
violence or intimidation on the person, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take
and carry away from the kidnapped JULIO ALEJO the following personal propert(ies): (a) grocery
items worth P100,000.00; (b) BPI ATM card with more or less P250,000.00 account; (c) cash money
of P350,000.00, (d) licensed pistol Cal. 45, (e) Dia Star Rado wristwatch, (f) Polo sunglasses, (g) a
college ring with markings "BSF," (h) Equitable and PCIB checks worth P1.6M, and from complainant
FRANCISCA ALEJO the following personal propert(ies): (a) P3,000.00 cash money, and (b) Saudi gold
necklace with pendant, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid JULIO ALEJO and FRANCISCA
ALEJO in the total sum of approximately Two Million and Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P 2,500,000.00), Philippine currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On March 14, 2002, the above Informations were filed with the RTC of Palayan City which issued
warrants of arrest against the accused. On March 21, 2002, Arthur Serna and Jong Linsangan, private
respondents, were arrested.

On April 22, 2002, petitioners Nida Alejo and Francisca Alejo filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator a request for transfer of venue in both criminal cases due to "threats to their personal
safety" and that of their witnesses and the possibility that the criminal gang from Bongabon, Nueva
Ecija, known as the Red Vigilante Group (RVG), might pressure then Presiding Judge Erlinda Pestaño-
Buted,2 public respondent, in deciding the cases in favor of the accused.

When arraigned on April 23, 2002, private respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereupon,
petitioners moved for suspension of the proceedings pending resolution of their request for transfer of
venue. However, respondent judge did not act on the motion. The following day, private respondents
filed a motion for bail in Criminal Case No. 1316-P.

Meanwhile, the police arrested one Miguel De la Cruz, a suspected RVG member, for illegal possession
of firearms. During the custodial investigation, he disclosed to the law enforcers that he was present at
the RVG "safehouse" in Jaen, Nueva Ecija where the abductors detained Julio Alejo and Julius Alejo;
that the duo were killed two days later; and that he even helped in digging their common grave. De la
Cruz also informed the police of the real names of the 17 John Does impleaded in Criminal Cases Nos.
1316-P and 1317-P. He agreed to testify against the accused and applied for protection under the
Witness Protection Program pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. Nonetheless, he was still charged with
illegal possession of firearms in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 1338-P. He was taken
into protective custody by the Philippine National Police (PNP) at Camp Olivas, San Fernando City.

Upon motion of the State Prosecutor, respondent judge ordered that the Information in Criminal Case
No. 1317-P be amended in the sense that the charge of robbery be changed to robbery with double
homicide.

On June 11, 2002, respondent judge issued a verbal order directing the immediate release of De la Cruz
from the PNP’s custody on the following grounds: (a) no warrant of arrest had been issued against him
in Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P; (b) he is not a witness for the prosecution; and (c) he posted
bail in Criminal Case No. 1338-P. The private prosecutor vehemently objected to the release of De la
Cruz considering that he is a potential witness for the prosecution. But respondent judge ignored the
objection.

On July 2, 2002, petitioners, with the conformity of the State Prosecutor, filed a Motion to Inhibit
respondent judge from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P on the following
grounds:

A. During the hearing of the above-captioned cases, the Honorable Court motu proprio brought
out the matter of the bail bond posted by or for Miguel dela Cruz in a case for illegal possession
of firearms, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1338-P, pending before this Honorable Court,
directing that Miguel de la Cruz be released from custody, despite the fact that the Honorable
Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the said Miguel de la Cruz since no warrant for his
arrest has been issued in the above-captioned cases, nor has he voluntarily surrendered.

B. The Honorable Court made it appear that the said order concerning Miguel de la Cruz was
issued in Criminal Case No. 1338-P. when the truth of the matter is that it was issued in open
court during the hearing of the above-captioned cases.

C. The Honorable Court ordered the immediate release of Miguel de la Cruz "if indeed he is
detained" without granting the bonding company concerned and/or the PNP Regional
Command at Camp Olivas the opportunity to be heard.

D. The Honorable Court has, time and again, even during the hearing in the above-captioned
cases on 11 June 2002, expressed dismay, if not anger, at the PNP officers from Camp Olivas
who are handling the investigation of the above-captioned cases as well as the illegal
possession case against Miguel de la Cruz.
 E. The Honorable Court has continued to conduct proceedings in the above-captioned cases
despite the pending petition for transfer of venue filed by private complainants with the
Supreme Court.

F. The Honorable Court ordered the immediate release of ELIAS MINGOY, one of the accused
in the above-captioned cases, in a habeas corpus case in violation of Section 15, Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

On July 11, 2002, the prosecution filed its Reply to the said Comment/Opposition.

On the same day, the State Prosecutor reiterated his motion for the suspension of the proceedings
pending resolution of his motion to inhibit respondent judge. However, she did not act on the motion
and instead, she directed the prosecution to present evidence in support of its opposition to accused’s
motion to be admitted to bail.

Petitioners are now before this Court contending that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to act on their Motion to Inhibit.

Eventually, after the present petition was filed with this Court, respondent judge issued an
Order3 dated August 9, 2002 denying the petitioners’ Motion to Inhibit for lack of "just and valid
reason."

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife, or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

In People v. Kho,4 this Court held that the foregoing Rule contemplates two kinds of inhibitions -
compulsory and voluntary. The first paragraph provides that compulsory disqualification conclusively
presumes that the judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case. The second paragraph, in turn,
leaves to the judge’s discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid
reasons. A judge, however, does not enjoy a wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion to inhibit
himself from hearing a case, as the inhibition must be for just and valid causes.5

In 1964, this Court, in People v. Gomez6 and Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz,7 held that a judge may voluntarily
inhibit himself on grounds other than those mentioned in paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 and these
grounds include bias and partiality. In Pimentel v. Salonga,8 the Court laid the following guideposts for
voluntary inhibition of judges:

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made
of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflects on the probability
that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.

In a long line of cases,9 this Court has unceasingly re-affirmed the standards laid down in Pimentel.

It may be recalled that at the onset of the proceedings, petitioners sought a change of venue in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P from Palayan City to Metro Manila, due to fear for their lives and those
of their witnesses. The prosecution also pointed out that the RVG has the capability of pressuring
respondent judge. Despite its pending request for change of venue, respondent judge opted to continue
with the proceedings. Significantly, the grounds specified by movants in their Motion to Inhibit are
obviously meritorious.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Salonga doctrine that judicial "discretion should be exercised
in a way that the people’s faith in courts of justice should not be impaired" becomes relevant. Given the
prosecution’s apparent lack of faith in respondent judge, she was placed in a difficult position. Should
she acquit the accused, her decision will appear to be tainted with bias. Such a situation is highly
detrimental, not only to the image of the trial court, but to the integrity of the judicial system. Like
Caesar’s wife, a judge must be beyond suspicion and that he should maintain nothing less than cold
neutrality and impartiality. Otherwise, the wisest course for a judge would be to disqualify himself.
Thus, respondent judge should have inhibited herself from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P
and 1317-P. At any rate, this issue has become moot considering that she had retired from the service
on January 7, 2006.

WHEREFORE, for being moot, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago*, Corona, Azcuna, JJ., concur.

 Salvador M. Perez vs. Hilarion A. Suller
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-94-936 November 6, 1995

MAYOR SALVADOR M. PEREZ, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE HILARION A. SULLER, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated March 23, 1994, Salvador M. Perez, Municipal Mayor of San Manuel,
Pangasinan accused Judge Hilarion A. Suller of grave abuse of discretion, misconduct, ignorance of the
law and acts unbecoming of a judge relative to Criminal Case No. SM-7962 entitled "People v. Carlo
Perez, Salvador Perez, Jr., and Jerico Perez," for qualified trespass to dwelling.

Complainant Mayor, father of the three (3) named accused, alleged that respondent Judge conducted
the preliminary investigation in said case although the complaining witness, Cristobal Suller, Jr. is his
nephew and thereafter issued the warrant of arrest against the accused on the same day the complaint
was filed without requiring the accused and their witnesses to submit their counter-affidavits; that on
the following day, a Friday, respondent judge purposely left his station to thwart any opportunity for
the accused to post bail.

In his comment, respondent judge averred that he issued the warrant of arrest against the accused when
he found probable cause of the commission of the crime by them; that issuance of the warrant was in
accord with the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 1of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. He denied
the allegation that he left his station on March 18, 1994, the day after the filing of the complaint; that in
a Joint "Sworn Statement" dated April 7, 1994, his Branch Clerk of Court, Staff Assistant and interpreter
attested that respondent judge, together with affiants reported for work on said date and maintained a
skeletal force up to noon the next day.

His comment, however, was silent as to his relationship with the complaining witness in Criminal Case
No. SM-7962, Cristobal Suller, Jr.

After an evaluation of the present complaint, we find that the resolution thereof hinges on two issues,
to wit: (1) whether or not it is necessary to first accord the accused their statutory right to submit
counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses, prior to issuance of the warrant of arrest; (2) whether
or not it was proper for respondent judge to conduct the preliminary investigation and then order the
arrest of the accused when the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. SM-7962, as claimed by
complainant mayor, is his nephew.

In resolving the first issue, this court finds guidance in its decision in Pangandaman, et
al. v. Demaporo Casar, et al. 2In said case, the court is confronted with the same issue, though stated
differently: "Whether or not the respondent judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without
completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation (i.e. the provisions of Section
3, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended)." 3The Court stated:

There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be
completed before a warrant of arrest may be issued. What the Rule provides is that no
complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be
filed without completing that procedure. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure
must be completed before a warrant of arrest may issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is
true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial
 court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the second phase4 of the
investigation if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity
to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. —

xxx xxx xxx

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — If the municipal trial judge conducting
the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.

Consequently in the case before us, we rule that no taint of irregularity attended the issuance of the
warrant of arrest by respondent judge.

Respondent judge issued the warrant after complying with the provision of Section 6, Rule 112. He need
not, as a condition precedent to the issuance of the warrant of arrest require submission of the counter-
affidavits of the accused and his witnesses, as insisted upon by complainant mayor.

Additionally, the complainant questions the impartiality of respondent judge in conducting the
preliminary investigation of the crime on the ground that the complaining witness is his nephew,
Cristobal Suller, Jr.

Respondent judge's comment, being silent on his relationship with complaining witness, Cristobal
Suller, Jr., the Court deems it an admission of the alleged relationship.

Respondent judge could have easily denied the alleged relationship and adduced proof to that effect,
but he chose to sidestep said issue by being silent, notwithstanding that this constitutes one of the
principal charges against him.

The Court finds that respondent judge should have refrained from handling the preliminary
investigation since he was closely related to the complainant, Cristobal Suller Jr., his nephew and a
relative by consanguinity within the sixth degree.

The Court mandates that all judges strictly comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct 5 which provides,
in Rule 3.12 that:

Rule 3.12. — A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among the others, proceedings
where:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth
degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 137 Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court which applies suppletorily provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

 While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as "sitting in a case,"
the underlying reason behind disqualification under Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the same.

Clearly, respondent judge's participation in the preliminary investigation, involving his nephew is a
violation of the aforequoted rules laid down to guide members of the judiciary. The rationale for the
rule on disqualification of a judge stems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in
which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. 6A judge should not handle a case
in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. 7The rule is intended to preserve
the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice. 8

As can be gleaned from the records, respondent judge may have been influenced or affected by his
relationship to Suller, Jr. during the preliminary investigation. Based on the documentary evidence
presented, 9it appears that during the preliminary investigation, respondent judge ordered the accused
to submit within the ten-day reglementary period, their counter-affidavit to controvert the complaint
filed against them; that prior to the expiration of said period, respondent judge issued a Resolution
dated March 17, 1994 ordering, among others, the forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor despite protestations from the accused. This, in effect, deprived the accused
of their opportunity to adequately present their position during the preliminary investigation. Such
actuation of respondent judge demonstrated partiality in favor of the complaining witness, his nephew,
thus casting doubt on his fairness in conducting the preliminary investigation.

We have declared often enough that the behavior of judges and court personnel, must at all times, not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be above suspicion. 10 Due process
cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure
litigants of his being fair and just. 11 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, moreover, mandates that
a judge should avoid, not merely impropriety in all his acts but even the appearance of impropriety.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge is FINED in the amount of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) for not having inhibited himself in the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. SM-
7962 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Carlo Perez, et al." with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. —

(a) By the regional Trial Court. — Upon the filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue
a warrant of arrest of the accused.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation
is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest.

2 No. L-71782, April 14, 1988, 159 SCRA 599.

3 Sec. 3. Procedure. — Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as
there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before
any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss
the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to the respondent,
attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents. Within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall also be
sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by
him to the complainant.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits
within ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented
by the complainant.

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties
so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the
parties or witnesses concerned.

(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve
the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

4 The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits
and other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either:
(1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint and
transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2)
that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry
and this ushers in the second phase.

This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the
complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At
this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses
questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with the Judge
rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for trial, which
shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action.

5 Effective October 20, 1989.

6 Garcia v. De la Pena, 229 SCRA 766; Gutierrez v. Santos, 112 Phil. 184; Geotina v. Gonzales , G.R. No.
26310, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 66; Umalek v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 33508, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA
84.

7 Urbanes Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 112884, August 30, 1994, 236 SCRA 72.

8 Pimentel v. Salonga, G.R. No. 27934, September 18, 1969, 21 SCRA 160.

9 Resolution issued by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dated May 30, 1994 dismissing the crime
charged, pp. 51-54 of Rollo.

10 Tan v. Herras, A.M. No. P-90-904, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 1.

11 Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, L-34756, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18, cited in Castillo, et al. v. San Juan, 62
SCRA 124.
 Ever Emporium, Inc. vs. Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Matter No. RTJ-04-1881 &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp October 14, 2004
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1283-RTJ)

EVER EMPORIUM, INC., complainant,

vs.
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Executive Judge, RTC Branch 275, Las Piñas City,
and ATTY. EDGAR ALLAN MORANTE, Branch Clerk of Court, respondents.

x-----------------------x

Adm. Matter No. RTJ-04-1882 October 14, 2004

(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 02-1388-RTJ)

ATTY. RACQUEL CRISOLOGO- LARA, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Las Piñas City, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Executive Judge, RTC Branch 275, Las Piñas City,
and ATTY. EDGAR ALLAN MORANTE, Branch Clerk of Court, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The instant consolidated administrative cases involve Executive Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda and
former Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Edgar Allan Morante, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 275, Las Piñas City, for gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and for serious or grave
misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

In a Letter1 dated September 3, 2001 addressed to the Chief Justice, Atty. Racquel Crisologo-Lara, Clerk
of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Las Piñas City, narrated the following events that gave
rise to the instant administrative matter:

At about 10:00 a.m. on August 15, 2001, respondent Morante approached Atty. Crisologo-Lara
and requested that LRC Case No. LP-01-00702 be assigned to their branch. Respondent Morante
apparently wanted to do a favor to his former law professor who was handling the said case. Atty.
Crisologo-Lara directed him to consult the matter with the respondent judge. Respondent
Morante later told her that he had already informed the respondent judge via telephone call and
that the latter was agreeable to the arrangement. Atty. Crisologo-Lara then acquiesced to the
request and the raffle of the cases then proceeded as scheduled.

At about 4:00 p.m. the next day, Atty. Crisologo-Lara went to the respondent judge’s office and
told him about the previous day’s events. She added that she had only granted respondent
Morante’s request because the latter told him that he (the respondent judge) already knew about
it, but that she could do no more of it in the future because of her "nervousness." The respondent
judge informed her that he had learned about the matter only after the raffling of the cases.

At about 9:30 a.m. of August 17, 2001, respondent Morante informed Atty. Crisologo-Lara that
the respondent judge scolded him after she left his office the previous afternoon since the
respondent judge apparently did not want her to know that he had "approved" the transfer of
the case to his sala prior to the raffle. Respondent Morante requested Atty. Crisologo-Lara to say
that it was all a misunderstanding, but she replied that she had only told the respondent judge
the truth. About half an hour later, respondent Morante returned with a case folder, placed it on
top of Atty. Crisologo-Lara’s table and said, "Atty., eto ho ang sa inyo," to which the latter replied,
 "Anong sa inyo?" Respondent Morante answered, "Ihiningi kita sa Professor ko." Atty.
Crisologo-Lara did not touch the folder and told respondent Morante that money did not play a
role when cases were raffled to their branch. Respondent Morante took the folder back and left
the office.

At about 11:00 a.m. on August 22, 2001, Atty. Crisologo-Lara told respondent Morante that she
would request the respondent judge for her exclusion in future raffles of cases, as it was in
conformity with a Supreme Court circular. She stated that she did not want the previous week’s
incident to be repeated, and would feel better if she no longer participated in the raffling of cases.
She and respondent Morante then went to the respondent judge’s chambers to tell the latter
about the request, but as she started to speak, the respondent judge exploded and began shouting
at her, told them to get out of his office and settle matters between themselves. The respondent
judge used words like "punyeta" and "stupid."

At about 2:00 p.m. on August 28, 2001, Atty. Crisologo-Lara went to the respondent judge’s chambers
to apologize and related to him that respondent Morante’s "favor" was the primary reason why she no
longer wanted to participate in the raffle of cases. The respondent judge called respondent Morante and
asked him about the matter and the latter admitted asking his professor for the "favor." Upon the
respondent judge’s prodding, respondent Morante revealed that the amount involved was P10,000.00.
The respondent judge asked where the money was, and respondent Morante at first replied that he had
returned it to his professor. He later on recanted this, and said that the money was given to him as
commissioner’s fee for the reception of evidence ex parte. Atty. Crisologo-Lara initially thought that she
and the respondent judge had parted on an amicable note, but was bothered by the latter’s final words:
"he had thought that she was a hindrance and he knew how to eradicate hindrances."

At about 9:30 a.m. on August 30, 2001, the respondent judge called Atty. Crisologo-Lara from his house
and told her to prepare a memorandum regarding the unloading of cases to newly created branches.
She started to ask him if she could base her report from June 30, 2001, but the respondent judge
shouted at her, and told her not to throw any problem back at him.

Atty. Crisologo-Lara added that she had written the letter in compliance with the directive of the Chief
Justice, and "not as a formal lodging of [a] complaint against anybody."3

The respondent judge denied these allegations in his Comment4 dated September 26, 2001. He claimed
that respondent Morante made no such call to him, and insisted that he would not have agreed to such
an irregular assignment of LRC Case No. LP-01-0070. He maintained that he kept his staff at arm’s
length, and would immediately have lambasted respondent Morante if he had ever made such a request.
He further narrated as follows:

What I recall is that Atty. Lara came to tell me in [the] Chambers that Atty. Morante asked her a
favor to raffle the aforesaid case to my sala but she refused. My immediate response was "good"
and that she was correct in refusing because I can never tolerate the fixing of the raffle of cases.
I thus instructed her not to entertain in the future any request by anyone to fix the raffle because
she can be sure I can never allow it.

While it is true that I scolded Atty. Morante after Atty. Lara left my office, it is NOT TRUE I told
Atty. Morante I did not want Atty. Lara to know that I approved of Atty. Morante’s asking for
that case prior to that raffle.

The truth is that I was furious when I scolded Atty. Morante who denied Atty. Lara’s allegation.
He explained that Atty. Lara may be sowing intrigues to discredit him. Atty. Morante stated
[that] he never asked Atty. Lara to fix any case to my sala. He related that after the LRC Case was
raffled to my sala, Atty. Lara hinted to him to give her money for allegedly fixing the case to my
sala.

Atty. Morante told me that he was surprised because he never asked for that case and that raffle
on August 15 was conducted in due course. The representatives of the other salas who attended
the raffle attested to that as shown by their signatures on the minutes of the raffle.

But in order not to embarrass Atty. Lara, Atty. Morante offered to waive in her favor the
designation as commissioner to receive evidence since the case is ex-parte. That way Atty. Lara
could deal directly with the petitioner’s counsel who happens to be his professor for any
commissioner’s fee. Atty. Morante denied offering money, much less P10,000, to Atty. Lara.5
The respondent judge admitted that Atty. Crisologo-Lara came to see him in his chambers on August
22, 2001, and that respondent Morante was, likewise, present. She also asked to be excluded from the
raffle of cases in the future, considering that according to a Supreme Court circular, she is not required
to participate therein. Her insistence prompted the respondent judge to raise his voice and say to her,
"Ang tagal-tagal mo nang nagra-raffle, ngayon ka pa magpapa-exclude. Nang-iinsulto ka ba?" He
added, "Kung may problema kayong dalawa, ayusin ninyong dalawa sa labas at huwag ’nyo ako idamay
sa problema ninyo."6 According to the respondent judge, he never insulted Atty. Crisologo-Lara, let
alone utter invectives at her.

Respondent Morante, likewise, denied the allegations against him.7According to the respondent:

… The regularity of the raffle is evidenced by the Minutes of the proceedings duly signed by
aforesaid personalities, Atty. Lara herself included, and the Affidavit of the Stenographer who
assisted in the raffle, Mrs. Leticia Agbayani (Annexes A, and B). The raffle was conducted on the
lawyer’s table w[h]ere I was seated opposite Atty. Lara, while on my right side was Ms. Agbayani,
the stenographer. Atty. Lara was flanked by (sic) both sides by Mr. Pacquing and Atty. Bato. At
the juncture of the raffle, the remaining cases to be raffled were two (2) civil cases and two (2)
LRC cases. Atty. Lara got four (4) pieces of paper and wrote therein the numbers of those cases,
as indicated in the list of cases, to wit: numbers 43, 44, 45 and 46, respectively. She then
personally rolled all of these pieces of paper, then shuffled them on the table and then took them
in her hands and shook them further. The representative of Branch 255 took two pieces, Branch
254 took one, and Branch 275 took one, as instructed by Atty. Lara in accordance with the ratio
of distribution of cases. Branch 255 got cases numbered as nos. 43 and 45, Branch 253 got no.
44 and Branch 275 got no. 46. Number 46 is LRC Case No. 01-0070 entitled "In re: Ex-parte
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession, Allied Banking Corporation, petitioner." The raffle
was then reviewed by Atty. Bato who recapitulated the results of the raffle. The raffle was then
concluded.8

Respondent Morante alleged that the raffle was done in the courtroom of Branch 275 in the presence
of many people, most of whom were newspaper representatives waiting for the next raffle of
publications. As such, the raffling of LRC Case No. 01-0070 could not have been rigged as alleged by
Atty. Crisologo-Lara. He stressed that the regularity of the conduct of the raffle was duly supported by
evidence prepared by Atty. Crisologo-Lara herself, such as the minutes of the raffle9 and the transmittal
of the cases. Respondent Morante further narrated as follows:

On August 28, 2001, Atty. Lara went to the chambers of Judge Maceda. It is not true that her
primary reason for her "hesitance" to join the raffle was due to the so-called "favor." The real
reason was because of the previous memorandum issued by Judge Maceda making drastic
reforms in the manner of the raffle of cases and publications (Copies of which are attached as H
and I). Said Memorandum clipped Atty. Lara’s powers considering that in the past she was the
one who personally conducted the raffle of publications not in open court but in her office only.
And in the raffle of cases, it was only pieces of paper that was used and not bingo paraphernalia
and it was Atty. Lara who personally distributed the pieces of paper. That practice of Atty. Lara
was set aside by Judge Maceda in Memorandum No. 04-2001 directing that the raffle of cases
be done in open court personally by the Executive Judge with the use of bingo paraphernalia
pursuant to existing Supreme [Court] Circulars (Annex J).

It is true that Judge Maceda called me inside the chambers while Atty. Lara was there, but it was
not because of the alleged "favor" and I have no idea w[h]ere Atty. Lara got the figure
of P10,000.00 Judge Maceda did not, in any portion of our conversation, ask about the alleged
money simply because there was no such conversation.10

Thereafter, in a Letter-Complaint dated October 3, 2001, Atty. Dale Michael T. Villaflor, counsel for
complainant Ever Emporium Inc., charged the respondents with gross violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and serious or grave misconduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.

According to the complainant, it commenced an action for Annulment of Foreclosure Proceedings and
Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction11 before
the RTC of Las Piñas City against Allied Banking Corporation, Sheriff Antolin L. Obsequio, Jr., and the
Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City on February 4, 2000. The said case was docketed as Civil Case No.
LP 00-0023 and was raffled to Branch 254, presided by Judge Manuel V. Fernandez, Jr. After hearing,
the complainant’s application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was granted by the trial court in an
Order12 dated March 28, 2000. In a desperate move, Allied Bank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance
of Writ of Possession13 before the RTC of Las Piñas City, docketed as LRC No. 01-0070.
According to the complainant, the respondent judge issued a Writ of Possession in favor of Allied Bank
in an Order14 dated September 27, 2001 despite full knowledge of the existence of the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued against the latter. Such act, according to the complainant,
showed the respondent judge’s gross disrespect and disregard for a lawful writ issued by a competent
court.

On September 28, 2001, the complainant filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Quash Writ of Possession15 which was set for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of October 1, 2001. On even date,
Allied Bank filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Allow Force Opening of Padlocked Premises16 before
the respondent judge’s court. Despite the pendency of this motion and only a few hours upon receipt
thereof, the respondent issued an Order17 granting the same on September 28, 2001. According to the
complainant, the litigious nature of such motion and the respondent judge’s failure to require it to file
its comment thereon demonstrates the latter’s undue inclination to favor Allied Bank. The complainant
further pointed out that even prior to the issuance of the break-open order, Allied Bank had already
taken steps to mobilize police officers, giving the impression that the motion for the issuance of the
break-open order was already a "done deal."18

It was further averred that during the hearing of October 1, 2001, the complainant’s Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration was sought to be withdrawn, the same having been rendered moot and academic with
the consequent implementation of the writ of possession. However, the respondent judge denied the
said motion to withdraw and instead ordered Allied Bank to comment on the motion for
reconsideration. It was pointed out that such motion to withdraw was clearly non-litigious and could
have been acted upon immediately; as such, the respondent’s actuations displayed his partiality, an
"apparent attempt to thwart Ever Emporium’s attempt to seek immediate legal remedies before a
higher court."19

The letter-complaint, likewise, made reference to the letter of Atty. Crisologo-Lara in this manner:

Gleaned from the letter of Atty. Lara, Atty. Morante approached and requested the former to
have said case assigned to the sala of Judge Maceda. Atty. Morante even bragged [about] the fact
that Judge Maceda knew and consented to such request. Atty. Morante even tried to bribe Atty.
Lara obviously for having the case assigned to their Court.

Judge Maceda, by taking undue interest in the case and by agreeing and consenting to the illegal
and anomalous request of Atty. Morante, has clearly violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and
his oath as a magistrate of law. Instead of being viewed as the visible representation of law and
justice from whom the people draw their will and inclination to obey the law, he has, in effect,
projected himself in collusion with his branch clerk of court, as a depository of arbitrary power.

The succeeding events that transpired after the filing of the Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of
Possession further indicates that Judge Maceda could no longer be expected to render just,
correct and impartial decision in the said case. He has displayed conduct that falls short of the
standard expected of a magistrate of law.20

The respondent judge vehemently denied these allegations in his Comment21 dated April 17, 2002.

Pursuant to the Report22 of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated November 19, 2001, the
letter of Atty. Crisologo-Lara was docketed as a regular administrative complaint and the two cases
were consolidated.23 The cases were initially assigned to then Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales for investigation, report and recommendation. Upon her designation as
Supreme Court Justice, the case was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña
III.

In the meantime, the complainant, through a representative, filed a Motion to Withdraw Letter-
Complaint24 on July 3, 2002, alleging that after a meticulous examination of the attendant facts and
circumstances, it came to realize that the filing of the instant suit arose out of a "misappreciation of
facts." It prayed for the immediate withdrawal of the Letter dated October 9, 2001 and the dismissal of
the case.

Atty. Crisologo-Lara testified and affirmed the contents of her Letter dated September 3, 2001. On
cross-examination, she reiterated that she submitted her letter in compliance with the directive of Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and that it was not a formal complaint. Thereafter, Atty. Villaflor
appeared for the complainant during the hearing of June 17, 2003, and affirmed the latter’s earlier
motion to withdraw the complaint. By reason of this manifestation, the complainant was deemed to
have waived the presentation of evidence.

After the hearings,25 the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation dated
January 6, 2004, which contained the following findings:

Judge Maceda has submitted an extensive discussion of his legal grounds for issuing the writ of
possession and enforcing it. The explanation states that: (1) The petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession is explicitly under Section 7 & 8 of Act 3135 an ex parte proceeding, (2) the
issuance of the writ has been declared by the Supreme Court in such cases as Marcelo Steel
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 89, to be ministerial in character, and (3) the
pendency of other cases such as annulment of the mortgage and foreclosure is no obstacle to the
issuance of the writ of possession, citing Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 294, and Navarra
vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 850, (4) even then, he did not immediately issue the writ but
asked the petitioner to submit a memorandum of authorities to show why the pendency of the
other case as well as the injunction therein should not bar the issuance of the writ of possession,
(5) it took him a full month after the petitioner submitted the memorandum on August 27, 2001
to issue the writ, (6) the break-open order he issued on September 28, a day after the writ, was
an ancillary writ and, therefore, should be dispatched without delay to implement the main
order, (7) at the hearing on October 1, Ever wanted him to act immediately on the motion for
reconsideration, which he could not do until the adverse party was notified of the motion in
accordance with the Rules of Court. That was when Ever made an oral motion to withdraw the
motion for reconsideration, which appeared to him as a gambit to rush him into making a
resolution on the motion.

Judge Maceda has correctly stated the basic principles upon which an ex-parte proceeding for a
writ of possession is founded. The action he has taken in the case may be adequately justified by
these doctrinal premises. The Supreme Court has spoken all too clearly that the proceeding for
the writ under Act 3135 is ex-parte and may proceed despite the pendency of a plenary case for
annulment of the mortgage and foreclosure. A fortiori, an interlocutory order of injunction in
the plenary case should not be an obstacle for the issuance of the writ. To show circumspection,
however, Judge Maceda did not immediately issue the writ, but asked the petitioner to justify
the application in the light of existing developments. This should belie any charge, suspicion or
innuendo that he was interested in the case. If he was, he would not have waited for a month
before issuing the writ. But the writ, once issued, should and could be enforced immediately. It
is therefore not unreasonable or unusual for a judge to issue without delay a break-open order
to implement the principal writ. In regard to his denying the complainant’s verbal manifestation
to withdraw a motion for reconsideration, made in the last hearing on October 1, Judge Maceda
said that he did this because he perceived at the time that the party was trying to force him to
rule on the motion for reconsideration immediately. His response may have been nothing more
than a judgment call, but certainly not one that shows a malicious intent to delay a party’s cause.
On the whole, nothing in his official actuations during the proceeding supports the complaint
that he was biased against the complainant.26

The Investigating Justice thus recommended the dismissal of the complaint initiated by Ever
Emporium. Anent the allegations in the letter of Atty. Crisologo-Lara, the following findings were made:

There is no witness to what transpired between Atty. Morante and Atty. Lara regarding the
assignment of the case to Branch 275. It is, at bottom, the word of Atty. Lara against that of Atty.
Morante. But there is one circumstance in repondent’s favor which makes the version given by
the complainant Atty. Lara to be less than plausible. In light of the fact that there was a regular
raffle proceeding that took place in the afternoon of August 15 which led to the assignment of the
case to Branch 275, we do not see, and we were not shown, how the raffle procedure was
manipulated to allow the case to go to Branch 275. The raffle was done in public in the sala of
Judge Maceda’s, Branch 275, since he was the Executive Judge. Judge Maceda was present, so
were the representatives of the 4 branches, the representatives of newspaper publishers, a
stenographer and the Clerk of Court and Deputy Clerk of Court. In the presence of many people,
Atty. Lara, the Clerk of Court, shook in her cupped hand the rolled pieces of paper bearing the
numbers corresponding to the cases on the list. After rolling them on the table, the representative
of each branch picked a rolled piece of paper. With this procedure, we wonder how Atty. Morante
could have identified and chosen the rolled piece of paper that corresponded to LRC 0070. It is
at least clear that Atty. Lara could not have made any suspicious or unusual movement with the
rolled pieces of paper, for that would easily expose her partiality to the public. The observance
 of the raffle procedure rules out the possibility that she had the case go to Branch 275, and if she
did not manipulate the raffle procedure to favor Branch 275, this cuts the ground from under her
claim that she had a deal with Atty. Morante to have the case go to his branch.

No person was also around to attest to the exact language of Judge Maceda when he got irritated
at what he perceived was Atty. Lara’s impertinence. It is possible that she has misinterpreted or
taken out of context words which might seem to her to be threatening words. Although he admits
that he was angry and raised his voice, Judge Maceda insists that he did not utter expletives. Nor
did he have any intention to threaten her. He gave his own account of the incident.27

The Investigating Justice, likewise, recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.

As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.28 He cannot be subjected to liability - civil,
criminal or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in
good faith.29 Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate
intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.30 As pointed out by the Investigating
Justice, "a contrary rule would result in an intolerable burden on the administration of justice, because
judges cannot be made to be absolute insurers of the correctness of their own rulings." 31 There is no
showing that the respondent judge in this case was motivated by ill will or bad faith in issuing the
questioned orders.

Indeed, an administrative complaint against a judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by his erroneous order or judgment. Administrative remedies
are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available
to the aggrieved parties and the same has not yet been resolved with finality. Until there is a final
declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there
will be no basis to conclude whether the respondent judge is administratively liable. 32

As found by the Investigating Justice, Atty. Crisologo-Lara failed to substantiate her allegations against
the respondents. When she was cross-examined during the hearing of June 3, 2003, she stated that she
went to see the Chief Justice out of fear of the respondent judge’s words pertaining to "eradicating
hindrances," and that what triggered her fears were the respondent judge’s use of invectives and the
statement that he knew "how to eradicate hindrances."33 She did not present any other evidence to
prove her claims against the respondent judge and that of respondent Morante. In fine, it is her word
against that of the respondents’, the respondents’ witnesses, and the evidence on record. This includes
the Minutes of Raffle of Cases34 held on August 15, 2001 to which Atty. Crisologo-Lara herself was a
signatory.

The Court notes that respondent Morante was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct for
extorting money from a party litigant, and was dismissed from the service with prejudice to re-
employment in the Court En Banc’s Decision35 of April 16, 2004.

As a final note, Justice Guariña III pointed out that the letter-complaint of Ever Emporium, Inc. was
anchored mainly on the allegations of Atty. Crisologo-Lara in her Letter dated September 3, 2001, and
was thus based on mere conjectures and unsupported conclusions. It must be stressed that in
administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a respondent’s malfeasance is
not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. 36 More importantly,
in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. Indeed, if a respondent judge, or a court
employee for that matter, should be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be
competent and derived from direct knowledge.37 Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions,
and fails to substantiate his claim, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. 38

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the administrative complaints against respondents Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda and Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 RULE 140

Charges Against Judges of First Instance

Section 1. Complaint - All Charges against judges of first instance shall be in writing and shall set out distinctly,
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of as constituting the alleged serious misconduct or inefficiency of the
respondent, and shall be sworn to and supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged, and shall be accompanied with copies of documents which may substantiate said facts.

Section 2. Service or dismissal. - If the charges appear to merit action, a copy thereof shall be served upon the
respondent, requiring him to answer within ten (10) days from the date service. If the charges do not merit action, or
if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the charges are not meritorious, the same shall be
dismissed.

Section 3. Answer; hearing. - Upon the filing of respondents answer or upon the expiration of the time for its filing,
the court shall assign one of its members, a Justice of the Court of Appeals or a judge of first instance to conduct
the hearing of the charges. The Justice or judge so assigned shall set a day for the hearing, and notice thereof shall
be served on both parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral or written evidence.

Section 4. Report - After the hearing, the Justice or judge shall file with the Supreme Court a report of his findings of
fact and conclusions of law, accompanied by the evidence presented by the parties and the other papers in he case.

Section 5. Action - After the filing of the report, the court will take such action as the facts and the law may warrant.

Section 6. Confidential. - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential.

Rule 140
Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
Section 1
How instituted. —
Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a
verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous
complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and
shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct
prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Courts or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 2
Action on the complaint. —
If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be served upon the
respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10) days from the date of service.
Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.
Section 3
By whom complaint investigated. —
Upon the filing of the respondent's comment, or upon the expiration of the time for filing the same
and unless other pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer the matter to the Office of
the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case for
investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the
respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank,
or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.
Section 4
Hearing. —
The investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day for the hearing and send notice thereof to both
parties. At such bearing, the parties may present oral and documentary evidence. If, after due notice,
the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the
date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant.
Section 5
Report. —
Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation. the investigating Justice or Judge
shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation. The
report shall be accompanied by the record containing the evidence and the pleadings filed by the
parties. The report shall be confidential and shall be for the exclusive use of the Court.
Section 6
Action. —
The Court shall take such action on the report as the facts and the law may warrant.
Section 7
Classification of charges. —
Administrative charges are classified as serious, less serious. or light.
Section 8
Serious charges. —
Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an
appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt:
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
Section 9
Less Serious Charges. —
Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;
2. Frequent and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple Misconduct.
Section 10
Light Charges. —
Light charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
2. Gambling in public;
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
Section 11
Sanctions. —
A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months: or
3. A fine of more than P20,000 00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or SDEHCc
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
Section 12
Confidentiality of proceedings. —
Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the Court
shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator.