3. G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989.
* in question as pertaining to our agricultural
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner,
vs.RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
PETITION for certiorari to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
SYLLABUS:
Land Registration; Public Lands; Public Forests;
Mangrove Swamps, Classification Of;
Mangrove swamps are classified as forest lands
but said classification is descriptive only of its
legal nature and status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like.—Mangrove swamps or manglaresshould
be understood as comprised within the public
forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917. The legislature having so
determined, we have no authority to ignore or
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the
exercise of our own discretion. The statutory
definition remains unchanged to date and, no
less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly,
the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional,
assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our
judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus
presumed valid and so must be respected. We
repeat our statement in the Amunategui case
that the classification of mangrove swamps as
forest lands is descriptive of its legalnature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no
cogent argument having been raised to annul
it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it.
And so we shall.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The previous
description of mangrove swamps as agricultural
lands covers only those lands over which
ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became
effective.—Our previous description of the term
lands should be understood as covering only
those lands over which ownership had already
vested before the Administrative Code of 1917
became effective. Such lands could not be
retroactively legislated as forest lands because
this would be violative of a duly acquired
property right protected by the due process
clause. So we ruled again only two months ago
in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, where the possession of the land in
dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it
was much later classified as timberland.
Same; Same; Alienable Public Lands; Mangrove
Swamps; Mangrove swamps form part of the
public forests and are not alienable under the
Constitution.—It is reiterated for emphasis that,
conformably to the legislative definition
embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, which remains
unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or
manglaresform part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable
under the Constitution and may not be the
subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and
classified as alienable agricultural land.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
The basic question before the Court is the legal
classification of mangrove swamps, or
manglares, as they are commonly known. If
they are part of our public forest lands, they are
not alienable under the Constitution. If they are
considered public agricultural lands, they may
be acquired under private ownership. The
private respondent’s claim to the land in
question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters
of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal
applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 1 of 42
had been in possession of the land for more
than forty years. He was opposed by several
persons, including the petitioner on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Capiz.1 The decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.2 The Director of
Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to
private appropriation. He asks that the
registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the
petitioner and the private respondent agree
that the land is mangrove land. There is no
dispute as to this. The bone of contention
between the parties is the legal nature of
mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner
claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable
and the private respondent insists it is alienable
as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal,
not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have
to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of
the earlier American organic acts in the
country. By this law, lands of the public domain
in the Philippine Islands were classified into three
grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and
timber or forest lands. This classification was
maintained in the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it
was superseded by the Constitution of 1973.
That new charter expanded the classification of
public lands to include industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and
even permitted the legislature to provide for
other categories.3 This provision has been
reproduced, but with substantial modifications,
in the present Constitution.4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which
was the charter in force when this case arose,
only agricultural lands were allowed to be
alienated.5 Their disposition was provided for
under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest
lands were not subject to private ownership
unless they were first reclassified as agricultural
lands and so released for alienation. In the
leading case of Montano v. Insular
Government,6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove
swamps or manglares were defined by the
Court as:
“x x x mud flats, alternately washed and
exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when
watered by the sea, extending their roots deep
into the mud and casting their seeds, which also
germinate there. These constitute the
mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist
naturally, but which are also, to some extent
cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove and like
trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are
literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that
they cannot be so regarded in the sense in
which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters
flowing over them are not available for purpose
of navigation, and they may be disposed of
without impairment of the public interest in what
remains. xxx
“Under this uncertain and somewhat
unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom
had grown of converting manglares and nipa
lands into fisheries which became a common
feature of settlement along the coast and at
the same time of the change of sovereignty
constituted one of the most productive
industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which
would destroy vested interests and prove a
public disaster.”
Mangrove swamps were thus considered
agricultural lands and so susceptible of private
ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature
categorically declared, despite the above-
cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 2 of 42
the public forests of this country. This it did in the
Administrative Code of 1917, which became
effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
“Section 1820. Words and phrase defined.—For
the purpose of this chapter ‘public forest’
includes, except as otherwise specially
indicated, all unreserved public land, including
nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest
reserves of whatever character.”
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding
this definition, the Court maintained the
doctrine in the Montano case when two years
later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of
Forestry:7
“x x x the words timber land are always
translated in the Spanish translation of that Act
(Act of Congress) as ‘terrenos forestales.’ We
think there is an error in this translation and that
a better translation would be ‘terrenos
madereros.’ Timber land in English means land
with trees growing on it. The manglar plant
would never be called a tree in English but a
bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or
aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called
‘timber land.’ xxx
“The fact that there are a few trees growing in
a manglare or nipa swamps does not change
the general character of the land from
manglare to timber land.”
More to the point, addressing itself directly to
above-quoted Section 1820, the Court
declared:
“In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10
Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase
‘agricultural lands’ as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands.
“Whatever may have been the meaning of the
term ‘forestry’ under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the public
lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral
or agricultural lands, and all public lands that
are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used
as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary
farm lands.
“The definition of forestry as including
manglares found in the Administrative Code of
1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to
its enactment.
“These lands being neither timber nor mineral
lands, the trial court should have considered
them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural
lands, then the rights of appellants are fully
established by Act No. 926.”
The doctrine was reiterated still later in
Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v.
Obias,8promulgated on March 4, 1933, more
than fifteen years after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand
declared for a unanimous Court:
“The opposition rests mainly upon the
proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown
in his opponent’s Exh. I, but we think this
opposition of the Director of Forestry is
untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely
decided that mangrove lands are not forest
lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in
the Act of Congress.”
No elaboration was made on this conclusion
which was merely based on the cases of
Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above
ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of
Forestry,9 with Justice Fernando declaring that
the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in
nature. The decision even quoted with
approval the statement of the trial court that:
“x x x Mangrove swamps where only trees of
mangrove species grow, where the trees are
small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes
and the trees growing are not of commercial
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 3 of 42
value as lumber do not convert the land into
public land. Such lands are not forest in
character. They do not form part of the public
domain.”
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan,10 the
Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11
reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that “all
public lands that are not timber or mineral lands
are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.”
But the problem is not all that simple. As it
happens, there is also a line of decisions holding
the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources,12 promulgated in 1983, the
Court ruled “that the Bureau of Fisheries has no
jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified as
forest lands.”
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry,13 the Court was more
positive when it held, again through Justice
Gutierrez:
“The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot
No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a
‘mangrove swamps.’ Although conceding that
a ‘mangrove swamp’ is included in the
classification of forest land in accordance with
Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees
classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as
first, second and third groups are found on the
land in question. Furthermore, they contend
that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is
still subject to land registration proceedings
because the property had been in actual
possession of private persons for many years,
and therefore, said land was already ‘private
land’ better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under
forest classification.”
“The petition is without merit.
“A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. ‘Forested
lands’ do not have to be on mountains or in out-
of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classsified as ‘forest’ is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply.”
The view was maintained in Vallarta v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,14 where this
Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s
submission that the land in dispute, which he
described as “swamp mangrove or forestal
land,” were not private properties and so not
registerable. This case was decided only twelve
days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the
Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and
for all the question of whether mangrove
swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function
initially belonging to the legislature, which has
the authority to implement the constitutional
provision classifying the lands of the public
domain (and is now even permitted to provide
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 4 of 42
for more categories of public lands). The
legislature having made such implementation,
the executive officials may then, in the
discharge of their own role, administer our
public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty
“to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed”
and in accordance with the policy prescribed.
For their part, the courts will step into the picture
if the rules laid down by the legislature are
challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is
claimed that they are not being correctly
observed by the executive. Thus do the three
departments, coordinating with each other,
pursue and achieve the objectives of the
Constitution in the conservation and utilization
of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly
delegated to the President of the Philippines the
function of making periodic classifications of
public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into:
(a)Alienable or disposable,
(b)Timber, and
(c)Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner
transfer such lands from one class to another, for
the purposes of their administration and
disposition.”
“Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration
and disposition of alienable or disposable lands,
the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands,
Section 9 of the same law provides:
“For the purpose of their administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be
classified, according to the use or purposes to
which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a)Agricultural;
(b)Residential, commercial, industrial, or for
similar productive purposes;
(c)Educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes; and
(d)Reservations for townsites and for public and
quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time make the classifications
provided for in this section, and may, at any
time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from
one class to another.”
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised
Administrative Code states as follows:
“Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest
reserves—Revocation of same.—Upon the
recommendation of the Director of Forestry,
with the approval of the Department Head, the
President of the Philippines may set apart forest
reserves from the public lands and he shall by
proclamation declare the establishment of
such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and
thereafter such forest reserves shall not be
entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public
forest.
“The President of the Philippines may in like
manner by proclamation alter or modify the
boundaries of any forest reserve from time to
time, or revoke any such proclamation, and
upon such revocation such forest reserve shall
be and become part of the public lands as
though such proclamation had never been
made.
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 5 of 42
“Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for
agricultural purposes.—Lands in public forest,
not including forest reserves, upon the
certification of the Director of Forestry that said
lands are better adapted and more valuable
for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under
forest, shall be declared by the Department
Head to be agricultural lands.”
With these principles in mind, we reach the
following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be
understood as comprised within the public
forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917. The legislature having so
determined, we have no authority to ignore or
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the
exercise of our own discretion. The statutory
definition remains unchanged to date and, no
less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly,
the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional,
assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our
judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus
presumed valid and so must be respected. We
repeat our statement in the Amunategui case
that the classification of mangrove swamps as
forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no
cogent argument having been raised to annul
it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it.
And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question
as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over
which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective.
Such lands could not be retroactively legislated
as forest lands because this would be violative
of a duly acquired property right protected by
the due process clause. So we ruled again only
two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals,15 where the possession of the
land in dispute commenced as early as 1909,
before it was much later classified as timber-
land.
It follows from all this that the land under
contention being admittedly a part of the
mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a
minor forest license had in fact been issued by
the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must
be considered forest land. It could therefore not
be the subject of the adverse possession and
consequent ownership claimed by the private
respondent in support of his application for
registration. To be so, it had first to be released
as forest land and reclassified as agricultural
land pursuant to the certification the Director of
Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan
of the mangrove swamps approved by the
Director of Lands,16 to prove that the land is
registerable. It should be plain, however, that
the mere existence of such a plan would not
have the effect of converting the mangrove
swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land.
Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly
inofficious. The Director of Lands was not
authorized to act in the premises. Under the
aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who
has the authority to determine whether forest
land is more valuable for agricultural rather than
forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as
agricultural land and release for private
ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
“It is elementary in the law governing the
disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as
disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to
lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 6 of 42
lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for
grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and
other modes of utilization.
“The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
administer and dispose of swamplands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified as
forest land or timber land and not released for
fishery or other purposes.”
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case,
thus:
“It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registerable. The
adverse possession which can be the basis of a
grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title
cases cannot commence until after the forest
land has been declared alienable and
disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter
how long cannot convert it into private
property.”
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute
were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession
thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no
convincing evidence of the existence of the
informacion posesoriaallegedly obtained by
the original transferor of the property, let alone
the fact that the conditions for acquiring title
thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it
been shown that the informacion posesoria has
been inscribed or registered in the registry of
property and that the land has been under the
actual and adverse possession of the private
respondent for twenty years as required by the
Spanish Mortgage Law.17These matters are not
presumed but must be established with definite
proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the
private respondent were practically the only
basis used by the appellate court in sustaining
his claim of possession over the land in question.
Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to
prove possession and much less vest ownership
in favor of the declarant, as we have held in
countless cases.18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has
not established his right to the registration of the
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the
petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to
the legislative definition embodied in Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, which remains unamended up to now,
mangrove swamps or manglares form part of
the public forests of the Philippines. As such,
they are not alienable under the Constitution
and may not be the subject of private
ownership until and unless they are first released
as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Note.—Tax declarations on realty tax payments
of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. (Ferrer-Lopez vs. Court of Appeals,
150 SCRA 393.)
4. G.R. No. 81961. April 18, 1989.*
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT and
DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MINO HILARIO,
respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Court of Appeals’ decision which affirmed
the trial court’s decision ordering the issuance
of a certificate of title in the name of Mino
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 7 of 42
Hilario over a parcel of land particularly
described in survey plan PSU-221769.
Land Titles and Deeds; Public Lands; Forest
Lands; Declassification of forest land is an
express and positive act of government which
cannot be presumed, neither should it be
ignored nor deemed waived.—–There can be
no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands
not yet classified as disposable or alienable.
Declassification of forest land is an express and
positive act of Government. It cannot be
presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor
deemed waived. As held in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals,[154 SCRA 476
(1987)]: “x x x It is already a settled rule that
forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into
private property (Vano v. Government of
Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v.
Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of
Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De
la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes
& Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701) unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable by the
Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of
the land prior to the reclassification of the land
as disposable and alienable cannot be
credited as part of the thirty-year requirement
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
this case, there is no showing that the land in
question is disposable or alienable. This is a
matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.”
Same; Same; Public Land Act; The provisions of
the Public Land Act giving members of the
cultural minorities the right to apply for
confirmation of their claims, apply only to
agricultural public lands and do not
contemplate forest reserves.—–We agree with
the Solicitor General’s observations, to wit: “1.
Republic Act No. 3872 is only amendatory to
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act. The Public Land Act
applies to agricultural public lands and to no
other type of land borne out by the explicit
terms of Section 2, Chapter I and Section 2,
Chapter II, both under Title I of the Public Land
Act. Chapter I is subtitled ‘Short title of the Act,
lands to which it applies, and officers charged
with its execution.’ Section 2 clearly states that
the ‘provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands
of the public domain; but timber and mineral
lands shall be governed by special laws x x x
Section 10 provides that ‘the words ‘alienation’,
‘disposition’, or ‘concession’ as used in this Act,
shall mean any of the methods authorized by
this Act for the acquisition, lease, use or benefit
of the lands of the public domain other than
timber or mineral lands. (Stress supplied). “2. The
new subsection (c) of Section 48 of the Public
Land Act should be read together with the
provision of the preceding subsection(b) which
expressly refers to ‘agricultural lands of the
public domain.’ Perforce, the term ‘lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture’ as used in
the said new subsection of Sec. 48 should mean
the same thing as the term ‘agricultural lands of
public domain.’ It does not appear that two
different classes of lands were intended to be
the subject matter of one section of the same
Public Land Act. And both terms manifestly do
not refer to either timber or forest land including
forest reserves. “3. The construction given by
respondent Court of Appeals to the particular
provision of law involved, as to include even
forest reserves as susceptible to private
appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply
such provision. For, both the 1973 and present
Constitutions do not include timber or forest
lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of
1973 Constitution states that ‘with the exception
of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential and resettlement lands of the pulic
domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated.’ The new Constitution, in its Article XII,
Section 2, also expressly states that ‘with the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 8 of 42
resources shall not be alienated.’ “What the law
contemplates are lands that are agricultural
although not disposable, such as agricultural
lands within a reservation for fruit experiments
(as the one in Baguio City administered by the
Bureau of Plant Industry, or agricultural lands
reserved for the Camarines Sur Agricultural
School in Pili, Camarines Sur), or those reserved
for a specific purpose, but certainly not a forest
reserve, a timber land, which the Constitution,
the Public Land Act itself, and jurisprudence
have excluded from alienation.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The government
must first declare the forest land as alienable
before the year of entry, cultivation and
exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title.–—As
to the lower court’s ruling that “applicant’s
predecessor, Shawidi, had been occupying
and working on the land at the outbreak of the
First World War in 1914” long before
Proclamation No. 217 declaring the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve was issued, this Court
has had the opportunity to rule on this issue
earlier. As held in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals, supra: “There is an erroneous
assumption implicit in the challenged decision
of the Court of Appeals which the government
oppositors also appear to have overlooked.
“This is the reliance on Proclamation No. 217 of
Governor General Henry L. Stimson as the
operative act which converted the lands
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong. The land
was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to
the 1929 proclamation. It did not earn a
classification from non-forest into forest land
because of the proclamation. The
proclamation merely declared a special forest
reserve out of already existing forest lands. The
land was already forest or timber land even
before the proclamation. The alleged entry in
1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15
hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares claimed
area has no legal significance. A person cannot
enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the
forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title”.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The facts of the case as stated in the Court of
Appeals’ decision are as follows:
“The land subject matter of the application for
registration is situated in the sitio of Cosaran, Bo.
Baloy, Itogon, Benguet, Philippines. It is within
the “Central Cordillera Forest Reserve”,
established under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929, the AmbuklaoBinga
Watershed covered by Executive Proclamation
No. 548, dated April 19, 1969, and the Upper
Agno River Basin Multiple Use of Forest
Management District created under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 518, dated March 9,
1971.
“In his application for land registration filed on
March 10, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of
Baguio-Benguet (now RTC), applicant-appellee
Mino Hilario claimed ownership in fee simple
over said land by purchase from his father
Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972. The subject
land, consisting of one (1) parcel, with an area
of 5.3213 hectares, is situated, bounded and
described as shown in plan PSU-221769, the
technical description of which is attached to
the application and made a part thereof.
“The applicant seeks to register the title to the
subject land under the Land Registration Act
(Act 496). However, as an alternative, the
applicant invokes the benefits of Chapter VIII of
Act No. 2874 as superseded by Commonwealth
Act 141, as well as the provisions of Republic Act
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 9 of 42
1942 and Republic Act 3872 because the
applicant is a member of the cultural minorities.
“On December 3, 1975, the Director of Bureau
of Lands filed his opposition dated July 14, 1975,
alleging that neither the applicant nor his
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to
acquire ownership in fee simple of the land
applied for, the same not having been
acquired by any of the various types of title
issued by the Spanish Government, or have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the present
application, and that the aforesaid property is
a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines and is not subject to
private appropriation.
“On March 8, 1976, the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development filed his opposition dated
March 1, 1976, to the registration of whatever
title of the applicant on the ground that the
area applied for is within the “Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve” under LC Map No. 1435, aside
from the fact that it is a part of the Ambuklao-
Binga Watershed covered by Executive
Proclamation No. 548 dated April 19, 1969 as
evidenced by the letter-report of Forest Ranger
Antonio Chagyo, and Engineer Carlito Banac;
that the area sought to be registered is not in
the entire possession of applicant Mino Hilario in
the concept of an owner considering that there
are several houses built by different individuals
within the area in question; that the applicant
does not have any registrable title either in law
or in fact over the property; and that the area is
not classified as alienable or disposable land.
“After due trial, the lower court rendered its
decision dated May 16, 1985, which decreed
the confirmation and registration of the subject
land in the name of applicant Mino Hilario,
married to Sofina Hilario.
“The decision is based on the facts found by the
trial court, to wit:
“ ‘The evidence for the applicant consists of his
testimony and those of his witnesses, namely,
Dionisio Capsula, 54 years old, farmer and a
neighbor in the place; Hilario Molang, 55 years
old, the applicant’s father; and Eustaquio
Cabson, 80 years old, and another neighbor;
and documentary exhibits, Exhibits “A” to “U”.
Also, an ocular inspection was conducted on
the premises. From these, the Court gathers that
the applicant acquired the land subject hereof
by purchase from his father, Hilario Molang on
April 17, 1972; that his said father, in turn
acquired the property from the latter’s father,
and the applicant’s grandfather Shawidi; that
the applicant and his predecessors
successively, continuously, publicly and
adversely occupied, possessed and worked on
the land in the concept of absolute owners
since before the First World War, building
supporting walls, rice paddies where they
planted rice, and planting fruit-bearing trees;
that as seen during the ocular inspection there
are about 100 mango trees, three of which are
more than 100 years old, about 50 matured
avocado trees, about 200 banana trees, about
30 maguey, about 40 cheza trees, about 30
coffee trees, about 8 jackfruit trees, cassava,
two bamboo groves more than 100 years old,
70 orange trees, camote patches, three rice
paddies for planting rice, about 50 pineapple
plants, stone walls, fence of German cables,
around 30 scattered Kaingins, 22 young
coconut trees, and about two old coconut
trees; that the land is suitable to agriculture; and
that there are seven old houses made of
galvanized iron inside the area being
registered. The property had been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Hilario
Molang, and land tax therefor had been paid
by him since 1945. Since 1972 the property has
been declared in the name of the applicant
and land tax has been paid by him.
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 10 of 42
“ ‘The evidence for the Government oppositors
consists of the testimonies of Antonio Chaggyo,
a Forest Manager of the Bureau of Forest
Development, and Alfredo A. Ramirez, a Land
Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, and their
respective reports (Exhibits “1” and “2”) and the
first indorsement of the District Land Office that
the land in question “appears to be within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reservation which is
outside the jurisdiction of this office.” (Exhibit
“3”). The testimonies of these witnesses on their
respective observations when they separately
investigated the land in question and their
respective reports do not refute the evidence of
the applicant as to the length, nature and
manner of possession of the land subject of this
case by the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest. On the contrary, their testimonies,
viewed in their entirety, would tend to
corroborate the evidence adduced by the
applicant. The report of the Land Investigator
even states that the other houses found within
the land at issue are “owned by his (applicant’s)
relatives x x x who swore that they are not
claiming any portion of the land they occupy.
“ ‘The preponderance of evidence clearly
shows that the applicant, and his predecessors-
in-interest before him, all of whom are members
of the national cultural minorities, have been in
actual, open, public, peaceful, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject hereof which is
suitable to agriculture, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since before the First World War up
to the present or at least more than sixty (60)
years.’ ”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision.
Hence, this present petition.
The Director of Land Management and the
Director of Forest Development raise the
following assignments of errors in this petition, to
wit:
“1.The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding
that the land in question, notwithstanding that it
is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, is
registrable on the basis of Republic Act No.
3872; which said court misconstrued and
misapplied.
“2.The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding
that private respondent Mino Hilario had
acquired a private right to the land in question
prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 217 on
February 17, 1929 establishing the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve and Executive
Proclamation No. 548 on April 19, 1969
establishing the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed,
and therefore, said land is exempted from the
force and effect of those executive issuances.
“3.The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
affirming the lower Court’s Decision which
granted the application for registration of the
land in question of respondent Mino Hilario.”
(Rollo, pp. 12-13).
The petition is impressed with merit.
There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed
over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable. Declassification of forest land is an
express and positive act of Government. It
cannot be presumed. Neither should it be
ignored nor deemed waived.
As held in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[154 SCRA 476 (1987)]:
“x x x It is already a settled rule that forest lands
or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert them into private
property, (Vano v. Government of Philippine
Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67
SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes &
Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 11 of 42
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701) unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable by the
Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of
the land prior to the reclassification of the land
as disposable and alienable cannot be
credited as part of the thirty-year requirement
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
this case, there is no showing that the land in
question is disposable or alienable. This is a
matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.”
In the instant case, the subject land is within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. Private
respondent Hilario submits that even assuming
that this is so, still he may own the land situated
within the forest reserve as he is a member of
the cultural minorities. His basis for this is
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended
(Public Land Act), sec. 48 (c) which provides:
“x x x The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
“(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
“(c) Members of the national cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof. (as amended
by R.A. No. 3872, section 1, approved June 18,
1964).
Respondent Hilario contends that the phrase
“whether disposable or not” should be
construed to mean that a parcel of land
situated in an inalienable land may be
privately-owned by a member of the cultural
minorities.
We agree with the Solicitor General’s
observations, to wit:
“1. Republic Act No. 3872 is only amendatory to
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act. The Public Land Act
applies to agricultural public lands and to no
other type of land borne out by the explicit
terms of Section 2, Chapter I and Section 2,
Chapter II, both under Title I of the Public Land
Act. Chapter I is subtitled ‘Short title of the Act,
lands to which it applies, and officers charged
with its execution.’ Section 2 clearly states that
the ‘provisions of this Act apply to the lands of
the public domain; but timber and mineral
lands shall be governed by special laws x x x
Section 10 provides that the words
‘alienation’,‘disposition’, or ‘concession’ as
used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods
authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease,
use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain
other than timber or mineral lands. (Stress
supplied).
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 12 of 42
“2. The new subsection (c) of Section 48 of the
Public Land Act should be read together with
the provision of the preceding subsection (b)
which expressly refers to ‘agricultural lands of
the public domain.’ Perforce, the term ‘lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture’ as
used in the said new subsection of Sec. 48
should mean the same thing as the term
‘agricultural lands of public domain.’ It does not
appear that two different classes of lands were
intended to be the subject matter of one
section of the same Public Land Act. And both
terms manifestly do not refer to either timber or
forest land including forest reserves.
“3. The construction given by respondent Court
of Appeals to the particular provision of law
involved, as to include even forest reserves as
susceptible to private appropriation, is to
unconstitutionally apply such provision. For,
both the 1973 and present Constitutions do not
include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus,
Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states
that ‘with the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential and
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural
resources shall not be alienated.’ The new
Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also
expressly states that ‘with the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated.’
“What the law contemplates are lands that are
agricultural although not disposable, such as
agricultural lands within a reservation for fruit
experiments (as the one in Baguio City
administered by the Bureau of Plant Industry, or
agricultural lands reserved for the Camarines
Sur Agricultural School in Pili, Camarines Sur), or
those reserved for a specific purpose, but
certainly not a forest reserve, a timber land,
which the Constitution, the Public Land Act
itself, and jurisprudence have excluded from
alienation.” (Rollo, pp. 16-18).
As to the lower court’s ruling that “applicant’s
predecessor, Shawidi, had been occupying
and working on the land at the outbreak of the
First World War in 1914” long before
Proclamation No. 217 declaring the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve was issued, this Court
has had the opportunity to rule on this issue
earlier.
As held in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,supra:
“There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
which the government oppositors also appear
to have overlooked. This is the reliance on
Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General
Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which
converted the lands covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is
wrong. The land was not non-forest or
agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation.
It did not earn a classification from non-forest
into forest land because of the proclamation.
The proclamation merely declared a special
forest reserve out of already existing forest lands.
The land was already forest or timber land even
before the proclamation. The alleged entry in
1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15
hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares claimed
area has no legal significance. A person cannot
enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the
forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.”
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the trial court which
granted the private respondent’s application
for registration of the land in question is reversed
and set aside. The application for land
registration is dismissed. SO ORDERED.
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 13 of 42
Note.—–Classification of public lands, an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, not the court. Absence of
classification renders the land as unclassified in
consonance with the Regalian Doctrine. (Dir. of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689).
5. G.R. No. L-56984. September 30, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Director of Forest Development and the Director
of Lands, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and in
behalf of the Heirs of SALMING PIRASO,
Respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
ABOUT THE CASE: This is a petition for review on
certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet,
Branch III, at La Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287,
Record No. 37205, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
FACTS:
"It having been proven convincingly that this
land was owned and possessed by the late
Salming Piraso and later by his successors-in-
interest, who are his children for a period of
more than thirty years up to this date, they have
shown to have a registerable title on the
property which the Court therefore confirms
and affirms in accordance with the law. Let the
land so described in the technical description of
the survey made of the same and in
accordance with the corresponding plan be so
registered." (p. 50, Rollo)
On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S.
Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of
Salming Piraso filed with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land
Registration No. N-287, covering the following
described property:
"A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639)
situated in the Barrio of Ansagan, Municipality of
Tuba, Mountain Province. Bounded in the NE.,
along line 1-2 by property of Sioco Carino (PSU-
43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW., along lines 2-
3-4-5 by public land, on the W., along lines 5-6-1
by property of Tunccalo. Containing an area of
TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY NINE
(2,197,879) SQUARE METERS. . ." (p. 13, Rollo)
On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands,
through the Solicitor General, filed an
opposition to the application for registration
stating, among others:
"That neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to
said parcel of land the same not having been
acquired by them either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894;
"That neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the present application;
"That the aforementioned parcel of land is a
portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines." (pp. 13-14, Rollo)
On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed
an opposition to the application for registration
on the following grounds:
"That the whole area applied for registration is
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
established under Proclamation No. 217, dated
February 16, 1929;
"That the area sought to be registered is neither
released for disposition nor alienation; and that
the herein applicant has no registerable title
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 14 of 42
over the whole parcel of land either in fact or in
law." (p. 14, Rollo)
After trial, a decision was rendered by the land
registration court, as earlier stated, adjudicating
the parcel of land to the applicants. The motion
for reconsideration filed by Government
oppositor’s having been denied, an appeal
was made to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of the land
registration court.
In this petition, the petitioner assigns the
following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT
CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION BEING PART OF THE
PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE CENTRAL
CORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE:
B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE
LAND BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST WAS NOT IN
CONCEPT OF OWNER UNDER SECTION 48 of the
PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND BEING IN-
ALIENABLE;
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE LAND IS AGRICULTURAL BECAUSE THE
GOVERNMENT FAILED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT
THE LAND IS MORE VALUABLE FOR FOREST
PURPOSES;
D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE PROPERTY BECAME SEGREGATED
FROM THE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND
ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP UPON APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY
PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF LAND IN 1925;)
E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAD POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED 10 TO 15
HECTARES OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR,
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THEY HAD ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THRU
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER THE REST OF
THE 219.7879 HECTARES APPLIED FOR. (p. 18,
Rollo)
The issues raised are:
1. Whether or not the land in question is part
of the public forest within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve; and
2. Whether or not private respondents have
established registerable title over the land in
question.
It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in
question covered by the Plan-Psu-43639 is part
of the public forests within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve established under Proclamation
No. 217 of Governor General Henry Stimson
dated February 16, 1929. On February 27, 1980,
an ocular inspection of said property was made
by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the
Bureau of Lands together with representatives
of the Bureau of Forestry, the Land Registration
Court, and the applicants for registration.
During the ocular inspection, the land was
found to be rolling and stony in nature. Bartolo,
Jr., submitted a report on April 17, 1970 stating
among others, that the land is covered with
trees, bushes and grasses and being also stony
is not suitable for agricultural purposes.
The representative of the Bureau of Forestry,
Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero, submitted to the
Provincial Fiscal a separate report dated April 6,
1970 to the effect that the whole area falls
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and
that the same has not been released for
agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry
who had administrative jurisdiction over the
same.
The petitioner states that since the land in
question is indubitably part of the public forest
and has not been reclassified or released from
the forest zone, the same can not be the
subject of registration either under Act 496,
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 15 of 42
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
or under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act. The petitioner points out that lands within
the forest zone or within a duly established
reservation do not form part of the disposable
portion of the public domain nor can the same
be alienated as said lands are not capable of
private appropriation or ownership and
possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert that same into private property.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the
private respondents or their predecessors-in-
interest, Salming Piraso, had not acquired
ownership over the land prior to its classification
as part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve because
there is no evidence on record that Salming
Piraso had possessed the property for any
appreciable period prior to 1929 when the and
became part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve.
On the other hand, the private respondents
assert that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals show that the land subject of
application is not within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve and the same land applied for
registration is disposable and alienable. The
private respondents, as applicants, claim to
have sufficiently shown by preponderance of
evidence that the land being applied for
registration had been possessed by Salming
Piraso as far back as 1915 when he and his
workers planted the arable portion of about 15
hectares to rice and other products and raised
cows on the other portion suited for pasture. The
late Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by
private surveyor Jose Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as
Plan Psu-43639 which was approved by the
then Director of Lands, Jorge B. Vargas on
March 6, 1925, while Proclamation No. 217 was
promulgated only on February 16, 1929. They
state that the approval of the said survey by the
government thru the Director of Lands Jorge B.
Vargas can only mean that said land was no
longer included in the overall survey of the
government as it was no longer part of the
public land. As applicants, they contend that
they have possessed the land applied for in
concept of owner, openly and publicly,
adverse against the whole world and
continuously for more than thirty (30) years
before they filed the application over the land
which is agricultural and separate from the
public domain.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
It is already a settled rule that forest lands or
forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert them into private property
(Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41
Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107
Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA
1183; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221;
Director of Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v.
Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless
such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable by the Director of
Forestry, but even then, possession of the land
by the applicants prior to the reclassification of
the land as disposable and alienable cannot be
credited as part of the thirty-year requirement
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
this case, there is no showing of reclassification
by the Director of Forestry that the land in
question is disposable or alienable. This is a
matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.
There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
which the government oppositors also appear
to have overlooked. This is the reliance on
Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General
Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which
converted the lands covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is
wrong. The land was not non-forest or
agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation.
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 16 of 42
It did not earn a classification from non-forest
into forest land because of the proclamation.
The proclamation merely declared a special
forest reserve out of already existing forest lands.
The land was already forest or timber land even
before the proclamation. The alleged entry in
1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15
hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares claimed
area has no legal significance. A person cannot
enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the
forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
The records positively establish that the land in
question is part of the public forest which the
Executive formally proclaimed as the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve to further preserve its
integrity and to give it a status which is more
special for certain purposes than that of
ordinary forest lands.
One reason for the respondent court’s decision
finding a registerable title for the private
respondents is its observation that the
Government failed to show that the disputed
land is more valuable for forest purposes. The
court noted a failure to prove that trees are
thriving in the land.
The Court of Appeals finding is based on a
wrong concept of what is forest land. There is a
big difference between "forest" as defined in a
dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain in
the Constitution. (Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, Section 10, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution, as amended; and Section 1,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution).
One is descriptive of what appears on the land
while the other is a legal status, a classification
for legal purposes.
The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast
tracts of wooded land with dense growths of
trees and underbush. However, the cutting
down of trees and the disappearance of virgin
forest and not automatically convert the lands
of the public domain from forest or timber land
to alienable agricultural land.
As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75);
"A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers.’Forest lands’
do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as ‘forest’ is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
"This Court ruled in the leading case of Director
of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. And in
Republic v. Animas, (56 SCRA 499), we granted
the petition on the ground that the area
covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the
forest zone and any patent and title to said
area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that
a positive act of Government is needed to
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 17 of 42
declassify land which is classified as forest and "A Yes, I inspected it, sir.
to convert it into alienable or disposable land for "Q What is the purpose of your inspection?
agricultural or other purposes." (at p. 75) "A The purpose of my inspection is to
determine the status of the area if it falls within
On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the reservation, or within the alienable or
the questioned property was conducted by disposable area.
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the "Q What is your finding, if any?
Bureau of Lands, together with Forester Ricardo "A My finding was that the area falls within
D. Zapatero of the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.
Clerk of Court Roberto Gogoling as "Q Was that finding reduced into writing?
representative of the land registration court, "A Yes, sir.
Fiscal Navarro and Andres Carantes as "Q I am showing to you a report found on
representative of the applicant. Pages Sixty-Eight (68) of the records which for
purposes of identification, we pray that the
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted same be marked as Exhibit "A" for the
his report dated April 17, 1970, which states, government oppositors, your Honor.
among others, that the land is covered with
trees, bushes and grasses and being stony is not "COURT:
suitable for agricultural purposes. This negates
the claim of the private respondents that the As what?
land has been cultivated since 1915. "FISCAL BRAWNER:
Rather as Exhibit "1."
More important, however, than the
appearance of the land is its status, as stated in "COURT:
the separate report dated April 6, 1970
submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Have it marked.
Province by Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero which "Q What is the relation of this report with that
declares that the whole area applied for by the report that you made?
applicant falls within the Central Cordillera "A This is the original copy of the Report
Forest Reserve and that the same has not been which I submitted to the Provincial Fiscal.
released for agricultural purposes by the "Q There appears a signature above the
Director of Forestry who has administrative typewritten name ‘Ricardo D. Zapatero’, whose
jurisdiction over the same. This has not been signature is that?
successfully refuted. It has not been proved "A That is mine, sir.
erroneous. "Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your
report, Exhibit 1 that the land falls within the
Testifying in connection with the matters stated Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, how did you
in his report, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero stated arrive at that conclusion?
that: "A Because of what I have even of the
improvements of the applicant and because of
"Q Do you know the land in question here in the Bureau of Forestry map.
this case? "Q Did you actually go to the land in
"A I know sir. question or the land applied for?
"Q In connection with your duty to inspect "A Yes, sir.
the lands that are subject matters of land "Q So, you actually saw this land applied
registration cases, have you inspected this land for?
in question also? "A Yes, sir.

FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 18 of 42


"Q What is the nature of this land applied
for?
"A It is generally stony and the topography
is level to rolling and there are certain species of
plants inside the land, in some area.
"COURT:
"Q What are the species of plants?
"A There are species of Binayuyu.
"Q That is for lumber?
"A No, that is not.
"FISCAL BRAWNER:
"Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report
that the topography of the land applied for is
generally stony, and because of the Binayuyu
species, the condition of the land is not suited
for agricultural purposes?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What is the basis of that statement?
"A Because of the topography which is of
solid inclination, we believe that is not good for
agricultural purposes. The land applied for is
more suited for pasture purposes." (pp. 203-206,
tsn., September 6, 1971; Emphasis supplied)
The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector
Bartolo and Forester Zapatero support the
contention of the petitioner that the area
applied for by the applicant is forest land within
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the
case of Ramos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175)
we have stated:
"Great consideration, it may be stated, should,
and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to
the opinion of the technical expert who speaks
with authority on Forestry matters."
There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the
appellate court that the property in question
was no longer part of the public land when the
Government through the Director of Lands
approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan
(Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The existence of
a sketch plan of real property even if approved
by the Bureau of Lands is no proof in itself of
ownership of the land covered by the plan.
(Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 623). The
fact that a claimant or a possessor has a sketch
plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of
land which forms part of the country’s forest
reserves does not convert such land into
alienable land, much less private property.
Assuming that a public officer erroneously
approves the sketch plan, such approval is null
and void. There must first be a formal
Government declaration that the forest land
has been re-classified into alienable and
disposable agricultural land which may then be
acquired by private persons in accordance
with the various modes of acquiring public
agricultural lands.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the land registration
court which granted the private respondents’
application for registration of the land in
question is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for land registration is DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.
6. G.R. No. 52518. August 13, 1991.*
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-
appellee, vs.UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and
JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants.
PETITION for review from the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
SYLLABUS:
Public Lands; Forest Lands; Transfer of
ownership; Effect on existing timber license
agreements.—When it ceded and transferred
the property to UP, the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the
public domain and, more specifically, in respect
to the areas covered by the timber license of
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 19 of 42
petitioner, removed and segregated it from a
public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title
thereto and relinquished and conveyed the
same to the UP; and made the latter the
absolute owner thereof, subject only to the
existing concession. x x x. The proviso regarding
existing concessions refers to the timber license
of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that
the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must
not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must
be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the
Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor
of the license were effectively assigned, ceded
and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the
above transfer of full ownership. This is further
borne out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which
provides, inter alia, that “any incidental receipts
or income therefrom shall pertain to the general
fund of the University of the Philippines.”
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction of Bureau of
Forestry.—Having been effectively segregated
and removed from the public domain or from a
public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were
likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact
that the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to
the effect that the disposition of timber shall be
subject to forestry laws and regulations is not
reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not
likewise provide that it is subject to the
conditions set forth in the proclamation. An
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing without other limitations than those
established by law.
Same; Same; Same; Authority to collect forest
charges.—As provided for in Article 441 of the
Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural
fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There
are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where
the property is subject to a usufruct, in which
case the usufructuary gets the fruits. In the
instant case, that exception is made for the
petitioner as licensee or grantee of the
concession, which has been given the license
to cut, collect, and remove timber from the
area ceded and transferred to UP until 1
February 1985. However, it has the correlative
duty and obligation to pay the forest charges,
or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the
same rate as provided for in the Agreement.
The charges should not be paid anymore to the
Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau
of Internal Revenue because of the very nature
of the transfer as aforestated.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
From an adverse decision of the then Court of
First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June
1968 in a special civil action for declaratory
relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650
entitled International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines vs. University of the
Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of petitioner and against the
respondents:
(a)Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not
empower the University of the Philippines, in lieu
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau
of Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the
timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of
land referred to in said Act, and collect the
corresponding forest charges prescribed by the
National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b)Dismissing the respondents’ counterclaim.”
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No.
49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in
1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)
promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution
elevating the case to this Court as the “entire
case hinges on the interpretation and
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 20 of 42
construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies
to a set of facts which are not disputed by the
parties and therefore, is a legal question.”1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner
Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June
1966.2Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that
respondent University of the Philippines
(hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the
right to supervise and regulate the cutting and
removal of timber and other forest products, to
scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and
royalties from petitioner and/or impose any
other duty or burden upon the latter in that
portion of its concession, covered by License
Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963,
ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic
Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined
from committing the acts complained of; and
prays that respondents be required to pay
petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages
and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue having been unfavorably acted upon,
and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26
August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on
13 September 1987,3 wherein they interpose the
affirmative defenses of, among others,
improper venue and that the petition states no
cause of action; they further set up a
counterclaim for the payment of it by petitioner
of forest charges on the forest products cut and
felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A.
No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and
interests as provided in the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioner filed a Reply and
Answer to Counterclaim.4
On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of
the Case for Judgment,5 which reads as follows:
“COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled
case, by the undersigned counsel, and
respectfully submit the following JOINT
STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION
OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice
to the presentation of evidence by either party:
xxx
2.Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the
manufacture, processing and exportation of
plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by
the Government an exclusive license for a
period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985,
to cut, collect and remove timber from that
portion of timber land located in the
Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and
Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the
Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavinti
and Calauan, Province of Laguna under
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment)
issued and promulgated by the Government
through the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on January 11, 1960. x x x;
3.That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A
(Amendment) is a renewal of the Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the
Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to
February 1, 1963. x x x;
4.Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to
the present, has been in peaceful possession of
said timber concession and had been felling,
cutting and removing timber therefrom
pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January
11, 1960;
5.Plaintiff, on the strength of the License
Agreement executed by the Government on
June 4, 1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and
of the License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has
constructed roads and other improvements
and installations of the aforementioned area
subject to the grant and purchased equipment
in implementation of the conditions contained
in the aforementioned License Agreement and
has in connection therewith spent more than
P7,000,000.00 as follows: x x x;
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 21 of 42
6.Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the
effectivity of License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President
of the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation
No. 791 which reads as follows: x x x
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH
AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION
STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY
IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL
PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF
QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant
to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P.
Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby
withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for
the College of Agriculture, University of the
Philippines, as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and production
studies of this College, a certain parcel of land
of the Public domain situated partly in the
municipalities of Paete and Pakil, province of
Laguna, and partly in the municipality of
Infanta, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon,
subject to private rights, if any there be, and to
the condition that the disposition of timber and
other forest products found therein shall be
subject to the forestry laws and regulations,
which parcel of land is more particularly
described as follows, to wit:
xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the seal of the Republic of
the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of
September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and sixty-one, and of the
Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
President of the Philippines x x x
7.That on or about June 18, 1964, during the
effectivity of the aforementioned License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11,
1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted by
the Congress of the Philippines and approved
by the President of the Philippines, which
Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central
experiment station for the use of the University
of the Philippines in connection with its research
and extension functions, particularly by the
College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.
SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public
domain consisting of three thousand hectares,
more or less, located in the Municipality of
Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise
boundaries of which are stated in Executive
Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is hereby
ceded and transferred in full ownership to the
University of the Philippines, subject to any
existing concessions, if any.
SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in
the central experiment station shall be exempt
from taxation, local or general, any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall
pertain to the general fund of the University of
the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 22 of 42
Approved, June 18, 1964.
8.That on the strength of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the
institution of the present suit, defendants have
demanded, verbally as well as in writing to
plaintiff:
(a)That the forest charges due and payable by
plaintiff under the License Agreement 27-A
(Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof
be paid to the University of the Philippines,
instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b)That the selling of any timber felled or cut by
plaintiff within the boundaries of the Central
Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act
No. 3990 be performed by personnel of the
University of the Philippines.
9.That the position of the plaintiff on the
demand of the defendants was fully discussed
in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiff’s
lawyer addressed to the President of the
University of the Philippines, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex “A” hereof.
10.That in line with its position as stated in
paragraph 9 hereof, plaintiff has refused to
allow entry to personnel of the University of the
Philippines to the Central Experiment Station
area assigned thereto for the purpose of
supervising the felling, cutting and removal of
timber therein and scaling any such timber cut
and felled prior to removal;
11.That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff
and in relation to the implementation of
Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business
Executive sent the letter quoted below to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
xxx
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June,
1964 a parcel of forest land approximately 3,500
hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by
the government to the University of the
Philippines. This area is known as Paete Land
Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the
name of the University of the Philippines. The law
transferring the ownership to the University of
the Philippines gives the University full rights of
dominion and ownership, subject to the existing
concession of International Hardwood and
Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the
terms of this law all forest charges due from the
concessionaire should now be paid to the
University of the Philippines. The purpose of
giving this land grant to the University is to
enable us to generate income out of the land
grant and establish a research and
experimental station for the Colleges of
Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and
Veterinary Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to
secure your approval of the following matters:
1.All forest charges paid by Interwood to the
District Forester of Laguna from June, 1964 up to
the present should be remitted in favor of the
University of the Philippines;
2.All forest charges presently due from
Interwood shall hereafter be paid to the
University of the Philippines and lastly
3.Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall
receive all forest charges and royalties due from
any logging concession at the land grant.
May we request that proper instructions be
issued by the District Forester of Laguna about
this matter. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR Business Executive.
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 23 of 42
12.That in reply to the above letter of defendant
Business Executive dated February 8, 1966, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the
following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:
xxx
March 11, 1966
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your letter dated February
8, 1966 stating as follows:
xxx
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you
as follows:
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code
as amplified by Section 15(a) of Revenue
Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products
Regulations, forest products, cut, gathered and
removed from registered private woodlands
are not subject to forest charges, but they must
be invoiced when removed to another
municipality or for commercial purposes in the
manner prescribed by the regulations. As the
Paete Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P.
in full private ownership and as the grant is
manifestly to be considered registered, no forest
charges are actually due and payable on the
timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest
charges purportedly to be paid by any
concessionaire under any licensing agreement
entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are,
therefore, to be considered not as the charges
contemplated by the National Internal
Revenue Code but as part of the royalties
payable by the concessionaires for the
exploitation of the timber resources of the land
grant.
Accordingly, your queries are answered viz:
1.The University may directly collect the
supposed forest charges payable by
concessionaires of the land grant.
2.The forest charges paid by International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines may be refunded provided that a
formal claim for the refund thereof is made
within two years from the date of payment. The
proper claimant shall be International
Hardwood and not the University.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
13.That subsequently, defendant Business
Executive sent the letter quoted below to the
District Forester of the province of Laguna
dated April 18, 1966:
April 18, 1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning
the right of the University of the Philip-pines to
collect forest charges from the existing logging
conces-sionaire at the Laguna Land Grant
(formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest
land containing some 3,500 hectares was
ceded to the University of the Philippines in full
ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved
in June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of
the Philippines requested that its authority over
said land be recognized and that the existing
concession-aire, International Hardwood and
Veneer Company of the Phil-ippines, in turn pay
its forest charges directly to the University
instead of to the national government.
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 24 of 42
Please take note of page ‘2’ of the enclosed
letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to the following points raised by the
University:
1.That the University of the Philippines may now
directly collect forest charges from
INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.
2.That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to
the Bureau of Forestry from June, 1964 up to
April, 1966 shall be refunded to the University of
the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the
amount heretofore paid by it to be remitted to
the University of the Philippines.
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, it is understood that forest
charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land
Grant as scaled by scalers of the University of
the Philippines shall now be paid directly to the
University of the Philippines. In another ruling by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is
exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue
taxes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
14.That the above quoted letter of defendant
Business Executive dated April 18, 1966 was duly
endorsed by the District Forester of the province
of Laguna to the Director of Forestry;
15.That on or about June 7, 1966, the Assistant
Director of Forestry addressed to plaintiff the
letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as
follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this
Office to comment on your reply to the letter of
Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of the
Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is
stated that the University of the Philippines is
claiming the right:
(a)To scale, measure and seal the timber cut
inside the areas covered by the U.P. Land Grant
at Paete, Laguna;
(b)To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c)To collect royalties aside from the forest
charges; and
(d)To exercise in effect all the authority vested
by law upon the Bureau of Forestry in the
cutting, removal and disposition of the timber
from said area, and the authority of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue respecting the
measurement and scaling of the logs and the
collection of the corresponding forest charges
and other fees in connection therewith
This office is in full accord with your arguments
against the claim of the University of the
Philippines to have acquired the above rights.
We believe that the right vested the
INTERWOOD by virtue of Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize the
timber inside subject area is still binding and
should therefore, be respected. It is on the basis
of this acknowledgment that we sent your client
our letter of November 4, 1965 requesting him to
comment on the application of the State
University for a Special Timber License over the
said area.
16.That acting on the endorsement referred to
in paragraph 14, the Director of Bureau of
Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below,
dated June 30, 1966: x x x
June 30, 1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 25 of 42
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd
paragraph of your letter dated April 26, 1966,
designated as above, as to whether or not you
shall turn over the scaling work for logs cut from
the area of the International Hardwood &
Veneer Company of the Philippines in the Paete
Land Grant to Scalers of the University of the
Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue that the Paete Land Grant,
which embraces the area of the International
Hardwood & Veneer Company of the
Philippines, is considered a registered private
woodland of the University of the Philippines
and therefore no forest charges are actually
due and payable on the timber cut and
removed therefrom, and in view further of the
ruling of said Commissioner that the forest
charges purportedly to be paid by any
concessionaire under any licensing agreement
entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to
be considered not as the charges
contemplated by the National Internal
Revenue Code but as part of the royalties
payable by the concessionaires for the
exploitation of the timber resources of the land
grant, you may turn over the scaling work
therein to the scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of
such licensing agreements entered or to be
entered into by the U.P. as a means of
smuggling forest products from the neighboring
public forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
x x x ownership’ and exclusive jurisdiction to control
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS, the pleadings filed in the case, and
whatever additional evidence may be
presented by the parties, the parties hereto,
through counsel, jointly move and pray of this
Honorable Court that judgment be rendered
granting full and appropriate relief, on the
following issues:
1.Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present
case was filed, should pay forest charges due
and payable under its Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth
in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines;
and
2.In the event that it be found by this Honorable
Court that said forest charges are to be paid to
the University of the Philippines, whether or not
the University of the Philippines is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
the logging, felling and removal of timber within
the Central Experiment Station area as
described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to
scale the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29, 1967.”
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial
court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in
favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which is quoted at the beginning of this
decision. In deciding the case against UP, it
held:
“x x x the court finds that the respondents’
demand on the petitioner has no legal basis. In
the first place, the cession in full ownership of the
tract of land referred to in the Act was expressly
made ‘subject to any existing concessions.’
Inasmuch as at the time of the enactment of
the Act, the petitioner’s timber concession over
the tract of land was existing and would
continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the
University of the Philippines will acquire ‘full
and administer the property only after February
1, 1985. The cession of the property to the
University of the Philippines is akin to the
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 26 of 42
donation of a parcel of land, subject to
usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership
thereof only upon the termination of the
usufruct. At the time of the donation, all what
the donee acquires is the ‘naked’ ownership of
the property donated. In the second place, the
respondents’ demand cannot be valid unless
the provisions of Secs. 262 to 276 of the National
Internal Revenue Code regarding the
measuring of timber cut from the forest and the
collection of the prescribed forest charges by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry are first amended. In their arguments,
the respondents tried to stretch the scope of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in order to
include therein such amendment of the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code and Revised Administrative Code, but
they failed to convince the Court, not only
because of the first reason above stated, but
also because it clearly appears that such
amendment is not intended in Republic Act No.
3990, which does not contain even a remote
allusion thereto in its title or a general
amendatory provision at the end. In the third
place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the
University of the Philippines cannot legally use
the tract of land ceded to it for purposes other
than those therein expressly provided, namely,
‘for the use of the University of the Philippines in
connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and
College of Arts and Sciences.’ Hence, upon the
expiration of the petitioner’s timber concession,
the University of the Philippines cannot even
legally renew it or grant timber concession over
the whole tract of land or over portions thereof
to other private individuals and exercise the
functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
Bureau of Forestry by scaling and measuring the
timber cut within the area and collecting from
them the forest charges prescribed by the
National Internal Revenue Code.”
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial
court erred:
“I x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION
INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL
DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II x x x WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER THE
RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN
LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND
BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND
SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN
THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT,
AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST
CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.”
1.The first assigned error is without merit. In the
Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move
and pray that the trial court render judgment
“granting full and appropriate remedy on the
following issues:
‘1.Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present
case was filed, should pay forest charges due
and payable under its Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth
in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines;
and
2.In the event that it be found by this Honorable
Court that said forest charges are to be paid to
the University of the Philippines, whether or not
the University of the Philippines is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
the logging, felling and removal of timber within
the Central Experiment Station area as
described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to
scale the timber thus felled.’ ”
These issues bring the matter within the scope of
an action for declaratory relief under Section 1,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render
meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down in
Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al.,6 that
declaratory relief cannot be joined by
injunction, because herein petitioner, for all
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 27 of 42
legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its
failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus,
what attains is an amendment to both
pleadings (the complaint and the answer),
which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:
“SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence.—When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respect, as if they had been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure to
so amend does not affect the result of the trial
by these issues. x x x.”
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to
the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites
for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy;
and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for
judicial determination.7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is
an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of
one exists between the parties, all of whom are
sui juris and before the court, and that the
declaration sought will help in ending the
controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable
controversy when it is translated into a claim of
right which is actually contested.8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents
assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic
of the Philippines may effect collection of forest
charges through the University of the Philippines
because the License Agreement does not
expressly provide that the forest charges shall
be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in
the absence of a specific contractual provision
limiting it to a particular agency in collecting
forest charges owing to it, the Republic may
effect such collection through another agency.
(b) Having been vested with administrative
jurisdiction over and being the owner of the
tract of land in question, the UP acquired full
control and benefit of the timber and other
resources within the area. Timber areas within
the ceded property but outside the concession
of petitioner can be fully exploited by UP.
However, in respect to timber areas within the
ceded property but covered by the concession
of petitioner, only forest charges (or more
appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP
until the expiration of petitioner’s license. To
deny it such charges would render its “full
ownership” empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly
entitled to the income derived from the tract of
land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990
expressly provides:
“All operations and activitiescarried on in the
central experiment station shall be exempt from
taxation, local or general, any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, and any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall
pertain to the general fund of the University of
the Philippines.” (italics supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty
bound to operate and maintain a central
experiment station; since this law does not
provide for appropriations for such purpose, it is
clearly the legislative intention that the
establishment and maintenance thereof must
be financed by the earnings or income from the
area, which can only come from the timber and
the royalties or charges payable therefrom. This
is in accordance with the general principle that
a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends to all
incidents that may arise in connection with the
matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e)
Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of
petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990.
(f) Finally, the two government agencies
affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued specific
rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 28 of 42
royalties or charges and to supervise petitioner’s
logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of
respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has
not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority
to collect forest charges or the authority to
supervise the operation by the petitioner of the
timber concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must
be construed strictly in favor of the public and
most strongly against the grantee, and nothing
will be included in the grant except that which
is granted expressly or by clear implication.
Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as
amended, the duties incident to the measuring
of forest products and the collection of the
charges thereon shall be discharged by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue under the
regulations of the Department of Finance. The
reforestation fee shall be collected by the
Bureau of Forestry.9 The supervision and
regulation of the use of forest products and of
the cutting and removal of forest products are
vested upon the Bureau of Forestry.10 R.A. No.
3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant
the UP any authority to collect from the holders
of timber concessions on the area ceded to it
forest charges due and payable to the
Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce
its provisions relating to charges on forest
products or to supervise the operations of the
concessions by the holders thereof. (b) The
cession in full ownership of the land in question
was expressly made “subject to any
concession, if any”, and that petitioner’s
concession would continue until 1 February
1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership
and exclusive jurisdiction to control and
administer the property only after 1 February
1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee
of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The
rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry
are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies
do not have the power to interpret the law,
which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d)
Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate
the timber concession under the supervision
and control of the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25
September 1961, a parcel of land of the public
domain described therein, with an area of 3,500
hectares, which is the very parcel of land
subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from
sale or settlement and was reserved for the
College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment
station for the proposed Dairy Research and
Training Institute and for research and
production studies of said college, subject
however to private rights, if any, and to the
condition that the disposition of timber and
other forest products found thereon shall be
subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area
covered by petitioner’s timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which
establishes a central experiment station for the
use of the UP in connection with its research and
extension functions, particularly by the College
of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine
and College of Arts and Sciences, the above
“reserved” area was “ceded and transferred in
full ownership to the University of the Philippines
subject to any existing concessions, if any.”
When it ceded and transferred the property to
UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and, more
specifically, in respect to the areas covered by
the timber license of petitioner, removed and
segregated it from a public forest; it divested
itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP;
and made the latter the absolute owner
thereof, subject only to the existing concession.
That the law intended a transfer of the absolute
ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 29 of 42
of the word “full” to describe it. Full means
entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or
not wanting in any essential quality.11 The
proviso regarding existing concessions refers to
the timber license of petitioner. All that it means,
however, is that the right of petitioner as a
timber licensee must not be affected, impaired
or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar
as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned,
all its rights as grantor of the license were
effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to
UP as a consequence of the above transfer of
full ownership. This is further borne out by Section
3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that
“any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University
of the Philippines.” Having been effectively
segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect,
converted into a registered private woodland,
the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is
obvious from the fact that the condition in
Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the
disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry
laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A.
No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide
that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the
proclamation. An owner has the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law.12 The right to
enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to
receive from the thing what it produces, and
the jus abutendi, or the right to consume the
thing by its use.13 As provided for in Article 441
of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the
natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil
fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this
rules, as where the property is subject to a
usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the
fruits.14 In the instant case, that exception is
made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee
of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from
the area ceded and transferred to UP until 1
February 1985. However, it has the correlative
duty and obligation to pay the forest charges,
or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the
same rate as provided for in the Agreement.
The charges should not be paid anymore to the
Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau
of Internal Revenue because of the very nature
of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently,
even the Bureau of Internal Revenue
automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area
and to collect forestry charges and other fees
due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of
petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the
UP the authority to collect forest charges and to
supervise the operations of its concession insofar
as the property of the UP within it is concerned.
Its argument that it has acquired vested rights to
operate its concession under the supervision
and control of the Bureau of Forestry is
preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the
Philippines, was by no means bound under the
License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent.
Neither is there force to its contention that
legislative grants must be construed strictly in
favor of the public and most strongly against the
grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is
transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership
which leaves no room for a strict interpretation
against the grantee, the UP. The reservation
therein made is in favor of the private party
pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless
protected. It is the concession in favor of the
petitioner which should, on the contrary, be
bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
the logging, felling, and removal of timber
within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
FALLO: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650,
rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that
forest charges due from and payable by
petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 30 of 42
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the
area ceded and transferred to the University of
the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be
paid to the University of the Philippines;
DECLARING that the University of the Philippines
is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling, and
removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Note.—The conditions sine qua non before relief
can be availed of include the presence of a
justiciable controversy between persons whose
interests are adverse, the existence of a legal
interest by the party seeking declaratory relief,
and the ripeness of the issue for judicial
determination. (Caltex (Phil.), Inc. vs. Palomar,
18 SCRA 247.)
9. G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996.*
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and
ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions
and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.
G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996.
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES,
Chief, Special Actions and Investigation
Division, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V.
GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., respondents.
PETITIONS for review of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
SYLLABUS:
Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry
Laws; Illegal Logging; Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines (P.D. 705); Under an
administrative seizure, the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles.—
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an
administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only
an inventory of the articles is taken and signed
by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further
orders.
Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry
Laws; IllegalLogging; Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines (P.D. 705); Words and Phrases;
Possession of lumber without the required legal
documents is penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705 because lumber is included in the term
timber.—The foregoing disquisitions should not,
in any manner, be construed as an affirmance
of the respondent Judge’s conclusion that
lumber is excluded from the coverage of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
thus possession thereof without the required
legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary,
this Court rules that such possession is penalized
in the said section because lumber is included
in the term timber.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Simply
put, lumber is processed log or timber.—The
Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of “Processing plant,” which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up,
machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw
materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products. This
simply means that lumberis a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 31 of 42
common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
lumber is defined, inter alia, as “timber or logs
after being prepared for the market.” Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Statutory Construction; In the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their
plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.—It is settled that in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their
plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
And insofar as possession of timberwithout the
required legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes
no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemus.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional
Law; Searches and Seizures; Seizure of a truck
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber not
accompanied with the required invoices and
transport documents is a valid exercise of the
power vested upon a forest officer or employee
by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705; A search could be
lawfully conducted on a moving vehicle
without a search warrant.—It was duly
established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner’s
truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out
from the petitioner’s lumberyard loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes
and dimensions which were not accompanied
with the required invoices and transport
documents. The seizure of such truck and its
cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80
of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the
search was conducted on a moving vehicle.
Such a search could be lawfully conducted
without a search warrant.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures;
Exceptions to the constitutional mandate that
no search or seizure shall be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of
probable cause.—Search of a moving vehicle is
one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions
to the constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause.
The other exceptions are: (1) search as an
incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches,
and (4) consented warrantless search.
Same; Same; Search Warrants; A search
warrant has a lifetime of ten days and it could
be served at any time within the said period,
and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in one day, the same may be
continued the following day or days until
completed.—We also affirm the rulings of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the
search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue
of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has
a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served
at any time within the said period, and if its
object or purpose cannot be accomplished in
one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus,
when the search under a warrant on one day
was interrupted, it may be continued under the
same warrant the following day, provided it is
still within the ten-day period.
Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry
Laws; Illegal Logging; Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines (P.D. 705); Where a lumber-
dealer’s license or permit has been suspended,
he has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or
otherwise dispose of lumber and the Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources or his
authorized representative has the authority to
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 32 of 42
seize the lumber.—The Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the petitioner’s appeal from
the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the
fact that its lumber-dealer’s license or permit
had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on
23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted,
and since the license had only a lifetime of up
to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has
absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise
dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary
Factoran or his authorized representative had
the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and
G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the
Second and Third Divisions of the Court,
respectively. They were subsequently
consolidated with the second, a case of the
Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with
principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at
Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered
as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit
as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles
were, during all the time material to these cases,
the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of
the Special Actions and Investigation Division
(SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a
huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID
organized a team of foresters and policemen
and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard
the petitioner’s truck, with Plate No. CCK-322,
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver
could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at
the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City.1 The team was not able to gain
entry into the premises because of the refusal of
the owner.2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a
search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano
R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the
team seized on that date from the petitioner’s
lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of
narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.3
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the
premises of the petitioner’s lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative
seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner
failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin,
auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery
receipts from the source of the invoices
covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of
their source and origin.4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an
administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only
an inventory of the articles is taken and signed
by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further
orders.5
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 33 of 42
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent
a letter to Robles requesting an extension of
fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the
required documents covering the seized articles
because some of them, particularly the
certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in
the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the
motion on the ground that the documents
being required from the petitioner must
accompany the lumber or forest products
placed under seizure.6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his
memorandum– report recommending to
Secretary Factoran the following:
1.Suspension and subsequent cancellation of
the lumber Dealer’s Permit of Mustang Lumber,
Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard
and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga
Lumber (a banned specie) without the required
documents;
2.Confiscation of the lumber seized at the
Mustang Lumber-yard including the truck with
Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded
herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the
event its owner fails to submit documents
showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber
within ten days from date of seizure;
3.Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy
Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz,
or if the circumstances warrant for illegal
possession of narra and almaciga lumber and
shorts if and when recommendation No. 2
pushes through;
4.Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639
and CDV-458 as well as the lumber loaded
therein for transport lumber using “recycled”
documents.7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an
order suspending immediately the petitioner’s
lumber-dealer’s permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469
and directing the petitioner to explain in writing
within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer’s
permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner
sent another letter to Robles informing the latter
that the petitioner had already secured the
required documents and was ready to submit
them. None, however, was submitted.8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued
another order wherein, after reciting the events
which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he
ordered “CONFISCATED in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance
with law” the approximately 311,000 board feet
of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts,
and sticks found inside the petitioner’s
lumberyard.9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for a restraining order or
preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A.
Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL
CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648
and assigned to Branch 35 of the said court. The
petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on
1 April 1990, without any search and seizure
order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate
No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber
consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of
different sizes and dimensions with a total value
of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary
Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice
and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports
that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended,
were committed and acting upon instruction of
Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series
of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the
business premises of the petitioner located at
No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The
team caught the petitioner operating as a
lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer’s
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 34 of 42
permit had already been suspended on 23 April
1990. Since the gate of the petitioner’s
lumberyard was open, the team went inside
and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer
loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the
team was informed that the lumber loaded on
the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner’s
customer. It also came upon the sales invoice
covering the transaction. The members of the
team then introduced themselves to the
caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be
the wife of the petitioner’s president and
general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then
out of town. The team’s photographer was able
to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber
including newly cut ones, fresh dust around
sawing or cutting machineries and equipment,
and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber.
The team thereupon effected a constructive
seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of
lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the
premises by issuing a receipt therefor.10
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990
incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE)
was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and
assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint
against the petitioner’s president and general
manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68
of P.D. Nos. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277.
After appropriate preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano,
handed down a resolution11 whose dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal
possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for
illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by
E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft.
of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by
legal documents be released to the rightful
owner, Malupa.12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary
of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as
Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal
Logging.13
On the basis of that resolution, an information
was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch
172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy
Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the
CRIMINAL CASE).
The accusatory portion of the information reads
as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or
prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in
Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan
and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal
documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila
rendered its decision15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered
as follows:
1.The Order of Respondent Secretary of the
DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 35 of 42
dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in
favor of the Government the approximately
311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside
and seized from the lumberyard of the
petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village,
Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on
April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and
vacated, and instead the respondents are
required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano
Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court,
NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said
311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt
with as directed by law;
2.The respondents are required to initiate and
prosecute the appropriate action before the
proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions loaded
in petitioner’s truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322
which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3.The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the
Court on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered
functus oficio upon compliance by the
respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment;
4.Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the
lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and
sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2
of this judgment be returned to said petitioner,
is withheld in this case until after the proper
court has taken cognizance and determined
how those lumber, shorts and sticks should be
disposed of; and
5.The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs. SO
ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held
that the warrantless search and seizure on 1
April 1990 of the petitioner’s truck, which was
moving out from the petitioner’s lumberyard in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large
volumes of lumber without covering document
showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did
not offend the constitutional mandate that
search and seizure must be supported by a
valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the
settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a
search of a moving vehicle.16As to the seizure
of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the
trial court ruled that the said seizure was a
continuation of that made the previous day
and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the
search warrant issued by Executive Judge
Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even
question.17 And, although the search warrant
did not specifically mention almaciga, supa,
and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was
valid because it is settled that the executing
officer is not required to ignore contrabands
observed during the conduct of the search.18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary
Factoran’s order of 3 May 1990 ordering the
confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the
Government for the reason that since the
articles were seized pursuant to the search
warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they
should have been returned to him in
compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of
Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the
same had been rendered moot and academic
by the expiration of the petitioner’s lumber-
dealer’s permit on 25 September 1990, a fact
the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the
decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-
G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the
CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to
Suspend Proceedings based on the following
grounds: (a) the information does not charge
an offense, for possession of lumber, as
opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 36 of 42
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not
be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil
Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of
Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending
before the Court of Appeals, which involves the
legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial
question.19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging
that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. Nos.
705, as amended, and, which gave the
example that a search warrant authorizing the
search for and seizure of a gun includes the
seizure of live shells found within the premises to
be searched although not specifically
mentioned in the warrant; in other words, a
departure from the command of the search
warrant describing what property may be
seized thereunder is justified where there is a
direct relation of the additional articles seized to
the primary purpose of the search.
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL
CASE,21 respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong granted the motion to quash and
dismissed the case on the ground that
“possession of lumber without the legal
documents required by forest laws and
regulations is not a crime.”22
Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied in the order of 18 October 1991,23 the
People filed a petition for cer-tiorari with this
Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends
that the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision24 in CA-G.R. SP No.
25510dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner’s
appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE
and affirming the trial court’s rulings on the
issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was
not carrying contraband articles since there is
no law punishing the possession of lumber, and
that lumber is not timber whose possession
without the required legal documents is
unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the
Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the
commercial nature of the forest product
involved has always been foisted by those who
claim to be engaged in the legitimate business
of lumber dealership. But what is important to
consider is that when appellant was required to
present the valid documents showing its
acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber
in question, it failed to present any despite the
period of extension granted to it.25
The petitioner’s motion to reconsider the said
decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution of 3 March 1992.26 Hence, the
petitioner came to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992.27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of
Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari
and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did
not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when
the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the
petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its
license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure
was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as
amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a
warrantless search and seizure under Section 80
of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to
the Court of Appeals, which docketed the
appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petitioner’s appeal in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and
sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial
court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 37 of 42
Relying on the definition of “lumber” by
Webster, viz., “timber or logs, especially after
being prepared for the market,” and by the
Random House Dictionary of the English
Language, viz., “wood, esp. when suitable or
adapted for various building purposes,” the
respondent Court held that since wood is
included in the definition of forest product in
Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
lumber is necessarily included in Section 68
under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a
forest officer or employee can seize the forest
product involved in a violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as
amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in
part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions.—
A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any
of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall
also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense, or the forest products
cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the
process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter
referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or
other forest products or possession of timber or
other forest products without the required legal
documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having
been denied by the Court of Appeals in the
resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed
with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for
review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting
with G.R. No. 106424 with which the other two
were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the
ground that it does not charge an offense.
Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted
the motion reasoning that the subject matter of
the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER,
which is neither “timber” nor “other forest
product” under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and hence, possession thereof
without the required legal documents is not
prohibited and penalized under the said
section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, an information may be quashed
on the ground that the facts alleged therein do
not constitute an offense. It has been said that
“the test for the correctness of this ground is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information,
that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of the offense,29 and matters aliunde
will not be considered.” Anent the sufficiency of
the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court requires, inter alia, that the information
state the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting
Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License.—Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 38 of 42
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case
of partnerships, associations, or corporations,
the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in
favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (a) the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or
other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; and
(b)possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in
Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this
omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber
from the section’s coverage, do the facts
averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE
validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily
leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is
not solely its subject matter. It is evident
therefrom that what are alleged to be in the
possession of the private respondent, without
the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and
shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa.
The “almaciga and lauan” specifically
mentioned in no. (1) are not described as
“lumber.” They cannot refer to the “lumber” in
no. (2) because they are separated by the
words “approximately 200,000 bd. ft.” with the
conjunction “and,” and not with the preposition
“of.” They must then be raw forest products or,
more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.— x x x
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood,
firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil,
honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest
growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering
plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geological
resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the
items covered by the information. The public
and the private respondents obviously
miscomprehended the averments in the
information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not
included in Section 68, the other items therein as
noted above fall within the ambit of the said
section, and as to them, the information validly
charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court
go beyond the four corners of the information
for enlightenment as to whether the information
exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the
pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives
at the conclusion that “only lumber has been
envisioned in the indictment.”
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view.
First, his proposition violates the rule that only the
facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law
violated must be considered in determining
whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted
to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 39 of 42
contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova,
Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the
annexes he referred to,30 cannot lead one to
infer that what the team seized was all lumber.
Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team
found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra
shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible
amount of narra lumber, and approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa which are
classified as prohibited wood species.
(emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the
resolution31 of the investigating prosecutor,
which served as the basis for the filing of the
information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal
possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting
of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment
of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of
PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any
manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge’s conclusion that lumber is
excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is
not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules
that such possession is penalized in the said
section because lumber is included in the term
timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no
definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined
in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found
in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of “Processing plant,” which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up,
machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw
materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed
log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,
the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or
common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
lumber is defined, inter alia, as “timber or logs
after being prepared for the market.”32Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases used
in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary,
and common usage meaning.33 And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal
documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction
between raw or processed timber. Neither
should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE
and in dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The
petitioner has miserably failed to show that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error in its assailed decision of 29 November
1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the
petitioner’s truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was
coming out from the petitioner’s lumberyard
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and
transport documents. The seizure of such truck
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 40 of 42
and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power
vested upon a forest officer or employee by
Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D.
No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, the search was conducted on a moving
vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate34that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause.
The other exceptions are: (1) search as an
incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches,
and (4) consented warrantless search.35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4
April 1990 was a continuation of the search on
3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the
search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has
a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served
at any time within the said period, and if its
object or purpose cannot be accomplished in
one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus,
when the search under a warrant on one day
was interrupted, it may be continued under the
same warrant the following day, provided it is
still within the ten-day period.36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the
search was illegal because possession of lumber
without the required legal documents is not
illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, since lumber is neither specified
therein nor included in the term forest product,
the same hardly merits further discussion in view
of our ruling in G.R. No. 108424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the
petition in this case palpably fail to show prima
facie that a reversible error has been
committed by the Court of Appeals in its
challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and
resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want
of merit. There is no need to require the
respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
petitioner’s appeal from the judgment of the
trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The
petitioner never disputed the fact that its
lumber-dealer’s license or permit had been
suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April
1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since
the license had only a lifetime of up to 25
September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely
no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of
lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his
authorized representative had the authority to
seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the
Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation.—In all
cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative may
order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed
or abandoned . . . .
The petitioner’s insistence that possession or sale
of lumber is not penalized must also fail in view
of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in
G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally
irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a
consequence of the viola tion of the suspension
of the petitioner’s license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No.
123784are nothing more than rituals to cover up
blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code
FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 41 of 42
of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. be deemed hypothetically admitted.
They are presumably trifling attempts to block (Ocampo III vs. Sandiganbayan, 236 SCRA
the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the 1[1994])
decree, efforts which deserve the
commendation of the public in light of the
urgent need to take firm and decisive action
against despoilers of our forests whose
continuous destruction only ensures to the
generations to come, if not the present, an
inheritance of parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The Government must not tire in
its vigilance to protect the environment by
prosecuting without fear or favor any person
who dares to violate our laws for the utilization
and protection of our forests.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

rendered

1.(a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424;

(b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion,
the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18
October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita
Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal
Case No. 324-V-91, entitled “People of the
Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po”; (c) REINSTATING the
information in the said criminal case; and (d)
DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her
successor to hear and decide the case with
purposeful dispatch; and

2.DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and

in G.R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the
petitioner to show that the respondent Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error in the
challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 25510in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and
of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE.

Costs against the petitioner in each of these

three cases. SO ORDERED.

Note.—For purposes of a motion to quash, the

allegations contained in the information must

FORESTRY CODE FOR READING Page 42 of 42