Magallona v. Ermita- GR No. 187167-Aug.

16, 2011

RA 9522 was enacted in order to comply with the terms of UNCLOS III. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine Archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as ”regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.

Respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the
KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic
interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

Ruling:

RA 9522 is valid.

As to the reduction of the Philippine’s Maritime Territory and the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power

Petitioners contend that RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign, in
violation of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.  Untenable.

RA 9522 is a Statutory tool to demarcate (to set the boundaries or limits of) the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf
under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine Territory.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It merely codified norms regulating the conduct of States in the
world’s ocean and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coast. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire or lose territory through
occupation, accretion, cession, and prescription and not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims are outside
UNCLOS III, instead they are governed by the rules on general international law.

The baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from
which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

As to weakening our claims over KIG and Scarborough Shoal and their inclusion in the “regime of islands”

Petitioners submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the
breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over them because the baselines under RA 8522
do not enclose the KIG nor the Scarborough Shoal which would remove them from the Philippine’s continued claim and sovereignty.
--> Untenable

This contention is negated by RA 9522 itself. Sec 2 of the same law affirms our continued claim of sovereignity and jurisdiction over
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Enclosing the KIG and Scarborough Shoal as part of our territory would be a breach of 2 provisions in the UNCLOS III. Article 47 (3) of
UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration
of the archipelago." Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save
for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.

The 2 islands are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago such that any straight
baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago”.

(Sen. Miriam Santiago explains: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough
Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which we call
archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa
ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic
baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations
because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.)

Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of Islands’ is consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III
which manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article
121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of
the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

As to delimiting our territorial waters

Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of
"about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.  Untenable

RA 8522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters,
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone). RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation
under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will
have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.

As to conversion of internal waters to archipelagic waters

Petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these
waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these
passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the
Constitution.  Untenable

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III
(Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space
over it and the submarine areas underneath.

This is affirmed by Sec. 49 of the UNCLOS III: “1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines xxx; 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein. xxx 4. Xxx shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters,
including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.”

As to contention of innocent passage

No state can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law.

The fact of sovereignty does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the archipelagic waters
the burdens (including innocent passage) consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation.

The political branches of the Philippine government may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms which were codified in
UNCLOS III operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters. Significantly, the right of innocent
passage is customary international law, thus, automatically incorporated in Philippine law.

As to invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Art II

Sec. 8 of Art. II states that the PH, consistent with the national interest, adopts, and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in its territory. (This was raised in relation to their contention of the right of innocent passage).

The provision in Art II are mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, “do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights”. Art II provision serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in
interpreting executory provision of the Constitution. The present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed
constitutional violation.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary- GR No. 208566, Nov. 19, 2013

The petitioners seek to nullify a PDAF article in the 2013 General Appropriations Act (GAA) on the ground that: (1) it is a violation of
the separation of powers; and (2) it violates the principle of non-delegability.

The pork barrel system involves 2 kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

(1) Congressional Pork Barrel which is a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund, wherein legislators are able to effectively control
certain aspects of the funds utilization through various post-enactment measures or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider PDAF a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislator to wield a collective power
(2) Presidential Pork Barrel which is a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the president to determine the
manner of its utilization. (The court delimited it to Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund)

Ruling:

Separation of Powers

There is a violation of separation of powers.

The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any
single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be
wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates.

Petitioners contend that there is a violation because it allows legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight.  Meritorious

What is the function of the Executive in the national budget? Enforcement. It "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting"
and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as
well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.
What is the function of the Legislative? Formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by
law. Thus, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national
budget begins. Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive. (Congress may still exercise its
oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight
is already a violation).

In this case, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been
accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment.

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong
to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.

Non-delegability of Legislative Power

There is a violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

Only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally
wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power. (Take note of
exceptions, meron sa memaid)

In the cases at bar, the post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, lodged in Congress. An act of
appropriation involves: (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue; and (b) for a specified purpose.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow.

Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as
all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.

Undue delegation of power in relation to the Presidential Pork Barrel

There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate:

(1) Completeness test states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate.
(2) Sufficient standard test law it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

In this case, there was undue delegation of power when the law (PD 910) did not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. The law
states that, “and for such other purpose as may be hereafter directed by the president” gives the president wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct, which, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond
the purview of the law.

While Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from
its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law
should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains
legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that
the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

Balag v. Senate- GR No. 234608- July 3, 2018

A legislative inquiry was conducted by the Senate on the death of Horacio Tomas Castillo IIII allegedly due to Hazing-related
activities. Petitioner and several other persons were invited to discuss and deliberate on some Senate Bills. While being questioned
by several senators, the petitioner refused to answer the queries and invoked his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner was then
cited for contempt and was placed under detention after the committee hearing. During the afternoon session, Petitioner
apologized or his earlier statement and moved for the lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a member of the AJ
Fraternity but he was not aware who the president was. Petitioner was then questioned by the senators again but he invoked his
right against self-incrimination and reiterated his plea that the contempt order be lifted. Petitioner was then placed under the
custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms.

Petitioner prays for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction because the Senate illegally enforced and the
Contempt Order, which caused him grave and irreparable injury as he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law. He
contends that respondents did not exercise their power of contempt judiciously and with restraint.

In this case, the petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be addressed by Court: what is the duration of the detention
for a contempt ordered by the Senate?

The period of detention under the Senate’s inherent power of contempt is not indefinite.

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of
legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked.

Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly
exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there
is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.

The legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:

1. Upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report-- the Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative
inquiry. Its approval or disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate whether or not
to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of business. At that point, the power of contempt
simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the
detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

2. Upon the expiration of one (1) Congress-- all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on
the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for
the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that
 Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the
imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.

Recourse of Congress: Enact a law or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify or produce papers
during inquiries in aid of legislation. The charge of contempt by Congress shall be tried before the courts, where the contumacious
witness will be heard. More importantly, it shall indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which may include a fine and/or
imprisonment, and the period of imprisonment shall be specified therein. This constitutes as the statutory power of contempt,
which is different from the inherent power of contempt.

Araullo v. Aquino- GR No. 209287- July 1, 2014

This case is an application of Sec. 25, Art. VI of the Constitution:

“No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law,
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.”

There must be concurrence of the following requisites:

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;

(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and

(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

First Requisite

Not complied with. 2011 and 2012 GAAs lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP. Hence, a the transfers
under the DAP were unconstitutional.

In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as
follows:

Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are
hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:

Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are
hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked the phrase “for their respective offices” contained in Section 25(5). The impact of the phrase “for
their respective offices” was to authorize only transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer
was to an item of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase (“to augment any item in this Act”),
and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in
the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the
Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the
Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional commission.
Second Requisite

Not complied with. There were no savings from which funds could be sourced for the DAP. The funds used in the DAP are not
actually savings.

Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which
are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to
vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned
targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

In this case, The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from “pooling of unreleased appropriations
such as unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow
moving projects and discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings.” The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state
the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings.The fact alone that the appropriations
are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened
into categories of items from which savings can be generated.

No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items not provided in the GAA.

The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer should be “to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for the respective offices.” The term “augment” means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree.

The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for any PAP must first be determined
to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings.

Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we conclude that the “savings” pooled under the
DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs. The Executive thereby substituted
its will to that of Congress. Worse, the Executive had not earlier proposed any amount for personnel services and capital outlays in
the NEP that became the basis of the 2011 GAA

Third Requisite:

Cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited under the Constitution. The President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions
may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA “for their respective offices,” Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders
between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the
guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border
augmentations.

Lagman v. Medialdea, GR No. 231658- July 4, 2017

The Scope of the Power to Review

The power to review under the 1987 Constitution refers only to the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.

The phrase “sufficiency of factual basis” in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for
judicial review of the President’s power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President’s decision is correct, rather it only
needs to determine whether the President’s decision had sufficient factual bases.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment
call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be
based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension, which
facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based
on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the
present depends on the President.

Standard of proof of the president

The President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion
was committed or is being committed.176 To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his
emergency powers.

SPARK v. CA, GR No. 187160, Aug 9, 2017

The petition prays that a TRO be issued ordering the respondents mayors to prohibit the implementation of RA 9344 of the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare act for being ultra vires and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violation of the constitutional right of
minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.

Void for Vagueness

Petitioners contend that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness because they do not contain sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions.  Untenable

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly identify any
provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so
that one may act accordingly. The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this
particular claim.

Petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected
curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point
to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing
unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this
perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to
second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due
process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids.

Right of Parents to Rear their Children

Petitioners contend that the ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in
rearing the youth without substantive due process. They assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be
required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily
with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.  Untenable
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their
children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.

This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to
exercise this authority conscientiously. While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions
concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the state may act to promote these
legitimate interests. Thus, in cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or
welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children.As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State
authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. As parens patriae, the State has the
inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children.

In this case, the Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their
children's well-being. The only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to
remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours. In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control
their minors' activities. As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's
right to bring up his or her child.

In the matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of
Noriel Rodriguez, GR No. 191805- Nov. 15, 2011

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

Nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied to attribute responsibility or accountability to
former President Arroyo.  Meritorious

The doctrine of command responsibility imputes responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.

In the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and
have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author
who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as
to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ
of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals
that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo
court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which,
of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.

Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level
of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil
or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and
accountability within these foregoing definitions.

Command responsibility of the president

WON the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.  Yes.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a.) the existence of a
superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b.) the
superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (c.) the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

The president as the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a
superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

As to the issue of knowledge, constructive knowledge is sufficient. Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for
neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is
being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. Knowledge of
the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s
area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved.

WON former president Arroyo is liable  No.

Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for
his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life,
liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston Report,"
respondents already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had
been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends
that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing
enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President
Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.
Saluday v. People, GR No, 215305- April 3, 2018

A bus was flagged down by the task force. The male passengers disembarked from the vehicle. The task force checked all the
baggages of the passenger. A small bag was lifted and found it too heavy for its small size. The task force asked who the owner of the
bag was. The conductor pointed at petitioner. The task force then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag to which
he obliged. The bag revealed a firearm.

The TC and the CA found the petitioner guilty of illegal possession of firearms. On appeal with the SC, the petitioner is assailing the
presence of the first element of the crime: presence of illegal possession of firearms. He alleges that the firearm seized was
inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by the Task Force Davao was illegal.  Unmeritorious.

The Constitutional guarantee only operates against unreasonable searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a search is
reasonable, the Constitutional guarantee does not apply. Justice Harlan in the case of Katz v. United States stated that there is a 2
part test that would trigger the application of the Constitutional guarantee: (1) a person exhibited actual expectation of privacy; (2)
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State
intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Constitutional guarantee triggered.
Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the
alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Constitutional guarantee.

In several cases, the Could held that "simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers
and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could
have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. In private properties that are accessible to the public
(malls, hotels, etc), the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only
difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is, the former emanates from ownership while the latter
stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is
diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public.

In this case, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66
of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further,
SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and
physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open their bags and
luggages. Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby
precluding the necessity for a warrant.

Warrantless inspection of the bag

OSG argues that the petitioner consented to the search thereby making the seized items admissible in evidence.  Meritorious.

The petitioner contends that his failure to object cannot be construed as an implied waiver.

The consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a public or secluded
location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked on; (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (g) the nature of the police
questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.

In this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open
petitioner's bag, petitioner answered ''yes, just open it' based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to
the search of the contents of his bag.
Searches prior to entry and while in transit

Prior entry While in transit

Passengers and their bags and luggage can be subjected to a 3 instances:

routine inspection. Passengers can be frisked. Bags can be
scanned instead of being opened for inspection. Inspection must
be made in the presence of the passenger.
If passenger objects, he or she can validly be refused entry into
the terminal
(1) Upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the
passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow
for an inspection of the person and his or her effects.
(2) Whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the
prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag
or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection
by government agents or private security personnel as
though the person boarded the bus at the terminal

(3) A bus can be flagged down at designated military or

police checkpoints where State agents can board the
vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and
their bags or luggages.

To be valid searches:

(1) As to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being
searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule;

(2) Neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar
motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar
groups should be protected;

(3) As to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety;

(4) As to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place
to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

Note:

 The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk.
 Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route
is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the
terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes
unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
 The guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or
personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no
longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang, GR No. L- 15905, Aug 3, 1966

The petitioners filed the present case to claim damages against the defendant for the publication of an alleged libellous letter of
defendant. The latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the letter is a privileged communication because at the time of
the publication, he was a member of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

WON the publication is a privileged communication.

Ruling:

No.

Art. VI, Sec. 15 states that:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

Is publication a speech or debate  No.

Speech or date refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform
its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question

The publication does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President of the Philippine when Congress presumably
was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines,
on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.