People v. Laog (Labrador) 7.
At around seven o’clock, he was arrested by the police officers of
G.R. No. 178321 | October 5, 2011 | VILLARAMA, JR., J. | Special
Complex Crimes; Composite crime; Rape with homicide
DOCTRINE: Where the law provides a single penalty for two or
more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special
complex crime.
Ruling:
RTC: Two separate informations = murder and rape; reclusion
perpetua each
CA: Affirmed
SC: Special complex crime of rape with homicide
Issue: WON the accused what correctly convicted of the separate crimes of
murder and rape? NO.
Facts:
1. AAA (19) testified that at around 6pm, she and her friend, Jennifer,
were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work
at a canteen near the National Highway in Bulacan.
2. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe,
waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back
of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the
head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down.
3. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit
her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant
stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter
covered her body with thick grass.
4. Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times
more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was
in such defenseless position, appellant raped her. She passed out.
5. When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining
hard. She crawled until she reached her uncle’s farm at daybreak.
When she saw him, she waved at him for help. She was brought to
the hospital by her uncle, BBB (appellant is his son-in-law). and a
certain Nano (neighbor). She later learned that Jennifer had died.
6. During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run
away when appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant
who was her uncle by affinity. She said that she never thought he
would harm them
San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the
police after he ―went wild‖ that same night and struck with a lead
pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house.
When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being
charged with murder and rape.
1. We find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate
crimes of murder and rape. The facts alleged and proven clearly
show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a
special complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8353.
2. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping
with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or
homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime,
the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they
were made the subject of separate complaints.
3. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only
a single penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing
committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
―ART. 266-B. Penalties.—Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide
is committed, the penalty shall be death.
 4. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from
aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also
to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA,
the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been
satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA’s body with grass, as he
did earlier with Jennifer’s body, so that it may not be easily noticed
or seen by passersby.
5. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on
AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA
survived and appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
6. In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term
―homicide‖ is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes
murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances
(treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation)
alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the
crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the
case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
only.
7. In this case, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe
then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. The appellant
intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to his unarmed victim.
8. Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic
aggravating circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the
penalty. The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is death.
9. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346,
entitled ―An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in
the Philippines‖ the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Sidenote: Robbery with homicide Explanation
1. In People v. De Leon, ―In robbery with homicide, the original
criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.
2. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.
The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is
only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration.
3. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the
crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
4. It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or
that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or
that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide,
rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed
by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
5. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of
the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the
felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21,
2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y
Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With
Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-
Rosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages,
P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages. He is further
ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
1
2
 People v. Nelmida
G.R. No. 184500 | September 11, 2012 | PEREZ, J. | Continuing Crime;
Single motivation and single purpose:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ ―ESLAO,‖ and RICARDO AJOK @
―PORDOY,‖ accused-appellants.
RTC: Double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder; reclusion perpetua
CA: Affirmed
SC: Two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted
murder.
Issue: WON the lowert court correctly convicted appellants of double
murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder? NO.
Facts:
1. Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his
security escorts composed of some members of the Philippine Army,
Philippine National Police (PNP) and civilian aides, to wit: (1) T/Sgt.
Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3) PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5)
Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a certain Jun,
respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del Norte.
2. In the afternoon, the group went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan
with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito.
3. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their
co-accused, brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one located on the left side of the
road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed by
appellants and their co-accused to stay in the said waiting shed while
they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of
the road, which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed.
Then, appellants and their co-accused surreptitiously waited for the
vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawantawan.
4. A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle
of Mayor Tawan-tawan approaching towards the direction of
Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment the yellow pick-up service
vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the aforesaid waiting shed,
appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the
vehicle using high-powered firearms.
5. Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and
PFC Tomanto, who was then sitting on the rear (open) portion of the
yellow pickup service vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on the right
side of the road firing at them in a squatting position using an M-16
armalite rifle.
6. Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran
towards the house of Samuel’s aunt located to get their bags and
other stuff. Thereafter, appellants and their co-accused hurriedly ran
towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del
Norte.
7. On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor
Tawan-tawan, namely, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died,
while others suffered injuries. In particular, Macasuba was slightly
hit on the head by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained injury on his shoulder
that almost severed his left arm; PFC Tomanto was hit on the right
and left sides of his body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was
hit on his left shoulder; and Juanito was hit on his right point finger,
right head and left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun were not
injured.
8. The victims were brought to the hospital. PO3 Dela Cruz, however,
died before reaching the hospital while T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the
hospital.
9. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed SPO4 Medrano that appellant
Wenceslao was one of those responsible for the ambush. SPO4
Medrano and his troops, then, conducted an investigation during
which he noticed Samuel at the scene of the crime. They arrested
him. More than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant
Wenceslao was arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was
arrested on 20 December 2001 while working in Puting Bato in
Sapad, Lanao del Norte.
Ruling:
1. This Court believes that appellants should be convicted not of a
complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder
and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and
wounding of the victims in this case were not the result of a single
act but of several acts of the appellants, thus, making Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.
3
 2. Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets
discharged from their firearms when the said vehicle passed by San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of two security
escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt.
Dacoco. [Attempted murder for Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto,
PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun]
3. Treachery was appreciated. The deadly successive shots of the
appellants and their co-accused did not allow the hapless victims,
i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a
decent defense. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, however, cannot be appreciated as it is deemed absorbed in
treachery. Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending
circumstance of evident premeditation, the circumstance cannot
likewise be appreciated.
4. In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed,
however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender
they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as
compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex
crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. A different rule governs where separate and
distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
5. Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the
circumstances present in this case do not fit exactly the description of
a compound crime. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in
different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that
more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one
gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims.
[IMPORTANT] There are, however, several rulings which applied Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code despite the fact that several acts were
performed by several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to the
death and/or injuries to their victims.
People v. Lawas
● The members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader, Lawas,
simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result,
50 persons died.
● It was there held that the killing was the result of a single impulse
as there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each
and every victim separately and distinctly from each other. If the
act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal
impulse, it constitutes a single offense.
● However, ―single criminal impulse‖ was not the only consideration
in applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in the said case
because there was no evidence at all showing the identity or number
of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to
perpetuate the killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could
not be imputed upon the accused (kaya they were just forced to apply
art 48)
● Since it was impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed
by each of them, this Court was ―forced‖ to find all the accused
guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding
each of them responsible for 50 deaths.
● [In the present case: Nelmida] Conspiracy is very much evident from
the afore-enumerated actuations of the appellants and their co-
accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. With the presence of
conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused had
assumed joint criminal responsibility—the act of one is the act of all.
The Lawas doctrine, cannot, to repeat, be applied (because again, in
Lawas, (1) There was no evidence as to the number of people killed,
and (2) there was no conspiracy, unlike in this case. Therefore, Art
48 cannot be applied in Nelmida)
In People v. De los Santos, People v. Abella, People v. Garcia, and People v.
Pincalin, this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code even
though several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended
the commission of the crime.
People v. De los Santos
● A prison riot occurred for two consecutive days inside the national
penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates were killed. Fourteen
(14) inmates were then convicted for the crime of multiple murder.
4
 ● The existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime was duly
proven. There was, however, no discussion why the accused were
convicted of a complex crime instead of separate crimes.
People v. Abella
● Involving the massacre of certain prisoners in the Davao Penal
Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that occurred in the national
penitentiary on 16 February 1958 (subject of De los Santos), all the
accused were also convicted for the complex crime of multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder.
● Conspiracy likewise attended the commission of the crime. This
Court applied the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the
ruling in the said case is predicated on the theory that ―when for the
attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense,
various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as
one offense,‖ a complex one.
● The Lawas doctrine was equally applied although conspiracy had
been duly proven (There was no conspiracy in Lawas but it was still
applied in this case). This Court then stated that where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose ―their individual
acts in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single
act—the act of execution—giving rise to a complex offense.
● In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and
Pincalin, this Court, gave the same justification as in Abella (those
mentioned in bold letters above)
People vs. Pincalin
● This Court has already clarified that: [n]onetheless, this Court further
held that ―in other cases where several killings on the same occasion
were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be
applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate
offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some
decided cases.‖
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the
general rule stated in Article 48 because of the peculiar circumstance of the
cases.
People v. Sanidad
● This Court, once again, applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
although the circumstances of the case were not the same as in
Lawas, De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court
departed from the general rule that Art 48 only applies to single acts.
● In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused
unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney boarded by the victims.
Miraculously, all passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando),
survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime.
● Accused were convicted for the complex crime of murder and
multiple attempted murder. We there held that the case comes within
the purview of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing Lawas
and Abella, it was pronounced that although several independent acts
were performed by the accused, it was not possible to determine who
among them actually killed Rolando; and that there was no evidence
that the accused intended to fire at each and every one of the victims
separately and distinctly from each other.
● On the premise that the evidence clearly shows a single criminal
impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi’s group as a whole, we repeated that
where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose,
their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked
upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single
complex offense. The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is
incorrect. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not involve prisoners
or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such,
Abella would not apply.
To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (complex crime) because of the impossibility of
ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy
was not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to
the accused. Each accused could not be held liable for separate crimes
because of lack of clear evidence showing the number of persons actually
killed by each of them.
[Back to ruling] With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable
for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts
of attempted murder.
As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed
5
upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph
2, Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The
penalty prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should
be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article 51 106 of the Revised
Penal Code. Under paragraph 2, Article 61, 107 in relation to Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. There being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the same should be imposed
in its medium period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64 108 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of attempted murder,

the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor,
which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its
periods, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court,
therefore, imposed upon the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum, for each count of attempted murder.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246 dated 18 June 2008 is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing upon them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count; (2) appellants are also found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of attempted murder thereby imposing
upon them the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for
each count; (3) other than the civil indemnity and moral damages already
awarded by the trial court and the appellate court, appellants are further
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, exemplary and temperate damages in
the amount of P30,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each
deceased victims; and (4) appellants are also directed to pay, jointly and
severally, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito the
amount of P40,000.00 each as moral damages, P25,000.00 each as temperate
damages and P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.
Costs against appellants. SO ORDERED.
People v. Jacinto (Evangelista)
G.R No. | Date | Judge | RA 9344, Sec 38 & 40; rape
RTC: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the
death penalty upon the accused is amended in order to consider the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty
impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. xxx
CA: xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is
ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SC: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant

6
Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the
death penalty imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Issue: WON the accused may enjoy the benefits under RA 9344? - YES
Facts:
1. Testimony of AAA (5 years old), her father FFF, and witness Julito
Apiki: FFF and Jacinto(17 years old) were neighbors since they were
born. FFF’s house is along the road and the house of Jacinto lies at
the back around 80 meters from FFF. AAA also knows Jacinto well
and they were friends until this incident.
2. 6pm of Jan 28, 2003 - FFF sent his 8 year old daughter CCC to buy
cigarettes. AAA went with CCC. CCC returned without AAA. FFF
thought AAA was watching TV at house of her aunt Rita.
3. Julito saw Jacinto place AAA on his lap at the same store that
evening. Jacinto held the hand of AAA and went towards a ―lower
area or place‖
4. AAA says they went towards the rice field and Jacinto made her lie
down, removed her panty and boxed her in the chest. He then
mounted her and pushed his penis into her vagina. Jacinto then left to
go to the house of the neighbor. AAA went home crying
5. FFF found AAA with her face greasy and mud on her head with
blood oozing down the back of her head. FFF found a contusion on
her neck. AAA had no underwear on and had white substance and
mud on her vagina
Ruling: Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age
of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
We find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to
appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict
with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Section 40
of the law and Section 48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately,
appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend
even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so
long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the
chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is
that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training
facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the
court of origin to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultural camp or
other training facility.
7
8
 People v. Sarcia (Alejaga)
G.R No. | Date | Judge | RA 9344, Sec 38 & 40; rape
RTC: Guilty of Rape - Reclusion Perpetua
CA: Affirmed RTC but modified penalty to Death
SC: Penalty of Sarcia is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua.
The case shall be remanded to the court a quo for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of RA 9344.
Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly imposed the penalty of death on
Sarcia - No.
Facts: On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her
[cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling
Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to
the backyard of Saling Crisologo's house. She agreed. Unknown to
appellant, [AAA's cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA's] shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he
ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her
and inserted his penis into [AAA's] private organ. Appellant made
an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt
severe pain inside her private part and said "aray". She also felt an
intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA's cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters
away from them, witnessed appellant's dastardly act. Horrified,
[AAA's cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA's]
mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen.
[AAA's] mother answered that they (referring to {AAA and her
cousin} were still very young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered
[AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA's cousin] immediately returned to the backyard
of Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant,
however, was gone. [AAA's cousin] approached [AAA] and asked
her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer,
[her cousin] did not ask her any further question and just
accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done
to her because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later,
when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in
her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA's
cousin] came to their house and told [AAA's] mother again that
appellant had earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of
[AAA]. [AAA's mother], however did not say anything. At that
time, [AAA's] father was working in Manila
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against
AAA, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
CA: Affirmed RTC but modified the penalty to death
Ruling: No. The Court finds the need to modify the penalty imposed on
Sarcia. The Court finds that Sarcia was 18 years of age, a minor, at the time
of the commission of the crime.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor
under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua.
Moreover, the CA did not suspend the sentence of conviction because SArcia
was about 25 y.o. at the time of promulgation, in accordance with PD 603
―The Child and Youth Welfare Code‖ and AM 02-1-1-18-SC ―Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law‖
However, RA 9344 has been promulgated and this is to be given retroactive
application as per Sec 68 of the said Act.
Sec. 38 of RA 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 y.o. or more at the
time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It does not distinguish
9
whether the crime committed is heinous or not. The primary consideration of
the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration.

Nonetheless, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21.

However, since Sarcia is at this time 31 y.o., application of Sec. 38 and 40 is

now moot and academic.

Nevertheless, Sarcia is entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of the

said Act: Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is
reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be
REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance
with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

10
 People v. Gambao, et. al (Garcia)
G.R. No. 172707 | October 1, 2013 | Perez, J. | Accomplice in Kidnapping with
Ransom
DOCTRINE: Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the suspension
of sentence of a child in conflict with the law shall still be applied
even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
RTC: convicted Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao,
Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping
for Ransom. – sentenced to death; Perpenian however was only 17
years old, hence – reclusion perpetua for him
CA: affirmed
SC: affirmed; modified penalties
Issues:
1. Whether or not Perpenian can benefit from Section 38 of RA
9344, which suspends the sentence of a child in conflict with the
law. – No.
2. Whether or not Perpenian should be liable as a principal. – No, as an
accomplice only.
Facts:
1. Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. One afternoon,
two persons, one of whom was Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went
to Chan’s residence to inquire about a certain passport alleged to
have been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to
her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left.
2. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another person, Tony
Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was
out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them
that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to
accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly
containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined.
3. Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at
large, returned to Chan’s residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy
ushered them in. The unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed
his gun at Chan’s son, Levy and the house companions. As the
unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop
the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen
pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the latter to release his grip on
Chan’s feet.
4. Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van, The group stopped
at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman)
warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth.
Chan was ordered to go with two women. Chan was brought inside a
house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad,
Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol). They threatened
Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million.
5. Chan was awakened and asked to board the van. Chan was brought
to a room on the second floor of a house. Inside the room were three
persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Udal (Udal)
and Gambao. Another woman, later identified as Perpenian
(Perpenian), arrived. Chan was instructed to talk to her son through
a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75,
000.00 she kept in her cabinet. The group then talked to Chan’s son
and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s
release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver ₱400,000.00 at
the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.
6. During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors observed a
Red Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s
residence. The inspectors observed that the occupants of the taxicab
kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors and
their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it
entered the Elizabeth Resort. Convinced that the woman the team
saw in the cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from
Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct
a rescue operation.
7. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the van during a
rescue operation and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as
Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also able to
recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.
Ruling:
1. Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of
Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344, a determination of
11
 whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary. Considering Perpenian’s actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for
that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from detention.
time of the commission of the offense, her minority should be
appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged 2. Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a
mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the RPC swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the
criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the suspension of sentence of a child in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong
conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen and would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however,
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the night at the
cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving moral
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible
from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. as an accomplice in the crime committed. It should be noted that the
9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the child accused-appellant’s presence and company were not indispensable and
in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is
years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. only liable as an accomplice. Moreover, this Court is guided by the
Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in ruling in People v. Clemente, et al., where it was stressed that in case of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that death doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part accomplice rather than that of a principal.
of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the
penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the commission of consummated
kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower
than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua). Applying Article
68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted
to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This
Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the
penalty lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be
imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty,
which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be
within the range of Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be
within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating
circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court
imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of
Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of People v. Reyes (Tagle)
Prision Mayor, as maximum. G.R No. 101127-31| August 7, 1992 | Judge | The Three Fold Rule, 30 years
durating of Perpetual Penalties
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other
training facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in
People v. Jacinto that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of
the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the
offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court,
however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that

12

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Cresenia C. Reyes
Doctrine: — The other applicable reference to reclusion perpetua is found in
Article 70 of the Code which provides that "the maximum duration of the
convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him," and "(i)n
applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties hall be
computed at thirty years." The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for
reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve as the basis for determining
the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold
rule in the service of multiple penalties.
TC: Guilty
CA: Bailable
SC: Non-Bailable *See dsipositive
Issue: Whether a penalty higher than reclusion temporal but less than thirty years
may properly be categorized and considered as embraced within the penalty of
reclusion perpetua (as has been provided in said amendatory decree, the common
praxis being to attribute to reclusion perpetua and the other perpetual penalties a
duration of thirty years)
Facts: Appellant Cresencia Reyes was charged in the RTC of Manila, in three
cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and two cases of estafa. On the
three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, appellant was convicted
and sentenced to a total penalty of two years of imprisonment and to pay a total
fine of P96,290.00. On the two indictments for estafa, in Criminal Case No. 86-
51210, she was convicted and imposed an indeterminate sentence of 6 yrs. and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 yrs, 8 mos and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, together with the accessory penalties, as well as to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P15,750.00 and to pay the costs. In
Criminal Case No. 86-51209 she was found guilty and sentenced to twenty-
two years of reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, to indemnify the
complaining witness in the sum of P80,540.00 and to pay the cost, and other
penalties.
On October 22, 1975, PD No. 818 introduced the ff. amendment to Art 315 of
the RPC:
"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;
Ruling: There is legal basis for PD No. 818 to declare that any penalty
exceeding twenty (20) years, or the maximum duration of reclusion temporal, is
within the range of reclusion perpetua.
Article 27 of the Code 7 provides for the minimum and maximum ranges of all
the penalties in the Code (except bond to keep the peace which shall be for such
period of time as the court may determine) from arresto menor to reclusion
temporal, the latter being specifically from twelve years and one day to twenty
years. For reclusion perpetua, however, there is no specification as to its
minimum and maximum range, as the aforesaid article merely provides that
"(a)ny person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after
undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his
conduct or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive
as unworthy of pardon."
Article 70 of the Code which, in laying down the rule on successive service of
sentences where the culprit has to serve more than three penalties, provides that
"the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-
fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed
upon him," and "(i)n applying the provisions of this rule the duration of
perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years."
The imputed duration of 30yrs for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to
serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for
the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.
Since, however, in all the graduated scales of penalties in the Code, as set out in
Articles 25, 70 and 71, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher
to reclusion temporal, it follows by necessary implication that the minimum of
reclusion perpetua is twenty (20) years and one (1) day with a maximum
duration thereafter to last for the rest of the convict's natural life although,
pursuant to Article 70, it appears that the maximum period for the service of
penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years.
It would be legally absurd and violative of the scales of penalties in the Code
to reckon the minimum of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years since there
would thereby be a resultant lacuna whenever the penalty exceeds the
13
maximum twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but is less than thirty (30)
years.
Other Issue: On Bail - Whether Reyes, who was convicted of estafa under Article
315 of the RPC and sentenced to serve 22 years of reclusion perpetua, may be
allowed to remain on bail during the pendency of her appeal from said conviction.
People vs. Ricardo C . Cortez laid down policies concerning the effectivity of
the bail of the accused:
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the
trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall
be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
Before the ratification of the present Constitution, the rule on non bailability of a
criminal offense was singularly in the case of a capital offense where the
evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, before, offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, were bailable
With the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution against the imposition of the death
penalty, a correlative provision therein categorically declared the unavailability
of bail to persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
the evidence of guilt is strong.
Section 3 of Rule 114 was amended to provide that no bail shall be granted
to those charged with "an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong." There can be no
pretense that such unequivocal and explicit provisions in the Constitution and the
Rules of Court would admit of any exception, qualification or distinction.
expressly or impliedly excluded from the aforestated provisions on non-
bailability, we see no reason why an accused charged with estafa punishable
by reclusion perpetua should now be given the exceptional and favored
treatment of being admitted to bail
It is suggested that since estafa is a crime against property and supposedly not as
"heinous" as crimes against persons or chastity, such as murder or rape, it should not
be equated with the latter felonies in justifying the denial of bail to the accused. The
obvious riposte is that this is a matter which should properly be addressed to the
legislature. It is not for this Court, by judicial legislation, to amend the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, much less the Constitution.
It is evident that the legislative criteria for the imposition of reclusion perpetua in
said offenses took into account not only the outrageous nature of the crime, but also
the moral depravity or criminal perversity shown by the acts of the accused, or the
necessity for protection of property in the governmental, financial or economic
interests of the country. The objectives of Presidential Decree No. 818 are
indubitably within the ambit of the same legislative intendment and the foregoing
justifications for the imposition of higher penalties and the consequent denial of bail
to the malefactor.
Dispositive: ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby RESOLVES (1) to ORDER the bondsman,
Oriental Assurance Corporation, to surrender accused-appellant Cresencia C. Reyes within ten
(10) days from notice to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, and to immediately
inform this Court of such fact of surrender; and (2) to REQUIRE said Regional Trial Court,
immediately after such surrender, to order the transmittal of the accused-appellant to the
Bureau of Corrections through the Philippine National Police and to forthwith report to this
Court its compliance therewith. SO ORDERED.

As such, it may not be said that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were
unaware of the felonies under the RPC which were already punishable with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and which, with the amendments introduced by the
present Constitution, would become non-bailable offenses. pecifically with
respect to the offense of estafa involved in the present case, the members of the
Constitutional Commission could not have been oblivious of Presidential Decree
No. 818, which took effect as early as 1975, providing for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua where bouncing checks of the requisite amount are involved.

There are other crimes involving government and private funds or property
which theretofore were also already punished with reclusion perpetua. Hence,
under the rule of contemporanea expositio and since the felony of estafa was not
14
 Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan (Cerrero)
G.R No.L-51065-72 | Date:June 30, 1987 | Judge:Cortes | Not about
imposition of penalty
DOCTRINE:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
SC: WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Is the penalty imposed upon him by the Sandiganbayan violates the
three-fold rule under Article 70 of the RPC? No
FACTS:
1. Arturo Mejorada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(E) of RA. 3019, aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Mejorada was a right-away agent whose duty was to
process the claims for compensation of damages of property owners
affected by highway construction and improvements.
2. He required the claimants to sign blank copies of Sworn Statements
and Agreements to Demolish, where it appeared that the properties
of the claimants have higher values than the actual value being
claimed by them.
3. However, the claimants did not bother reading through the paper
because they very much interested in the compensation of damages.
After processing the claims, instead of giving to the claimants the
proper amount, Mejorada gave one of them Php 5,000 and the rest,
Php 1,000 each, saying that there are many who would share in said
amounts.
4. The claimants weren’t able to complain because they were afraid of
the accused and his armed companion.
5. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Mejorada 56 years and 8 years of
imprisonment which is equivalent to the eight (8) penalties for the
eight (8) informations filed against him.
Contention of the State: Section 3 of RA 3019 states that Mejorada should
be punished with ―imprisonment for not less than 1 year nor more than 10
years‖ as stated in Sec 9 of the same Act. In this case, there are 8 charges
against him and each charge should be served with the penalty prescribed by
the law.
Contention of the Accused: Mejorada states that the penalty imposed upon
him is contrary to the three-fold rule and states that the duration should not
exceed 40 years. This is in accordance to Article 70 of the RPC.
RULING:The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took
advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants
sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which
contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots.
There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the
values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share
of the amounts due them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which
relates to the allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a violation of
the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not
the violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery. Contrary to the
petitioner averment. We find no variance between the offense charged in the
information and the offense proved. The prosecution was able to establish
through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how
through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants and the
Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the private parties
of the compensation they received was part of' the scheme which commenced
when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he
could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or
improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba
Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish a violation
of Section 3(e).
15
 The petitioner also assails the competency of the Sandiganbayan to hear and Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still
decide this case. He argues that before the Sandiganbayan could legally impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses
function as a judicial body, at least two (2) divisions, or majority of the committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding
justices shall have been duly constituted and appointed. penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the
State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to
We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman v. People impose the appropriate penal sanctions.
(G.R. No. 54288, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 337). In that case, the
petitioner De Guzman questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan to hear
and decide his case on the same ground that herein petitioner assails its
jurisdiction. The Court upheld the authority of the Sandiganbayan saying
that: Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice, and
eight Associate Justices, it does not mean that it cannot validly function
without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that
the "Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three justices each" while
Section 5 thereof provides that the unanimous vote of three justices of a
division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.Thus the
Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each
Division functions independently of the other. As long as a division has been
duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as
judgments of the Sandiganbayan.The judgment convicting petitioner was a
unanimous Decision of the First Division duly constituted. It thus met the
requirement for the pronouncement of a judgment as required by Section 5 of
P.D. 1606 supra.

The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days of
imprisonment. Petitioner impugns this as contrary to the three-fold rule and
insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty
(40) years.Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set
forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into
account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the
service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]).
Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty
"to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the
"imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made
to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the
maximum of which is forty years.

The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing

eight penalties for the eight informations filed against the accused-
petitioner. As We pointed out in the case of People v. Peralta,
16
 People v. Ducosin (Narag)
G.R No. 38332 | December 14, 1933 | BUTTE, J. | ISL; “Maximum and
Minimum”
DOCTRINE: Under section 1 of Act No. 4103 the court must,
instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two penalties, referred
to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and
"minimum". The prisoner must' serve the minimum penalty before
he is eligible for parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103,
which leaves the period between the minimum and maximum
penalty indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the conditions
set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or
in part. He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a
period which is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the
"minimum", as these terms are used in the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.
SC: The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent: that
the defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a maximum penalty
of ten years and one day of prisión mayor in its maximum degree,
and to a minimum imprisonment period of seven years, and as thus
modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. With costs de
oficio.
Issue: How shall the "maximum" and the "minimum" penalty be
determined?
Facts:
1. In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on September 30,
1932, for the crime of frustrated murder upon the following
information:
"That on or about the 23d day of September, 1932, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill,
treacherously attack, assault and wound one Rafael Yanguas by then
and there suddenly and without any warning, stabbing the latter with
a knife, thereby inflicting upon him several wounds in different parts
of the body, some of which are necessarily mortal, thus performing
all the acts of execution which would produce the death of the said
Rafael Yanguas as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of said
accused, that is, by the timely intervention of medical assistance.
"Contrary to law."
2. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to
ten years and one day of prisión mayor with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law and to pay the costs. The penalty for the crime of
murder, under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusión
temporal in its maximum period to death. Under article 50, the
penalty for a frustrated felony is the one next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the consummated felony, which in the present case is
prisión mayor in its maximum period to reclusión temporal in its
medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen years and
four months. The accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating
circumstance, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, fixes
the penalty within the minimum period, that is to say, from ten years
and one day to twelve years, leaving to the discretion of the court the
precise time to be served within said range, i. e., not less than ten
years and one day nor more than.twelve years. The penalty imposed
by the trial judge being within this range is correct and therefore is
the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense
which this accused has committed.
3. As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was enacted after
this appeal was lodged in this court, we are now required to revise
the sentence imposed upon the appellant and to bring the same into
conformity with Act No. 4103.
4. It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court must
now, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two penalties,
referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and
"minimum". The prisoner must serve the minimum penalty before he
is eligible for parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which
leaves the period between the minimum and maximum penalty
indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out
in said Act, -be released from serving said period in whole or in part.
He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which
is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the "minimum", as
these terms are used in the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Ruling:
1. The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable
by the Revised Penal Code, in accordance with the rules and
17
 provisions of said Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate committee they stated that the court might fix the minimum penalty
Sentence Law, had never been passed. We think it is clear from a at five years or seven years.
reading of Act No. 4103 that it was not its purpose to make
inoperative any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Neither Dispositive:
the title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the part of
the Legislature to repeal or amend any of the provisions of the The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent: that the
Revised Penal Code. The legislative history of the Act further shows defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten years
that attention was called to the necessity for taking care "so as not to and one day of prisión mayor in its maximum degree, and to a minimum
bring the provisions of this bill in conflict with the provisions of our imprisonment period of seven years, and as thus modified, the judgment
penal laws, especially with those treating with penalties." appealed from is affirmed. With costs de oficio.
2. We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period"
referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this
"minimum which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment
period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for
the offense." We are here upon new ground. It is in determining the
"minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the
fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had.
The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects:
first, the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits
of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad
question of the factors and circumstances that should guide the
discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the
ascertained limits.
3. We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by said Code for the offense" to mean the penalty
next lower to that determined by the court in the case before it as the
maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by the Revised
Penal Code, see our discussion above). In the example which the
Legislature had before it in the Committee Report above mentioned,
the maximum of the sentence was correctly stated to be the medium
degree of prisión mayor in its medium and maximum period. The
penalty next lower is prisión correccional in its maximum degree to
prisión mayor in its minimum degree (article 61, paragraph 4,
Revised Penal Code), that is to say, anywhere from f our years, two
months and one day to eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Act No. 4103, simply provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less
than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower."
In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the court to
fix the minimum of the penalty anywhere between four years, two
months and one day and eight years. In the example given by the

18
19
 People v. Temporada (Delocario)
G.R No. 173473 | 17-Dec-’08 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | ISL; Penalty next lower
DOCTRINE: The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)
of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is
taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional
minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the
five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional since this
is within the range of prisión correccional minimum and medium.
RTC: Convicted Beth Temporada of the crime of large scale illegal
recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, and
five counts of estafa under Article 315, par. (2) (a) of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of accused
Beth Temporada BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is hereby
rendered CONVICTING the said accused, as principal of the offenses
charged and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment; and the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to nine
(9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum for the estafa
committed against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.; the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as
minimum to ten (10) years and one day of prision mayor as maximum each
for the estafas committed against complainants, Dennis Dimaano, Soledad
B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to eleven (11)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the estafa
committed against Evelyn Estacio.
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC of Manila
SC: Modified the decision of the CA (see dispositive)
Issue: Whether or not the indeterminate penalties imposed for the five counts
of estafa committed by Beth Temporada were correct. Yes, because she’s
guilty of the five counts of estafa as principal.
Facts: From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie "Baby"
Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and appellant
Beth Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and Tours
Corporation (ATTC), recruited and promised overseas employment, for a
fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and
Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory
workers in Hongkong. The accused and appellant were then holding office at
Dela Rosa Street, Makati City but eventually transferred business to
Discovery Plaza, Ermita, Manila. After complainants had submitted all the
requirements consisting of their respective application forms, passports, NBI
clearances and medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on different
dates, collected and received from them placement fees in various amounts,
viz: a) from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. – 57,600.00; b) from Dennis Dimaano –
P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn Estacio – P88,520.00; d) from Soledad Atle –
P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay – P69,520.00. As none of them was able
to leave nor recover the amounts they had paid, complainant lodged separate
criminal complaints against accused and appellant before the City Prosecutor
of Manila. On November 29, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto
Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations against the accused and appellant,
one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38 (a) of the Labor
Code as amended, and the rest for five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thusly:
ART. 13. Definitions. – x x x
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements must
concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b)
the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any
of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code
(now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. In the case at
bar, the foregoing elements are present. Appellant, in conspiracy with her co-
20
accused, misrepresented to have the power, influence, authority and business
to obtain overseas employment upon payment of a placement fee which was
duly collected from complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Dennis Dimaano, Evelyn
Estacio, Soledad Atle and Luz Minkay. Further, the certification issued by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the
testimony of Ann Abastra Abas, a representative of said government agency,
established that appellant and her co-accused did not possess any authority or
license to recruit workers for overseas employment. And, since there were
five (5) victims, the trial court correctly found appellant liable for illegal
recruitment in large scale.
Although Beth Temporada argues that she was merely an employee of
ATTC. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it
is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.9
Appellant actively took part in the illegal recruitment of private
complainants. Rogelio Legaspi testified that after introducing herself as the
General Manager of ATTC, appellant persuaded him to apply as a technician
in Singapore and assured him that there was a job market therefor. In
addition to the placement fee of P35,000.00 which he paid to accused
Bernadette Miranda, he also handed the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant
who, in turn, issued him a receipt for the total amount of P45,000.00. The
totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an
indispensable participant and effective collaborator of her co-accused in the
illegal recruitment of complainants.
Ruling: The totality of the evidence established that the accused is an
indispensable participant and effective collaborator of her co-accused in the
illegal recruitment of their complainants.
Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale or by a syndicate. The trial court, therefore,
properly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 on
the appellant.
Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under
the Labor Code may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.
The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
On penalties:
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC,
when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisión correccional
maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the
penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum and
medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the five estafa
cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional since this is within the
range of prisión correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of
prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum
period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.
However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is not prisión mayor
minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of
which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article
6517 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years.18 The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus
be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the
discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be
subtracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00.
Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done starting with the case
of People v. Pabalan20 in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws
shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. The doctrine enunciated
in People v. Benemerito21 insofar as the fraction of a year was utilized in
computing the total incremental penalty should, thus, be modified. In
accordance with the above procedure, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentences imposed by the RTC should be as follows:
21
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED with respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant
for the five (5) counts of estafa, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as
minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor as maximum.
(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the
accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prisión correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of
prisión mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as
minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusión temporal as
maximum.
In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

22
 Dela Cruz v. CA 265 SCRA 299 (1996) (Tan)
G.R. No. 105213, December 4, 1996 PANGANIBAN, J.: |
ISL; Maximum penalty to exceed 20 years
DOCTRINE: In determining penalties in estafa, for each P10,000
that exceeds the P22,000 benchmark, one year of imprisonment is
added. But the law categorically declares that the maximum penalty
should be not more than 20 years.
Issue: Was the CA correct in clarifying the penalty applicable to an
indeterminate penalty of 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum?
Facts: In August 1989, the private complainant Bellosillo was introduced to
the accused at the Maxim's Restaurant in Manila. This meeting resulted into
an Agreement of Undertaking, whereby the accused, as seller, undertook to
cause the release from the Bureau of Customs of 832 pieces of used gasoline
engines and spare parts which the private complainant, as buyer, agreed to
pay for P700,000.00.
(1st transaction) As agreed, the private complainant paid to the accused the
amount of P300,000.00, and the balance of P400,000.00, payable within
three (3) day(s) after delivery of the merchandise. The merchandise however
could not be released for lack of certain signatures, so the Agreement of
Undertaking was not consummated.
The accused, instead presented the bill of lading to the private complainant,
propositioned, instead, to work for the release of used engines contained in
five (5) container vans. Bellosillo agreed considering that she has influence
and connections in the Bureau of Customs as a representative of a broker,
promising that his money would be doubled.
(2nd transaction) Because of these representations by the accused, Bellosillo
agreed to fund the release of the five (5) container vans containing used
engines. He gave an additional amount of P100,000.00. The accused failed
however to fulfill her end of the bargain.
(3rd transaction) Meanwhile, the accused also proposed for the release of a
Mercedes Benz car which she said can be done together with the five (5)
container vans of used engines, if the additional amount of P140,000.00 is
given by the private complainant. The private complainant agreed and raised
this amount by pawning his valuables. But, still the Mercedes Benz car and
the five (5) container vans of used engines were not delivered, on the excuse
that there was still lacking P175,000.00 for demurrage and storage fees. The
private complainant also gave this amount.
But neither the five (5) container vans of used engines or the Mercedes Benz
car was delivered, notwithstanding her promises to do so, and inspite of the
repeated demands from the private complainant. Hence, a case for estafa was
filed against the accused. Math: 300+100+140+175 = 715K.
RTC Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the
accused, ERLINDA DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of Estafa, under Article
315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC, taking into consideration the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances which
attended the commission of the offense, the said accused is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional in its medium
period, as the minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as the maximum, plus 69 years considering that the
amount defrauded by the accused exceeds the sum of P22,000.00,
computed at one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 out of the
P693,000.00 excess thereof, but the penalty to be suffered by the accused
shall not exceed twenty (20) years; with all the accessory penalties; to
indemnify Bellosillo P715,000.00, and to pay the costs.
CA Ruling: Petitioner appealed to the CA. But finding her allegations
superficial and unsupported by the evidence, it disposed of the appeal:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction herein appealed from is
AFFIRMED, and the indeterminate penalty imposed by the lower court on
appellant is clarified so as to read:
From four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correcional as minimum to
20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SC Ruling: YES. The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded.
Article 315 of the RPC provides that the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (or imprisonment
ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years), if the amount of the
fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period (6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years), adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 pesos; but the total
penalty shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with
23
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the "4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed
other provisions of the RPC, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000): x x x x x x
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

Inasmuch as the amount of P715,000.00 is P693,000.00 more than the above

mentioned benchmark of P22,000.00, then, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days
to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 69 years, as
computed by the trial court. But the law categorically declares that the
maximum penalty should be not more than 20 years. The maximum penalty
then shall not exceed 20 years of reclusion temporal. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty
should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense committed, which is prision
correccional. Finding no error in the penalty proposed by the Solicitor
General and imposed by the respondent Court, we thus sustain it.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of

merit, and the Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

IMPORTANT: Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885, PD 1689,

and PD 818, has been further amended by RA 10951:

"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

"1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos
(₱2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000), and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (₱2,000,000);
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.

"2nd. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed
Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).

"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its
minimum period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed
One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).

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