Ruling
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
A warrant cannot be issued while a
vehicle is moving, therefore a search
without warrant due to probable cause
is valid and legal.
Sec 3 :
1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court,
or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
***Every person has the right to keep his
communication or correspondence a
secret. His communication with others
by phone or by letter is a personal or
private matter that nobody should
intrude upon.But this right can be
lawfully suspended upon order of the
court if the safety and security of the
people is at stake.
MEANING OF RIGHT OF PRIVACY
-The right to be left alone.
- Right of a person to be free from
undesired publicity, or disclosure of his
communication and correspondence
asn as the right to live without
unwarranted interference by the public
in matters which the public is not
necessarily concerned
BASIS AND PURPOSE OF THE RIGHT
1. Right existing in the state of
nature
Considered as belonging to that class
of rights which every human in his
natural state
2. Right designed to secure
enjoyment of one’s private life
Accorded protection to secure the
enjoyment by a person of his private life
RELATIONSHIP WITH RIGHT AGAINST
SEIZURES
1. Aspect of the right to be secure
in one’s person
Constitutional provision on the right of
privacy complements or implements
the security of the citizen against
unreasonable searches and seizures
2. Privacy of communication and
correspondence
RIght to privacy covers all intrusions or
arbitrary interference into the private
affairs of persons
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS
1. Permissible interference
a. Upon lawful order of the
court;
b. When public safety or
order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law
2. Intervention of the court
Right is subject to the police power of
the State
EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
1. Inadmissible- any evidence
obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable search
and seizures and the right to
privacy and communication.
2. Reason – its exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the
constitutional guarantees.
3. Right of owner – the owner has
the right that the articles seized
be returned.
MEANING OF WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
a judicial remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.
PURPOSE OF THE WRIT
The writ, together with the writ of
habeas corpus and Writ of Amparo ,
completes the legal armory and
remedy of a citizen against violations
and threats to his rights to life, liberty,
security and information.
HOW THE WRIT OPERATES
Any aggrieved party may file a petition
for the writ of habeas data. However, in
cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be
filed by:
[a] Any member of the immediate
family of the aggrieved party, namely:
the spouse, children and parents; or
[b] Any ascendant, descendant or
collateral relative of the aggrieved party
within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity
SEC 4:
No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for a redress of
grievances.
***In essence, our constitution
promotes press freedom as a right of
every Filipino. However, the current
situation of Philippine media shows
otherwise.
MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
OF EXPRESSION, AND OF THE PRESS
The right to freely utter and publish
whatever one pleases without previous
restraint, and to be protected against
any responsibility for so doing as long
as it does not violate the law, or injure
someone’s character, reputation, or
business.
SCOPE OF THE FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
the rights of assembly and petition, the
right to form associations or societies
not contrary to the law, and the right to
religious freedom.
SCOPE OF TERMS “SPEECH”,
“EXPRESSION”, AND “PRESS”
1. “Speech” and “expression” cover any
form of oral utterances such as protests
as an expression of opinion about
subjects of public concern
2. The “press” covers any sort of
publications as instruments for mass
communication.
IMPORTANCE OF THE GUARANTEE
1. Promotes growth of the individual
and the nation.
2. Makes possible scrutiny of acts and
conduct of public officials.
3. Insures a responsive and popular
government.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION NOT
ABSOLUTE
1. Subject to regulation by the state.
2. Subject one to liability when abused.
JUSTIFICATION FOR ABRIDGMENT OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE
PRESS
1. Clear and present danger rule.
2. Application of rule.
MEANING OF RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY
AND RIGHT OF PETITION
1. The right of assembly means the
right on the part of the citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs.
2. The right of petition means the right
of any person or group of persons, to
apply without fear of penalty to the
appropriate branch or office of
government for redress of grievances.
RELATIONSHIP WITH FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
1. Complement of right of free speech.
2. Application of clear and present
danger rule.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs
ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991 193 SCRA
57
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his
common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went
to the booth of the “Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders” carrying Four
(4) wrapped packages. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was
sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked
if she could examine and inspect the
packages. She refused and assures her
that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellant’s box to
the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes(Proprietor),
following the standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. A peculiar odor emitted
from the box and that the gloves
contain dried leaves. He prepared a
letter and reported to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examinations.
The dried marijuana leaves were found
to have contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.
The accused – appellant assigns the
following errors: The lower court erred
in admitting in evidence the illegality
of search and seized objects contained
in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal
objects is legal?
HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987
Constitution
Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of
communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561
January 18, 1991
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his
common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went
to the booth of the “Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4)
wrapped packages. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes (proprietress)
that he was sending the packages to a
friend, WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II in
Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked
if she could examine and inspect the
packages. She refused and assures her
that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellant’s box to
the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor),
following the standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. A peculiar odor emitted
from the box and that the gloves
contain dried leaves. He prepared a
letter and reported to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examinations.
The dried marijuana leaves were found
to have contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.
The accused – appellant assigns the
following errors: The lower court erred
in admitting in evidence the illegality of
search and seized objects contained in
the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal
objects is legal
HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987
Constitution
Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule
Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as
inadmissible any evidence obtained
by virtue of a defective search
warrant, abandoning in the process
the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs
People’s Court.
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to
be excluded was primarily discovered
and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of
state authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused / appellant
validly claim that his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar
having come into possession of the
government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the
Court sees no cogent reason why the
same should not be admitted.
JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
FACTS:
Two warrants were issued against
petitioners for the search on the
premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers and the
seizure of items alleged to have been
used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of
preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as
evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for
the lack of probable cause and that
the two warrants issued indicated
only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to
the warrant were real properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the two warrants were
valid to justify seizure of the items.
HELD:
The defect in the indication of the
same address in the two warrants
was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in
view of the correct determination of the
place sought to be searched set forth in
the application. The purpose and intent
to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two
warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized
were real properties, the court applied
the principle in the case of Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that
machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a
temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner.” In
the case at bar, petitioners did not
claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being
the case, the machinery in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground
remain movable property susceptible
to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two
warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined
as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the affidavits
submitted for the application of the
warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the
statements of the witnesses having
been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the
prohibition on the issuance of general
warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas).
The description and enumeration in
the warrant of the items to be
searched and seized did not indicate
with specification the subversive
nature of the said items.
Adiong Vs Comelec
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 2347
pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166
and other election laws. Section 15(a) of
the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda.”
The following are lawful election
propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals
Provided, That decals and stickers may
be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph
(f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution
provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election
propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display
or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary,
except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a
senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992
elections assails the COMELEC’s
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in
“mobile” places like cars and other
moving vehicles. According to him
such prohibition is violative of Section
82 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may
prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on “mobile” places, public or
private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting
areas that it fixes.
HELD:
The petition is hereby GRANTED.
The portion of Section 15 (a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC
providing that “decals and stickers may
be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph (f)
of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED
NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s
prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on “mobile” places whether
public or private, except in
designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds. The
prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen’s fundamental right of free
speech enshrined in the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the
freedom of expression curtailed by
the questioned prohibition is not so
much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at
the freedom of an individual to express
his preference and, by displaying it on
his car, to convince others to agree with
him.
Also, the questioned prohibition
premised on the statute (RA 6646)
and as couched in the resolution is
void for overbreadth. The restriction as
to where the decals and stickers should
be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen’s private
property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle (The provisions
allowing regulation are so loosely
worded that they include the posting of
decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s
living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section
1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due
process of law. (The right to property
may be subject to a greater degree of
regulation but when this right is joined
by a “liberty” interest, the burden of
justification on the part of the
Government must be exceptionally
convincing and irrefutable. The burden
is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional
objective to give a rich candidate and
a poor candidate equal opportunity
to inform the electorate as regards
their candidacies, mandated by
Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII,
section 1 in relation to Article IX (c)
Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers
on cars and other private vehicles. It is
to be reiterated that the posting of
decals and stickers on cars, calesas,
tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the
owner of the vehicle. Hence, the
preference of the citizen becomes
crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources
of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of
decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private, except in
authorised areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
 right of the people to information on
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. matters of public concern.
GONZALES,
G.R. No. 168338 ISSUE:
February 15, 2008 Whether or not the acts of the
respondents abridge freedom of
FACTS: speech and of the press.
A year following the 2004 national
and local elections, Press Secretary HELD:
Ignacio Bunye disclosed to the public
how the opposition planned to Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of
destabilize the administration by speech and expression are evaluated
releasing an audiotape of a mobile by either or a combination of three
phone conversation allegedly tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency
between President Gloria Macapagal doctrine, which limits speech once a
Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano rational connection has been
of the Commission on Elections established between the speech
(COMELEC). The conversation was restrained and the danger
alleged to have been audio-taped contemplated; (b) the balancing of
through wire-tapping. On June 8, interests tests, a standard when courts
2005, respondent Secretary Raul balance conflicting social values and
Gonzales of the Department of Justice individual interests, and (c) the clear
(DOJ) warned reporters who are in and present danger rule which rests on
possession of copies of the said the premise that speech may be
conversation, as well as those restrained because there is substantial
broadcasting companies and/or danger that the speech will likely lead
publishers that they may be held liable to an evil the government has a right to
under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. prevent.
Consequently, the National
Telecommunications Commission It appears that the great evil which
(NTC) issued a press release government wants to prevent is the
strengthening the prohibition on the airing of a tape recording in alleged
dissemination of the same – that the violation of the anti-wiretapping law.
broadcasting/airing of such However, respondents’ evidence falls
information shall be just cause for the short of satisfying the clear and present
suspension, revocation and/or danger test.
cancellation of the licenses or Firstly, the various statements of the
authorizations issued by the Press Secretary obfuscate (blur) the
Commission. Petitioner Francisco identity of the voices in the tape
Chavez filed a petition against recording.
respondent Gonzales and NTC, praying Secondly, the integrity of the taped
for the issuance of writs of certiorari conversation is also suspect. The Press
and prohibition for the nullification of Secretary showed to the public two
the acts, issuances and orders of versions, one is supposed to be a
respondents – as they were outright “complete” version and the other, an
violations of the freedom of “altered” version.
expression and of the press, and the Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the who’s and the
how’s of the wiretapping act is tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent
ambivalent, especially considering the Secretary Raul Gonzales of the
tape’s different versions. The identity of Department of Justice (DOJ) warned
the wire-tappers, the manner of its reporters who are in possession of
commission and other related and copies of the said conversation, as well
relevant proofs are some of the as those broadcasting companies
invisibles of this case. and/or publishers that they may be
Fourthly, given all these unsettled held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping
facets of the tape, it is even arguable Act.
whether its airing would violate the
anti-wiretapping law. Consequently, the National
Telecommunications Commission
We rule that not every violation of a law (NTC) issued a press release
will justify straitjacketing the exercise strengthening the prohibition on the
of freedom of speech and of the press. dissemination of the same – that the
broadcasting/airing of such
The need to prevent their violation information shall be just cause for the
cannot per se trump the exercise of suspension, revocation and/or
free speech and free press, a preferred cancellation of the licenses or
right whose breach can lead to greater authorizations issued by the
evils. For this failure of the respondents Commission. Petitioner Francisco
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear Chavez filed a petition against
and present danger test, the Court has respondent Gonzales and NTC, praying
no option but to uphold the exercise of for the issuance of writs of certiorari and
free speech and free press. There is no prohibition for the nullification of the
showing that the feared violation of the acts, issuances and orders of
anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers respondents – as they were outright
the national security of the State. violations of the freedom of expression
and of the press, and the right of the
people to information on matters of
Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales public concern.
GR No. 168338, 15 February 2008
Ponente: Puno ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the
respondents abridge freedom of
speech and of the press.
FACTS:
A year following the 2004 national and HELD:
local elections, Press Secretary Ignacio
Bunye disclosed to the public how the Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of
opposition planned to destabilize the speech and expression are evaluated
administration by releasing an by either or a combination of three
audiotape of a mobile phone tests, i.e.,
conversation allegedly between
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,
Commissioner Garcillano of the which limits speech once a rational
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). connection has been established
The conversation was alleged to have between the speech restrained and the
been audio-taped through wire- danger contemplated;

(b) the balancing of interests tests, a
standard when courts balance
conflicting social values and individual
interests, and
(c) the clear and present danger
rule which rests on the premise that
speech may be restrained because
there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the
government has a right to prevent.
It appears that the great evil which
government wants to prevent is the
airing of a tape recording in alleged
violation of the anti-wiretapping law.
However, respondents’ evidence falls
short of satisfying the clear and present
danger test.
Firstly, the various statements of the
Press Secretary obfuscate (blur) the
identity of the voices in the tape
recording.
Secondly, the integrity (completeness)
of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to
the public two versions, one is
supposed to be a “complete” version
and the other, an “altered” version.
Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the who’s and the
how’s of the wiretapping act is
ambivalent (conflicted), especially
considering the tape’s different
versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission
and other related and relevant proofs
are some of the invisibles of this case.
Fourthly, given all these unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable
whether its airing would violate the
anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a
law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of
the press.
The need to prevent their violation
cannot per se, trump (overall win) the
exercise of
free speech and free press, a
preferred right whose breach can
lead to greater evils. For this failure of
the respondents alone to offer proof to
satisfy the clear and present danger
test, the Court has no option but to
uphold the exercise of free speech and
free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping
law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
Adiong vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
Facts:
Public respondent promulgated a
resolution prohibiting the posting of
decals and stickers on “mobile” places,
public or private, and limit their
location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that
COMELEC fixes. Petitione Blo Umpar
Adiong, senatorial candidate assails
said resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in mobile
places like cars and other moving
vehicles, wherein it is his last medium
to inform the electorate (voters) that he
is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban
on radio, tv and print political
advertisements.
Issue:
Whether or not the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the
posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places, public or private, and
limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.
Ratio:
No. The prohibition on posting of decals
and stickers on “mobile”places whether
public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution:
. . . The concept of the Constitution as
the fundamental law, setting forth the
criterion (criteria) for the validity of any
public act whether proceeding from
the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system
of government. That is to manifest
fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the
topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.
The three departments of government
in the discharge of the functions with
which it is entrusted have no choice but
to yield obedience to its commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment
of statutes must ever be on guard lest
the restrictions on its authority, either
substantive or formal, be transcended.
The Presidency in the execution of the
laws cannot ignore or disregard what it
ordains. In its task of applying the law to
the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of
judicial review to pass upon the validity
of the acts of the coordinate branches
in the course of adjudication is a logical.
corollary of this basic principle that the
Constitution is paramount. It overrides
any governmental measure that fails to
live up to its mandates. Thereby there is
a recognition of its being the supreme
law. (Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, supra)
The unusual circumstances of this
year's national and local elections call
for a more liberal interpretation of the
freedom to speak and the right to
know. It is not alone the widest possible
dissemination of information on
platforms and programs which
concern us. Nor are we limiting
ourselves to protecting the unfettered
interchange of ideas to bring about
political change. (Cf. New York Times v.
Sullivan, supra) The big number of
candidates and elective positions
involved has resulted in the peculiar
situation where almost all voters
cannot name half or even two-thirds of
the candidates running for Senator. The
public does not know who are aspiring
to be elected to public office.
There are many candidates whose
names alone evoke qualifications,
platforms, programs and ideologies
which the voter may accept or reject.
When a person attaches a sticker with
such a candidate's name on his car
bumper, he is expressing more than
the name; he is espousing ideas. Our
review of the validity of the challenged
regulation includes its effects in today's
particular circumstances. We are
constrained to rule against the
COMELEC prohibition.
There is no public interest substantial
enough to warrant the prohibition.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a)
of Resolution No. 2347 of the
Commission on Elections providing
that "decals and stickers may be posted
only in any of the authorized posting
areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL
and VOID.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261 December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against
petitioners for the search on the
premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers and the
seizure of items alleged to have been
used in subversive activities. Petitioners
prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory (they won’t return the
seized items) and prohibitory
injunction (restrain on the action) be
issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents be
enjoined from using the articles thus
seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for
the lack of probable cause (reasonable
belief that a crime has been
committed) and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same
address. In addition, the items seized
subject to the warrant were real
properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were
valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same
address in the two warrants was held
by the court as a typographical error
and immaterial in view of the correct
determination of the place sought to
be searched set forth in the application.
The purpose and intent to search two
distinct premises was evident in the
issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized
were real properties, the court applied
the principle in the case of Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that
machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by
the owner of the tenement (house),
property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary
right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.” In the case at bar,
petitioners did not claim to be the
owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed.
This being the case, the machinery in
question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
However, the Court declared the two
warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined
as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits
submitted for the application of the
warrant did not satisfy the requirement
of probable cause, the statements of
the witnesses having been mere
generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the

prohibition on the issuance of general
warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas).
The description and enumeration in
the warrant of the items to be searched
and seized did not indicate with
specification the subversive nature of
the said items.