Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.

LAUREL, J.:

On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an

information charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the
crime of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any
justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison,
attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his
body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:

"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the
superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab
wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left
elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days
afterwards.

On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The
defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the
defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopatic
Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital to
render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio
Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On
March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in
view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor
of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the
complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to
this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for the
necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the court to
summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of
the accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation.
The trial court then issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the
chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital for his personal
observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition
of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital,
rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was
called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit
5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof,
the case was suspended indefinitely.

On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could
be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a
recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that
the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused was
arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.

After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the
information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following
assignment of errors:

A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the
accused has had dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had
it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.

B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows
that during and immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused
did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language and
appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.

C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden
was on the defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time
of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not establish any
evidence to this effect.

D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in
not acquitting him thereof.

It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan
met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to
Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard
the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw the
accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who
said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill
him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by
policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took
possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General
Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy
performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem
necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the only question to be
determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane at the
time of the commission of the crime charged.

On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental

corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required,
theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the
United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical
Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in
Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a defense in a
confession and avoidance and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the
commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not made out
beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the
time of committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit
the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N.
J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed
by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th
ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149;
Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is
that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United
States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United
States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs.
Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed.,
730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true that the
presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential
ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential
ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove
insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt.

In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos
[1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed,
and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental
incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs.
Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and
reiterate this doctrine.

In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the
time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests
on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the character and degree of
evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or
circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane
at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental
condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition
of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S.
W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E.,
14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of
derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense.
Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives
and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the
practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial
evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).

The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time
of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the
insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C.
J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the preseumption
ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason
forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law
from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from
physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned
with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof
during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular and
isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a
positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act
complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record
which can not be overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily
upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion different from
that reached by the court below:.

(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the

prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods
from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was
confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a
disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods,
it is true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12,
1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the
ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any
rational or scientific foundation.

(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as
having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal
responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by
Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and
Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of
the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in
certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive
psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated"
because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of disease, either
dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of
excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if
viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive
insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that
forensic relations of manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this
disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the case with which
impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal
checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine
and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).

(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco,

at one time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately
preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was committed —
the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the
symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony
of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).

(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the
police station on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and
although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from him
(see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he
was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day
following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police
authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which
doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of
the San Lazaro Hospital.

(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio
Joson, which report was made within the first month of treatment, the
defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive
psychosis.We quote the report in full:

INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL

MANDALUYONG, RIZAL

January 15, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.

1. MENTAL STATUS:

(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time
in his bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other
times, however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he
apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic
movements with the extremities and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he
takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food offered by his
mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did not
take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to have the bath, or to
have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would also
sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed
impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his
fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the
door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes
laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.

(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to

speak, and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him.
Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was
mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he
was seen in this condition with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his
hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the literature as for
example the following.

"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del

hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of
a dependable character.)"

At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.

(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks
anxious and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the
hospital.

(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found
oriented as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.

(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that
he could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for
example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed because he
was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former
sweetheart in the hospital. There are times however when he could not hear or
see at all anything.

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner

that he could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt
he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already
buried in the La Loma Cemetery.

(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.

(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but
his memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place during
his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
 (i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general
information. He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.

( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might
have been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the
interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were,
of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has
shown marked improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent
in his speech.

2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:

The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering
from a form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.

(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.

Assistant Alienist

In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A.
Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the
following conclusion was reached:

I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the
Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the
court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is
not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality
lacking in control, overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of
this earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and many times
executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate
— beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic
has taste and desires as to make him queer before the average conception of an
earthly man.

He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.

(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist

To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at
the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso
Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from
the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-appellant replied that the
deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife,
Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been
watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective,
was also called and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind
of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of
Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine
(3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually
preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are
common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that
their property is being taken."

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was
demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information
and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment
of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro
Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of
the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First
Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.