Republic of the Philippines In connection with the above facts, it should further be stated that when
SUPREME COURT the Tacloban Cadastral Case was before the courts in 1918, this land
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31346 December 28, 1929
PO SUN TUN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
W. S. PRICE and THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
LEYTE, defendants-appellees.
Vicente Sotto for appellant.
Kapunan and Kapunan for appellee Price.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for the Provincial Government of Leyte.
MALCOLM, J.:
The undisputed facts in this case are the following:
On November 29, 1921, Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap was the owner of a
certain parcel of land situated in the municipality of Tacloban, Province
of Leyte. On the date mentioned, he sold the land to Po Tecsi for the
sum of P8,000. On June 21, 1923, Po mortgaged the land to W. S.
Price in the amount of P17,000. The mortgage was duly noted in the
office of the register of deeds of Leyte on August 18th of the same
year. On December 17, 1924, Po executed a deed of sale of the land
to Price in consideration of P17,000. This sale was recorded with the
register of deeds on January 22, 1925. Price in turn, with the consent
of his wife, sold the land on February 16, 1927, to the Province of
Leyte for P20,570.
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was claimed by Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap acting through his agent,
Po Tecsi, but subsequently on motion the names of Mr. and Mrs. Price
were substituted as claimants. On March 17, 1927, the original
certificate of title was issued in the name of the spouses Price. Later,
the proper transfer certificate of title was provided for the Province of
Leyte.
Returning again to the original date of November 29, 1921, on that
date Po Tecsi gave a general power of attorney including the right to
sell to Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap. Acting under this power, Gabino
sold the land on November 22, 1923, for P8,000 to Jose H. Katigbak.
On this document there appears on the upper right-hand margin the
following: "Register of Deeds, Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of
Leyte." In turn Jose H. Katigbak transferred the property to Po Sun Tun
on October 12, 1927, for P8,000.
Further explaining the relationship of the parties, it should be taken into
consideration that Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap and Po Tecsi, between
whom was the original transaction and between whom was the
provision made for the power of attorney, are brothers. Gabino Barreto
P. Po Ejap and Po Sun Tun, the first the original vendor, and the latter
the person to whom the property eventually returned pursuant to the
power of attorney, are father and son. As to the possession of the
property, it has been under the control of Price and the Provincial
Government of Leyte and has not been under the material control of
Po Sun Tun.
Predicated on these facts, Po Sun Tun began an action in the Court of
First Instance of Leyte to gain the possession of the property and to
secure damages in the amount of P3,600. Judge Causing sitting in first
instance decided the case on the pleadings and the evidence,
absolving the defendants W. S. Prince and the Province of Leyte from
the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. The principal error
assigned on appeal by the plaintiff in connection with this judgment is
 that the trial judge erred in finding that the deed, Exhibit D, in favor of
Jose H. Katigbak had not been registered in the corresponding registry
of property.
The provision of law relied upon by the trial judge as authority for his
decision was the second paragraph of article 1473 of the Civil Code,
which provides that if the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, "Si fuere inmueble, la propiedad pertenecera al adquirente
que antes la haya inscrito en el Registro," or, as translated by Fisher,
"Should it be real property, it shall belong to the purchaser who first
recorded it in the Registry of Deeds." Recalling that the deed of Po
Tecsi to Price was duly registered on January 22, 1925, and that
thereafter a Torrens title was obtained in the name of Price, and that
the deed of Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap to Jose H. Katigbak has noted
on it "Register of Deeds, Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of Leyte,"
can it be said that within the meaning of the law this latter deed was
ever recorded?
We are clearly of the opinion that it was not. The law and the
authorities are overwhelmingly demonstrative of this statement. The
mere presentation to the office of the register of deeds of a document
on which acknowledgment of receipt is written is not equivalent to
recording or registering the real property. Escriche says that
registration, in its juridical aspect, must be understood as the entry
made in a book or public registry of deeds. (See Altavas, Land
Registration in the Philippine Islands, 2d ed., p. 151.) Soler and
Castello in their Diccionario de Legislacion Hipotecaria y Notarial, vol.
II, p. 185, state:
Registration in general, as the law uses the word, means any
entry made in the books of the Registry, including both
registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even the marginal notes. In its strick
acceptation, it is the entry made in the Registry which records
solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real
rights.
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The American authorities conform in this respect to the Spanish
authorities for the term "To register" it has been said that it means to
"enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter
in a list" (Reck vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. [1889], 7 N. Y. Suppl., 492; 54
Hun., 637; Harriman vs. Woburn Electric Light Co. [1895], 163 Mass.,
85). If any doubt remained on the subject, it would be dispelled by
turning to Act No. 2837 amendatory of section 194 of the
Administrative Code, and recalling that it is therein provided that "No
instrument or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging,
modifying or extinguishing rights with respect to real estate not
registered under the provisions of Act Numbered Four hundred and
ninety-six, entitled "The Land Registration," and its amendments, shall
be valid, except as between the parties thereto, until such instrument
or deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, in
the office of the register of deeds for the province or city where the real
estate lies." (There follows in the law the requirements regarding the
books which it is the duty of the register of deeds to keep and use.)
It results as a matter of course since the deed made by Gabino Barreto
P. Po Ejap in favor of Jose H. Katigbak was not only not first recorded
in the registry of deeds but never legally so recorded, and since the
purchaser who did record his deed was Price, who secured a Torrens
title and transferred the same to the Province of Leyte, that Po Sun
Tun, the holder of a defeasible title, has no legal rights as against Price
and the Province of Leyte, the holders of indefeasible titles. Also, if
necessary, it could be ruled that within the meaning of section 38 of the
Land Registration Law, Price and the Province of Leyte are innocent
purchasers for value of the disputed property.
Finding the judgment appealed from to be correct from all points of
view, it will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines Upon the authority of Laureano vs. Stevenson (45 Phil., 252)
SUPREME COURT and Government of the Philippines vs. Trino (50 Phil., 763), we
Manila affirmed the order on appeal wherein certificate of title No. 15150 was
declared null and void as well as the lien noted thereon in favor of Luis
EN BANC Meneses and a new certificate title ordered issued in the name of
Santiago Imperial. Luis Meneses moved for reconsideration praying
G.R. No. L-47566 July 3, 1942 that the ruling laid down in the two cases above cited be reexamined
and abandoned. We granted the motion and, after a careful
deliberation, we have decided to modify the ruling.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
BASILIO ABACHE, ET AL., claimants; We still hold that, in registration proceedings, a cadastral court has no
authority to award a property in favor of persons who have put in no
claims to it and have never asserted any right of ownership thereover,
SANTIAGO, movant-appellee,
and the certificate of title issued under the circumstances to such
vs.
persons would be declared null and void. Where, however, innocent
LUIS MENESES, oppositor-appellant.
third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard
Luis Meneses in his own behalf. such rights and other the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect
Calleja & Sierra for appellee. of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in
the certificates of title, for everyone dealing with property registered
MORAN, J.: under the Torrens System would have to inquire in every instance as to
whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court.
In a cadastral proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Albay, Lina And this is contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Section 39 of Act
F. de Vda. Imperial and Santiago Imperial, mother and son, appeared No. 496 provides that every person receiving a certificate of title in
and claimed lot No. 8305, the latter asserting ownership and the former pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser
her usufructuary right as widow. After hearing at which Santiago of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith,
Imperial appeared as the sole witness for the claimants, the court shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on
awarded to them the said property. However, in the written decision said certificate. We have heretofore emphasized, and do so now, that
subsequently rendered the lot was awarded in favor of Inocencio, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
Simeona, David, Constancio Salvacion and Solomon, all surnamed correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in
Adornado, who had neither presented any claim nor appeared at the no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
trial, and, thereafter, original, certificate of title No. 15150 was issued in condition of the property.
their names. The lot was later mortgaged by the Adornados to Luis
Meneses. Santiago Imperial filed a motion asking that said certificate of Modifying the judgment rendered in this case, we declare null and void
title and the lien noted thereon be declared null and void and that a certificate of title No. 15150 issued in favor of the Adornados and order
new certificate of title be issued in his favor, her mother having died. that a new certificate of title to be issued in favor of Santiago Imperial,
but subject to the mortgage lien of Luis Meneses which appears duly

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 noted in the certificate to be cancelled. Luis Meneses may, in a single
complaint, sue the Adornados and Santiago Imperial for the collection
of his mortgage credit, the former as primary obligors and the latter as
owner of the property mortgaged, without prejudice to any right which
Santiago Imperial may have against the assurance fund. We make no,
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
Yulo, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115402 July 15, 1998
LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, and LEE
TEKSHENG, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
After his mother's death, petitioner 1 filed a complaint against his
father, herein private respondent, to partition the conjugal
properties of his parents. 2 In his answer with counterclaim,
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private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered
solely in petitioner's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
8278 are conjugal properties. Private respondent contends that
the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but was registered in
petitioner's name only as a trustee considering that at that time,
the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family.
Accordingly, private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful
owner — the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during
the pendency of the case, private respondent caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner
moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied
by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose
of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the
property within the power of the court pending
litigation. 3 Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel
the notice of lis pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition
to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. 4
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the
resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue of
ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed
upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a
collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He
argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be
improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done
through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent
posits that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case
as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings where the
court's jurisdiction is limited.
Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are
not at point, luckily for private respondent, petitioner's claim is
 not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate
of title cannot be collaterally attacked 5 but that rule is not material
to this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in
any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a
collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land. The
concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of
P.D. 1529 which states that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law. 6 (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to
ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing
a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title.
The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. 7 Besides, the certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. 8 Mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a
trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To
repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only
the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to petitioner's
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fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private
respondent. 9 What the latter disputes is the former's claim
of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioner's certificate of
title may have become incontrovertible one year after
issuance, 10 yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar
private respondent from questioning his ownership. 11
It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the
denial of the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But
whether as a matter of procedure 12 or substance, 13 a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are: (1) if
the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the
adverse party, or, (2) when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither
ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to
concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the
cancellation of the notice on the legally untenable grounds that
such annotation amounts to a collateral attack of petitioner's
certificate of title or that ownership cannot be adjudicated in a
partition case. It must be emphasized that the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to
the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result
of the litigation over said property." 14 Here, the parties are still
locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of
ownership. The lower court allowed the annotation pending
litigation only for the purpose of giving information to the public
that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those who deal
with the property is forewarned of such fact.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in a
partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the
property. 15 For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens,
there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking
annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. 16 Besides, an
 action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens is proper. 17
Further, contrary to petitioner's argument, one of the issues
agreed upon by the parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the
properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage. 18 In
addition, private respondent in his answer with counterclaim
prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots. Accordingly, the
issue of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant must
present their respective evidence to substantiate their respective
allegations. 19 Considering that this is a partition case, the court is
required to inquire into the "nature and extent of title" of the
supposed claimant. 20 The title referred to by the rule is the
purported ownership of the claimants and not the certificate of
title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529, although the latter may
be considered in the determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED
and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Petitioner is one of the legitimate children of private
respondent. The latter has illegitimate children with
another woman.
2 The listed properties are lumber business, rents, four
buildings and a warehouse. (Complaint, ANNEX "D" of
Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, p. 47-48).
3 Order of RTC dated November 24, 1992; Rollo, p. 72.
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4 Court of Appeals Decision promulgated February 8,
1994; Rollo, pp. 35-41.
5 Halili v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 174.
6 Property Registration Decree.
7 Halili v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 174 (1996).
8 Heirs of Gonzaga v. CA, 261 SCRA 327; Republic v. CA,
258 SCRA 712; In ejectment cases, a certificate of title is
conclusive evidence of ownership and it does not matter if
the title is questionable (Dizon v. CA, 264 SCRA 391).
9 Private Respondent's Memorandum, p. 6; Rollo, p. 196.
10 Sec. 32, P.D. 1529.
11 Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 16.
12 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, Section 14
(formerly Section 24).
Notice of lis pendens. — xxx xxx xxx
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be
cancelled only upon order or the court, after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
(Emphasis supplied).
13 Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 provides. "Cancellation of lis
pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled, upon order of the court, after
 proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of
Deeds upon the verified petition of the party who caused
the registration thereof. (Emphasis supplied).
14 Sajonas v. CA, 258 SCRA 79; Garbin v. CA, 253 SCRA
187; Tanchoco v. Aquino, 154 SCRA 1; J.P. Pellicer & Co.,
Inc. v. Philippine Realty Corp., 87 Phil. 302.
15 Catapusan v. CA, 264 SCRA 534.
16 Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 117108, November 5, 1997.
17 The other instances where the notice of lis pendens is
proper are: a) an action to recover possession of real
estate, b) an action to quiet title thereto, c) an action
remove clouds thereon, d) any other proceedings of any
kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the
use or occupation thereof or the buildings
thereon. See Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
CA, 184 SCRA 325 (1990) cited in Villanueva v. CA, G.R.
No. 117108, November 5, 1997; See also Section 14, Rule
13 (formerly Section 24, Rule 14), 1997 Rules or Civil
Procedure and Section 76 of P. D. 1529.
18 Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 61.
19 Sec. 1, Rule 131.
20 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 69.
"Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A
person having the right to compel the partition of real
estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in
his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
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adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property. (Emphasis supplied).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133140 August 10, 1999
JOSE MA. T. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO & MA. LUISA MAGPAYO
AND PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
44707 entitled "Jose Ma. T. Garcia, Plaintiff-Appellee versus Spouses
Luisito and Ma. Luisa Magpayo and Sheriff of Makati, Defendants,
Philippine Bank of Communications, Defendant-Appellant".1
The facts are as succinctly summarized by the appellate court, viz.:
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air
II Village, Makati, was registered, sold with the consent of his
wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma. Luisa
Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos).
On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan,
 Five Hundred Sixty Four Thousand (P564,000.00) Pesos
according to them, One Million Two Hundred Thousand
(P1,200,000.00) Pesos according to PBCom. 1âwphi1.nêt
On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia's Title was cancelled and in its
stead Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545 was
issued in the name of the Magpayos.
The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at the
Makati Register of Deeds and annotated on the Magpayos title.
The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence,
the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public
auction sale, PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the
land.
The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired
without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over
the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled
the Magpayo's title and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138233
was issued in its name.
On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a
complaint seeking the nullification of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and PBCom's title
docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint was
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession over the land, docketed as LRC Case No. M-731,
which Branch 148 thereof granted.
Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's
brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of
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the land, refused to honor it and filed a motion for Intervention
in the above-said PBCom petition, which motion was denied.
Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the
RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages
wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited the land as one
of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom
acquired no right thereover.
In its answer, PBCom averred, inter alia, that Garcia's claim
over the land is belied by the fact that it is not among the
properties owned by his mother listed in the Inventory of Real
Estate filed at the then CFI of Pasay City, Branch 27, in SP
Proc. No. 2917-P, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Remedios T. Garcia Petition for Letters of Administration,
Pedro V. Garcia Petitioner-Administrator.
The Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title over the
land was transferred to them by Mrs. Magpayo's parents to
enable them (Magpayos) to borrow from PBCom.
Garcia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment praying that
judgment be rendered in his favor to which PBCom counter-
motioned that judgment should be rendered in its favor.
The court a quo denied the motion for summary judgment on
the ground that PBCom raised in its answer both factual and
legal issues which could only be ventilated in a full-blown trial.
The court a quo, however, later issued a summary judgment.2
In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage
executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void. It
found that:
 . . . [A]t the time that the defendants Magpayo spouses
executed the mortgage in favor of the defendant PBCom on
March 5, 1981, the said spouses were not yet the owners of
the property. This finding is evident from the other undisputed
fact that a new Torrens title was issued to the defendants
Magpayo spouses only on March 9, 1981 . . . . The Magpayo
spouses could not have acquired the said property merely by
the execution of the Deed of Sale because the property was in
the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia,
was not in possession and hence could not deliver the property
merely by the execution of the document (MANALILI V.
CESAR, 39 PHIL. 134). The conclusion is therefore
inescapable that the said mortgage is null and void for lack of
one of the essential elements of a mortgage as required by Art.
2085 of our Civil Code . . . .3
Thus, it invalidated the foreclosure sale and nullified TCT No. 138233
issued to PBCom. Dissatisfied, PBCom appealed. In reversing the trial
court, the Court of Appeals held:
(P)laintiff-appellee's assertion that ownership over the disputed
property was not transmitted to his sister and her husband-
Magpayo spouses at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Sale as he was still in actual and adverse possession thereof
does not lie.
For in his complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that he entered
into possession of the disputed property only upon the demise
of his mother, from whom he alleges to have inherited it but
who was not the registered owner of the property, that is, on
October 31, 1980 (Certificate of Death, p. 17, Records), by
which admission he is bound. Since the execution of the deed
of sale by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took
place earlier or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim,
plaintiff-appellee was not in possession of the property at the
time of the execution of said public instrument.
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Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had
control of the property which was registered in his name and
that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then the sale was
consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the
attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the land.
When the land is registered in the vendor's name, and the
public instrument of sale is also registered, the sale may be
considered consummated and the buyer may exercise the
actions of an owner (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 Ed., p.
55).
That the Magpayos' title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four
(4) days following the execution of the deed of real estate
mortgage is of no moment, for registration under the Torrens
system does not vest ownership but is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one may already have on
the land (Municipality of Victorias v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 32, 44-45 [1987]).
Petitioner Garcia moved for a reconsideration of above decision which
was denied. He now comes before us raising the following errors
committed by the Court Appeals:
I
The respondent Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and
usual course of proceedings when it decided the appeal subject of this
case based on issues which were raised neither in the trial court nor in
the appellant's brief.
II
The Court of Appeals decided the appeal in a manner not in accord
with applicable jurisprudence when it disregarded the admissions of
 the private respondents and, despite ruling that Summary Judgment
was proper, made its own findings of facts which were contrary to the
said admissions.
III
The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was not in accord
with established jurisprudence and even contradicts itself, as far as the
issue of the propriety of the Summary Judgment is concerned.
The petition has no merit.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner alleged that the Court of
Appeals resolved the issues "ownership" and "possession" though they
were not raised by PBCom in its appellant's brief. The allegation is
belied by page 17 of PBCom's appellate brief, viz.:
Due to the wrong cited case, the trial court opined erroneously
that "Magpayo Spouses could not have acquired the property
merely by the execution of the deed of sale because the
property was in the possession of the plaintiff" (Order, p. 10).
Again, the trial court could not distinguish ownership from
possession. Ownership and possession are two entirely
different legal concepts.
Plaintiff-appellee's possession as found by the trial court,
started only "at the time of the filing of the complaint in this
present case up to the present." (page 2, Summary Judgment).
Assuming that to be true, plaintiff-appellee's possession which
started only in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has no
valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder,
one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom's Writ of Possession).
His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This
is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in
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the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was
subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by
PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title
in favor of the latter in 1985.
Anent the second-assignment of error, petitioner contends that the
following facts were admitted by the parties in the trial court:
1. The petitioner is a compulsory heir of the late spouses Atty.
Pedro V. Garcia and Remedios Tablan Garcia;
2. The property subject of this dispute was previously the
conjugal property of the said spouses;
3. The petitioner and his family have been and are continuously
to the present in actual physical possession of the property. At
the time of the alleged sale to the Magpayo spouses, petitioner
was in possession of the property;
4. When his mother Remedios Tablan (sic) Garcia died,
sometime in October, 1980, he became, by operation of law, a
co-owner of the property;
5. Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the
instrument in favor of the Magpayo spouses was not in
possession of the subject property.4
We reject the contention of petitioner for a perusal of the records
shows that these alleged admitted facts are his own paraphrased
portions of the findings of fact listed by the trial court in the summary
judgment.5 Indeed petitioner did not cite any page number of the
records or refer to any documentary Exhibit to prove how and who
admitted the said facts.
Petitioner's third assignment of error that he alone as plaintiff in the trial
court is entitled to a summary judgment merits scant attention. A
 summary judgment is one granted by the court, upon motion by either
party, for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important
questions or issues of fact are involved (except the determination of
the amount of damages) and that therefore the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.6 Under Rule 34, either party may
move for a summary judgment — the claimant by virtue of Section 1
and the defending party by virtue of Section 2, viz.:
Sec. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim or to obtain
a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in
answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to
all or any part thereof.
It is true that petitioner made the initial move for summary judgment.
Nonetheless, PBCom likewise moved for a summary judgment with
supporting affidavit and documentary exhibits, to wit:
COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PBCom Is Entitled To A Summary Judgment
The procedure for summary judgment may be availed of also
by the defending parties who may be the object of unfounded
claims as clearly shown in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 34.
xxx xxx xxx
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WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
to render summary judgment in PBCom's favor by
DISMISSING plaintiff's Complaint as well as Sps. Magpayo's
Cross-Claim for being sham and frivolous.7
Needless to state, there was no error on the part of the appellate court
in resorting to summary judgment as prayed for by both parties.
We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal
concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others.8 Ownership confers certain rights to
the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of
sale.9 Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to
dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the
Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.10 Literally, to possess
means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept
of an owner and possession of a holder.11 "A possessor in the concept
of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be
so."12 On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."13 The records show
that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for
his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. We held in Caniza
v. Court of Appeals 14 that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy
his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and indefeasible right
of possession in the latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no moment
that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale
to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of
ownership. On the other hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of
ownership as successor to his mother's share in the conjugal asset is
belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of
the estate submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses
the ruling that indeed the property was no longer considered owned by
petitioner's parents. We also uphold the Court of Appeals in holding
 that the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid
notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property
was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into.
Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such
ownership over a particular property.15 The deed of sale operates as a
formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the
buyer to use the document as proof of ownership.16 All said, the
Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the
property to PBCom.17
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 44707 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. 1âw phi 1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64159 September 10, 1985
CIRCE S. DURAN and ANTERO S. GASPAR, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERLINDA B. MARCELO
TIANGCO and RESTITUTO TIANGCO, respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
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The respondent then Court of Appeals rendered judgment, modifying
the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, which reads as
follows:
(1) the complaint of the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) is
hereby DISMISSED;
(2) the defendants-appellants spouses Erlinda B.
Marcelo Tiangco and Restituto Tiangco (herein private
respondents) are hereby declared the lawful owners of
the two (2) parcels of land and all the improvements
thereon including the 12-door apartment thereon
described in the complaint, in the counterclaim, in the
cross-claim, and in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale;
(3) the plaintiffs-appellants and the defendant-appellee
Fe S. Duran are hereby ordered to deliver to (the
Tiangcos) the two parcels of land and all the
improvements thereon including the 12-door apartment
thereon, subject matter of the complaint, counterclaim,
and cross-claim, and in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale;
(4) the plaintiffs-appellants and the defendant-appellee
Fe S. Duran are hereby ordered to pay solidarily to the
Tiangcos the sum of Two Thousand Four Hundred
Pesos (P2,400) a month from May 16, 1972 until
delivery of possession of the properties in question to
said Tiangco spouses, representing rentals collected by
plaintiffs-appellants and defendant- appellee Fe S.
Duran;
(5) the plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee Fe
S. Duran are hereby ordered to pay solidarily to the
spouses Tiangco the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000) as damages for attorney's fees, and the sum
 of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000) for moral
damages, and the costs. (pp. 149-150, Rollo)
The antecedent facts showed that petitioner Circe S. Duran owned two
(2) parcels of land (Lots 5 and 6, Block A, Psd 32780) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1647 of the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City which she had purchased from the Moja Estate. She left
the Philippines in June 1954 and returned in May 1966.
On May 13, 1963, a Deed of Sale of the two lots mentioned above was
made in favor of Circe's mother, Fe S. Duran who, on December 3,
1965, mortgaged the same property to private respondent Erlinda B.
Marcelo-Tiangco. When petitioner Circe S. Duran came to know about
the mortgage made by her mother, she wrote the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City informing the latter that she had not given her mother
any authority to sell or mortgage any of her properties in the
Philippines. Failing to get an answer from the registrar, she returned to
the Philippines. Meanwhile, when her mother, Fe S. Duran, failed to
redeem the mortgage properties, foreclosure proceedings were
initiated by private respondent Erlinda B. Marcelo Tiangco and,
ultimately, the sale by the sheriff and the issuance of Certificate of Sale
in favor of the latter.
Petitioner Circe S. Duran claims that the Deed of Sale in favor of her
mother Fe S. Duran is a forgery, saying that at the time of its execution
in 1963 she was in the United States. On the other hand, the adverse
party alleges that the signatures of Circe S. Duran in the said Deed are
genuine and, consequently, the mortgage made by Fe S. Duran in
favor of private respondent is valid.
With respect to the issue as to whether the signature of petitioner Circe
S. Duran in the Deed of Sale is a forgery or not, respondent appellate
court held the same to be genuine because there is the presumption of
regularity in the case of a public document and "the fact that Circe has
not been able to satisfactorily prove that she was in the United States
at the time the deed was executed in 1963. Her return in 1966 does not
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prove she was not here also in 1963, and that she did not leave shortly
after 1963. She should have presented her old passport, not her new
one. But even if the signatures were a forgery, and the sale would be
regarded as void, still it is Our opinion that the Deed of Mortgage is
VALID, with respect to the mortgagees, the defendants-appellants.
While it is true that under Art. 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential that
the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property mortgaged, and
while as between the daughter and the mother, it was the daughter
who still owned the lots, STILL insofar as innocent third persons are
concerned the owner was already the mother (Fe S. Duran) inasmuch
as she had already become the registered owner (Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 2418 and 2419). The mortgagee had the right to rely upon
what appeared in the certificate of title, and did not have to inquire
further. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of
Torrens Certificate of Titles would be futile and nugatory. Thus the rule
is simple: the fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the
root of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from
the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger (See
De la Cruz v. Fable, 35 Phil. 144; Blondeau et al. v. Nano et al., 61
Phil. 625; Fule et al. v. Legare et al., 7 SCRA 351; see also Sec. 55 of
Act No. 496, the Land Registration Act). The fact that at the time of the
foreclosure sale proceedings (1970-72) the mortgagees may have
already known of the plaintiffs' claim is immaterial. What is important is
that at the time the mortgage was executed, the mortgagees in good
faith actually believed Fe S. Duran to be the owner, as evidenced by
the registration of the property in the name of said Fe S. Duran (pp.
146-147, Rollo)."
In elevating the judgment of the respondent appellate court to Us for
review, petitioners discussed questions of law which, in effect and
substance, raised only one issue and that is whether private
respondent Erlinda B. Marcelo-Tiangco was a buyer in good faith and
for value.
Guided by previous decisions of this Court, good faith consists in the
possessor's belief that the person from whom he received the thing
was the owner of the same and could convey his title (Arriola vs.
 Gomez dela Serna, 14 Phil. 627). Good faith, while it is always to be
presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires a well-
founded belief that the person from whom title was received was
himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it (Santiago vs.
Cruz, 19 Phil. 148). There is good faith where there is an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage from
another (Fule vs. Legare, 7 SCRA 351). Otherwise stated, good faith is
the opposite of fraud and it refers to the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. In the case at bar,
private respondents, in good faith relied on the certificate of title in the
name of Fe S. Duran and as aptly stated by respondent appellate court
"[e]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that
the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the
theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply
here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System
of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or
forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the
certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the
true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the
forger." (p. 147, Rollo)
Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued, acquire rights over the property, the court
cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate for that would impair public confidence in the certificate of
title; otherwise everyone dealing with property registered under the
torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether
the title had been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Indeed,
this is contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing
with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate
of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Stated
differently, an innocent purchaser for value relying on a torrens title
issued is protected. A mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears
in the certificate of title and, in the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, he is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said
certificate.
Likewise, We take note of the finding and observation of respondent
appellate court in that petitioners were guilty of estoppel by laches "in
not bringing the case to court within a reasonable period. Antero
Gaspar, husband of Circe, was in the Philippines in 1964 to construct
the apartment on the disputed lots. This was testified to by Circe
herself (tsn., p. 41, Nov. 27, 1973). In the process of construction,
specifically in the matter of obtaining a building permit, he could have
discovered that the deed of sale sought to be set aside had been
executed on May 13, 1963 (the building permit needed an application
by the apparent owner of the land, namely, Circe's mother, Fe S.
Duran). And then again both plaintiffs could have intervened in the
foreclosure suit but they did not. They kept silent until almost the last
moment when they finally decided, shortly before the sheriff's sale, to
file a third-party claim. Clearly, the plaintiffs can be faulted for their
estoppel by laches." (p. 148, Rollo)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the petition without merit and
hereby AFFIRMED in toto the decision of respondent appellate court
promulgated on August 12, 1981.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

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 G.R. No. L-23243 January 26, 1937 certificates of title duly issued in their favor.
libra ry
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law

VIRGINIA YUMUL, Plaintiff-Appellant, The trial court rendered judgment absolving the
vs. CAYETANO RIVERA and JULIA RITA defendants from the complaint. Plaintiff has
DIZON, Defendants-Appellees. appealed to this court by bill exceptions duly
presented and approved. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Buenaventura P. Bundok for appellant.

Teotimo Duque and Benigno Aquino for The contention of the appellant is that the
appellees. appellees had obtained decrees of registration
through fraud, to the prejudice of the appellant
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

who was the true owner thereof; that the

appellee, Cayetano Rivera, was a
By this action the plaintiff seeks to compel the mere encargado or administrator of the
defendants to convey to her two parcels of land appellant, and that, the existence of such
described in the amended complaint (B. E., p. fiduciary relation justifies the reconveyance to
36) or, in default thereof, to pay to her the sum her of the lands wrongfully registered in the
of P50,000 in damages for wrongful registration name of the appellees.
by the defendants of said parcels of land. The
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

plaintiff further prays that the defendants be The two parcels of land in question are indicated
required to render an accounting of their with red pencil marks in sketches, Exhibits Z
administration of said lands from the year 1905 and Z-1, and are situated in the municipality of
to the present. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nro bles virtual law lib rary

Concepcion, Province of Tarlac, the first parcel,

measuring 87 hectares, 49 ares and 4 centiares,
The defendants answered by a general and being a portion of lot No. 1241 (plan Psu-2112)
special denial and, as special defense, alleged and the other parcel, measuring 74 hectares, 6
that they were the absolute owners of the ares and 22 centiares, being a portion of lot No.
parcels of land claimed by the plaintiff, their 1303 (plan Psu-6609). The legal title of the
ownership being evidenced by transfer

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 whole of lots Nos. 1241 and 1303, in which are
included the portions claimed by the appellant,
had twice been adjudicated in favor of the
appellees, at first in the voluntary registration
proceedings instituted by them ( Expediente No.
8144, defunct Court of Land Registration
and Expediente No. 429, Court of First Instance
of Tarlac), and then in the cadastral proceedings
for the registration of lands in the municipality
of Concepcion, Province of Tarlac (Cadastral
Case No. 9, G. L. R. O. Rec. No. 187). In the
voluntary registration proceedings, original
certificates of title Nos. 213 and 1186 covering
the two lots were separately issued to the
appellees on November 29, 1912 and August
14, 1919, respectively (Exhibits 17 and
19).These original certificates of title were
substituted, as a result of the cadastral
proceedings, by transfer certificates of title Nos.
1371 and 1402 issued to the appellees on
October 22 and November 22, 1926,
respectively (Exhibits 18 and 20). The appellant
presented no adverse claim of ownership over
any portion of lots Nos. 1241 and 1303 in the
registration proceedings above-mentioned. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry
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chan robles vi rt ual law li bra ry
It results that the legal title of the appellees
over lots Nos. 1241 and 1303, which include the
portions now claimed by the appellant, became
absolute and irrevocable upon the expiration of
one year counted from the entry of the final
decrees of registration in their favor (sec. 38,
Act No. 496, as amended; Broce vs.
Apurado [1914], 26 Phil., 581; Legarda and
Prieto vs. Saleeby [1915], 31 Phil., 590, 596;
Mariano Velasco & Co. vs. Gochuico & Co.
[1916], 33 Phil., 363, 367; Blas vs. De la Cruz
and Melendres [1917], 37 Phil., 1;
Calimbas vs. Paguio [1924], 4 6 Phil., 566, 571;
Rivera vs. Moran [1926], 48 Phil., 836, 840;
Sugayan vs. Solis and Paredes [1931], 56 Phil.,
276, 279). The registration by the appellees
freed the lands from claims and liens of
whatever character, which existed against the
lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of
title, except those noted on said certificates and
certain other liens specially mentioned in the
law, such as taxes, etc. (sec. 39, Act No. 496,
as amended; Escueta vs. Director of Lands
[1910], 16 Phil., 482, 486; De Jesus vs. City of
Manila [1914], 29 Phil., 73; Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Del Carmen Rodriguez [1915], 29 Phil.,
336, 340; Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon and
 Director of Lands [1927], 50 Phil., 791;
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Del
Rosario and Tiangco [1929], 54 Phil., 138, 143).
Neither the alleged mental insanity of the
appellant nor the existence of fraud in the
registration can vitiate the legal title acquired
by the appellees after the lapse of over ten
years since the Torrens certificates of title were
issued to them (sec. 38, Act No. 496, as
amended). A certificate of title is conclusive
evidence of the ownership of the land referred
to therein (sec. 47, Act No. 496; Aldecoa &
Co. vs. Warner, Barnes & Co. [1915], 30 Phil.
153, 209). chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
The appellant, however, claims that the legal
title of the appellees incurred to her benefit, for
the reason that the appellees came into the
possession of the parcels in question
as encargados or administrators of the
appellant. Were this fiduciary relation between
the parties and the breach thereof by the
appellees established by sufficient evidence this
court, in line with adjudicated cases, would
order the reconveyance of the lands held in
trust to the appellant cestui que trust, or
compel the appellees as encargados to make
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reparation in damages for the injury occasioned
by their wrong (Consunji vs. Tison [1910], 15
Phil., 81, 84; Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan Ling [1910],
19 Phil., 202, 205; Camacho vs. Municipality of
Baliuag [1914], 28 Phil., 466, 468; Sy-Juco and
Viardo vs. Sy-Juco [1920], 40 Phil., 632, 634;
Severino vs. Severino [1923], 544 Phil., 343,
350; Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva
Caceres vs. Municipality of Tabaco [1924], 46
Phil., 271, 276). Indeed, ". . . No reasons of
public policy demand that a person guilty of
fraud or breach of trust be permitted to use his
certificate of title as a shield against the
consequence of his own wrong"
(Severino vs. Severino, supra, at page 358).
But a strong presumption exist that Torrens
certificates of title have been regularly issued
and are valid and, in order to maintain an
action in personam for reconveyance such as
the present, the ". . . proof as to the fiduciary
relation of the parties and of the breach of trust
must be clear and convincing. . . ."
(Severino vs. Severino, supra, at page 357). In
the present case, the parol evidence introduced
by the appellant was not sufficient to establish
the fiduciary relation between the parties. On
the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence
 shows that the appellees came into the Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
possession of the lands by purchase from other Manila
persons and from that appellant herself (Exhibit
4), and not by virtue of an oral agreement that EN BANC
the appellees were to administer the lands
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
as encargados of said appellant. The trial court,
whose findings of fact are entitled to due credit CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO
and weight (People vs. Garcia [1936], 63 Phil., PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
296 and cases cited), arrived at the same N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
conclusion. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.

It is obvious that the appellees, being the D.R. Williams for appellee.

owners of the two parcels of land in question,

need not account for their administration
thereof. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

JOHNSON, J.:
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with
From the record the following facts appear:
costs against the appellant. So ordered.
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners,
Avance�a, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone
wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the
plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a

petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot.
After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of
October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be

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 registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under
the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in
the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now
occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed
the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided
for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the
petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the
plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the
certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said
parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant,
denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the
petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make
any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the
name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of
each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied
by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action
for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding
and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did
not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the
plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on
which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct
one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact,
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belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory
should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him,
he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the
plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six
years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain
it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs
having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they
obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in
the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a
portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in
the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens
system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is
to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality
of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration,
in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the
proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is
judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed
with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon
all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands
(supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez,
29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences
than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the
government. After the registration is complete and final and there
exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an
interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of
registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice
to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration
proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same
questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered
title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The
 registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any
better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he
can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered.
The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise
and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner.
The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered,
with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered,
changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles
would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged,
or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496)
providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords
us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief
under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which
indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered
in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the
registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over
the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the
world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is
forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the
action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in
the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once
registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not
be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one
can plead ignorance of the registration.
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The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two
different persons, has been presented to the courts in other
jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory
provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his
excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823,
says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails,
whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in
part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2
Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7
A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of
Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however
that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of
construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land
in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and
cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of
the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general
question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land
the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest
in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the
estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not
expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same
land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to
include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one
continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration)
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name
 in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of
registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall
not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not
even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of
registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a
direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set
aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a
subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the
law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title
in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs
the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the
ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil
Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real
property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the
person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of
course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has
acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends
upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the
general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land
Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we
think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a
persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a
double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe
to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the
torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land
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has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of
two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful
argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto
et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a
proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and
that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the
subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They
had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground
for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands
with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the
torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest
secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If
those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then
nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred
thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered
land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had
secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would
be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are
bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done
thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of
the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case,
the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real
owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not
opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a
party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in
 the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and
to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree
adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and
should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for
impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land
upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of
the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud,
forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that
judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the
appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land
Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner
of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be
applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is
discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser."
The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or
interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor
had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be
the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast
some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the
vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the
vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which
the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of
third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an
"innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or
interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by
virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had
his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently
sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser,"
as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been
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deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in
favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the
sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot,
including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser
be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in
said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent
purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which
of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as
innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met
in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said
sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second
original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as
against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate,
his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in
the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record
notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of
what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any
portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and
is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is
so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its
support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629;
Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill.,
500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such
 presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption
cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of
knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original
deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule
requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil
Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art
.1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to
be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of
the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead
ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the
land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the
recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that
he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of
said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must
take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon
all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can
plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is
contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows
clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory
and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of
land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent
purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been
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registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the
opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to
such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in
the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied
to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the
owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense,
can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record
contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a
prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or
his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the
safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser,"
used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where
unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under
the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens
system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could
Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land
included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for
example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included
in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his
vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would
his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The
record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the
possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the
rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the
question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that
these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than
the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser
from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be
required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like
the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who
 has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in
their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of
land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts
contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is
charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,
resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first
certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
Separate Opinions
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the
difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system
and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to
decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon
the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view,
without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede TRENT, J., dissenting:
all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in
dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is I dissent.
registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone
can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree
title to the land. with the reasoning and authority on which it is held in the majority
opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, where
acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who there has been no transfer of title by either party to an innocent
acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in
law should be protected. permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that an
innocent purchaser claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower land as against the original holder of the later certificate, and also as
court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the
to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the
exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and issuance of the later certificate.
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in
including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning
the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate of the majority opinion sustains the proposition that the original holder
certificates issued. of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against an innocent
purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.

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 As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is
sufficient to say that the rules laid down by both Hogg and Niblack are
mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of course of
no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which these
rules are based is applicable to the facts developed in a particular
case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion
rests upon the proposition set forth in the last page of the opinion
wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and equitable rule,
when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold
that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to
the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just
and equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and
independent registered titles to the same land, under the Land
Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title
and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that
regard should be protected, in the absence of any express statutory
provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of
the general rule to be applied in cases of double or overlapping
registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in
the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by
the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the
absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of
the courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances,
so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration all of the
conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not
be applied in a case wherein the reasons on which it is based do not
exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons demand the
application of a contrary rule.
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The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere
application of a well settled equity rule that: "Where conflicting equities
are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given the
preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have
had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it should be the last test
resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable
ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181;
and may cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the
general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping registration the
earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to
deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of
the earlier certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate.
Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard to
invoke the "just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion,
in order to have his own title protected and the title of an innocent
purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case
wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly
without fault, while the holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in
that he might have prevented its issuance by merely entering his
appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally served
upon him in the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the
second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier
certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a
default judgment to be entered against him adjudicating title in favor of
the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles
I am contending for by reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree)
whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as between the original
holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule
should prevail, because both such original parties must held to have
been fault and, their equities being equal, preference should be given
to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my
contention by the reasoning whereby it undertakes to sustain the
application of the general rule in favor of the original holder of the
 earlier certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the
later certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such purchasers can
in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said,
negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so
that in no event can he claim to be without fault when it appears that
the lands purchased by him from the holder of a duly registered
certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described
in a certificate of title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the
general rule laid down under the various systems of land registration,
other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a purchaser
of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged
with notice of the contents of each and every one of the thousands and
tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land registry
office, so that negligence may be imputed to him if he does not
ascertain that all or any part of the land purchased by him is included
within the boundary lines of any one of the thousands or tens of
thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date
than the date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is
contended that he cannot claim to be without fault should he buy such
land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that the
land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or
overlapping registration by a comparison of the description and
boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be
found in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to
be attained by the introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens
system for the registration of land. The avowed intent of that system of
land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the
necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in
order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands
conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he
is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in
the office of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its
contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
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If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new
system of land registration, instead of making transfers of real estate
simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the necessity
for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and
registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of the title before
purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and
uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the
validity of the title to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal
object, of the torrens system of land registration upon which our Land
Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real
estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective
purchasers and all others dealing in registered lands from the
necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands
furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore,
give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of
registered lands with notice of the contents of every other certificate of
title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to
him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of
such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land
Registration Act desires to avoid the imputation of negligence in the
event that, unknown to him, such lands have been made the subject of
double or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue?
What measures should he adopt in order to search out the information
with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him
nor is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land
he proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable
probability will furnish him a clue as to the fact of the existence of such
double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to him,
if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or
overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful, laborious
and extensive comparison of the registered boundary lines contained
in the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with
those contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the
 land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of the author of the
new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of
duly registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge
which might thus be acquired may be imputed to him by this court as
negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands
which have been the subject of double or overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be
imputed to a holder of a registered certificate of title who stood supinely
by and let a default judgment be entered against him, adjudicating all
or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears
that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of
the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default
judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its
registry in the Court of Land Registration may reasonably be required
to appear and defend his title when he has actual notice that
proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant,
claiming the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his
name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in
those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the certificate of title
registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all
the damage and inconvenience flowing from the double or overlapping
registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system
of land registration which seems to render it either expedient or
necessary to relieve a holder of a registered title of the duty of
appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is
being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of
his neglect or failure so to do, his lands become subject to double or
overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject an
innocent purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss
and damage resulting from the double or overlapping registration, while
he goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest misapplication
of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise equal
in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only
where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly
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applicable as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later
certificate of registry to the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority
opinion as to the right of the holder of a certificate to rest secure in his
registered title so that those dealing with registered lands can
confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by
way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other certificate in
case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to determine
which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of
that question in favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of
destroying the value of the registered title of the other and to that
extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system
for the registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority
opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied and
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the
courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so
as to minimize the damages, taking into consideration all the conditions
and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them." lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable
rule, as laid down in the majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of
the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency of the
proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was
issued, or to cases in which he has received personal notice of the
pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the
pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the
majority opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence,
should not be imputed to him for failure to appear and defend his title
so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that
the order of publication in such cases having been duly complied with,
all the world is charged with notice thereof, but it does not necessarily
follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in
permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be
imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to defeat his right to
the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such a
holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority
 opinion) of requiring the holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely
"in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in
order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree with the
writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place an
unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not
contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no
unreasonable burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by
a rule which imputes culpable negligence to him when he sits supinely
by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating
title to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he
has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which
such judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has been
personally served with summons to appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the
respective parties," it seems to me that there is no "equality in merit"
between the conflicting equities set up by an innocent purchaser who
acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder
of an earlier certificate who permitted a default judgment to be entered
against him, despite actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings
in the course of which the later certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of
the innocent purchaser in cases such as that now under discussion,
there are strong reasons of convenience and public policy which
militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather than that of the
holder of the earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered
lands to unknown, unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against
which all such persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and
labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to
such lands; while the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so
directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the land
registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder
of a certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title
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on those rare, definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual
notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land Registration,
a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum
by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his
claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent
purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case
such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the
danger of double or overlapping registrations by encouraging holders
of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to
permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title
to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other applicants,
despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had for
that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the
security of thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or
inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which
their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their
right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been
conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or
overlapping registration without actual notice to the holder of the earlier
certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare as to be
practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost
invariably occurs in relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or
claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double
registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal
service of notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of
the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such notice to be served
upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which
application for registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining
land owner can, even by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings for the
registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice
to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from
the original holder of a certificate of title issued by the Court of Land
Registration, relying upon the records of the Court of Land Registration
 with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land
thus purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate of title,
negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against him in
the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included
in his own certificate of title in favor of another applicant, from whom
the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the fact that
he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of
the proceedings and was personally served with summons to appear
and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to me that there can
be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the
parties, and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the
plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein
registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their
titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land
Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and
probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in
registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or
overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land Registration.
Carson, J., concurs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41342 November 28, 1934
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant,
vs.
EUSTAQUIA ABALLE, ET AL., claimants.
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LEVY HERMANOS, INC., petitioner-appellee.
ANTONIO ALEGATO and CHIONG BONCO, oppositors-appellants.
Marcos S. Gomez for appellant Alegato.
David G. Fuentebella for appellant Chiong Bonco.
Rafael L. Almacen for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
By virtue of the execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
in civil case No. 8491, wherein Gervasio Ignalaga was one of the
defendants, the provincial sheriff of Occidental Negros levied upon and
sold to Levy Hermanos, Inc., all the rights, interest and participation of
Gervasio Ignalaga in lots Nos. 419, 762 and 763 of Cadastral Record
No. 27, G. L. R. O. Record No. 284. These lots were originally
adjudicated in the name of the spouses Gervasio Ignalaga and Petra
Maderazo.
On March 7, 1933, Levy Hermanos, Inc., filed a petition praying that
the register of deeds be ordered to cancel the certificates of title to
these lots in the name of Gervasio Ignalaga and Petra Maderazo and
to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of
Levy Hermanos, Inc., for the reason that the legal period for
redemption has expired with nobody having exercised this right. To this
petition opposition was filed by Antonio Alegato with respect to lots
Nos. 762 and 419, claiming to be the owner thereof for having bought
them from their original owners, and by Chiong Bonco, with respect to
lot No. 763, claiming that he held a mortgage credit on this lot. The
court, overruling all these oppositions, ordered the register of deeds of
the Province of Occidental Negros to cancel the certificates of title
covering lots Nos. 419, 762 and 763 of this cadastral record and issue
the transfer certificate of title, free from all aliens and encumbrance, in
favor of Levy Hermanos, Inc.
 The attachment of these lots in case No. 8491 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo was presented and noted in the books of the registry
of deeds on November 14, 1930. This notice of attachment was
likewise noted on the original certificate of title covering lot No. 419,
but, though, an involuntary oversight on the pat of the register of
deeds, was not noted on the original certificate of title covering lot No.
762. 1aw phil.net
By virtue of a deed of sale executed by the spouses Gervasio Ignalaga
and Petra Maderazo in favor of Antonio Alegato, covering lots Nos. 419
and 762, which was presented in the registry of deeds on December 6,
1930, both original certificates of title were cancelled and the
corresponding transfer certificates of title in the name of Antonio
Alegato were issued, with a notation of the notice of attachment on that
covering lot No. 419, and without this notation on that covering lot No.
762. Thereafter, the register of deeds, becoming aware of the omission
of the notice of attachment on the original as well as on the transfer
certificate of title covering lot No. 762, asked permission of the court,
which was granted him, to make the annotation thus omitted.
As lot No. 419, there is no doubt that the opposition of Antonio Alegato
is entirely unfounded. It appearing in the books of the registry of deeds
and on his transfer certificate of title that his right to this lot is subject to
the attachment levied against Gervasio Ignalaga, his vendor, he cannot
now oppose the effects of said attachment (Buzon vs. Licauco, 13
Phil., 354).
Neither is his opposition with respect to lot No. 762 founded,
notwithstanding the fact that the notice of attachment had not been
noted on the original certificate of title to this lot in the name of
Gervasio Ignalaga and Petra Maderazo or on the transfer certificate of
title which was later issued in his name, inasmuch as this notice of
attachment was duly inscribed in the books of the registry of deeds.
According to section 51 of Act No. 496, the registration of the
instrument in the books of the registry of deeds is notice to all as
regards such document. It does not provide that it is the notation
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thereof on the certificate of title. And section 56 of the same Act, in
prescribing the form in which the registers of deeds should keep their
entry books and directing the entry therein, in the order of their
reception, of all deeds and other voluntary instruments and all copies
of writs and other process filed with them relating to registered land,
noting therein the year, month, day, hour and minute when they
received them, provides that inscription or registration shall be
regarded as made from the time so noted. According to this, the
notation of the attachment of this lot in the entry book of the register of
deeds produces all the effects which the law gives to its registration or
inscription.
It is also alleged that, at all events, the levy and sale made by the
provincial sheriff in favor of Levy Hermanos, Inc., should affect only
one-half of each of these lots, which represents Ignalaga's share in the
conjugal property, it not appearing that the execution entered in case
No. 8491 was for an indebtedness contracted during the marriage.
However, there is no evidence to the contrary and, on the other hand,
the circumstance that execution was issued during the marriage
authorizes the conclusion that said indebtedness was contracted
during the same. At any rate, inasmuch as the sale of these lots to
Levy Hermanos, Inc., was made with the legal formalities, it is
incumbent upon those who seek to annul it to prove the facts justifying
their claim.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
So ordered.
Street, Abad Santos, Hull and Vickers, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
UDK No. 7671 June 23, 1988
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, registrant-appellant,
vs.
THE ACTING REGISTER DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent-
appellee.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, rather cut-and-dried as far as factual background is concerned, turns upon a
determination of the true meaning and intendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, 1 which in part reads:
Sec. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees, certified copies. —
Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry
book in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall
enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments
including copies of writs and processes filed with him
relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary
process in registration, note in such book the date, hour
and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order
in which they were received. They shall be regarded as
registered from the time so noted, and the
memorandum of each instrument, when made on the
certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same
date: Provided, that the national government as well as
the provincial and city governments shall be exempt
from the payment of such fees in advance in order to
be entitled to entry and registration.
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xxx xxx xxx
The facts are few and undisputed. On June 13, 1980, the Development
Bank of the Philippines (hereafter, DBP) presented for registration to
the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's
certificate of sale in its favor of two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034, both in the
names of the spouses Andres Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which
said institution had acquired as the highest bidder at an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. The transaction was entered as Entry No. 8191 in the
Registry's Primary Entry Book and DBP paid the requisite registration
fees on the same day. Annotation of the sale on the covering
certificates of title could not, however be effected because the originals
of those certificates were found to be missing from the files of the
Registry, where they were supposed to be kept, and could not be
located. 2 On the advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP instituted
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to
reconstitute said certificates, and reconstitution was ordered by that
court in a decision rendered on June 15, 1982. 3 For reasons not
apparent on the record, the certificates of title were reconstituted only
on June 19,1984. 4
On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted titles of
the certificate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191 on the basis of that
same four-year-old entry. The Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt
of the proper action to take on the solicitation, took the matter to the
Commissioner of Land Registration by consulta raising two questions:
(a) whether the certificate of sale could be registered using the old
Entry No. 8191 made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact that the original
copies of the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June
19, 1984; and (b) if the first query was answered affirmatively, whether
he could sign the proposed annotation, having assumed his duties only
in July 1982.5
The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No. 8191 had been
rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing
 registration at the time the document was entered because of the non-
availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved. For said certificate of
sale to be admitted for registration, there is a need for it to be re-
entered now that the titles have been reconstituted upon payment of
new entry fees," and by-passed the second query as having been
rendered moot and academic by the answer to the first. 6
Unwilling to accept that result, the DBP appealed the resolution to the
Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court) 7 which, after
reviewing the record, certified the appeal to this Court as involving a
question purely of law.8
The appealed resolution appears to be based upon a reading of the
cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529, and particularly of the provision
therein referring to the Register's act of making a primary entry as " ...
a preliminary process in registration ...," as depriving of any effect a
primary entry without a corresponding annotation thereof on the
certificate of title to which the instrument subject of said entry refers.
That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire context of
said Section 56 which in another part also provides that the instrument
subject of a primary entry "... shall be regarded as registered from the
time so noted ...," and, at the very least, gives such entry from the
moment of its making the effect of putting the whole world on notice of
the existence the instrument on entered. Such effect (of registration)
clearly attaches to the mere making of the entry without regard to the
subsequent step of annotating a memorandum of the instrument
subject of the entry on the certificate of title to which it refers. Indeed,
said Section, in also providing that the annotation, "... when made ...
shall bear the same date ..." as the entry, may be said to contemplate
unspecified intervals of time occurring between the making of a primary
entry and that of the corresponding annotation on the certificate of title
without robbing the entry of the effect of being equivalent to
registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in the appealed
resolution that annotation must annotation entry immediately or in short
order justified by the language of Section 56.
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Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus between primary
entry and proposed annotation in this case has not been of DBP's
making. Though it was under no necessity to present the owner's
duplicates of the certificates of title affected for purposes of primary
entry, since the transaction sought to be recorded was an involuntary
transaction, 9 and the record is silent as to whether it presented them or
not, there is nonetheless every probability that it did so. It was the
mortgagee of the lands covered by those titles and it is usual in
mortgage transactions that the owner's duplicates of the encumbered
titles are yielded into the custody of the mortgage until the mortgage is
discharged. Moreover, the certificates of title were reconstituted from
the owner's duplicates, 10 and again it is to be presumed that said
duplicates were presented by DBP, the petitioner in the reconstitution
proceedings.
It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees were fully
paid and that the certificate of sale was registrable on its face. 11 DBP,
therefore, complied with all that was required of it for purposes of both
primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale. It cannot be
blamed that annotation could not be made contemporaneously with the
entry because the originals of the subject certificates of title were
missing and could not be found, since it had nothing to do with their
safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it was
the Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and
custody of those documents.
It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat the
process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as the appealed
resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation which through no
fault on its part, had to be deferred until the originals of the certificates
of title were found or reconstituted. That it is hardly just or equitable to
do so also seems to have occurred to the Solicitor General, who dilutes
his argument in support of the appealed resolution with the suggestion
that "... the making of a new entry ... would be the more orderly
procedure," and that DBP should not be made to pay filing fees anew.12
 Jurisprudence on the subject, while it has not been entirely consistent,
is not wanting. In Government vs. Aballe, 13 this Court ruled that " ...
(a)lthough a notice of attachment has not been noted on the certificate
of title, its notation in the book of entry of the register of deeds
produces all the effects which the law gives to its registration or
inscription." Seemingly, that ruling was abandoned in the wartime case
of Basa vs. De la Rama, 14 where it was held that the entry of an
instrument in the primary entry book produces no legal effect unless a
memorandum thereof is noted on the certificate of title. Villasor vs.
Camon, 15 however, clarified that Aballe was never really abandoned or
reversed insofar as it applied to involuntary transactions. Said the
Court in that case, which involved a voluntary transactions — a deed of
assignment of rights in a parcel of land and its improvements:
The appellant cannot invoke in support of her
contention, the ruling laid down in the case of
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Aballe, 60
Phil., 986, which was followed in Director of Lands vs.
Abad, 61 Phil. 479, to the effect that an attachment
entered upon the entry book is duly registered although
the duplicate certificate is not presented at the time of
registration to the register of deeds. Appellant cannot
invoked said ruling, not because it has been
abandoned by the Supreme Court during the Japanese
occupation in the case of Bass VS. De la Rama, et al.,
... in which it was said that "we are constrained to
abandon the ruling in said two cases,"- it was not
abandoned for the decision was concurred by only two
justices or less than a majority, and said statement was
not necessary or an obiter dictum and against the law,
as correctly stated by the two associate justices who
dissented and only concurred in the result, but because
said ruling, subsisting and in force, does not support
appellant's contention, for it is only applicable to
registration of involuntary instruments, such as
attachment, or other liens and adverse claims of
any description. This ruling is correct or in conformity
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with the provisions of section 72 of Act No. 496, which
do not require the production by the registrant of the
duplicate certificate of the land to be affected, ...
(emphasis supplied)
The decision in Villasor also quoted with approval the following excerpt
from an earlier case, Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez. 16
Coming now to the second ground on which the
appellant bases his claims, we find that when Simona
Fausa executed the document, Exhibit 3, on October
17, 1928, conveying her interest in the land to the
appellant, her interest therein had already been
attached by the provincial sheriff and also by him at
public auction to the Philippine National Bank, and the
certificate of sale filed in the office of the register of
deeds in accordance with the law (sections 429 and
450 of the Code of Civil Procedure). It was not
necessary for the sheriff to present the owner's
duplicate of the certificate of title when he filed notice of
attachment with the register of deeds, nor was it
necessary for the Philippine National Bank to present
the owner's duplicate when the bank filed its certificate
of sale for registration (sections 71 and 72 of Act No.
496).
Later cases appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that entry in the
day book, even without the corresponding annotation on the certificate
of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of, registration to
voluntary transactions, provided the requisite fees are paid and the
owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented.
Thus, in Levin vs. Bass, et al., 17 it was held:
... Under the Torrens system the act of registration is
the operative act to convey and affect the land. Do the
entry in the day book of a deed of sale which was
 presented and filed together with owner's duplicate
certificate of title which the office of the Registrar of
Deeds and full payment of registration fees constitute a
complete act of registration which operates to convey
and affect the land? In voluntary registration, such as a
sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's
duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented
or if no payment of registration fees be made within 15
days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale does not
operate to convey and affect the land sold. In
involuntary registration, such as an attachment, levy
upon execution, lis pendens and the like entry thereof
in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of
such adverse claim. ... The pronouncement of the court
below is to the effect that an innocent purchaser for
value has no right to the property because he is not a
holder of a certificate of title to such property acquired
by him for value and in good faith. It amounts to holding
that for failure of the Registrar of Deeds to comply and
perform his duty, an innocent purchaser for value loses
that character-he is not an "innocent holder for value of
a certificate of title." ... Neither violence to, nor
stretching of the meaning of, the law would be done, if
we should hold that an innocent purchaser for value of
registered land becomes the registered owner and in
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate thereof
the moment he presents the owner's duplicate
certificate of title to the property sold and pays the full
amount of registration fees, because what remains to
be done lies not within his power to perform. The
Registrar of Deeds is in duty bound to perform it. We
believe that is a reasonable and practical interpretation
of the law under considerations-a construction which
would lead to no inconsistency and injustice. (emphasis
supplied)
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A similar ruling was made in Potenciano vs. Dineros, et
al., 18 concerning land a deed of sale of which was entered in the day
book upon payment of the corresponding fees and presentation of the
owner's duplicate of the covering certificate of title, on November 4,
1944. However, due to the confusion arising from the bombing of
Manila (this having happened during the final months of the Japanese
Occupation), the papers presented by the registrant were either lost or
destroyed, no certificate of title was issued to him and as far as the
records of the Register of Deeds showed, the property remained in the
name of the vendor. Another party later sued the vendor, obtained
judgment against him and purchased the property on execution sale. In
affirming judgment annulling the execution sale in an action brought by
the original purchaser, this Court held:
The judgment creditor contends that entry of the deed
in the day book is not sufficient registration. Both upon
law and authority this contention must be rejected.
Section 56 of the Land Registration Act says that deeds
relating to registered land shall, upon payment of the
filing fees, be entered in the entry book — also called
day book in the same section — with notation of the
year, month, day, hour, and minute of their reception
and that "they shall be regarded as registered from the
moment so noted." And applying this provision in the
cases of Levin vs. Bass, etc., G.R. Nos. L-4340 to
4346, decided on May 28, 1952, this Court held that
"an innocent purchaser for value of registered land
becomes the registered owner and in contemplation of
law the holder of a certificate thereof the moment he
presents and files a duly notarized and lawful deed of
sale and the same is entered on the day book and at
the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's
duplicate certificate of title to the property sold and pays
the full amount of registration fees, because what
remains to be done lies not within his power to
perform."
 Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect
of registration, whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an
involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is
required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more
remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of
deeds.
certificate of sale in favor of appellant Development Bank of the
Philippines as entered under Entry No. 8191 dated June 13, 1980 of
the Primary Entry (Day) Book of said Registry. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Therefore, without necessarily holding that annotation of a primary Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
entry on the original of the certificate of title may be deferred
indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of said entry, the Court Republic of the Philippines
rules that in the particular situation here obtaining, annotation of the SUPREME COURT
disputed entry on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to Baguio City
which it refers is entirely proper and justified. To hold said entry
"ineffective," as does the appealed resolution, amounts to declaring
FIRST DIVISION
that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims
arising, or transactions made, thereafter which are adverse to or in
derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus G.R. No. 149121 April 20, 2010
entered. That, surely, is a result that is neither just nor can, by any
reasonable interpretation of Section 56 of PD 1529, be asserted as NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
warranted by its terms. vs.
AUGUSTO BASA, JR., LUZ BASA and EDUARDO S.
The qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and present BASA, Respondents.
appellee) register of deeds about making annotation of an entry
effected before he assumed that office are more imagined than real. DECISION
He would only be making a memorandum of an instrument and of its
entry based on or reciting details which are already of indubitable LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
record and, pursuant to the express command of the law, giving said
memorandum the same date as the entry. No part of that function is This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
exclusive to the incumbent of the office at the time entry was made or Court seeks to set aside the Amended Decision1 of the Court of
is forbidden to any of his successors. Appeals dated November 27, 2000 and its Resolution dated July 19,
2001 denying the motion for reconsideration of the National Housing
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Acting Commissioner of Authority (NHA).
Land Registration is SET ASIDE. The respondent-appellee Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, or his successor, is ordered to annotate on the On April 19, 1983, spouses Augusto and Luz Basa loaned from NHA
originals of the reconstituted Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT- the amount of ₱556,827.10 secured by a real estate mortgage over
149033 and NT-149034 of his Registry a memorandum of the their properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos.

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 287008 and 285413, located at No. 30 San Antonio St., San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City.2 Spouses Basa did not pay the loan despite
repeated demands. To collect its credit, the NHA, on August 9, 1990,
filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before
the Sheriff’s Office in Quezon City, pursuant to Act No. 3135, as
amended.3
After notice and publication, the properties were sold at public auction
where NHA emerged as the highest bidder.4 On April 16, 1991, the
sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on the
owner’s duplicate copies of the titles in the hands of the respondents,
since the titles in the custody of the Register of Deeds were among
those burned down when a fire gutted the City Hall of Quezon City on
June 11, 1988.5
On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired,6 without respondents
having redeemed the properties. Shortly thereafter, on April 24, 1992,
NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership7 over the
foreclosed properties, and the same was inscribed by the Register of
Deeds on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA under Entry No.
6572/T-287008-PR-29207.8
On June 18, 1992, NHA filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession. The said petition was granted by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in an Order9 dated August 4, 1992.
A Writ of Possession10 was issued on March 9, 1993 by the RTC,
ordering spouses Augusto and Luz Basa to vacate the subject lots.
The writ, however, remained unserved. This compelled NHA to move
for the issuance of an alias writ of possession on April 28, 1993.
Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an alias
writ of possession, respondents spouses Basa and Eduardo Basa, on
June 2, 1993, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition in
Intervention (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction).11 Respondents anchored said petition for
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intervention on Section 812 of Act No. 3135, as amended, which gives
the debtor/mortgagor the remedy to petition that the sale be set aside
and the writ of possession be cancelled. In the said petition for
intervention, respondents averred that the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the subject properties was a nullity since notices were not posted and
published, written notices of foreclosure were not given to them, and
notices of sale were not tendered to the occupants of the sold
properties, thereby denying them the opportunity to ventilate their
rights.13 Respondents likewise insisted that even assuming arguendo
that the foreclosure sale were valid, they were still entitled to redeem
the same since the one-year redemption period from the registration of
the sheriff’s certificate of foreclosure sale had not yet
prescribed.14 Citing Bernardez v. Reyes15 and Bass v. De la
Rama,16 respondents theorized that the instrument is deemed
registered only upon actual inscription on the certificate of title in the
custody of the civil registrar.17 Since the sheriff’s certificate was only
inscribed on the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, and not on the
certificate of title in the possession of the Register of Deeds, then there
was no effective registration and the one-year redemption period had
not even begun to run. Thus, respondents asked the RTC, among
others, to declare the foreclosure sale null and void, to allow the
respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties in the amount of
₱21,160.00, and to cancel the Writ of Possession dated March 9,
1993.
NHA opposed respondents’ petition for intervention.18 It countered that
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted validly and made in
accordance with Act No. 3135 as evidenced by the publication of the
Notice of Sheriff’s Sale in the Manila Times in its issues dated July 14,
21 and 28, 1990.19 NHA also said that respondents had been furnished
with a copy of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale as shown at the bottom
portion of said notice.20 NHA maintained that respondents’ right of
redemption had long expired on April 15, 1992 since the certificate of
sale was inscribed on their TCT Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year
earlier, or on April 16, 1991. It pointed out that the RTC, via its Order
dated August 4, 1992, had already ruled that respondents’ right of
redemption was already gone without them exercising said right. Since
 said order had already attained finality, the ruling therein could no
longer be disturbed.
On January 2, 1995, the RTC issued the first assailed Order21 with the
following directives: 1) granting the issuance of the alias writ of
possession which allowed NHA to take possession of the subject
properties; 2) admitting the Petition in Intervention and "treating the
same as the petition to set aside sale mentioned in [Sec. 8] of Act No.
3155"; and 3) granting the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
in favor of respondents that ordered NHA to refrain from selling or
disposing of the contested properties. The pertinent portion of the order
reads:
After examining the record and following precedents x x x this Court
hereby orders:
1. The issuance of an alias writ of possession;
2. Admission of the "Petition in Intervention," treating the same
as the "petition" to set aside sale, etc., mentioned in [Sec. 8] of
Act No. 3155;
3. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after a
BOND in the amount of ₱20,000.00 had been duly filed by
intervenors, ordering movant National Housing Authority, its
agents and/or any other person acting under its command, to
desist and refrain from selling or in any manner from disposing
of the subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 287008 and
285413 and located at No. 30, San Antonio Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, pending the termination of
this proceeding and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this
Court;
4. Setting the hearing of the petition in intervention (to set
aside) on March 17, 1995, at 8:30 a.m.22
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NHA filed a motion for reconsideration23 assailing the RTC’s Order
insofar as it admitted respondents’ motion for intervention and issued a
writ of preliminary injunction. NHA argued that respondents should
have assailed the foreclosure sale during the hearing in the petition for
the issuance of a Writ of Possession, and not during the hearing in the
petition for the issuance of an alias writ of possession since the
"petition" referred to in Section 8 of Act No. 3135 pertains to the
original petition for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and not the
Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Possession. NHA stressed
that another reason why the petition for intervention should be denied
was the finality of the Order dated August 4, 1992 declaring
respondents’ right of redemption barred by prescription. Lastly, NHA
asserted that the writ of possession was issued as a matter of course
upon filing of the proper motion and thereby, the court was bereft of
discretion.
In the second assailed Order24 dated September 4, 1995, the RTC
denied NHA’s motion for reconsideration reasoning that the admission
of the intervention was sanctioned by Section 8 of Act No. 3135. As to
the grant of preliminary injunction, the RTC made the justification that if
the NHA was not restrained, the judgment which may be favorable to
respondents would be ineffectual. The order partly provides:
The motion is without merit. The admission of the intervention is
sanctioned by Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135. And, because, otherwise or if no
preliminary injunction is issued, the movant NHA may, before final
judgment, do or continue the doing of the act with the intervenor asks
the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment
rendered afterwards which may grant the relief sought by the
intervenor.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 25
Undaunted, NHA filed on November 24, 1995, a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
 The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision26 dated February 24, 2000,
in favor of the NHA. It declared null and void the assailed orders of the
RTC dated January 2, 1995 and September 4, 1995, to the extent that
the said orders admitted the petition in intervention and granted the
issuance of the preliminary injunction; but it upheld the grant of the
alias writ of possession, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the assailed order of
January 2, 1995 is declared NULL AND VOID except for the portion
directing the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Likewise declared
NULL AND VOID is the second assailed order of September 4, 1995
denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Let an alias writ of
possession be issued and executed/implemented by the public
respondent without further delay.27
The Court of Appeals defended its affirmation of the RTC’s grant of the
alias writ of possession in NHA’s favor by saying that it was a
necessary consequence after the earlier writ was left unserved to the
party. It further explained that NHA was entitled to the writ of
possession as a matter of course after the lapse of the redemption
period.
As to the RTC’s admission of respondents’ petition for intervention, the
appellate court opined that it was improperly and erroneously made.
The Court of Appeals believed that the only recourse available to a
mortgagor, in this case the respondents, in a foreclosure sale is to
question the validity of the sale through a petition to set aside the sale
and to cancel the writ of possession, a summary procedure provided
for under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It also observed
that the grant of the preliminary injunction by the RTC was uncalled for
as it would effectively defeat the right of NHA to possession, the latter
having been entitled by virtue of the grant of the alias writ of
possession.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They alleged that
28
since they raised the issue that their right of redemption had not
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prescribed, said fact should have changed the whole scenario such
that the issuance of a writ of possession ceased to be summary in
nature and was no longer ministerial. Respondents then concluded that
their right to redeem the properties against NHA’s right to the writ of
possession must be threshed out in a hearing of the case on its merits.
With regard to the RTC Order dated August 4, 1992 granting the writ of
possession which, according to the NHA, became final and executory,
respondents argued that said order did not constitute res judicata so as
to bar the filing of the petition for intervention since the said order was
not a judgment on the merits that could attain finality.
Also, respondents would like the Court of Appeals to treat the petition
for intervention not only as an opposition to the issuance of the alias
writ of possession, but also as a proper remedy under Section 8 of Act
No. 3135, as amended, in view of the various issues raised.
On November 27, 2000, the Court of Appeals, in its Amended
Decision, reconsidered its earlier stance. It declared that the period of
redemption had not expired as the certificate of sale had not been
registered or annotated in the original copies of the titles supposedly
kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were earlier razed by
fire. Taking its cue from Bass v. De la Rama where the Court
purportedly made a ruling that entry of a document, such as sale of
real property, in the entry book is insufficient to treat such document as
registered, unless the same had been annotated on the certificate of
title; the Court of Appeals went on to say that the entry of the certificate
of sale in the owner’s duplicate of the titles could not have been
sufficient to register the same since anyone who would wish to check
with the Register of Deeds would not see any annotation. Thus, entry
made on the owner’s duplicate of the titles cannot be considered notice
that would bind the whole world. Having been deprived of their right of
redemption, the Court of Appeals deemed it proper to allow
respondents to intervene. The dispositive part of the amended
1avv phi 1
decision decrees:
 WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our
decision dated February 24, 2000, is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE and the petition DISMISSED.29
Unfazed, NHA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied in its July 19, 2001 Resolution, to wit:
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24,
2000 is DENIED for lack of merit.30
Hence, the instant petition.
In its memorandum, NHA tendered the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF THE
SHERIFF’S CERTIFICATE OF SALE IN THE PRIMARY
ENTRY BOOK OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS AND ON THE
OWNER’S DUPLICATE TITLE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF LAW ON REGISTRATION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF BASS VS. DE LA
RAMA HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED.31
Respondents, on the other hand, offered the following as issues:
I provisional registration instruments affecting lost or destroyed
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ACT WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE RESPONDENTS’
INTERVENTION AND GRANTING THE EQUITABLE WRIT OF
INJUNCTION THEREBY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION.
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II
WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION COMPLIES
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 45 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.32
On the procedural aspect, respondents question NHA’s alleged failure
to include in its petition copies of material portions of the record such
as pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals as required
under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Respondents also
pointed out the purported defective verification of NHA in view of the
fact that it merely stated that the one verifying had read the allegations
of the petition and that the same were true and correct to the best of
his knowledge. According to respondents, such declarations were not
in accordance with the rules which require that a verified pleading must
state that the affiant had read the pleading and that the allegations
therein were true and correct based on his personal knowledge and
not only to the "best" of his knowledge.
As to the merits, NHA stresses that the annotation and entry in the
owner’s duplicate certificate of titles of the sheriff’s certificate of sale
are sufficient compliance with the requirement of law on registration.
To support this, NHA refers to Land Registration Administration
Circular No. 3 dated December 6, 1988, entitled "Entry and Provisional
Registration of Instruments Pending Reconstitution of Title" which
allegedly authorized all Registers of Deeds to accept for entry and
certificates of title pending reconstitution of the original. The legality
and validity of the disputed registration on its duplicate copies of the
sheriff’s certificate of sale, NHA insists, are backed by this Court’s
ruling in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija,33 where purportedly, this Court made a
favorable interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
NHA says that the inscription of the sheriff’s certificate of sale only to
the owner’s duplicate copies, but not to those in the custody of the
register of deeds is justified as the latter were burned down. Thus, it
 could not be blamed for the non-registration of the sale in the original
copies.
NHA faults the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Bass v. De la Rama since
the ruling therein stating that entry and annotation of a sale instrument
on the owner’s duplicate copy only as insufficient registration, was
already abandoned in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, where it was allegedly ruled that the
primary entry alone of the transaction produces the effect of
registration so long as the registrant has complied with all that is
required of him for purposes of entry and annotation.
In contrast, respondents submit that annotation of the sheriff’s
certificate of sale on the owner’s copy is inadequate to propel the
running of the redemption period. They firmly believe that for the sale
instrument to be considered as registered, the inscription must be
made on the reconstituted titles.
Respondents disagree with NHA’s opinion that Bass v. De la Rama
was superceded by Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. They are of the persuasion that the
ruling in DBP pertains exclusively to the unique factual milieu and the
issues attendant therein, but not to the instant case
where Bass purportedly applies. Respondents also assail NHA’s
citation of Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.34 According to them, said case finds no application to the
instant controversy because the issue involved in the former was
whether the redemption period should be reckoned from the date of the
auction sale or the registration of the certificate of sale, which
ostensibly is not the bone of contention in this case.
Ascribing NHA’s inaction to have the burned titles reconstituted,
respondents assert that such neglect should not be used as a
justification for the non-inscription in the original titles of the certificate
of sale. Additionally, respondents insist that the question of whether the
redemption period should be reckoned from the inscription on the
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owner’s duplicate copies is a factual and legal issue that is
appropriately adjudicated in a hearing on the merits of their petition in
intervention, and not in the instant special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition which is limited in scope, namely, whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
admitting their petition in intervention.
Respondents reiterate that the issuance of the writ of possession
prayed for by NHA before the RTC is no longer ministerial since it
raised the issue of whether their period of redemption has already
expired. They cite Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court35 as the
authority to this argument.
We dwell first with the procedural issues before the main controversy.
Respondents contend that the instant petition is dismissible on the
ground that NHA failed to attach pleadings filed in the RTC and the
Court of Appeals as required under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which partly provides:
SEC. 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen
(18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall x x x (d) be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the
judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the
court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such
material portions of the record as would support the petition; x x x.
In its petition, NHA attached the February 24, 2000 Decision, the
November 27, 2000 Amended Decision, and the July 19, 2001
Resolution all of the Court of Appeals; copies of the transfer certificates
of title of the disputed properties; and the June 13, 1994 Order of the
Quezon City RTC ordering the reconstitution of the said titles. This
Court finds that NHA substantially complied with the requirements
under Section 4 of Rule 45. The same conclusion was arrived at by this
Court in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Family Foods
 Manufacturing Co., Ltd.36 when it was faced with the same procedural
objection, thus:
As held by this Court in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora:
[E]ven if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need
not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be]
found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the
material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a
questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the
judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record
may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon
showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that
it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on
the merits.
Nevertheless, even if the pleadings and other supporting documents
were not attached to the petition, the dismissal is unwarranted because
the CA records containing the promissory notes and the real estate
and chattel mortgages were elevated to this Court. Without a doubt, we
have sufficient basis to actually and completely dispose of the case.
We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits, after all
parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections. In
that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and
rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact,
Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
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Contrary to respondents’ assertion, NHA’s verification conforms to the
rule. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied
by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based
on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and
belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
The reason for requiring verification in the petition is to secure an
assurance that the allegations of a pleading are true and correct; are
not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good
faith.37 To achieve this purpose, the verification of a pleading is made
through an affidavit or sworn statement confirming that the affiant has
read the pleading whose allegations are true and correct of the affiant's
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.38
The General Manager of NHA verified the petition as follows:
3. I have read the allegations contained therein and that the same are
true and correct to the best of my own personal knowledge.39
A reading of the above verification reveals nothing objectionable about
it. The affiant confirmed that he had read the allegations in the petition
which were true and correct based on his personal knowledge. The
addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of my personal
knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7, it
being sufficient that the affiant declared that the allegations in the
petition are true and correct based on his personal knowledge.
 Now, as to the merits of the case. The main issue before us is whether
the annotation of the sheriff’s certificate of sale on the owner’s
duplicate certificate of titles is sufficient registration considering that the
inscription on the original certificates could not be made as the same
got burned.
Jurisprudence is replete with analogous cases. Of foremost importance
is Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija40 where the Court listed cases where the transaction or
instrument was annotated not on the original certificate but somewhere
else. In that case, DBP, following the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
where it emerged as the highest bidder, registered with the Register of
Deeds the sheriff’s certificate of sale in its favor. After it had paid the
required fees, said transaction was entered in the primary entry book.
However, the annotation of the said transaction to the originals of the
certificates of title could not be done because the same titles were
missing from the files of the Registry. This prompted DBP to
commence reconstitution proceedings of the lost titles. Four years had
passed before the missing certificates of title were reconstituted. When
DBP sought the inscription of the four-year old sale transaction on the
reconstituted titles, the Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the
proper action to take, referred the matter to the Commissioner of the
Land Registration Authority by consulta, the latter resolved against the
annotation of the sale transaction and opined that said entry was
"ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing registration at the
time the document was entered because of the non-availability of the
certificate (sic) of title involved."41 In other words, annotation on the
primary book was deemed insufficient registration. The Court
disagreed with this posture. Considering that DBP had paid all the fees
and complied with all the requirements for purposes of both primary
entry and annotation of the certificate of sale, the Court declared that
mere entry in the primary book was considered sufficient registration
since "[DBP] cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made
contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the subject
certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it had
nothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for
failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was chargeable
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with the keeping and custody of those documents."42 To buttress its
conclusion, the Court reviewed the relevant jurisprudence starting from
1934. The Court noted that before the Second World War, particularly
1avvph!1
in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Aballe,43 the prevailing
doctrine was an inscription in the book of entry even without the
notation on the certificate of title was considered as satisfactory and
produced all the effects which the law gave to its registration. During
the war, however, the Court observed that there was apparent
departure from said ruling since in Bass v. De la Rama, the holding
was that entry of an instrument in the primary entry book does not
confer any legal effect without a memorandum thereof inscribed on the
certificate of title.44 DBP noted that Bass v. De la Rama, however,
survived only for a little while since "later cases appear to have applied
the Aballe ruling that entry in the day book, even without the
corresponding annotation on the certificate of title, is equivalent to, or
produces the effect of, registration to voluntary transactions, provided
the requisite fees are paid and the owner’s duplicates of the certificates
of title affected are presented."45
These later cases are Levin v. Bass46 and Potenciano v.
Dineros,47 both of which involve the issue of whether entry in the day
book of a deed of sale, payment of the fees, and presentation of the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title constitute a complete act of
registration.48
Simply, respondents’ resort to Bass v. De la Rama is futile as the same
was abandoned by the later cases, i.e., Bass, Potenciano and DBP.
In the recent case of Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,49 the
respondent was awarded the foreclosed parcels of land. A sheriff’s
certificate of sale was thereafter issued in its favor. Thereafter,
petitioners in that case filed a complaint before the RTC with a prayer
for the issuance of an ex parte TRO aimed at preventing the Register
of Deeds from registering the said certificate of sale in the name of the
respondent and from taking possession of the subject
properties.50 Before the RTC could issue a TRO, respondent presented
 the sheriff’s certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds who entered the
same certificate in the primary book, even if the registration fee was
paid only the following day. Four days after, the RTC issued a TRO
directing the Register of Deeds to refrain from registering the said
sheriff’s certificate of sale. A preliminary injunction was thereafter
issued as the TRO was about to expire. The preliminary injunction was
questioned by therein respondent. One of the main issues raised there
was whether the entry of the certificate of sale in the primary book was
equivalent to registration such that the TRO and the preliminary
injunction issues would not lie anymore as the act sought to be
restrained had become an accomplished act. The Court held that the
TRO and the preliminary injunction had already become moot and
academic by the earlier entry of the certificate of sale in the primary
entry book which was tantamount to registration, thus:
In fine, petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction, to
prevent the register of deeds from registering the subject certificate of
sale, had been rendered moot and academic by the valid entry of the
instrument in the primary entry book. Such entry is equivalent to
registration. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the act sought to be
enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished act.51
Indeed, the prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the
registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry
and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on
the register of deeds. The Court thus once held:
Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect
of registration, whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an
involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is
required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more
remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of
deeds.52
In the case under consideration, NHA presented the sheriff’s certificate
of sale to the Register of Deeds and the same was entered as Entry
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No. 2873 and said entry was further annotated in the owner’s transfer
certificate of title.53 A year later and after the mortgagors did not
redeem the said properties, respondents filed with the Register of
Deeds an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership54after which the
same instrument was presumably entered into in the day book as the
same was annotated in the owner’s duplicate copy.55 Just like in DBP,
Levin, Potenciano and Autocorp, NHA followed the procedure in order
to have its sheriff’s certificate of sale annotated in the transfer
certificates of title. There would be, therefore, no reason not to apply
the ruling in said cases to this one. It was not NHA’s fault that the
certificate of sale was not annotated on the transfer certificates of title
which were supposed to be in the custody of the Registrar, since the
same were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed for the fact that
there were no reconstituted titles available during the time of inscription
as it had taken the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted
as early as July 15, 1988.56 NHA did everything within its power to
assert its right.
While it may be true that, in DBP, the Court ruled that "in the particular
situation here obtaining, annotation of the disputed entry on the
reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to which it refers is
entirely proper and justified," this does not mean, as respondents
insist, that the ruling therein applies exclusively to the factual milieu
and the issue obtaining in said case, and not to similar cases. There is
nothing in the subject declaration that categorically states its pro hac
vice character. For in truth, what the said statement really conveys is
that the current doctrine that entry in the primary book produces the
effect of registration can be applied in the situation obtaining in that
case since the registrant therein complied with all that was required of
it, hence, it was fairly reasonable that its acts be given the effect of
registration, just as the Court did in the past cases. In fact the Court
there continued with this pronouncement:
To hold said entry ineffective, as does the appealed resolution,
amounts to declaring that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant
(DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made, thereafter which are
adverse to or in derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the
 transaction thus entered. That, surely, is a result that is neither just nor
can, by any reasonable interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 be asserted as warranted by its terms.57
What is more, in Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,58 the pertinent
DBP ruling was applied, thereby demonstrating that the said ruling
in DBP may be applied to other cases with similar factual and legal
issues, viz:
Petitioners contend that the aforecited case of DBP is not apropos to
the case at bar. Allegedly, in DBP, the bank not only paid the
registration fees but also presented the owner’s duplicate certificate of
title. We find no merit in petitioner’s posture x x x.
xxxx
Like in DBP v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, the instrument
involved in the case at bar, is a sheriff’s certificate of sale, We hold
now, as we held therein, that the registrant is under no necessity to
present the owner’s duplicates of the certificates of title affected, for
purposes of primary entry, as the transaction sought to be recorded is
an involuntary transaction.
xxxx
x x x Such entry is equivalent to registration. Injunction would not lie
anymore, as the act sought to be enjoined had already become a fait
accompli or an accomplished act.59
Moreover, respondents’ stand on the non-applicability of the DBP case
to other cases, absent any statement thereof to such effect,
contravenes the principle of stare decisis which urges that courts are to
apply principles declared in prior decisions that are substantially similar
to a pending case.60
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Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered, the
redemption period accruing to respondents commenced therefrom,
since the one-year period of redemption is reckoned from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale.61 It must be noted that on April 16,
1991, the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered and annotated only
on the owner’s duplicate copies of the titles and on April 16, 1992, the
redemption period expired, without respondents having redeemed the
properties. In fact, on April 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership. Clearly, respondents have lost their
opportunity to redeem the properties in question.
As regards respondents’ allegation on the defect in the publication and
notice requirements of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the same is
unavailing. The rule is that it is the mortgagor who alleges absence of a
requisite who has the burden of establishing such fact.62 This is so
because foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of
regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on the party
who questions it.63 Here, except for their bare allegations, respondents
failed to present any evidence to support them. In addition, NHA stated
in its Comment to Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene that it had
complied with the publication of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale in the
Manila Times in the latter’s issues dated July 14, 21 and 28, 1990.64 It
also claimed that an Affidavit of Publication of said newspaper was
attached as Annex "B" in the said comment.65 NHA also said that
respondents had been furnished with a copy of the Notice of Sheriff’s
Sale as shown at the bottom portion of said notice.66 From all these, it
would tend to show that respondents’ aspersion of non-compliance
with the requirements of foreclosure sale is a futile attempt to salvage
its statutory right to redeem their foreclosed properties, which right had
long been lost by inaction.
Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent registration
with the Register of Deeds were done validly, there is no reason for the
non-issuance of the writ of possession. A writ of possession is an order
directing the sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or
personal property, such as when a property is extrajudicially
foreclosed.67 Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the rule in the
 issuance of the writ of possession involving extrajudicial foreclosure
sales of real estate mortgage, to wit:
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the
purchaser may petition the [Regional Trial Court] of the province or
place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him
possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an
amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve
months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was
made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the
requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and
filed in the form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral
proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in
the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under
section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of
any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in
the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law,
and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such
petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one
hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four Hundred and ninety-six,
as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and
the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the
property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to
apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing
an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding
registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with
Torrens title.68 Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to
issue the order for a writ of possession.69
The time-honored precept is that after the consolidation of titles in the
buyer’s name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right.70 Its issuance to a purchaser in
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an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.71 The writ of
possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. The judge issuing
the writ following these express provisions of law neither exercises his
official discretion nor judgment.72 As such, the court granting the writ
cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.73 To accentuate the writ’s ministerial character, the
Court disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a pending
action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.74
Believing that the instant case does not come within the penumbra of
the foregoing rule, respondents resort to the ruling in Barican v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.75 Unfortunately for them, the instant case
does not even come close to the cited case. There, the Court deemed
it inequitable to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in
the auction sale considering that the property involved was already in
the possession of a third person by virtue of a deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage even before the purchaser could register the
sheriff’s certificate of sale. Also, the auction buyer therein
unreasonably deferred to exercise its right to acquire possession over
the property. These circumstances are not present in the instant case.
Moreover, in Fernandez v. Espinoza,76 the Court refused to apply the
ruling in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court77 and Cometa v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,78 two cases which are exemptions to the
stated rule, reasoning that:
In Cometa, which actually involved execution of judgment for the
prevailing party in a damages suit, the subject properties were sold at
the public auction at an unusually lower price, while in Barican, the
mortgagee bank took five years from the time of foreclosure before
filing the petition for the issuance of writ of possession. We have
considered these equitable and peculiar circumstances
in Cometa and Barican to justify the relaxation of the otherwise
absolute rule. None of these exceptional circumstances, however,
attended herein so as to place the instant case in the same stature as
 that of Cometa and Barican. Instead, the ruling in Vaca v. Court of
Appeals is on all fours with the present petition. In Vaca, there is no
dispute that the property was not redeemed within one year from the
registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale; thus, the mortgagee
bank acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the issuance of the
writ of possession. Similarly, UOB, as the purchaser at the auction sale
in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right, to the issuance of the
writ of possession.
Just as in Fernandez, this Court does not see any compelling reason to
veer away from the established rule.
In fine, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in ruling that the annotation of NHA’s sheriff’s certificate of sale
on the duplicate certificates of title was not effective registration and in
holding that respondents’ redemption period had not expired.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 27, 2000 is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23691 November 25, 1967
ARSENIO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO NOBLEJAS, in his official capacity as Land Registration
Commissioner, and JOSE SANTOS, in his capacity as the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, respondents.
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Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal by certiorari to review the resolution of the Land Registration
Commissioner dated August 25, 1964 — ordering the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to deny registration of the Deed of Sale and the
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership presented to him by herein
petitioner. The main issue is, whether or not the period of redemption
of properties sold at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act No. 4118, is to be counted from the date of the execution of the
certificate of sale by the sheriff, or, from the date of registration of the
corresponding certificate of sale issued by the sheriff in the Office of
the Register of Deeds concerned.
For purposes of disclosing the law question involved, the following
statement of facts lifted from the resolution appealed from will suffice:
It appears from the facts of record that the spouses Leonardo
Gamboa and Aurora L. Cariaga are the registered owners of
the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos.
18230, 18231, 18232, 18233 and 18234, of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal. These properties were mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank and upon the failure of the mortgagors
to pay the amount of the indebtedness upon maturity, the
mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially under the provisions of
Act No. 3135, as amended.
On February 6, 1963, the mortgaged properties were sold at
public auction by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the sum of
P6,010.00 in favor of Arsenio Reyes, the highest bidder, and
the corresponding certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff
on February 21, 1963. In said certificate, the expiration date of
the period of redemption was fixed by the sheriff to be "one (1)
 year from and after the date of the sale." It should be noted in
this connection, that the duplicate of the certificate of sale was
not filed (registered) by the sheriff in the office of the Register
of Deeds. A copy thereof which was attached to the Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership as a supporting paper, was neither
entered in the Primary Entry Book for Act 496.
On February 10, 1964, there were presented for registration in
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership executed on February 8, 1964, by the auction-
vendee, Arsenio Reyes, and a Deed of Sale executed by the
Philippine National Bank as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagee
(sic), in favor of the auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes.
The Register of Deeds denied the registration of the above
mentioned documents on the ground that the period of
redemption has not yet expired. In support of his opinion on the
matter, the Register of Deeds invoked the doctrine laid by the
Supreme Court in the case of Salazar v. Meneses, G. R . No.
L-15378, promulgated on July 31, 1963, wherein it was held
that the rule that the period of redemption in execution sales
pursuant to Section 26 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
begins to run not from the date of sale but from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale, is also applicable in
extrajudicial foreclosure sales of registered land.
Claiming that Section 6 of Act 3135, as amended, is so clear
on the point that the redemption period shall begin to run from
the date of sale, the petitioner, thru his counsel, disagreed with
the ruling of the Register of Deeds. Hence, this appeal.
As stated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, the Land
Registration Commissioner, upon the foregoing premises, promulgated
the resolution appealed from, ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal
to deny the registration of the Deed of Sale executed by the mortgagee
and the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the
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auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes, who presented the said documents for
registration. A motion for reconsideration of the resolution was
subsequently denied by the Land Registration Commissioner, hence,
the instant petition for review.
It is the theory of petitioner that in sales of property at public auction
pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the period of redemption
should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale which, he
contends, is the express mandate of Section 6 of Act No. 3135:
Sec. 6. In all cases in which the extrajudicial sale is made under the
special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in
interest, or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or
any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage
or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the
same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of
sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
sections 464 to 466 inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar
as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
On the other hand, the Land Registration Commissioner is of the
opinion that the above-quoted provision is not the only pertinent and
controlling law on the matter, specially when it is taken into
consideration that the land involved is registered land under the
Torrens system. He maintains, and so held in the resolution appealed
from, that Section 6 of Act 3135 should be applied to the present case
together with: (1) sections 30 to 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court with regard to redemption; (2) Section 27, Rule 39 of the said
Rules and Section 71 of Act 496 with regard to the filing (registration)
of the sheriff's certificate of sale; and (3) Section 50 of Act 496, with
regard to the registration of the certificate of sale so as to consider the
land conveyed and affected under the Land Registration Act.
The ruling of the Land Registration Commissioner must be sustained.
Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the
 certificate of sale executed by the sheriff in a public auction sale must
be filed (registered) in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
province where the land is situated. This is mandatory requirement.
Failure to register the certificate of sale violates the said provision of
law and, construed in relation with Section 50 of the Land Registration
Law (Act 496), shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land
covered by a torrens title because "the act of registration is the
operative act to convey and effect the land." So the redemption period,
for purposes of determining the time when a final deed of sale may be
executed or issued and the ownership of the registered land
consolidated in the purchase at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under
Act 3135, should be reckoned from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the office of the register of deeds concerned and
not from the date of the public auction sale. To this effect is the holding
in the case of Ernesto Salazar v. Flor de Lis Meneses, L-15378, July
31, 1963, where this Court explained at length this principle, as follows:
The issue decisive of this appeal is the one raised by, the
appellant in their third assignment of error, which is to this
effect: That the lower court erred in not holding that the period
of redemption in this case, as far as appellants are concerned,
started only on May 26, 1956, the date when the certificate of
sale issued by the sheriff was registered. Should we rule to this
effect, it is clear that when the appellants attempted to exercise
their right to redeem, as judgment creditors of the deceased
mortgagor by judgment subsequent to the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, and when they instituted the present action on
October 1, 1956, the period of redemption had not yet expired.
We find appellants' contention to be meritorious. In the case
of Agbulos v. Alberto, G. R. No. L-17483, promulgated on July
31, 1962, we held:
The property involved in the present case is registered
land. It is the law in this jurisdiction that when property
brought under the operation of the Land Registration
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Act is sold, the operative act is the registration of the
deed of conveyance. The deed of sale does not 'take
effect as a conveyance, or bind the land' until it is
registered (Section 50, Act 496; Tuason v. Raymundo,
28 Phil. 635; Sikatuna V. Guevarra, 43 Phil. 371;
Worcester v. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646). Undoubtedly, to
be in consonance with this well settled rule, Section 24,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides that the
duplicate of the certificate of sale given by the sheriff
who made the auction sale to the purchaser must be
filed (registered) in the office of the register of deeds of
the province where the property is situated.
In Garcia v. Ocampo, G. R. No. L-13029, June 30,
1959, we held that the twelve months period of
redemption provided for in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court "begins to run not from the date of sale,
but from the time of the registration of the sale in the
office of the register of deeds." The entry or annotation
on the back of the certificate of title of the property in
question on July 18, 1959 (supra) was in accordance
with this ruling when it provided that the execution sale
was "subject to redemption within one year from
registration hereof."
A case similar to the present is that of Gonzales, et al.
v. Philippine National Bank, et al., 48 Phil. 824, where
we held that the provision of Section 32, Act 2938
(Charter of the Philippine National Bank) providing for a
right of redemption in favor of the bank's mortgagor
"within one year from the sale of the real estate as a
result of the foreclosure" should be construed to mean
one year after the confirmation of the foreclosure sale,
because the sale becomes valid only after the
confirmation. Along the same line we may say in this
case that the period of one year after the sale must
likewise start only from the date of registration of the
 certificate of sale, because it is only when that the
certificate takes "effect as a conveyance" in accordance
with Act 496.
The above ruling is squarely applicable to the present case
which involves also registered land, inspite of the fact that the
sale in question is not an execution sale but a foreclosure sale.
But it is further argued by the petitioner that the rule should not be
applied to this case where there are no third parties involved. He cites
a number of authorities,1 to the effect that as between the parties
registration is not necessary to bind the immediate parties to a
transaction involving registered land. He would then conclude that
since the only purpose of registration is not protect the buyer from third
party claims, it stands to reason that when as in this case, there are no
third party claimants to the land, registration is not necessary and the
sale between the parties should be made to take effect from the date of
the auction sale. We are not impressed by the argument. Apparently,
herein petitioner failed to see the "other side of the coin" and
overlooked the doctrine, also well settled, that the registration required
by Section 50 of the Land Registration Law is intended primarily for the
protection of innocent third persons, i.e., persons who, without
knowledge of the sale and in good faith, have acquired lights to the
property.2 The same protection to third parties is obviously one of the
objects of Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court in
requiring that the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff in an auction
sale be registered in the office of the register of deeds, for the purpose
of the legislature in providing for our present system of registration is to
afford some means of publicity so that persons dealing with real
property may reach the records and thereby acquire security against
instruments the execution of which has not been revealed. Redemption
is not the concern merely of the auction-vendee and the mortgagor, but
also of the latter's successors in interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor of said mortgagor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage under which the property has
been sold. It is precisely for this reason that the certificate of sale
should be registered, for only upon such registration may it legally be
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said that proper notice, though constructive, has been served unto
possible redemptioners contemplated in the law. We have to conclude,
therefore, that the date of sale mentioned in Section 6 of Act 3135, as
amended, should be construed to mean the date of registration of the,
certificate of sale in the office of the register of deeds concerned. Only
after the lapse of the twelve-month redemption period from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale and in the absence of any
redemptioner within the said period, may the deed of final sale be
executed in favor of the purchaser who may then consolidate the title
of the property in his favor. Consequently, We have to declare that the
Land Registration Commissioner was right in ordering the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to deny the registration of the Deed of Sale and the
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, the simultaneous registration
of which documents was sought by herein petitioner even before the
certificate of sale issued by the sheriff was registered.
WHEREFORE, and considering all the foregoing, the resolution
appealed from should be, as hereby it is affirmed, with costs against
herein petitioner.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.
Footnotes
1Galanza v. Nuesa, 95 Phil. 713 (1954); Evangelista v.
Montano et al., 93 Phil. 275 (1953); Carillo v. Salak de Paz, et
al., 91 Phil. 265; Manuel v. PNB, 101 Phil. 968.
2 See Evangelista v. Montano, et al., supra.
 Republic of the Philippines spouses Santos and Matilde de Torres. A Deed of Conditional Sale
SUPREME COURT (Exhibit "B") was executed by the spouses de Torres in favor of the two
Manila Fernandez couples.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 83141 September 21, 1990
SPOUSES FLORENTINO L. FERNANDEZ AND VIVENCIA B.
FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ZENAIDA ANGELES
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Wilfredo Espiritu Taganas for petitioners.
L.B. Camins for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05191 which
modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
32843 ordering private respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez to execute a deed of conveyance
over 1/3 portion or 110 square meters of the lot subject of the action.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 28, 1966, petitioners-spouses Florentino and Vivencia
Fernandez and private respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez and
the latter's husband Justiniano Fernandez purchased in common a
parcel of land with an area of 310 square meters Identified as Lot 13,
Block 19, Pagasa Subdivision, Quezon City. The parcel of land was
purchased for P15,500.00. Spouses Florentino and Vivencia
Fernandez advanced the downpayment of P5,500.00 to the vendors-
On February 24, 1967, the vendors Torres executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Zenaida and Justiniano Fernandez
only. When petitioners learned that the Absolute Deed of Sale did not
include their names as vendees they confronted Zenaida and
Justiniano Fernandez. Thus, on April 24, 1967, Zenaida and Justiniano
Fernandez executed an affidavit (Exhibit "D") in which they
acknowledged the sale to petitioners Florentino and Vivencia
Fernandez of a portion of the subject parcel of land consisting of 110
square meters and the receipt of the consideration therefor in the
amount of P5,500.00.
When private respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez planned to build
a house on the lot, she was informed by the City Engineer of Quezon
City that the area in Pag-asa is classified under the zoning ordinance
as R-2 or residential 2, wherein the minimum requirement for a family
house is 240 square meters and therefore, no two (2) separate and
independent family houses can be built on the 310 square meter lot.
She also found out that the Register of Deeds will not issue a separate
title for only 110 square meters (p. 4, C.A. Decision; p. 36, Rollo).
Thus, a duplex building was constructed on the subject land, one unit
known as No. 216-A Road I, Pag-asa, Quezon City which was
occupied by petitioners Florentino and Vivencia and the other unit
known as No. 216, Pag-asa, Quezon City which was occupied by the
spouses Zenaida and Justiniano.
On January 26, 1970, Zenaida and Justiniano caused the issuance of
a certificate of title (TCT No. 149347) only in their names (p. 47, Rollo).
On February 26, 1976, private respondent Zenaida Fernandez and her
husband Justiniano Fernandez filed a petition for voluntary dissolution
of their conjugal partnership before the Juvenile and Domestic

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 Relations Court, Quezon City. In the petition, the couple prayed for
judicial approval of their compromise agreement wherein Justiniano
waived all his rights to the conjugal properties including the subject
parcel of land. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court awarded the parcel of land subject of
the instant case to private respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez on
December 13, 1976. In a letter dated October 22, 1977, private
respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the premises of the lot
awarded to her. On June 9, 1981, petitioners' spouses Florentino and
Vivencia filed an action to quiet title and damages against Zenaida
Fernandez only, who was then already estranged from her husband
Justiniano. In another letter dated June 21, 1981, Zenaida reiterated
her demand that petitioners vacate the premises of the lot awarded to
her, which lot was also the subject matter of the complaint for quieting
of title filed by petitioners.
After trial, a decision (pp. 43-45, Rollo) was rendered on July 23, 1984
wherein the trial court made the following findings and conclusions:
1. The genuineness and/or due execution of the Deed
of Conditional Sale dated November 28, 1966 (Exhibit
'B' & Exhibit '2') and Affidavit dated April 24, 1967
(Exhibit 'D' & Exhibit '4'), were admitted by defendant
Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez. Likewise, the
voluntariness of the execution thereof, including their
contents, were not seriously controverted by defendant
Zenaida Angeles- Fernandez. Said documents,
therefore, should be taken against her for as ruled by
the higher court; a man's acts, conduct, and
declarations wherever made, if voluntary, are
admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to
presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is
his fault if they do not. (US vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578,
583);
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2. The claim of defendant Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez
to the effect that the P5,500.00 used as down payment
for the purchase price in the total amount of P15,500.00
mentioned in the Deed of Conditional Sale dated
November 28, 1966 (Exhibit 'B' & Exhibit '2'), was
merely a loan, and that she and her husband Justiniano
E. Fernandez have already paid the same almost three-
fold to plaintiffs, cannot be considered there being no
concrete proof on record to substantiate the same. The
Court noted, however, that no further amount, aside
from the P5,500.00 were paid by the plaintiffs for the
purchase of Lot 13, Block N-19 of Pag-asa Subdivision.
By mathematical computations, said amount was short
for the amount they should pay for the 1/2 portion of the
purchased lot, and they should be required to
reimburse defendant Zenaida Angeles- Fernandez;
3. Likewise, the verbal claim of the defendant Zenaida
Angeles- Fernandez that she and her husband
Justiniano B. Fernandez executed the Affidavit dated
April 24, 1967 (Exhibit 'D' & Exhibit '4') as security or
assurance to plaintiffs' non-eviction from the premises
they are co-occupying and/or payment of the alleged
loan, appears gratuitous and illogical, and cannot be
given weight more than their admission (Exhibit 'B' &
Exhibit '4'), while admission is against interest.
4. The fact that the names of plaintiffs no longer appear
as co-vendees in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 24,1967 (Exhibit 'C', & Exhibit '3'), and to the
title to Lot 13, Block N-1 9 of the Pagasa Subdivision,
Quezon City Exhibit 'A' & Exhibit '1'), as of not moment
(sic) and inconsequential to their right or ownership
over the 1/2 portion of the lot, the same having been
sufficiently established by the Deed of Conditional Sale
dated November 28, 1966 (Exhibit 'B' and Exhibit '2');
the Affidavit dated April 24,1967 (Exhibit 'D' & Exhibit
 '4'); and the proof on record showing that defendant
Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez collected taxes due on the
subject lot for the year 1974, 1975,1976 and 1977
(Exhibit 'H'). (pp. 50-51, Rollo)
Anent the ownership of the duplex house, the trial court concluded that
although the petitioners advanced the sum of P l,258.00 (Exhibit "K"
and "K-1") for the unit occupied by them, said amount is not sufficient
to construct one unit of the duplex building.
The trial court disposed of the case as follows:
All told, this Court finds plaintiffs spouses Florentino L.
Fernandez and Vivencia B. Fernandez, owner of 1/2
portion or the area of 113 square meters of the Lot 13,
Block N-19 of Pag-asa Subdivision, Quezon City,
subject to reimbursement of the sum of P 2,250.00,
representing the difference of the total amount they
ought to pay for the purchase price thereof, to
defendant Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez, plus legal
interest thereon from February 24, 1967 until fully paid;
and defendant Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez owner of
the other one-half or 113 square meters of the
aforesaid lot, together with both units of the duplex
house existing thereon, subject to the provision of
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered:
l. ORDERING defendant Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez
to execute a deed of conveyance over 1/2 portion of 13
square meters of Lot 13, Block N-19 of Pag-asa
Subdivision, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
149347 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in
favor of plaintiffs, spouses Florentino L. Fernandez and
Vivencia B. Fernandez, upon the latter's payment of P
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2,225.00 plus legal interest thereon counted from
February 24, 1967, until fully paid.
2. The portion of the duplex building resting on the
portion of the lot to be reconveyed to the plaintiffs,
spouses Florentino L. Fernandez and Vivencia B.
Fernandez, shall remain under the ownership of
defendant Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez, subject to the
provision of Article 448 of the Civil Code.
xxx
(pp. 53-54, Rollo).
Petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the decision insofar as the area
awarded them was concerned and the amount spent by them for the
construction of the duplex house. On November 15, 1984, an order
(pp. 55-56, Rollo) was issued by the trial court amending the July 23,
1984 decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, 1) The dispositive portion of the
decision dated July 23, 1984, is hereby amended as
follows: 'l. ORDERING defendant Zenaida Angeles-
Fernandez to execute a deed of conveyance over 1/3
portion or 110 square meters of Lot 13, Block N-19 of
the Pag-asa Subdivision, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 149347 of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City, in favor of plaintiffs, spouses Florentino
L. Fernandez and Vivencia B. Fernandez, upon the
latter's payment of P 2,225 plus legal interest thereon
counted from February 24, 1967, until fully paid.' 2)
Denying all other matters raised in the motion for
reconsideration and opposition thereto.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
 While the order amended the area of the land to be awarded to the
petitioners from 1/2 to 1/3, it failed to delete the portion ordering
petitioners to pay private respondent the amount of P 2,225, as
originally ordered in the July 23, 1984 decision.
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision and the order amending said
decision, both the petitioners and the private respondent appealed to
respondent Court of Appeals. In a decision (pp. 33-40, Rollo)
promulgated on January 26, 1988, respondent appellate court made a
different conclusion and modified the decision of the trial court:
The main basis of the trial court in concluding that the
plaintiffs are entitled to 1/2 and later to 1/3 portion of
the lot and house in Pag-asa are the deed of
conditional sale (Exh. B and 2) and the affidavit
executed by Justiniano Fernandez (Exh. D).
It appears, however, that the effect of said documents
have been modified by later events. The first is the
absolute deed of sale of the house and lot in question
and the subsequent issuance of the title thereof only in
the name of Justiniano Fernandez and his wife (Exh. C
and 3 and Exh. A and 1). Thereafter, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 149347 in the name of the
spouses Justiniano E. Fernandez and Zenaida A.
Fernandez was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City on January 26, 1970 (Exh. A). If, indeed,
the herein plaintiffs were entitled to 1/2 of the said
property, they should have taken steps to include their
names in the said title or at least had it annotated on
said title. A Certificate of Title issued a party
accumulates all the ultimate facts with respect to a
particular piece of registered land in one single
document, making out a precise and correct statement
to the exact status of the fee simple title which the
owner has in fact. Once issued, the certificate is the
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evidence of the title which the owner has (Legarda vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). A torrens title concludes all
controversy over ownership of land covered by final
decree of registration, and title by adverse possession
cannot be acquired against the registered owner (Sec.
46, Act 496; J.M. Tuason and Co. vs. Vibat, L-28884,
May 29,1963,8 SCRA 54; Espiritu vs. Sison, CA 51612-
R, Feb. 14,1979).
What militates more against the claim of ownership of a
portion of the property in question by the plaintiffs is the
fact that as a result of marriage settlement between
Justiniano Fernandez and his wife Zenaida, the whole
property was adjudicated to Zenaida. The settlement
was approved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court. The herein plaintiffs were supposed to know
about said marriage settlement of property. Here is a
situation where Zenaida was in fact abandoned by her
husband Justiniano, who is a nephew of plaintiff
Florentino Fernandez. The plaintiffs should have
intervened in said case by filing their claims on the
property that was to be granted to Zenaida alone in the
marriage settlement. Indeed, it would be less than fair
for the herein plaintiffs to demand their alleged share
against Zenaida alone after their nephew agreed to
grant said property to his wife whom he abandoned.
Lastly, the cause of action of the plaintiffs had already
prescribed. As already stated, the Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued in the name of the spouses
Justiniano and Zenaida Fernandez in 1970. From said
date, Justiniano and his wife exercised acts of absolute
ownership by mortgaging the property. The instant
action to claim ownership of the portion of the land was
filed on July 9, 1981.
 With these findings, We find no merit in the contention
of plaintiffs-appellants that they are entitled to damages
and attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED by declaring the defendant Zenaida
Fernandez as the sole owner of the property in
question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14934, Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. In fairness to
the plaintiffs, however, defendant Zenaida Fernandez is
ordered to return to the plaintiffs the amount of
P5,500.00 plus interest at the legal rate from November
28, 1966 until full payment thereof. SO ORDERED. (pp.
39-40, Rollo)
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals was denied on April 22, 1988 (p. 42, Rollo).
On June 15, 1988, petitioners filed the instant petition for review. They
contend that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring them
part owners of the lot in question despite the fact that it is not disputed
that petitioners and defendant Zenaida Fernandez with her husband
Justiniano Fernandez entered into an agreement with the vendors-
spouses Santos and Matilde de Torres that the subject land would be
purchased by them in common.
While, as a rule, this Court is bound by the findings of the Court of
Appeals in matters of fact, that rule is subject to well-settled
exceptions, amongst them: (1) when the same are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise, and conjecture; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3)...; (4) its judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) it went beyond the issues of the case and
its findings contravene admissions of the parties; (6) its findings of fact
are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) the same are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence; (8) ...; and (9) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence or
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contradicted in fact by the evidence on record (Teodoro v. Court of
Appeals, L-31471, November 12, 1987).
In the instant case, there is a disparity in the factual findings and
conclusions of the respondent appellate court and the trial court. On
the basis of the evidence presented and in view of the accepted rule
that "the judge who tries a case in the court below, has vastly superior
advantage for the ascertainment of truth and the detection of falsehood
over an appellate court of review (Roque v. Buan, L-22459, October
31, 1967, 21 SCRA 642), the findings of the trial court must be upheld.
We agree with petitioners' contention that respondent court erred in not
declaring them as part owners of the subject property. There is
sufficient evidence on record to prove that petitioners and spouses
Justiniano and Zenaida Fernandez purchased in common the lot
subject of this case and that it was the parties' intention to become
owners of specific portions thereof.
The purchase of the property by the two Fernandez couples was
evidenced by a Deed of Conditional Sale (Exhibit "B" and Exhibit "2")
executed by the previous owners Spouses Santos and Matilde de
Torres in favor of the petitioners and the Spouses Zenaida and
Justiniano Fernandez. Respondent appellate court concluded that the
effect of the Deed of Conditional Sale was modified by later events
specifically, the execution of a deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Justiniano Fernandez and private respondent Zenaida Fernandez only.
However, respondent appellate court lost sight of the fact that upon
petitioners' knowledge that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in
favor of Justiniano and Zenaida Fernandez only, the petitioners
confronted the latter spouses which led to the execution by the latter
on April 24,1967 of an affidavit (Exhibit 'D') acknowledging petitioners'
purchase of 110 square meters of the subject lot and the receipt of the
consideration therefor for P5,500.00. The due execution and
authenticity of both the Deed of Conditional Sale and Affidavit were
never denied by private respondent. Having recognized the sale and
 the receipt of the consideration in the affidavit, private respondent is
now estopped from going against such declaration.
It is noted that subsequent to the execution of the affidavit, a duplex
house was constructed on the lot where one unit was occupied by
private respondent Zenaida and her husband Justiniano and the other
unit by the petitioners. The expenses for the construction of the duplex
were advanced by the spouses Zenaida and Justiniano, but they
demanded reimbursement of the expenses they advanced for the
portion belonging to petitioners. Exhibit "I" and Exhibit "J" reveal that
on November 10, 1969, Justiniano demanded from the petitioners
payment of their share of the materials used in the construction of their
portion of the duplex house amounting to P 2,607.70 (p. 44, Rollo) and
the taxes due from them for the house and lot. On March 8, 1977,
petitioners paid for their share of the realty taxes for the year
1974,1975,1976 and 1977 in the total amount of P 894.36 to private
respondent Zenaida (Exhibit "H"). For the expenses in the construction
of the portion of the duplex possessed by petitioners, they gave
P1,258.10 to Justiniano who issued a receipt therefor (Exhibit "K" and
"K-1") Petitioners promised to liquidate the balance in installment at the
rate of P 300.00 a month. The trial court concluded that the amount of
P l,258.10 advanced by petitioners was not sufficient to construct their
portion of the duplex house and that no evidence was presented to
prove that petitioners paid for the balance. From this findings, it
erroneously concluded that the entire duplex house belongs to private
respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez.
It should be noted that Justiniano Fernandez admitted in Exhibits "I"
and "J" petitioner's ownership of the portion of the duplex house now
occupied by them. It may be that the amount of P1,258.10 paid by
petitioner Florentino Fernandez to Justiniano Fernandez was not
sufficient to construct their portion of the duplex house but such
insufficiency cannot be made the basis for divesting them of their
ownership.
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Respondent court's conclusion that petitioners were not part owners of
subject land relied much on the existence of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 149347 issued in the name of Spouses Justiniano and Zenaida
Fernandez only. It further concluded that if, indeed, petitioners were
entitled to 1/2 of the property, they should have taken steps to include
their names in the title.
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that
the registration of the deed is the operative act to bind or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the party has
knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time
he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The
torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud
(Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). As far as private respondent
Zenaida Angeles and her husband Justiniano are concerned, the non-
registration of the affidavit admitting their sale of a portion of 110
square meters of the subject land to petitioners cannot be invoked as a
defense because (K)nowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to
registration (Winkleman v. Veluz, 43 Phil. 604).
The respondent appellate court also erred in ruling that the cause of
action of petitioners had already prescribed in view of the issuance in
1970 of a certificate of title in the name of the Spouses Justiniano and
Zenaida Fernandez. As already stated, the issuance of a certificate of
title in the name appearing therein does not preclude petitioners from
asserting their right of ownership over the land in question. Time and
again it has been ruled that the torrens system should not be used as a
shield to protect fraud. Moreover, prescription cannot be considered
against petitioners who had been in possession of subject premises
from the time it was purchased from the de Torres spouses in 1967
and continue to possess the same under claim of ownership. There is
no sufficient basis for the respondent court to conclude that spouses
Zenaida and Justiniano were possessing the entire property adversely
against petitioners. At most, the first time that respondent Zenaida
Fernandez claimed adverse possession of the entire premises was
when she demanded from petitioners the possession of the unit
 possessed by them in a letter dated October 22, 1977 (Exhibit "F")
emboldened by a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court awarding the premises to her. The decision of private respondent
to claim total ownership of the premises was in fact, pursued only half-
heartedly by her because the second time that she demanded
possession of the premises was four (4) years after or on June 21,
1981, after an action to quiet title was filed by petitioners on June
9,1981. In Almanza v. Arguelles, L-49250, December 21, 1987, We
held that, "prescription cannot be invoked in an action for
reconveyance, which is, in effect an action to quiet title against the
plaintiff therein who is in possession of the land in question. As lawful
possessor and owner of the disputed portion, her cause of action for
reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's
possession is imprescriptible (also cited in Caragay-Layno v. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 718, citing Sapto et al. v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683
and Faja v. C.A., 75 SCRA 441). The reason, we explained in Bucton
v. Gabar, L-36359, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 499, is:
... that while the owner in fee continues liable to an
action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he
has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and
its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in
his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed
or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not
available as a defense of an action to remove a cloud
from title can only be invoked by a complainant when
he is in possession. .... (44 Am. Jur., p. 47)
The judgment in the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership
filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of private
respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez and her husband Justiniano
where the property in question was awarded to Zenaida cannot bind
the petitioners who were not parties thereto. The failure of petitioners
to intervene in the said proceedings for dissolution of conjugal
partnership is not fatal. Petitioners may file their claim of ownership
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over the one-third portion of the property in question separately which
they did when they brought the complaint for quieting of title before the
trial court.
As already stated, the affidavit executed by Justiniano Fernandez and
private respondent Zenaida Angeles Fernandez acknowledged the
sale of one-third (1/3) portion of the subject land to petitioners-spouses
Florentino and Vivencia Fernandez and the receipt by the former of the
amount of P5,500.00 as consideration thereof. However, the trial court
in awarding the said one-third portion to petitioners also ordered the
payment by them of P 2,225.00 to private respondent Zenaida
Angeles-Fernandez, oblivious of the fact that only 1/3 and not one half
(1/2) pertain to petitioners and that the P5,500.00 advanced by
petitioners at the time the subject property was purchased from the de
Torres spouses was sufficient payment for the 1/3 portion awarded to
them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
respondent appellate court is REVERSED. Judgment is hereby
rendered declaring petitioners owners of 1) one-third (1/3) or 110
square meters of Lot 13, Block N-19 of Pag-asa Subdivision, presently
occupied by them, covered by TCT No. 149347 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City; and 2) the portion of the duplex house occupied
by them after payment of the balance of P l,349.70 advanced by the
husband of private respondent Zenaida Fernandez for the construction
thereof, with interest at the legal rate from November 1969 until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.