Sulpicio Intod vs .

Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Facts:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino DAligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to
go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Afterwards, they all went to meet Aniceto
Dumalagan. He (Dumalagan) told Mandaya that due to a land dispute between Palangpangan, he
wanted him to be killed; and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise he would
also be killed.

At around 10:00 pm of February 4, 1979, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig armed with firearms
arrived at Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez, Jaena, Misamis Occidental. With Mandaya’s
instructions, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired the bedroom of Palangpangan. However, it turned
out that Palangpangan was in another city, and the home was being occupied by son-in-law and his
family who were not at the room during the gun fire.

Witnesses has identified the petitioners and his companions, and one even testified that prior to leaving
the premises, they shouted: “We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and
we will come back if you were not injured.”

The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder after the trial and was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. A modification of the judgement was seeked by Intod by holding him liable only for
an impossible crime.

Issue :
Whether or not Intod is criminally liable for an impossible crime.

Held :
As per Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code wherein criminal responsibility shall be incurred by any
person performing an act which should be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means. Palagpangan’s absence from the room on the night of the crime where his
companions threw a gun fire made the crime inherently impossible.

However, the crime was not impossible as argued by the Respondent People of the Philippines, and
the facts were enough to establish an attempt to convict Intod for attempted murder, since there was
intent. In the Comment to Petition, the respondent pointed out that:
“The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment as described in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, but due to a cause or accident
other than petitioner’s and his accused’s own spontaneous desistance as per Article 3, Palagpangan
did not sleep at her house that time, making the crime possible.”

Intod may have not been held as criminally liable only if the following conditions were not present:
 Execution of the act has been commenced
 That the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed
 Employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become reality
 That the result or end contemplated shall have been physically liable.

Article 4(2) refers to protection against criminal tendencies wherein, it recognizes the offender’s
capability of an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible that would establish felony
against a person or property.

In this case, execution of the act has been commenced though there was a failure to accomplish its
expected result since the victim was not present at the time and place the incident happened.

However, the factual situation present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime
impossible of accomplishment due to the absence of Palangpangan which makes him not liable to the
criminal act of attempted murder, but will be held liable and guilty of an impossible crime, considering
the social danger and degree of criminality as stated on Article 4 par. 2 and 59.