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127383 August 18, 2005
Section 234.
THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY TREASURER AND THE CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO
CITY, Petitioners,
Same; Same; Same; Same; The exemptions from real property taxes are enumerated in Section
vs.
234, which specifically states that only real properties owned “by the Republic of the Philippines or any
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY AND THE GOVERNMENT
of its political subdivisions” is exempted from payment of the tax. Clearly, instrumentalities or GOCCs do
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Respondent.
not fall within the exceptions under Section 234.—This Court, in Mactan, acknowledged that under
Section 133, instrumentalities were generally exempt from all forms of local government taxation, unless
Taxation; Exemptions; Local Government Units (LGUs); Local Government Code; The Court, in
otherwise provided in the Code. On the other hand, Section 232 “otherwise provides” insofar as it allowed
ruling MactanCebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) nonexempt from realty taxes, considered
local government units to levy an ad valorem real property tax, irrespective of who owned the property.
that Section 133 of the Local Government Code qualified the exemption of the National Government, its
At the same time, the imposition of real property taxes under Section 232 is in turn qualified by the phrase agencies and instrumentalities from local taxation with the phrase “unless otherwise provided herein.”—
“not hereinafter specifically exempted.” The exemptions from real property taxes are enumerated in The Court, in ruling MCIAA nonexempt from realty taxes, considered that Section 133 qualified the
Section 234, which specifically states that only real properties owned “by the Republic of the Philippines exemption of the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities from local taxation with the
or any of its political subdivisions” are exempted from the payment of the tax. Clearly, instrumentalities phrase “unless otherwise provided herein.” The Court then considered the other relevant provisions of the
or GOCCs do not fall within the exceptions under Section 234. Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutes; Only the constitution may operate to preclude or place Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 133 was not intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the
restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws—constitutional dicta are of higher order than legislative power of LGUs to tax the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities.—Section 133 was not
statutes, and the latter should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict.—The second intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the power of LGUs to tax the National Government, its
paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, effectively imposes restrictions on the agencies and instrumentalities, as evidenced by these cited provisions which “otherwise provided.” But
competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue what was the extent of the limitation under Section 133? This is how the Court, in a discussion of far
restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially considering that it is a reaching consequence, defined the parameters in Mactan: The foregoing sections of the LGC speak of: (a)
lawmaker’s act that imposes such burden. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place the limitations on the taxing powers of local government units and the exceptions to such limitations; and
restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws. Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative (b) the rule on tax exemptions and the exceptions thereto. The use of exceptions or provisos in these
statutes, and the latter should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict. sections, as shown by the following clauses: (1) “unless otherwise provided herein” in the opening
paragraph of Section 133; (2) “Unless otherwise provided in this Code” in Section 193; (3) “not hereafter
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Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on
Tinga, J.: the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws.—It is a basic precept
that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the
A Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the taxexempt status of the Government Service passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best
Insurance System (GSIS) for the years 1992 to 1994 in contravention of the mandate under the Local
senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an
Government Code of 1992,1 the precedent set by this Court in MactanCebu International Airport
unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive
Authority v. Hon. Marcos,2 and the public policy on local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.3
to the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, “[t]o be sure, there are no
irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and
The matter was elevated to this Court directly from the trial court on a pure question of law. 4 The facts are
uncontroverted. we should not fear change.”
On 8 April 1994, the GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction scheduling the Same; Same; The express withdrawal of all tax exemptions accorded to all persons natural or
public bidding of GSIS properties located in Matina and Ulas, Davao City for nonpayment of realty taxes juridical, as stated in Section 193 of the Local Government Code applies, without impediment to the
for the years 1992 to 1994 totaling Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty One present case.—The two conditionalities of Section 33 cannot bear relevance on whether the Local
Pesos and Sixty One Centavos (₱295,721.61). The auction was subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline
5
Government Code removed the taxexempt status of the GSIS. The express withdrawal of all tax
extension allowed by Davao City for the payment of delinquent real property taxes. 6
exemptions accorded to all persons, natural or juridical, as stated in Section 193 of the Local Government
Code, applies without impediment to the present case. Such position is bolstered by the other cited
On 28 July 1994, the GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land
provisions of the Local Government Code, and by the Mactan ruling.
owned by the GSIS. Another Notice of Public Auction was received by the GSIS on 29 August 1994,
setting the date of auction sale for 20 September 1994.
Same; Same; The State is mandated to ensure local autonomy of local governments, and local
On 13 September 1994, the GSIS filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus And/Or governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees, and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to
Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Davao City. It also sought the issuance of a temporary restraining congressional guidelines and limitations.—Also worthy of note is that the Constitution itself promotes the
order. The case was raffled to Branch 12, presided by Judge Maximo Magno Libre. On 13 September principles of local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure
1994, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order for a period of twenty (20) days, effectively enjoining
7
the autonomy of local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges
the auction sale scheduled seven days later. Following exchange of arguments, the RTC issued that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local
an Order dated 3 April 1995 issuing a writ of preliminary injunction effective for the duration of the suit. 8
autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and
appropriate enforcement by this Court.
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a) The tax exemption privilege of petitioner should be upheld and continued and that the warrants of levy At the pretrial, it was agreed that the sole issue for resolution was purely a question of law, that is,
and notices of levy issued by the respondent Treasurer is hereby voided and declared of no effect; whether Sections 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax
exemptions of government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), have also withdrawn from the
b) Let a writ of prohibition be issued restraining the City Treasurer from proceeding with the auction sale GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of the realty taxes sought to be levied by Davao City. 9 The
of the subject properties, as well as the respondents Register of Deeds from annotating the parties submitted their respective memoranda.
warrants/notices of levy on the certificate of titles of petitioners real properties subject of this suit; and
On 28 May 1996, the RTC rendered the Decision10 now assailed before this Court. It concluded that
c) Compelling the City Assessor of Davao City to include the properties of petitioner in the list of notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code, the GSIS retained its exemption from all
properties exempt from payment of realty tax and if the warrants and levies issued by the City Treasurer taxes, including real estate taxes. The RTC cited Section 33 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, the
had been annotated in the memorandum of encumbrance on the certificates of title of petitioner’s Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as amended by P. D. No. 1981, which mandated
properties, to cancel such annotation so that the certificates of titles of petitioners will be free from such such exemption.
liens and encumbrances.
The RTC conceded that the tax exempting statute, P.D. No. 1146, was enacted prior to the Local
SO ORDERED.13 Government Code. However, it noted that the earlier law had prescribed two conditions in order that the
tax exemption provided therein could be withdrawn by future enactments, namely: (1) that Section 33 be
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 30 October 1996, expressly and categorically repealed by law; and (2) that a provision be enacted to substitute the declared
hence the present petition. policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the GSIS fund. 11 The
RTC concluded that
Petitioners argue that the exemption granted in Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, was effectively
withdrawn upon the enactment of the Local Government Code, particularly Sections 193 and 294 thereof. both conditions had not been satisfied by the Local Government Code. The RTC likewise accorded
These provisions made the GSIS, along with all other GOCCs, subject to realty taxes. Petitioners point out weight to Legal Opinion No. 165 of the Secretary of Justice dated 16 December 1996 concluding that
that under Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code, even special laws, such as PD No. 1146, which Section 33 was not repealed by the Local Government Code, and a memorandum emanating from the
are inconsistent with the Local Government Code, are repealed or modified accordingly. Office of the President dated 14 February 1995 expressing the same opinion.12
On the other hand, GSIS contends, as the RTC held, that the requisites for repeal are laid down in Section The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, namely that it be done expressly and categorically by law, and that a
provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from taxes as an essential factor for Now then, in light of the foregoing observation, the court perceives, that the cause of action asseverated
the solvency of the by petitioner in its petition has been well established by law and jurisprudence, and therefore the
following relief should be granted:
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As it stood then, Section 33 merely provided a general rule exempting the GSIS from all taxes. However, GSIS fund. It stresses that it had been exempt from taxation as far back as 1936, when its original charter
Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 was amended in 1985 by President Marcos, again in the exercise of his was enacted through Commonwealth Act No. 186.14 It asserts further that this Court had previously
legislative powers, through P.D. No. 1981. It was through this latter decree that a second paragraph was recognized the "extraordinary exemption" of GSIS in Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim v. City of
added to Section 33 delineating the requisites for repeal of the tax exemption enjoyed by the GSIS by Manila,15 and such exemption has similarly been affirmed by the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the
incorporating the following: President in the aforementioned issuances also cited by the RTC.16
… GSIS likewise notes that had it been the intention of the legislature to repeal Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146
through the Local Government Code, said law would have included the appropriate retraction in its
Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary, such as the repealing clause found in Section 534(f). However, said section, according to the GSIS, partakes the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1931 and other similar laws that have been or will be enacted, nature of a general repealing provision which is accorded less weight in light of the rule that implied
unless this section is expressly and categorically repealed by law and a provision is enacted to substitute repeals are not favored. Consequently with its position that it remains exempt from realty taxation, the
the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the GSIS argues that the Notices of Assessment, Warrants and Notices of Levy, Notices of Public Auction
fund. 17
Sale and the Annotations of the Notice of Levy are void ab initio.
It bears noting though, and it is perhaps key to understanding the necessity of the addendum provided A review of the relevant statutory provisions is in order.
under P.D. No. 1981, that a presidential decree enacted a year earlier, P.D. No. 1931, effectively withdrew
all tax exemption privileges granted to GOCCs. 18 In fact, P.D. No. 1931 was specifically named in the Presidential Decree No. 1146 was enacted in 1977 by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
aforequoted addendum as among those laws which, despite passage, would not affect the tax exempt powers. Section 33, as originally enacted, read:
status of GSIS. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1931 states:
Sec. 33. Exemption from tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
Sec. 1. The provisions of special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding, all exemptions from the that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the System shall be preserved and maintained at all times and
payment of duties, taxes, fees, imposts and other charges heretofore granted in favor of government that the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible
owned or controlled corporations including their subsidiaries, are hereby withdrawn. in order not to burden the members of the system and/or their employees. . . . Accordingly,
notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the System, its assets, revenues including the accruals thereto,
There is no doubt that the GSIS which was established way back in 1937 is a GOCC, a fact that GSIS and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
itself admits in its petition for certiorari before the RTC. 19 It thus clear that Section 1 of P.D. No. 1931 specifically revoked and any assessment against the System as of the approval of this Act are hereby
expressly withdrew those exemptions granted to the GSIS. Presidential Decree No. 1931 did allow the considered paid.
exemption to be restored in special cases through an application for restoration with the Secretary of
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(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and Finance, but otherwise, the exemptions granted to the GSIS prior to the enactment of P.D. No. 1931 were
local government units. withdrawn.
However, the Court, in ruling MCIAA nonexempt from realty taxes, considered that Section 133 Notably, P.D. No. 1931 was also an exercise of legislative powers then accorded to President Marcos by
qualified the exemption of the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities from local taxation virtue of Amendment No. 6 to the 1973 Constitution. Whether he was aware of the effect of P.D. No.
with the phrase "unless otherwise provided herein." The Court then considered the other relevant 1931 on the GSIS’s taxexempt status or the ramifications of the decree thereon is unknown; but
provisions of the Local Government Code, particularly the following: apparently, he immediately reconsidered the withdrawal of the exemptions on the GSIS. Thus, P.D. No.
1981 was enacted, expressly stating that the taxexempt status of the GSIS under Section 33 of P.D. No.
SECTION 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. – Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax 1146 remained in place, notwithstanding the passage of P.D. No. 1931.
exemption or incentives granted to, or enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including governmentowned and controlled corporations, except local water districts, However, P.D. No. 1981 did not stop there, serving merely as it should to restore the previous exemptions
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, nonstock and nonprofit hospitals and educational on the GSIS. It also attempted to proscribe future attempts to alter the taxexempt status of the GSIS by
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. imposing unorthodox conditions for its future repeal. Thus, as intimated earlier, a second paragraph was
added to Section 33, containing the restrictions relied upon by the RTC and presently invoked by the
SECTION 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. – A province or city or a municipality within the GSIS before this Court.
Metropolitan Manila area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building,
machinery, and other improvements not hereafter specifically exempted. These laws have to be weighed against the Local Government Code of 1992, a landmark law which
implemented the constitutional aspirations for a more extensive breadth of local autonomy. The Court,
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the in Mactan, was asked to consider the effect of the Local Government Code on the taxability by local
real property tax: governments of GOCCs such as the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Particularly,
MCIAA invoked Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code as the basis for its claimed exemption,
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except the provision reading:
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.— Unless
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit or otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
for religious charitable or educational purposes;
. . . .
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initially hampers a ready understanding of the sections. Note, too, that the aforementioned clause in (c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts
Section 133 seems to be inaccurately worded. Instead of the clause "unless otherwise provided herein," and governmentowned and controlled corporations engaged in the distribution of water and/or generation
with the "herein" to mean, of course, the section, it should have used the clause "unless otherwise and transmission of electric power;
provided in this Code." The former results in absurdity since the section itself enumerates what are
beyond the taxing powers of local government units and, where exceptions were intended, the exceptions (d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938; and
are explicitly indicated in the next. For instance, in item (a) which excepts income taxes "when levied on
banks and other financial institutions"; item (d) which excepts "wharfage on wharves constructed and (e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.
maintained by the local government unit concerned"; and item (1) which excepts taxes, fees and charges
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to,
for the registration and issuance of licenses or permits for the driving of "tricycles." It may also be
or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all governmentowned
observed that within the body itself of the section, there are exceptions which can be found only in other
or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (Emphasis
parts of the LGC, but the section interchangeably uses therein the clause, "except as otherwise provided
supplied.)
herein" as in items (c) and (i), or the clause "except as provided in this Code" in item (j). These clauses
would be obviously unnecessary or mere surplusages if the opening clause of the section were "Unless
Evidently, Section 133 was not intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the power of LGUs to tax the
otherwise provided in this Code" instead of "Unless otherwise provided herein." In
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, as evidenced by these cited provisions which
"otherwise provided." But what was the extent of the limitation under Section 133? This is how the Court,
any event, even if the latter is used, since under Section 232 local government units have the power to
in a discussion of farreaching consequence, defined the parameters in Mactan:
levy real property tax, except those exempted therefrom under Section 234, then Section 232 must be
deemed to qualify Section 133.
The foregoing sections of the LGC speak of: (a) the limitations on the taxing powers of local government
units and the exceptions to such limitations; and (b) the rule on tax exemptions and the exceptions thereto.
Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as
The use of exceptions or provisos in these sections, as shown by the following clauses:
laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local government units cannot extend to the levy
of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
(1) "unless otherwise provided herein" in the opening paragraph of Section 133;
instrumentalities, and local government units"; however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities,
and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except
(2) "Unless otherwise provided in this Code" in Section 193;
on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or (3) "not hereafter specifically exempted" in Section 232; and
otherwise, to a taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234.
(4) "Except as provided herein" in the last paragraph of Section 234
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exempted from the payment of the tax. Clearly, instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or judicial persons,
exceptions under Section 234. including governmentowned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general
rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water
Worth reckoning, however, is an essential difference between the situation of the MCIAA (and most other districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, nonstock and nonprofit hospitals and
GOCCs, for that matter) and that of the GSIS. Unlike most other GOCCs, there is a statutory provision— educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to
Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended—which imposes conditions on the subsequent withdrawal of the Section 234 which enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of
GSIS’s tax exemptions. The RTC justified the affirmance of the tax exemptions based on the non Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption insofar as real property taxes are concerned by
compliance by the Local Government Code with these conditionalities, and not by reason of a general limiting the retention only to those enumerated therein; all others not included in the enumeration lost the
proposition that GOCCs or instrumentalities remain exempt from local government taxation. privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as to real property owned by the Republic of
the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section
Absent Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, there would be no impediment in squarely applying the 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been granted to a taxable
express provisions of Sections 193, 232 and 234 of the Local Government Code, as the Court did person for consideration or otherwise.
in Mactan and recently in Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. et al. v. Secretary of
Interior And Local Government, et al. 21 and in ruling that the tax exemptions of GSIS were withdrawn by Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC,
the Code. Thus, the crucial proposition is whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including
by the Local Government Code notwithstanding Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 as amended. governmentowned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a governmentowned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax
Concededly, it does not appear that at the very least, the second conditionality of Section 33 has been met. granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can
No provision has been enacted "to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but
essential factor for the solvency of the fund."22 Yet the Court is averse to employing this framework, in the not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by Sections
first place as utilized by the RTC, for we recognize a fundamental flaw in Section 33, particularly the 232 and 234.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
amendatory second paragraph introduced by P.D. No. 1981.
This Court, in Mactan, acknowledged that under Section 133, instrumentalities were generally exempt
The second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, effectively imposes restrictions on the from all forms of local government taxation, unless otherwise provided in the Code. On the other hand,
competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue Section 232 "otherwise provides" insofar as it allowed local government units to levy an ad valorem real
restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially considering that it is a property tax, irrespective of who owned the property. At the same time, the imposition of real property
lawmaker’s act that imposes such burden. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place taxes under Section 232 is in turn qualified by the phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted." The
restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws. Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative exemptions from real property taxes are enumerated in Section 234, which specifically states that only
statutes, and the latter should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict. real properties owned "by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions" are
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funds for government employees. If Congress has the inherent power to abrogate the GSIS itself, then it It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the
necessarily has the ability to inflict less detrimental burdens, such as abolishing its taxexempt status. If prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws. 23 Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of
there could be legal authority proscribing the Congress from enacting such legislation, such should be the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their
sourced from the Constitution itself, and not from antecedent statutes which were themselves enacted by allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus
legislative power. that may be responsive to the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, "[t]o be
sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate
The Court’s position is aligned with entrenched norms of statutory construction. In Duarte v. Dade,26 the of progress and we should not fear change."24
Court cited with approval Lewis’ Southerland on Statutory Construction, which states:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability
A state legislature has a plenary lawmaking power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal
things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised
at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before It might be argued that Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, does not preclude the repeal of the tax
it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It exempt status of GSIS, but merely imposes conditions for such to validly occur. Yet these conditions, if
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. Thus, the same rationale for
legislation upon existing statutes. (Emphasis supplied.) 27
prohibiting irrepealable laws applies in prohibiting restraints on future amendatory laws. President
Marcos, who exercised his legislative powers in amending P.D. No. 1146, could not have demanded
The citation is particularly apropos to our present task, since the question for resolution is primarily one obeisance from future legislators by imposing restrictions on their ability to legislate amendments or
of statutory construction, i.e., whether or not Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 has been repealed by the Local repeals. The concerns that may have militated his enactment of these restrictions need not necessarily be
Government Code. It is evident that we cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of shared by subsequent Congresses.
Section 33
We do not mean to trivialize the need to ensure the solvency of the GSIS fund, a concern that has seen
as the RTC did, for by doing so, we would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative expression, even with the most recently enacted Government Service Insurance System Act of
legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a particular mode of repeal. 1997.25 Yet at the same time, we recognize that Congress has the putative authority, through valid
legislation, to diminish such fund, or even abolish the GSIS itself if it so desires. The GSIS may provide
Thus, the two conditionalities of Section 33 cannot bear relevance on whether the Local Government vital services and security to employees of the civil service, yet it is not a sacred cow that is beyond
Code removed the taxexempt status of the GSIS. The express withdrawal of all tax exemptions accorded abolition by Congress if, for example, more innovative methods are devised to ensure stable pension
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do not hold decisive sway upon the judiciary but are merely persuasive. These issuances cannot derogate to all persons, natural or juridical, as stated in Section 193 of the Local Government Code, applies without
from the binding precept that one legislature cannot enact irrepealable legislation or limit or restrict its impediment to the present case. Such position is bolstered by the other cited provisions of the Local
own power or the power of its successors as to the repeal of statutes. The act of one legislature is not
30
Government Code, and by the Mactan ruling.
binding upon and does not tie the hands of future legislatures. 31
There are other reasons that guide us to construe the Local Government Code in favor of the City of
The GSIS’s taxexempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but Davao’s position. Section 5 of the Local Government Code provides the guidelines on how to construe the
restored by the Government Service Insurance System Code’s provisions in cases of doubt, and they are selfexplanatory, thus:
Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is Section Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. – In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following
rules shall apply:
39.32 The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the
Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao. (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor,
and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;
Costs de oficio. (b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local
government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or
SO ORDERED. relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be
construed strictly against the person claiming it; (Emphasis supplied.)
Also worthy of note is that the Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy as embodied
in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments, 28 and
local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject
to congressional guidelines and limitations.29 The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance
but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court.
We are aware that this stance runs contrary to that which was adopted by the Secretary of Justice in his
Opinion dated 22 July 1993, as well as the memorandum from the Office of the President dated 14
February 1995, expressing the same opinion. However, statutory interpretations of these executive bodies
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restrictions do not impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the legislature to so amend G.R. No. 186242 December 23, 2009
it.—The foregoing exempting proviso, couched as it were in an encompassing manner, brooks no other
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
construction but that GSIS is exempt from all forms of taxes. While not determinative of this case, it is to
vs.
be noted that prominently added in GSIS’ present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of
CITY TREASURER and CITY ASSESSOR of the CITY OF MANILA, Respondents.
the taxexempt clause so as to protect the solvency of GSIS funds. Moreover, an express repeal by a
subsequent law would not suffice to affect the full exemption benefits granted the GSIS, unless the
following conditionalities are met: (1) The repealing clause must expressly, specifically, and
Government Service Insurance System; Legal Research; In 1936, Commonwealth Act No. (CA)
categorically revoke or repeal Sec. 39; and (2) a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the
186 was enacted abolishing the then pension systems under Act No. 1638, as amended, and establishing
exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund. These
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to manage the pension system, life and retirement
restrictions for a future express repeal, notwithstanding, do not make the proviso an irrepealable law, for
insurance, and other benefits of all government employees.—In 1936, Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 186
such restrictions do not impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the legislature to so
was enacted abolishing the then pension systems under Act No. 1638, as amended, and establishing the
amend it. The restrictions merely enhance other provisos in the law ensuring the solvency of the GSIS
GSIS to manage the pension system, life and retirement insurance, and other benefits of all government
fund.
employees. Under what may be considered as its first charter, the GSIS was set up as a nonstock
corporation managed by a board of trustees. Notably, Section 26 of CA 186 provided exemption from any
Same; Same; While recognizing the exempt status of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
legal process and liens but only for insurance policies and their proceeds, thus: Section 26. Exemption
owing to the reenactment of the full tax exemption clause under Sec. 39 of Republic Act No. 8291 in 1997,
from legal process and liens.—No policy of life insurance issued under this Act, or the proceeds thereof,
the ponencia in City of Davao v. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City, 467 SCRA 280 (2005), appeared to have
when paid to any member thereunder, nor any other benefit granted under this Act, shall be liable to
failed to take stock of and fully appreciate the allembracing condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39
attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or
which, for all intents and purposes, considered as paid “any assessment against the GSIS as of the
equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of such member, or his beneficiary, or
approval of this Act.”—While recognizing the exempt status of GSIS owing to the reenactment of the full
any other person who may have a right thereunder, either before or after payment; nor shall the proceeds
tax exemption clause under Sec. 39 of RA 8291 in 1997, the ponencia in City of Davao appeared to have
thereof, when not made payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the member for
failed to take stock of and fully appreciate the allembracing condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39
payment of his debt. x x x
which, for all intents and purposes, considered as paid “any assessment against the GSIS as of the
approval of this Act.” If only to stress the point, we hereby reproduce the pertinent portion of said Sec.
Same; Taxation; It is to be noted that prominently added in Government Service Insurance
39: SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.—x x x Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
System’s (GSIS’s) present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of the taxexempt clause
impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the
so as to protect the solvency of GSIS funds; Restrictions in the Government Service Insurance System
benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its
(GSIS) Charter which for a future express repeal do not make the proviso an irrepealable law, for such
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the national government. Such grant does not necessarily result in the loss of the tax exemption. The tax assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,
exemption the property of the Republic or its instrumentality carries ceases only if, as stated in Sec. assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
234(a) of the LGC of 1991, “beneficial use thereof has been granted, for a consideration or otherwise, to a specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby
taxable person.” GSIS, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable juridical person under Sec. considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence
133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however, lost in a sense that status with respect to the Katigbak property when contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered
it contracted its beneficial use to MHC, doubtless a taxable person. Thus, the real estate tax assessment of ineffective and without legal force and effect.
PhP 54,826,599.37 covering 1992 to 2002 over the subject Katigbak property is valid insofar as said tax
delinquency is concerned as assessed over said property. Same; Same; The Court’s fairly recent ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals, 495 SCRA 591 (2006), a case likewise involving real estate tax assessments by a Metro Manila
Same; Same; The unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the taxable person city on the real properties administered by Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), argues for
who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the owner.—The the nontax liability of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for real estate taxes.—Apart from
next query as to which between GSIS, as the owner of the Katigbak property, or MHC, as the lessee the foregoing consideration, the Court’s fairly recent ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v.
thereof, is liable to pay the accrued real estate tax, need not detain us long. MHC ought to pay. As we Court of Appeals, 495 SCRA 591 (2006), a case likewise involving real estate tax assessments by a Metro
declared in Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim, “the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable Manila city on the real properties administered by MIAA, argues for the nontax liability of GSIS for real
against the taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or estate taxes. There, the Court held that MIAA does not qualify as a GOCC, not having been organized
not he is the owner.” Of the same tenor is the Court’s holding in the subsequent Manila Electric Company either as a stock corporation, its capital not being divided into shares, or as a nonstock corporation
v. Barlis, 357 SCRA 832 (2001) and later in Republic v. City of Kidapawan, 477 SCRA 324 (2005). because it has no members. MIAA is rather an instrumentality of the National Government and, hence,
Actual use refers to the purpose for which the property is principally or predominantly utilized by the outside the purview of local taxation by force of Sec. 133 of the LGC providing in context that “unless
person in possession thereof. Being in possession and having actual use of the Katigbak property since otherwise provided,” local governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities. And as the
November 1991, MHC is liable for the realty taxes assessed over the Katigbak property from 1992 to Court pronounced in Manila International Airport Authority, the airport lands and buildings MIAA
2002. administers belong to the Republic of the Philippines, which makes MIAA a mere trustee of such assets.
No less than the Administrative Code of 1987 recognizes a scenario where a piece of land owned by the
Same; Same; A valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax liability; Even granting arguendo Republic is titled in the name of a department, agency, or instrumentality.
that Government Service Insurance System’s (GSIS’s) liability for realty taxes attached from 1992, when
Republic Act No. 7160 effectively lifted its tax exemption under Presidential Decree Nos. 1146 to 1996, Same; Same; Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as a government instrumentality, is
when Republic Act No. 8291 restored the tax incentive, the levy on the subject properties to answer for not a taxable juridical person under Sec. 133(o) of the Local Government Code.—Thus read together, the
the assessed realty tax delinquencies cannot still be sustained for the simple reason that the governing provisions allow the Republic to grant the beneficial use of its property to an agency or instrumentality of
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The Facts law, Republic Act No. 8291, in force at the time of the levy prohibits it.—In light of the foregoing
disquisition, the issue of the propriety of the threatened levy of subject properties by the City of Manila to
Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land, one located at Katigbak 25th St., Bonifacio answer for the demanded realty tax deficiency is now moot and academic. A valid tax levy presupposes a
Drive, Manila (Katigbak property), and the other, at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., also in Manila
corresponding tax liability. Nonetheless, it will not be remiss to note that it is without doubt that the
(ConcepcionArroceros property). Title to the ConcepcionArroceros property was transferred to this
subject GSIS properties are exempt from any attachment, garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal
Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation No. 835 3 dated April 27, 2005. Both the GSIS and the
processes. This is the clear import of the third paragraph of Sec. 39, RA 8291, which we quote anew for
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the ConcepcionArroceros property, while the
clarity: x x x The Court would not be indulging in pure speculative exercise to say that the underlying
Katigbak property was under lease.
legislative intent behind the above exempting proviso cannot be other than to isolate GSIS funds and
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The issues raised may be formulated in the following wise: first, whether GSIS under its charter is exempt realty taxes that may be imposed on the subject property; and (b) the ConcepcionArroceros property is
from real property taxation; second, assuming that it is so exempt, whether GSIS is liable for real property partly occupied by GSIS and partly occupied by the MeTC of Manila.
taxes for its properties leased to a taxable entity; and third, whether the properties of GSIS are exempt
from levy. The Ruling of the RTC
In the main, it is petitioner’s posture that both its old charter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1146, and By Decision of November 15, 2007, the RTC dismissed GSIS’ petition, as follows:
present charter, RA 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997, exempt the agency and its properties from all forms of
taxes and assessments, inclusive of realty tax. Excepting, respondents counter that GSIS may not WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, DISMISSING the petition for lack
successfully resist the city’s notices and warrants of levy on the basis of its exemption under RA 8291, of merit, and declaring the assessment conducted by the respondents City of Manila on the subject real
real property taxation being governed by RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC, properties of GSIS as valid pursuant to law.
hereinafter).
SO ORDERED.9
The petition is meritorious.
GSIS sought but was denied reconsideration per the assailed Order dated January 7, 2009.
First Core Issue: GSIS Exempt from Real Property Tax
Thus, the instant petition for review on pure question of law.
Full tax exemption granted through PD 1146
The Issues
In 1936, Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 18611 was enacted abolishing the then pension systems under Act
1. Whether petitioner is exempt from the payment of real property taxes from 1992 to 2002;
No. 1638, as amended, and establishing the GSIS to manage the pension system, life and retirement
insurance, and other benefits of all government employees. Under what may be considered as its first
2. Whether petitioner is exempt from the payment of real property taxes on the property it leased to a
charter, the GSIS was set up as a nonstock corporation managed by a board of trustees. Notably, Section
taxable entity; and
26 of CA 186 provided exemption from any legal process and liens but only for insurance policies and
their proceeds, thus:
3. Whether petitioner’s real properties are exempt from warrants of levy and from tax sale for non
payment of real property taxes.10
Section 26. Exemption from legal process and liens. — No policy of life insurance issued under this Act,
or the proceeds thereof, when paid to any member thereunder, nor any other benefit granted under this
The Court’s Ruling
Act, shall be liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or
applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of such member,
or his beneficiary, or any other person who may have a right thereunder, either before or after payment;
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Then came the enactment in 1991 of the LGC or RA 7160, providing the exercise of local government nor shall the proceeds thereof, when not made payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the
units (LGUs) of their power to tax, the scope and limitations thereof, and the exemptions from taxations.
14
estate of the member for payment of his debt. x x x
Of particular pertinence is the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption privileges in Sec. 193 of
the LGC, and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in In 1977, PD 1146,12 otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, was
the last paragraph of the succeeding Sec. 234, thus: issued, providing for an expanded insurance system for government employees. Sec. 33 of PD 1146
provided for a new tax treatment for GSIS, thus:
SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. – Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, Section 33. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
including governmentowned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the System shall be preserved and maintained at all times
registered under R.A. No. 6938, nonstock and nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions, are and that the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. possible in order not to burden the members of the System and/or their employees. Taxes imposed on the
System tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to
SEC. 234. Exemption from Real Property Tax. – x x x Except as provided herein, any exemption from sustain the benefits under this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the System, its
payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,
or juridical, including all governmentowned or controlled corporation are hereby withdrawn upon the assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
effectivity of this Code. specifically revoked and any assessment against the System as of the approval of this Act are hereby
considered paid.
From the foregoing provisos, there can be no serious doubt about the Congress’ intention to withdraw,
subject to certain defined exceptions, tax exemptions granted prior to the passage of RA 7160. The The benefits granted under this Act shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy
question that easily comes to mind then is whether or not the full tax exemption heretofore granted to or other processes. This, however, shall not apply to obligations of the member to the System, or to the
GSIS under PD 1146, particular insofar as realty tax is concerned, was deemed withdrawn. We answer in employer, or when the benefits granted herein are assigned by the member with the authority of the
the affirmative. System. (Emphasis ours.)
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos,[15] the Court held that the express withdrawal A scrutiny of PD 1146 reveals that the nonstock corporate structure of GSIS, as established under CA
by the LGC of previously granted exemptions from realty taxes applied to instrumentalities and 186, remained unchanged. Sec. 3413 of PD 1146 pertinently provides that the GSIS, as created by CA 186,
governmentowned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), such as the MactanCebu International Airport shall implement the provisions of PD 1146.
Authority. In City of Davao v. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City, the Court, citing Mactan Cebu
16
International Airport Authority, declared the GSIS liable for real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 RA 7160 lifted GSIS tax exemption
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or protect the solvency of the fund, notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the national (contested real estate tax assessment therein), its previous exemption under PD 1146 being considered
government to secure such solvency or liability. withdrawn with the enactment of the LGC in 1991.
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies Significantly, the Court, in City of Davao, stated the observation that the GSIS’ taxexempt status
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC was restored in 1997 by RA 8291.17
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasijudicial agencies or administrative
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the Full tax exemption reenacted through RA 8291
members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or
performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or Indeed, almost 20 years to the day after the issuance of the GSIS charter, i.e., PD 1146, it was further
work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS. (Emphasis amended and expanded by RA 8291 which took effect on June 24, 1997.18 Under it, the full tax exemption
ours.) privilege of GSIS was restored, the operative provision being Sec. 39 thereof, a virtual replication of the
earlier quoted Sec. 33 of PD 1146. Sec. 39 of RA 8291 reads:
The foregoing exempting proviso, couched as it were in an encompassing manner, brooks no other
construction but that GSIS is exempt from all forms of taxes. While not determinative of this case, it is to SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
be noted that prominently added in GSIS’ present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times
the taxexempt clause so as to protect the solvency of GSIS funds. Moreover, an express repeal by a and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible
subsequent law would not suffice to affect the full exemption benefits granted the GSIS, unless the in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
following conditionalities are met: (1) The repealing clause must expressly, specifically, and categorically impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the
revoke or repeal Sec. 39; and (2) a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets,
herein as an essential factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund. These restrictions for a future revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,
express repeal, notwithstanding, do not make the proviso an irrepealable law, for such restrictions do not assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly
impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the legislature to so amend it. The restrictions and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are
merely enhance other provisos in the law ensuring the solvency of the GSIS fund.1avvphi1 hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or
jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and
Given the foregoing perspectives, the following may be assumed: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 33 of PD 1146, rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect.
GSIS enjoyed tax exemption from real estate taxes, among other tax burdens, until January 1, 1992 when
the LGC took effect and withdrew exemptions from payment of real estate taxes privileges granted under Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless this
PD 1146; (2) RA 8291 restored in 1997 the tax exempt status of GSIS by reenacting under its Sec. 39 section is expressly, specifically and categorically revoked or repealed by law and a provision is
enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain
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purview of local taxation by force of Sec. 133 of the LGC providing in context that "unless otherwise what was once Sec. 33 of P.D. 1146; 19 and (3) If any real estate tax is due to the City of Manila, it is,
provided," local governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities. And as the Court following City of Davao, only for the interim period, or from 1992 to 1996, to be precise.
pronounced in Manila International Airport Authority, the airport lands and buildings MIAA administers
belong to the Republic of the Philippines, which makes MIAA a mere trustee of such assets. No less than Real property taxes assessed and due from GSIS considered paid
the Administrative Code of 1987 recognizes a scenario where a piece of land owned by the Republic is
titled in the name of a department, agency, or instrumentality. The following provision of the said Code While recognizing the exempt status of GSIS owing to the reenactment of the full tax exemption clause
suggests as much: under Sec. 39 of RA 8291 in 1997, the ponencia in City of Davao appeared to have failed to take stock of
and fully appreciate the allembracing condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39 which, for all intents
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.––Whenever real property of the Government is and purposes, considered as paid "any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act." If only
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government to stress the point, we hereby reproduce the pertinent portion of said Sec. 39:
by the following: x x x x
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – x x x Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of x x x any corporate the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.21 this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including
all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or
While perhaps not of governing sway in all fours inasmuch as what were involved in Manila duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
International Airport Authority, e.g., airfields and runways, are properties of the public dominion and, assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
hence, outside the commerce of man, the rationale underpinning the disposition in that case is squarely Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in
applicable to GSIS, both MIAA and GSIS being similarly situated. First, while created under CA 186 as a derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without
nonstock corporation, a status that has remained unchanged even when it operated under PD 1146 and legal force and effect. (Emphasis added.)
RA 8291, GSIS is not, in the context of the afore quoted Sec. 193 of the LGC, a GOCC following the
teaching of Manila International Airport Authority, for, like MIAA, GSIS’ capital is not divided into unit GSIS an instrumentality of the National Government
shares. Also, GSIS has no members to speak of. And by members, the reference is to those who, under
Sec. 87 of the Corporation Code, make up the nonstock corporation, and not to the compulsory members Apart from the foregoing consideration, the Court’s fairly recent ruling in Manila International Airport
of the system who are government employees. Its management is entrusted to a Board of Trustees whose Authority v. Court of Appeals,20 a case likewise involving real estate tax assessments by a Metro Manila
members are appointed by the President. city on the real properties administered by MIAA, argues for the nontax liability of GSIS for real estate
taxes. There, the Court held that MIAA does not qualify as a GOCC, not having been organized either as
Second, the subject properties under GSIS’s name are likewise owned by the Republic. The GSIS is but a a stock corporation, its capital not being divided into shares, or as a nonstock corporation because it has
mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the Government or acquired no members. MIAA is rather an instrumentality of the National Government and, hence, outside the
16 of 669
It is true that said Sec. 234(a), quoted below, exempts from real estate taxes real property owned by the for the enhancement of the system. This particular property arrangement is clearly shown by the fact that
Republic, unless the beneficial use of the property is, for consideration, transferred to a taxable person. the disposal or conveyance of said subject properties are either done by or through the authority of the
President of the Philippines. Specifically, in the case of the ConcepcionArroceros property, it was
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The following are exempted from payment of the real transferred, conveyed, and ceded to this Court on April 27, 2005 through a presidential proclamation,
property tax: Proclamation No. 835. Pertinently, the text of the proclamation announces that the ConcepcionArroceros
property was earlier ceded to the GSIS on October 13, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 78 for office
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except purposes and had since been titled to GSIS which constructed an office building thereon. Thus, the
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. transfer on April 27, 2005 of the ConcepcionArroceros property to this Court by the President through
Proclamation No. 835. This illustrates the nature of the government ownership of the subject GSIS
This exemption, however, must be read in relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which prohibits LGUs
properties, as indubitably shown in the last clause of Presidential Proclamation No. 835:
from imposing taxes or fees of any kind on the national government, its agencies, and instrumentalities:
WHEREAS, by virtue of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended), Presidential
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise
Decree No. 1455, and the Administrative Code of 1987, the President is authorized to transfer any
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
government property that is no longer needed by the agency to which it belongs to other branches
not extend to the levy of the following:
or agencies of the government. (Emphasis ours.)
x x x x
Third, GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits of
all government employees and their beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an essential
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
and vital function which the government, through one of its agencies or instrumentalities, ought to
and local government units. (Emphasis supplied.)
perform if social security services to civil service employees are to be delivered with reasonable dispatch.
It is no wonder, therefore, that the Republic guarantees the fulfillment of the obligations of the GSIS to its
Thus read together, the provisions allow the Republic to grant the beneficial use of its property to an
members (government employees and their beneficiaries) when and as they become due. This guarantee
agency or instrumentality of the national government. Such grant does not necessarily result in the loss of
was first formalized under Sec. 24 22 of CA 186, then Sec. 8 23 of PD 1146, and finally in Sec. 8 24 of RA
the tax exemption. The tax exemption the property of the Republic or its instrumentality carries ceases
8291.
only if, as stated in Sec. 234(a) of the LGC of 1991, "beneficial use thereof has been granted, for a
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person." GSIS, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable
Second Core Issue: Beneficial Use Doctrine Applicable
juridical person under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however, lost in a sense that status with respect to
the Katigbak property when it contracted its beneficial use to MHC, doubtless a taxable person. Thus, the
The foregoing notwithstanding, the leased Katigbak property shall be taxable pursuant to the "beneficial
real estate tax assessment of PhP 54,826,599.37 covering 1992 to 2002 over the subject Katigbak property
use" principle under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC.
is valid insofar as said tax delinquency is concerned as assessed over said property.
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Third Core Issue: GSIS Properties Exempt from Levy Taxable entity having beneficial use of leased
property liable for real property taxes thereon
In light of the foregoing disquisition, the issue of the propriety of the threatened levy of subject properties
by the City of Manila to answer for the demanded realty tax deficiency is now moot and academic. A The next query as to which between GSIS, as the owner of the Katigbak property, or MHC, as the lessee
valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax liability. Nonetheless, it will not be remiss to note that it is thereof, is liable to pay the accrued real estate tax, need not detain us long. MHC ought to pay.
without doubt that the subject GSIS properties are exempt from any attachment, garnishment, execution,
levy, or other legal processes. This is the clear import of the third paragraph of Sec. 39, RA 8291, which As we declared in Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim, "the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is
we quote anew for clarity: chargeable against the taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of
whether or not he is the owner." Of the same tenor is the Court’s holding in the subsequent Manila
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – x x x. Electric Company v. Barlis25 and later in Republic v. City of Kidapawan.26 Actual use refers to the purpose
for which the property is principally or predominantly utilized by the person in possession thereof. 27
x x x x
Being in possession and having actual use of the Katigbak property since November 1991, MHC is liable
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies for the realty taxes assessed over the Katigbak property from 1992 to 2002.
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasijudicial agencies or administrative The foregoing is not all. As it were, MHC has obligated itself under the GSISMHC Contract of Lease to
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the shoulder such assessment. Stipulation l8 of the contract pertinently reads:
members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or
performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or 18. By law, the Lessor, [GSIS], is exempt from taxes, assessments and levies. Should there be any change
work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS. (Emphasis in the law or the interpretation thereof or any other circumstances which would subject the Leased
ours.) Property to any kind of tax, assessment or levy which would constitute a charge against the Lessor or
create a lien against the Leased Property, the Lessee agrees and obligates itself to shoulder and pay
The Court would not be indulging in pure speculative exercise to say that the underlying legislative intent such tax, assessment or levy as it becomes due.28 (Emphasis ours.)
behind the above exempting proviso cannot be other than to isolate GSIS funds and properties from legal
processes that will either impair the solvency of its fund or hamper its operation that would ultimately As a matter of law and contract, therefore, MHC stands liable to pay the realty taxes due on the Katigbak
require an increase in the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of the system. Throughout property. Considering, however, that MHC has not been impleaded in the instant case, the remedy of the
GSIS’ life under three different charters, the need to ensure the solvency of GSIS fund has always been a City of Manila is to serve the realty tax assessment covering the subject Katigbak property to MHC and to
legislative concern, a concern expressed in the taxexempting provisions. pursue other available remedies in case of nonpayment, for said property cannot be levied upon as shall be
explained below.
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SO ORDERED. Thus, even granting arguendo that GSIS’ liability for realty taxes attached from 1992, when RA 7160
effectively lifted its tax exemption under PD 1146, to 1996, when RA 8291 restored the tax incentive, the
levy on the subject properties to answer for the assessed realty tax delinquencies cannot still be sustained.
The simple reason: The governing law, RA 8291, in force at the time of the levy prohibits it. And in the
final analysis, the proscription against the levy extends to the leased Katigbak property, the beneficial use
doctrine, notwithstanding.
Summary
In sum, the Court finds that GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. Moreover, as an
instrumentality of the national government, it is itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the
City of Manila against its Katigbak and ConcepcionArroceros properties. Following the "beneficial use"
rule, however, accrued real property taxes are due from the Katigbak property, leased as it is to a taxable
entity. But the corresponding liability for the payment thereof devolves on the taxable beneficial user. The
Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a public auction sale, notwithstanding its realty tax
delinquency. This means that the City of Manila has to satisfy its tax claim by serving the accrued realty
tax assessment on MHC, as the taxable beneficial user of the Katigbak property and, in case of
nonpayment, through means other than the sale at public auction of the leased property.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The November 15, 2007 Decision and January
7, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the real property tax assessments issued by the City of Manila to the Government Service
Insurance System on the subject properties are declared VOID, except that the real property tax
assessment pertaining to the leased Katigbak property shall be valid if served on the Manila Hotel
Corporation, as lessee which has actual and beneficial use thereof. The City of Manila is permanently
restrained from levying on or selling at public auction the subject properties to satisfy the payment of the
real property tax delinquency.
No pronouncement as to costs.
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generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
lack of jurisdiction.
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE
POELLAMANZARES, Respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; There is grave abuse of discretion when a
constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) or the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence,
Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; Exclusive, original jurisdiction
which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of
over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the
stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.—There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional
scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals.—Exclusive, original jurisdiction over
organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope
errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly
of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that postelection
introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted
challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of
for. A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a
the President and the Vice President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17’s
discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
stipulation of electoral tribunals’ being the “sole” judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII,
Section 1’s express statement that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to
Same; Same; Same; Writs of certiorari have been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s approach to an
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
issue is premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
misrepresentation, of the evidence; (b) where a tribunal’s assessment of a case is “far from reasonable[,]
[and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article
standards that can be used”; “(c) where the tribunal’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent
evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable”; and (d) where
civil action.—A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the
the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.—Writs
jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s approach to an issue is premised on
of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is
wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the
taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in
evidence; (b) where a tribunal’s assessment of a case is “far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action. The viability of such a petition is
personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used”;
premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.” The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been
“(c) where the tribunal’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
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Constitution, therefore, is the People’s consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technicallegal, discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable”; and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or
understanding. Thus: We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given Constitutional Law; Senators; Naturalborn Citizens; Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus Constitution spells out the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for naturalborn citizen of the Philippines.”—Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a naturalborn citizen of the
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text Philippines.”
of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based Same; Statutory Construction; Even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient,
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear
need for construction is reduced to a minimum. textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.—At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional
Same; Same; The Constitution should be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet,
magis valeat quam pereat.—Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this
whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components through the dynamism of these foundling, remains unknown. Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation.
components’ interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign’s purpose so as to identify
item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis which among competing interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable construction.
valeat quam pereat. Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Primarily, the actual words — text — and how they are situated within the whole document — context —
Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings. govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails,
Same; Same; Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “[j]udicial decisions contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system.”—Reading a plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for
certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously considered that exact same text, verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “judicial decisions applying or interpreting Same; Same; Verba Legis Doctrine; Words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is
the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system.” Jurisprudence is not an independent consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.—To the extent possible, words must be given their
source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text itself as of the ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. The Constitution is truly a
date that it was originally passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People: exercising their right of
suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the
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political community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to intent that the text brings to effect. Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering prior
participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the interpretation as immutable.
right to petition the government for redress of grievance. Citizenship also entails obligations to the Same; Same; Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted
political community of which one is part. Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.—Contemporaneous construction and aids that
loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is particularly so are external to the text may be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. It is only
if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen’s birth. then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has
Same; Same; Naturalborn Citizens; A naturalborn citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to
one who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.
Philippine citizenship.” By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not naturalborn.— Same; Same; On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision,
A naturalborn citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines “from which principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “naturalborn
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.” By necessary citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a reference to
implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not naturalborn. Bengson III v. House of Representatives parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case.—
Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), articulates this definition by dichotomy: [O]nly naturalized Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an
Filipinos are considered not naturalborn citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of
under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues;
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of international
citizenship, necessarily is a naturalborn Filipino. Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels. On an initial level, a plain textual reading
shed light on the concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized readily identifies the specific provision, which principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in
citizens, he stated, are “former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they Article IV, Section 2, of “naturalborn citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s
had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in
disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens.” relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private
sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court respondent’s Filipino parentage.
(SC) has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.—Although the Same; Citizenship; The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right
Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and
proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.—Citizenship is a legal device denoting
There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings political affiliation. It is the “right to have rights.” It is one’s personal and . . . permanent membership in a
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Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative
enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments. proceedings. In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may
Same; Same; Same; Concluding that foundlings are not naturalborn Filipino citizens is result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal
tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens; Concluding that foundlings are system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a
not naturalborn citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and
through no fault of their own.—Concluding that foundlings are not naturalborn Filipino citizens is quasijudicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.
tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Words and Phrases; Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
certain means such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their evidence required by law.—“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of
present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular proof lies on the party making the allegations; that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the issue”
politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not naturalborn citizens creates an inferior class of Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift
citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own. happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor. The other party then bears the
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that “burden of going forward” with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly been established
“persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of against him or her.
‘privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.’”—The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Foundlings; The presumption that all foundlings found in the
“persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus naturalborn,
‘privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.’ It is a guarantee against ‘undue favor and individual or unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.’” Other than the anonymity “effectuate [its] whole purpose.”—The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born
of their biological parents, no substantial distinction differentiates foundlings from children with known to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus naturalborn, unless there is substantial
Filipino parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the state’s protection from the moment of their proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole
birth. Foundlings’ misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them — an inability arising purpose.” As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2),
from no fault of their own — cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the
best, as inferior, secondclass citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the constitutional mandate to defend the wellbeing of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and
state as those who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They must also be read in
dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of conjunction with the Constitution’s reasons for requiring naturalborn status for select public offices.
desolation and deprivation.
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the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Same; Citizenship; Foundlings; Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.” Llamanzares, private respondent’s naturalborn status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various
Same; Same; Naturalborn Citizens; Naturalborn Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act official public acts.—Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings’ Filipino citizenship
(RA) No. 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine on account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or
citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities without having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are naturalborn citizens.
attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized her natural
for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens born status. This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it
of another country before the effectivity of RA No. 9225 “reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and may appear that she was a viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the
exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities.—Naturalborn proceedings in the related case of PoeLlamanzares, private respondent’s naturalborn status has been
Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” affirmed and reaffirmed through various official public acts. First, private respondent was issued a
that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to foundling certificate and benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she
exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of was granted an order of reacquisition of naturalborn citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the
allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the Philippines appointed her as
hand, those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 MTRCB Chairperson — an office that requires naturalborn citizenship.
“reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225
compliance with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2’s declaration of a policy of superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and RA No. 8171 specifically “to do away with the provision in
immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who
Rather, this reacquisition works to restore naturalborn status as though it was never lost at all. become naturalized citizens of other countries.”—“Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law.” Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was
Same; Same; Same; Requisites which Naturalborn Filipinos who Have Been Naturalized naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that “[a] Filipino citizen
Elsewhere and Wish to Run for Elective Public Office Must Comply.—Naturalborn Filipinos who have may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country.” Thus, private respondent lost her
been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must comply with all of the Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took
following requirements: First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225.
reacquisition of one’s status as a naturalborn Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition
political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted. Republic Act No.
solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied. Second, compliance with Article 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and Republic Act No. 8171 specifically “to do away with
V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee
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born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular, Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that
extended process with which the former naturalborn citizen must comply. is, to allow for voting in elections. Third, “mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.” This, along with satisfying
LEONEN, J.: the other qualification requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
Same; Same; Same; It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had to comply with
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously exclude all foundlings from
public service. Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a naturalborn, Filipino citizen.
—It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent search, but shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a naturalborn, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that
sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship. To do so
required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient
to establish that he or she is a naturalborn citizen. When these inferences are made by the Senate is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as articulated in
Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative to decide the qualifications of the Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a
members of the Senate, then there is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the naturalborn Filipino citizen’s naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or her
Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.
naturalborn status.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single foundling as naturalborn. Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to
The circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for
naturalborn. The nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the scheme of political powers, facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural
as devised by the Constitution, are likewise different from the other ways to raise questions of citizenship.
born citizenship itself.—Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force,
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225’s policy of permanence and immutability: “all
the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.”
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 00115. 2 The assailed November 17, 2015 In Bengson’s words, the once naturalized citizen is “restored” or brought back to his or her natural
Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat private
born status. There may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or
respondent Mary Grace PoeLlamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a naturalborn citizen of the
Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section 3 4 of the 1987 she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of naturalborn status expurgates this intervening fact.
Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution5 denied David's Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving
forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact
Senator Mary Grace PoeLlamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are
may have consequences de facto. Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to
unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. 6 Edgardo Militar found
her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. 7 He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for
Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural
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Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to found on September 6, 1968.9 She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. 10 Local
the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree. 22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate
Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. 23chanrobleslaw stating:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and
Filipino national since birth.24 The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO,
Manila.25cralawred On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her husband. 26 For ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD
some time, she lived with her husband and children in the United States.27chanrobleslaw IS PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL
STREET, JARO . . .11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the Petition
and Jesusa Anika (Anika). 28 Brian was born in the United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.)
July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). 12 The Decision also ordered the change
Philippines.29chanrobleslaw in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had become final
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. 30 She was in a Certificate of Finality.14chanrobleslaw
subsequently given a United States passport.31chanrobleslaw
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil RegistrarIloilo received the Decision of the San Juan Court
Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald
2004 National Elections.32 To support her father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna Allan and Jesusa Poe.15 This handwritten notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling
returned to the Philippines on April 8, 2004. 33 After the Elections, she returned to the United States on certificate:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that she gave birth to her youngest daughter, NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun.
Anika.35chanrobleslaw Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No.
138.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually "slipped into a coma." 36 Senator Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18 years
Poe returned to the Philippines on December 13, 2004. 37 On December 14, 2004, her father died. 38 She old.17 The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196,
stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to the settling of Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.18chanrobleslaw
his estate.39chanrobleslaw
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport. 19 Her passport was
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked for work again in the renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18,
United States.40chanrobleslaw 2014.20 Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December 19,
2013.21chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. 41 After consulting her children, they all agreed to return to
the Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces. 42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's
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and Memorandum Circular No. AFF2005 per Office Order No. AFF069133 signed Associate schools Virginia, United States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the following
Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006."57chanrobleslaw semester.43 She came back on May 24, 2005. 44 Her children also arrived in the first half of
2005.45 However, her husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending projects, and to arrange for
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, the sale of the family home there."46chanrobleslaw
2006.58chanrobleslaw
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax Identification
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 using her United Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47chanrobleslaw
States Passport No. 170377935.59 She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines:48
October 2010."60 The following are the flight records given by the Bureau of I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Immigration:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
Departures Flight No.
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
November 1, 2006 SQ071 myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Reacquisition of Philippine
July 20, 2007 PR730 Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225.50 She also "filed applications for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time." 51chanrobleslaw
October 31, 2007 PR300
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Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie November 4, 2006 SQ076
and Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong
husay at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at July 23, 2007 PR731
ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking
itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na November 5, 2007 PR337
susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang
May 8, 2008 PR103
may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang
walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas. October 5, 2008 PR359
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regarding the issue and submit any development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 1502 was issued by the Senate Electoral Tribunal, through its
submitted "the issue of her naturalborn Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to
arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal." 97 On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. file an answer to the amended Petition.80chanrobleslaw
1510, the Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and considered the case submitted for
resolution."98chanrobleslaw Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the Record of Application of
Citizenship Reacquisition and related documents from the Bureau of Immigration on August 25,
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator 2015.81 The documents requested included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO kept Birth
Poe to be a naturalborn citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator. 99 The Decision Certificate.82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 1504 granting the
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Motion.83 The same Resolution directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned
We rule that Respondent is a naturalborn citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continue to be a officials of the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office. 84 The subpoenas ordered the
naturalborn citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the Secretary of the Senate
birth, without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship. bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents.85 The subpoenas were complied with by both the
Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on September 1, 2015.86chanrobleslaw
. . . .
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a naturalborn Filipino citizen, Respondent Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative
validly reacquired her naturalborn Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect
Republic of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. Contempt of Court.87chanrobleslaw
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05002 (the Revised Rules Implementing R.A. On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 1505 requiring the parties to
No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire naturalborn Philippine file a preliminary conference brief on or before September 9, 2015. 88 The Resolution also set the
citizenship. Preliminary Conference on September 11, 2015.89 During the Preliminary Conference, the parties "agreed
to drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription."90chanrobleslaw
. . . .
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21, 2015. 91 The parties were
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced her American then "required to submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the submission of DNA
citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a naturalborn Filipino citizen from that time on evidence by [Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date."92chanrobleslaw
until today.
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission of DNA test results. 93 The
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED. Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 1508. 94 On
November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of DNA Testing, 95 which stated
No pronouncement as to costs. that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took provided results that would shed light to the real identity of
her biological parents."96 The Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to continue to find closure
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For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted)
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration. 101 The Senate Electoral Tribunal issued
based on its finding that private respondent is a naturalborn Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as Resolution No. 1511 on November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion
Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. for Reconsideration.102chanrobleslaw
I Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on December 1,
2015.103 David's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 3,
Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a petition for certiorari under 2015:104
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private respondent's citizenship. promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.
Ruling on petitioner's plea for postjudgment relief calls for a consideration of two (2) factors: first, the The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 1511 dated 24 November 2015 issued by the
breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second, the nature Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for
of the remedial vehicle—a petition for certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of Respondent on 01 December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit memorandum
the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court. as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus
Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15139
I. A (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares,
Respondent."
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a creation
of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution:112 SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
ARTICLE VI On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received by David. 106 On December
The Legislative Department 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari before this Court. 107chanrobleslaw
. . . . On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe to comment on
the Petition "within a nonextendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." 108 The Resolution also set
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which oral arguments on January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the Solicitor
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their General, submitted its Comment on December 30, 2015.110 Senator Poe submitted her Comment on
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be January 4, 2016.111chanrobleslaw
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on Elections case on the issue
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered of private respondent's citizenship.
under the partylist system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
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Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasijudicial
elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on Elections 113) the power to rule on contests114 relating to
only before them that postelection challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the House of
and Representatives (as well as of the President and the VicePresident, in the case of the Presidential Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and distinct constitutional organ. There are two
Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated. (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests
is exclusive to any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no other
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17's function.
stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII,
Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal system an "independent,
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of impartial and nonpartisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review is, purpose."115 The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, independent from the
therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120 National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests relating to members of the National
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House of Representatives Electoral Assembly.116 This was a departure from the system introduced by prior organic acts enforced under
Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications American colonial rule—namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which vested
of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of Representatives the power to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution was amended to
Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the make room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment was made for there to be separate
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court electoral tribunals for each chamber of Congress. 117 The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral
that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." tribunals, but they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which provide for the creation of
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in their
are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this Court's language. The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
socalled extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution
was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. . . . The
power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature[.]" Earlier,
this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear and
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature
and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to and the Electoral Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.119chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to
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Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is premised vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of Constitution itself calls for remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
the evidence;127 (b) where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its
very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there has been an error in
used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable"; 129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes
erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.130chanrobleslaw I. B
I. C A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this
Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure as an independent civil action.122 The viability of such a petition is premised on an
The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the allegation of "grave abuse of discretion."123chanrobleslaw
Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological parents are [T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one's virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent. discretion is not enough: it must be grave.124chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable interpretation Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces
of the law while needfully considering the established personal circumstances of private respondent. It of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the
could not have asked the impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's errand to subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.125chanrobleslaw
establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose because private respondent's parentage was
unknown and has remained so throughout her life. A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or
misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion. 126 The
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist on burdening private arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short months, the one thing that she
has never been in a position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs from settled principles
implications of all other facts known about her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent against a party.
keeping with the degree of proof required in proceedings before a quasijudicial body: not absolute
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At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but "substantial evidence, or
parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where parentage conclusion."131chanrobleslaw
may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown. 132 Resolving this controversy
hinges on constitutional interpretation. In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the misfortune of having been
abandoned by their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, secondclass citizens, the
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's purpose so as to identify Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the wellbeing
which among competing interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable construction. of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access to
Primarily, the actual words—text—and how they are situated within the whole document—context— opportunities for public service.
govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails,
contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the II
plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for
verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution. Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o person shall be a
Senator unless he [or she] is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines."
III. A
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a naturalborn citizen and, therefore, not qualified to sit as
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily begin with the text itself. Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are
The language of the provision being interpreted is the principal source from which this Court determines unknown, private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to establish
constitutional intent.133chanrobleslaw her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's determination of who are
naturalborn citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic private respondent was never a naturalborn citizen, she could never leave reverted to naturalborn status
precept of verba legis.134 The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was ratified and approved despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as
by a direct act of the People exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is,
popular, rather than technicallegal, understanding. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are "[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except private respondent's foundling status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the private respondent having supposedly failed to discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it is that she is not a naturalborn Filipino.
should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be III
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
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calibration—of previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced as the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction
a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules. is reduced to a minimum.135 (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the Constitution. A
One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current iteration with prior counterpart constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that
provisions, keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous animates each of its components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is
substantive changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in enumerations, shifting called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should,
terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat.136 Each
penalties. The tension between consistency and change galvanizes meaning. provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains,
from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.137chanrobleslaw
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines, may
be compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws 142 and The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each provision at the heart of a
in similar mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still resonate today. controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:138
It is a wellestablished rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal interpretation must grapple with separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
the truth that meaning is not always singular and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
on Elections,144 this Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
interpretation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively) construe to be plainly by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces
no distinction between direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes; and, on the In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of construction
part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the word "subscriber" means that which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The variance in the parties' positions, considering that they are nugatory.139 (Citations omitted)
both banking on what they claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously considered that exact
extant ambiguity. same text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system." 140 Jurisprudence is not an
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity. The dangers of independent source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text
inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and need not be belabored. These itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the
dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced contemporaneous intent that the text brings to effect. 141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation
literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. of considering prior interpretation as immutable.
A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that
unbridled textualism purports to bolster. Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has evolved. Unless
completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the readoption—often with accompanying re
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Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In reality,
When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is, judicial decisions on similar, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is
but not the very same, matters or concerns), 148 as well as thematically similar statutes and international static.
norms that form part of our legal system. This includes discerning the purpose and aims of the text in light
of the specific facts under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when external aids may be The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider
consulted—that the supposedly underlying notions of the framers, as articulated through records of context and the interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial
deliberations and other similar accounts, can be illuminating. interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be
effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the
III. C Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution — saligan —
demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy.
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning from the supposed intent
of the framers or fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who adopted the basic document Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider not an
is the weakest approach. abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is
aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the greatest have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and
errors. The alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the demand fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
records of deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have not actively engaged in III. B
interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a proposition for reasons entirely their own and
not necessarily in complete agreement with those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that the Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when the text is
beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding capable of multiple, viable meanings.146 It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the
can also misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of actions made within specific historical document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading of the plain
episodes through detached, and not necessarily betterguided, modern lenses. text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always uniform with the original Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that the business of
understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of our
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of government, and even the People, read the
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be fundamental law and are guided by it. When competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality at which
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings, however, judicial
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the involvement must remain guided by a framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically
the polls gave the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual
case, may be entertained.147chanrobleslaw
35 of 669
from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied)
Philippines:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of thisreasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there
Constitution;
is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 150 governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of "naturalborn citizens." This
definition must be harmonized with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage.
These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are naturalborn citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances
Sec. 2. Naturalborn citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizens. (Emphasis On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are naturalborn unless there is substantial
supplied) evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole
Section 2's significance is selfevident. It provides a definition of the term "naturalborn citizens." This is Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the wellbeing
distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and
specifically articulates those who may count themselves as naturalborn. respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring naturalborn status for select public offices.
Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated when supplemented with enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
an understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and naturalborn citizenship have evolved. As will be
seen, the term "naturalborn citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign concept. V
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Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom. . . . In case grievance.152chanrobleslaw
they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is part. 153 Citizenship,
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and
protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from
Thus the moment of the citizen's birth.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United Tecson v. Commission on Elections154 reckoned with the historical development of our concept of
States shall be determined by Congress.162chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial rule.155 Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who had ceased to be Spanish Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects." 156 Church records show that
subjects were "issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection native inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The alternative identification of native inhabitants as
of the United States."163chanrobleslaw subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial master's regard for native inhabitants as inferior. 157 Natives
were, thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in the Philippine Organic Act,
otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:164 Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory, not just peninsular Spain,
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish were considered Spaniards, classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninetynine, and then resided in said Islands, expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by special laws. 158 It was only on December
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens,159 thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninetyeight.
(Emphasis supplied) (b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the Philippine Islands to its
inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did not account for the status of (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
children born in the Islands to parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any tow
common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the United
States, applied to the Philippine Islands.165chanrobleslaw
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were ceded by Spain to the United
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was States of America under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of
made to include a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This Paris did not automatically convert the native inhabitants to American citizens. 161 Instead, it left the
proviso read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary determination of the native inhabitants' status to the Congress of the United
States:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
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Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands. the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age 166 of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
therein. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of 1916, replaced the
Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended: 167
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
The term "naturalborn citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's provision
stipulating the qualifications for President and VicePresident of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary eighteen hundred and ninetynine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or VicePresident, unless he be a thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election. between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninetyeight,
While it used the term "naturalborn citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define the term. and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil law provisions that stipulated
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women who marry alien husbands—was discriminatory
the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
towards women.170 The 1973 Constitution rectified this problematic situation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a nativeborn inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899,
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this(2)Constitution.
residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country."168chanrobleslaw
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
Constitution that made sole reference to parentage visavis the determination of citizenship. Article III,
169
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Con
38 of 669
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term "naturalborn citizen" SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine
appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility requirement for the presidency. 175 It is not defined in citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her
that Constitution or in American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a requirement for the citizenship.171chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
presidency are not even found in the records of constitutional deliberations. 176 However, it has been The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term "naturalborn citizen." Article
suggested that, as the United States was under British colonial rule before its independence, the III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
requirement of being naturalborn was introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in the SECTION 4. A naturalborn citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
administration of national government:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.172chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response to a letter sent by John The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on citizenship, "except
Jay to George Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary proviso in the 1935 Constitution."173chanrobleslaw
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of
Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Command in Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
natural born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had served valiantly in the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constituti
letter, and the resulting constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the Convention was concocting
a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign monarch.177chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizensh
V. C
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 174
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: naturalborn and naturalized.
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of naturalborn citizens, as
A naturalborn citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By necessary Sec. 2. Naturalborn citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not naturalborn. Bengson v. House of Representatives perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship
Electoral Tribunal178 articulates this definition by dichotomy:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizens. (Emphasis
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not naturalborn citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration supplied)
of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen Ironically, the concept of "naturalborn" citizenship is a "foreign" concept that was transplanted into this
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility requirements for President and VicePresident of
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a naturalborn Filipino.179chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the Philippines.
39 of 669
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual naturalization Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of naturalized citizens in
process. There is no more straightforward and more effective way to terminate this inquiry than this his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who
realization of total and utter lack of proof. had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become
At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to foundlings, as well as compliance Filipino citizens."180chanrobleslaw
with Republic Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The statutory
mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The investiture of citizenship on One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally required to file a verified
foundlings benefits children, individuals whose capacity to act is restricted. 184 It is a glaring mistake to petition.181 He or she must establish. among others, that he or she is of legal age, is of good moral
liken them to an adult filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, character, and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has
the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later resided in the Philippines for a significant period of time. 182 Further, the applicant must show that he or
be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of naturalborn status. It privileges she will not be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs. 183chanrobleslaw
naturalborn citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the restrictive process of
naturalization. V. D
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be naturalborn Filipino citizens. It does not even require She did not.
them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both
parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.
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Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The citizenship of everyone else
conviction if: in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) There is more than one circumstances; Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by
evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and cralawlawlibrary a Filipino citizen.
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. V. F
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to
criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these proceedings attests to how at least
proceedings.189 There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to one—if not both—of her biological parents were Filipino citizens.
criminal proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or
administrative proceedings. Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible. To begin with, she was
abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in handful of those who, in 1968, were ableminded adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the
deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the identification of individuals against whom DNA
would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive.
standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi
judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent to establish her
evidence.190chanrobleslaw parentage.
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence. In SuerteFelipe v.
3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino People:185
population.192 Private respondent is described as having "brown almondshaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption;
straight black hair and an ovalshaped face." 193 She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. 194 Further, in 1968, while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken either singly or collectively,
there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo. the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable
consequence.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her biological parents were People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial evidence:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue, which by
1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us
an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a to a satisfactory conclusion.188 (Citation omitted)
foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates when circumstantial
her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it. evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
41 of 669
2014 1,351
In the other related case of PoeLlamanzares v. Commission on Elections,195 the Solicitor General
underscored how it is statistically more probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather
than as a foreigner. He submitted the following table is support of his statistical inference: 196
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible]197chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES: 19651975 and
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were 20102014
foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private respondent was born a Filipino
citizen.
YEAR FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES FILIPINO
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents after half a century, a
1965 1,479
range of substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's
parentage. 1966 1,437
VI 1967 1,440
1968 1,595
Before a discussion on how private respondent's naturalborn status is sustained by a general assumption
on foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading and validated by a contemporaneous construction of 1969 1,728
the Constitution, and considering that we have just discussed the evidence pertaining to the circumstances
of private respondent's birth, it is opportune to consider petitioner's allegations that private respondent 1970 1,521
bore the burden of proving—through proof of her bloodline—her naturalborn status. 1971 1,401
2011 1,140
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making 2012 1,454
the allegations;198 that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue" 199 Burden of proof never
shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party 2013 1,315
42 of 669
(5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and makes a prima facie case in his or her favor. 200 The other party then bears the "burden of going
forward"201 with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly been established against him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the action and
(6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of typical Filipinos.
who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings
before quasijudicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As against petitioner's substantial evidence.202 This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie
suggested conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts is that at least one of private case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
respondent's parents is a Filipino.
Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor of
VII petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private respondent's biological parents are not
known, it does not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
Apart from how private respondent is a naturalborn Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that
harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of naturalborn citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means substantial
parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.
at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus naturalborn, unless there is substantial
proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof must show that Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes other uncontroverted
both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are not Filipino citizens. circumstances that we have previously established as substantive evidence of private respondent's
parentage:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
VII. A (1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita LeonardoDe Castro's Dissenting Opinion to the assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural
(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;
born citizenship may be indulged in resolving this case. 203 He insists that it is private respondent's duty to
present incontrovertible proof of her Filipino parentage.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates that actual proof is (3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;
preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based on presumptions is firmly established in
jurisprudence.
(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as a foundling;
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the allegations that former
presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural
born Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions that: first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s
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Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be indulged in favor grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, while the country was still under Spanish colonial
of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the claimant" was preceded by a sentence rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as indicated in his dearth certificate, must have
specifically referencing the duty of "the respondent." The syntax of this Court's pronouncement—using also been his place of residence before death, which subjected him to the "en masse Filipinization," or
the definitive article "the"—reveals that its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his circumstances. sweeping investiture of Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. 205 This Court then
Otherwise, this Court would have used generic language. Instead of the definite article "the," it could have noted that Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan
used the indefinite article "a" in that same sentence: "no presumption can be indulged in favor F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then have been a naturalborn Filipino as he was born
of a claimant of Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used other words that would show while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers, was in
absolute or sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can be indulged in favor effect:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no presumption can be indulged in favor In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
of all claimants of Philippine citizenship." COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a naturalborn
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its statements, therefore, are himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced showing that respondent respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion
Quintin Chan was registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was likewise on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
of private respondent's or of both of her parents' foreign citizenship. place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear that the same acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
pronouncement was generally applicable:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and illegitimate.206chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.210 (Emphasis supplied) It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and Go v. Ramos208 (which merely cites Paa)—to the
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In any case, Go was decided effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.
by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided by this Court sitting En
Banc. Likewise, Go's factual and even procedural backdrops are different from those of this Paa, decided in 1967, stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
case. Go involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and undesirable alien, not an election It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the
controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing the Chinese citizenship of Go and court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant, of Philippine
of his siblings were adduced. citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State. 209 (Emphasis
supplied)
VII. B These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more recent ruling in Tecson.
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The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or
. . . . a Filipino mother (and are thus naturalborn, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one
reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose." 211chanrobleslaw
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2),
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary. . . . constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the
constitutional mandate to defend the wellbeing of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They must also be read in
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring naturalborn status for select public offices.
development[.] (Emphasis supplied) Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to naturalborn citizens of the Philippines. The 1987 enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to naturalborn citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) President;212 Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require the state to enhance
children's wellbeing and to project them from conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their
(2) Vice-President;213 development. Fulfilling this mandate includes preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially,
dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the veneer of the legal
(3) Senator;214
apparatus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(4) Member of the House of Representatives;215 ARTICLE II
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court; 216 . . . .
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission; 217
State Policies
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections;218
. . . .
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 219
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SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall public offices.225 Certain professions are also limited to naturalborn citizens, 226 as are other legally
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. established benefits and incentives.227chanrobleslaw
. . . . Concluding that foundlings are not naturalborn Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the
ARTICLE XIII highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as
Social Justice and Human Rights professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These
consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from office.
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political Concluding that foundlings are not naturalborn citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.
common good. (Emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like circumstances and falling If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
within the same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a
guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public
oppression of inequality.'"228chanrobleslaw service:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ARTICLE II
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction 229 differentiates foundlings
from children with known Filipino parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the state's . . . .
protection from the moment of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the parents who
abandoned them—an inability arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule that State Policies
reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, secondclass citizens who are not entitled to as much
benefits and protection from the state as those who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not . . . .
only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, were
abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation. SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to effect the Constitution's
dictum of defending and promoting the wellbeing and development of children. It is not our business to . . . .
reify discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth.
ARTICLE III
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are human persons whose dignity Bill of Rights
we value and rights we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ARTICLE II
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the program and policy formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be
ensured by the concerned government agency. (Emphasis supplied) . . . .
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the child" as the "totality of the
circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security State Policies
of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."
. . . .
Consistent with this statute is our ratification 230 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. This specifically requires the statesparties' protection of: first, children's rights to immediate SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
registration and nationality after birth; second, against statelessness; and third, against discrimination on rights. (Emphasis supplied)
account of their birth status.231 Pertinent portions of the Convention read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary VII. C
Preamble
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of constitutional text, the
The State Parties to the present Convention, presumption that foundlings are naturalborn citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the
foreign citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, or contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of Congress, international instruments in
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth. It has
fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined adopted mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, ratified treaties that put this mandate into effect.
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. The following State policies shall be observed at all times:
rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary. . . .
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that will ensure the
that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance, observance of international standards of child protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a
party. Proceedings before any authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner
. . . .
which allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself freely. The participation of children in
Have agreed as follows:
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chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary. . . .
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular Article 2
where the child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis supplied) 1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his
The Philippines likewise ratified 232 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As with or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires that children be allowed immediate opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
registration after birth and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends them against
discrimination:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 24. . . . 2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against
all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his
status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State. Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
. . . . 3. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his
or her wellbeing, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians,
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to legislative and administrative measures.
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other . . . .
status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written form and governed by Article 7
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
whatever its particular designation."233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared
require concurrence by the Senate before they became binding:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary for by his or her parents.
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
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Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act No. 8552:237 The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by transformation. It then has
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the Department or the child the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of
placing or childcaring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:234
biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied) transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the InterCountry Adoption Act of 1995, transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern InterCountry Adoption of Filipino incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
Children, and for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes foundlings have the force of domestic law.
among "Filipino children" who may be adopted:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of intercountry Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
adoption, hi order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
submitted: to the Board: unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary a) Child study; transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.235 (Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter,
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate; the whole of government—including the judiciary—is dutybound to abide by the treaty, consistent with
the maxim pacta sunt servanda.
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of discrimination. They
d) Medical evaluation/history; are vested with the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights,
deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and cralawlawlibrary undermine their development.
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied) Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth certificates Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of promoting the wellbeing of
to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by children and protecting them from discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the intent to
foreigners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified true copy of the Court
Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and amended birth certificates as issued by the Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is formally
OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case the applicant is entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for
for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall be required: Other Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and assistance through
foster care or adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."236chanrobleslaw
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the Death Certificate
VIII. A executed after the birth of the child.
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law." 240 Commonwealth Act
No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on October 18,
b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.
2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in
a foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an
American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate. 238 (Emphasis supplied)
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship.
Shortly after, this Petition was granted.241chanrobleslaw Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account of their
birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63242 and Republic Act No. complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are naturalborn citizens.
8171243 specifically "to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized her natural
countries."244chanrobleslaw born status. This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it
appear that she was a viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own words, to ensure
proceedings in the related case of PoeLlamanzares, private respondent's naturalborn status has been
"that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their affirmed and reaffirmed through various official public acts.
Philippine citizenship."245 This Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on Elections:246 "[w]hat
Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to naturalborn Filipino citizens who have lost First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the domestic adoption
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country." 247chanrobleslaw process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of naturalborn citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of
Republic Act No. 9225 made naturalborn Filipinos' status permanent and immutable despite the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson—an office that requires naturalborn
naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 citizenship.239chanrobleslaw
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
VIII
naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to naturalborn citizenship,
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
respondent, a naturalborn Filipino citizen, reacquired naturalborn Filipino citizenship when, following
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No.
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
9225.
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(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet thesupreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
Naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Naturalborn Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took
effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the
effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are
subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office; Provided, acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of another country before
That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath; the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may exercise
attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with
Section 2's declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a
vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore naturalborn status as though
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
it was never lost at all.
practice; and
VIII. B
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public officeTaking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of naturalborn citizenship. It also
in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities."248 However, other conditions must be met for the exercise of other
faculties:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
(Emphasis supplied) chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
Thus, naturalborn Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective public 9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and oth
office must comply with all of the following requirements:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention
or reacquisition of one's status as a naturalborn Filipino. 249 This also enables the enjoyment of full civil
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Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired naturalborn citizenship; she has also complied and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the
with all of the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied. 250chanrobleslaw
9225.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 251 Republic Act No. 9189,
VIII. D otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to
facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.252chanrobleslaw
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225
shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a naturalborn, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship. officer authorized to administer an oath." 253 This, along with satisfying the other qualification
requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as articulated
in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume As explained in SobejanaCondon v. Commission on Elections,254 this required sworn renunciation is
that a naturalborn Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or her intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees
naturalborn status. owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 dealt with by law."255 It is also in view of this that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy
reacquire naturalborn citizenship. The prefix "re" signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs. It is public office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces of other countries from being
to this status quo ante that one returns. "Re"acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.
were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the investiture of an entirely new status, it should
not have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make VIII. C
new citizens whose citizenship commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements.
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that repatriation involves the of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. 256 Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered
restoration of former status or the recovery of one's original nationality:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan. 257 This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed with the need to comply
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit
other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
restored to his former status as a naturalborn Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied) Citizenship.258 This was complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping Nationality of the United States 259 before ViceConsul Somer E. BessireBriers on July 12, 2011, 260 which
with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." 264 In Bengson's words, the once December 9, 2011261 and the approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of
naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back to his or her naturalborn status. There may have been an State, on February 3, 2012.262chanrobleslaw
interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but
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The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional competence when it ruled the restoration of naturalborn status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a
that private respondent is a naturalborn citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de jure,
petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision and Resolution. as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences de facto.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and
did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other
excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of naturalborn citizenship itself. Therefore, it is
Resolution. markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular, extended process with which the former
naturalborn citizen must comply.
Private respondent Mary Grace PoeLlamanzares is a naturalborn Filipino citizen qualified to hold office
as Senator of the Republic. IX
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice are the bedrocks of our
constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of those gave
them life, foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing
destitution that can never be truly remedied by any economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate an interpretation that
condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their being abandoned. The Constitution
cannot be rendered inert and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against other reasonable
interpretations of our basic law. It does command us to consider legal text, but always with justice in
mind.
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we must always sustain. Not
only will this manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane
and civilized people.
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in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. But even G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner
the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. To
vs.
have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (PDEA), respondents.
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
x x
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on standing is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed
G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008
for nontraditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner
or of paramount public interest.—The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can vs.
be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance AGENCY, respondents.
to society, or of paramount public interest. There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines
x x
and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial
interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008
Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner
importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.—Pimentel’s contention is welltaken.
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that
if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and Remedial Law; Actions; Power of Judicial Review; Parties; PartyinInterest; The power of
has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the
conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of statute sought to be reviewed; Even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the court may
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having
it imposes must be observed. the requisite standing to challenge it.—It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised
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senator to be certified illegaldrug clean, obviously as a precondition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be Same; Same; Definition of the limits on legislative power in the abstract.—Congress’ inherent
proclaimed as senatorelect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the
mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the following wise: Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drugfree bar set up under the governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for noncompliance with the drugtesting requirement. such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.
Same; Same; Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.—Guided Same; Same; The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.—In the same vein,
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules
within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen
in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
Same; Same; A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate
concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.—The Court can take judicial notice of the Same; Same; Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the wellbeing of the people, particularly the effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution;
youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method Whether or not the drugfree bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot as sume office for
not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, noncompliance with the drugtesting requirement—Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in
from Vernonia, “[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for
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servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to enforcement of the Nation’s laws against the importation of drugs”; the necessity for the State to act is
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. magnified by the fact that the effects of a druginfested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon
the entire student body and faculty. Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law
Same; Same; In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless; To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the Same; Same; The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
stated objectives of RA 9165.—We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.—Just as in
before the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec.
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for
“suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither the individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as
the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, Same; Same; If RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.—
forced to incriminate themselves. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the welldefined limits set
Same; Same; Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 declared forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
unconstitutional.—WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor
PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the
agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
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x x x x
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty
VELASCO, JR., J.:
of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use
other personalities, is put in issue.
shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
said resolution read as follows:
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
x x x x
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. x x x
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant
x x x x
to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
mandatory drug test.
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and private
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
efficiency; officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
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Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re election in the May WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of
10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution,
No. 6486. Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states: drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, and, on SECTION 1. Coverage. All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10,
the day of the election, is at least thirty five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and SEC. 3. x x x
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates.
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second
senator. list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. Before the start of the campaign period,
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency) the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. No person elected
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required.
the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an (Emphasis supplied.)
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of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable
relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public searches is also breached by said provisions.
interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
The Consolidated Issues Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
The principal issues before us are as follows: Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for the right against self incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and guarantees.
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these The Issue on Locus Standi
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal
protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power? First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to
Pimentel Petition allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and petitions.2
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. 3 But even with the presence of an
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. 4 To have standing,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution. The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non traditional
plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
Pimentel's contention is well taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter
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as a pre condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. 8 In the discharge of their
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator elect. The COMELEC defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. 9
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in
not the drug free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is the following wise:
really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non
compliance with the drug testing requirement. Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of
the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four
not expressly state that non compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug testing on which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap. 10
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other
reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
whatsoever. senators.
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School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and SJS Petition
addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate. 15
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure 16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry,
while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy
of a state decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and
students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
proceedings is veritably one of first impression. system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti drug abuse policies, programs and
projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be
testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and
(Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court decided cases involving
the constitutionality of governmental search. Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. A
drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order
with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification
high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
x x x x
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. A drug
their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be
than non athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a student x x x x
need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the
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The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted
well being of the people, 21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. reasonable search under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug testing policy
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug constitutional.
testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if
the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test
be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's for high school students desiring to join extra curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show
schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug
importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug testing policy made to apply to non athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued,
infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. 22 Needless unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker
to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to rooms, non athletes are entitled to more privacy.
incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no
by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not distinction between a non athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of
exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that
"subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted the school could implement its random drug testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind
intrusion of the individual right to privacy," 23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1)
Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students
merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration: have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the and well being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy are fair, just, and nondiscriminatory.
and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow. 25
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be
26 RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
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that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are
a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be state's exercise of police power.29
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing
that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place." "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. 30 And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to determined by a judge. Given that the drug testing policy for employeesand students for that matter
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as
the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access controlled laboratories "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable cause standard is not required or even
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug administrative search in question.
results shall be on the "need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which
results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes.
any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of
as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an
privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
of test results, and is relatively minimal. agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
the well being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. 36 To the Court, the need Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
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Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the back stance with respect to this modern day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private
9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the
how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted. chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
[f], and [g] of RA 9165) reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. 37 And if RA 9165 passes
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38
by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded test results are established.
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against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. 40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and
to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” The provision draws a
vs.
plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
of a province to a district on the other.
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.—The Mariano case limited the
application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative
district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Supreme Court sanctioned momentary deviation
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district . There is no reason why the Mariano paramount public importance.—In Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied (PAGCOR), 346 SCRA 485 (2000) and Jaworski v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not (PAGCOR), 419 SCRA 317 (2004), this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance.
for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by Constitutional Law; Statutes; Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population. Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated
or transgressed.—Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.
PEREZ, J.: Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the
Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic
Same; Election Law; Legislative Districts; There is no specific provision in the Constitution that
Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.—There is no specific
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on
district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of
Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution
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Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. 1 In substance, the said law
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
following table illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
3
first and second legislative districts of the province.
District Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
Municipalities/Cities
1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
1st District Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi District Municipalities/Cities Population
Sipocot
Cabusao 1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
Ragay Minalabac
2nd District Libmanan Lupi Pamplona
Minalabac Sipocot Pasacao
Pamplona Cabusao San Fernando
Pasacao
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Milaor Camaligan
Pili Naga Magarao
Ocampo Pili Bombon
Canaman Ocampo Calabanga
4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan 3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Presentacion Siruma
5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga 4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Baao Bula
Balatan Balatan Nabua
Bato Bato
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(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative. Republic Act No. 9716 is a wellmilled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of
the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied). Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked
by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the abovecited provision is the minimum a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners theorize that, save in the
7
the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution
case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a for such new district.4
minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid. 8 Under this view, existing legislative districts
may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate.
population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a His copetitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district
legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district.
stricken down as invalid for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth
districts of the province.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats. 9 The Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986. 10 According to the petitioners, 55 million Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
representative. Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
11
Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
distributing the initial 200 legislative seats. minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation Article VI
of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the
Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment. Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
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On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the Verbatim, the submission is that:
present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided
defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the appended thereto; and
petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI,
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the
existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned The provision subject of this case states:
provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in
provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a Article VI
legislative district in a city.
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law. law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
(2) x x x x
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition,
the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons: (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of at least one representative.
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person, legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
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entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasijudicial body, nor were
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed .
(Emphasis supplied) 3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a petition for
Guingona, Tatad v. Executive Secretary, Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Bagong Alyansang
18 19 20
declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
Makabayan v. Zamora, just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking
21
judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in
Lim v. Executive Secretary, this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be
22 danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the
been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales. 23 constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason
beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules, 14 as
We deny the petition. well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of
overreaching significance to society.15
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) 16 and Jaworski v.
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and
neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case
violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to ratiocinates:
sustain.25
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
compose a legislative district. defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well
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Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least
representative . 28 (Emphasis supplied) a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum
of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only
to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least
a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid,
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of
neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a
interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the
No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The
Local Government Code states:
petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constant prices and either of the following requisites: constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the
Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
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From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. Management Bureau; or
The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each
was given to the seventythree (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the National Statistics Office.
Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely
Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Constitution:
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand"
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of
ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of
Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document.
reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account
The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT
representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila.
appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their
Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute
determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the
received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned. precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many
districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates: determinants.
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
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On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more
District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He
District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether
Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned
City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on
Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes. the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and
contiguous.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of
Aborlan. Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the
northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
x x x x
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as
and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34 against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the
northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto
the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts. Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the
south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
included in the south or the Second District.
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested
for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
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There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I. 35 Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one
district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor. because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it
could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area;
another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the
common interests in line with the standard of compactness." In the districting of Maguindanao, among
36
year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes
the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that populationwise, Baguio would more
possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
leaders." For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with
37
the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba
area and population." 38
will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City.
He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that: Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body
should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of offices and functions.
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of
access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
supplied).
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed
by the Constitution. Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have
two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan,
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson. Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District
shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
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(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find
Two. 41
support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased
erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse beyond the 1986 numbers.
of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should 1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the
not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts in addition to
Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this
exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1 point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an
additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province 2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against
of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
a VALID LAW. Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first
and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new
SO ORDERED. legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted
upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District
One; and
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only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010
projections must be as of the middle of every year.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and
legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the Office of the Solicitor MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,
General (OSG) cited Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of vs.
Population Sizes), otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.—Executive COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent Commission on
Election Law; Legislative Districts; The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus: Here, based on the NSO projection,
legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”—The 1987
“the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “ a population of at
growth rate of 3.78 between 19952000.” This projection issued by the authority of the NSO
least two hundred fifty thousand.” The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population
Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of
of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the
Certification of Population Sizes), which states: x x x (d) Certification of population size based on
City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district
projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will
in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
correspond to the official low and high population projections. x x x (f) Certifications of population size
Same; Same; A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative
based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional
district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population.—The
Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO
Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.” (Emphasis supplied) Any population projection
effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The
forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source.
Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of
That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be
Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections
unreliable or speculative.
cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is
entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of
Same; Same; Same; Same; A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the
the 250,000 population.
immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.—A city that has attained a
Same; Same; National Statistics Office; National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB);
population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately following election.” In Certifications on demographic projection can be issued only if such projections are declared official by
short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).—First, certifications on demographic
such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued
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It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing conditions, this Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10
Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely May 2010 elections.
political and therefore nonjusticiable. The overwhelming weight of authority is that district
apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:] CARPIO, J.:
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one which the court This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of the
cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question. Decision dated 25 January 2010.1
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected in the
the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is Decision, that Congress’ reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III
properly brought before it. Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City’s population in 2010, is non
justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos City’s population
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does not indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report 2) and as of
render it political instead of judicial. 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July 2008, 3 and Certification of the
Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008 4) which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present setup constitutes no excuse for approving
9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its nonjusticiability argument to these materials.
a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means. Furthermore,
there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its We find no reason to grant the motion.
sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of the
Constitution.6 (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted) First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population
indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are nonjusticiable. If laws creating legislative districts are
To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court has unquestionably within the ambit of this Court’s judicial review power, 5 then there is more reason to hold
no power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government," a duty mandated specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELEC’s theory, this with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the
Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable and Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators
nonauthoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no surer Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already
way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 7
rejected claims of nonjusticiability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation:
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The Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from its ambit Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to measure
certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate Malolos City’s compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and nonauthoritative. On
the water district’s socalled population census to the level of credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to Miranda’s Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the
render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population data incidentally gathered by electric, year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO
telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter into legislative processes even though these private entities 135’s requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be based on a set of demographic
are not in the business of generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific training, experience and projections and estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b)
competence to handle, collate and process them. certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and (c)
certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his
Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like the Malolos designated certifying officer. Further, using Miranda’s own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos
City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census, much less City’s population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000
during offcensus years. The nonNSO entities EO 135 authorizes to conduct population census are local (using as base Malolos City’s population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his
government units (that is, province, city, municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval of the Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable as it neither
NSCB and makes Miranda the NSO Administrator’s designated certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its
fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or
under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing. 9 make the projection as of the middle of 2010.1avvphi1
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SO ORDERED. NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the population requirement in the creation and
conversion of local government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO
certification.14 Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less important than the creation of local
government units in enhancing our democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the
same stringent standards.
Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections, it
breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member." COMELEC
neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.
Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population
requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the
former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass
of that district.15 This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district
shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to
say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The
geographic layout of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making compliance
with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its
purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the
municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting
contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population
floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents.
WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections
dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.
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Same; Election Laws; Plebiscite; Certiorari; Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the [G.R. No. 180050 : February 10, 2010]
conduct of a plebiscite are actual in nature; hence, they cannot be the subject of this special civil action
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, AND RENE O. MEDINA, PETITIONERS, VS.
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is a remedy designed only for the correction of
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, REPRESENTING THE PRESIDENT OF
errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—
THE PHILIPPINES; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE
Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a plebiscite are factual in nature; hence, they PRESIDENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE HOUSE SPEAKER;
cannot be the subject of this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, REPRESENTING THE MOTHER PROVINCE OF
is a remedy designed only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion SURIGAO DEL NORTE; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners should have filed the proper action with the REPRESENTING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT ISLANDS, RESPONDENTS.
Commission on Elections. However, petitioners admittedly chose not to avail themselves of the correct
remedy. Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation
of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any
PERALTA, J.: derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.—The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act (R.A.) must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from
No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Gerrymandering; Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina aver that they are taxpayers and of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin
residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte. They have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined ‘gerrymandering’ as the formation
as Vice Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively. They claim to have previously
of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.
filed a similar petition, which was dismissed on technical grounds. [1] They allege that the creation of the
Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly —“Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so
deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the
rich resources from the area. 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined “gerrymandering” as the formation of one legislative district
out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
The facts are as follows:
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous,
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June 19, compact and adjacent territory.
1960. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2)
Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities,
namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon.
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The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed
Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics Office
P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers. (NSO),[2] the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416, broken
down as follows:
On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. Mainland
9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo.
Surigao City
On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine Siargao Island & Bucas Grande
whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Dinagat Island
Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities of Basilisa, Cagdianao,
Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943
affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.[5]
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province may
On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as
Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified
votes cast in the plebiscite.[6] by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is
On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.
appointment by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected
during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1, 2007, the elected On April 3, 2002, the Office of the President, through its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs,
provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient population in
existence.[7] the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands.[3]
Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the
because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual
Government Code. population in support of the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census
yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did not
Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent appointments certify the result of the special census. On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert
and elections to the new vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for all purposes, the 2003
null and void. They also prayed for the return of the municipalities of the Province of Dinagat Islands and Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576.[4]
the return of the former districts to the mother Province of Surigao del Norte.
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takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in keeping with the duty to determine Petitioners raised the following issues:
whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.
[10]
I
Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355, CREATING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT
decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. [11] The courts will decide a question otherwise ISLANDS, COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. [12] UNDER SECTION 461 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.
The main issue is whether or not R.A. No. 9355 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
II
Petitioners contend that the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is not qualified to become a province
because it failed to comply with the land area or the population requirement, despite its compliance with WHETHER OR NOT THE CREATION OF DINAGAT AS A NEW PROVINCE BY THE
the income requirement. It has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the RESPONDENTS IS AN ACT OF GERRYMANDERING.
statutory requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based on the NSO 2000 Census of
Population, the total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the III
statutory requirement is a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESULT OF THE PLEBISCITE IS CREDIBLE AND TRULY REFLECTS
Petitioners allege that in enacting R.A. No. 9355 into law, the House of Representatives and the Senate THE MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE.[8]
erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. EcleoVillaroman of the Province of Dinagat
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands."[13] The preceding italicized provision Islands raises procedural issues. She contends that petitioners do not have the legal standing to question
contained in the Implementing Rules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated as an exemption the constitutionality of the creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured
to the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. Petitioners assert that when by its creation and are without substantial interest over the matter in controversy. Moreover, she alleges
the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict with the law that they seek to implement, the law that the petition is moot and academic because the existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has
prevails. already commenced; hence, the petition should be dismissed.
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SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as Second, the Lands Management Bureau certified that though the land area of the Province of Dinagat
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed of one or more islands; thus, it is exempt from the
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: required land area of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code.
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or Third, in the special census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte, with the
assistance of a District Census Coordinator of the NSO, the number of inhabitants in the Province of
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the Dinagat Islands as of 2003, or almost three years before the enactment of R.A. No. 9355 in 2006, was
National Statistics Office: 371,576, which is more than the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original In his Memorandum, respondent Governor Ace S. Barbers contends that although the result of the special
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte on December 2, 2003 was never
certified by the NSO, it is credible since it was conducted with the aid of a representative of the NSO. He
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a alleged that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of NSO officials, who testified
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. during the deliberations on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, and who
questioned neither the conduct of the special census nor the validity of the result.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
The Ruling of the Court
funds, trust funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income.[15]
The petition is granted.
As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code
requires a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
Management Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
states:
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the
province. SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
If a proposed province is composed of two or more islands, does "territory," under Sec. 461 of the Local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
Government Code, include not only the land mass above the water, but also that which is beneath it?
units directly affected."[14]
In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein contended that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new
Province of Negros del Norte, was unconstitutional for it was not in accord with Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the
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At issue in Tan was the land area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, and the validity of the Constitution, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code. Although what was
plebiscite, which did not include voters of the parent Province of Negros Occidental, but only those living applicable then was the 1973 Constitution and the former Local Government Code, the provisions
within the territory of the new Province of Negros del Norte. pertinent to the case are substantially similar to the provisions in this case.
The Court held that the plebiscite should have included the people living in the area of the proposed new Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution provides:
province and those living in the parent province. However, the Court did not direct the conduct of a new
plebiscite, because the factual and legal basis for the creation of the new province did not exist as it failed Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio (barangay in the 1987 Constitution) may be created,
to satisfy the land area requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new Province of divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
Negros del Norte, was declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the land area of the new province established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a
was only about 2,856 square kilometers, which was below the statutory requirement then of 3,500 square plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
kilometers.
The requisites for the creation of a province in Sec. 197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 are similar to the
Respondents in Tan insisted that when the Local Government Code speaks of the required territory of the requisites in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but the requirements for population and
province to be created, what is contemplated is not only the land area, but also the land and water over territory/land area are lower now, while the income requirement is higher. Sec. 197 of Batas Pambansa
which the said province has jurisdiction and control. The respondents submitted that in this regard, the Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code, provides:
marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of
the new province. SEC. 197.Requisites for Creation.A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three
thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an
The Court stated that "[s]uch an interpretation is strained, incorrect and fallacious." [18] It held: average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under
"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.
this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof,
clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area The average estimated annual income shall include the income allotted for both the general and
and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. infrastructure funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.[17]
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However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended
when it added the italicized portion above stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands." Nowhere in the Local Government Code concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous
is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by
instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there is already the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of
compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).[19]
a province, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government
Code.[21] There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and The discussion of the Court in Tan on the definition and usage of the terms "territory," and "contiguous,"
regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go and the meaning of the provision, "The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.[22] islands," contained in Sec. 197 of the former Local Government Code, which provides for the requisites in
the creation of a new province, is applicable in this case since there is no reason for a change in their
Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "[t]he land area respective definitions, usage, or meaning in its counterpart provision in the present Local Government
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" is null Code contained in Sec. 461 thereof.
and void.
The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and Regulations
Respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that rules and regulations have the Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR),[20] thus:
force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law. They contend
that the exemption from the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers is germane to the purpose of ART. 9. Provinces.(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be created unless the following
the Local Government Code to develop political and territorial subdivisions into selfreliant communities requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. [23] They assert that in Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,[24] the Court declared as valid the implementing rules (1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the
and regulations of a statute, even though the administrative agency added certain provisions in the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The
implementing rules that were not found in the law. average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor, the provisions in the implementing rules and
regulations, which were questioned by petitioner therein, merely filled in the details in accordance with a (2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
known standard. The law that was questioned was R.A. No. 9207, otherwise known as "National inhabitants, as certified by National Statistics Office; or land area which must be contiguous with an
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003." It was therein declared that the area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not
"policy of the State [was] to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other
which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply
purposes." Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207 created the National Government Center Administration
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
Committee, which was tasked to administer, formulate the guidelines and policies and implement the land
province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
disposition of the areas covered by the law.
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The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to execute a Petitioners therein contended that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixed the selling rate of a lot at P700.00
contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committee's authority to formulate per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 did not provide for the price. In addition, Sec. 3.2 (c.1) of the IRR penalizes a
guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of the
and conditions governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No.
nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the contract to 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be
sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good nullified.
customs, public order, or public policy.[25]
In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., the Court held:
Hence, the provisions in the implementing rules and regulations that were questioned in Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc. merely filled in the necessary details to implement the objective of the law Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being
in accordance with a known standard, and were thus germane to the purpose of the law. implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature
of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
In this case, the pertinent provision in the IRR did not fill in any detail in accordance with a known thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
standard provided for by the law. Instead, the IRR added an exemption to the standard or criteria the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the Local Government Code in the creation of a province as regards the land area prescribed by the law.
requirement, which exemption is not found in the Code. As such, the provision in the IRR that the land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one or more islands is not in In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines
conformity with the standard or criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code; hence, it is null and and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and
void. the statute's objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by
which the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee
Contrary to the contention of respondents, the extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the
the purpose of the law to develop territorial and political subdivisions into selfreliant communities terms and conditions governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of
because, in the first place, it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a the law. These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the
territorial subdivision. discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over
these matters.
Further, citing Galarosa v. Valencia,[26] the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the IRRs issued
by the Oversight Committee composed of members of the legislative and executive branches of the The Committee's authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the ratefixing power of
government are entitled to great weight and respect, as they are in the nature of executive construction. administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of ratefixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
The case is not in point. In Galarosa, the issue was whether or not Galarosa could continue to serve as a reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond June 30, 1992, the date when the term of office of the elective reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon expired. Galarosa was the incumbent president of price of the lots is unreasonable.
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Under the circumstances prevailing in Galarosa, the Court considered the relevant provisions in the IRR the Katipunang Bayan or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of the Municipality of Sorsogon,
formulated by the Oversight Committee and the pertinent issuances of the DILG in the nature of executive Province of Sorsogon; and was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon
construction, which were entitled to great weight and respect. pursuant to Executive Order No. 342 in relation to Sec. 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local
Government Code.
Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within the law's four corners.
[30]
If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its Sec. 494 of the Local Government Code of 1991[27] states that the duly elected presidents of the liga [ng
express terms.[31] If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then mga barangay] at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including the component cities and
courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law, [32] or municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang bayan,
may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of sangguniang panglungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only
executive construction. during their term of office as presidents of the liga chapters which, in no case, shall be beyond the term of
office of the sanggunian concerned. The section, however, does not fix the specific duration of their term
In this case, the requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local as liga president. The Court held that this was left to the bylaws of the liga pursuant to Art. 211(g) of the
Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in absurdity Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. Moreover, there was no
or injustice. Hence, the provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one indication that Secs. 491[28] and 494 should be given retroactive effect to adversely affect the presidents of
or more islands from the landarea requirement cannot be considered an executive construction of the the ABC; hence, the said provisions were to be applied prospectively.
criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local
Government Code and, therefore, is null and void. The Court stated that there is no law that prohibits ABC presidents from holding over as members of
the Sangguniang Bayan. On the contrary, the IRR, prepared and issued by the Oversight Committee upon
Whether R.A. No. 9355 complied with the requirements of Section 461 of the Local Government Code specific mandate of Sec. 533 of the Local Government Code, expressly recognizes and grants the hold
in creating the Province of Dinagat Islands over authority to the ABC presidents under Art. 210, Rule XXIX. [29] The Court upheld the application of
the holdover doctrine in the provisions of the IRR and the issuances of the DILG, whose purpose was to
prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when the successor may be chosen and inducted into
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 9355 complied with the income requirement specified by the Local office.
Government Code. What is disputed is its compliance with the land area or population requirement.
The Court held that Sec. 494 of the Local Government Code could not have been intended to allow a gap
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land area of in the representation of the barangays, through the presidents of the ABC, in the sanggunian. Since the
eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including term of office of the punong barangays elected in the March 28, 1989 election and the term of office of
Hibuson Island and approximately fortyseven (47) islets x x x." [33] R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to the presidents of the ABC had not yet expired, and taking into account the special role conferred upon,
comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. and the broader powers and functions vested in the barangays by the Code, it was inferred that the Code
never intended to deprive the barangays of their representation in the sangguniang bayan during the
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than interregnum when the liga had yet to be formally organized with the election of its officers.
250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the
NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.
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MS. VERGARA. We only certify population based on the counts proclaimed by the President. And in this
case, we only certify the population based on the results of the 2000 census of population and housing. Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the
THE CHAIRMAN. Is that... NSO as required by the Local Government Code. [34] Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
MS. VERGARA. Sir, as per Batas Pambansa, BP 72, we only follow kung ano po `yong mandated by the would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation
law. So, as mandated by the law, we only certify those counts proclaimed official by the President. of the new province.[35]
THE CHAIRMAN. But the government of Surigao del Norte is headed by Governor Robert Lyndon Ace Respondents contended that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of the officials
Barbers and they conducted this census in year 2003 and yours was conducted in year 2000. So, within of the NSO during the deliberations on the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, since they
that time frame, three years, there could be an increase in population or transfer of residents, is that did not object to the result of the special census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del
possible? Norte.
MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir, but then we only conduct census of population every 10 years and we conduct The contention of respondents does not persuade.
special census every five years. So, in this case, maybe by next year, we will be conducting the 2006.
Although the NSO representative to the Committee on Local Government deliberations dated November
THE CHAIRMAN. But next year will be quite a long time, the matter is now being discussed on the 24, 2005 did not object to the result of the provincial government's special census, which was conducted
table. So, is that the only thing you could say that it's not authorized by National Statistics Office? with the assistance of an NSO district census coordinator, it was agreed by the participants that the said
result was not certified by the NSO, which is the requirement of the Local Government Code. Moreover,
MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir. We have passed a resolutionorders to the provincial officesto our provincial the NSO representative, Statistician II Ma. Solita C. Vergara, stated that based on their computation, the
offices stating that we can provide assistance in the conduct, but then we cannot certify the result of the population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants would be attained by the Province of Dinagat Islands by
conduct as official. the year 2065. The computation was based on the growth rate of the population, excluding migration.
THE CHAIRMAN. May we hear from the Honorable Governor Robert Lyndon Ace Barbers, your reply The pertinent portion of the deliberation on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of Dinagat reads:
on the statement of the representative from National Statistics Office.
THE CHAIRMAN (Hon. Alfredo S. Lim): . . . There is no problem with the land area requirement and to
MR. BARBERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning. the income requirement. The problem is with the population requirement.
Yes, your Honor, we have conducted a special census in the year 2003. We were accompanied by one of
the employees from the Provincial National Statistics Office. However, we also admit the fact that our x x x x
special census or the special census we conducted in 2003 was not validated or certified by the
National Statistics Office, as provided by law. So, we admit on our part that the certification that I have Now because of this question, we would like to make it of record the stand and reply of National Statistics
issued based on the submission of records of each locality or each municipality from Dinagat Island[s] Office. Can we hear now from Ms. Solita Vergara?
were true and correct based on our level, not on National Statistics Office level.
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THE CHAIRMAN. Please, Ms. Vergara.
But with that particular objection of Executive Director Ericta on what we have conducted, I believe, your
MS. VERGARA. `Yong sinasabi n'yo po, sir, bale we computed the estimated population po ng Honor, it will be, however, moot and academic in terms of the provision under the Local Government
Dinagat Province for the next years. So, based on our computation, marireach po ng Dinagat Code on the requirements in making one area a province because what we need is a minimum of 20
Province'yong requirement na 250,000 population by the year 2065 pa po based on the growth rates million, as stated by the Honorable Chairman and, of course, the land area. Now, in terms of the land area,
during the period of .... Dinagat Island[s] is exempted because xxx the area is composed of more than one island. In fact, there are
about 47 low tide and high tide, less than 40? xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. 2065?
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Governor. xxxx
MS. VERGARA. 2065 po.
x x x x
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. Although the claim of the governor is, even if we hold in abeyance this questioned
THE CHAIRMAN. . . . [T]his is not the center of our argument since, as stated by the governor, kahit ha requirement, the other two requirements, as mandated by law, is already achieved the income and the
huwag na munang iconsider itong population requirement, eh, nakalagpas naman sila doon sa income land area.
and land area, hindi ba?
MS. VERGARA. We do not question po the results of any locally conducted census, kasi po talagang
Okay. Let's give the floor to Congresswoman Ecleo. we provide assistance while they're conducting their own census. But then, ang requirement po kasi
is, basta we will not certifywe will not certify any population count as a result noong kanilang
REP. ECLEO (GLENDA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. locally conducted census. Eh, sa Local Government Code po, we all know na ang xxx nirerequire
nila is a certification provided by National Statistics Office. `Yon po `yong requirement, di ba po?
This is in connection with the special census. Before this was done, I went to the NSO. I talked to
Administrator Ericta on the population. Then, I was told that the population, official population of THE CHAIRMAN. Oo. But a certification, even though not issued, cannot go against actual reality
Dinagat is 106,000. So, I told them that I want a special census to be conducted because there are so because that's just a bureaucratic requirement. Ang ibig kong sabihin, ipagpalagay, a couple isang lalaki,
many houses that were not reached by the government enumerators, and I want to have my own or our isang babae nagmamahalan sila. As an offshoot of this undying love, nagkaroon ng mga anak, hindi ba,
own special census with the help of the provincial government. So, that is how it was conducted. Then, pero hindi kasal, it's a livein situation. Ang tanong ko lang, whether eventually, they got married or not,
they told me that the official population of the proposed province will be on 2010. But at this moment, that love remains. And we cannot deny also the existence of the offspring out of that love, di ba?
that is the official population of 106,000, even if our special census, we came up with 371,000 plus. Kaya...'yon lang. Okay. So, we just skip on this....
So, that is it. MS. VERGARA. Your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman. REP. ECLEO (GLENDA). Mr. Chairman.
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Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering on the Your insights will be reflected in my reply to Senate President Drilon, so that he can also answer the letter
ground that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a population of 118,534 inhabitants, from of Bishop Cabahug.
the new province for complete political dominance by Congresswoman Glenda EcleoVillaroman.
According to petitioners, if Siargao were included in the creation of the new province, the territorial MS. VERGARA. Mr. Chairman, may clarifications lang din po ako.
requirement of 2,000 square kilometers would have been easily satisfied and the enlarged area would have
a bigger population of 200,305 inhabitants based on the 2000 Census of Population by the NSO. But THE CHAIRMAN. Please.
House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, because its inclusion would result in uncertain political
control. Petitioners aver that, in the past, Congresswoman Glenda EcleoVillaroman lost her congressional MS. VERGARA. `Yon po sa sinasabi naming estimated population, we only based the computation doon
seat twice to a member of an influential family based in Siargao. Therefore, the only way to complete sa growth rate lang po talaga, excluding the migration. xxxx
political dominance is by gerrymandering, to carve a new province in Dinagat Islands where the
Philippine Benevolent Members Association (PMBA), represented by the Ecleos, has the numbers. MR. CHAIRMAN. No'ng mga residents.
The argument of petitioners is unsubstantiated. MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir, natural growth lang po talaga siya.[36]
Lastly, petitioners alleged that R.A. No. 9355 was ratified by a doubtful mandate in a plebiscite held on Whether the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands
December 2, 2005, where the "yes votes" were 69,9343, while the "no votes" were 63,502. They contend is an act of gerrymandering
that the 100% turnout of voters in the precincts of San Jose, Basilisa, Dinagat, Cagdianao and Libjo was
contrary to human experience, and that the results were statistically improbable. Petitioners admit that
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they did not file any electoral protest questioning the results of the plebiscite, because they lacked the
means to finance an expensive and protracted election case.
Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a plebiscite are factual in nature; hence, they
cannot be the subject of this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
is a remedy designed only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[44] Petitioners should have filed the proper action with the
Commission on Elections. However, petitioners admittedly chose not to avail themselves of the correct
remedy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as [An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands], is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The
provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Same; Same; Plebiscite; The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008
to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,
unit; No plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.—A
vs.
pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out
any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast,
no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v.
Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), a case that arose from the division of the congressional district formerly Remedial Law; Actions; Hierarchy of Courts; Direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is
covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was petition; Recourse must first be made to the lowerranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none higher court.—The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. It was pursuant to this original jurisdiction
for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly that the petitioner filed the present petition. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new and the RTCs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are
legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of
did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took practicality, dictated by an increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters
place. within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule otherwise known as the “principle of
Same; Same; Same; The plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, hierarchy of courts.” More generally stated, the principle requires that recourse must first be made to the
municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for lowerranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.—These considerations clearly show the Municipal Corporations; Congressional Districts; Definition of Legislative Apportionment and
distinctions between a legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the division of a local Reapportionment.—Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the
government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a
does not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the
plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts
apportionment or reapportionment. brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
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Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007. 7 On 10 BRION, J.:
April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the following as respondents: Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman of Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,1 with a prayer for the issuance of a
the Commission on Audit; the Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to
Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers.8 prevent the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the
ground that Republic Act No. 93712 the law that Resolution No. 7837 implements is unconstitutional.
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the
petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, BACKGROUND FACTS
regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or
conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored
cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the
instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de City of Cagayan De Oro." 3 This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. 4 It increased
Oro. Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's
voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as
preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
and Resolution No. 7837.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that:
1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with Legislative Districts The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is hereby apportioned to
concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon,
increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan,
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsagan, Tumpagon, Bayanga,
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camamanan, Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa,
no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays from
place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.5
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 78376 implementing R.A. No.
9371.
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The hierarchy of courts principle. The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling in Del Mar v. PAGCOR,9 the
Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro City's
warranto, and habeas corpus.11 It was pursuant to this original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or
present petition. substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals 12 and the RTCs,13 a direct invocation of the involve a common denominator the material change in the political and economic rights of the local
Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 4) a voter's sovereign power to decide
clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an increasingly on who should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half
overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district
the existence of this rule otherwise known as the "principle of hierarchy of courts." More generally stated, designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman
the principle requires that recourse must first be made to the lowerranked court exercising concurrent and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 6) government funds were
jurisdiction with a higher court.14 illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.10
Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be exceptions to the rule, are THE ISSUES
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our nation's lawmakers when
the validity of their enactments is assailed. 15 The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can be limited to the following
the nature of the issues raised among them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of contentious points:
Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit are reasons enough for considering it an exception to
the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the 1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition be dismissed on
COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an this ground?
action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in
turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.16 For these reasons, we do not see 2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or
the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block in our consideration of the present case. does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?
The Plebiscite Requirement. 3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local OUR RULING
government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative apportionment. This argument
Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without merit.
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Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.20 In its strict and proper essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of apportionment of
sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of legislative districts and division of local government units.
the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof." The creation, division,
21
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities, Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. 17It is the
this Article provides: allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. 18 Reapportionment, on the other
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.19
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of
legislative districts,22 and likewise acts on local government units by setting the standards for their Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
they interface and relate with one another. be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to x x x
make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above
stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent
districts."23 Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the uniform and progressive territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in at least one representative.
terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
the people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every province (irrespective of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and
provinces and cities, on the other, relate and interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the
local government units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that the
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did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took the required standards of apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as
place. the given standards are met.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for one under Article VI, In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10
Section 5 can best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical roots of these two provisions, the expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
nature of the concepts they embody as heretofore discussed, and their areas of application. boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the modification
of local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific
A Bit of History. standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local
government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
In Macias v. COMELEC,28 we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of our directly affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of
apportionment provision, noting its roots from the Fourteenth Amendment 29 of the U.S. Constitution and income, population and land area are specified as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide
from the constitutions of some American states. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created the services.24 The division or merger of existing units must comply with the same requirements (since a new
Philippine Assembly, the body that acted as the lower house of the bicameral legislature under the
30
local government unit will come into being), provided that a division shall not reduce the income,
Americans, with the Philippine Commission acting as the upper house. While the members of the population, or land area of the unit affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the
Philippine Commission were appointed by the U.S. President with the conformity of the U.S. Senate, the Code.25
members of the Philippine Assembly were elected by representative districts previously delineated under
the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement
Assembly among the provinces as nearly as practicable according to population. Thus, legislative of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry
apportionment first started in our country. out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. 26 In
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the apportionment provision, dividing In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a case that arose from the division of the congressional district formerly covering
the country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative districts electing one delegate each to the House San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no
of Representatives. Section 16 of the Act specifically vested the Philippine Legislature with the authority plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was
to redistrict the Philippine Islands. ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none
was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative apportionment
for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
together with "district" as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern was "equality of representation . . .
urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new
as an essential feature of republican institutions" as expressed in the leading case of Macias v.
legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself
COMELEC.31 The case ruled that inequality of representation is a justiciable, not a political issue, which
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local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of government ruling was reiterated in Montejo v. COMELEC.32 Notably, no issue regarding the holding of a plebiscite
are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not ever came up in these cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite was required.
encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a
corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal representation "in
delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs. accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay, ratio" with each district being, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the formulation was essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution, distinguished only from the previous
congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not one by the presence of partylist representatives. In neither Constitution was a plebiscite required.
to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal
personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local government units was not
plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district. constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution. However, as early as 1959, R.A. No.
226433 required, in the creation of barrios by Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the territorial boundaries be "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected." In 1961, the Charter of the
and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution
35 City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278) carried this further by requiring that the " Act shall take effect after a
and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, majority of voters of the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the conversion of their municipality
create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by into a city in a plebiscite." This was followed up to 1972 by other legislative enactments requiring a
both the Constitution and the Legislature. A local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the
36 plebiscite as a condition for the creation and conversion of local government units as well as the transfer
election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian. 37 of sitios from one legislative unit to another.34 In 1973, the plebiscite requirement was accorded
constitutional status.
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the
functions of government."38 As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite was never a
the State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched,
community in the administration of local affairs" 39 and the mediums through which the people act in their a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of
corporate capacity on local concerns. 40 In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly boundaries of local government units, never with the concept of legislative apportionment.
secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite. Nature and Areas of Application.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit
reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the
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Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit
The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a
another law R.A. No. 6636 whose Section 3 provides:
41
province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a
requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
SECTION 3. Other Cities. The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of Cebu,
City of Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district shall have eight (8) councilors R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837
for each district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified voters therein, provided that
the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other cities comprising a representative R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with
district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all other cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision
elected at large by the qualified voters of the said cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present Section 1 provides:
number of councilors according to their charters be reduced.
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon,
the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsagan, Tumpagon,
Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod. Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while
barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camamanan, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan,
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from
city council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative
42
Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.
districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen,
each one representing 250,000 of the city's population. In terms of services for city residents, this easily Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place
means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
against the 500,000 he used to represent. The same goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of
ranks increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation
the fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play
and in the Sanggunian; each congressman and each councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
constituents whose fewer numbers are now concentrated in each representative. The City, for its part, now
has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another congressional
number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional
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and does not require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional
requirements are satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.
adjacent as far as practicable.
Equality of representation.
The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de Oro City into
two districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly rural barangays while the second The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719
district is mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while
question the division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels of development or District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of
developmental focus as these are not part of the constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or equality of representation.
reapportionment. What the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the
lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or violation A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of
of the established legal parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies. 47 the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. We settled this very
same question in Herrera v. COMELEC44 when we interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166 and
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the
basis for districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the
SO ORDERED. official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National
Statistics Office.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of Cagayan de Oro
City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which
shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total population of 254,644, while
the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population
sizes of the districts.45 The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid
equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. 46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative," while ensuring
representation for every province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found
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to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
(BANAT), Petitioner,
Representatives shall consist of partylist representatives.
vs.
Same; Same; The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”—
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the x x
House of Representatives.”
Same; Same; Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for partylist representatives under G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the allocation of seats for partylist representatives under
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION,
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and
COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
ABONO, Petitioners,
during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
vs.
total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Same; Same; The remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum Constitutional Law; PartyList System Act; In computing the allocation of additional seats, the
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.—In computing the additional seats, continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.—We rule that, in computing the
each, to every twopercenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of
the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
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Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition participating in the partylist system.—Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, assails NBC Resolution No. 0760 promulgated on 9 July
3 4
political parties from participating in the partylist system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
2007. NBC No. 0760 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at clearly intended the major political parties to participate in partylist elections through their sectoral
least two percent of the total votes cast under the PartyList System. The COMELEC announced that, wings.
upon completion of the canvass of the partylist results, it would determine the total number of seats of
Same; Same; By a vote of 87, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
major political parties from participating in the partylist elections, directly or indirectly.—By a vote of
COMELEC5 (Veterans).
87, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the partylist elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a
motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. major political parties from the partylist elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate
opinion. On the formula to allocate partylist seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
The Facts this ponencia.
CARPIO, J.:
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the partylist representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the PartyList System.6 The Case
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August
petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07041 (PL). The COMELEC’s
national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, resolution in NBC No. 07041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating partylist seats." There were no intervenors in
7
the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot.
BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 0760. NBC
Resolution No. 0760 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the partylist elections, namely: The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS),
Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior
Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Citizens).
Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative
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(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Natco Network Party (COOPNATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) We quote NBC Resolution No. 0760 in its entirety below:
seats.
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of partylist votes, the presumptive Committee for PartyList, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a
two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fiftynine (15,283,659) votes
two (334,462) votes; under the PartyList System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC,
reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of
seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total partylist votes cannot go any higher than sixteen
stating that the same shall be determined only after all partylist ballots have been completely canvassed; million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twentyone (16,723,121) votes given the
following statistical data:
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred
thirty four thousand four hundred sixtytwo (334,462) votes are as follows: Projected/Maximum PartyList Votes for May 2007 Elections
5 APEC
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (PartyList System Act) provides in part:
6 A TEACHER
7 AKBAYAN The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent
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3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption 8 ALAGAD
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
11 BATAS
Reforms, Inc.
12 ANAK PAWIS
7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party
13 ARC
8 Alagad
14 ABONO
9 Luzon Farmers Party
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the
List System. Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to
PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties,
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant organizations and coalitions participating under the PartyList System:
to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the partylist
results. 1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
2 Bayan Muna
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2 BAYAN MUNA The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby
deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and
3 CIBAC academic.
4 GABRIELA
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
5 APEC disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
6 A TEACHER
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of
7 AKBAYAN the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
8 ALAGAD
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
9 BUTIL
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 0760, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
10 COOP-NATCO
No. 0772, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the
11 ANAKPAWIS COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 0772:
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of
of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party"
Canvassers, the projected maximum total partylist votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually
in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against
canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum
total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the partylist system of
representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats
Party-List Projected total number of votes
based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
1 BUHAY
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WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed
coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows: in Veterans, is:
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to
additional seats:
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
A TEACHER
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
AKBAYAN
1,178,747
ALAGAD = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
BUTIL
COOP-NATCO
ANAKPAWIS which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
ARC
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Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to ABONO
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 0788 on 3 August 2007, which
on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby
reads as follows:
RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats,
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the to wit:
Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Party List Additional Seats
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
BUHAY
Transparency (BANAT) partylist, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal
Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07041 (PL)], which BAYAN MUNA
reads:
CIBAC
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS: GABRIELA
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to
APEC
Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the
following reliefs, to wit:
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later
1. That the full number twenty percent (20%) of PartyList representatives as mandated by Section 5, on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the partylist
Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed. system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them
to one (1) additional seat.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized
with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
be applicable only to the first partylist representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
ranking.
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Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution. 3. The 3seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
SO ORDERED.10 4. Initially, all partylist groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes
they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is,
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 0788. in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each partylist group in relation to the total
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 0788. nationwide votes cast in the partylist election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which
were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider "ALLOCATION OF PARTYLIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25
its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 0760 because June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which
the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On partylist groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the
Aside from the thirteen partylist organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed procedure in allocating seats for partylist representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be
three other partylist organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the PartyList followed.
System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), 12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and
An Waray.14 Per the certification15 by COMELEC, the following partylist organizations have been R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
Party-List No. of Seat(s)
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 0760 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the
1.1 Buhay 3
Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating
1.2 Bayan Muna 2 Under the PartyList System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among
others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
1.3 CIBAC 2
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of
1.4 Gabriela 2 the partylist results."1awphi1
1.5 APEC 2
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby
1.6 A Teacher 1 RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal
Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.
1.7 Akbayan 1
107 of 669
4. How shall the partylist representatives be allocated?16 1.8 Alagad 1
1. The 246 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First Party"
violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941. The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against
which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Partylist
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and another for Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was
the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941. deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07250.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA Issues
7941;
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine partylist system as provided for under the
same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC. 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for partylist representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the FirstParty Rule in the allocation of seats to 2. Is the threeseat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
qualified partylist organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans
Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved 3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
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Third, the threeseat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941,
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats; and are of transcendental importance to our nation.17
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." 19
following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for partylist representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
seats to partylist organizations.
2. Is the threeseat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Number of PartyList Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution 3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
4. How shall the partylist representative seats be allocated?
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the partylist elections?
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the partylist elections? 18
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or The Ruling of the Court
organizations.
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippinestyle partylist election has at least four
(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
including those under the partylist. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all partylist congressmen shall not
onehalf of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
under the party list;
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
valid votes cast for the partylist system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
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Section 11. Number of PartyList Representatives. — The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
After prescribing the ratio of the number of partylist representatives to the total number of under the partylist.
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to partylist
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature. x x x
Allocation of Seats for PartyList Representatives: Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of
and the ThreeSeat Cap Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and partylist representatives. The
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the PartyList Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to partylist candidates garnering at
least twopercent of the total partylist votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of partylist representatives
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the PartyList to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to partylist
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent
20
representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first
in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula as an alternative.
21
formula in Veterans, thus:
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed: This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for partylist
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to partylist representatives.
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
220
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for x .20 = 55
the partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two .80
110 of 669
secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
7941. 23
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
Fortyfour (44) partylist seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for PartyList Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for partylist representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. number of votes received and allocate partylist representatives proportionately according to the
No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC: percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes
cast for the partylist system. (Emphasis supplied)
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate partylist
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and, representative seats.
(c) allocate partylist representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with
each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the partylist system. 24 Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the (a) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House
votes received by each party as against the total nationwide partylist votes, and the other is "by making of Representatives including those from the partylist groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the
the votes of a partylist with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996.
seats."25 Thirtyfour (34) partylist seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 PartyList
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 246
formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the partylist seats from being filled (b) All partylist groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total
up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party partylist votes they obtained; provided, that no partylist groups shall have more than three (3) seats
List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the threeseat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. (Section 11, RA 7941).
After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a
qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified (c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the partylist groups under the
party is computed by multiplying the total partylist seats available with the second percentage. There will immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those
be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the partylist groups which have not
seats allocated to the concerned partylist. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
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11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked
from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI are filled up.26
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for partylist representatives.
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO
garnered during the elections.27
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG!
Votes V
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered G
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM
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The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions 30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one
seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the twopercenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA
list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by 32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all
partylist candidates. 33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM
Rank Party Votes Garnered 37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG
11 BATAS29 385,810
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We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent 12 ARC 374,288
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available 14 ABONO 339,990
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
15 AMIN 338,185
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives shall consist of partylist representatives. 16 AGAP 328,724
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 partylist candidates received at least 2% from the total number
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents of votes cast for partylist candidates. The 17 qualified partylist candidates, or the twopercenters, are the
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and partylist candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat
prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
House of Representatives." 30
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2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
Votes
Garnered Additional the partylist system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
Guaranteed
over Seats
Votes Seat
Rank Party Total Votes (Second 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
Garnered (First Round)
for Party Round) additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
(B)
List, in % (C)
(A)
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 already been allocated, at one seat each, to every twopercenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 for a rounding off of fractional seats.
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33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 partylist 21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1
representatives from the 36 winning partylist organizations. All 55 available partylist seats are filled. 22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1
The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case
to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D). 23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1
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MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as
that they are also organized along sectoral lines. political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation
side of it only?
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can
sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree? field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will allocating under the party list system.
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties. participate in the party list system?
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned sectoral candidates.
from running under the party list system?
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system. MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
MR. TADEO. The same. the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
x x x x MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDPLaban and the UNIDO. I see no
117 of 669
Definition of Terms. (a) The partylist system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the
which they form part does not participate in the partylist system. opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that
with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the
public office. Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there
has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFLCIO always vote with the Democratic
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is
no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support
this [MonsodVillacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political
power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the threeseat cap to prevent any party from dominating the
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission.
partylist elections.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
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In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) partylist system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. parties to participate in partylist elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 1922, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the partylist organization’s nominee "wallow reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. 33 In defining a "party" that participates in party
in poverty, destitution and infirmity" as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that
34
list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented major political parties will participate in the partylist elections. Excluding the major political parties in
sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee partylist elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen. R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in sociopolitical engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the partylist elections in patent violation of the Constitution and
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the fillingup of the entire 20% allocation of party the law.
list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI,
left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or
otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of partylist representatives is merely a ceiling; party political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the
list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, partylist election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The
we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further
constitutionally allocated 20% partylist representatives from being filled. The threeseat cap, as a illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the partylist election, and
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified partylist organization may occupy, remains a valid this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the partylist elections. Seats for partylist the same for the urban poor.
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
The qualifications of partylist nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
However, by a vote of 87, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the partylist elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to Qualifications of PartyList Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as partylist representative unless
continue disallowing major political parties from the partylist elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate partylist seats, the Court is unanimous in of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
concurring with this ponencia. fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.
119 of 669
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in
NBC No. 0760. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional
partylist seats. The allocation of additional seats under the PartyList System shall be in accordance with
the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in
partylist elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
120 of 669
vs. G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
x x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203958
x x
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,
vs. G.R. Nos. 20381819
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
x x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203960
x x
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1CARE), Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 203922
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its
x x President Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 203976 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner, x x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 203936
x x AKSYON MAGSASAKAPARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas
Kida, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 203981
121 of 669
x x ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY
LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the party’s Secretary General, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204122 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
vs. x x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, G.R. No. 204002
Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner, Respondents. ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
vs.
x x COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204125 x x
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (AIPRA), represented by its G.R. No. 204094
Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs. ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x x
x x
G.R. No. 204126
G.R. No. 204100
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly
known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its 1BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BROPGBI) formerly
Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner, PGBI, Petitioner,
vs. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
122 of 669
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner, x x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., G.R. No. 204139
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña
AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents. Causing, Petitioner,
vs.
x x COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204174 x x
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LISTPARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, G.R. No. 204141
Jr., Petitioner,
vs. BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x x
x x
G.R. No. 204216
G.R. No. 204153
COCOFEDPHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs. PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x x
x x
G.R. No. 204220
G.R. No. 204158
123 of 669
G.R. No. 204240 ABANG LINGKOD PARTYLIST, Petitioner,
vs.
AGRIAGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs. x x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204236
x x
FIRM 24K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204263 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, x x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 204238
x x ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 204318 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTYLIST, Petitioner, x x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 204239
x x GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH
(GREENFORCE), Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204321 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C.
Policarpio, Jr., Petitioner, x x
124 of 669
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner, vs.
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x x
x x
G.R. No. 204323
G.R. No. 204358
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS Navarroand Guiling Mamondiong, Petitioner,
(AAMA), Petitioner, vs.
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M.
x x PADACA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204359 x x
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented G.R. No. 204341
by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs. ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTYLIST, represented herein by its
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
x x COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204364 x x
125 of 669
G.R. No. 204379 SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner, Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. x x
x x G.R. No. 204367
G.R. No. 204394 AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(GUARDJAN), Petitioner, x x
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 204370
x x AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 204402 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
KALIKASAN PARTYLIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary x x
General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204374
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
BINHIPARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
x x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204408
x x
126 of 669
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRYURBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND
AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE WELFARE (PACYAW), Petitioner,
COMMISSION, Respondents. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x x
x x
G.R. No. 204426
G.R. No. 204410
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA
EH), Petitioner, 1UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1UTAK), Petitioner,
vs. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective x x
capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204421
x x
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 204428 SENIOR CITIZEN PARTYLIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco
G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, vs.
Jr., Petitioner, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. x x
x x G.R. No. 204425
127 of 669
G.R. No. 204485 1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
vs.
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), Petitioner,
vs. x x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204436
x x
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204486 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs. x x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204455
x x
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204490 vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs. x x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204484
PERLASBERNABE,*
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M.
Election Law; PartyList System; The partylist system is intended to democratize political power Federazo, Petitioner,
by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the vs.
House of Representatives.—The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the partylist system of COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
representation. Simply put, the partylist system is intended to democratize political power by giving
x x
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
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Same; Same; “Political Party” and “Sectoral Party,” Distinguished.—Section 3(a) of R.A. No. Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her
7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” Clearly, legislative district, and another for his or her partylist group or organization of choice.
a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a Same; Same; The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the partylist system to include not
“political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles only sectoral parties but also nonsectoral parties.—Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
and policies for the general conduct of government.” On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 intended the partylist system to include not only sectoral parties but also nonsectoral parties. The
provides that a “sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the partylist system. As
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the partylist
of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. system “[F]or as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other. that we shall designate in this Constitution.”
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7941; R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties Same; Same; The common denominator between sectoral and nonsectoral parties is that they
or organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors.—R.A. No. 7941 does cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least
not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections.—The
underrepresented” sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the partylist system to common denominator between sectoral and nonsectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of
based and causeoriented parties from the partylist system. How will these ideologybased and cause votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The partylist system will be the
oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these nontraditional parties that
they are excluded from the partylist system? To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent could not compete in legislative district elections.
them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude Same; Same; The partylist system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
them from the partylist system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.—What the
intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the partylist system, an framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the partylist
ideologybased or causeoriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three
party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a “marginalized separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the partylist system is composed of three different groups: (1)
and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
status as citizens. organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines
and need not represent any particular sector.
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partylist elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the Same; Same; Same; The economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in
“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack welldefined political constituencies.” The the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.—The phrase
participation of major political parties in partylist elections must be geared towards the entry, as members “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
of the House of Representatives, of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well nature, economically “marginalized and underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant,
defined political constituencies,” giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in partylist fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong
sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can to the “marginalized and underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong
register under the partylist system. Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the
constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not mean one must “wallow in poverty, destitution or
must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and infirmity.” It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the
is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in the low income group as
7941, which provides that “component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
independently (in partylist elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate Same; Same; Same; Major political parties can participate in subsequent partylist elections since
in the partylist system.” the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 partylist elections.—Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941
Same; Same; Same; A partylist nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization expressly prohibited the “first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide partylist nominee House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress” from participating in the May 1988 partylist
one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector. — elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent partylist elections since the
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of partylist nominees. This provision prescribes prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 partylist elections. However, major political parties
a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector. Section 9. Qualifications of PartyList should participate in partylist elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major
Nominees.—No person shall be nominated as partylist representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are “marginalized and
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year underrepresented” or lacking in “welldefined political constituencies,” will facilitate the entry of the
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or “marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack welldefined political constituencies” as
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, members of the House of Representatives.
and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the participate in partylist elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack welldefined political
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. A partylist nominee must be a bona constituencies.”—The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
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rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.—Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral
reinforcing the stability of our Constitution, because the legislature is certain to find it impracticable, if parties, to be a bona fide partylist nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or
not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying laws into effect. The growing have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the Sereno, C.J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental Election Law; PartyList System; View that the place of the partylist system in the constitutional
powers is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not only execute elections laws, but also scheme was that it provided for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena.—The
promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest. This is the principle of place of the partylist system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided for the realization of the
subordinate legislation discussed in People v. Rosenthal and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public ideals on social justice in the political arena. The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist
Service Commission. Terry MacDonald: First, an idea that has received much attention among democratic theorists is that
Same; Same; View that the disqualification of a partylist group due to the disqualification of its representatives should be selected to ‘mirror’ the characteristics of those being represented—in terms of
nominee is only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the nominee’s gender, ethnicity, and other such characteristics judged to be socially relevant. This idea has been
qualifications.—I propose the view that the disqualification of a partylist group due to the advocated most notably in some recent democratic debates focused on the need for special
disqualification of its nominee is only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the representation of disadvantaged and underrepresented social groups within democratic
nominee’s qualifications. Otherwise, the disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the assemblies. The applicability of this idea of ‘mirror’ representation is not confined to debates about
partylist group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos. 15 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on representing marginalized minorities within nationstates; Iris Young further applies this model of
the basis of the new parameters set in the ponencia, that they validly qualify as national, regional or representation to global politics, arguing that global representation should be based on representation of
sectoral partylist group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for reasons the various ‘peoples’ of the world, each of which embodies its own distinctive identity and ‘perspective’.
explained below. The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and In practice, special representation for certain social groups within a ‘mirror’ framework can be combined
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. Consistent therewith, R.A. No. with election mechanisms” in various ways—such as by according quotas of elected representatives to
7941 provides that the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open partylist system that would designated social groups. But since the selection of these ‘social groups’ for special representation
achieve proportional representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing partylist groups’ would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the process of selecting legitimate representatives,
“chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature.” Because of this policy, I believe that the occurring prior to the electoral process, such ‘mirror’ representation is still recognizable as a
COMELEC cannot interpret Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely administrative, quasi distinct mechanism for selecting representative agents.
legislative or quasijudicial power to ipso facto disqualify partylist groups based on the disqualification Same; Same; Principle of Subordinate Legislation; View that the growing complexity of modern
of a single nominee. life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
Same; Same; View that any disqualification of a partylist group based on the disqualification of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers is largely
its nominee must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee’s qualifications. —It responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not only execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain
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represent the partylist group.—If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be should also be pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election laws as a disqualifying
allowed. Thus, their ranking remains the same and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be considered a violation of election laws, it must be
determining the one/s that will represent the winning partylist group in Congress. This means that if the demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The standard cannot be less for
first nominee is disqualified, and the partylist group is able to join the elections and becomes entitled to the rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a partylist group based
one representative, the second cannot take the first nominee’s place and represent the partylist group. If, on the disqualification of its nominee must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that
however, the partylist group gets enough votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can nominee’s qualifications. This also finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers
represent it. declaring “untruthful statements in its petition” as a ground for disqualification.
Same; Same; View that the primary purpose of an election case is the ascertainment of the real Same; Same; View that partylist groups should have at least one qualified nominee among its top
candidate elected by the electorate.—In Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, 593 SCRA 139 (2009), it three nominees for it to be allowed to participate in the elections.—Partylist groups should have at least
was also held that the primary purpose of an election case is the ascertaimnent of the real candidate one qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to participate in the elections.
elected by the electorate. Thus, there must first be an election before there can be an election case. Since This is because if all of its top three nominees are disqualified, even if its registration is not cancelled and
the national and local elections are still to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of automatic review and is thus allowed to participate in the elections, and should it obtain the required numberof votes to win a
summary evidentiary hearing under the Resolution No. 9513 cannot be an election case. For this reason, a seat, it would still have no one to represent it, because the law does not allow the group to replace its
prior motion for reconsideration under Section 3, is not required. disqualified nominee through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying Sections 13 in
relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
CARPIO, J.: Same; Same; View that only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a
partylist group to change the ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted.—Only in case of
The Cases
death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a partylist group to change the ranking of its
nominees in the list it initially submitted. The ranking of the nominees is changed through, substitution,
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52
which according to Section 8 is done by placing the name of the substitute at the end of the list. In this
partylist groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
case, all the names that come after the now vacant slot will move up the list. After substitution takes
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections, either by
effect, the new list with the new ranking will be used by COMELEC to determine who among the
denial of their petitions for registration under the partylist system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as partylist organizations. nominees of the partylist group shall be proclaimed, from the first to the last, in accordance with Section
13.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 20 2
Same; Same; View that if any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be
November 2012, 27 November 2012, 4 December 2012, 11 December 2012, and 19 February 2013.
3 4 5 6 7
allowed; This means that if the first nominee is disqualified, and the partylist group is able to join the
elections and becomes entitled to one representative, the second cannot take the first nominee’s place and
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Resolution dated 27 November 201210 The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections.
(PLM) Advocating
Autonomy Party
(1AAAP) G.R. No. SPP No. Group
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9 204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng 7 204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo
Mamamahayag 12-165 Party (AI)
(ALAM) (PLM)
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These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALAEH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, 11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Guard, Utility
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 partylist elections.
Domestic
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary Helper,
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent Janitor, Agent
to participate in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections have continually complied with the requirements of and
Nanny of the
R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The
Philippines, Inc.
COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 (GUARDJAN)
partylist elections:
Resolution dated 5 December 201218
G.R. No. SPP No. Group 12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP)
Resolution dated 10 October 201224
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5 204318 12-220 United 2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled reg
(PLM) Movement (PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Against Drugs Paglaum) - The nomine
Foundation to the sector
(UNIMAD) represents; a
- The party fa
Statement of
and Expendit
2010 Election
136 of 669
Resolution dated 23 October 201229 8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled reg
(PLM) Federation of - Three of the
11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Farmers and nominees do
(PLM) Party-List Party Fishermen the sector of
( AT ) International, fishermen, th
Inc. (A to be represe
BLESSED - None of the
Party-List) registered vo
XI, the region
represented.
137 of 669
15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng 13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled reg
(PLM) Nagkakaisang (PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party c
Agilang Magsasaka ng more than a
Pilipinong Pilipinas after the May
Magsasaka Movement - The nomine
(KAP) (AGRI) to the sector
farmers that
represent;
- Only four no
submitted to
and
- Failure to sh
activities for
138 of 669
20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng 18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled reg
(PLM) mga Nakulong (PLM) Association for - Change of s
na Walang Sala, Country – Urban urban poor y
Inc. (KAKUSA) Poor Youth poor) necess
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to sh
( PA C YAW ) for the margi
underreprese
- Failure to pr
majority of it
officers are f
poor sector;
- The nomine
members of
sector.
139 of 669
23 204239 12-060 Green Force for 21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled reg
(PLM) the Environment (PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
Sons and - Failure to at
Daughters of summary he
Mother Earth - Failure to sh
(GREENFORCE) for the margi
underreprese
- The nomine
appear to be
underreprese
140 of 669
27 204359 12-272 Social 25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled reg
(PLM) Movement for (PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Active Reform Masses (ALIM) - Failure to es
and nominees are
Transparency indigenous p
(SMART) Mindanao an
sector that th
represent;
- Only two of
nominees res
Mindanao an
and
Resolution dated 7 November 201237 - Three of the
not appear to
28 204238 12-173 Alliance of marginalized
(PLM) Bicolnon Party
(ABP) Resolution dated 7 November 201235
141 of 669
31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng 29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled reg
(PLM) Indigenous (PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to pr
Alliance, Inc. record of tryi
(A-IPRA) marginalized
underreprese
professionals
- One nomine
unqualified t
sector of pro
142 of 669
35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng 33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled reg
(PLM) mga Magsasaka (PLM) Party-List - Failure to es
Para sa mga (ABANG record of con
Magsasaka LINGKOD) representing
(BINHI) farmers sect
- Failure to sh
members act
the peasant
and
- Failure to sh
nominees are
Resolution dated 28 November 201245 and underrep
actively part
36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers programs for
(PLM) Party (BUTIL) advancemen
adhere to its
143 of 669
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BROPGBI, 37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled reg
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED PartyList, 1CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMAPTM, (PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
KAP, AKOBAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, Bayan - Declaration
Ginhawang statements;
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, AIPRA, COCOFED,
Sangkatauhan - Failure to ex
ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were (1st one year; an
able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of KABAGIS) - None of its
these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 partylist elections. belong to the
fisherfolk, an
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
indigenous c
This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated communities
petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely: seeks to repr
Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC) 39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled reg
204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party v
12-191 in the laws because
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-s
(APEC) (SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)
1st
Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)
144 of 669
1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc. Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS) (AKMA-PTM)
Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum) Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
United Movement Against Drugs Foundation Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
(UNIMAD) Inc. (ARARO)
(PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM) The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country
and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG (BANTAY)
LINGKOD)
Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
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(PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association, Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
Inc. (Manila Teachers)
(PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB) Social Movement for Active Reform and
Transparency (SMART)
1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
(1AAAP) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
146 of 669
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter elects two Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his MASDA)
or her partylist group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI The Issues
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the partylist system, or by
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as partylist organizations; and second, whether
be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
the criteria for participating in the partylist system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
organizations.
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections 49 (BANAT) should
be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections.
(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, The Court’s Ruling
onehalf of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 partylist
elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
Sections 7 and 8, Article IXC
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the partylist system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system,
registered under the partylist system as provided in this Constitution.
and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections, under the new parameters prescribed in
this Decision.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the partylist system, shall not be
represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
The PartyList System
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the partylist system of representation. Simply put, the party
list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
147 of 669
then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the partylist system, stressed that "the party
list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions
representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party on the partylist system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:
or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a
list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are MR. MONSOD: x x x.
entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on
does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of
and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean
coalition. that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in
those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were
can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in
have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or
Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included
percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting
women’s party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration.
50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers.
These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate would be included in that sector.
legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason
why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid
they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats
percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will
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why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and,
party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x. therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
x x x We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to
My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely,
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
district legislation side of it only?
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would
we are allocating under the party list system. not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system? BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list
system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only list?
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system? mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral
parties within the party list system.
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution. x x x x
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
the farmers, would he qualify? because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x
x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
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MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito. farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics. MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published
to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the existence of dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
unappealable. (Emphasis supplied)
52
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the partylist system to include not only Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
sectoral parties but also nonsectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, from running under the party list system?
but not the entirety, of the partylist system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the partylist system "For as long as they field candidates who MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution." 53 UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
In fact, the framers voted down, 1922, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the partylist system exclusively to sectoral parties.
As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani: MR. TADEO. The same.
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to partylist
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that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The partylist system will be the entry representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented
point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these nontraditional parties that could not sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in
compete in legislative district elections. delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into fullpledged parties
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the partylist system both equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The
sectoral and nonsectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and lessmoneyed
states: sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the
bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned House of Representatives from participating in the partylist system for the first partylist elections held in
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise — that the partylist system be open
by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating
parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied) only half of the seats under the partylist system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the
required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 1922, the proposal for permanent seats,
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystalclear that there shall be "a partylist system of
and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words
only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected
"national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of
sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they
the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would
would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multiparty
have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)
intention to make the partylist system exclusively sectoral.
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
partylist system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the
terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the
three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are
proposal to make the partylist system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended
separate from sectoral parties.
the partylist system to include both sectoral and nonsectoral parties.
Thus, the partylist system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
The common denominator between sectoral and nonsectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes
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Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties
which they form part does not participate in the partylist system. or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "onehalf of the seats
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the partylist
members as candidates for public office. system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority First, the other onehalf of the seats allocated to partylist representatives would naturally be open to non
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at sectoral partylist representatives, clearly negating the idea that the partylist system is exclusively for
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of onehalf
of the partylist seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the partylist system fully open after the end of the first
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class
concerns of their sector. or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the partylist system.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and partylist structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the partylist system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for nonsectoral parties.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied) Republic Act No. 7941 or the PartyList System Act, which is the law that implements the partylist
system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The partylist system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
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Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon partylist system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration judicial fiat, ideologybased and causeoriented parties from the partylist system. How will these
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: ideologybased and causeoriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the partylist system? To exclude them from the partylist
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the partylist system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
(3) It is a foreign party or organization; Under the partylist system, an ideologybased or causeoriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
election purposes;
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals."56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented,"
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
(2%) of the votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in may "lack welldefined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
which it has registered. advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
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The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to nonrepresentation of the "marginalized
women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideologybased and underrepresented."
and causeoriented parties who lack "welldefined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on
the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the representatives to the House of Representatives through the partylist system," which will enable Filipinos
margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
seats in the House of Representatives. lack welldefined political constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While
the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define
party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the
will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and
will also make the partylist system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively welloff underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
partylist representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they
attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs. How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major the matter?
political parties cannot participate in the partylist elections since they neither lack "welldefined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that
regional parties under the partylist system are necessarily those that do not belong to major are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the partylist system peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
to those who "lack welldefined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
the House of Representatives. must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either
must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
under the partylist system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
the Constitution to participate in the partylist system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall
of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58
the House of Representatives.’ "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline,
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sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties disqualified major political parties from participating in the partylist system. This inherent
or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in partylist elections) provided the inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the partylist system." sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the partylist system,
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of partylist nominees. This provision prescribes even through their sectoral wings.
a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis
Section 9. Qualifications of PartyList Nominees. No person shall be nominated as partylist of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the participating in the May 1988 partylist elections. 59 Thus, major political parties can participate in
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to subsequent partylist elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 partylist
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least elections. However, major political parties should participate in partylist elections only through their
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of
of the election. whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "welldefined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) welldefined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
years of age on the day of the election.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in partylist elections
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
continue in office until the expiration of his term.1âwphi1 underrepresented" and to those who "lack welldefined political constituencies." The participation of
major political parties in partylist elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House
A partylist nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack welldefined political
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide partylist nominee one must either belong
constituencies," giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus,to participate in partylist elections, a major
to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like
a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
partylist system.
BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in
the partylist system:
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, bylaws, platform or program
of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The
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(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
which it has registered." participate in the partylist system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or of Representatives." x x x.
assisted by, the government. x x x.
x x x x
x x x x
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the partylist system. x x x.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: x x x x
"SEC 9. Qualifications of PartyList Nominees. No person shall be nominated as partylist representative Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a the grounds for disqualification as follows:
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) (3) It is a foreign party or organization;
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x. election purposes;
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
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Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the In 2009, by a vote of 87 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent partylist elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in partylist
parameters: elections,60 abandoning even the lipservice that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution
and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in partylist elections.
1. Three different groups may participate in the partylist system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the partylist
system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along in partylist elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in sociopolitical engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the partylist elections in patent violation of the Constitution and
3. Political parties can participate in partylist elections provided they register under the partylist system the law."61 The experimentations in sociopolitical engineering have only resulted in confusion and
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that absurdity in the partylist system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
sectoral wing that can separately register under the partylist system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections, we must now impose and
"welldefined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special mandate the partylist system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of partylist seats, reversing the
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT,
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "welldefined political constituencies" include professionals, the however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly,
elderly, women, and the youth. even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare
that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
partylist elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "welldefined political
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "welldefined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
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petitioners are qualified to register under the partylist system under the parameters prescribed in this advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 partlist elections. The 41 petitions, which have be bonafide members of such parties or organizations.
been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
under the partylist system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections under the parameters nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for
this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory. The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
SO ORDERED. "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of nonsectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to
qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socioeconomic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to rewrite the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should
be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 partylist elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted
Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the
printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
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longer change the ballots because of the nature of an automated election. In an exercise as important as an G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010
election, the Comelec cannot make a declaration and impose a deadline, and, thereafter, expect everyone
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its SecretaryGeneral
to accept its excuses when it backtracks on its announced declaration. The Comelec knew very well that
GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner,
there were still cases pending for judicial determination that could have been decided before the deadline
vs.
was set.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Same; Same; Automated Elections; Contempt; The Court expects obedience to and respect for its
Orders and Resolutions, and such cannot be sidetracked based solely on supposed operational
constraints caused by the automated polls.—To be excused, the Comelec needed more than its Election Law; Commission on Elections; In an exercise as important as an election, the Comelec cannot
generalized descriptions of the process of ballot printing and the alleged problems it faced. We needed make a declaration and impose a deadline for the correction of errors and omissions prior to printing, of
reasons on how and why the deadline was set, as well as detailed and specific reasons why PGBI could no the published list of participating partylist groups in the election, and, thereafter, expect everyone to
longer be listed while other errors and omissions could still be remedied. Unfortunately for the Comelec, accept its excuses when it backtracks on its announced declaration.—Based on the recited antecedent
we did not see that kind of justification in its Compliance before us. Like the Comelec, we expect facts, it cannot be disputed that the Comelec did not comply with our Status Quo Order; it simply
obedience to and respect for our Orders and Resolutions, and we cannot be sidetracked based solely on pleaded insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications as reasons for its
supposed operational constraints caused by the automated polls. Its treatment of our Status Quo Order avoidance of our Order. It essentially posited that compliance with our Status Quo Order was rendered
simply meant that even before the Comelec deadline, a definitive ruling that a partylist organization impossible by the automation of the May 10, 2010 elections. However, we find this explanation
should be included in the list to be voted upon would have been for naught as the Comelec would have unacceptable, given the Comelec’s own selfimposed deadline of February 4, 2010 for the correction of
anyway pleaded automation constraints. Even if its excuse had been meritorious, the Comelec effectively errors and omissions, prior to printing, of the published list of participating partylist groups and
would have been guilty of misrepresentation on an election matter and in dealing with this Court. organizations in the May 10, 2010 elections. The Comelec deadline could only mean that the Comelec
had determined that changes in the official ballot could still be made at any time prior to the deadline. In
Same; PartyList System; An equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is the the context of the cases then pending involving the registration of partylist organizations, the deadline
right of free choice of the electorates on who shall govern them—the partylist system affords them this was a clear signal from the Comelec that the cases would have to be resolved before the deadline;
choice, as it gives the marginalized and underrepresented sectors the opportunity to participate in otherwise, the Comelec could not be held liable for their noninclusion. We fully read and respected the
governance.—Although we have recognized the validity of the automation of the May 10, 2010 elections Comelec’s signal, fully aware that we have to balance the interests the Comelec has to protect, with
in Roque, Jr. v. Comelec, 599 SCRA 69 (2009), we stress that automation is not the endall and beall of PGBI’s intent to be voted as a partylist organization. Thus, on February 2, 2010, we issued our Status
an electoral process. An equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is the right of free Quo Order after a preliminary but judicious evaluation of the merits of PGBI’s motion for
choice of the electorates on who shall govern them; the partylist system, in the words of Ang Bagong reconsideration, only to receive the Comelec’s response on February 3, 2010 manifesting that it could no
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totally exculpate, the Comelec from liability for its failure to comply with the Status Quo Order.—In the Bayani–OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), affords them this choice, as it gives the
present case, special circumstances exist which call for our leniency and compel us to impose the penalty marginalized and underrepresented sectors the opportunity to participate in governance. Wittingly or
of severe reprimand instead of imprisonment and/or fine under Section 7, of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court unwittingly, the Comelec took this freedom of choice away and effectively disenfranchised the members of
as we have ruled in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party. We emphasize that although automation is a the sector that PGBI sought to represent when it did not include PGBI in the list of qualified parties vying
special circumstance that should be considered in the present incidental matter, however, its effect on the for a seat under the partylist system of representation. This is a consideration no less weighty than the
Comelec’s noncompliance is merely to mitigate, not to totally exculpate, the Comelec from liability for automation of the election and cannot be simply disregarded on mere generalized allegations of
its failure to comply with our Status Quo Order. In other words, even if we grant that automation might automation difficulties.
have posed some difficulty in including a new party in the partylist listing, the Comelec still failed to
prove to our satisfaction that the PGBI’s inclusion was technically impossible and could not have been Same; Contempt; While Rule 71 of Rules of Court does not provide that reprimand may be
done even if the Comelec had wanted to. Thus, at the most, we can give the Comelec the benefit of the imposed on one found guilty of indirect contempt, the Court can impose a penalty less than what is
doubt to the extent of recognizing its excuse as a mitigating factor. provided under the Rules if the circumstances merit such.—In the past, we have found the Chairman and
Same, Contempt; Retirement; Departure from government service, however, does not render moot members of the Comelec guilty of indirect contempt in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v.
and academic public officer’s liability for indirect contempt, since contempt of court applies to all COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001). In that case, we held that the Chairman and members of the
persons, whether in or out of government—the higher interest of effective and efficient administration of COMELEC guilty of contempt and required them to pay a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 for
justice dictates that a petition for contempt must proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of “degrading the dignity of th[e] Court; for brazen disobedience to its lawful directives, in particular its
the government official or employee, more so if it involves a former member of the bench. —At this Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001; and for delaying the ultimate resolution of the many
juncture, we take judicial notice of Comelec Chairperson Jose A.R. Melo’s resignation effective January incidents of the case, to the prejudice of the litigants and of the country.” We also warned the Comelec
15, 2011 and Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal’s retiremen t on February 2, that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future. Evidently, the
2011. We hasten to clarify that their departure from government service, however, do not render moot and Rule cited above does not provide that reprimand may be imposed on one found guilty of indirect
academic their liability for indirect contempt, since “contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in contempt. However, we have in recent cases imposed a penalty less than what is provided under the
or out of government.” Thus, in Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA 214 (2009), we held: Rules if the circumstances merit such.
Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers government
officials or employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a civil
servant may strategize to avail himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt Same; Party List System; Automate Elections; Special circumstances exist which call for leniency
citation, if he perceives that he would be made responsible for a contumacious act. The higher interest of and impose the penalty of severe reprimand instead of of imprisonment and/or fine under Section 7, of
effective and efficient administration of justice dictates that a petition for contempt must proceed to its Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; Although automation is a special circumstance that should be considered
in the present incidental matter, its effect on the Comelec’s noncompliance is merely to mitigate, not to
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6(8) of R.A. No. 7941. To conclude otherwise is to effectively recognize the ineffectiveness of our Status final conclusion despite the retirement of the government official or employee, more so if it involves a
Quo Order, of our April 29, 2010 Decision, and of this Court. former member of the bench.
Same; PartList System; The Court cannot recognize Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
BRION, J.: (PGBI) to be a partylist organization fully qualified to run under the partylist system in the coming 2013
partylist elections since the question of full and total qualification is not ripe for judicial determination
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari 1 and in the motion and for the court’s resolution.—We partly agree with the Comelec that we cannot recognize PGBI to be a
for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No.
partylist organization fully qualified to run under the partylist system in the coming 2013 partylist
8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009
elections. The question of full and total qualification is not ripe for judicial determination as this is not
denying PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the
before us for resolution. Participation in a previous election and the level of votes in favor of a
COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations
participating organization are not the only qualification issues that can arise in a partylist election, and we
or coalitions under the partylist system.
cannot assume that PGBI shall meet all other legal standards to qualify as a partylist organization in the
BACKGROUND 2013 elections.
Same; Same; As it was the Comelec itself which prevented Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the PartyList System Act, Inc. (PGBI) from participating in the 10 May 2010 partylist elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave
provides: abuse of discretion, from the list of accredited partylist groups or organizations and, thereafter, refused
to return it to the list despite the Court’s directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be deemed to have
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
participated in the 10 May 2010 elections, and cannot be disqualified for nonparticipation or for failure
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
to garner the votes required under Section 6(8) of R.A. No. 7941.—But separate from the question of
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
PGBI’s overall qualification is the narrower question of its participation in the May 10, 2010 elections—
an issue that is subsumed by the issues in the main certiorari case. As shown above, PGBI intended to
x x x x
participate in the May 10, 2010 elections but it was not able to do so because the Comelec did not—
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum contrary to our express directive—include it in the list of partylist organizations to be voted upon in the
(2%) of the votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in May 10, 2010 elections. As it was the Comelec itself which prevented PGBI from participating in the May
which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.] 10, 2010 partylist elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave abuse of discretion, from the list of
accredited partylist groups or organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to the list despite our
directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be deemed to have participated in the May 10, 2010 elections,
and cannot be disqualified for nonparticipation or for failure to garner the votes required under Section
161 of 669
No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court’s ruling in The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the Rules and Regulations
G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other partylist is a denial Governing the Election of the PartyList Representatives through the PartyList System – which it
of the equal protection of the laws; promulgated on June 25, 1996.
(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to prevent a For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution
miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the same Section 6(8) No. 8679 deleting several partylist groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
or R.A. No. 7941. 2
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the partylist organizations affected was PGBI; it was
delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit. elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party
or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized representative
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
7941.3 The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization
does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission
must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a partylist organization under the PartyList System Act.
exempt PGBI from registering anew. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:
Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in (1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of
2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections. R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered with the
Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the Commission, not later
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the partylist
complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007
the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition. elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not
to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and
As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have
responsibilities imposed;
been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646.
The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline. (2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association,
also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections – cannot apply in the instant controversy for two
PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC
reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI’s; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting,
when it moved to reconsider its delisting.
was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution
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PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment
participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero); 4 we said that no grave
secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying
Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:
Considering PGBI’s arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the court’s docket.
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in
THE ISSUES the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two
preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.
We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether PGBI’s
right to due process was violated. PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI
claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence.
OUR RULING Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and
import of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994. It
We find the petition partly impressed with merit.
cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:
a. The Minero Ruling
Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5 – there are actually
two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its failure to obtain
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the partylist system in either of the last two (2)
PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered"
coalitions under the partylist system.
In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. The second
First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the partylist system in either of the last two
party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
preceding elections, Mr. President,
party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b)
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2)
Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. 6 The word "or" is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. 7 Thus, the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.
5 [Underscoring supplied.]
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We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a partylist group or Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s
organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the cited congressional deliberations clearly show.
reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this
disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of partylist votes garnered by the last Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the nonparticipation
partylist organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less of a partylist organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold partylist vote.
than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election
to partylist groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the partylist votes. To be sure, this is a confused
constituency in which it registered. interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat
the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an
cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive
partylist votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean interpretation of the law.8
failure to qualify for a partylist seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement
under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the application of the principle of
10 and National Transparency v. COMELEC9 (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% partylist vote
stare decisis. requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus: threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
legal system of the Philippines. party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule of Representatives shall consist of partylist representatives.
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the The disqualification for failure to get 2% partylist votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and be understood in light of the Banat ruling that partylist groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of
closed to further argument. The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability
11
the partylist votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.
of judicial decisions, thus:
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b. The Issue of Due Process Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a
court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non
for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for
essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trialtype hearing is not at all times principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of
lack of notice and hearing x x x.14 We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.12
denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for
complaint on due process grounds. The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC is justified in setting it aside.13
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09004 As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an
(MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a partylist group or organization in the coming May 2010 erroneous application of the law – an application that the principle of stability or predictability of
elections. decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of
the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
SO ORDERED. continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling
case law.
We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior
election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election – is something that is not
covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as
such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which full
discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of
separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the
legislature’s notice.
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ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their qualifications according to law are a G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010
different matter.
MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,
CARPIO MORALES, J.: vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009 VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
and Resolution No. 09130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public
respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality
of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the
Election Law; PartyList System; A candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified
partylist organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives, and
to be a youth sector nominee.—As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election,
In her Petition for Quo Warranto seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged that, among
1
so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector
other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the PartyList System Act, it covers ALL
on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the youth sector nominees vying for partylist representative seats.
time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond Same; Same; Changes of Political Party and Sectoral Affiliation; A nominee who changes his
the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party sectoral affiliation within the same party will not only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral
List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers affiliation of the change has been effected at least six months before the elections.—What is clear is that
and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter
be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
may occur within the same party since multisectoral partylist organizations are qualified to participate in
the Philippine partylist system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same
Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to have entered a general
party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected
denial pursuant to public respondent’s Rules.2
at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009, dismissed petitioner’s Petition for
3 be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule
Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the partylist organizations which the COMELEC had or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat in the House of Representatives through National Same; Same; A partylist organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 0760 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter.—That private respondent is the
first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A partylist organization’s
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The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether petitioner’s Petition for Quo filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private
Warranto was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA respondent’s proclamation.
No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms
considering petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10day after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered
reglementary period provided in its Rules from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 0760 on July 9,
8
exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multisectoral organization, is not.
2007 is erroneous.
In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 0760 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May, 2007 workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as
elections, along with other partylist organizations, it was by no measure a proclamation of private
9
there was no resultant change in partylist affiliation.
respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09130 dated August 6,
Section 13. How PartyList Representatives are Chosen. Partylist representatives shall be proclaimed by 2009,4 petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari.5
the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions
to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list. Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in the application of
Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions, fostering interpretations at
AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 0760 in Barangay Association for National war with equal protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 0760, which was a partial proclamation
Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC after revisiting the formula for allocation of additional
10
of winning partylist organizations, was not enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July
seats to partylist organizations. 10, 2007, especially considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate of Proclamation only on
December 13, 2007.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private respondent’s
proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively, In his Comment,6 private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not substantiated her claims of
since petitioner’s challenge goes into private respondent’s qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that he became a member of the overseas
his term. Filipinos and their families sector years before the 2007 elections.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of It bears noting that the term of office of partylist representatives elected in the May, 2007 elections will
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the expire on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot and academic, rendering of a decision
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. 11
on the merits in this case would still be of practical value. 7
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the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth
applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
Section 9. Qualifications of PartyList Nominees. No person shall be nominated as partylist
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the third congressional representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day
distinguish, we must not distinguish. 13
of the election.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30)
respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis and
change in partylist affiliation. Section 15 reads: underscoring supplied.)
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected partylist representative who changes his political The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9 applied only to
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until
his political party or sectoral affiliation
within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
for nomination as partylist representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.) A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.12
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multisectoral partylist organizations are As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twentyfive (25)
qualified to participate in the Philippine partylist system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election,
so it must be that a candidate who is
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is
the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and contained in RA No. 7941, the PartyList System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. partylist representative seats.
This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is
the index of intention.14 As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason to apply
Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three congressional terms after
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It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being
stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. 15 Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least
six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.161avvphi1
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no moment.
A partylist organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their qualifications
according to law are a different matter.
It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a partylist
representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the compensation and
emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the same. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09130
dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel
J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives
representing the partylist organization CIBAC.
SO ORDERED.
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establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
Ladlad.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
vs.
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval.—We are not blind to the fact that, through the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure—religious beliefs, convictions
Constitutional Law; Election Law; PartyList System; The enumeration of marginalized and
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive.—As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
Party v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), “the enumeration of marginalized and under
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these “generally accepted public morals” have not
represented sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
Election Law; PartyList System; Civil Law; “Nuisance,” Defined.—Article 694 of the Civil Code
RA 7941.
defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which
Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) moral objection and the
shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
belated allegation of nonexistence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a partylist organization under any of the requisites under Republic
Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
Act No. 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.—We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.—A violation of
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of nonexistence, nowhere in the records has the
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a partylist organization under
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.
Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the nonestablishment clause for the Commission on
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the partylist system.—We hold that moral disapproval,
Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.—Our
without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
participation in the partylist system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification
substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non
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certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
discouraging a disfavored one. reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites violence or puts Constitutional Law; Election Law; PartyList System; Equal Protection Clause; Recent
forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,
of association guarantee.—A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly the Supreme Court will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. legitimate government end.—Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. relationship to some legitimate government end. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko
Same; PartyList System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of nondiscrimination requires Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), we declared that “[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of
that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a
sexual orientation.—The principle of nondiscrimination requires that laws of general application relating deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a
to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.”
is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal force to Lesbian,
ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to “sex” in Article 26 should be construed Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate in the partylist system on the
to include “sexual orientation.” Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors.—From the standpoint of the political
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements. process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the partylist
Same; Same; Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of lenses, these system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
are—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.—Using even deserve to participate in the partylist system on the same basis as other marginalized and under
the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various represented sectors.
international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute binding obligations on Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the “soft law” foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, received but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.—Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than wellmeaning desires, without the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
support of either State practice or opinio juris. received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
DEL CASTILLO, J.: COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is
171 of 669
partylist organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the PartyList System ... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
Act. 4
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or transgendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for Justice Robert A. Jackson
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that
the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1
Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under different choices – choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and
with the 8point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. 7 Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of
morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox – philosophical justifications about what is
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that: moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes,
however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live
and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus: together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
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ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one
disregards decency or morality x x x gender."
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that
‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into
policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning. that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in
their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, that recompense of their error which was meet.
penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows:
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of
prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond
and fine, shall be imposed upon: bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of
those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals; mischief" (29:30).
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F:
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, ‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further
scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
(1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence,
prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to
lawful orders, decrees and edicts. be complied with for accreditation.
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If entry into the partylist system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its 3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are
constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the partylist race. offensive to morals.
But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The partylist system is not a tool to advocate
tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the partylist system is a Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise
tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s
– for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/partylist representatives have not
only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the partylist Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment
system will remain just that. that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in
the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency
II. No substantial differentiation of the government, ours too is the State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to
protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.8
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not
recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while
right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo
social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief. T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and
speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
x x x x
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the partylist system. Even assuming that it has
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike. properly proven its underrepresentation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed
sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
x x x x
Section 2 of the partylist law unequivocally states that the purpose of the partylist system of electing
IV. Public Morals congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
is there any attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
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In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly
12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the religiousbased, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and
COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions. 16
Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into
society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its CommentinIntervention. 17 The CHR opined that the V. Legal Provisions
denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene. Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene which motion was granted
18
publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal
on February 2, 2010. 19
provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
The Parties’ Arguments the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000.
Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioner’s application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf
immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the
been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner’s
maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights. application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required
it to file its own comment. 14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national 2, 2010.15
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also
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it said that it or any of its nominees/partylist representatives have not violated or failed to comply with argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged nonexistence were already available to the COMELEC
prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a Our Ruling
belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s right to
procedural due process. We grant the petition.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the
had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
sectors in the enumeration.
group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates
around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
§ Abra Gay Association
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan and professionals) may be registered under the partylist system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under
§ Albay Gay Association represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
§ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija RA 7941.
§ Boys Legion – Metro Manila Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it
had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that
§ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS) upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country,
petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country." 21
§ Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when
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§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR § Circle of Friends
§ Rainbow Rights Project (RRights), Inc. – Metro Manila § Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte
§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan § Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal § Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila
§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila § Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila
§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal § Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte
§ The Link – Davao City § Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City
§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon § Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur
§ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila § Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23 § LUMINA – Baguio City
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no § Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s
findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang § Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila
Ladlad’s principal place of business.
§ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated § ONE BACARDI
allegation of nonexistence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a partylist organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or
§ PUP LAKAN
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In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality,
like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it or lack thereof.
is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those
engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our nonestablishment
codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." 24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on
spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." 25 We thus find that it was grave
could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable violation of the nonestablishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify
and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 26
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 27
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of
Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
may be religionbased, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs
COMELEC argues: or agenda. The nonbelievers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or nonreligious views that would not support the policy.
which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear
is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any that those whose beliefs are disapproved are secondclass citizens.1avvphi1
society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence. 28
178 of 669
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation,
morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall
a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
32
that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29
hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.
determination of liability or culpability. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members
have committed or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the partylist system. The denial of Ang x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not
a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates the intendment of the law.31
our equal protection clause.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
Equal Protection required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the partylist system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters
be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and
prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
persons." The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
33
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In
like circumstances. 34
this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
179 of 669
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 36 we
under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case." followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Freedom of Expression and Association Constitution."37
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as
of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply
39
immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately
held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize
Escritor: 40
homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to
assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here – that is,
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its
access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would
of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored
access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining group.
which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a
constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same
in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized interest in participating in the partylist system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the partylist system on the same basis
specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small – not only as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
for a majority, however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a selfdenying
ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
minorities. insofar as the partylist system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
180 of 669
majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
concerned. Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
45
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. 46
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that
that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing samesex conduct. 41 European
moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and
the community. equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international
texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally
be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.
of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion,
even at its most liberal, reflect a clearcut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision. doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there an unpopular viewpoint."43
has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a
exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses
participate in the partylist system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of
x x x x the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
181 of 669
The principle of nondiscrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows: A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take
part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right
Article 26 to vote is a constitutionallyguaranteed right which cannot be limited.
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and Ladlad’s petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations
In this context, the principle of nondiscrimination requires that laws of general application relating to imposed by law. x x x47
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is
not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party
Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not
include "sexual orientation." Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
48
a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements. 49
COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal
basis in the political process with other equallyqualified partylist candidates, we find that there has,
The UDHR provides: indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.
Article 21. NonDiscrimination and International Law
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human
representatives. rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane
world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support,
Likewise, the ICCPR states: international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in
domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Article 25
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article
rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of nondiscrimination as it relates to the right to
2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
182 of 669
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the
panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are As stated by the CHR in its CommentinIntervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct
international law to ascertain their true status.
of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service.
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to
or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of
broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human
x x x x
rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no
longer controversial.1avvphi1
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that
persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election,
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated
such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise
by various international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding
eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the
as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer
"soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation,
discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than wellmeaning desires,
indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from
without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.53
elective office.50
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As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in
opinion. This Court’s role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the
Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge
that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for partylist accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
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apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive G.R. Nos. 20684445 July 23, 2013
effect. When the termsharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
by any law or resolution.
(SENIOR CITIZENS PARTYLIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee,
Civil Law; Prospectivity of Laws; Article 4 of the Civil Code states that laws shall have no FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., Petitioner,
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.—Article 4 of the Civil Code states that “[l]aws shall vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Reyes, 480 SCRA 382 (2006), “[t]he general rule is that statutes are prospective. However, statutes that
x x
are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statutes.” We also reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National Power G.R. No. 206982
Corporation, 528 SCRA 287 (2007), that: It is a wellentrenched principle that statutes, including
administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
manifest by express terms or by necessary implication because the retroactive application of a law usually (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the House of
divests rights that have already become vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, Petitioner,
respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
Election Law; Notice and Hearing; The twin requirements of due notice and hearing are
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same partylist organization, the indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now praying accreditation of a partylist organization.—Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and
for essentially the same reliefs from this Court. hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration
and accreditation of a partylist organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organization’s incumbent in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC.
representative in the House of Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Arquiza
Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organization’s erstwhile third nominee. This
Same; TermSharing Agreements; When the termsharing agreement was executed in 2010, the
group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol Group.
same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.—The Datol Group argues that the public
policy prohibiting termsharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to
185 of 669
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable G.R. Nos. 20684445 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith
Covenant, the relevant terms of which we quote: Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo
Ante Order [SQAO])1 filed in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS by Francisco G. Datol, Jr. For brevity, we
IRREVOCABLE COVENANT shall refer to this petition as the Datol Group’s petition.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)2 filed on behalf of SENIOR CITIZENS by Rep.
We, in representation of our respective personal capacity, hereby covenant and agree as follows: Arquiza. We shall refer to this as the Arquiza Group’s petition.
2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 35 Quezon Avenue, Quezon On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a partylist organization
City, hereinafter referred to as the SECOND PARTY; in a Resolution6 issued on even date in SPP No. 06026 (PL).
3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at North Olympus Blk., 3, SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get
Lot 15 Ph4 Grieg St., Novaliches, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the THIRD PARTY; the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. 7 Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted leave
to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881 C.M. Recto Avenue,
v. Commission on Elections.8 In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of
Sampaloc, Manila, hereinafter referred to as the FOURTH PARTY;
additional seats under the partylist system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep.
Arquiza, then the organization’s first nominee, served as a member of the House of Representatives.
5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 150 Don Francisco, St. Francis
Vil., San Fernando, Pampanga City (sic) hereinafter referred to as the FIFTH PARTY;
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
x x x x
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In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1 shall serve for three (3) years, ARTICLE III
and No. 2 and No. 3 will each serve for oneandahalf years. THE LIST OF CANDIDATES
In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No. 1 shall serve for three years; No. We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTYLIST and in the following order
2 will serve for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish the second seat to No. 4 nominee, who will shall be:
then serve for one (1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third seat for two (2) years and afterwards shall
relinquish said seat on the third year to Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining one (1) year. CTC No. Issued at
S.C.I.D.#2615256 Manila
The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and interest as well as the legal
SHARING OF RIGHTS privileges and rights of the respective partylist offices, under the following circumstances and events:
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES
ELECTION RESULTS
That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the event one or more is elected and qualified shall
observe proper sharing of certain benefits by virtue of his position as such, to include among others, Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1 shall assume the Office of Party
appointment of persons in his office, projects which may redound to the benefits and privileges that may list Representative in CONGRESS from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012 and shall relinquish his seat in
be possible under the law. Congress by the proper and legal acts and No. 2 shall assume said seat from July 1, 2012 to June 30,
2013;
The above mentioned parties shall oversee the implementation of this COVENANT.
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in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his constituents." 10 Further, a new set IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this MAY 05 2010 in QUEZON CITY.
of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected during the
said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as
(Signed) (Signed)
the organization’s Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was
expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza. 11 Godofredo V. Arquiza David L. Kh
S.C.I.D. #2615256 Iss. at Manila CTC#16836
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both groups, on 04-02-04 Quezon City
with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.
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COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF Republic of the Philippines
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC. Quezon City
Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building
132 West Avenue, Quezon City Sir:
Gentlemen/Ladies: I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as Representative of the Senior Citizens Partylist in the
House of Representatives, effective December 31, 2011 in the event that only two (2) seats are won by
It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed organization of my decision to resign as the partylist our partylist group; and will resign on June 30, 2012 in case three seats are won.
nominee for the House of Representatives this 15th Congress for personal reason already conveyed to
you. As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. shall
nominate my successor pursuant to law and Rules on the matter.
Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens of our dear country.
Please accept my esteem and respect.
Very truly yours,
Truly yours,
(Signed)
DAVID L. KHO17 (Signed)
Rep. David L. Kho
In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12040, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 was
18
Partylist Congressman
promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that:
Copy furnished:
SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among The Board of Trustees
nominees of winning partylist groups/organizations shall not be allowed. Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. 16
On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep. Arquiza According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a letter dated December 31, 2011, notifying
issued Board Resolution No. 0032012, which pertinently stated thus: them of his resignation in this wise:
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 0032012 December 31, 2011
Series of 2012
189 of 669
admitted that Rep. Kho’s tender of resignation was made pursuant to the agreement entered into by the A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOARD IN RESOLUTION NO. 11
organization’s nominees. However, said counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the
20
0012 OF THE RESIGNATION OF CONGRESSMAN DAVID L. KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO
organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Kho’s resignation and the latter was, instead, to CONTINUE REPRESENTING THE SENIOR CITIZENS PARTYLIST IN THE HOUSE OF
complete his term. Also, from the transcript of the hearing, it appears that the Arquiza Group previously
21
REPRESENTATIVES, ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS TERM AND IMPOSING CERTAIN
manifested that it was withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the Datol Group and was not CONDITIONS ON HIM TO BE PERFORMED WITH THE COALITION;
acted upon by the COMELEC. 22
WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho, tendered his resignation as representative
On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution in E.M. No. 12040, dismissing the
23
of the Senior Citizens Partylist effective December 31, 2011, x x x;
petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The pertinent portions of the Resolution stated,
thus: WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board of Trustees in a resolution signed
unanimously, in view of the nature of his resignation, and in view of his determination to resign and
First, resignation of Kho, return to private life, x x x;
pursuant to the party nominees’
termsharing agreement, cannot WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the said nominee changed his mind and requested
be recognized and be given effect the Board of Trustees to reconsider the acceptance, for he also reconsidered his resignation, and requested
so as to create a vacancy in the to continue his term;
list and change the order of the
nominees. WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the partylist and in view of the forthcoming
elections, the Board opted to reconsider the acceptance, recall the same, and allow Cong. David L. Kho to
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the nominee of his nomination is continue his term;
one of the three (3) exemptions to the rule that "no change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC." While we can consider the WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is however imposing certain
resignation of Rep. Kho as akin to the withdrawal of his own nomination, we are constrained however conditions on Cong. Kho to be performed;
NOT to recognize such resignation but only in so far as to change the order of petitioner’s nominees as
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to recall the acceptance of
submitted to the Commission.
the resignation of Congressman David L. Kho in view of his request and change of mind, hence allow him
x x x x to continue his term subject to conditions stated above.19
Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS’
petition in E.M. No. 12040. At the hearing, the counsel for SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group)
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of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho was made by virtue of a prior
COMELEC, except for three (3) enumerated instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the agreement of the parties, we resolve and hereby rule that we cannot recognize such arrangement and
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. accordingly we cannot approve the movement in the order of nominees for being contrary to public
policy. The term of office of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties.
x x x x Public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private
agreement. Public office is vested with public interest that should not be reined by individual interest.
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner partylist were true, the list and order of nominees of
the Senior Citizen’s partylist remains the same in so far as we are concerned as it does not fall under one In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list nominees, the
of the three grounds mentioned above. Neither does it have an automatic effect on the organization’s Commission recently promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
representative in the House of Representatives, for once a partylist nominee is "elected" into office and
becomes a member of the House, he is treated similarly and equally with the regular district "SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. – Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among
representatives. As such, they can only be expelled or suspended upon the concurrence of the twothirds nominees of winning partylist groups/organizations shall not be allowed."
of all its Members and never by mere expulsion of a partylist organization.
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the nominees of the Senior Citizen’s Party
x x x x List null and void. Any action committed by the parties in pursuit of such termsharing arrangement—
including the resignation of Congressman David Kho—cannot be recognized and be given effect. Thus, in
WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the petitioner organization, the instant so far as this Commission is concerned, no vacancy was created by the resignation of Rep. Kho and there
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The list and order of nominees of petitioner hereby can be no change in the list and order of nominees of the petitioner partylist.
remains the same as it was submitted to us there being no legally recognizable ground to cause any
changes thereat.24 (Citation omitted.) Second, the expulsion of Datol –
even if proven true – has no effect
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration 25 of the above resolution, but the same in the list and in the order of
remained unresolved. nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS’ Registration elevated as the third nominee.
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to x x x x
Participate in the Partylist System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of
SENIOR CITIZENS.26 The Manifestation of the Datol Group was docketed as SPP It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to this Commission, is meant to be
permanent. The legislature in crafting Republic Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the partylist organization
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But following the termsharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Kho’s term starts No. 12157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was docketed as SPP No. 12191 (PLM).
on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Kho’s resignation. By virtue
of the termsharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House of Representatives is cut short to On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, 27 which, inter alia, set for summary
one year and six months which is merely half of the threeyear term. This is totally opposed to the evidentiary hearings by the COMELEC En Banc the review of the registration of existing partylist
prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of Representatives. Hence, when organizations, which have filed their Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Partylist System of
confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission made a Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
categorical pronouncement that such termsharing agreement must be rejected.
The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the COMELEC En Banc on August 24, 2012
x x x x and they both submitted their respective evidence, which established their continuing compliance with the
requirements of accreditation as a partylist organization.28
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a ground for On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 29 in SPP Nos. 12157 (PLM) and 12
cancellation of registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 which states: 191 (PLM). By a vote of 43, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the registration of
SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:
"Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in a petition that
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned
PartyList Nominee" and docketed as EM No. 12040. In the process of resolving the issues of said case,
x x x x this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and
Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a termsharing agreement. x x x.
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
Nominee David Kho’s term as partylist congressman is three (3) years which starts on June 30, 2010 and
x x x x to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
CANCEL the registration of Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (SENIOR "Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
CITIZENS) under the PartyList System of Representation. shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election."
192 of 669
To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to CANCEL the registration and accreditation, The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution before this Court by filing their
of petitioner Senior Citizens, for violating laws, rules, and regulations relating to elections pursuant to respective petitions for certiorari. The petition filed by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204421,
Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941. while the petition of the Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425.
The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse its earlier finding in the Resolution for SPP On December 11, 2012, the Court initially granted status quo ante orders on said petitions, directing the
Nos. 12157 (PLM) & 12191 (PLM) promulgated on 04 December 2012, in relation to the Resolution for COMELEC to include the name of SENIOR CITIZENS in the printing of official ballots for the May 13,
E.M. No. 12040 promulgated on 27 June 2012. The sole ground for which the petitioner Senior Citizens 2013 partylist elections. Eventually, both petitions were consolidated with the petition in Atong Paglaum,
was disqualified was because of the termsharing agreement between its nominees, which the Inc. v. Commission on Elections, which was docketed as G.R. No. 203766.
Commission En Banc found to be contrary to public policy. It will be noted that this ground is
independent of the six parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is nothing in the doctrine enunciated in On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum, which ordered the remand to the
that case which will absolve the petitioner Senior Citizen of what, to the Commission En Banc, is a clear COMELEC of the petitions that have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of the
bastardization of the term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution as implemented by petitioners in the printing of ballots. Following the parameters set forth in the Court’s Decision, the
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941, which expressly provides that Members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC was to determine whether said petitioners, which included the two factions of SENIOR
including partylist representatives, shall be elected for a term of three years. A term, in the legal sense, is CITIZENS, were qualified to register under the partylist system and to participate in the May 13, 2013
a fixed and definite period of time during which an officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a elections. For this purpose, the Court stated that the COMELEC may conduct summary evidentiary
fixed interval after which the several incumbents succeed one another. Thus, service of the term is for the hearings.
entire period; it cannot be broken down to accommodate those who are not entitled to hold the office.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed Omnibus Resolution in SPP
That the termsharing agreement was made in 2010, while the expression of the policy prohibiting it was Nos. 12157 (PLM) and 12191 (PLM), ruling in this wise:
promulgated only in 2012 via Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366 ("Res. No. 9366"), is of no
moment. As it was in 2010 as it is now, as it was in 1987 when the Constitution was ratified and as it was Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the Court in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on
in 1995 when R.A. No. 7941 was enacted into law, the agreement was and is contrary to public policy Elections], as well as the provisions of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 7941 ("R.A. No. 7941") or the
because it subjects a Constitutionallyordained fixed term to hold public elective office to contractual PartyList System Act, and other pertinent election laws, and after a careful and exhaustive reevaluation
bargaining and negotiation, and treats the same as though it were nothing more than a contractual clause, of the documents submitted by the petitioners per their compliance with Resolution No. 9513 ("Res. No.
an object in the ordinary course of the commerce of men. To accept this defense will not only open the 9513"), the Commission En Banc RESOLVES as follows:
floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more importantly it will render inutile Section 16 of R.A. No.
I. SPP Nos. 12157 (PLM) & 12191 (PLM) – SENIOR CITIZENS
7941 which prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill a vacancy in the available seats for a partylist
group or organization. For this mistake, the petitioner Senior Citizens cannot hide behind the veil of
corporate fiction because the corporate veil can be pierced if necessary to achieve the ends of justice or
193 of 669
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and its disqualification to participate in equity, such as when it is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, or protect fraud. It further
the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions. cannot invoke the prohibition in the enactment of ex post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the
Constitution because the guarantee only the retrospectivity of penal laws and definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is
On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very 2 Urgent Motion to Reiterate Issuance of Temporary not penal in character.
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order, 31 alleging that the COMELEC had ordered the stoppage
of the counting of votes of the disqualified partylist groups. The Datol Group urged the Court to issue a From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of the petitioner Senior Citizens
TRO and/or a status quo ante order during the pendency of its petition. is therefore in order, and consequently, the two Manifestations of Intent to Participate filed with the
Commission should be denied.
Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution, which considered as final
32
and executory its May 10, 2013 Resolution that cancelled the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. On x x x x
even date, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), promulgated
NBOC Resolution No. 000613,33 proclaiming fourteen (14) partylist organizations as initial winners in WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES:
the partylist elections of May 13, 2013.
A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the registration and accreditation,
The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to the "Very Urgent Petition for of the following parties, groups, or organizations:
Certiorari," also reiterating its application for a TROand a writ of preliminary injunction.
34
(1) SPP No. 12157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12191 (PLM) – Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC Resolution No. 000813, 35 which partially the Philippines, Inc.;
proclaimed the winning partylist organizations that filled up a total of fiftythree (53) out of the available
fiftyeight (58) seats for partylist organizations. x x x x
on the instant petitions and to cease and desist from further proclaiming the winners from among the of the Commission, and shall NOT BE ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE as a candidate for the PartyList
from implementing the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and
194 of 669
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION SPP No. 12191 (PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS was concerned and to observe the status quo ante
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONER’S before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise ordered the COMELEC to
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. reserve the seat(s) intended for SENIOR CITIZENS, in accordance with the number of votes it garnered
in the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court, however, directed the COMELEC to hold in abeyance the
4.3 proclamation insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS is concerned until the instant petitions are decided. The Most
Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite filed
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION by the Datol Group was denied for lack of merit.
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING. On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Comment39 on the instant petitions. In a Resolution40 dated June 10, 2013, the Court required the parties to
4.4 submit their respective memoranda. On June 19, 2013, the Arquiza Group filed its Reply 41 to the
Comment of the COMELEC. Subsequently, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their separate
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
memoranda.42 On the other hand, the OSG manifested43 that it was adopting its Comment as its
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE
memorandum in the instant case.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY THE EN BANC OF THE REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION
GRANTED BY ITS DIVISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION THE ISSUES
THAT THE EN BANC CAN ONLY REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.44 (Citation omitted.) The Datol Group’s memorandum raised the following issues for our consideration:
Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza Group brought forward the following arguments: IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 10, 2013 is invalid for being 4.1
contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction? WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ADDED ANOTHER GROUND
(1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 10, 2013 was issued pursuant to the directive of the (VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION OF A PARTY–
Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum. Therefore, the SUBSIDIARY ISSUES arising therefrom are: LIST GROUP AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941.
a. Are there guidelines prescribed in Atong Paglaum to be followed by respondent Comelec in 4.2
determining which partylist groups are qualified to participate in partylist elections?
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(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with those of Issue No. 4.3, namely: b. If there are these guidelines to be followed, were these adhered to by respondent Comelec?
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid? (2) Is the ground the TermSharing Agreement between Senior Citizens nominees a legal ground to
cancel Senior Citizens’ Certificate of Registration?
b. Is the total of the partylist votes cast which was made as the basis thereof correct?
4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed? contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting laws/rules on qualifications and disqualifications of the
candidates after the election where they have received the winning number of votes? (1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May 10 and 24, 2013 and NBOC Resolutions of May a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
24 and 28, 2013 be annulled and set aside?45
b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 20, 2013, in fact, become final and executory?
THE COURT’S RULING
4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of CANVASSERS’ (NBOC) RESOLUTION No. 000613 of
After reviewing the parties’ pleadings, as well as the various resolutions attached thereto, we find merit in MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of
the petitioners’ contentions.1âwphi1 jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
SENIOR CITIZENS’ Right to Due Process (1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their petitions, the two rival groups of SENIOR a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
CITIZENS are actually one in asserting that the organization’s disqualification and cancellation of its
registration and accreditation were effected in violation of its right to due process. b. Is the total of the partylist votes cast which was made as the basis thereof correct?
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?
cancellation of its registration on account of the termsharing agreement of its nominees. The Arquiza
Group maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to a single hearing date in the afternoon 4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 000813 of MAY 28, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to
of August 24, 2012 and the COMELEC’s review therein focused on the group’s programs, law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting
accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza Group asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS was not to lack of jurisdiction?
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(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, advised, before or during the hearing, that the issue of the termsharing agreement would constitute a
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan basis for the review of its registration and accreditation.
election purposes;
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and accreditation of
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show that it complied with the parameters
laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum,
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; the COMELEC conducted summary hearings in executive sessions, without informing SENIOR
CITIZENS. The Arquiza Group says that it filed a "Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For Hearing Or To
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or Be Included In The Hearing Set On Thursday, May 9, 2013," but its counsel found that SENIOR
CITIZENS was not included in the hearings wherein other partylist groups were heard by the
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on May 10, 2013 a "2nd Very Urgent Motion To Set
(2%) of the votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
Case For Public Hearing," but the same was also not acted upon. The Arquiza Group alleges that it only
which it has registered.
found out after the elections that the assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution was issued and the
Arquiza Group was not actually served a copy thereof.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC
may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a partylist organization. In
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 794146 provides for the procedure relative to the review of the registration
connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections 47 the concept
of partylist organizations, to wit:
of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasijudicial
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
below:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x. (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to (3) It is a foreign party or organization;
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
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The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decisionmaker which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decisionmaking. Briefly,
the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decisionmaker "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence. reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasijudicial body, (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
further complements the hearing and decisionmaking due process rights and is similar in substance to the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which
it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the "duty to give (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
reason" to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought arriving at a decision.
through by the decisionmaker. (Emphases ours, citations omitted.)
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
in SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.
Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with
the requirements for partylist accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the
they were not apprised of the fact that the termsharing agreement entered into by the nominees of
proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization’s
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side
qualifications as a partylist group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trialtype
CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of
opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the termsharing agreement and/or to adduce
Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of
evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.
the presence or denial of due process.
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The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein constitute the threshold legal issue of the instant In its Comment48 to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the
cases: whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of opportunity to present their side on the issue of the termsharing agreement during the hearing on April
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the registration 18, 2012.49 Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners’ continuing compliance for
and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition accreditation as a partylist organization.
against termsharing.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting termsharing was provided for under Section 7, CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the termsharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC,
Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M.
the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing No. 12040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had
therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the termsharing agreement was executed in 2010, the tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript of the hearing
same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution. reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent
manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing,
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant between the COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground for the conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by their termsharing agreement.
cancellation of the organization’s registration and accreditation because the nominees never actually However, E.M. No. 12040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a
implemented the agreement. partylist group and the issue of whether the termsharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification
was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was not sufficient as to
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no termsharing actually transpired between constitute a fair warning that the termsharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were made by the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.
nominees on the termsharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the resignation of Rep.
Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the members of SENIOR CITIZENS. Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other cases, the
disqualification cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should have still been afforded the
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the termsharing agreement was actually implemented, the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the termsharing agreement, either through a hearing or through
Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section 7 of written memoranda. This was the proper recourse considering that the COMELEC was about to arrive at a
Resolution No. 9366. The termsharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior to the final determination as to the qualification of SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May
promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM) without conducting
applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at it any further proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in Atong Paglaum.
already earned a vested right in 2010 as partylist organization.
The Prohibition on Termsharing
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Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 50 "the general rule is that statutes are
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS. prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested rights, do
not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." We also reiterated in Lintag
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the termsharing and Arrastia v. National Power Corporation51 that:
agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested
by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in It is a wellentrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
E.M. No. 12040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in implication because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
E.M. No. 12040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the termsharing agreement and the vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the backward). (Citations omitted.)
execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the termsharing agreement. True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect. Nonetheless,
Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of nonimplementation of the the Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned
agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a a vested right to its registration as a partylist organization.
member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the
COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point. Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections 52 teaches that "a public office is not a property right. As the
Constitution expressly states, a ‘Public office is a public trust.’ No one has a vested right to any public
Indubitably, if the termsharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section 2(5), Article
that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a partylist organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the IXC of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "register, after sufficient
COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is duty
election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions already registered in order
the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on. to ensure the latter’s continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by law and the relevant rulings
of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate in partylist elections.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify the
SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No.
jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike down 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested right.
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SO ORDERED. the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191
(PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by the
petitioners. In particular, the dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an issue
raised here, should be threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having jurisdiction
thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be
proclaimed as one of the winning partylist organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013
elections.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order
[SQAO]) in G.R. Nos. 20684445 and the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in G.R. No. 206982 are GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No.
12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En Bane is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning partylist organizations during the May 13,
20 13 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it
garnered during the said elections.
No costs.
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have already been proclaimed and have taken their oath of office.—The controversy involving Lokin is G.R. Nos. 17943132 June 22, 2010
neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may
(CIBAC), Petitioner,
properly be available to one partylist organization seeking to unseat another partylist organization to
vs.
determine which between the defeated and the winning partylist organizations actually obtained the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular partylist
organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same partylist organization. Neither does x x
an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty
of CruzGonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her. G.R. No. 180443
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the
review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,
A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by CruzGonzales. The vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
CINCHONA C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance
Election Law; Election Protests; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases; “Election Protest,” and
with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court
“Quo Warranto,” Distinguished.—An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the
office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
COMELEC.
electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of
the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed
Actions; Forum Shopping; Pleadings and Practice; What is truly important to consider in
a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections. A special civil action for quo
determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by
warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The
a party who accesses different courts and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in
or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties
decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.—Forum shopping consists of the
strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Certiorari, not an election protest or quo warranto, is the proper
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a)
recourse to review a Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolution approving the withdrawal the
whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by
nomination of its original nominees and substituting them with others, even if the substitute nominees
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powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files
will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that
other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated. Under certain circumstances, even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar
the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and remedy) would still be open”; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from
promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court. What is truly important to consider in
fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by
standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper a party who accesses different courts and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or
standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.
prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large
measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the Same; Same; Same; The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not
conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power necessarily constitute forum shopping—the test is whether the several actions filed involve the same
to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.—The filing of identical petitions in different
courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and
Same; Same; Requisites for Validity of Administrative Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs); It is condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper
axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative conduct that degrades the administration of justice. Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on
rule issued for its implementation.—The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions
legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively filed involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. The actions must also
legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where
promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The judicata in the other.
power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to Administrative Law; Delegation of Powers; As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or
this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional; Under certain circumstances, the
axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and
rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they promulgate Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs), but the Legislature must declare the policy of
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases.—The legislative power of the
comply with the following requisites to be valid: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of separation of
203 of 669
but one way to obey the command “thou shall not,” and that is to completely refrain from doing the Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; 3. It must be
forbidden act, subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case. promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and 4. It must be reasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Allowing the partylist organization to change its nominees through
withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of Same; Election Law; PartyList System; The Legislature deprived the partylist organization of the
nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency.—The prohibition is not arbitrary or right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the Commission
capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume on Elections (COMELEC), except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the partylist organization. The nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.—The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature
COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the thereby deprived the partylist organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of
partylist organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the
by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision
disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single,
circulation. Although the people vote for the partylist organization itself in a partylist system of election, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the
not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really
partylist organization are. The publication of the list of the partylist nominees in newspapers of general intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of
circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not
contrast, allowing the partylist organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their depart. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees construction, but only for application. Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a
circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.
has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention. Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of directory, for there is but one way to obey the command “thou shall not,” and that is to completely
the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed—the exceptions extend only as far refrain from doing the forbidden act, subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself.—The usage of
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision “No” in Section 8—“No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the
rather than the exceptions; The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws
from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee
general words.—When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, shall be placed last in the list”—renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent
the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the
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Same; Election Law; PartyList System; The success of the partylist system could only be ensured exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting
by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the partylist organizations, by seeing to the transparency of authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule
the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the
and informed choices of their partylist representatives.—We further note that the new ground would not applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice. The
secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open partylist electoral appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general
system. The success of the system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
partylist organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to
electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their partylist all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be
representatives. resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a
Same; Same; Same; An axiom in administrative law postulates that administrative authorities statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the
should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their Implementing Rules and Regulations statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
(IRRs), but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view.—The Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; To reword means to alter the wording of or to
insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that administrative restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new form.—The COMELEC explains that
authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it has
their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology. The explanation does not
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be persuade. To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase
invalid and should be struck down. anew or in a new form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.
BERSAMIN, J.: However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,
because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus is granted to the partylist organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to
whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs)
the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the
that provide a ground for the substitution of a partylist nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No.
unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the
7941,1 otherwise known as the PartyList System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.
nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The
Common Antecedents grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the
partylist organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under from the capriciousness of the partylist organizations.
the partylist system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
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The motion was opposed by Villanueva and CruzGonzales. synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to
participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees
Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying
list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March
the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona
and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007. 9
C. CruzGonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance
were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, 10 whereby it resolved to set the matter two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News 4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the Inquirer.5
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07054.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, 6 whereby it withdrew the
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 0760 dated July 9, 2007 to partially proclaim the following
11
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The
parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the PartyList System as having won in the May amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) CruzGonzales, and (3) Borje.
14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party,
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members,
Luzon Farmers Party, CooperativeNatco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of
Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the
pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases. nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that
Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.
The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 0772 dated July 18,
2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC, On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as
Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each; the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. 8 The
and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly
with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases. based on PartyList Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of
744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the
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As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed CruzGonzales as the official second nominee of House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 0772 and requested that Lokin be
CIBAC. CruzGonzales took her oath of office
14
formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied,
however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden
as a PartyList Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15 D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07054.
Precís of the Consolidated Cases On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 0705413 thuswise:
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth
nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. CruzGonzales as second
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of
2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07054 (approving CIBAC’s CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth
nominees, respectively, and the substitution by CruzGonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right 1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804). He alleges that Section 13
17
of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to 2. Cinchona C. CruzGonzales
thereby implement.
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due
to the proclamation of CruzGonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s SO ORDERED.
proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin. The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of
CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by
For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC ByLaws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which
petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
second nominee of CIBAC. elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of
CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions had
Issues always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board
approval, was accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of
The issues are the following: the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.
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determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to (a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections. (b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of (c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the PartyList
the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but System Act; and
not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a
contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the (d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
respondent may be unseated. jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it on matters that were intracorporate in nature.
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of
CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one partylist organization seeking to Ruling
unseat another partylist organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning partylist
The petitions are granted.
organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee
of a particular partylist organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same partylist
A
organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the
The Court has jurisdiction over the case
ineligibility and disloyalty of CruzGonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of
disqualification for her.
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning partylist organization has been done
and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the
candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section
review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an
IXA of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by CruzGonzales. The
election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
certiorari in this Court.
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance
We do not agree.
with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
COMELEC. defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
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an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution B
No. 0760 and NBC Resolution No. 0772 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping
concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance
until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus,
authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning partylist forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a
organizations with pending disputes. favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in
the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately
On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007 splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed,
resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a
and the substitution by CruzGonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.19
challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing
CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination. What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative agencies
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue. 20
because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum
C shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. 21
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute
doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same
legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be essential facts and circumstances. 22 The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter,
delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
delegated.25 where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.24
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second
the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 0772 (announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to
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The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature
the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall. In addition to the powers
29
should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional
implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of
and administers. 30
making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive
officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the PartyList System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be. 26
The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation
procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in
resolution itself. nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to
existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing
the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law
13 succeeds. and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot
be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting
executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27
IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, 32 for administrative IRRs are solely intended to To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid: 28
carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not
enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
additional noncontradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature. 33
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
Section 8. Nomination of PartyList Representatives.Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later that fortyfive (45) days before the election a list of names, not less 4. It must be reasonable.
than five (5), from which partylist representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.
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MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
consider the same. has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing. incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the partylist system shall
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been not be considered resigned.
submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political party
affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the political The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the partylist organization of the right to
party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party affiliation. change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except
when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee
MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from
exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has to be a ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed
change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the prioritization to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced
made by the party will not be adversely affected.37 that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should
defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from
The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
which the courts must not depart. 34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. 35 Accordingly, an administrative agency
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the
tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of
and unambiguous.36
the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be
directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain The legislative intent to deprive the partylist organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter
from doing the forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case. the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the partylist organization of its right to choose its nominees, but MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any
merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees’ names provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the nominees or to
after submission of the list to the COMELEC. alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any time after
submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?
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general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The
former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the
excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire partylist organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the
whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice. 1avvphi1
39
real intended nominees of the partylist organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass
all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers
words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, of general circulation. Although the people vote for the partylist organization itself in a partylist system
the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in particular partylist organization are. The publication of the list of the partylist nominees in newspapers
favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed
seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited choices. In contrast, allowing the partylist organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of
or abridged, should receive a restricted construction. their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees
circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal
E has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 D
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the partylist organization can
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A partylist nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC,
his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c)
withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee when the nominee becomes incapacitated.
shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls. the three exceptions.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are
when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the
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nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory
grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the grounds for substituting a nominee.
partylist organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate
from the capriciousness of the partylist organizations. We agree with Lokin.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
guaranteeing a full, free and open partylist electoral system. The success of the system could only be administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, 40 has neither the authority
ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the partylist organizations, by seeing to the nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the
transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not
making intelligent and informed choices of their partylist representatives. override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they
intend to carry out.41
The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative
must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs,
must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45 because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42
F The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A.
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 No. 7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology.
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the The explanation does not persuade.
law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no
law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law. 47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a
cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power. new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.
Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the partylist However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground
withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees were granted to the partylist organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to
also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could only be the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the
unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the
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for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC’s
approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBAC’s
substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of
legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a
partylist organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to
the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. CruzGonzales as a PartyList
Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a PartyList
Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
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Representatives.” Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed G.R. No. 178678 April 16, 2009
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over elections relating to
DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEÑERES, Petitioner,
the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
vs.
Same; Same; Same; PartyList System; Where the right of the nominees as partylist
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, Respondents.
representatives had been recognized and declared by a Resolution of the COMELEC and the nominees
had taken their oath and already assumed their offices in the House of Representatives, the proper
Election Law; Election Contests; Electoral Tribunals; Certiorari; While certiorari is the proper
recourse would have been to file a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives
remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) within ten (10) days from receipt of the Resolution and not a petition for
adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers,” there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave
certiorari before the Supreme Court.—Without a doubt, at the time Señeres filed this petition before this
abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
Court on July 23, 2007, the right of the nominees as partylist representatives had been recognized and
course of law.—A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer
declared in the July 19, 2007 Resolution and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed
exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is
their offices in the House of Representatives. As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a
no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
petition for quo warranto before the HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19, 2007
annulling the proceeding. It is the “proper remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision of the
Resolution and not a petition for certiorari before this Court. Since Señeres failed to file a petition
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers.” For certiorari to
for quo warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring
prosper, however, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion and
the validity of Robles’ Certificate of Nomination, said Resolution of the COMELEC has already become
that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the
final and executory. Thus, this petition has now become moot and can be dismissed outright. And even if
present case, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to
we entertain the instant special civil action, still, petitioner’s postulations are bereft of merit.
Señeres. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. It’s Article VI, Section 17 states:
Same; PartyList System; Electioneering; Partisan Political Activity; Words and Phrases; As long
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
as the acts embraced under Sec. 79 of the Omnibus Election Code pertain to or are in connection with the
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
nomination of a candidate by a party or organization, then such are treated as internal matters and
Members. x x x
cannot be considered as electioneering or partisan political activity—the twin acts of signing and filing a
Same; Same; Same; Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or organization and are not designed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over elections relating to
to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the elections.—Guided by the above perspective,
the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s
Robles’ act of submitting a nomination list for BUHAY cannot, without more, be considered
(HRET’s) own jurisdiction begins.—The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) sole
electioneering or partisan political activity within the context of the Election Code. First of all, petitioner
and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
did not aver that Robles committed any of the five (5) acts defined in the aforequoted Sec. 79(b) of the
of the House of Representatives “begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
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signed by Robles, is still the product of a valid and legal act of the National Council of BUHAY. Robles’ Code, let alone adduce proof to show the fact of commission. Second, even if Robles performed any of the
connection with LRTA could not really be considered as a factor invalidating the nomination process. previously mentioned acts, Sec. 79 of the Code is nonetheless unequivocal that if the same is done only
Same; Same; HoldOver Doctrine; As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold for the “purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nominations for candidacy to a public office by
over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed.— a political party, agreement, or coalition of parties,” it is not considered as a prohibited electioneering or
Petitioner Señeres further maintains that at the time the Certificate of Nomination was submitted, Robles’ partisan election activity. From this provision, one can conclude that as long as the acts embraced under
term as President of BUHAY had already expired, thus effectively nullifying the Certificate of Sec. 79 pertain to or are in connection with the nomination of a candidate by a party or organization, then
Nomination and the nomination process. Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable. As a general rule, such are treated as internal matters and cannot be considered as electioneering or partisan political
officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their activity. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of
successors are elected or appointed. Sec. 23 of the Corporation Code contains a provision to this effect, the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the
thus: Section 23. The board of directors or trustees.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the elections. The act of Robles of submitting the certificate nominating Velarde and others was merely in
corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted compliance with the COMELEC requirements for nomination of partylist representatives and, hence,
and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected cannot be treated as electioneering or partisan political activity proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art.
from among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the members of the IX(B) of the Constitution for civil servants. Moreover, despite the fact that Robles is a nominating officer,
corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year until their successors are elected and qualified. The as well as Chief of the LRTA, petitioner was unable to cite any legal provision that prohibits his
holdover doctrine has, to be sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to concurrent positions of LRTA President and acting president of a partylist organization or that bars him
what would otherwise be deemed as dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate enterprise from nominating.
in its relation to outsiders. This is the analogical situation obtaining in the present case. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is irrelevant who among a partylist organization’s officials sign the
Same; Same; Same; De Facto Officers; Authorities are almost unanimous that one who continues Certificate of Nomination, as long as the signatory was so authorized by said organization. —The
with the discharge of the functions of an office after the expiration of his or her legal term—no successor nomination of Velarde, Coscolluela, Tieng, Monsod, and Villarama to the 2007 partylist elections was, in
having, in the meantime, been appointed or chosen—is commonly regarded as a de facto officer, even the final analysis, an act of the National Council of BUHAY. Robles’ role in the nominating process was
where no provision is made by law for his holding over and there is nothing to indicate the contrary. — limited to signing, on behalf of BUHAY, and submitting the party’s Certificate of Nomination to the
Authorities are almost unanimous that one who continues with the discharge of the functions of an office COMELEC. The act of nominating BUHAY’s representatives was veritably a direct and official act of the
after the expiration of his or her legal term—no successor having, in the meantime, been appointed or National Council of BUHAY and not Robles.’ Be that as it may, it is irrelevant who among BUHAY’s
chosen—is commonly regarded as a de facto officer, even where no provision is made by law for his officials signs the Certificate of Nomination, as long as the signatory was so authorized by BUHAY. The
holding over and there is nothing to indicate the contrary. By fiction of law, the acts of such de alleged disqualification of Robles as nominating officer is indeed a nonissue and does not affect the act
facto officer are considered valid and effective. So it must be for the acts of Robles while serving as a of the National Council of nominating Velarde and others. Hence, the Certificate of Nomination, albeit
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In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson of Buhay, a partylist group holdover Buhay President. Among these acts was the submission of the nomination certificate for the
duly registered with COMELEC. The constitution of BUHAY provides for a threeyear term for all its
3
May 14, 2007 elections.
party officers, without reelection. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as
4
Same; Same; Estoppel; As a principle of equity rooted on natural justice, the bar of estoppel
its president. All the required Manifestations of Desire to Participate in the said electoral exercises, precludes a person from going back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of another
including the Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the signature of Robles as president of whom he has led to rely upon them.—As a final consideration, it bears to state that petitioner is estopped
BUHAY.5 On January 26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007 elections, BUHAY again filed a
from questioning the authority of Robles as President of BUHAY. As a principle of equity rooted on
Manifestation of its Desire to Participate in the PartyList System of Representation. 6 As in the past two
natural justice, the bar of estoppel precludes a person from going back on his own acts and representations
elections, the manifestation to participate bore the signature of Robles as BUHAY president.
to the prejudice of another whom he has led to rely upon them. Again, it cannot be denied that Robles, as
BUHAY President, signed all manifestations of the party’s desire to participate in the 2001 and 2004
On March 29, 2007, Robles signed and filed a Certificate of Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees for the
2007 elections containing the following names: (i) Rene M. Velarde, (ii) Ma. Carissa Coscolluela, (iii) elections, as well as all Certificates of Nomination. In fact, the corresponding certificate for the 2004
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BE IT RESOLVED FURTHER, that the President and Chairman of the National Council of Buhay, Mr. WHEREAS, Hans Christian M. Señeres, without authority from the National Council, caused the filing of
Melquiades A. Robles, is hereby authorized to cause the necessary filing of whatever documents/letters his Certificate of Nomination with the Comelec last 27 March 2007.
before the House of Representatives and/or to any other entity/agency/person to remove/drop Mr.
Señeres’ name in the roll of members in the said lower house. 11 WHEREAS, Hans Christian M. Señeres, again without authority from the National Council, listed in his
Certificate of Nomination names of persons who are not even members of the Buhay party.
Later developments saw Robles filing a petition praying for the recognition of Jose D. Villanueva as the
new representative of BUHAY in the House of Representatives for the remaining term until June 30, WHEREAS, Hans Christian M. Señeres, knowing fully well that the National Council had previously
2007. Attached to the petition was a copy of the expelling resolution adverted to. Additionally, Robles
12 approved the following as its official nominees, to wit x x x to the 2007 PartyList elections; and that Mr.
also filed on the same day an "Urgent Motion to Declare Null and Void the Certificate of Nomination and Melquiades A. Robles was authorized to sign and submit the party’s Certificate of Nomination with the
Certificates of Acceptance filed by Hans Christian M. Señeres, Hermenegildo Dumlao, Antonio R. Comelec; and, with evident premeditation to put the party to public ridicule and with scheming intention
Bautista, Victor Pablo Trinidad and Eduardo Solangon, Jr." 13 to create confusion, still proceeded with the filing of his unauthorized certificate of nomination even
nomination persons who are not members of Buhay.
On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as
a winning partylist organization for the May 2007 elections entitled to three (3) House seats. 14 WHEREAS, Hans Christian M. Señeres, in view of the foregoing, underwent Party Discipline process
pursuant to Article VII of the Constitution and ByLaws of the Party.
This was followed by the issuance on July 19, 2007 by the en banc COMELEC of Resolution E.M. No.
07043 recognizing and declaring Robles as the president of BUHAY and, as such, was the one "duly x x x x
authorized to sign documents in behalf of the party particularly the Manifestation to participate in the
partylist system of representation and the Certification of Nomination of its nominees." 15 Explaining its WHEREAS, after a careful examination of the [evidence] on his case, the National Council found Hans
action, COMELEC stated that since no party election was held to replace Robles as party president, then Christian M. Señeres to have committed acts in violation of the constitution and bylaws of the party and
he was holding the position in a holdover capacity.161avvphi1 decided to expel him as a member of the party.
The COMELEC disposed of the partisan political activity issue with the terse observation that Señeres’ NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED that the National Council has
arguments on the applicability to Robles of the prohibition on partisan political activity were decided to expel Hans M. Señeres as a member of the party effective close of business hour of 10 May
unconvincing.17 The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Resolution reads: 2007.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission (En Banc) hereby recognizes Melquiades A. BE IT RESOLVED FURTHER, that all rights and privileges pertaining to the membership of Hans M.
Robles as the duly authorized representative of Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) and to act for and in its Señeres with the party are consequently cancelled.
behalf pursuant to its Constitution and ByLaws.
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any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the SO ORDERED.18
proceeding.21 It is the "proper remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers." 22 For certiorari to prosper, however, On July 20, 2007, the first three (3) listed nominees of BUHAY for the May 2007 elections, as per the
there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no Certificate of Nomination filed by Robles, namely Rene M. Velarde, Ma. Carissa Coscolluela, and
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. William Irwin C. Tieng, took their oaths of office as BUHAY partylist representatives in the current
Congress.19 Accordingly, on September 3, 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as National Board of Canvassers,
In the present case, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to issued a Certificate of Proclamation to BUHAY and its nominees as representatives to the House of
Señeres. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. Its Article VI, Section 17 states: Representatives.20
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition.
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
Members. x x x The Issue
This constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the Electoral Tribunal Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
of the House of Representatives, to wit: amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated June 19, 2007,
which declared respondent Robles as the duly authorized representative of BUHAY, and there is no
RULE 14. Jurisdiction.—The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the instant
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. petition.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, the Court elucidated on the import of the word "sole" in Art. VI, Our Ruling
Sec. 17 of the Constitution, thus:
The petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
The use of the word ‘sole’ emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise
of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as ‘intended to Petition for Certiorari Is an Improper Remedy
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.’ Earlier, this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as ‘full, clear and complete.’ Under the A crucial matter in this recourse is whether the petition for certiorari filed by Señeres is the proper
amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remedy.
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer exercising
Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the
judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or
1987 Constitution."23
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Consequently, the first three (3) nominees in the Certificate of Nomination submitted by Robles then took Then came Rasul v. COMELEC and AquinoOreta, in which the Court again stressed that "the word ‘sole’
their oaths of office before the Chief Justice on July 20, 2007 and have since then exercised their duties in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscore the
and functions as BUHAY PartyList representatives in the current Congress. exclusivity of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members." 24
Without a doubt, at the time Señeres filed this petition before this Court on July 23, 2007, the right of the The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests
nominees as partylist representatives had been recognized and declared in the July 19, 2007 Resolution relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives "begins
and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed their offices in the House of Representatives. only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives." 25 Thus, once a winning
As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for certiorari before this Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over elections relating to the election, returns, and
Court. 30
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.26
Since Señeres failed to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of It is undisputed that the COMELEC, sitting as National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed BUHAY as a
the July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring the validity of Robles’ Certificate of Nomination, said Resolution winning partylist organization for the May 14, 2007 elections, entitled to three (3) seats in the House of
of the COMELEC has already become final and executory. Thus, this petition has now become moot and Representatives.27 The proclamation came in the form of two Resolutions dated July 9, 2007 and July 18,
can be dismissed outright. And even if we entertain the instant special civil action, still, petitioner’s 2007,28 respectively. Said resolutions are official proclamations of COMELEC considering it is BUHAY
postulations are bereft of merit. that ran for election as partylist organization and not the BUHAY nominees.
Act of Nominating Is Not Partisan Political Activity The following day, on July 19, 2007, the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution declaring "Melquiades
A. Robles as the duly authorized representative of Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) and to act in its
Petitioner Señeres contends that Robles, acting as BUHAY President and nominating officer, as well as behalf pursuant to its Constitution and ByLaws." COMELEC affirmed that his Certificate of Nomination
being the Administrator of the LRTA, was engaging in electioneering or partisan political campaign. He was a valid one as it ruled that "Robles is the President of Buhay PartyList and therefore duly authorized
bases his argument on the Constitution, which prohibits any officer or employee in the civil service from to sign documents in behalf of the party particularly the Manifestation to participate in the parylist
engaging, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. He also cites Sec. 4
31
system of representation and the Certificate of Nomination of its nominees."29 The September 3, 2007
of the Civil Service Law which provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service x x x shall proclamation merely confirmed the challenged July 19, 2007 Resolution. The July 19, 2007 Resolution
engage in any partisan political activity." Lastly, he mentions Sec. 26(i) of the Omnibus Election Code coupled with the July 9, 2007 and July 18, 2007 proclamations vested the Robles nominees the right to
which makes it "an election offense for any officer in the civil service to directly or indirectly x x x represent BUHAY as its sectoral representatives.
engage in any partisan political activity."
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Guided by the above perspective, Robles’ act of submitting a nomination list for BUHAY cannot, without This contention lacks basis and is far from being persuasive. The terms "electioneering" and "partisan
more, be considered electioneering or partisan political activity within the context of the Election Code. political activity" have wellestablished meanings in the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
First of all, petitioner did not aver that Robles committed any of the five (5) acts defined in the
aforequoted Sec. 79(b) of the Code, let alone adduce proof to show the fact of commission. Section 79. x x x
Second, even if Robles performed any of the previously mentioned acts, Sec. 79 of the Code is (b) The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the
nonetheless unequivocal that if the same is done only for the "purpose of enhancing the chances of election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
aspirants for nominations for candidacy to a public office by a political party, agreement, or coalition of
parties," it is not considered as a prohibited electioneering or partisan election activity. (1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
From this provision, one can conclude that as long as the acts embraced under Sec. 79 pertain to or are in
connection with the nomination of a candidate by a party or organization, then such are treated as internal (2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
matters and cannot be considered as electioneering or partisan political activity. The twin acts of signing purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or organization and are
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of
not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the elections. The act of Robles of
any candidate for public office;
submitting the certificate nominating Velarde and others was merely in compliance with the COMELEC
requirements for nomination of partylist representatives and, hence, cannot be treated as electioneering or
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election
partisan political activity proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution for civil servants.
of any candidate; or
Moreover, despite the fact that Robles is a nominating officer, as well as Chief of the LRTA, petitioner
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
was unable to cite any legal provision that prohibits his concurrent positions of LRTA President and
acting president of a partylist organization or that bars him from nominating.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nominations for candidacy to a public office by a political party, agreement, or coalition of parties shall
Last but not least, the nomination of Velarde, Coscolluela, Tieng, Monsod, and Villarama to the 2007
not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity.
partylist elections was, in the final analysis, an act of the National Council of BUHAY. Robles’ role in
the nominating process was limited to signing, on behalf of BUHAY, and submitting the party’s
Public expression of opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes
Certificate of Nomination to the COMELEC. 32 The act of nominating BUHAY’s representatives was
of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forth coming political party
veritably a direct and official act of the National Council of BUHAY and not Robles’. Be that as it may, it
convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity
is irrelevant who among BUHAY’s officials signs the Certificate of Nomination, as long as the signatory
contemplated under this Article. (Emphasis supplied.)
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impliedly prohibit a holdover situation. As such, since no successor was ever elected or qualified, Robles was so authorized by BUHAY. The alleged disqualification of Robles as nominating officer is indeed a
remained the President of BUHAY in a "holdover" capacity. nonissue and does not affect the act of the National Council of nominating Velarde and others. Hence,
the Certificate of Nomination, albeit signed by Robles, is still the product of a valid and legal act of the
Authorities are almost unanimous that one who continues with the discharge of the functions of an office National Council of BUHAY. Robles’ connection with LRTA could not really be considered as a factor
after the expiration of his or her legal term––no successor having, in the meantime, been appointed or invalidating the nomination process.
chosen––is commonly regarded as a de facto officer, even where no provision is made by law for his
holding over and there is nothing to indicate the contrary. 37 By fiction of law, the acts of such de "HoldOver" Principle Applies
facto officer are considered valid and effective. 38
Petitioner Señeres further maintains that at the time the Certificate of Nomination was submitted, Robles’
So it must be for the acts of Robles while serving as a holdover Buhay President. Among these acts was term as President of BUHAY had already expired, thus effectively nullifying the Certificate of
the submission of the nomination certificate for the May 14, 2007 elections. Nomination and the nomination process.
As a final consideration, it bears to state that petitioner is estopped from questioning the authority of Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable. As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold
Robles as President of BUHAY. As a principle of equity rooted on natural justice, the bar of estoppel over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed. 33 Sec.
precludes a person from going back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of another whom 23 of the Corporation Code contains a provision to this effect, thus:
he has led to rely upon them. 39
Section 23. The board of directors or trustees.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate
Again, it cannot be denied that Robles, as BUHAY President, signed all manifestations of the party’s powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all
desire to participate in the 2001 and 2004 elections, as well as all Certificates of Nomination. In fact, the 40
property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from
corresponding certificate for the 2004 elections included petitioner as one of the nominees. During this among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who
time, Robles’ term as President had already expired, and yet, petitioner never questioned Robles’ shall hold office for one (1) year until their successors are elected and qualified.
authority to sign the Certificate of Nomination. As a matter of fact, petitioner even benefited from the
nomination, because he earned a seat in the House of Representatives as a result of the party’s The holdover doctrine has, to be sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity
success.41 Clearly, petitioner cannot now be heard to argue that Robles’ term as president of BUHAY has to what would otherwise be deemed as dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate
long since expired, and that his act of submitting the Certificate of Nomination and the manifestation to enterprise in its relation to outsiders. 34 This is the analogical situation obtaining in the present case. The
participate in the 2007 elections is null and void. He is already precluded from doing so. voting members of BUHAY duly elected Robles as party President in October 1999. And although his
regular term as such President expired in October 2002, 35 no election was held to replace him and the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Resolution E.M. No. 07043 of the COMELEC dated July other original set of officers. 36 Further, the constitution and bylaws of BUHAY do not expressly or
19, 2007 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
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SO ORDERED.
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Same; Same; Same; The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010
choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,
where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified
vs.
nominee to become its partylist representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO
with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.—Petitioners Abayon and Palparan
C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.
of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a partylist nominee belongs to the
party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of x x
aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or
organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had G.R. No. 189506
chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its partylist representative in the lower House and
enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Commission on Elections; Once the party or organization of the
LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN,
partylist nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, Respondents.
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) own jurisdiction
Election Law; PartyList Representatives; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); It is for
begins.—What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to interpret the meaning of this particular
be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his
House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, partylist nominees are “elected members” of the
partylist organization in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
that they presumably embody.—It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification
organization of the partylist nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his partylist
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
ABAD, J.:
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nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to
Aangat Tayo. pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the partylist groups that won seats in the lower house of
Congress.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but
upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. 1 The latter moved for The Facts and the Case
reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009, prompting Abayon to file the
2
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But, although it is the partylist organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that COMELEC pursuant to the PartyList System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the
sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.3 Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied
Constitution,5 identifies who the "members" of that House are: it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,4 hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by The Issue Presented
law, shall be elected through a party
- list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied) The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a partylist system of Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay partylist organizations, respectively, who
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
Constitution’s point of view, it is the partylist representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
The Court’s Ruling
parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar partylist
system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the PartyList System
votes for the organizations or parties to which such partylist representatives belong.
Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the
qualifications to seek partylist seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the
Once elected, both the district representatives and the partylist representatives are treated in like manner.
HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of
They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of
Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were
laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
It may not be amiss to point out that the PartyList System Act itself recognizes partylist nominees as
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her
"members of the House of Representatives," thus:
qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantay’s personality is so
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo
representatives to the House of Representatives through a partylist system of registered national, regional warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.
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In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined
represent. The PartyList System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
or organization which he seeks to represent." 7
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his partylist organization—in the context of the Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BARA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,6 a partylist
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote
partylist nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right cast in a partylist election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees,
to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party
8
or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its partylist representative in Both the Constitution and the PartyList System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification
the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is of partylist nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:
taken out of its hand.
Sec. 9. Qualification of PartyList Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as partylist
Parenthetically, although the PartyList System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of
when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
authority to approve the registration of partylist organizations. But the Court need not resolve this election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties. represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive
(25) years of age on the day of the election.1avvphi1
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
9
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, partylist nominees are "elected members" of the House thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the partylist nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
227 of 669
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo partylist and Bantay partylist but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16,
2009 and Resolution 09183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07041 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09178 dated
September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07040.
SO ORDERED.
228 of 669
nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.—In the case of the party G.R. No. 193256 March 22, 2011
list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their
ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, represented herein by its
qualifications. Although it is the partylist organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
Chairman, JAMES MARTY LIM, Petitioner,
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the partylist
vs.
nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondents.
Same; Same; Electoral Tribunals; Since the representative of the elected partylist organization
becomes a member of the House of Representatives, contests relating to the qualifications of the said
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
partylist representative is within the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(COMELEC) over petitions for cancellation of registration of any political party, organization or
(HRET).—Since the representative of the elected partylist organization becomes a member of the House
coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IXC of the Constitution.—The jurisdiction of the
of Representatives, contests relating to the qualifications of the said partylist representative is within the
COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any political party, organization or coalition
jurisdiction of the HRET, as Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and
is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IXC of the Constitution, which states: Sec. 2. The Commission on
the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: x x x x (5) Register, after sufficient
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Abayon held: x x
publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements,
x [P]artylist nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district
must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their
the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the partylist nominee has been
goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. Financial contributions
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends
from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and when accepted, shall be an additional
Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of discretion implies
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and
may be prescribed by law. Based on the provision above, the Constitution grants the COMELEC the
despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility.—The COMELEC has the
authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the
constitutional mandate to register political parties, organizations and coalitions, and to cancel their
registration of the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of
registration on legal grounds; hence, the COMELEC en banc, in this case, has the prerogative to direct
R.A. No. 7941
that a hearing be conducted on the petition for cancellation of registration of the ABC PartyList. The
COMELEC en banc stated in its Resolution that only then can the petition be resolved on its merits with
Same; Same; Although it is the partylist organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
due regard to private respondent’s right to due process. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the partylist
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1. Although its National Chairman, James Marty Lim, was being publicly bruited as its first nominee, the whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of
real number one nominee of the party is Arnulfo "Noel" Molero, who is a known top official of Ang power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
Dating Daan; as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
2. ABC was organized, established and is being run by Ang Dating Daan not as a partylist organization
banc has the discretion to liberally construe procedural rules in order to achieve a just and speedy
for political purposes [envisioned by R.A. No. 7941 (the PartyList System Act)], but as a religious sect
resolution of every action brought before it.—As regards the alleged lack of proper verification of the
for religious purposes;
petition of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc held that private respondent substantially complied
3. The resources of Ang Dating Daan are being used to finance the campaign of ABC on a nationwide with the requirements of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as he submitted his community tax
scale; and certificate and two identification cards with the verification page. The Court agrees with the ruling of the
COMELEC en banc, which has the discretion to liberally construe procedural rules in order to achieve a
4. The membership of ABC is composed of the members of Ang Dating Daan. 5
just and speedy resolution of every action brought before the COMELEC.
PERALTA, J.:
Private respondent also alleged that ABC made an untruthful statement in its petition for accreditation, as
it stated that it does not possess any of the disqualifications provided by the PartyList System Act when it This is a special civil action for certiorari 1 alleging that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
is disqualified for being, in reality, a religious organization. In addition, he alleged that ABC is receiving banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
support from third parties abroad. jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated August 3, 2010, which reinstated the petition to cancel the
registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) PartyList, and directed
Private respondent prayed that the accreditation of ABC be cancelled, and that it be declared disqualified the Commission Secretary to schedule a hearing on the petition.
as a partylist group for violating R.A. No. 7941.
The facts are as follows:
In its Answer,6 petitioner ABC denied private respondent’s allegations, which were unproven by any
material and convincing evidence. It averred that ABC, as a political party, is allowed by law to be On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition 2 with the COMELEC for the
registered and run under the partylist system of representation. The COMELEC has approved petitioner’s cancellation of registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC PartyList 3 on the ground that petitioner is
registration and accreditation as a partylist group, and petitioner had participated and was voted upon in a front for a religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a partylist group under Section 6
the 2007 elections. (1)4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the PartyList System Act.
Moreover, petitioner stated that as a political party of national constituency, it was founded and headed by Private respondent contends that ABC is a front for a religious group called the Children of God
Mr. James Marty Lim, who held the position of National President of the Association of Barangay International, which is more popularly known as Ang Dating Daan, based on the following circumstances:
Chairmen for 11 years. Its stature as a partylist organization with national constituency that could
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In response thereto, petitioner filed on July 21, 2010 a Supplement 11 to its Comment/Opposition with contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation for the marginalized and
Extremely Urgent Motion to Dismiss that was filed on July 6, 2010. Petitioner urged the COMELEC to underrepresented sectors of society should remove any doubt that it was established for religious
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction, since the Secretary General of the House of Representatives purposes. Petitioner averred that it has not been identified with any religious entity or aggrupation.
had already recognized ABC as a proclaimed partylist group by asking its first nominee to attend the
Orientation Program for the new members of the House of Representatives, Fifteenth Congress on July 8, On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC, Second Division issued a Resolution 7 dismissing the petition based on
2010 at the plenary hall. procedural and substantial grounds.
On July 30, 2010, private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition12 to petitioner's motion to dismiss, The dismissal on procedural grounds was grounded on the lack of proper verification of the petition.
arguing that ABC was not validly proclaimed; hence, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction over the case. According to the COMELEC, Second Division, the Verification with Certification Re: Forum Shopping
and Special Power of Attorney was not duly notarized in accordance with the 2004 Rules on Notarial
On August 3, 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution partially granting private respondent’s
13
Practice, as amended. Sections 1 and 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require that the
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend Its Effects dated June 22, person appearing before a notary public must be known to the notary public or identified by the notary
2010. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: public through competent evidence of identity. In this case, the COMELEC, Second Division found that
the "Acknowledgment" at the end of the verification did not contain the name of private respondent who
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. supposedly appeared before the notary public, and he was not identified by any competent evidence of
The petition is hereby REINSTATED and the Commission Secretary is hereby DIRECTED TO identity as required by the rules on notarial practice.
SCHEDULE a hearing on the petition with notice to the parties. 14
The COMELEC, Second Division also dismissed the petition based on substantial grounds, as it found
Contrary to the findings of the Second Division, the COMELEC en banc found that the petition’s that ABC is not a religious sect, and is, therefore, not disqualified from registration.
verification page substantially complied with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, thus:
On June 22, 2010, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Annul
x x x A perusal of the said verification page immediately shows that photostatic copies of Mauricio, Jr.’s Proclamation and Suspend its Effects.8 He argued that his petition was not defective since attached to the
Community Tax Certificate No. CCI2009 30975061, Integrated Bar of the Philippines Lifetime verification were photocopies of his identification cards. He likewise argued that he should be given the
Membership Card, and Permit to Carry Firearms No. 09083204 were attached thereto, thereby making opportunity to present his evidence to support his Petition in accordance with Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
them an integral part of said verification page. Clearly, Mauricio Jr.’s submission of his community tax
certificate and two (2) identification cards, with the verification page substantially complies with the On July 6, 2010, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition with Extremely Urgent Motion to Dismiss.9
requirements of the 2004 Notarial Rules.15
On July 6, 2010, private respondent submitted a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 10 and his
More importantly, the COMELEC en banc stated that the records of the case showed that the Resolution evidence to support his petition.
of the Second Division was issued without any hearing, which deprived Mauricio of the opportunity to
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Petitioner avers that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Senate and the House submit evidence in support of his petition. The COMELEC en banc averred that Section 6 16 of R.A. No.
of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests 7941 requires the sending out of notices and that an actual hearing is held to ensure that the parties’ right
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members." Hence, once a candidate to due process is respected. It cited the case of Sandoval v. Commission on Elections, 17 which held that
for House of Representatives is proclaimed, the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction to pass upon its procedural due process demands notice and hearing.
qualification and the same is vested with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
ABC filed this petition raising the following issues:
Petitioner states that in this case, there is no dispute that ABC PartyList has been proclaimed by the
COMELEC as one of the winners in the partylist elections of May 10, 2010; therefore, any question as to 1. The Commission en banc has no more jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of
its qualification should be resolved by the HRET and not by the COMELEC. Petitioner asserts that once a registration and accreditation since ABC was already proclaimed as winner.
partylist group has been proclaimed winner and its nominees have taken their oath, the COMELEC
should be divested of its jurisdiction over both the partylist group and its nominees. 2. Granting that public respondent still has jurisdiction, the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it set the petition of Mauricio for hearing
Further, petitioner submits that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which states that the COMELEC may motu when he was already given all the time and opportunity to present and substantiate his case.
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition, is applicable only to a 3. Granting that public respondent still has jurisdiction, the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
nonwinning partylist group. According to petitioner, its submission is supported by the fact that one of discretion amountING to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it did not recognize that on its face the
the grounds for the cancellation of the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party is failure to petition of Mauricio is unmeritorious and procedurally defective.
obtain the required two percent of votes or to participate in the past two elections which are obviously
4. Granting that public respondent still has jurisdiction, the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
applicable only to losing partylist groups.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it singled out the case of ABC, setting the
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The members of the House of Representatives are provided for in Section 5, Article VI of the (5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
Constitution: other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party - list
system of registered national, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and when accepted,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . 22
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.20
Thus, the members of the House of Representatives are composed of the members who shall be elected
from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, Based on the provision above, the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal
grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides:
Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal23 held:
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The Comelec may motu proprio or upon verified
x x x x [F]rom the Constitution's point of view, it is the partylist representatives who are "elected" into complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
partylist system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters
cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such partylist representatives belong. (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
Once elected, both the district representatives and the partylist representatives are treated in like manner. x x x
They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of
laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms. registration of the ABC PartyList.
It may not be amiss to point out that the PartyList System Act itself recognizes partylist nominees as In the case of the partylist nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests
"members of the House of Representatives," thus: relating to their qualifications. Although it is the partylist organization that is voted for in the elections, it
is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, 21 but it is the
partylist nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.
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Therefore, the jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relating to the qualifications of a partylist nominee Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
or representative is derived from Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, while the jurisdiction of the representatives to the House of Representatives through a partylist system of registered national, regional
COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IXC of the Constitution.1avvphi1 the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
In sum, the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
accreditation of petitioner ABC PartyList for alleged violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Moreover, petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it still set the petition for hearing despite the fact that provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)24
private respondent had the opportunity to be heard and was not denied due process, and he presented his
evidence as attachments to his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Since the representative of the elected partylist organization becomes a member of the House of
Representatives, contests relating to the qualifications of the said partylist representative is within the
The contention lacks merit. jurisdiction of the HRET, as Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
The COMELEC has the constitutional mandate to register political parties, organizations and coalitions, Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
and to cancel their registration on legal grounds; hence, the COMELEC en banc, in this case, has the be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
prerogative to direct that a hearing be conducted on the petition for cancellation of registration of the ABC Members.
PartyList. The COMELEC en banc stated in its Resolution that only then can the petition be resolved on
its merits with due regard to private respondent’s right to due process. Abayon held:
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liberally construe procedural rules in order to achieve a just and speedy resolution of every action brought
before the COMELEC.
Further, petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it
singled out this case and directed that it be set for hearing when other cases of the same nature were
summarily and motu proprio dismissed by the COMELEC, citing the cases of Barangay Natin PartyList
(BANAT) v. Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) Foundation, Inc., and BANAT v. 1st
Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy (1CARE) and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC).28
The contention is without merit.
In the cited case of BANAT v. CIBAC Foundation, Inc., the COMELEC dismissed the petition for
cancellation of the certificate of registration and accreditation of CIBAC Foundation Inc. on the ground
that this Court had already determined the eligibility of CIBAC as a registered/accredited partylist
organization, unlike in this case. 29
In regard to the case of BANAT v. 1CARE and APEC, 30 the COMELEC dismissed a similar petition on
the ground that the registration and qualification of APEC and its nominees have been settled
affirmatively by this Court in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. 31
In fine, the COMELEC en banc did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated August 3, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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the provisions of E.O. 464. The prohibition under Section 1 of E.O. 464 has to do with the question hour, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate
President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N.
not with inquiries in aid of legislation. As to the prohibition authorized by Section 3 in relation to Section
PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as
2(b), the basis thereof is executive privilege, not the purported failure to publish rules of procedure. If the Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO,
President would prohibit executive officials from appearing before Congress on the ground of lack of JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
published rules of procedure, such would not be an exercise of executive privilege, but simply a claim to RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO
OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, MAR ROXAS and MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR.,
protection under the due process clause—a right which the President has in common with any other
citizen. The claim to such protection is not based on the confidential nature of the information held by the Petitioners,
official concerned, as in the case of executive privilege, but on the defective nature of the legislative
inquiry itself. The prohibition under Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is based
solely on executive privilege, not on any alleged defect in the inquiry arising from a lack of published versus
rules of procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To secure a fair opportunity to determine whether the matter under EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alterego of President Gloria
legislative investigation calls for a claim of executive privilege, the executive branch need not resort to a MacapagalArroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines,
precautionary claim of privilege—the President may, instead, direct the official concerned to ask Respondents.
Congress for reasonable time to discuss with her the subject matter of the investigation.—The tentative
prevention of an official from appearing before Congress pending discussion of the matter on inquiry with
the President cannot, however, be properly deemed an exercise of executive privilege, not even one “for
Congress; Legislative Inquiries; Executive Privilege; Executive Order 464; Due Process; Even
practical purposes.” Any such discussion is meant precisely to allow the President to determine whether
assuming arguendo that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had not
the information sought falls under the privilege. Before such determination, the claim of privilege could
been published, such does not have any bearing on the validity of any of the provisions of Executive
only be based on mere speculation that the information sought might be confidential in nature. Certainly,
Order 464—if the President would prohibit executive officials from appearing before Congress on the
Congress cannot be bound by such a tenuous invocation of the privilege. The executive branch,
ground of lack of published rules of procedure, such would not be an exercise of executive privilege, but
nonetheless, need not be apprehensive that it might not be able to invoke executive privilege in time to
simply a claim to protection under the due process clause, a right which the President has in common
prevent disclosures of legitimately confidential information. As this Court stated in the Decision, the
with any other citizen.—In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents argue that the Senate Rules of
President and the Executive Secretary must be given fair opportunity to determine whether the matter
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation has not been published, hence, the President may
under legislative investigation calls for a claim of privilege. To secure this fair opportunity, the executive
properly prohibit the appearance of executive officials before Congress. Even assuming arguendo that the
branch need not resort to a precautionary claim of privilege like that proffered by respondents. The
said Rules of Procedure had not been published, such does not have any bearing on the validity of any of
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President may, instead, direct the official concerned to ask Congress for reasonable time to discuss with
her the subject matter of the investigation.
Pending consideration are 1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 18, 2006 filed by respondents, Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; PartyList Organizations; While PDPLaban and Bayan
praying that the Decision promulgated on April 20, 2006 (the Decision) be set aside, and 2) the Motion
Muna both have members in Congress, the former, unlike the latter, is not represented therein as a party
for Reconsideration dated May 17, 2006 filed by petitioner PDPLaban in so far as the Decision held that
it was without the requisite standing to file the petition in G.R. No. 169834. list organization, thus entitling Bayan Muna to participate in the legislative process in a way that cannot
be said of PDPLaban.—As for its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner PDPLaban avers that there is
Petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Francisco I. Chavez, and PDP
no fundamental difference between it and petitioner Bayan Muna to justify their unequal treatment since
Laban filed their respective Comments to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
both of them have members in, Congress. It claims, moreover, that all its members are taxpayers and
Respecting PDPLaban's Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al. and Filipino citizens whose right to information was, as held in the Decision, violated by E.O. 464. There are,
petitioner Chavez endorse the same. Respondents, however, pray for its denial. however, fundamental distinctions between PDPLaban and Bayan Muna which call for this Court’s
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents argue that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing contrasting rulings with regard to their standing. While both parties have members in Congress, PDP
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation has not been published, hence, the President may properly prohibit the Laban, unlike Bayan Muna, is not represented therein as a partylist organization. The PDPLaban
appearance of executive officials before Congress. members in Congress were elected to represent, not their party, but their constituents, i.e., their
Even assuming arguendo that the said Rules of Procedure had not been published, such does not have any legislative district in the case of representatives, or the nation at large in the case of senators. The Bayan
bearing on the validity of any of the provisions of E.O. 464. The prohibition under Section 1 of E.O. 464 Muna members in Congress, on the other hand, were elected precisely to represent their party. In fact, in
has to do with the question hour, not with inquiries in aid of legislation. As to the prohibition authorized light of the partylist system, the representatives from Bayan Muna may be said to have been elected only
by Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b), the basis thereof is executive privilege, not the purported failure indirectly, since it was Bayan Muna itself, as a party, which was voted for in the last elections where it
to publish rules of procedure.
received enough votes to entitle it to three seats in the House of Representatives. This, again, contrasts
If the President would prohibit executive officials from appearing before Congress on the ground of lack with the situation of the PDPLaban members in Congress who were all elected in their individual
of published rules of procedure, such would not be an exercise of executive privilege, but simply a claim capacities. Indeed, the rights of the Bayan Muna representatives are so intertwined with their party’s right
to protection under the due process clause a right which the President has in common with any other
to representation in Congress that, in the event they change their party affiliation during their term of
citizen. The claim to such protection is not based on the confidential nature of the information held by the
office, they would have to forfeit their seat—a rule which clearly does not apply to the PDPLaban
official concerned, as in the case of executive privilege, but on the defective nature of the legislative
inquiry itself. The prohibition under Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is based members in Congress. Bayan Muna is thus entitled to participate in the legislative process in a way that
solely on executive privilege, not on any alleged defect in the inquiry arising from a lack of published cannot be said of PDPLaban.
rules of procedure.
RESOLUTION
Respondents go on to argue that the President's invocation of executive privilege is "for practical
purposes," in that since the President would be in no position to raise an objection the moment a question
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
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There are, however, fundamental distinctions between PDPLaban and Bayan Muna which call for this is asked by Congress, she must be allowed to prohibit the appearance of the official concerned, at least
Court's contrasting rulings with regard to their standing. until she is able to thoroughly discuss the matter with the said official. For, so respondents contend, "once
the information has been coerced out of the official, there is no turning back, and the damage that could
While both parties have members in Congress, PDPLaban, unlike Bayan Muna, is not represented therein result might be devastating to the functioning of government."[1]cralaw
as a partylist organization. The PDPLaban members in Congress were elected to represent, not their
party, but their constituents, i.e., their legislative district in the case of representatives, or the nation at The tentative prevention of an official from appearing before Congress pending discussion of the matter
large in the case of senators. The Bayan Muna members in Congress, on the other hand, were elected on inquiry with the President cannot, however, be properly deemed an exercise of executive privilege, not
precisely to represent their party. [4]cralaw In fact, in light of the partylist system, the representatives even one "for practical purposes." Any such discussion is meant precisely to allow the President to
from Bayan Muna may be said to have been elected only indirectly, since it was Bayan Muna itself, as a determine whether the information sought falls under the privilege. Before such determination, the claim
party, which was voted for in the last elections where it received enough votes to entitle it to three seats in of privilege could only be based on mere speculation that the information sought might be confidential in
the House of Representatives.[5]cralaw This, again, contrasts with the situation of the PDPLaban members nature. Certainly, Congress cannot be bound by such a tenuous invocation of the privilege.
in Congress who were all elected in their individual capacities.
The executive branch, nonetheless, need not be apprehensive that it might not be able to invoke executive
privilege in time to prevent disclosures of legitimately confidential information. As this Court stated in the
Indeed, the rights of the Bayan Muna representatives are so intertwined with their party's right to
Decision, the President and the Executive Secretary must be given fair opportunity to determine whether
representation in Congress that, in the event they change their party affiliation during their term of office,
the matter under legislative investigation calls for a claim of privilege. [2]cralaw To secure this fair
they would have to forfeit their seat [6]cralaw a rule which clearly does not apply to the PDPLaban
opportunity, the executive branch need not resort to a precautionary claim of privilege like that proffered
members in Congress.
by respondents. The President may, instead, direct the official concerned to ask Congress for reasonable
Bayan Muna is thus entitled to participate in the legislative process in a way that cannot be said of PDP time to discuss with her the subject matter of the investigation.
Laban.
Section 3 in relation to 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is far from being a mere directive to officials
With regard to PDPLaban's assertion that it consists of taxpayers and Filipino citizens, suffice it to state summoned by Congress to ask for time to confer with the President. It is an authorization for implied
that its Petition did not assert this as a ground for its standing to sue. It merely alleged that E.O. 464 claims of privilege.[3]cralaw As such, the criteria for evaluating its validity must be those for claims of
hampers its legislative agenda and that the issues involved are of transcendental importance, executive privilege. On the basis of such criteria, the Court found the implied claim authorized under
[7]
cralaw which points were already addressed in the Decision. Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 to be defective.
If PDPLaban intended to sue as an organization of citizens in pursuit of the right to information of such In fine, no argument in respondents' Motion for Reconsideration merits a reversal or modification of the
citizens, it did not so state in its petition. As such, the Court could not be satisfied that its participation in Decision.
the controversy would ensure "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
As for its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner PDPLaban avers that there is no fundamental difference
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." [8]cralaw
between it and petitioner Bayan Muna to justify their unequal treatment since both of them have members
A final point. Petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al., by Manifestation dated April 25, 2006, called in Congress. It claims, moreover, that all its members are taxpayers and Filipino citizens whose right to
this Court's attention to the inadvertent omission, in the title of the petition in G.R. No. 169777, of the information was, as held in the Decision, violated by E.O. 464.
name of Senator Manuel B. Villar, Jr. The Manifestation reiterated an earlier Manifestation dated October
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24, 2005 requesting that Senator Villar's name be included in the title of said petition. Finding the
Manifestations welltaken, the title of G.R. No. 169777 is hereby amended to reflect the name of Senator
Villar as one of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of Respondents dated May 18, 2006 and the
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of Petitioner PDPLaban dated May 17, 2006 are DENIED WITH
FINALITY for lack of merit. The title of G.R. No. 169777 is amended to include the name Senator
Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as one of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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3.Id.; Id.; Id.; Quorum of Philippine Senate.—The Court held that there was a quorum in the session of G.R. No. L2821 March 4, 1949
the Philippine Senate (composed of twentyfour Senators) in which twelve Senators were present,
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
one Senator being in the United States.
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
In G.R. No. L2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny
the petition. 1.Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Supreme Court has no Jurisdiction over Senate Controversy
for Selection of Presiding Officer.—The subject matter of this quo warranto proceeding—to declare
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain
petitioner the rightful President of the Philippine Senate and oust respondent—is not within the juris
the principal grounds for the denial.
diction of the Supreme Court, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established: (Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.,
1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare quested that his right to
speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President not be interfered with nor taken over by the judiciary. The selection of the presiding officer of the
Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved. Philippine Senate affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator Tañada and
Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against
the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof. 2.Id.; Id.; Id.; Constitutional and Political Law; Separation of Powers; when may Supreme Court Assume
Jurisdiction Over Senate Controversy for Selection of Presiding Officer.—The Supreme Court
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the
appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his assumed jurisdiction over this quo warranto proceeding", in the light of events subsequent to the
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not original resolution.
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted
by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read slowly and carefully said
resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
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Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order.
to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all
the Senator were present.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session
hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but
senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Protempore, urged by those Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his
senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session. partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech.
The roll was called.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Protempore Arranz Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above
the Senate. mentioned conspiracy.
Senate President Protempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly
session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair. stood up to claim his right to deliver his onehour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding,
continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary, recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower,
latter abandoned the session. Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter
would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by prearrangement. At
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved. about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by
petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above
With Senate President Protempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.
to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position
of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved. seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote.
Another commotion ensued.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
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to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
deliberations. Philippines Senate.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not where By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be
it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves into another Senate. The The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial
petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his place in the points:
same one Philippines Senate.
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subjectmatter?
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes it
advisable, more than ever, to adopt the handsoff policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
similar nature.
c. Should the petition be granted?
The second question depends upon these subquestions. (1) Was the session of the socalled rump Senate
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature
a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21,
of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs.
1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president,
useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no
which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take
jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four on those sub
cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged
questions.
affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of
the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme
endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. Court.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and lawabiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves
242 of 669
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators
Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not
mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr.
Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no
doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would
be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this
decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino,
it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the
Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any
session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the
shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.
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Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998
gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.—Dissenting in part,
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, Petitioners, v. SEN.
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition. Wellsettled
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, Respondents.
is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; For special and important reasons
relief asserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, the Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to the
jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether doctrine on hierarchy of courts, and original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their warranto, assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President and the Speaker of the House
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. have been recognized as exceptions to the rule.—In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this
Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
Constitutional Law; Parliamentary Rules; Statutory Construction; Words and prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
Phrases; “Majority” and “Minority,” Explained; The plain and unambiguous words of Section 16 (1), petitions in the lower tribunals. However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and
Article VI of the Constitution simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. In
one half of all the senators, and not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative
“majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body.—The term “majority” has been judicially defined officers like the Senate President and the Speaker of the House have been recognized as exceptions to this
a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the rule.
number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half Same; Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of
of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments—it
the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.—Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution
other than the usual meanings of these terms. is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
elect the minority leader.—In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted; It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Supreme
244 of 669
identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of the many minority groups or the become the minority leader.
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader. Same; Same; Same; Same; History would also show that the “majority” in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the
“minority” normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.—The Comment of Respondent
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political Questions; The method of choosing who will be such Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested in petitioners’ Reply. During the
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the Constitution, and eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Supreme Court.—While the Constitution is nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the minority,
explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the
Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators,
the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that
including those belonging to the minority. This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even
“[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. History would also show that the “majority” in
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the belonged, while the “minority” normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Senate itself, not by this Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific Same; Same; Same; Same; Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half—sometimes referred to as plurality—while minority
relative thereto.—Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority;” No
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of the many minority groups or the independents or
the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.—Let us go back to the definitions of the
long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific terms “majority” and “minority.” Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
relative thereto. contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature—it is would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than
not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.—On grounds of respect for the two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it representing all the minorities. In a government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as
is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
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Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion
rules and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, the Same; Same; Same; Same; Being merely matters of procedure, the observance of legislative rules
Supreme Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at
abuse of discretion.—While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice will, upon the concurrence of a majority.—Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do
of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject
discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of
an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. This is the plain procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded
implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
power and the duty not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of Law; Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
and enforceable,” but likewise “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Supreme Court from prying into the internal workings of
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the the Senate; The Supreme Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and
Government.” judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.—In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the
Actions; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases; “Usurpation” and “Quo Warranto,” Explained.— power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has
color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of
to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold—the very duty that justifies the Court’s
action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. The action shall be this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a
brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the
such office. law.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts; Judicial Review; Words and Phrases; The all Same; Same; Same; Judicial Legislation; To accede to the interpretation of petitioners would
embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court “to determine whether or not there has been a grave practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or powers.—To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
instrumentality of the Government” is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term “grave legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone,
abuse of discretion.”—The allembracing and plenary power and duty of the Court “to determine whether the petition would easily fail.
246 of 669
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto any branch or instrumentality of the Government” is restricted only by the definition and confines of the
T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful
term “grave abuse of discretion.” “By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical
minority leader.
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
general to file COMMENT thereon within a nonextendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice. On to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective Comments. In by reason of passion and hostility.”
compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Same; Same; Same; Same; Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of
Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and
the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.—
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1 to hear and Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or
decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for hostility.” Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original petitions for certiorari,
imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate
President4 and the Speaker of the House5 have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
The Facts exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on July 27, Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this
1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the
composition of the Senate was as follows:6cräläwvirtualibräry laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP) authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
7 members LakasNational Union of Christian DemocratsUnited Muslim Democrats of
The Case
the Philippines (LakasNUCDUMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
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On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
seven LakasNUCDUMDP senators,9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority
leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority 1 member Peoples Reform Party (PRP)
leader of the Senate.
1 member Gabay Bayan
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
2 members Independent
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.
Issues
23 total number of senators7 (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as independent.)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of
From the parties pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? position by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate.
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority as majority leader.
leader?
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who
minority leader? had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the minority.
The Courts Ruling
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that
After a close perusal of the pleadings10 and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con, the Court the senators belonging to the LakasNUCDUMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a
finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived
the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader. at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad
First Issue: The Courts Jurisdiction
delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve
the issue.
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light of subsequent events which justify its intervention; and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the
on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of majority and
therein elect a Senate President. minority involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof,
stating that [t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: [I] concur with the majority that this Court has majority vote of all its respective Members.
jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the issue of
the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well.14cräläwvirtualibräry who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the
legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part: separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not
provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly
provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.
explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of the
Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving an
expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there
effective settlement are pinned.15 peculiar circumstances impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general
adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners theory that a senator who
x x x This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should
votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority leader.
refuse to decide them.16
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various important
x x x The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.17cräläwvirtualibräry
cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
In Taada v. Cuenco,18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that it refers to
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Courts power of judicial review; that
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a
questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal
particular measure.19cräläwvirtualibräry
finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies.12cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senates full
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful
discretionary authority, but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that
Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the
Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) in the
249 of 669
justiciable or nonpolitical, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it
act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
prescribed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue
and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential form of In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia,21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the Court
government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for
predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]. This ruling was made in spite of the
said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and peremptory by previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker22 and Montenegro v. Castaeda23 that the authority to
our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it. decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege x x x) belongs to the
This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a duty, President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. But the
rather than a power, to determine whether another branch of the government has kept within Chief Justice cautioned: the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the
constitutional limits. Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power.
The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary:24cräläwvirtualibräry
validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable, not
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the nonjusticiability of socalled political
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave questions is the principle of separation of powers characteristic of the presidential system of
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality government the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3)
of the Government.25cräläwvirtualibräry categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the Court. Daza v. applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing
Singson,26 Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales28 similarly resolved issues assailing the with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to which legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere
each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the issue was but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid
justiciable, even if the question were political in nature, since it involved the legality, not the wisdom, of of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other
the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed,
Constitution. measures taken or decisions made by the other departments provided that such acts, measures or
decision are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara,29 wherein the petitioners sought to
nullify the Senates concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
The Court ruled: Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected is
250 of 669
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The
the judgment of that body. Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the
political departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a wellknown will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse
constitutionalist try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), of discretion.
Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They
also invoke the Courts expanded judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to reverse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Respondents. a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all contests
petition. Wellsettled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner original and exclusive.31 The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such
is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire discretion.32cräläwvirtualibräry
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia,33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine and to
look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which was later
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that
certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They averred further
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In recognizing
that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate
President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws? The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the internal
procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional provision
requiring the election of the Senate President by majority vote of all its members carries with it a judicial It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set
duty to determine the concepts of majority and minority, as well as who may elect a minority leader. They aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
argue that majority in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. x x x In the
cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
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referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or Furthermore, the members of the LakasNUCDUMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they
adherents than the majority.42 Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there
are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multiparty system such as in the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of
The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out
which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general
of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. 36 The
elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political
plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President
parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority
must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
delineate who comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there is no showing
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. 43 To our
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader.
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
leader.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of its
The Comment37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested in
proceedings.44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal
petitioners Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of the
affairs.45 Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a
Rule I member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular session, when Sen.
Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee
ELECTIVE OFFICERS chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the minority. 39 This practice continued during
the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40 History would
SECTION 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro also show that the majority in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the
Tempore, a Secretary, and a SergeantatArms. most number of lawmakers belonged, while the minority normally referred to a party with a lesser number
of members.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their duties.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms majority and minority. Majority may also refer to the group,
Rule II
party, or faction with the larger number of votes, 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes
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To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, ELECTION OF OFFICERS
a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the
petition would easily fail. SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members. Should there
be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate was shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither
Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is the plain implication of is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually
duty not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of
but likewise to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the
Explaining the abovequoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the 1986 words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable
Constitutional Commission, said in part:51cräläwvirtualibräry norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity
to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
xxx the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the intervene.47cräläwvirtualibräry
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
courts of justice. obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.48 Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body 49 at will, upon
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question the concurrence of a majority.
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the
nature. exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade and uphold the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will
remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
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By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of Respondent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.59cräläwvirtualibräry
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 52 by one without
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the LakasNUCDUMDP. By unanimous resolution of the enjoyment.54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor 55 or any person
members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, another.56 The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is
wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. unlawfully holding or exercising such office.57cräläwvirtualibräry
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of capricious or In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has
whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
hostility. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been unlawfully held by the respondent.58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself
in which the power has been vested. Absent any clearcut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality
SO ORDERED. or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of
Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of
his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernans Recognition of Guingona
The allembracing and plenary power and duty of the Court to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term grave abuse
of discretion.
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their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the G.R. No. 227757
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives].” Hence, as
a general rule, “[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C.
without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x. LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE,
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S.
Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of Representatives].”
VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO,Petitioners
vs.
Judicial Power; Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly “includes the duty of the courts
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARINAS, and
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, Respondents
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”—Of course, as in any
Political Law; Speaker of the House of Representatives; The Speaker of the House of
general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states
act of the political departments of government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such
that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method
action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. This stems from the
and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control.—The Speaker of the
expanded concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also
expressly “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. In the case
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” Case law decrees that “[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department’s duty and of DefensorSantiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756 (1998), which involved a dispute on the rightful
power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (19982001), this Court observed that “[w]hile the
including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the
Charter says is that ‘[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.’ [As such],
Same; By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with.—By and
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any
prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court.”
showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not
only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers Same; Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
doctrine. Verily, “[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for authority to, inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These “legislative rules, unlike statutory
this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’”—Section
in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.” 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia,
“determine the rules of its proceedings.” These “legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
D E C I S I O N imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ Being merely matters of procedure,
255 of 669
Petitioners hoped that as a "longstanding tradition" of the House where the candidate who garnered the PERLASBERNABE, J.:
second (2nd)highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader Rep.
Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However, despite numerous follow Before the Court is a petition for mandamus1 filed by petitioners Representatives Teddy Brawner
ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as such.5 Baguilat, Jr., (Rep. Baguilat), Edcel C. Lagman (Rep. Lagman), Raul A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice, Emmanuel
A. Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin, and Gary C. Alejano (collectively, petitioners), all members of the
On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon), House of Representatives, essentially praying that respondents Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker
manifested before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez Alvarez), Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Farifias (Rep. Fariñas), and Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep.
(including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader. 6 Thereafter, Suarez; collectively, respondents), also members of the House of Representatives, be compelled to
on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Farinas moved for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the 17th Congress of the House of Representatives;
Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that various "irregularities" and (b) petitioners as the legitimate members of the Minority.
attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the
Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and The Facts
(b) that the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as
Minority Leader are supposed to be considered independent members of the House, and thus, irregularly The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17 th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news articles
deemed as part of the Minority.7 However, Rep. Lagman's opposition was overruled, and consequently, surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of President
Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader. Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the
House of Representatives (or the House), and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the majority partisans. The
as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "longstanding tradition" in the House where the candidate who petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority
garnered the second (2nd)highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the
Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position. Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader. 2
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal matter to the House On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then
of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the
the Court cannot interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of the govemment. 8 In the same Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning
vein, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of Speaker Alvarez and Majority Leader Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the
Farinas contends, inter alia, that the election of Minority Leader is within the exclusive realm of the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority;
House of Representatives, which the Court cannot intrude in pursuant to the principle of separation of
and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority. 3 Thereafter, the
powers, as well as the political question doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues that the recognition of Rep.
Elections for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight [(8)]
Suarez as the House Minority Leader was not tainted with any violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one [(l)] registering a no
of discretion and, thus, must be sustained.9
vote,"4 thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House of Representatives
of the 17th Congress.
The Issue Before the Court
256 of 669
Recognized by the Chair, Rep. Atienza inquired as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House The essential issue for resolution is whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ
of Representatives. of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and
(b) petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House Minority.
REMARKS OF REP. FARINAS
The Court's Ruling
In reply, Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of the Rules of the house on membership to the Majority and
the Minority. He explained that the Members who voted for the winning candidate for the Speaker shall The petition is without merit.
constitute the Majority and shall elect from among themselves the Majority Leader. while those who
voted against the winning Speaker or did not vote at all shall belong to the Minority and would thereafter "Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
elect their Minority Leader. required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
NOMINAL VOTING ON THE NOMINEES FOR SPEAKER OF enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw." 10 In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda,11 the Court
THE HOUSE explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to
Thereafter, on motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Members proceeded to the election of one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.12
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Presiding Officer then directed Deputy Secretary
General Adasa to call the Roll for nominal voting for the Speaker of the House and requested each After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs
Member to state the name of the candidate he or she will vote for. sought. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, thenActing Floor
Leader Rep. Farinas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the
The result of the voting was as follows: Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas then articulated that: (a) all those who
vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for other candidates
For Rep. Pantaleon D. Alvarez:
shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of
the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the
x x x x
Minority.13 Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of the House proceeded without any objection from
any member of Congress, including herein petitioners. Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House
For Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr.
is the essential and formative step conducted at the first regular session of the 17 th Congress to determine
the constituency of the Majority and Minority (and later on, their respective leaders), considering that the
x x x x
Majority would be comprised of those who voted for the winning Speaker and the Minority of those who
did not. The unobjected procession of the House at this juncture is reflected in its Journal No. 1 dated July
For Rep. Danilo E. Suarez
25, 2016,14which, based on case law, is conclusive15 as to what transpired in Congress:
x x x x
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF REP. ATIENZA
257 of 669
Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show that the House of Representatives had Abstained
effectively adopted Rep. Farinas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the membership of the Minority,
as well as the process of determining who the Minority Leader would be. More significantly, this x x x x
demonstrates the House's deviation from the "legal bases" of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the
reliefs sought before this Court, namely: (a) the "longstanding tradition" of automatically awarding the With 252 Members voting for Rep. Alvarez (P.), eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep.
Minority Leadership to the second placer in the Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep. Baguilat; and (b) the Suarez, 21 abstaining and one registering a no vote, the Presiding Officer declared Rep. Alvarez (P.) as
rule21 that those who abstained in the Speakership Elections should be deemed as independent Members the duly elected Speaker of the House of Representatives for the 17th Congress.
of the House of Representatives, and thus, they could not have voted for a Minority Leader in the person
of Rep. Suarez.22 As will be explained hereunder, the deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid COMMITTEE ON NOTIFICATION
rules is not averse to the Constitution.
On motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Body constituted a committee composed of the
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: following Members to notify Rep. Alvarez (P.) of his election as Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to escort the Speakerelect to the rostrum for his oathtaking: Reps. Eric D. Singson, Mercedes K.
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a Alvarez, Fredenil "Fred" H. Castro, Raneo "Ranie" E. Abu, Lucy T. Gomez, Nancy A. Catamco, Elenita
majority vote of all its respective Members. Milagros "Eileen" ErmitaBuhain, Rose Marie "Baby" J. Arenas, Mylene J. GarciaAlbano, Gwendolyn F.
Garcia, Marlyn L. PrimiciasAgabas, Emmeline AglipayVillar, Sarah Jane I. Elago and Victoria Isabel G.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. Noel.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of SUSPENSION OF SESSION
its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have
officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is The Presiding Officer motu proprio suspended the session at 12:43p.m.16
something within its sole control.23 In the case of DefensorSantiago v. Guingona,24 which involved a
dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (19982001), this Court observed After Speaker Alvarez took his oath of office, he administered the oath of office to all Members of the
that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of House of the 17th Congress.17 On the same day, the Deputy Speakers, and other officers of the House
Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower (among others, the Majority Leader) were elected and all took their respective oaths of office. 18
House]. All that the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.' [As such], the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the During his privilege speech delivered on July 26, 2016, which was a full day after all the above
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method mentioned proceedings had already been commenced and completed, Rep. Lagman questioned Rep.
must be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court. "25 Fariñas' interpretation of the Rules.19 Aside from the belated timing of Rep. Lagman's query, Rep. Suarez
aptly points out that the Journal for that session does not indicate any motion made, seconded and carried
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI26 of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the to correct the entry in the Journal of the previous session (July 25, 2016) pertinent to any recording error
sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike that may have been made, as to indicate that in fact, a protest or objection was raised. 20
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact,
258 of 669
grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil they 'are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being
this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be
doctrine.33 Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of the House of
this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has Representatives]. "27 Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to
in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself." 34 protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of Representatives]." 28
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over
SO ORDERED. petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, will not review the wisdom,
merits or propriety of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.29 This stems from the expanded concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, expressly "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Case law decrees that "[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial
department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained
by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:30
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.31
Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold
the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government." 32
However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the questioned
proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hardpressed to find any
attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this case
concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of
259 of 669
G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the imposition of suspension is not automatic or selfoperative
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
as the validity of the information must be determined in a presuspension hearing, there is no hard and
vs.
fast rule as to the conduct thereof.—En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V.
selfoperative as the validity of the information must be determined in a presuspension hearing, there is
CHICONAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST
no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that—“ ‘x x x No specific rules need be
DIVISION, respondents.
laid down for such presuspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him,
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Preventive Suspension; AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices
e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
Act; Sandiganbayan; The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 has
provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under both legal and jurisprudential support.—The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x.’ ” 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congressional Discipline; The order of suspension prescribed by court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it.
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order
Constitution.—The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” In issuing the
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each—“x x x house may preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
as the case may be, upon an erring member. with which he has been charged—the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The doctrine of separation of powers by
accused.—Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
nor from its sanctions.—The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any
effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands
maxim simply recognizes each of the three coequal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the accused.
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The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the government—the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary—has exclusive prerogatives and
preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago, in connection with pending cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding
in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise into the internal affairs of either branch.
known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Where the question pertains to an affair internal to either
of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view that unless an infringement of any specific
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration
Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over
and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the AntiGraft
that of any other two branches of government—it is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific
and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator Gualberto
constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. —Section 1,
dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request,
Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of “actual
came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also in the
the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the determination of “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date. jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the
Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly: has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the
light of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic,
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO, a public
question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court
officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident
subscribes to the view that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully,
inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the following aliens:
of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision
Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy,
that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to
Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan
Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the
Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez,
Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen YuehO, Cai VITUG, J.:
Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324
dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that
261 of 669
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to accept a fellowship said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1
order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 9194555 and
case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her No. 9194897.
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 9928990. At Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.
names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended undue Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from
advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint. injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June
1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner's by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991,
arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof. Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed
thirtytwo amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to
post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 1837118402, filed against her. On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and Preliminary
Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 9928990, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her
109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.
its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations,
and seeking the nullification thereof. The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the
consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease
and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary
petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceedings with her arraignment restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
262 of 669
implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this Court of On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to
the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof. consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were
consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the suspension
order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at that time." 2 Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss
or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninetyday with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam DefensorSantiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines,
from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga
implementation of the suspension order. (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion of
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its 03rd
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a DefensorSantiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her. On 25
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him. "WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby
suspends the accused Miriam DefensorSantiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.
BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court reiterated: Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the
263 of 669
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or selfoperative as the validity of the "The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended — treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
information must be determined in a presuspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the accused public officer — may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
conduct thereof. It has been said that —
"xxx xxx xxx
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such presuspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE "The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of pertaining to the career or noncareer service." 4
Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once,
bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of before it.
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a
resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended
an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it
of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code." 9 has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. 8
264 of 669
of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding
A piecemeal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is selfdefeating. before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength
of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were authorized under records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity
policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due
aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 2531). mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is
subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the Procedure. 10
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that: The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon to
(1) She was a public officer, resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, 11 petitioner sought to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after
No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12 petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure order
January 1, 1984;
issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 13 petitioner
sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.' said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended
informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order
No. 3019." 16 allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, 15 the Court declared:
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved "We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. (G.R. Nos. 9928999290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue
265 of 669
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which are discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each —
legally demandable and enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or "x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave and, with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17
terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its
normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view 19 that unless an member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations
substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an impairment on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled:
or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the
Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary
power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend
needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter
or expel a Member' by a vote of twothirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty
itself.
of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division
of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members
it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner. of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of
the three coequal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs. Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either
SO ORDERED. branch.
266 of 669
profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license THIRD DIVISION
and the law invest in them.
A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
Same; Same; Same; It is imperative on our part to reinstill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their
vs.
own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO, Respondent.
without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.
—We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language Administrative Law; Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official; Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a
that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to reinstill in government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a
that the parliamentary nonaccountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them lawyer.—The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes
and intimidation aimed at influencing the decisionmaking prerogatives of Congress and its members. a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.
Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Public Officers; When the Code of Professional
VELASCO, JR., J.: Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined
to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyer’s professional duties, but also
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show
Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago’s speech delivered on
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in
the Senate floor:
them.—Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as
267 of 669
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then
a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against
debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative the lady senator.
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.2 making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.
of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council
diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon tobe vacated position of
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court
manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress nonsitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts,
3 4
can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. 5 The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the
on the matter. underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable
undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for
statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots." occasion offense."1
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x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they
to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder
idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.) and perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvphi1
A careful rereading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon
her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court
and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress offensive or otherwise improper.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She
and offensive personalities.
was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oftcited authority on constitutional and
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to
"unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is dutybound to
while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. 7 Senator Santiago should have known, as any
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the
defamatory words against all of them. courts.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides: legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of
what she said. We quote the passage once more:
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And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x to the courts."
x x x x
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel that: 12
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and
ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
"not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."13
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally independence;
speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a x x x x
violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 10 we reiterated our pronouncement in
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, 15 a good character being an essential
Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer 11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the
Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to
profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
and the law invest in them.16
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor."
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senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
avoided imposing their own rules on her. consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal
malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of
overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang 17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most
land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. 21
insolent manner.
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for
in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even
admission is good enough for the Court. without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
WHEREFORE, the lettercomplaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam DefensorSantiago We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language
is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to reinstill in
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew
SO ORDERED. that the parliamentary nonaccountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform
the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums
outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decisionmaking prerogatives of Congress and its
members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator
or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. 20 The lady
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swimming pool, manmade lakes, Japanese gardens, a horse stable with practice race tracks, an extensive G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
farm for fighting cocks, green houses and orchards.5
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioner, v. HON. EVANGELINE C. CASTILLOMARIGOMEN,
According to petitioner, Mercado related in said hearing that because VP Binay's wife would not allow IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON
the estate's developer, Hillmares' Construction Corporation (HCC), to charge the development expenses CITY, BRANCH 101 AND ANTONIO L. TIU, Respondents.
against VP Binay's 13% share in kickbacks from all Makati infrastructure projects, HCC was compelled
to add the same as "overprice" on Makati projects, particularly the Makati City Hall Parking Building. 6
D E C I S I O N
Petitioner averred that private respondent thereafter claimed "absolute ownership" of the estate, albeit
asserting that it only covered 145 hectares, through his company called Sunchamp Real Estate TIJAM, J.:
Corporation (Sunchamp), which purportedly entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with a
certain Laureano R. Gregorio, Jr. (Gregorio, Jr.), the alleged owner of the consolidated estate and its This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court over public respondent's
improvements.7 Order2 dated May 19, 2015 which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss premised on the special and
affirmative defenses in his Answer, and public respondent's Order 3 dated December 16, 2015 which
Petitioner further averred that private respondent testified before the SBRS on the so denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No. RQZN1410666CV
called Hacienda Binay on October 22 and 30, 2014, and at the October 30, 2014 hearing, the latter entitled "Antonio L. Tiu v. Antonio F. Trillanes IV."
presented a onepage Agreement 8 dated January 18, 2013 between Sunchamp and Gregorio. 9 On its face,
the Agreement covered a 150hectare property in Rosario, Batangas and showed a total consideration of
P400 Million, payable in tranches and in cash and/or listed shares, adjustable based on the fair market
The Facts
value. The Agreement likewise ostensibly showed that Gregorio is obligated to cause the registration of
improvements in the name of Sunchamp and within two years, to deliver titles/documents evidencing the
Petitioner, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed Proposed Senate Resolution No. 826 (P.S.
real and enforceable rights of Sunchamp, and the latter, in the interim, shall have usufruct over the
Resolution No. 826) directing the Senate's Committee on Accountability of Public Officials and
property, which is extendible.
Investigations to investigate, in aid of legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11
storey Makati City Hall II Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22storey Makati City Hall
Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during gaps and breaks in the
Building at the average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, and related anomalies purportedly
plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, and in reply to the media's request to respond to private
committed by former and local government officials.4
respondent's claim over the estate, he expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the
documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the
Petitioner alleged that at the October 8, 2014 Senate Blue Ribbon SubCommittee (SBRS) hearing on P.S.
actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.10
Resolution No. 826, former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped
former Vice President Jejomar Binay (VP Binay) acquire and expand what is now a 350hectare estate in
On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages 11 against petitioner, docketed as
Barangay Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to as the Hacienda Binay, about 150 hectares of
Civil Case No. RQZN1410666CV, for the latter's alleged defamatory statements before the media
which have already been developed, with paved roads, manicured lawns, a mansion with resortstyle
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Claiming that petitioner's statements besmirched his reputation, and caused him sleepless nights, wounded from October 8 to 14, 2014, specifically his repeated accusations that private respondent is a mere
feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and social humiliation, private respondent sought to recover P4 "dummy" of VP Binay.
Million as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the amount of
P500,000.00. Private respondent alleged that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in various businesses primarily in
the agricultural sector, and that he has substantial shareholdings, whether in his own name or through his
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,13 petitioner raised the following Special and Affirmative Defenses: holding companies, in numerous corporations and companies, globally, some of which are publicly listed.
He averred that because of petitioner's defamatory statements, his reputation was severely tarnished as
First, petitioner averred that private respondent failed to state and substantiate his cause of action since shown by the steep drop in the stock prices of his publicly listed companies, AgriNurture, Inc.
petitioner's statement that private respondent was acting as a "front," "nominee" or "dummy" of VP Binay (AgriNurture), of which he is the Executive Chairman, and Greenergy Holdings, Inc. (Greenergy), of
for his Hacienda Binay is a statement of fact.14 which he is the Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer. To illustrate this, private respondent
alleged that on October 7, 2014, the price of a share of stock of Greenergy was P0.011 per share and the
Petitioner asserted that private respondent was unable to prove his alleged ownership of the subject estate, volume of trading was at 61 Million, while on October 8, 2014, the price dropped to P0.0099 per share
and that Mercado had testified that VP Binay is the actual and beneficial owner thereof, based on his (equivalent to a 10% reduction) and the volume of trading increased by more than seven times (at 475.7
personal knowledge and his participation in the consolidation of the property. Petitioner noted that the Million), with the price continuing to drop thereafter. Similarly, private respondent alleged that on
titles covering the estate are in the names of persons related to or identified with Binay. He argued that the October 8, 2014, AgriNurture experienced a six percent (6%) drop from its share price of October 7, 2014
onepage Agreement submitted by private respondent hardly inspires belief as it was unnotarized and (from P2.6 to P2.45) and an increase of more than six times in the volume of trading (from 68,000 to
lacked details expected in a legitimate document such as the technical description of the property, the 409,000), with the share price continuing to drop thereafter. According to private respondent, the unusual
certificates of title, tax declarations, the area of the property and its metes and bounds, schedule of drop in the share price and the drastic increase in trading could be attributed to the statements made by
payments, list of deliverables with their due dates, warranties and undertakings and closing date. He also petitioner, which caused the general public to doubt his capability as a businessman and to unload their
pointed out that while the total consideration for the Agreement was P446 Million, the downpayment was shares, to the detriment of private respondent who has substantial shareholdings therein through his
only P5 Million. With a yearly P30 Million revenue from the orchard, petitioner questioned why Gregorio holding companies.
would agree to part with his possession for a mere one percent (1%) of the total
consideration.15 Petitioner likewise disputed private respondent's supposed claim that Sunchamp had Denying that he is a "dummy," private respondent alleged that he possesses the requisite financial
introduced improvements in the estate amounting to P50 Million, stressing that it took over the estate only capacity to fund the development, operation and maintenance of the "Sunchamp AgriTourism Park." He
in July 2014 and that it did not own the property and probably never would given the agrarian reform averred that petitioner's accusations were defamatory, as they dishonored and discredited him, and
issues. Petitioner claimed that it was based on the foregoing and the report of his legal/legislative staff that malicious as they were intended to elicit bias and prejudice his reputation. He further averred that such
he made his statement that private respondent is a front, nominee or dummy of VP Binay. 16 statements were not absolutely privileged since they were not uttered in the discharge of petitioner's
functions as a Senator, or qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, 12 nor
Second, petitioner posited that his statements were part of an ongoing public debate on a matter of public constitutive of fair commentaries on matters of public interest. He added that petitioner's statement that he
concern, and private respondent, who had freely entered into and thrust himself to the forefront of said was willing to apologize if proven wrong, showed that he spoke without a reasonable degree of care and
debate, has acquired the status of a public figure or quasipublic figure. For these reasons, he argued that without regard to the gravity of his sweeping accusation.
his statements are protected by his constitutionally guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of
expression and of the press.17
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Whether true or false, the allegations in the complaint, would show that the same are sufficient to enable
the court to render judgment according to the prayer/s in the complaint. Third, petitioner contended that his statements, having been made in the course of the performance of his
duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987
SECOND ISSUE: The defendant's parliamentary immunity. Constitution.18
With the defense invoking the defendant's parliamentary immunity from suit, it claims that this Court has Petitioner added that he never mentioned private respondent's two companies in his interviews and it was
no jurisdiction over the instant case. Again, whether or not the courts have jurisdiction over the instant private respondent who brought them up. Petitioner pointed out that private respondent only had an eight
case is determined based on the allegations of the complaint. percent (8%) shareholding in one of said companies and no shareholding in the other, and that based on
the records of the Philippine Stock Exchange, the share prices of both companies had been on a
xxxx downward trend long before October 8, 2014. Petitioner described the Complaint as a mere media ploy,
noting that private respondent made no claim for actual damages despite the alleged price drop. This,
Subject to the presentation of evidence, the complaint alleged that the libelous or defamatory imputations according to petitioner, showed that private respondent could not substantiate his claim.20
(speech) committed by the defendant against the plaintiff were made not in Congress or in any committee
thereof. This parliamentary immunity, again, is subject to special circumstances which circumstances Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint and for the award of his Compulsory Counterclaims
must be established in a full blown trial. consisting of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.21
xxxx Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion (to Set Special and Affirmative Defenses for Preliminary
Hearing)22 on the strength of Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which allows the court to hold a
FOURTH. Whether or not a motion to dismiss was filed to prevent a preliminary hearing on the preliminary hearing on any of the grounds for dismissal provided in the same rule, as may have been
defendant's special and affirmative defenses. pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer.23
xxxx Private respondent opposed the motion on the grounds that the motion failed to comply with the
provisions of the Rules of Court on motions, and a preliminary hearing on petitioner's special and
Said 'answer with motion to dismiss' of the defendant did not contain any notice of hearing and was not affirmative defenses was prohibited as petitioner had filed a motion to dismiss.
actually heard. To the mind of the Court, the use of the phrase 'with motion to dismiss' highlights the
allegations of special and affirmative defenses which are grounds for a motion to dismiss. Thus, absent On May 19, 2015, public respondent issued the Order 24 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss premised
any motion to dismiss as contemplated by law, the preliminary hearing on the special and affirmative on the special and affirmative defenses in his Answer. The Order, in pertinent part, states:
defenses of the defendant may be conducted thereon. FIRST ISSUE: The Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
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Finally, he avers that because failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in public respondent's Order 25 dated December 16,
matter are determined solely by the allegations of the complaint, a preliminary hearing is unnecessary. 2015. Public respondent held that:
xxxx
The Court's Ruling
To reiterate the ruling in the assailed order, parliamentary immunity is subject to special circumstances
Hierarchy of courts should have been observed which must be established in a full blown trial.
In justifying his direct recourse to the Court, petitioner alleges that there is a clear threat to his In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that the defamatory statements were made in broadcast and print
parliamentary immunity as well as his rights to freedom of speech and freedom of expression, and he had media, not during a Senate hearing. Hence, between the allegations in the complaint and the affirmative
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could protect him from defenses in the answer, the issue on whether or not the alleged defamatory statements were made in
such threat. Petitioner argues that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an ironclad rule, and direct Congress or in any committee thereof arises. It would be then up to the Court to determine whether the
filing with the Court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed alleged defamatory statements are covered by parliamentary immunity after trial.
at the most immediate time. Petitioner asserts that the case encompasses an issue which would require an Petitioner subsequently filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, assailing public respondent's May 19,
interpretation of Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 2015 and December 16, 2015 Orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In ascribing grave abuse of discretion against public respondent, petitioner
The Court is not persuaded. reiterates the special and affirmative defenses in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, and asks that the
assailed Orders be nullified, reversed and set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the Complaint.
The power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is not exclusive to this Court.27 The
Court shares the jurisdiction over petitions for these extraordinary writs with the Court of Appeals and the In his Comment,26 private respondent points out that the petition violates the doctrine of hierarchy of
Regional Trial Courts.28 The hierarchy of courts serves as the general determinant of the appropriate courts. He contends that petitioner cannot invoke parliamentary immunity as his utterances were made in
forum for such petitions.29 The established policy is that "petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs various media interviews, beyond the scope of his official duties as Senator, and that the constitutional
against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the right to free speech can be raised only against the government, not against private individuals.
latter, with the Court of Appeals," and "[a] direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly Private respondent asserts that his Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as petitioner's
and specifically set out in the petition." 30 The parties, therefore, do not have an unfettered discretion in imputations, as alleged therein, were defamatory, malicious and made public, and the victim was clearly
selecting the forum to which their application will be directed. 31 identifiable. According to him, petitioner's claim that his imputations were statements of fact, covered by
his parliamentary immunity and not actionable under the doctrine of fair comment, are irrelevant as his
Adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts ensures that every level of the judiciary performs its motion to dismiss, based on failure to state a cause of action, hypothetically admitted the allegations in the
designated role in an effective and efficient manner. 32 This practical judicial policy is established to Complaint. At any rate, he argues that truth is not a defense in an action for defamation.
obviate "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction," and to prevent the congestion of the Court's docket. 33 The Court must Private respondent further contends that he is not a public figure as to apply the doctrine of fair comment,
remain as a court of last resort if it were to satisfactorily perform its duties under the Constitution. 34 and that it was petitioner who brought up his name, out of nowhere, at the October 8, 2014 SBRS hearing.
He asserts that contrary to petitioner's claim, the Courts, not the Senate, has jurisdiction over the case.
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The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, After all, trial courts are not limited to the determination of facts upon evaluation of the evidence
it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presented to them.35 They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the
presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. 36
general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of It is true that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an ironclad rule, and this Court has allowed a
Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, direct application to this Court for a writ of certiorari when there are genuine issues of constitutionality
the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged. (Emphasis ours.) that must be addressed at the most immediate time.37
Albeit rendered in reference to the 1935 constitutional grant of parliamentary immunity,
the Jimenez pronouncement on what constitutes privileged speech or debate in Congress still applies. The However, the issue of what parliamentary immunity encompasses, in relation to a lawmaker's speech or
same privilege of "speech or debate" was granted under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, with words spoken in debate in Congress, has been addressed as early as 1966 in the case of Nicanor T.
the latter Charters specifying that the immunity extended to lawmakers' speeches or debates in any Jimenez v. Bartolome Cabangbang,38 where the Court succinctly held:
committee of the legislature. This is clear from the "speech or debate" clauses in the parliamentary The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within
immunity provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions which respectively provide: the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein"that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Section 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of the Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
not be questioned in any other place.40 (Emphasis ours.) same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in
Section 9. A Member of the National Assembly shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions, and in going to and authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
returning from the same; but the National Assembly shall surrender the Member involved to the custody (Citations omitted and emphasis ours.)39
of the law within twentyfour hours after its adjournment for a recess or its next session, otherwise such In Jimenez, a civil action for damages was filed against a member of the House of Representatives for the
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. A Member shall not be questioned or held liable in any publication, in several newspapers of general circulation, of an open letter to the President which spoke of
other place for any speech or debate in the Assembly or in any committee thereof. 41 (Emphasis ours.) operational plans of some ambitious officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) involving a
"massive political buildup" of then Secretary of National Defense Jesus Vargas to prepare him to become
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not a presidential candidate, a coup d'etat, and a speech from General Arellano challenging Congress'
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No authority and integrity to rally members of the AFP behind him and to gain civilian support. The letter
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the alluded to the plaintiffs, who were members of the AFP, to be under the control of the unnamed
"planners," "probably belong(ing) to the VargasArellano clique," and possibly "unwitting tools" of the
Congress or in any committee thereof.42 (Emphasis ours.)
plans.
Clearly, settled jurisprudence provides sufficient standards and guidelines by which the trial and appellate
courts can address and resolve the issue of parliamentary immunity raised by petitioner. The Court is,
Holding that the open letter did not fall under the privilege of speech or debate under the Constitution, the
thus, unconvinced that petitioner has presented an "exceptionally compelling reason" 43 to justify his direct
Court declared:
application for a writ of certiorari with this Court.
276 of 669
in securing Government contracts, preparing socalled "news letters" to constituents, news releases, and
speeches delivered outside the Congress. The range of these related activities has grown over the Even assuming arguendo that direct recourse to this Court is permissible, the petition must still be
years. They are performed in part because they have come to be expected by constituents, and dismissed.
because they are a means of developing continuing support for future elections. Although these are
entirely legitimate activities, they are political in nature, rather than legislative, in the sense that term Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary speech or debate"
privilege
has been used by the Court in prior cases. But it has never been seriously contended that these political
matters, however appropriate, have the protection afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Careful
Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private respondent as former VP
examination of the decided cases reveals that the Court has regarded the protection as reaching only those
Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the socalled Hacienda Binay, in response to media
things "generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate. 44 With Jimenez as our
before it," Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, at 204, or things "said or done by him, as a representative, in the
guidepost, it is evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under
exercise of the functions of that office," Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 ( 1808).
Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part of any speech
delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in
xxxx
said fora. It cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge or
performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the
xxx In stating that those things "in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative process"
legislative process.
were not covered by the privilege, the Court did not in any sense imply as a corollary that everything that
"related" to the office of a Member was shielded by the Clause. Quite the contrary, in Johnson we held, The Speech or Debate Clause under the 1935 Constitution "was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, that only acts generally done in the course of the process of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States." 45 Such immunity has come to this country from the
enacting legislation were protected. practices of the Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. 46
xxxx The U.S. Supreme Court's disquisition in United States v. Brewster47 on the scope of the privilege is of
jurisprudential significance:
In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all con duct relating to the legislative Johnson thus stand as a unanimous holding that a Member of Congress may be prosecuted under a
process. In every case thus far before this Court, the Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to an criminal statute provided that the Government's case does not rely on legislative acts or the motivation for
act which was clearly a part of the legislative process the due functioning of the process. xxx legislative acts. A legislative act has consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in
relation to the business before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry only into those
xxxx things generally said or done in the House or the Senate in the performance of official duties and into the
motivation for those acts.
(c) We would not think it sound or wise, simply out of an abundance of caution to doubly insure
legislative independence, to extend the privilege beyond its intended scope, its literal language, and its It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many activities other than the purely
history, to include all things in any way related to the legislative process. Given such a sweeping reading, legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. These include a wide range of legitimate
we have no doubt that there are few activities in which a legislator engages that he would be unable "errands" performed for constituents, the making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance
277 of 669
Legislative acts are not allencompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. somehow to "relate" to the legislative process. Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be read
Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch, but no more
deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House than the statutes we apply, was its purpose to make Members of Congress supercitizens , immune
proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or from criminal responsibility. In its narrowest scope, the Clause is a very large, albeit essential, grant of
with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either privilege. It has enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity, but that was the
House. xxx (Emphasis ours.) conscious choice of the Framers.
It is, thus, clear that parliamentary nonaccountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's speech or
utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of xxxx
the (legislative) process."49 To participate in or respond to media interviews is not an official function of
any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. xxx.The authors of our Constitution were well aware of the history of both the need for the privilege and
Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate the abuses that could flow from too sweeping safeguards. In order to preserve other values, they wrote the
with the press. A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in privilege so that it tolerates and protects behavior on the part of Members not tolerated and protected
nature,"50 outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 when done by other citizens. but the shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the
Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary immunity to cause integrity of the legislative process. Moreover, unlike England, with no formal written constitutional
the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises not because the statement is made by limitations on the monarch, we defined limits on the coordinate branches, providing other checks to
a lawmaker, but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation. protect against abuses of the kind experienced in that country. (Emphasis ours.)
The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators and Congressmen into "super xxxx
citizens"51 whose spoken words or actions are rendered absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil In Gravel v. United States,48 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Senator's private publication of certain
action. The Constitution conferred the privilege on members of Congress "not for their private indulgence, classified documents (popularly known as the Pentagon Papers), which the latter had taken up at a Senate
but for the public good."52 It was intended to protect them against government pressure and intimidation subcommittee hearing and placed in the legislative record, did not constitute "protected speech or debate,"
aimed at influencing their decisionmaking prerogatives. 53 Such grant of legislative privilege must holding that it "was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate," and was "not part and parcel of
perforce be viewed according to its purpose and plain language. Indeed, the privilege of speech or debate, the legislative process." Explaining the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court
which may "(enable) reckless men to slander and even destroy others," 54 is not a cloak of unqualified declared:
impunity; its invocation must be "as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the But the Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere. That Senators generally perform
legislative department."55 As this Court emphasized in Pobre,56 "the parliamentary nonaccountability thus certain acts in their official capacity as Senators does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in
granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to nature. Members of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive Branch of the Government and
enable them, as the people's representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of with administrative agencies they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the administration of a federal
being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall." statute but such conduct, though generally done, is not protected legislative activity. xxx
Jurisdiction lies with the courts, not the Senate xxxx
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such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a Petitioner argues that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, and citing Pobre, asserts that the
preponderance of evidence. authority to discipline a member of Congress lies in the assembly or the voters and not the courts.
In fine, petitioner cannot successfully invoke parliamentary nonaccountability to insulate his statements, Petitioner's reliance on Pobre is misplaced. The statements questioned in said disbarment case were part
uttered outside the "sphere of legislative activity,"61 from judicial review. of a lawyerSenator's privilege speech delivered on the Senate floor professedly with a view to future
remedial legislation. By reason of the Senator's parliamentary immunity, the Court held that her speech
Preliminary hearing was not warranted was "not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court." The questioned
statements in this case, however, were admittedly made in response to queries from the media during gaps
Petitioner argues that a preliminary hearing on his special and affirmative defenses is necessary to allow in the Senate's plenary and committee hearings, thus, beyond the purview of privileged speech or debate
him to present evidence that will warrant the immediate dismissal of the Complaint. under Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution.
The Court is not persuaded. The Court held in Pobre:
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses may be functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed. Section 6, however, must be construed in the light falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
of Section 3 of the same Rule, which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly
deferment of such resolution on the ground of indubitability. Thus, Section 6 disallows a preliminary discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. (Citations omitted
hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed because such defenses should and emphasis ours.)57
have already been resolved.62 Clearly, the Court's pronouncement that the legislative body and the voters, not the courts, would serve as
the disciplinary authority to correct abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity, was
In this case, however, petitioner's motion to dismiss had not been resolved when petitioner moved for a premised on the questionable remarks being made in the performance of legislative functions, on the
preliminary hearing. As public respondent stated in the assailed May 19, 2015 Order, the motion did not legislative floor or committee rooms where the privilege of speech or debate may be invoked. Necessarily,
contain a notice of hearing and was not actually heard. Even so, a preliminary hearing is not warranted. therefore, statements falling outside the privilege and giving rise to civil injury or criminal responsibility
will not foreclose judicial review.
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner averred that private respondent failed to state and
substantiate his cause of action, arguing that the statement he made before the media, in which he Furthermore, it is wellsettled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. 58 An
described private respondent as a "front" or "dummy" of former VP Binay for the so action for damages on account of defamatory statements not constituting protected or privileged "speech
called Hacienda Binay, was one of fact. or debate" is a controversy well within the courts' authority to settle. The Constitution vests upon the
courts the power and duty "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
By raising failure to state a cause of action as his defense, petitioner is regarded as having hypothetically and enforceable."59 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, conferred jurisdiction over actions for
admitted the allegations in the Complaint.63 damages upon either the RTC or the Municipal Trial Court, depending on the total amount claimed. 60 So
also, Article 33 of the Civil Code expressly provides that in cases of defamation, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party, and
279 of 669
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the The test of the sufficiency of the facts stated in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or
memory of one who is dead. not, admitting the facts so alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the plaintiff's prayer. 64 Inquiry is into the sufficiency not the veracity of the facts so alleged. 65 If the
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same should not be
be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable. 73 Any of the imputations dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be raised by the defendants. 66
covered by Article 353 is defamatory,74 and every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious.75
Accordingly, in determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action, only the
The Civil Code provides that moral damages include mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched statements in the complaint may properly be considered. 67 The court cannot take cognizance of external
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, and may be recovered facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine its existence. 68 For the court to do otherwise would be a
in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation, 76 while exemplary damages may be recovered procedural error and a denial of the plaintiff's right to due process.69
in addition to moral damages, by way of correction or example for the public good, as determined by the
court.77 As this Court, in Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al.70 instructs:
The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses as raised in the
Measured against the foregoing requisites and considerations, including the scope of parliamentary non answer under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court. It has been held, however, that such a hearing
accountability, private respondent's Complaint, on its face, sufficiently makes out a cause of action for is not necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action, and that it is, in
damages. fact, error for the court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine the existence of external facts
outside the complaint. The reception and the consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint
In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that petitioner gave statements during interviews by the
fails to state a cause of action, has been held to be improper and impermissible. Thus, in a preliminary
media, describing him as the "dummy" of former VP Binay in connection with the so
hearing on a motion to dismiss or on the affirmative defenses raised in an answer, the parties are allowed
called Hacienda Binay. Private respondent averred that such imputation, unprivileged as it was uttered to present evidence except when the motion is based on the ground of insufficiency of the statement of the
outside of petitioner's legislative functions, actually discredited him and tarnished his reputation as a cause of action which must be determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and no
legitimate businessman, and caused him sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental
other. Section 6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
anguish and social humiliation. The statements, presumed to be malicious and so described by private
action. The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection with this ground.
respondent, were also alleged to have been made public through broadcast and print media, and identified
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours.)
private respondent as their subject. Hypothetically admitting these allegations as true, as is required in
Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action
determining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, private respondent may be granted his
claim.78
Private respondent filed his Complaint for moral and exemplary damages pursuant to Article 33 of the
Civil Code71 which authorizes an injured party to file a civil action for damages, separate and distinct from
The Complaint, therefore, cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. As the
the criminal action, in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries.
RTC held, whether true or false, the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to enable the court to
render judgment according to private respondent's prayer.
As defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, a libel 72 is a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
Defense of lack of cause of action requires a fullblown trial
280 of 669
to "substantiate" his cause of action, petitioner effectively questioned its existence, and would have the
trial court inquire into the veracity and probative value of private respondent's submissions. In moving for the outright dismissal of the Complaint, petitioner averred that private respondent failed to
prove his alleged ownership of the subject estate. To establish this, petitioner pointed to Mercado's
Distinguished from failure to state a cause of action, which refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in testimony that former VP Binay is the actual and beneficial owner thereof, the certificates of title covering
the pleading, lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the the estate purportedly in the names of persons related to or identified with former VP Binay, and the one
action.79 Petitioner, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, clearly impugned the sufficiency of private page Agreement between Sunchamp and Gregorio which, according to petitioner, hardly inspires belief
respondent's basis for filing his action for damages. because it was not notarized and lacked details expected in a legitimate document, and because the
transaction, which required Gregorio to give up possession, entailed a measly downpayment of P5
Section 6, Rule 16 allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses pleaded in the Million, out of the P446 Million total consideration, for an estate with a yearly P30 Million revenue from
answer based on grounds for dismissal under the same rule. 80 The ground of "lack of cause of action," its orchard.
however, is not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, hence, not proper for resolution
during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6 thereof. 81 For these reasons, petitioner asserted that when he remarked before the media that private respondent was
acting as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy," he was simply making a statement of fact which he had
Furthermore, Aquino teaches that the existence of a cause of action "goes into the very crux of the based on documents, reports and information available to him, and which was never intended to be an
controversy and is a matter of evidence for resolution after a fullblown hearing." An affirmative defense, insult or a derogatory imputation.
raising the ground that there is no cause of action as against the defendant, poses a question of fact that
should be resolved after the conduct of the trial on the merits.82 Petitioner also argued that because private respondent had thrust himself into the public debate on the so
called Hacienda Binay, he should be deemed a "public figure" and the questioned statements
Indeed, petitioner, in asking for the outright dismissal of the Complaint, has raised evidentiary matters and consequently qualify for the constitutional protection of freedom of expression.
factual issues which this Court cannot address or resolve, let alone at the first instance. The proof thereon
cannot be received in certiorari proceedings before the Court, but should be established in the RTC.83 Private respondent, however, has notably denied being a "dummy," and rebuffed petitioner's claim that he
had thrust himself into the public debate, alleging that it was petitioner who brought up his name, out of
Thus, even granting that the petition for certiorari might be directly filed with this Court, its dismissal nowhere, at the October 8, 2014 SBRS hearing.
must perforce follow because its consideration and resolution would inevitably require the consideration
and evaluation of evidentiary matters. The Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot accept the petition Petitioner's Answer likewise repudiated private respondent's claim that the questioned statements had
for certiorari for that reason.84 brought about a steep drop in the share prices of two listed companies he was managing, to the detriment
of his substantial shareholdings therein. Petitioner countered that said prices had been on a downward
All told, for its procedural infirmity and lack of merit, the petition must be dismissed. trend long before he uttered the questioned statements; that he never mentioned said companies in his
interviews; and that far from substantial, private respondent only had an 8% stake in one of the companies
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Public respondent's Orders dated May 19, 2015 and and none in the other.
December 16, 2015 in Civil Case No. RQZN1410666CV are affirmed insofar as they are consistent
with this decision. A perusal of petitioner's defenses and arguments, as above outlined, at once reveals that the averments
were grounded on lack of cause of action. In fact, by pleading in his Answer that private respondent failed
281 of 669
SO ORDERED.
282 of 669
jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.—The doctrine of G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011
primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled: x x x It may occur that the Court
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N.
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also
PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Petitioners,
judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
vs.
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE
intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
ENRILE, Respondents.
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of
the court. x x x The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are
within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to Remedial Law; Actions; Parties; Test to Determine if a Party is an Indispensable Party.—The test
resolve. to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows: An indispensable party is a party who has
Same; Same; Same; The Court therefore is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence,
the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers.—It has been held that “the without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting
and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly
by the principle of separation of powers.” The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a
issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court
contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in
Same; Same; Due Process; The referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate an action before it may properly go forward. A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his
Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it
process.—Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between
investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief
that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the
Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar’s right to action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will
due process. avoid multiple litigation.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
apply to this case; the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and
283 of 669
Cayetano (petitioners). Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from Same; Same; Same; The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is
conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal the observance of quorum, voting and publication when required.—The Constitutional right of the Senate
(Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. The only
the alleged double insertion of ₱200 million for the C5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and
Appropriations Act.
publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere
with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
The Antecedents
Same; Same; Same; Internal rules of the House or Senate need not be published unless such rules
On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.—The Constitution does not require
"Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"2 In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect
congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the ₱200 million only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such
appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.
Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including RightofWay (ROW), and another ₱200 million Same; Same; Same; The Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules
appropriated for the extension of C5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C5 is what was must be published before the Rules can take effect.—In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate
formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect.
stretch – from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate
DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority
congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to of the members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the
the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
publication requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent
cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706,3 the full text of which reads:
already been published in the Official Gazette.
WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly "advocated" (sic) the construction of the C5
Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking Sucat Road in Parañaque City to the South Luzon CARPIO, J.:
Expressway;
The Case
WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of ₱200 million for the C5 Road
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition 1 with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
Extension project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act;
and/or temporary restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Manuel
B. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter S.
284 of 669
WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President has betrayed the trust of the people, WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that the double insertion for
and by doing so has shamed the Philippine Senate; the C5 Road Extension Project was made by the Senate President;
WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to reclaim the people’s trust and WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg;
confidence and show that the illegal conduct of any of its member, even of its leaders, shall not go
unpunished; WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, from the time he was
member of the House of Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the realignment of
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE the C5 Road Extension project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City
ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT and Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Piñas would be financially benefited by the
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC construction of the new road;
OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C5 ROAD EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS
THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, through his corporations,
RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS negotiated the sale of his properties as roads right of way to the government, the same properties affected
REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT by the projects he proposed;
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President caused the sale of his
Adopted, landholdings to government as a grossly overpriced cost prejudicial to other lot owners in the area, the
government, and the Filipino people;
(Sgd.)
M.A. MADRIGAL4 WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, in the overpriced sale of
another property, used his power and influence to extort from the original landowner the profit made from
On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics the overprice by the Villar owned corporations;
Committee) which at that time was composed of the following members:
WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the Constitution, the AntiGraft
Sen. Pia S. Cayetano Chairperson and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers;
Sen. Loren Legarda Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in order to serve his personal
interests thereby sacrificing the people’s welfare;
Sen. Joker Arroyo Member
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application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular, Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano Member
petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11
amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate Sen. Miriam DefensorSantiago Member
Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14 May 2009, Senator
Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of Sen. Gregorio Honasan Member
the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On
Sen. Panfilo Lacson Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon
18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all Senators
to come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent
On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President. The
declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary
Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators
conference was set on 26 May 2009.
Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16
December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:
the Ethics Committee.5 After consultation with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed
1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee. 6 On 26 January
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s constitutional right to equal protection; 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics
Committee.7 Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their
2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minority’s
by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the decision on the matter is final. 8 Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on
majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. 9
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3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate 2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to equal protection;
3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on the
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;
Whole is a violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement
under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and 4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity. 5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the doctrine or
primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
The Ruling of this Court
6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior;
Indispensable Party
7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which exclusively
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: pertains to Congress;
SEC. 7 – Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final 8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of
determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. discretion; [and]
The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows: 9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted[,] allow the adoption
of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.14
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has The Issues
not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a
final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition The issues for the Court’s resolution are the following:
that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been
considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination 1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in
between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an this petition;
indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior
resort;
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administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is
the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x 18
separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously
affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and those already parties to the
their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. 19 person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation. 15
As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole
power assigned to it by the sovereign people." Thus, it has been held that "the power of judicial review is
20
which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal’s interest. The nature of Senator Madrigal’s
not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her
in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation participation.1awphi1
of powers." The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere
21
invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for the determination of
Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by
courts of justice."16 Citing Pimentel v. HRET,17 respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners
to the Senate Committee on the Whole should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial branches of the government.
Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the Senate Committee of the
Whole violates his constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled:
the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against
Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that
recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body. the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
We do not agree with petitioners. technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
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Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the Court notes
by a majority of the members of the Senate. that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics Committee
was also reorganized. Senator Lacson, who first called the Senate’s attention to the alleged irregularities
Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee committed by Senator Villar, was elected as Chairperson. On 16 December 2008, when Senator Lacson
inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee, Senator
by the Senate Committee of the Whole Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee.
On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the
representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel informed him that it is the stand of the
Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process.
Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel promised to
convene a caucus to determine if the Minority’s decision on the matter is final but the records did not
We do not agree.
show that a caucus was convened.
Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate
accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. It was because of the
Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the
accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case that Senator
Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process.
Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate acting as a
Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against,
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
and five abstentions.
affirmed by this Court. Thus:
The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges,
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine the
safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive
rules of its proceedings."
jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges." 22 However, in this case, the refusal of the
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this an investigation about one of its members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction
power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics
Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor
x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
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state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his
to sufficiently put public on notice. constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to
alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the publication.23
next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity. The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum,
voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the
rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the Prior Publication
publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective. 26 (Emphasis Petitioners assail the nonpublication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent
supplied) counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the
Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.
In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., the Court 27
Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the
further clarified: Senate Committee of the Whole.
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of The Court explained in the Resolution25 denying the motion for reconsideration:
the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need
not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
effect. accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
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However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate
constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, 35
since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members.
there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81,
Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:
requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in
case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a
will of course prevail. newspaper of general circulation.29
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the
Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the
Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate approved the Rules
SO ORDERED. of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which they adopted should be
considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just
because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette. To
reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules
can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if
the rights of its own members are affected.
Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole 30 is an
exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges31 which states that the Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary to the
fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate. In addition, Section
5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole 32 is an exact reproduction of Section
5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges 33 which states that only two
members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to respondent’s allegation in its
Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a quorum. 34
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official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the G. R. No. 175352 January 18, 2011
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is not governmentowned but
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, Intervenor.
privately owned.—The PNRC is not governmentowned but privately owned. The vast majority of the
thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter,
those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC
for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon Special Proceedings; Quo Warranto; Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can as the proper party plaintiff; An individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the
be members of the PNRC. public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. —Quo
warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.: Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be
entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own
This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration 1 filed on August 10, 2009 by
name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show
respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009
that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the
(the Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration 2 filed on August 27, 2009 by movantintervenor
present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latter’s Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached
have no standing to file the present petition.
Position Paper3 filed on December 23, 2009.
In the Decision,4 the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC); Public Officers; Constitutional Law; The
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch
office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; Not being a
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC
5
government official or employee, the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not
Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC hold a government office or employment.—The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC.
should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman.
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation." 6 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment
follows: does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an
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2. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95, AS AMENDED WAS NEVER AN WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
ISSUE IN THIS CASE. government office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a),
B. THE CURRENT CHARTER OF PNRC IS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1264 AND NOT 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1264 WAS NOT A CREATION OF 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
CONGRESS. private corporation or grant it corporate powers.7
with the position taken by the PNRC in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated August 27, 2009; and Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a nonissue; therefore, it was unnecessary for the
(2) as of the writing of said Comment and Manifestation, there was pending before the Congress of the Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel v. Garcia, 9 wherein the Court said that it "will
Philippines a proposed bill entitled "An Act Recognizing the PNRC as an Independent, Autonomous, not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be
NonGovernmental Organization Auxiliary to the Authorities of the Republic of the Philippines in the disposed of on some other ground" and goes on to claim that since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of
Humanitarian Field, to be Known as The Philippine Red Cross."11 the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there was no need for it to delve
into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be deemed obiter.
After a thorough study of the arguments and points raised by the respondent as well as those of movant
intervenor in their respective motions, we have reconsidered our pronouncements in our Decision dated In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court sustain the constitutionality of its
July 15, 2009 with regard to the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the Charter on the following grounds:
PNRC Charter, R.A. No. 95, as amended.
A. THE ASSAILED DECISION DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95 AS
As correctly pointed out in respondent’s Motion, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not AMENDED DEPRIVED INTERVENOR PNRC OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not PROCESS.
the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of
constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,12 thus: 1. INTERVENOR PNRC WAS NEVER A PARTY TO THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY.
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established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well
viability. established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate unavoidable.13
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A.
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the
Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure, upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely
but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was
international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
The PNRC succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross which was in existence in the Philippines
since 1917. It was created by an Act of Congress after the Republic of the Philippines became an Its existence as a chartered corporation remained unchallenged on ground of unconstitutionality
independent nation on July 6, 1946 and proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Convention notwithstanding that R.A. No. 95 was enacted on March 22, 1947 during the effectivity of the 1935
of Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in Constitution, which provided for a proscription against the creation of private corporations by special law,
the Field (the "Geneva Red Cross Convention"). By that action the Philippines indicated its desire to to wit:
participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the
Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose and like other volunteer organizations established in SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
other countries which have ratified the Geneva Conventions, to promote the health and welfare of the regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned and controlled by the Government
people in peace and in war. 14
or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. (Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution.)
The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373, and further amended by P.D. Similar provisions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution and Article XII, Section
Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the historical background and legal basis of the creation of the PNRC by 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The latter reads:
legislative fiat, as a voluntary organization impressed with public interest. Pertinently R.A. No. 95, as
amended by P.D. 1264, provides: SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Governmentowned or controlled corporations may be created or
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Section 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the WHEREAS, during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22 August 1894, the nations of the world
voluntary organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the unanimously agreed to diminish within their power the evils inherent in war;
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a
national Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the Geneva
Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armed Forces in the Field and at Sea, The Prisoners of War, and The Civilian Population in Time of War
The significant public service rendered by the PNRC can be gleaned from Section 3 of its Charter, which referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Conventions;
provides:
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946, and
Section 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as follows: proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Geneva Conventions of 1929, and by the action,
indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war
(a) To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armed forces in time of war, in accordance with and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as contemplated by the
the spirit of and under the conditions prescribed by the Geneva Conventions to which the Republic of the Geneva Conventions;
Philippines proclaimed its adherence;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a chapter of the American National Red Cross
(b) For the purposes mentioned in the preceding subsection, to perform all duties devolving upon the which was terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and
Corporation as a result of the adherence of the Republic of the Philippines to the said Convention;
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in other countries which have ratified or adhered to
(c) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the authorities of the armed forces as a the Geneva Conventions assist in promoting the health and welfare of their people in peace and in war,
medium of communication between people of the Republic of the Philippines and their Armed Forces, in and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their international organizations
time of peace and in time of war, and to act in such matters between similar national societies of other promote better understanding and sympathy among the people of the world;
governments and the Governments and people and the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Philippines;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
(d) To establish and maintain a system of national and international relief in time of peace and in time of powers vested in me by the Constitution as CommanderinChief of all the Armed Forces of the
war and apply the same in meeting and emergency needs caused by typhoons, flood, fires, earthquakes, Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1
and other natural disasters and to devise and carry on measures for minimizing the suffering caused by dated September 22, 1972, do hereby decree and order that Republic Act No. 95, Charter of the Philippine
such disasters; National Red Cross (PNRC) as amended by Republic Acts No. 855 and 6373, be further amended as
follows:
(e) To devise and promote such other services in time of peace and in time of war as may be found
desirable in improving the health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people;
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The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies (RCS) Position (f) To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or resident of the Philippines a member of the Red
Paper, submitted by the PNRC, is instructive with regard to the elements of the specific nature of the
17
Cross.
National Societies such as the PNRC, to wit:
The PNRC is one of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which, together with the
National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its sister Red Cross and Red Crescent International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the IFRC and RCS, make up the International Red
Societies, have certain specificities deriving from the 1949 Geneva Convention and the Statutes of the Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement). They constitute a worldwide humanitarian
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement). They are also guided by the seven movement, whose mission is:
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Humanity, Impartiality,
Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality. [T]o prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life and health and ensure
respect for the human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other emergencies, to work for
A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected component of the Red Cross the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary
movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, especially in times of armed conflict. service and a constant readiness to give help by the members of the Movement, and a universal sense of
These provisions require that the staff of a National Society shall be respected and protected in all solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and assistance. 15
circumstances. Such protection is not ordinarily afforded by an international treaty to ordinary private
entities or even nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). This sui generis character is also emphasized by The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in humanitarian activities in the
the Fourth Geneva Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot require any change in the Philippines since 1982. Among others, these activities in the country include:
personnel or structure of a National Society. National societies are therefore organizations that are
directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, 1. Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or otherwise affected by armed clashes between
including NGOs. the government and armed opposition groups, primarily in Mindanao;
x x x x 2. Working to minimize the effects of armed hostilities and violence on the population;
In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by their public authorities as voluntary 3. Visiting detainees; and
aid societies, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field, but also benefit from recognition
4. Promoting awareness of international humanitarian law in the public and private sectors. 16
at the International level. This is considered to be an element distinguishing National Societies from other
organisations (mainly NGOs) and other forms of humanitarian response.
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in
the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief and health and social
programmes.
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Furthermore, a strict and mechanical interpretation of Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution will x x x. No other organisation belongs to a worldwide Movement in which all Societies have equal status
hinder the State in adopting measures that will serve the public good or national interest. It should be and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other. This is considered to be the essence of
noted that a special law, R.A. No. 9520, the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and not the general the Fundamental Principle of Universality.
corporation code, vests corporate power and capacities upon cooperatives which are private corporations,
in order to implement the State’s avowed policy. Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be auxiliaries to the public authorities in the
humanitarian field. x x x.
In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public service rendered by the PNRC as the
government’s partner in the observance of its international commitments, to wit: The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private
institution and a public service organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation
The PNRC is a nonprofit, donorfunded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring with the authorities, a link with the State. In carrying out their major functions, Red Cross Societies
timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without give their humanitarian support to official bodies, in general having larger resources than the Societies,
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC working towards comparable ends in a given sector.
provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health
and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service. x x x No other organization has a duty to be its government’s humanitarian partner while remaining
independent.18 (Emphases ours.)
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a
voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929. x x It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and
x. (Citations omitted.)
20 effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.
So must this Court recognize too the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the
unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional
force and effect of law. 21 Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
of international law as part of the law of the land. 22 This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 19 explained that the purpose of the
former. constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations was to prevent the
granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other
By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the groups. Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that the PNRC Charter does not come within the
Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a particular individual,
as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the common good.
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Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all Conventions. Although the PNRC is called to be independent under its Fundamental Principles, it
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood interprets such independence as inclusive of its duty to be the government’s humanitarian partner. To be
requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core recognized in the International Committee, the PNRC must have an autonomous status, and carry out its
in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial manner.
on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the
Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary Service of National Societies of the
must therefore stay. Movement, the PNRC must be distinguished from private and profitmaking entities. It is the main
characteristic of National Societies that they "are not inspired by the desire for financial gain but by
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordon’s Motion for Clarification and/or for individual commitment and devotion to a humanitarian purpose freely chosen or accepted as part of the
Reconsideration and movantintervenor PNRC’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in service that National Societies through its volunteers and/or members render to the Community." 23
G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as amended,
the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither
have been passed upon by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis¸ being neither strictly "be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality" as well as its
private nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law
portion of the Decision should therefore be MODIFIED by deleting the second sentence, to now read as and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.24
follows:
Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently established.1âwphi1 Although
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a governmentowned or
government office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009,
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman
thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the
SO ORDERED. PNRC is a "private corporation" within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must
be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a casetocase
basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a
sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
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hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
brought the test and measure of the law.” (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
Constitutional Law; House Electoral Tribunal; Nature of functions.—The use of the word “sole”
vs.
in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL.
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election,
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
function as a nonpartisan court although twothirds of its members are politicians. It is a nonpolitical
body in a sea of politicians x x x To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Political Law; Separation of powers; Judicial review of acts of the other branches of government.—Since
Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to “a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided For as to what
be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts
Same; Same; Grounds for removal; Disloyalty to party not a valid cause for termination of to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law The
membership.—As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their question thus posed is Judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence—even independence from the Constitution is upheld” (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196). That duty is a part of the judicial
political party to which they belong. Hence, “disloyalty to party” and “breach of party discipline,” are not power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. ln expelling Congressman Camasura from the the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts to settle actual
HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Same; Same; Same.—The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions
of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to
Same; Same; Same; Same.—Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk “the irksome task”
of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure, Members of the of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable
HRET, as “sole judge” of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such
members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 198? action, as in this case. lt is—"a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable
Constitution). Therefore; membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a them to administer justice according to law. x x x It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to
just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent
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the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government disability, resignation fromthe political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise political party, or removal forother valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, Representatives for “party disloyalty” short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political
limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid
to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 196).
GRIOAQUIÑO, J.:p
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of
political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the
the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
(1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the
Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as
Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the
"an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought
before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is — In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too
willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrichlike in
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice
the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter
according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or
involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination
controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure
by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance.
of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of
its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or
executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in
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Supreme Court candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each
received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
HONORATO Y. AQUINO
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Congressman
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
1st District
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
Benguet LDP
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON
(HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of
Congressman nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of
the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
1st District Palawan and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
LDP
Associate Justice
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Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," LDP
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case
but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self respect," and to honor a JOSE E. CALINGASAN
"gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the
appreciation of the contested ballot1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP Congressman
which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the proBondoc majority in the
4th District Batangas
Tribunal.
LDP
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30
P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991. ANTONIO H. CERILLES
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco Congressman
informed Congressman Camasura by letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur
Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 0391 had already expelled him and Congressman
2nd District Zamboanga del Sur
Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
(formerly GAD, now NP)
"Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said
political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a
complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991,
the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3 After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's
protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two
congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty
it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite. 4 three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount
of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. decision in the case.
Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the The reexamination and reappreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to
House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
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its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.
overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the partylitigant which would have been defeated. The letter reads as follows:
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor 13 March 1991
of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested reappreciation of some ballots,
the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months. Honorable Justice Ameurfina MelencioHerrera Chairman
With the reappreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City
Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. MelencioHerrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P.
Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 Dear Honorable Justice MelencioHerrera:
March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives
Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP
which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party. communication which is selfexplanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue Thank you.
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In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the in the Tribunal.
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating
Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the
decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving
and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of nonjudicial elements playing a
decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justicesmembers of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that
this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership
electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective
in the Tribunal. political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a member There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
of the Tribunal. promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also recess.
manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.
Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all membership in the Tribunal.
contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members
of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases x x x x x x x x x
before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the memberslegislators, thereof, upon
assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the 0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co
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3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and
Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of
comment on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and
5
nonjudicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which
allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and
replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the
issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as legislature, is coextensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but
member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justicesmembers of the Tribunal to submit the issue to
ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.) the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition. Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be
allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being will take place.' MelencioHerrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political
parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A.
Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or
whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal 6
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
member's term of office is not coextensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who
7
changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating 1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination
representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; and that the expulsion of
8
and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives
Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind
9
Electoral Tribunal;"
his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the HouseofRepresentative
Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10 2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of
respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
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Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides: In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause
of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which HRET.11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in
members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the HRET.12
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he
assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had
members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by
constitutional provision reads as follows: cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence,
although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge,
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."15
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was
upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had
largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapers of
935 Constitution of the Philippines.) general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman
Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.16
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political
party to control the voting in the tribunal. Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the
disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa. representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
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limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles
x x x x x x x x x vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was
created to function as a nonpartisan court although twothirds of its members are politicians. It is a non
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission
relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:
with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the
139.) legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification
following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
Constitutional Commission, attest: in the legislature.
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you. The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals
to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own
of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief
distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement. jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature
nor with the Courts.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.? The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a
power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
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Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals
are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are
independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals? MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the
Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice ConcepcionCommissioner Concepcionthat there present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are
seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has
tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from
an political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of
detachment when there are six politicians sitting there. government.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to
sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust leave unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of
that the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, their members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular
Emphasis supplied.) controversy.
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. — Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because
apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice
that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
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the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House
proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's
that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal
from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
tenure.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP)
not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the
latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —
of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with
judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which
Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor
they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the SecretaryGeneral of the party how he voted in the committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —
for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the
LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and,
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in
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said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the
immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda. strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for
relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of
SO ORDERED. discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the
Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his
rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the
Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself"
(Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. PonceEnrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor,
the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election
contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13,
1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio
Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab
initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered
reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET
Resolution No. 910018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case
No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable
delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral
cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the
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Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Jurisdiction; The petitioner cannot be considered a G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013
Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office; The term of
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
vs.
following their election.” Thus, until such time, the Commission on Elections retains jurisdiction.―Here,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has
not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House
Election Law; House of Representative; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus,
Jurisdiction; As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the House of Representatives
until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. In her attempt to comply with the second
Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of
requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5
Representatives.―As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the HRET does not have
June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of
jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit: As to the
Representatives. Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members.—Members shall take their oath or affirmation either
petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the
collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session. Consequently, before there is a valid or
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2)
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not
in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of
jurisdiction over the question.
office was indeed complied with. More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy
Same; Same; To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
— that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
concurrence of the following requisites:(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution
office.―It is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We will
office. Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been
inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted
made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to
of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision.
elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be
The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a
noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate
decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.
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the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone Same; COMELEC Rules of Procedure; Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
district of Marinduque. Procedure “shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.”―It must
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality
be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in
of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to
the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure “shall be
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material
liberally construed in order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I.
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.” In view of the fact that the
Mandanas of Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also
then the “newly discovered evidence” was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional
Spouses of the House of Representatives; 2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960; 3 (4) that she is not a permanent resident of but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant of the United States of America; and
4 5 pleadings.―In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen. 6
the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC, 688 SCRA 552 (2013):
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage between them. and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code,
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
rendering it void ab initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not dutybound to live with
Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her. 8 As to her date of birth, the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. 9 Lastly,
petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of
PEREZ, J.:
America is not supported by evidence.10
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a "Manifestation with Motion
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina
to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits" 11 consisting of, among others: (1) a
Ongsiako Reyes, assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public
copy of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13053. The assailed Resolutions ordered
about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document executed by its
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the Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating
origin, which is Boac, Marinduque. that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records
of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau
On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution 15 denying petitioner’s Motion for of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 12 cancelling petitioner’s COC, to
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections. wit:
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen and that she has not
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.
that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an American citizen in concluding
that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted
32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225.
of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newlydiscovered evidence" without
Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary
the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence which became the basis for its
Public on 24 September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the oneyear residency requirement prescribed by
Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law.
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First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over 33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency
averred that she has filed such action. requirement for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House 34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed
additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. x x x The petition must fail.
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC visavis that of House
member of the House of Representatives, to wit: of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a nonissue. Petitioner is taking an
inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is asserting that it
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her eligibility and
issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s qualifications to be a Member of the House of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt
of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final and executory judgment in SPA No. 13053.
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point
has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.) Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the issues raised by petitioner. The
need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives? when it was emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the House of Representatives begins on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
In VinzonsChato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the
Court ruled that: According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
(Emphasis supplied.) Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
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On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to Our attention This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 25 wherein the Court,
that on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC visavis the HRET, held that:
already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives of the
First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very same day, he had taken his oath before The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly. assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the House of (Emphasis supplied.)
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:
Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed office, and
hence, was already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case. After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of
his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns – were
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
election." Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
28 must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office
taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made,
confers membership to the House of Representatives. COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides: in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had
not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or affirmation either
collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session. For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET
against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker before the Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007, or
of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:
Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it
remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.
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Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of
discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May
Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we
evidence. accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was
proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which
Her contentions are incorrect. proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En
Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was promulgated on 27 March
"shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013,
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the became final and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, Procedure which provides:
then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in preproclamation cases and petitions to deny due
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate,
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s petition was and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from
filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
(5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory, petitioner
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 6430 of
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:31 the Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5day period, but she failed to do so.
She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her oneyear
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
316 of 669
passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen and has not lost on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
the same, or that she has reacquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside
from the bare allegation that she is a naturalborn citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC
support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to First Division, discoursed as follows:
her.
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual FilipinoAmerican citizen, thus the Republic of the Philippines before the ConsulGeneral of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2)
requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of
33 make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said
34 to administer an oath.
Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a
superfluity."35 We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If petitioner executed said In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on
Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of proof regarding her American citizenship,
Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed contending that it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has
Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012. become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Due to petitioner’s submission of newlydiscovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to
office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of natural use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously naturalborn Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of
passed upon by Respondent COMELEC."36 This statement raises a lot of questions – Did petitioner RA 9225 by becoming a dual FilipinoAmerican citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation
execute an oath of allegiance for reacquisition of naturalborn Filipino status? If she did, why did she not of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for
present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed and hold any elective public office in the Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)
lost her naturalborn Filipino status?
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US
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The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has met the oneyear residency requirement of the To coverup her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends
law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator
Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a naturalborn Filipino citizen.
not sufficient to prove her oneyear residency. For, petitioner has never regained her domicile in
Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA."37 (Emphasis supplied.) it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered
compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the Memorandum Circular No. AFF0401, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship
COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF05002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative
objective of determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in Mastura v. Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner’s oath of office as
COMELEC: 38
Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No.
9225.
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except
when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship.
applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level
higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her naturalborn status,
of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be considered a
of evidence.1âwphi1 resident of Marinduque:
Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which warrants this Court’s exercise "Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin.
of certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he chose to
Elections where the Court held:
39 establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be
counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already reacquired her Filipino
of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the Philippines.
of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in There being no proof that petitioner had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
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contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. (Emphasis supplied.)
Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives other
than those enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.
The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of Representatives
who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed by Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and
must have oneyear residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the COMELEC did not
err when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if
she reacquired her status as a naturalborn Filipino citizen. It simply applied the constitutional provision
and nothing more.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
En Bane affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.
SO ORDERED.
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for mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the G.R. No. 211140
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
vs.
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” A
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN 1 B.
petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty,
BARUAYAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.
and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases; A petition for quo
warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office
Same; Same; Same; “Ministerial Act” and “Discretionary Act,” Distinguished.—The difference
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not wellfounded, or if he has forfeited his right
between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely ministerial act or duty is
to enjoy the privilege.—A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not
the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
wellfounded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
the undisturbed possession of the office. In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the
judgment.
COMELEC in SPA No. 13053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and
executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13010 declaring null and void the proclamation of
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the
In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party is the son of a sitting
determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely
Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought to be done as dictated by law and justice
solely for that reason. the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so
will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, by
Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte, Same; Same; Mandamus; A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. BaruaYap (Sec. Gen. BaruaYap ), Secretary thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
General, House of Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone person, and that the petitioner has a welldefined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.—
District of the Province of Marinduque . Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition
320 of 669
resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections in
civil status is single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to." The case
5
accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this]
was docketed as SPA No. 13053 (DC), entitled "Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Honorable Court;"2 thus, he seeks the following reliefs:
Reyes."
a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR. be issued
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's COC was ordering said respondent to administer the proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco
accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads: for the position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; and allow petitioner to assume the
position of representative for Marinduque and exercise the powers and prerogatives of said position of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate Marinduque representative;
of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED. 6
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:
A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque,
through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013. On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the Municipality
of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition 4 to deny due
Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May 16, 2013.
course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate for the position of
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque
Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that she is a resident of Brgy.
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections
Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent
for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
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On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing Reyes's On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of
petition, viz.: Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13028, entitled "Lord Allan
Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
IN VIEW OF THE∙ FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against Reyes in the
COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13027, entitled "Christopher P Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako
upheld. 10
Reyes."
[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate EXECUTION of this On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR. No. 207264,
Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the
PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local Elections.12 March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division cancelling her . Certificate of Candidacy (for
material misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.
At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started discharging the functions
of a Member of the House of Representatives. In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC docketed
as SPC No. 13010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old Members of the
On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako
COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void Reyes," assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void.
and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes. The dispositive part reads:
On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC No. 13010.
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Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Marinduque in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Further, Director Ester VillaflorRoxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial Board of Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is
Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay Q. declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q.
Velasco in the 2013 National and Local Elections. VELASCO is hereby proclaimed the winning candidate for the position of representative in the House
of Representatives for the province of Marinduque.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy of the Certificate
of Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the House of Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.
Representatives. 14
On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i) granting Tan's
On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein petitioner Velasco as the motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii) directing the reconstitution of a new
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque with 48,396 PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected
votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts. 15
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which states:
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion. Accordingly, a
session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of new composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque is hereby constituted to be
Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open composed of the following:
session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz Chairman
On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition "without waiver of
her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be articulated in the HRET which is now the 2. Atty. Abigail Justine CuaresmaLilagan Vice Chairman
proper forum." 16
3. Dir. Ester VillaflorRoxas Member
On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration 17 (of this Court's June 25, 2013 Resolution
in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, viz.: 4. Three (3) Support Staffs
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the convening of the New
Entry of Judgment is ordered.18 Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the
COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY
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On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. reiterating the above On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for
mentioned request but to no avail. Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.
On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. BaruaYap reiterating his earlier requests On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for reconsideration and was denied by
(July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and register his name in her this Court.
place as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes essentially
However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and requests demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque and to
to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. BaruaYap, they refused to recognize him as the duly elected relinquish the same in his favor.
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands
for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among others, that he
continues to discharge the duties of said position. be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution
injunction anchored on the following issues: filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:
A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to implement and enforce the
of Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of petitioner as duly elected Marinduque Representative and May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13053, the July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13010 and the July
allow him to assume said position and exercise the prerogatives of said office. 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as Representative of
Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certified true copy of the writ of execution be personally served
B. Whether or not respondent SG BarnaYap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a and delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano Belmonte for the latter's implementation
Writ of Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members of the House and and enforcement of the aforementioned May 14, 2013 Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the
include the name of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation issued by the Special Board of Canvassers of the Honorable
Commission.19
C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of PERMANENT.
INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit respondent Reyes from exercising the the COMELEC issued an Order20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all copies of its
prerogatives and performing the functions as Marinduque Representative, and to order her to VACATE Resolutions in SPA No. 13053 (DC) and SPC No. 13010, the Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013,
the said office. 21
the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and
furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.
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Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a welldefined and clear legal right and
name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus." 22 He insists that the final and executory decisions of
petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases. 28 the COMELEC in SPA No. 13053 (DC), and this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification
of respondent Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly elected Representative of
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to claim the congressional seat.
Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition
for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. "to administer the
absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. " She argues that numerous jurisprudence have
29
oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the congressional seat for
already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive Marinduque representative;"23 and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. BaruaYap "to register [his] name xx x as
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House the duly elected member of the House and delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll ofM
of Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically embers." 24 Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,25 citing a statement of this Court to
states that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the winning candidate, as, the effect that the Speaker of the House of Representatives has the ministerial duty to recognize the
in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction over quo warranto cases filed against Reyes by
30
petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
several individuals.
Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua
Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to annul [her] Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding
proclamation. " But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of argument that the
31
him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be declared the winner x x x" as he Marinduque.26
was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from
asserting the jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and unlawful holding of
Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014. such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in that she has
already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position of
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. BaruaYap, Marinduque Representative since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around several
opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds: hundreds of thousands of pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
a writ of permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to "restrain, prevent and prohibit [her] from
I. usurping the position."27
UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus
TO RESOLVE ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT REYES, INCLUDING THE given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the installation of
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Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013 Resolution, upholding the VALIDITY OF HER PROCLAMATION AND HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE
cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no compelling reason for the House to withdraw HRET.
its recognition of respondent Reyes as Marinduque Representative, in the absence∙ of any specific order or
directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the Honorable Court's disposition in Reyes v. Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest filed against
COMELEC that required any action from the House. Again, it bears emphasis that neither petitioner nor respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final and executory, respondent
respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. BarnaYap were parties in Reyes v. COMELEC. Reyes may not be restrained from exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and
respondent Sec. Gen. BaruaYap may not be compelled by mandamus to remove respondent Reyes :S
Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against respondent Reyes: name from the Roll of Members of the House.
(i) Case No. 13036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina II.
Ongsiako Reyes;
CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT PETITIONER,
(ii) Case No. 13037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes; BEING MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS, CANNOT
VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF MARINDUQUE REPRESENTATIVE.
(iii) Case No. 13027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes; and
Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. BaruaYap may not be compelled by mandamus to,
(iv) Case No. 13028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.33 respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner and register the latter's name in the Roll of
Members of the House.
And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:
III.
If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office of the winner, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then there would obviously be a clash of PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.32
jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011 HRET Rules provide that the
appropriate cases should be filed before it within 15 days from the date of proclamation of the winner. If, The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for this Court to revisit its
as the June 25, 2013 Resolution provides, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only after assumption of office, twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 both in GR. No. 207264, given that (i) this
at noon of June 30 following the election, then quo warranto petitions and election protests filed on or Court was "divided" when it issued the same; and (ii) there were strong dissents to the majority opinion. It
after said date would be dismissed outright by the HRET under its own rules for having been filed out of argues that this Court has in the past revisited decisions already final and executory; there is no hindrance
time, where the winners have already been proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up to for this Court to do the same in G.R. No. 207264.
June 14. 34
Moreover, the OSG contends that:
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Province of Marinduque." In addition, the petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to follow In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14, 2015 dismissing
the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264. HRET Case Nos. 13036 and 13037,35 the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes, to wit:
On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his PetitionInIntervention, pleads for the outright dismissal of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of Victor
the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part, Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is
respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception of hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are
evidence by the contending parties. hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.36
The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. No. 207264 is the
election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or authority of the Tribunal is COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution."37
echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal of a PetitionIn
Representatives." Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin petitions for quo warranto, for "lack of
merit." Further, the HRET directed "the hearing and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo
x x x x Warranto against x x x Respondent [Reyes] to proceed. "38 Sioco, however, moved for the reconsideration
of the said September 11, 2014 HR.ET Resolution based on the argument that the latter was contrary to
In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13053 (DC), had already resolved
that the COMELEC First Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that
citizenship and residency requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina
Reyes challenged the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 The Tribunals Jurisdiction
in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.
It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo
With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of her warranto, considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve the same visa
proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over the present vis the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray that "after due
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Regina Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives," as declared by the x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House
Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses: of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013. Without the x x x x
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office,
there can be no valid and effective assumption of office." As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a
member of the House of Representatives x x x.
The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme Court is "supreme in its task of adjudication; x x x x x x
x. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at
the Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all other courts, must take their bearings The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?
from the decisions and rulings of the Supreme Court.39
In VinzonsChato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court
Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1 77 (Usurpation of ruled that:
Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015, has been filed in
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
court,40 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. "41
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
The Issue contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.xx x
The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus to compel
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. BaruaYap to perform the specific acts sought by Velasco in this From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
petition. must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office x x x.
The Ruling
Based on the abovequoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first essential element
The petition has merit. before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House of Representatives over which the Tribunal
could assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes'
At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this petition to relitigate proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On
what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are reminded to respect the Entry of this ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions since
Judgment that has been issued therein on October 22, 2013.
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The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely ministerial After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this special civil
act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon respondents.
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not wellfounded, or if he has
official discretion or judgment.44 forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that
he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. BaruaY ap have no discretion of the office.42 In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of
whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13
Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final 053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the
and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions COMELEC in SPC No. 13010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming
of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province
a final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13010 declaring null and void the of Marinduque it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of
proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Velasco to the claimed office.
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and beyond disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo
dispute Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the Lone District of warranto.
the Province of Marinduque.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition
Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions regarding her election, performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
especially so that she has already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties as a other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A
Member of the House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty,
But the confluence of the three acts in this case her proclamation, oath and assumption of office has and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well
not altered the legal situation between Velasco and Reyes. defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.43
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Representatives in representation of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. The said The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the
proclamation has not been challenged or questioned by Reyes in any proceeding. Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when
Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her noneligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the
Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. in open session, Province of Marinduque for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the
Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation. election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC was
promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court's final and
Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in deciding this case will executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.
paradoxically alter the wellestablished legal milieu between her and Velasco.
This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC, the
Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve as a Member PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling
of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, and therefore, Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made
she HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as a partyrespondent at a quo that as early as May 16, 2013, a couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already received
warranto proceeding before the HRET. the said decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the much argued proclamation was
made in clear defiance of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution acknowledging and ruling
that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was That Velasco now has a welldefined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the present petition
based on the existence of a final and executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 that Reyes is not for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts that should be taken into consideration:
a bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To reiterate this
Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v. Commission on Elections45 First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the COMELEC En Banc in
its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the effectivity of which was not enjoined by this
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial Court, as Reyes did not avail of the prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining order within a period
question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, of five (5) days as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order
was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013? was forthcoming, the PBOC should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent Reyes's COC in its
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these Resolutions are already final and executory.
of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.
Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13010 cancelled respondent
x x x x Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of
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administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of "More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before the proclamation of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. BaruaYap. They are legally petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After
dutybound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications
Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x."
compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.
As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to argue on the basis of
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the House of her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we
Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative district and the here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY
SecretaryGeneral to enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of BASIS." (Emphasis supplied.)
Representatives. In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, the Court decreed:
46
Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a plain, speedy
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to any party, specially to Velasco,
for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the who should be the sitting Member of the House of Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or leadership of the latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the Supreme
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such Court
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes before the HRET had
a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13010.
the petitioner has a welldefined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the HRET' s December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's
welldefined, clear and certain right to the subject office.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. BaruaYap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In other
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of words, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration
official discretion or judgment. of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial
in character visavis the factual and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the
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therein nor argue that the doctrine of res judieata by conclusiveness of judgment applies to him and the In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members
public respondents, this Court maintains that such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along with public of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. BarnaYap, are all legally bound by this Court's discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner
judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC correctly cancelled Reyes' s COC for garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque on the elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on
ground that the latter was ineligible for the subject position due to her failure to prove her Filipino Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and
citizenship and the requisite oneyear residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been
have our dockets unnecessarily clogged with petitions to be filed in every direction by any and all challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
registered voters not a party to a case to question the final decision of this Court. Such restricted
interpretation of res judieata is intolerable for it will defeat this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 207264. To be In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte has been
sure, Velasco who was duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke the Court's final finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule
judgment that Reyes was ineligible for the subject position.47 of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land There is no alternative to the rule
of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated and take judicial
notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected to the subject position had already IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
been long affirmed by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such established ruling will be contrary to Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly
the Rule of Law and should not be countenanced. elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent SecretaryGeneral shall
likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after
In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13053 (DC) and SPC No. 13010, there is he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory. (Citations omitted.)
no longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through then Associate Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane Resolution dated May 14, 2013 in SPA No.
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,48 "[t]he rule of law demands that its Decision be 13053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No. 13053 (DC); (iii) COMELEC en
obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July
confusion." 10, 2013 in SPA No. 13053 (DC); and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16,
2013, Velasco is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque;
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. Feliciano R. hence, entitled to a writ of Mandamus.
Belmonte, Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath of office of petitioner Lord
Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the dulyelected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. BarnaYap
Marinduque. And public respondent Hon. Marilyn B. BaruaYap, Secretary General, House of are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the enforcement of the Decision rendered
332 of 669
Representatives, shall register the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This Decision shall
be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
333 of 669
but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and G.R. No. 219603
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel. To
MARY ELIZABETH TYDELGADO, Petitioner,
determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have been written or published with the
vs.
knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of whether it is false or not. Reckless disregard of what
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA
is false or not means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or
PICHAY, Respondents.
possesses a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity.
Same; Same; The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a
Election Law; Disqualifications of Candidates; Moral Turpitude; A sentence by final judgment for
daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.—The Revised Penal Code provides that: “Any
Election Code.—A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code: Sec. 12. Disqualifications.—Any person
by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a
the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.” The provision did
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or degree of the participation of the persons
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The
involved in the crime of libel. It is basic in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish,
disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
we should not distinguish. Accordingly, we cannot distinguish Pichay’s criminal liability from the others’
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
criminal liability only because he was the president of the company that published the libelous articles
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
instead of being their author. Pichay’s criminal liability was the same as that of the others, such that he
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to
was even meted the same penalty as that imposed on the author of the libelous articles. The crime of libel
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
would not even be consummated without his participation as publisher of the libelous articles. One who
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. Although not every criminal act involves moral
furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to
turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude
servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published what actually
while crimes mala prohibita do not.
appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether he was individually concerned in the
Criminal Law; Libel; To determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have
publication or not.
been written or published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of whether it is false
Same; Same; Moral Turpitude; Disqualification of Candidates; Having been convicted of the
or not.—To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a
crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person
a crime involving moral turpitude.—Contrary to Pichay’s argument, the imposition of a fine does not
defamed; and (d) existence of malice. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty
334 of 669
(2012), we held that if a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude or not. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections, 369
criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy SCRA 126 (2001), we held that a crime still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment
that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation imposed is reduced to a fine. In Tulfo v. People, 565 SCRA 283 (2008), we explained that a fine was
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility imposed on the accused since they were first time offenders. Having been convicted of the crime of libel,
in his certificate of candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that he was eligible for elective public office involving moral turpitude.
constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office. Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, the disqualification
Same; Same; Same; A person whose certificate of candidacy (CoC) had been denied due course shall be removed after the expiration of a period of five (5) years from his service of sentence.—Under
and/or cancelled under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is deemed to have not been a candidate
Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration of a period of five years from his
at all, because his CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and
service of sentence. In Teves v. Comelec, 587 SCRA 1 (2009), we held that the fiveyear period of
necessarily to valid votes.—A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or
cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate of disqualification would end only on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid
candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to the fine he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309 (2004). In this case, since
valid votes. In both Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 670 SCRA 572 (2012) and Aratea v. Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the fiveyear period shall end only
Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 105 (2012), we proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified
on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives
candidate who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor. We found that
since the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the highest number of votes was void ab initio, he until then. Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12, which became final
was never a candidate at all, and all his votes were considered stray votes. on 1 June 2009, Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; While it is wellrecognized that the House of certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay’s disqualification under Section
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole 12 is a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus
judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Election Code.
Representatives, the Supreme Court (SC) maintains jurisdiction over it to check “whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter. — Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Moral Turpitude; Misrepresentation; Pichay
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy (CoC) because he knew that he had been
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it is wellrecognized that the HRET has convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that he was
been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns,
eligible for elective public office constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or
and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over
it to check “whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of eligibility for the office.—Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate
jurisdiction” on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and of candidacy is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for
settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits grave abuse of discretion. the elective office. This is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 670 SCRA 572
335 of 669
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, and it was filed out of time. He CARPIO, J.:
admitted his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed that libel does not
necessarily involve moral turpitude. He argued that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and The Case
his conviction for libel was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing
company. This special civil action for certiorari 1 assails the Decision dated 18 March 20152 and Resolution dated 3
August 20153 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), in HRET Case No. 13022,
On 14 May 2013, TyDelgado filed a motion to suspend the proclamation of Pichay before the Comelec. declaring respondent Philip A. Pichay (Pichay) eligible to hold and serve the office of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur.
On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur, The Facts
obtaining a total of seventysix thousand eight hundred seventy (76,870) votes.
On 16 September 2008, the Court promulgated its Decision in G .R. Nos. 161032 and 161176,
On 31 May 2013, TyDelgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the HRET reiterating entitled "Tulfo v. People of the Philippines," convicting Pichay by final judgment of four counts of
that Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of Representatives because: (1) he was libel.4 In lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two (P6,000.00) for each count of libel and One Million Pesos (Pl,000,000.00) as moral damages. This
years have passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the penalty imposed on him. Decision became final and executory on 1 June 2009. On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid One Million
In his Answer, Pichay claimed that his conviction for the crime of libel did not make him ineligible Pesos (Pl,000,000.00) as moral damages and Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as fine for each count of
because ineligibility only pertained to lack of the qualifications under the Constitution. libel.
In its Resolution dated 4 June 2013, the Comelec First Division dismissed the petition for disqualification On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House of
filed against Pichay because of lack of jurisdiction. Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections.
On 16 July 2013, TyDelgado manifested her amenability to convert the ad cautelam petition into a On 18 February 2013, petitioner Mary Elizabeth TyDelgado (TyDelgado) filed a petition for
regular petition for quo warranto. disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude.
On 22 October 2013, the preliminary conference took place and the parties waived the presentation of TyDelgado argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the fiveyear period barring him
their evidence upon agreement that their case only involved legal issues. to be a candidate had yet to lapse.
The HRET Decision In his Answer dated 4 March 2013, Pichay, through his counsel, alleged that the petition for
disqualification was actually a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under
336 of 669
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS In a Decision dated 18 March 2015, the HRET held that it had jurisdiction over the present quo
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED warranto petition since it involved the eligibility of a Member of the House of Representatives due to a
THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING RESPONDENT PICHAY'S CONVICTION OF disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, the HRET held that there is
LIBEL DID NOT SHOW THAT MORAL TURPITUDE IS INVOLVED, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO nothing in Tulfo v. People of the Philippines which found that Pichay directly participated in any way in
THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 161032 writing the libelous articles, aside from being the president of the publishing company.
ENTITLED "ERWIN TULFO V PEOPLE AND ATTY CARLOS T SO" AND IN G.R. NO. 161176
ENTITLED "SUSAN CAMBRI, ET AL. V COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL." Thus, the HRET concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel showed that
the crime did not involve moral turpitude.
[II]
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition (for Quo Warranto) is DISMISSED, and
DECLARE RESPONDENT PICHAY INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED FROM HOLDING THE respondent Philip A. Pichay is DECLARED ELIGIBLE to hold and serve the office of Member of the
POSITION OF MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES BY REASON OF HIS House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur.
CONVICTION OF LIBEL, A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
[III]
SO ORDERED.5
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO In Resolution No. 15031dated3 August 2015, the HRET denied TyDelgado's motion for reconsideration
DECLARE THAT RESPONDENT PICHAY FALSELY REPRESENTED IN HIS CERTIFICATE OF for lack of merit considering that no new matter was raised which justified the reversal or modification of
CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE RENDERED HIM INELIGIBLE
Hence, this petition.
OR DISQUALIFIED.
The Issues
[IV]
TyDelgado raises the following issues for resolution:
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO
[I]
337 of 669
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving DECLARE THAT RESPONDENT PICHAY SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE NEVER BECOME A
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been CANDIDATE SINCE HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IS VOID AB INITIO.
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
[V]
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) DECLARE THAT SINCE THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY
OF RESPONDENT PICHAY'S CANDIDACY, THE JURISPRUDENCE ON A "SECOND PLACER"
Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an BEING PROCLAIMED AS WINNER SHOULD THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF A "FIRST
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or PLACER" IS CANCELLED, SHOULD APPLY.
to society in general. Although not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by
7
one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do [VI]
not.8
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
In Villaber v. Commission on Elections, we held that violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is a crime
9 DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY FAILING TO
involving moral turpitude because a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on the DECLARE THAT PETITIONER DELGADO WAS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE FOR
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of MEMBER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF
right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. In Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, we held that 10 SURIGAO DEL SUR, THUS SHE MUST BE DECLARED THE RIGHTFUL WINNER IN THE 2013
the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude because actual knowledge by the "fence" that property ELECTIONS AND MUST BE MADE TO ASSUME THE SAID POSITION.6
received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that
which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. In Magno The Ruling of the Court
v. Commission on Elections,11 we ruled that direct bribery involves moral turpitude, because the fact that
We find merit in the petition.
the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors denotes a malicious intent on the part of the
A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under
offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:
In Zari v. Flores,12 we likewise listed libel as one of the crimes involving moral turpitude. The Revised
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
Penal Code defines libel as a "public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
338 of 669
The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." 13 The law
or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or recognizes that the enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of
serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he life, liberty or property.14
were the author thereof. "23
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable
The provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or degree of the act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and
participation of the persons involved in the crime of libel. It is basic in statutory construction that where (d) existence of malice.15 Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to
the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Accordingly, we cannot distinguish Pichay's injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
criminal liability from the others' criminal liability only because he was the president of the company that harm.16 Malice is bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel. 17 To determine actual
published the libelous articles instead of being their author. Pichay's criminal liability was the same as that malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that it is
of the others, such that he was even meted the same penalty as that imposed on the author of the libelous false or in reckless disregard of whether it is false or not. 18 Reckless disregard of what is false or not
articles. means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or possesses a high
degree of awareness of its probable falsity.19
The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation as publisher of the libelous
articles. One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People of the
management to servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published Philippines,20 the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are
what actually appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether he was individually concerned in libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another libelous
the publication or not. 24
article was published after the filing of the complaint can be considered as further evidence of
malice.21 Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Although the participation of each felon in the crime of libel differs in point in time and in degree, both He committed an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow
author and publisher reneged on the private duties they owe their fellow men or society in a manner men, or society in general," and an act which is "contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals.
The dissenting opinion before the HRET even considered it "significant that [Pichay] has raised no issue
Contrary to Pichay's argument, the imposition of a fine does not determine whether the crime involves against libel being a crime involving moral turpitude, and has taken issue only against ascribing moral
moral turpitude or not. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections, we held that a crime still involves moral
25
turpitude to him despite his being only the President of the publishing company." 22 Thus, Pichay insists
turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine. In Tulfo v. People of the that, since he was only the publisher of the libelous articles and the penalty for his conviction was reduced
Philippines, we explained that a fine was imposed on the accused since they were first time offenders.
26
to payment of fine, the circumstances of his conviction for libel did not amount to moral turpitude.
339 of 669
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twentyfive, days from the time of the filing of Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration of a period of five years from
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days his service of sentence.1âwphi1 In Teves v. Comelec,27 we held that the fiveyear period of
before the election. (Emphases supplied) disqualification would end only on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid
the fine he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. In this case, since Pichay served his sentence
In Fermin v. Comelec, we likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
28
when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the fiveyear period shall end only on 16 February 2016.
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a Thus, Pichay is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then.
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation,
while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. This is also similar Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June
to a quo warranto petition contesting the election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the 2009, Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of
ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines filed before the HRET. 29 candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification under Section 12 is a
material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election
Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy is premised Code. The pertinent provisions read:
on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office. This 30
is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
public office.31 In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections,32 we held that if a candidate is not actually eligible filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city
under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his
clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he knew thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, his authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
representation that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material representation as to imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
his qualification or eligibility for the office. facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or cancelled under Section 78 is x x x x
deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate of candidacy is considered void ab
340 of 669
Elizabeth TyDelgado is DECLARED the winner for the position of Member of the House of initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. 33 In both Jalosjos, Jr.
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections. v. Commission on Elections34 and Aratea v. Commission on Elections,35 we proclaimed the second placer,
Considering that the term of the present House of Representatives will end on 30 June 2016, this Decision the only qualified candidate who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor.
is immediately executory. We found that since the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the highest number of votes was
void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all, and all his votes were considered stray votes.
SO ORDERED.
Accordingly, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess
of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude. Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was
never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast for him
were considered stray votes. Thus, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who
received the highest number of valid votes shall be declared the winner. Based on the Provincial Canvass
Report, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who received the highest number of
valid votes is petitioner Mary Elizabeth TyDelgado.36
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it is wellrecognized that the HRET has
been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over
it to check "whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled
precedents on the matter before it, it commits grave abuse of discretion. 37
341 of 669
Separation of Powers; Electoral Tribunals; Commission on Appointments; The Constitution expressly G.R. No. 141489 November 29, 2002
grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE,
from among its district and partylist representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and
House in the HRET and the CA.—The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
PATRICIA M. SARENAS, petitioners,
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and partylist
vs.
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO,
18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect
VICENTE V. MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S.
among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in
TAMMANG, RAUL M. GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON Q.
the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of BUESER,1 NAPOLEON R. BERATIO, SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B.
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members VILLAR, JR., respondents.
would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Even assuming that partylist
representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with G.R. No. 141490 November 29, 2002
the Supreme Court; Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House of
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE,
Representatives is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court.—Even assuming
LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and
that partylist representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common
PATRICIA M. SARENAS, petitioners,
nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives
vs.
and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, partylist COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, its Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT BLAS F. OPLE, and
representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be Members, namely: SENATORS FRANKLIN M. DRILON, RENATO L. CAYETANO, LOREN
entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the LEGARDALEVISTE, ROBERT Z. BARBERS, ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG,
Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the partylist GREGORIO HONASAN, RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR., TERESA AQUINOORETA, RAUL S.
representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of ROCO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, VICENTE C. SOTTO III and REPRESENTATIVES LUIS A.
primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case ASISTIO, EMILIO R. ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, MANUEL M. GARCIA,
to the court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court is premature. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, FAUSTINO S. DY, JR., PACIFICO M.
Same; Same; Same; Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court may not FAJARDO, ERNESTO F. HERRERA, NUR G. JAAFAR, CARLOS M. PADILLA, ROGELIO M.
interfere with the exercise by the House of the constitutionally mandated duty to choose its members to SARMIENTO and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.
342 of 669
the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their the HRET and the CA, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting
internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the
Same; The rendering of an advisory opinion is outside the jurisdiction of the Court.—The issues CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events. On May 14, 2001, a new set of However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
district and partylist representatives were elected to the House. The Court cannot now resolve the issue of House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the “present composition” of the House of of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers
Representatives as presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. With the May 14, 2001 elections, it calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Neither can the
is certain that the composition of the House has changed. In the absence of a proper petition assailing the Court speculate on what action the House may take if partylist representatives are duly nominated for
present composition of the HRET and the CA, the instant petitions must fail. Otherwise, for the Court to membership in the HRET and the CA.
rule on the instant petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering an advisory opinion, which is Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; Requisites.—It is a wellsettled rule that a constitutional
outside our jurisdiction. question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry
concur: (1) there must be an actual controversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue
CARPIO, J.: must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy must
be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue must be
The Case indispensable to the final determination of the controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The party raising the constitutional issue must have “such personal
Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Tribunal ("HRET" for brevity)2 and the Commission on Appointments ("CA" for brevity). 3 Petitioners
—The five partylist representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that they are
pray that respondents be ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the
HRET and the CA to include partylist representatives in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither have they
of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the PartyList System Act. claimed that they have been nominated by the partylist groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. As
Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA be enjoined from exercising their functions until they such, they do not possess the personal and substantial interest required to confer them with locus
have been reorganized. standi. The party raising the constitutional issue must have “such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
Antecedent Facts the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
Same; Same; Same; The HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.—
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a partylist system in the House of
We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to
Representatives ("House" for brevity), as follows:
343 of 669
House, while the 12 other partylist groups had one representative each. Also elected were district "Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
representatives belonging to various political parties. members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent 6 by electing its representatives to these respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. 7 From available records, it does not organizations.
appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the partylist groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House (2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
different political parties. onehalf of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate other sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector."
President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R.
8
Melo (now retired),9 as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice On March 3, 1995, the PartyList System Act took effect. The Act sought to "promote proportional
Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include partylist representatives representation in the election of representatives, to the House of Representatives through a partylist
to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
Senator Pimentel’s letter to the SecretaryGeneral of the House of Representatives. 10 On the same day, and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
HRET Secretary Daisy B. PangaVega, in an Indorsement 11 of even date, referred the letter to House of House of Representatives."4
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.
On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the PartyList System Act, national elections were held which
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of partylist groups and organizations whose
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 partylist representatives
and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. Petitioners contend that, under the
12 13
from 13 organizations, including petitioners from partylist groups Association of Philippine Electric
Constitution and the PartyList System Act, partylist representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in Cooperatives5 (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda
the HRET,14 and 2.4 seats in the CA.15 Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOPNATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of February 8, Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the
2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.
16
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"Sec. 11. Number of PartyList Representatives. The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a motion 17 to amend their petitions to implead then
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as
the partylist. xxx" 19
one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions.
Petitioners raise the following issues: "Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION registered under the partylist system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HRET. vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON the Members,"18 (Emphasis supplied)
APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA. Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941:
345 of 669
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,25 each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, 3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE THEMSELVES
within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of TO INCLUDE PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF
each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. DISCRETION.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petitions are procedurally defective and
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit: substantially lacking in merit for having been filed’ prematurely, thus:
"Rule 3. Composition. The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be "It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the pleading determine the existence of a cause
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be of action. In the instant petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they or any one of them was elected by a
Members of the House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation party or organization registered under the partylist system as a Member of the HRET or CA to represent
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system represented said party or organization under the partylist system of the House of Representatives." 22
therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Ruling of the Court
Rule 4. Organization. (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the election of
the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose the House of Representatives Electoral Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in the petitions under review, citing the following
Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its pronouncement in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :23
organization and adoption of such resolutions as it may deem proper." (Emphasis supplied)
"Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the alleged facts, procedural questions
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides: acquire a relatively minor significance, and the transcendental importance to the public of the case
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside xxx technicalities of procedure."
"Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty (30) days after both Houses
of Congress shall have organized themselves with the election of the Senate President and the Speaker of Petitioners’ reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is misplaced. The "procedural questions" that
the House of Representatives, the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted. It shall be composed petitioners want the Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive matters that are
of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House specifically provided for in the constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the partylist system represented herein. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and partylist representatives those who may occupy the
(Emphasis supplied) seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution 24 explicitly
confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
346 of 669
Moreover, it is a wellsettled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the Thus, even assuming that partylist representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to
courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must be an actual designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House
controversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution,
interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable partylist representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to
opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the
determination of the controversy. 29
Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the partylist
representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of
The five partylist representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that they are primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case
entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither have they to the court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court is premature.
claimed that they have been nominated by the partylist groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. As
such, they do not possess the personal and substantial interest required to confer them with locus standi. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject
The party raising the constitutional issue must have "such personal stake in the outcome of the to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. 26 However, under the doctrine of
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 30
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.27 Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. 28 Neither can the Court speculate on what
the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their action the House may take if partylist representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET
internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. and the CA.
Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events. On May 14, The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the partylist groups in the
2001, a new set of district and partylist representatives were elected to the House. The Court cannot now House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that
resolve the issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the "present after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the partylist representatives from seeking membership
composition" of the House of Representatives as presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. With in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the partylist groups in the House
the May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the House has changed. In the absence of at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The partylist representatives did
a proper petition assailing the present composition of the HRET and the CA, the instant petitions must not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with the predictable result
fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering that the House did not consider any partylist representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the
an advisory opinion, which is outside our jurisdiction.31 primary recourse of the partylist representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot
resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are DISMISSED.
347 of 669
SO ORDERED.
348 of 669
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Nuisance Candidates; It is not enough for G.R. No. 217012. March 1, 2016.
Wigberto to have Alvin John’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) cancelled, because the effect of such
cancellation only leads to stray votes. Alvin John must also be declared a nuisance candidate, because WIGBERTO “TOBY” R. TAÑADA, JR., petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
only then will Alvin John’s votes be credited to Wigberto.—The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, ANGELINA “HELEN” D. TAN, and ALVIN JOHN S. TAÑADA,
discretion in declaring that it has no jurisdiction to determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance respondents.
candidate. If Wigberto timely filed a petition before this Court within the period allotted for special
actions and questioned Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy, then it is proper for this Court to assume
Election Law; COMELEC Rules of Procedure; Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the Commission on Elections
jurisdiction and rule on the matter. As things stand, the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling on Alvin John’s
(COMELEC) Rules of Procedure specifically prohibits the filing of a “motion for reconsideration of an
nuisance candidacy had long become final and executory. To our mind, it appears that Wigberto’s petition
En Banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases.” —Wigberto committed
challenging Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy filed before the HRET, and now before this Court, is a mere
several fatal procedural errors. First, Wigberto filed a prohibited pleading: a motion for reconsideration of
afterthought. It was only after Angelina was proclaimed a winner that Wigberto renewed his zeal in
a resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
pursuing Alvin John’s alleged nuisance candidacy. It is not enough for Wigberto to have Alvin John’s
specifically prohibits the filing of a “motion for reconsideration of an En Banc ruling, resolution, order or
CoC cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation only leads to stray votes. Alvin John must also be
decision except in election offense cases.” Consequently, the COMELEC En Banc ruling became final
declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin John’s votes be credited to Wigberto.
and executory, precluding Wigberto from raising again in any other forum Alvin John’s nuisance
candidacy as an issue. Second, Wigberto filed his petition beyond the period provided by the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. The COMELEC En Banc promulgated its resolution on Alvin John’s alleged
CARPIO, J.: nuisance candidacy on 25 April 2013. Wigberto filed his petition in G.R. Nos. 207199200 before this
Court on 27 May 2013. By this date, the COMELEC En Banc’s resolution on Alvin John’s alleged
The Case nuisance candidacy was already final and executory. Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides: Section 3. Decisions Final After Five Days.—Decisions in preproclamation cases and
G.R. No. 217012 is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions promulgated on 25 September
1
petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance
2014 and 22 January 2015 by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case
2 3
candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and
No. 13018 (EP). The HRET dismissed Wigberto “Toby” R. Tañada, Jr.’s (Wigberto) election protest ad executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
cautelam on two grounds: for being insufficient in form and substance, and for lack of jurisdiction to What Wigberto should have done was to file a petition for certiorari with this Court within five days from
pronounce and declare Alvin John Tañada (Alvin John) as a nuisance candidate. promulgation of the 25 April 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. Wigberto failed to timely assail
before this Court through a petition for certiorari the COMELEC En Banc resolution declaring that Alvin
John was not a nuisance candidate.
349 of 669
b) Respondent Tañada was a resident of Parañaque where he was enrolled as a The Facts
voter from 2009 until 4 June 2012, when he transferred his Voter’s Registration to
Gumaca, Quezon; and The HRET recited the facts as follows:
c) Respondent Tañada’s own tweets and entries in Facebook are bereft of any
political plans or activities which betray his true intentions to run as Member of the Culled from the records and the submissions of the parties herein, as well as from the
4th District of Gumaca, Quezon. ruling of the Supreme Court in Tañada, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, et al., [G.R. Nos.
On April 25, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc denied Wigberto’s motion for reconsideration 207199200, 22 October 2013, 708 SCRA 188] are the factual antecedents relevant to this
in SPA No. 13057, but granted his motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 13056, decreeing resolution.
thusly: For the position of Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of
Quezon contested in the National and Local Elections of 2013, three candidates filed their
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 18 respective Certificates of Candidacy (CoC), namely: Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. (Wigberto) of the
February 2013 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Motion for Reconsideration for SPA Liberal Party; Angelina D. Tan (Tan) of the Nationalist People’s Coalition [(NPC)]; and Alvin
No. 13057 (DC) is DENIED for LACK OF MERIT. However, the Motion for John S. Tañada (Alvin John) of the Lapiang Manggagawa. In October 2012, Wigberto filed twin
Reconsideration for SPA No. 13056 (DC) is GRANTED. Accordingly, Respondent petitions in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to seek the cancellation of Alvin John’s
Alvin John S. Tañada’s Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the CoC (docketed as SPA No. 13056), and to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate (docketed
House of Representatives for the 4th District of the Province of Quezon is hereby as SPA No. 130357). The petitions were eventually consolidated.
CANCELLED.
On May 7, 2013, Wigberto sought the reconsideration of the denial of his petition in SPA On January 29, 2013, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the consolidated petitions
Case No. 13057 to urge the declaration of Alvin John as a nuisance candidate on the basis of for their lack of merit.
newly discovered evidence. Wigberto duly filed his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petitioners [sic],
For the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, the name of candidate Alvin John alleging the following grounds, to wit:
remained in the ballots. After the canvass of the votes, the following results indicated that Tan a) Assuming Respondent Tañada resided in Purok 3, Barangay Progreso,
was the winning candidate, to wit: Gumaca, Quezon for a period of thirteen (13) years, the said period was long ago.
Presently, Respondent Tañada failed to comply with the oneyear residency
Tan 84,782 requirement.
Tañada, Wigberto 80,698
350 of 669
COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2013 declaring Alvin John not a Tañada, Alvin John 7,038
nuisance candidate, docketed as G.R. Nos. 207199200, thereby imploring the Supreme Court to
declare Alvin John as a nuisance candidate, and to order the COMELEC to credit the votes On May 16, 2013, Wigberto filed with the Quezon Provincial Board of Canvassers
received by Alvin John in his favor. (Quezon PBOC) his PETITION TO CORRECT MANIFEST ERRORS IN THE
CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS FOR THE POSITION OF MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
On May 30, 2013, Wigberto filed [with] this Tribunal this election protest ad cautela, REPRESENTATIVES, 4TH DISTRICT, QUEZON with URGENT MOTION TO SUSPEND
pertinently alleging as follows: CANVASS AND/OR PROCLAMATION FOR THE SAID POSITION, whereby he prayed that
the COMELEC direct the Quezon PBOC to consolidate in his favor the votes canvassed for
13. The fraud perpetrated upon herein Protestant in the fielding of Alvin John Alvin John, and to proclaim the candidate with the highest number of votes as the winner.
Tañada as a nuisance candidate consists of the following:
a. The lawyers who turned out to be counsels for Protestee The Quezon PBOC denied Wigberto’s motion to have the votes garnered by Alvin John
collaborated, in varying degrees and at various times, in support of the credited in his favor on the same date of May 16, 2013, holding that the votes of Alvin John
nuisance candidate Alvin John Tañada, in a case of an otherwise patent could not be counted in favor of Wigberto because the cancellation of the former’s CoC had
conflict of interest, unless their client Protestee in the first place was been on the basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
precisely the sponsor of the candidacy of Alvin John as a nuisance Code, not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Omnibus Election Code. The
candidate in order to confuse and mislead the voters into voting for Alvin Quezon PBOC then proclaimed Tan as the winning candidate.
John instead of herein Protestant, to wit: x x x.
b. As found by the Comelec En Banc in SPA 13056, Alvin John On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a SUPPLEMENT TO THE PETITION WITH
Tañada “is not a resident of and/or never resided” in the Fourth District of ADDITIONAL PRAYER FOR ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION, whereby he reiterated
Quezon, and that he had the “intent to mislead, misinform, or deceive the his prayer to be declared as the winning candidate for the position of Representative of the
electorate” since he is a resident of Parañaque City, and therefore Fourth District of Quezon by consolidating the votes received by Alvin John with the votes he
disqualified from running for any elective post in the Fourth District of garnered.
Quezon. x x x.
d. Alvin John Tañada was never seen campaigning in the Fourth On May 27, 2013, Wigberto brought in the Supreme Court his AD
District of Quezon Province, nor did he have any posters in the common CAUTELAM PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION with
URGENT MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER to assail the
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Meanwhile, on June 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division favorably acted on the poster areas. Neither did he attend any campaign rally or candidate’s forum.
motion to annul the proclamation of Tan, and annulled the proclamation, and directed the To top it all, he did not even bother to vote in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
Quezon PBOC to credit the 7,038 votes of Alvin John to Wigberto, and to declare the winner e. An avid user of social media such as Facebook and Twitter, Alvin
after the recomputation of the votes. While Wigberto’s petition for certiorari was still pending John Tañada never made a single post or tweet to his friends, relatives or
in the Supreme Court, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the action of the COMELEC Second associates in said media about his political plans of the fact that he was
Division annulling Tan’s proclamation. However, Tan had by then taken her oath and assumed running as
office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her Congressman. Such palpable silence, if not secrecy, on one’s
proclamation moot. candidacy is a trademark attitude of nuisance candidates. They make
On October 22, 2013, the Supreme Court promulgated its resolution in G.R. Nos. 207199 themselves publicly scarce and difficult to track down, when the very nature
200 dismissing Wigberto’s AD CAUTELAM PETITION of a candidacy precisely seeks nourishment from widespread publicity and
FOR CERTIORARI, MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION with URGENT MOTION FOR THE maximum exposure.
ISSUANCE OF A STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER, viz.: f. The fraudulent fielding of Alvin John Tañada as a nuisance
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the candidate resulted in 7,038 votes for the one and only bona fide candidate
election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, with the surname “Tañada,” Wigberto “Toby” Tañada, [Jr.,] whose
returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The certificate of candidacy, in the first place, had already been ordered
phrase “election, returns and qualifications” refers to all matters affecting the validity cancelled by the Comelec in its April 25, 2013 consolidated Resolution in
of the contestee’s title. In particular, the term “election” refers to the conduct of the SPA 13056 and 13057. x x x.
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the 22. Because of the perpetration of fraud upon herein Protestant through the
casting and counting of the votes; “returns” refers to the canvass of the returns and the malicious and intentional fielding of a nuisance candidate in the person of Alvin John
proclamation of winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board Tañada to sabotage the candidacy of herein Protestant, and the inclusion of Alvin
of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” refers to John’s name in the ballot despite the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy,
matters that could be raised in quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed Protestant is hereby protesting the miscounting and mistabulation of the votes cast for
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC. him as votes for Alvin John in the ten (10) Municipal Board of Canvassers of the
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Fourth District of Quezon and the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon as
Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on follows: x x x.
May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of
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On February 27, 2014, the Tribunal granted Tan’s motion to set the oral arguments, and June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they
held oral arguments on March 13, 2014.4 stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation
of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms
The HRET’s Ruling “election” and “returns” as above stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s
sole jurisdiction.
The HRET promulgated the assailed Resolution on 25 September 2014.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
The HRET held that Wigberto did not commit forum shopping. Wigberto sought exclusive relief SO ORDERED.
from the HRET for his electoral protest in the belief that it was the proper forum for his predicament. He
did not go to the HRET to look for a friendly forum to obtain a favorable result. Thereafter, the Tribunal directed Tan to submit her responsive pleading to the election
contest.
However, the HRET held that Wigberto’s election protest was insufficient in form and substance. In compliance, Tan filed her verified answer with special and affirmative defenses and
The HRET found that Wigberto’s election protest failed to allege the facts to support a valid election counterprotest, praying that the Tribunal dismiss the election protest pursuant to Rule 16 in
protest as required by Rule 16 of the 2011 HRET Rules. Although the pleading was captioned as an relation to Rule 21 of The 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (2011
election protest, its contents were more appropriate for a petition to annul Tan’s proclamation. The HRET HRET Rules) for being grossly deficient in form and substance under the law, and considering
further stated that the material fraud in an election protest must be of an “intrinsic nature as to which the further that Wigberto was guilty of forum shopping.
protestant was caught off his guard,” and not extrinsic, or “one that he could have effectively prevented
after the filing of Alvin John’s CoC but still during the campaign period.” In his reply and answer to the counterprotest, Wigberto insisted that the Supreme Court
had already declared in G.R. Nos. 207199200 that the Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction to
Finally, the HRET ruled that it has no jurisdiction to declare that Alvin John was a nuisance determine whether or not Alvin John was a nuisance candidate, and whether or not crediting the
candidate. The HRET relied on Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 15 of the 2011 votes garnered by Alvin John to Wigberto constituted an election contest.
HRET Rules to declare that its power to judge election contests is limited to Members of the House of
Representatives. Alvin John, admittedly, is not a Member of the House of Representatives. On February 11, 2014, Tan filed her comment with motion to dismiss and/or set the case
for preliminary hearing or oral argument.
The dispositive portion of the HRET’s Resolution reads:
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WHEREFORE, the election protest ad cautela of protestant WIGBERTO “TOBY” R.
Finally, Rep. Ilagan concurred with the Resolution that Wigberto did not commit forum shopping. TAÑADA, JR. is DISMISSED for being insufficient in form and in substance, and for lack of
Even if Wigberto instituted actions before different institutions, the actions had different causes of action. jurisdiction to pronounce and declare Alvin John S. Tañada as a nuisance candidate.
Wigberto filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the HRET’s Resolution on 3 November 2014. He No pronouncement as to costs.
raised the following grounds: (1) the jurisdiction of the HRET in election protests is defined by the SO ORDERED.5
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence, and cannot be arbitrarily limited by the HRET; (2) the opening of
ballot boxes and the revision of ballots are not essential to an election protest; and (3) the HRET cannot
refuse the exercise of its jurisdiction over the fraud committed by a protestee on the ground that it has no Representative Luzviminda C. Ilagan (Rep. Ilagan) of Gabriela Women’s Party wrote a Concurring
power to reverse a COMELEC ruling on a nuisance candidate. and Dissenting Opinion.
The HRET denied Wigberto’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated 22 January 2015.
Wigberto filed the present Petition for Certiorari on 18 March 2015. Rep. Ilagan stated that Wigberto’s election protest is sufficient in form and substance. The purpose
of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the
The Issues lawful choice of the people. Wigberto was not raising matters of irregularities in the counting of votes at
the precinct level, so there was no need to cite the specific precincts in the protest filed before the HRET.
Wigberto enumerated the following grounds warranting allowance of his petition: Rep. Ilagan further stated that the principle of liberal interpretation and application of the HRET Rules is
1. Public respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of consistent with the HRET’s constitutional duty to ensure that the will of the electorate is not defeated.
jurisdiction, when it whimsically, capriciously, and arbitrarily limited its own jurisdiction in
election protests as defined by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence. Rep. Ilagan declared that the HRET has jurisdiction to determine whether Tan committed fraud by
2. Public respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of fielding Alvin John, and whether Alvin John is a nuisance candidate. The jurisdiction of the HRET in the
jurisdiction, when it whimsically, capriciously, and arbitrarily declared that an election protest is adjudication of election contests is intended to be full, complete and unimpaired. The facts and
limited to the opening of ballot boxes and the revision of ballots. circumstances of the case, that is, the limitations in the procedures of the computerized elections that led
3. Public respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of to the nondeletion of Alvin John’s name in the ballots despite the cancellation of his certificate of
jurisdiction, when it whimsically, capriciously, and arbitrarily declared that it cannot look into candidacy, the refusal of the COMELEC to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate, and the eventual
the fraudulent fielding of a nuisance candidate as perpetrated by herein private respondent, decision of the COMELEC to annul Tan’s proclamation and credit Alvin John’s votes to Wigberto, show
that the electorate’s will was not realized.
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On May 15 and 16, 2013, Wigberto filed with the COMELEC En Banc an Extremely because it has no power to review, modify, or reverse the factual finding of the COMELEC on
Urgent Motion to Admit Additional and Newly Discovered Evidence and to Urgently nuisance candidates.6
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration and an Urgent Manifestation and Supplemental
thereto. These motions, however, remained unacted upon until the filing of the present The Court’s Ruling
petition before the Court on May 27, 2013. Thus, in order to avoid charges of forum
shopping, said motions were withdrawn by Wigberto.7 The petition has no merit. We affirm the Resolutions of the HRET.
Wigberto committed several fatal procedural errors. Wigberto’s Procedural Errors
First, Wigberto filed a prohibited pleading: a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the In G.R. Nos. 207199200, this Court narrated the following events:
COMELEC En Banc. Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically prohibits In a Resolution dated January 29, 2013, the COMELEC First Division dismissed both
the filing of a “motion for reconsideration of an En Banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in petitions for lack of merit. On Wigberto’s motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En
election offense cases.” Consequently, the COMELEC En Banc ruling became final and Banc, in a Resolution dated April 25, 2013, upheld the COMELEC First Division’s ruling in
executory,8 precluding Wigberto from raising again in any other forum Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy SPA No. 13057 (DC) that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined under Section 69
as an issue. of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the “Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines” (OEC). However, in SPA No. 13056 (DC), it granted the motion for
Second, Wigberto filed his petition beyond the period provided by the COMELEC Rules of reconsideration and cancelled Alvin John’s CoC for having committed false material
Procedure. The COMELEC En Banc promulgated its resolution on Alvin John’s alleged nuisance representations concerning his residency in accordance with Section 78 of the OEC.
candidacy on 25 April 2013. Wigberto filed his petition in G.R. Nos. 207199200 before this Court on 27
May 2013. By this date, the COMELEC En Banc’s resolution on Alvin John’s alleged nuisance candidacy On May 15, 2013, Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
was already final and executory. Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: COMELEC En Banc’s ruling in SPA No. 13057 (DC) on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. He alleged that Alvin John’s candidacy was not bona fide because: (a) Alvin John
Section 3. Decisions Final After Five Days.—Decisions in preproclamation cases and was merely forced by his father to file his CoC; (b) he had no election paraphernalia posted in
petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as official COMELEC posting areas in several barangays of Gumaca, Quezon Province; (c) he did
nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall not even vote during the May 13, 2013 National Elections; and (d) his legal representation
appeared to have been in collusion with the lawyers of Angelina.
355 of 669
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member restrained by the Supreme Court.
of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as
she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is What Wigberto should have done was to file a petition for certiorari with this Court within five days
now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the from promulgation of the 25 April 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. Wigberto failed to timely
conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are assail before this Court through a petition for certiorari the COMELEC En Banc resolution declaring that
matters which fall under the scope of the terms “election” and “returns” as above stated and Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate.
hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.11
The HRET’s Exercise of its Jurisdiction
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Resolutions promulgated on
25 September 2014 and 22 January 2015 by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it has no jurisdiction to
Case No. 13018 (EP). determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. If Wigberto timely filed a petition before this
SO ORDERED. Court within the period allotted for special actions and questioned Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy, then
it is proper for this Court to assume jurisdiction and rule on the matter. As things stand, the
COMELEC En Banc’s ruling on Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy had long become final and executory.
To our mind, it appears that Wigberto’s petition challenging Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy filed
before the HRET, and now before this Court, is a mere afterthought. It was only after Angelina was
proclaimed a winner that Wigberto renewed his zeal in pursuing Alvin John’s alleged nuisance candidacy.
It is not enough for Wigberto to have Alvin John’s CoC cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation
only leads to stray votes.9 Alvin John must also be declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will
Alvin John’s votes be credited to Wigberto.10
Wigberto further argues that this Court directed him to seek resolution regarding Alvin John’s
purported nuisance candidacy before the HRET. This is inaccurate. We directed Wigberto to the HRET to
question the conduct of the canvass and Tan’s proclamation. We stated thus:
356 of 669
—The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to the G.R. No. 222236
COMELEC to declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with exclusive
HARLIN C. ABAYON, Petitioner,
jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, which
vs.
necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities committed
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTOLRAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and RAUL A.
before, during or after the elections. To deprive the HRET the prerogative to annul elections would
DAZA, Respondents.
undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election contests. The phrase “election, returns and
qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the x x
contestee’s title. Consequently, the annulment of election results is but a power concomitant to the
HRET’s constitutional mandate to determine the validity of the contestee’s title. G.R. No. 223032
Same; Same; Same; The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of HARLIN C. ABAYON, Petitoner,
Representatives, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and RAUL A.
irregularities existed to warrant the annulment.—The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is
DAZA, Respondent.
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Thus, the
HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other
electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its Election Law; Election Protests; An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from
constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast. office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
Same; Same; Same; The passage of Republic Act (RA) No. 7166 cannot deprive the House of electoral frauds or irregularities. It aims to determine who between them has actually obtained the
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) of its incidental power to annul elections in the exercise of its majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office.—An Election Protest proposes to
sole and exclusive authority conferred by no less than the Constitution.—The passage of R.A. No. 7166 oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning
cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to annul elections in the exercise of its sole and candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities. It aims to determine who between
exclusive authority conferred by no less than the Constitution. It must be remembered that the COMELEC them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office.
exercises quasijudicial, quasilegislative and administrative functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC, 606 Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; The Constitution no less, grants
SCRA 554 (2009), the Court expounded, to wit: The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election
upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, which necessarily includes those which
quasilegislative, and quasijudicial. The quasijudicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections.
357 of 669
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election preproclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the qualifications. Its quasilegislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws.
Same; Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Failure of Elections; Annulment of In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IXA) and the Omnibus Election Code
Elections; There is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) (Section 52[c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. The quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory
does so in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and
same grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasijudicial functions.—The difference between to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of failure of elections by the same law.
COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the former is an incident of the judicial function of electoral Same; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; Republic Act (RA) No. 7166 was enacted to
tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative function. Second, electoral empower the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to be most effective in the performance of its sacred
tribunals only annul the election results connected with the election contest before it whereas the duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections.—The COMELEC exercises its quasijudicial
declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned function when it decides election contests not otherwise reserved to other electoral tribunals by the
precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who among Constitution. The COMELEC, however, does not exercise its quasijudicial functions when it declares a
the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a failure of elections pursuant to R.A. No. 7166. Rather, the COMELEC performs its administrative
failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were function when it exercises such power. R.A. No. 7166 was enacted to empower the COMELEC to be
suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of most effective in the performance of its sacred duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections.
elections, special elections will have to be conducted. Hence, there is no overlap of jurisdiction because Further, a closer perusal of Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code readily reveals that it is more in line
when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or with the COMELEC’s administrative function of ensuring that elections are free, orderly, honest,
other irregularities, it does so in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul peaceful, and credible, and not its quasijudicial function to adjudicate election contests. The said
elections under the same grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasijudicial functions. provision reads: Sec. 6. Failure of elections.—If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
Same; Same; Failure of Elections; The power to declare a failure of elections should be exercised or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
with utmost care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt that the disregard of the been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the great election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
358 of 669
These consolidated petitions for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seek to reverse and body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their
set aside the December 14, 2015 and January 21, 2016 Resolutions of the House of Representatives
1 2
franchise.—It must be remembered that “[t]he power to declare a failure of elections should be exercised
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 13023, dismissing the counterprotest fpr petitioner Harlin with utmost care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt that the disregard of the
C. Abayon (Abayon); and the February 3, 2016 Decision 3 and the March 7, 2016 Resolution 4 of the HRET law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what
in the same case, which found the private respondent Raul A. Daza. (Daza) as the duly elected
votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the great
Representative of the First Legislative District of Northern Samar in the May 13, 2016 Elections.
body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their
franchise.” Consequently, a protestant alleging terrorism in an election protest must establish by clear
The Antecedents
and convincing evidence that the will of the majority has been muted by violence, intimidation or threats.
Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in the First Legislative District of Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Annulment of Elections; It is but expected
Northern Samar during the May 13, 2013 Elections. Out of the votes cast in the 332 clustered precincts in that annulment of elections be judiciously exercised with utmost caution and resorted only in exceptional
the First District of Northern Samar, Abayon emerged as the winner after obtaining the majority vote of circumstances.—The testimonies of a minute portion of the registered voters in the said precincts should
72,857. Daza placed second with a total of 72,805 votes. The difference was 52 votes. On May 17, 2013, not be used as a tool to silence the voice of the majority expressed through their votes during elections. To
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar proclaimed Abayon as the duly elected member of do so would disenfranchise the will of the majority and reward a candidate not chosen by the people to be
the House of Representatives for the said legislative district. 5
their representative. With such dire consequences, it is but expected that annulment of elections be
judiciously exercised with utmost caution and resorted only in exceptional circumstances.
On May 31, 2013, Daza filed his Election Protest6 challenging the elections results in 25 clustered
Moot and Academic; A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
precincts in the Municipalities of Biri, Capul, Catarman, Lavezares, San Isidro, and Victoria. In his
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
protest, he bewailed that there was massive fraud, votebuying, intimidation, employment of illegal and
value.—Daza cannot claim that the issue had been mooted by his assumption to office because the same is
fraudulent devices and schemes before, during and after the elections benefitting Abayon and that
premised on the fact that the HRET had correctly ruled Daza to be the duly elected representative. A moot
terrorism was committed by the latter and his unidentified cohorts, agents and supporters. 7
and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
On August 1, 2013, Abayon filed his Verified Answer raising special and affirmative defenses as well as so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. In the present case, there is still a
his CounterProtest. 8 He challenged the results in all 332 precincts alleging that the 72,805 votes obtained justiciable controversy — who between Daza and Abayon was truly chosen by the majority of voters of
by Daza were questionable in view of the frauds and anomalies committed by the the First Legislative District of Northern Samar to be their representative.
latter and his supporters during the elections.9 MENDOZA, J.:
In its Resolution No. 14055,10 dated February 27, 2014, the HRET found both Daza's protest and
Abayon's counterprotest to be sufficient in form and substance. From October 14, 2014, until October 15,
359 of 669
submitted their memoranda, the HRET decided the election protest in Daza' s favor and declared him as 2014, revision proceedings were conducted on the 25 clustered precincts protested by Daza. 11 After the
the winning candidate. revision of ballots in the said precincts, the votes for Abayon increased by 28 and the votes for Daza
increased by 14.12
G.R. No. 223032
In his Urgent Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, 13 dated September 3, 2015, Daza moved for the
In its February 3, 2016 Decision, the HRET annulled the election results in five ( 5) clustered precincts in withdrawal of his cause of action for the recount, revision and reappreciation∙ of the ballots in the
the municipalities of Lavezares and Victoria because of the commission of massive terrorism. As a result clustered precincts in the municipalities of Biri, Capul and San Isidro. He likewise prayed that the validity
of nullifying the election results in the said clustered precincts, the HRET deducted the votes received by and legitimacy of his separate and distinct cause of action for the annulment of election results in certain
the parties in the concerned clustered precincts and concluded that Daza obtained 72,436 votes and identified precincts on the ground of terrorism be upheld. 14 In its Resolution No. 15052, dated
Abayon had 72,002 votes. September 24, 2015, the HRET granted Daza's motion and directed the Hearing Commissioner to
continue with the reception of Abayon 's defense on the issue of terrorism and to hold in abeyance the
The HRET highlighted that Daza presented testimonial and documentary evidence showing that: (1) prior proceedings relative to his counterprotest. 15
to the May 13, 2013 elections, the National Democratic FrontEastern Visayas (NDFEV) had already
shown its animosity and hostility towards him and his then incumbent governor son through the posting G.R. No. 222236
on the NDFEV website and in conspicuous places statements declaring them as enemies of the people of
Thereafter, Daza filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion, 16 dated November 4, 2015, praying that
Northern Samar; (2) comic magazines vilifying them were distributed; (3) "pulongpulongs" were held in Abayon's counterprotest be dismissed as a consequence of the withdrawal of his (Daza's) cause of action
the concerned barangays where the NDFEV exhorted the residentattendees to vote against him and in for the recount, revision and reappreciation in the concerned clustered precincts.
favor of Abayon, threatening to comeback if the result were otherwise; (4) his supporters and/or fellow
Liberal Party candidates were prohibited from campaigning for him, and also from mounting In its Resolution No. 15058, dated December 14, 2015, the HRET granted Daza's motion and dismissed
tarpaulins/posters and distributing sample ballots; (5) Abayon had meetings with NDFEV officials, Abayon's counterprotest.1âwphi1 Abayon moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the
during which times, he gave them money and guns; and (6) NDFEV armed partisans were deployed HRET in its
around the school premises in the concerned precincts on election day.
January 21, 2016 Resolution. Aggrieved, Abayon filed a Petition for Certiorari17 with prayer for the
The HRET found that Daza had adduced convincing evidence to establish that fear was instilled in the urgent issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a status quo ante order and/or Preliminary
minds of hundreds of residentvoters in the protested clustered precincts from the time they had attended injunction before the Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 222236.
the "pulongpulongs" up until the election day itself when armed partisans were deployed to the schools to
ensure that the voters would not vote for him but for Abayon. Meanwhile, the HRET proceeded with the reception of evidence with regard to the issue of terrorism on
the remaining clustered precincts in the municipalities of Lavezares and Victoria. After the parties had
360 of 669
2] Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the counterprotest filed by The HRET disregarded the certifications issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Antonio G.
Abayon. Gulay Jr. that there was no failure of election in Northern Samar and by P/SSupt. Mario Abraham
Gonzalez Lenaming, OfficerinCharge of the Northern Samar Police Provincial Office, that the conduct
G.R. No. 222236 of the elections was generally peaceful despite the occurrence of two electionrelated incidents in the First
District of Northern Samar. The HRET noted that the said government officials were not presented to
Petitioner Abayon insists that the HRET erred when it dismissed his counterprotest as it was in violation testify and, even if the said certifications were admissible, it had no probative value in disputing the
of his right to due process. He states that the resolutions issued by the HRET dismissing his counter terroristic acts committed upon the voters in the assailed precincts.
protest did not state clearly and distinctly the facts and legal bases thereof. Abayon even asserts that the
HRET admitted in its resolution that it merely adopted the facts and the law invoked by Daza in his urgent The HRET ratiocinated that there was clear and convincing evidence to warrant the annulment of the
manifestation and motion. elections in the concerned precincts because the terrorism affected more than 50% of the votes cast in the
said precincts and it was impossible to distinguish the good votes from the bad.
He argues that the counterprotest could not be simply dismissed on the basis of Daza's withdrawal of his
cause of action for the recount, revision and reappreciation of the ballots in the clustered precincts in Biri, Abayon moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the HRET in its March 7, 2016
Resolution.
Capul and San Isidro; that a counterprotest is an independent, distinct, separate and alternative legal
remedy which is exclusively available to a protestee in an election protest case; and that his counter On March 9, 2016, Abayon filed before the Court this petition for certiorari18 and prohibition with prayer
protest may be summarily dismissed only if the grounds under Rule 21 19 of the 2011 HRET Rules of for the urgent issuance of TRO and/or a status quo ante order and/or preliminary injunction before the
Procedure are present. Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 223032.
G.R. No. 223032 These present consolidated petitions raise the following:
Abayon asserts that the nullification of the election results in the concerned clustered precincts was not ISSUES
within the jurisdiction of the HRET.1avvphi1
1] Whether the HRET had jurisdiction to annul the elections in the contested precincts in the
He explains that the annulment of election results on the ground of terrorism is akin to a declaration of municipalities of Lavezares and Victoria;
failure of elections, which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166.20 2] Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the elections on the ground of
terrorism; and
Further, Abayon argues that even if the HRET had jurisdiction to annul election results, it still committed
grave abuse of discretion in this particular case for lack of legal and factual bases. He avers that there was
361 of 669
Tonog (PISSupt. Tonog), then Provincial Director of Northern Samar; and Col. Roberto S. Capulong no clear and convincing evidence to establish that terrorism affected more than 50% of the votes cast and
(Col. Capulong), Operations Officer of the 8 Division, Philippine Army in Catbalogan, Samar. Daza
th
that it was impossible to distinguish the good votes from the bad. Abayon heavily relies on the respective
explained that the totality of his evidence clearly and convincingly showed that the NDFEV, through certifications issued by the COMELEC and the Philippine National Police (PNP) that the elections in
violence, intimidation and threats conducted before and during elections, harassed voters in the contested Northern Samar were orderly and peaceful.
precincts to vote for Abayon and threatened them should they not do so.
Also, Abayon laments that his right to due process was violated because the HRET did not exhibit the
In its Consolidated Comment, dated March 28, 2016, the HRET, through the Office of the Solicitor
22
cold neutrality of an impartial judge in handling the present election protest. He points out that the HRET
General, averred that it had jurisdiction to annul election results. It highlighted Rule 16 of the 2011 HRET granted Daza's motion to present additional witnesses without him being granted the opportunity to be
Rules stating that the election or returns of a proclaimed House Representative may be assailed in an heard. Abayon also reiterates that his counterprotest was unceremoniously dismissed.
election protest if the election or returns were attended by specific acts or omission constituting electoral
frauds, anomalies or irregularities, which necessarily included acts of terrorism to dissuade voters from Position of Respondent Daza
casting their vote or to alter the results of the election.
In his Consolidated Comment,21 dated March 28, 2016, Daza countered that the petition (G.R. No.
The HRET faulted Abayon in claiming that the case was similar to a declaration of failure of elections 222236) should be dismissed because it contained fatal violations of the Rules of Court. He cited the
which was under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc, pursuant to R.A. No. 7166. It reasoned that following infractions: (1) forum shopping; (2) the resolution dismissing Abayon's protest had become
mere allegation of terrorism would not immediately convert the case to a nullification case because final and executory for his failure to file a motion for reconsideration thereof; and (3) the petition did not
terrorism was an act resulting in either failure of elections or electoral fraud, anomaly, or irregularity, indicate in its caption the original case number before the HRET. Moreover, Daza contended that the
which can only be protested through an election protest. Moreover, the HRET claimed that it did not
commit grave abuse of discretion as its decision in favor of Daza was supported by clear and convincing petition was without merit because the HRET could continue or discontinue the revision
evidence. As such, it concluded that its decision should be sustained. proceedings motu propio. In addition, he stated that the case had been mooted by the promulgation of the
HRET decision declaring him as the winner in the last electoral process.
The HRET further stated that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Abayon's counter
protest because it had the prerogative to discontinue the revision proceedings. It likewise elucidated that Further, Daza posited that the HRET had jurisdiction to annul the election results on the ground of
Abayon was not deprived of due process when his counterprotest was dismissed because he was given terrorism. He questioned the present petition (G.R. No. 223032) as it raised factual issues, which was
his day in court. outside the province of a Rule 65 petition. He stressed that the Court could only exercise its certiorari
jurisdiction in cases of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET. Daza further stated that even if
The HRET underscored that Abayon did not move for reconsideration when his counterprotest was the Court were to review the factual findings of the HRET, it would still find clear and convincing
denied, hence, the resolution became final and executory. evidence to justify the annulment of election results in the contested precincts. He asserted that the
testimonies of the voters and residents of the concerned precincts were corroborated by P/SSupt. Isaias B.
362 of 669
Both Abayon and Daza do not contest the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET to decide election protests Finally, the HRET posited that it did not violate Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution 23 because the
filed against members of the House of Representatives. They, however, diverge as to the extent of its assailed resolutions were merely interlocutory orders and, even if they were considered decisions or final
jurisdiction. orders, they sufficiently stated the facts and law upon which they were based as there was no proscription
against the court's adoption of the narration of facts made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties.
An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities. 25 It aims to The Court's Ruling
determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore,
entitled to hold the office. 26 The petitions are impressed with merit.
The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to the The HRET Jurisdiction
COMELEC to declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, which Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution clearly spells out HRET's jurisdiction, to wit:
necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities committed
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
before, during or after the elections. To deprive the HRET the prerogative to annul elections would
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election contests. The phrase "election, returns and
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
contestee' s title. 27
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
Consequently, the annulment of election results is but a power concomitant to the HRET' s constitutional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist
mandate to determine the validity of the contestee' s title. system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it [Emphasis Supplied]
had remained originally in the legislature. 28 Thus, the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to
Abayon argues that the annulment of the election results in the contested precincts was beyond the
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, may annul election
jurisdiction of the HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the
of members of the House of Representatives. He claims that under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166, 24 only the
annulment. Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the
COMELEC En Banc has jurisdiction to annul elections or declare a failure of elections. Daza, on the other
candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast.
hand, counters that the power of the HRET to annul election results, where terrorism, fraud or other
irregularities are existent, differs from the power of the COMELEC to declare failure of elections or annul
elections pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7166.
363 of 669
Thus, the COMELEC exercises its quasijudicial function when it decides election contests not otherwise To the Court's mind, the HRET had jurisdiction to determine whether there was terrorism in the contested
reserved to other electoral tribunals by the Constitution. The COMELEC, however, does not exercise its precincts. In the event that the HRET would conclude that terrorism indeed existed in the said precincts,
quasijudicial functions when it declares a failure of elections pursuant to R.A. No. 7166. Rather, the then it could annul the election results in the said precincts to the extent of deducting the votes received by
COMELEC performs its administrative function when it exercises such power. Daza and Abayon in order to remain faithful to its constitutional mandate to determine who among the
candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast.
R.A. No. 7166 was enacted to empower the COMELEC to be most effective in the performance of its
sacred duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections. 31 Further, a closer perusal of Section 6 Moreover, the passage of R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to annul
of the Omnibus Election Code readily reveals that it is more in line with the COMELEC's administrative elections in the exercise of its sole and exclusive authority conferred by no less than the Constitution. It
function of ensuring that elections are free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible, and not its quasi must be remembered that the COMELEC exercises quasijudicial, quasilegislative and administrative
judicial function to adjudicate election contests. The said provision reads: functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC,29 the Court expounded, to wit:
Sec. 6. Failure of elections If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasilegislative, and quasijudicial.
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure The quasijudicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies; and of all
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasilegislative power refers to the
due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions
orwhich resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative Junction refers to the enforcement and
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the administration of election laws. in the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IXA)
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations
to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
[Emphasis Supplied]
The quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of
In Sambarani v. COMELEC; the Court clarified the nature of the COMELEC's power to declare failure
32
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
of elections, to wit: by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. 30
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and [Emphases Supplied]
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
364 of 669
Annulment of elections only and recall." Indisputably, the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the
warranted in exceptional necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve its primordial objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
circumstances peaceful and credible elections.
Abayon asserts that even if the HRET had jurisdiction to annul the elections in the concerned precincts, The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and administrative in
the latter nonetheless acted with grave abuse of discretion because the circumstances did not warrant the nature. It is elementary in administrative law that "courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
nullification of the results in the contested precincts. He explains that Daza failed to sufficiently establish to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
that terrorism was so prevalent in the said clustered precincts that it had adversely affected the right of the the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies." The authority given to COMELEC to
majority of residents to vote and that made it impossible to differentiate the valid votes from the invalid declare a failure of elections and to call for special elections falls under its administrative function.33
ones.
[Emphasis Supplied]
It must be remembered that "[t]he power to declare a failure of elections should be exercised with utmost
care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt that the disregard of the law had Consequently, the difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration
been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what votes are of failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the former is an incident of the judicial
lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of the function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative
voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election results connected with the election contest
franchise." 35 Consequently, a protestant alleging terrorism in an election protest must establish by clear before it whereas the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in
and convincing evidence that the will of the majority has been muted by"violence, intimidation or threats. the concerned precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to
determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the
The Court agrees with the observation of HRET Member and esteemed colleague, Associate Justice other hand, declares a failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which
Diosdado M. Peralta (Justice Peralta), that the circumstances in the case at bench did not warrant the were not held or were suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC
nullification of the election in the concerned clustered precincts. The Court quotes the pertinent portions declares a failure of elections, special elections will have to be conducted. 34
of his dissent in the HRET decision, to wit:
Hence, there is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections on
Protestant's evidence is utterly weak, unclear and unconvincing. The Tribunal, in Balindong v. the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative
Macarambon, Jr., declared that "[t]here should be clear and convincing evidence to nullify an election. It capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in the
is the duty of the courts to sustain an election authorized by law if it has so conducted as to give performance of their quasijudicial functions.
substantially a free and fair expression of the popular will, and actual result thereof is clearly ascertained.
When a person elected obtained a considerable plurality of votes over his adversary, and the evidence
365 of 669
Moreover, at the time of the alleged submission to the offices of the Provincial and Regional Directors, offered to rebut such a result is neither solid nor decisive, it would be imprudent to quash the election, as
Philippine National Police (PNP), of intelligence reports regarding the commission of massive terroristic that would be to oppose without reason the popular will solemnly expressed in suffrage."
acts, Comelec Resolution No. 9583 xxx was already effective. Upon validation of intelligence reports, the
logical step that should have been undertaken by the PNP, which is in accord with human experience, was x x x
to report also such terroristic acts to the Comelec in order to place under its immediate and direct control
and supervision the political divisions, subdivision, unit or area affected by "serious armed threats" to There are two (2) indispensable requisites that must concur in order to justify the drastic action of
ensure the holding of free, peaceful, honest, orderly and credible elections. However, no evidence on nullifying the election:
reporting to the Comelec for said purpose was made to concretize protestant's postulation of
(1) The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fiftypercent (50%) of the votes cast on the specific
massive terrorism. The protestant himself did not even bother to report to the COMELEC the
precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or in case of the entire municipality, more than fifty percent
alleged terroristic acts in order to control or prevent such serious armed threats and to ensure the holding
(50%) of its total precincts and the votes cast therein; and
of free, peaceful, honest, orderly and credible elections. Protestant also did not report the matter to the
police so that the alleged persons committing such terroristic acts would be arrested and the proper cases
(2) It is impossible to distinguish with reasonablecertainty between the lawful and unlawful ballots. xxx
filed against them in court. It is thus highly doubtful that such terroristic acts, as protestant claimed,
existed. Such actuation by protestant is simply not in accord with human experience.
While protestant's witnesses, Messrs. Crisanto G. Camposano, Alex B. Rimbao and Melquiades T.
Bornillo, contended that they are residents and voters of Barangay Salvacion, Barangay Toog and
Since public officers like those in the PNP are presumed to have regularly performed their official duties,
Barangay Datag, respectively, and merely voted for protestee out of fear of the said armed partisans, not a
given the foregoing intelligence reports, and the effectivity as well during the election period xxx of
single ballot or vote cast by said witnesses and/ or other voters allegedly subjected to terroristic acts had
Comelec Resolution No. 9561Axxx it is expected that they would have assigned their forces therein to
been identified and the effect thereof, proven extensive or massive. Failing in this regard, the Tribunal
protect not only the life and limb of the voters, but also their right to vote. In fact, in his postelection
cannot order the annulment of votes for protestee, as prayed for by protestant. The validity of the results
memorandum addressed to the Regional Director dated May 27, 2013, P /SSupt. Tonog, then Provincial
of the elections in the protested clustered precincts must be upheld.
Director, mentioned about the strict implementation of "PRO8 LOI 20/2012 "SAFE 2013 WARAY"
through the Provincial Special Operations Task Group, Secure and Fair Elections 2013 (PSOTGSAFE
It is worthy to note that no evidence was presented which will directly point to protestee as the one
2013)." Hence, it is incredible that there were as many as five (5) NPA armed partisan at the school
responsible for the incidents which allegedly happened before and during the elections. Absent anything
premises for the purpose of overseeing that the voters in involved barangays would not be supporting
that would concretely and directly establish protestee as the one who had induced or actually perpetrated
protestant on the day of the elections. Such circumstance was not even reflected in the memorandum of
the commission of terroristic acts and demonstrate that those incidents were part of a scheme to frustrate
P /SSupt. Tonog.36
the free expression of the will of the electorate, the alluded handing of material considerations, including
guns, to the NDFEV officials, and the garnering of votes higher than those of the protestant in the
[Emphases Supplied]
protested clustered precincts, do not per se make him, responsible for the charges of terrorism.
366 of 669
with official pronouncements of government agencies, which are presumed to be issued in the regular It is on record that Daza presented several residents of the concerned precincts to illustrate how NDFEV
performance of their duties. members terrorized the residents of the said precincts before and during the elections to ensure Daza's
defeat to Abayon. The Court, nevertheless, observes that only three (3) witnesses testified that they voted
In Tan v. COMELEC,37 the Court found wanting the testimony of a sole witness to substantiate the claim for Abayon out of fear from the NDFEV. The other witnesses merely described the alleged violence
of terrorism which disenfranchised a majority of voters and gave more credence to official statements of committed by the NFDEV but did not expound whether the same had ultimately made other voters vote
government agencies, to wit: for Abayon.
We agree with the finding of the COMELEC en bane that the evidence relied upon by petitioners to Neither did the testimonies of P/SSupt. Tonog and Col. Capulong corroborate the fact that the alleged
support their charges of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of elections in the questioned terrorism by the NDFEV caused voters to vote for Abayon. These testimonies do not prove that voters in
municipalities consisted of affidavits prepared and executed by their own representatives; and that the the concerned precincts indeed voted for Abayon out of fear of the NDFEV. For one, Col. Capulong
other pieces of evidence submitted by petitioners were not credible and inadequate to substantiate simply stated that the NDFEV would want to see that politicians and candidates whom they call "enemies
petitioners' charges of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of elections. Mere affidavits are insufficient, of the people" be defeated in the elections. Further, as noted by Justice Peralta, P/SSupt. Tonog's Post
more so, when they were executed by petitioners' poll watchers. The conclusion of respondent Election Memorandum did not state that NDFEV armed partisans were present in the course of the
COMELEC is correct that although petitioners specifically alleged violence, terrorism, fraud, and other elections.
irregularities in the conduct of elections, they failed to substantiate or prove said allegations. Had there
been massive disenfranchisement, petitioners should have presented the affidavits of these Daza presented three (3) voters as witnesses to establish that they were coerced by NDFEV armed
disenfranchised voters, instead of only a single affidavit of one allegedly disenfranchised voter. partisan to vote for Abayon during the 2013 Elections. Their collective testimonies, however, fail to
impress. First, their testimonies made no reference to Abayon's alleged participation in the purported
We go along with the COMELEC en bane in giving more weight to the affidavits and certifications terroristic acts committed by the NDFEV. Second, Daza's witnesses alone are insufficient to prove that
executed by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors and the PNP and military authorities that the indeed terrorism occurred in the contested precincts and the same affected at least 50% of the votes cast
elections held were peaceful and orderly, under the presumption that their official duties had been therein. The testimonies of three (3) voters can hardly represent the majority that indeed their right to vote
regularly performed. 38 was stifled by violence. With the allegation of widespread terrorism, it would have been more prudent for
Daza to present more voters who were coerced to vote for Abayon as a result of the NDFEV's purported
[Emphasis Supplied] violence and intimidation.
The testimonies of a minute portion of the registered voters in the said precincts should not be used as a Indubitably, the numbers mattered considering that both the COMELEC and the PNP issued
tool to silence the voice of the majority expressed through their votes during elections. To do so would certifications stating that no failure of elections occurred in Northern .Saf11ar and that the elections was
disenfranchise the will of the majority and reward a candidate not chosen by the people to be their generally peaceful and orderly. The unsubstantiated testimonies of Daza's witnesses falter when faced
367 of 669
District of Northern Samar to be their Representative in Congress. Hence, Abayon should be reinstated as representative. With such dire consequences, it is but expected that annulment of elections be judiciously
the duly elected Representative of the said legislative district. exercised with utmost caution and resorted only in exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, Daza cannot claim that the issue had been mooted by his assumption to office because the It is true that in Vilando v. HRET,39 the Court recognized that the power granted to the HRET by the
same is premised on the fact that the HRET had correctly ruled Daza to be the duly elected representative. Constitution is full, clear and complete, which excludes the exercise of any authority by the Court that
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening may restrict or curtail, or affect the same. 40 The Court, nevertheless, clarified in Tagolino v. HRET41 that
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 44 In the present case, there is the HRET's independence is not without limits as the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over it if only to
still a justiciable controversywho between Daza and Abayon was truly chosen by the majority of voters check whether it had gravely abused its discretion. 42 As such, the Court will not hesitate to set aside the
of the First Legislative District of Northern Samar to be their representative. HRET's decision favoring Daza if it was tainted with grave abuse of discretion on its part.
DECLARED to be the law.fully elected Representative of the First Legislative District ofNorthem Samar [Emphasis Supplied]
in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
As discussed above, the decision of the HRET was clearly unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. Thus, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the elections in the contested precincts
and disregarding the respective number of votes received by Abayon and Daza from the precincts, which
SO ORDERED. led to its conclusion that Daza was the one elected by the majority of voters in the First Legislative
368 of 669
369 of 669
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The transcendental importance to the public of cases where
vs.
serious constitutional questions are involved demands that they be settled promptly and brushing aside
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS
the technicalities of procedure.—The respondent’s contention that he has been improperly impleaded is
SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.
even less persuasive. While he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the
petitioner’s removal, we feel that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Political question defined; The Supreme Court has the
controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner
competence to act in the case at bar since it involved the legality of the act of the House of
is actually questioning the respondent’s right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.—Ruling first on the
another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases that where serious constitutional
jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent’s assertion, the Court has the competence to
question are involved, “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.”
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s expanded jurisdiction includes the
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in
been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the goverment; Case at bar.—To summarize, then,
Tanada v. Cuenco: x x x the term political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
we hold, in view of the foregoing consideration, that the issue presented to us is justiciable rather political,
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, x x x it refers “to those questions which, under the
involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is
nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave
Same; Same; Same; Same; Expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court conferred by
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
Art. VII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution; Case at bar.—In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same maybe brushed aside, conformably to
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised maybe addressed. Lastly, we resolve
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
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Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
attained political stability.
CRUZ, J.:
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDPLaban, the NPUnido, the Liberal
required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A.
Commission on Appointments. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court. realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned
from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows: their former party to only 17 members. 2
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations newlyformed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of
registered under the partylist system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty additional member from the LDP. 3
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
the Members. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same
the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.4
of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is
involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on
Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v.
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Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion
decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primiciasmember and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senatebehalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional ... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of the question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity of the proceeding in connection therewith. In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of two
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been validly
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the minority
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nineman composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the
statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied) 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that
Charter, the six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and determine nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
the principal issue raised by the parties herein." largest number of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could
nominate only three members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise
involved the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of the
or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives. petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument,
holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in justiciable and not a political question, thus:
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
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resolved.' It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being barely six established by law.
months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate
invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
with no choice then; we must act on the matter. which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent are of the Government.
invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a
quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one. The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may
be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that this
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one thing,
Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the
the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For another, we have held as
the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the
House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been
House representation in the Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held through
originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority. Chief Justice Fernando:
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five members of the Court.
Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be restrained from
Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the performing any specific act, this suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory
rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted. opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a
majority would affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the a petition for prohibition.
Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political
group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional
Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held: multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now
373 of 669
with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held ... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less
by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the socalled "Allied Majority," does not
said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution. suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the
Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who was in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ,
supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerably simplify like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.
the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the nonregistration of
the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the
reorganization. As he insists: Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IXB, Section 2(5), in relation
to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the socalled party has not yet achieved
(c) Assuming that the socalled new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have died "a
reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered political bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP No.
881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered in determining the required The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly
proportional representation of political parties in the House of Representatives. 9
allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only
that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDPLaban
xxx xxx xxx and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That change
fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP
... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly registered
with the Comelec. 10 Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION
Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of
August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken the Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take
wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can. appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently
thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the
permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in
ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed
the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the
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As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The
congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of
said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the
only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan. Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four
months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us is Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers
justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, of the Congress.
or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the
question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the
to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its
designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in
aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone
Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in discord.
the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do
not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that
matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to
jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six
resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely
discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the
evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath. Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now
opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is
LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution requires is that there be at G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the Commission shall rule by majority vote
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKASNATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN
of all the members and in Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the
DEMOCRATS (LAKASNUCD), petitioners,
call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members “to discharge such powers and functions herein
vs.
conferred upon it.”
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, respondents.
Same; Same; The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve (12) Senators
and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in order that the Commission may function.—It NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitionerinintervention.
is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve (12) senators
and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Constitutional Law; Commission on Appointments; Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the
Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their functions even if context of the alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance and the
not fully constituted and even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constitution. Among these transcendental importance to the public of the case demands that they be settled promptly and definitely
are the Supreme Court, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Election, Commission on Audit. They brushing aside xxx technicalities of procedure.—There is no doubt that the issues involved herein are
perform their functions so long as there is the required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The constitutional in nature and are of vital importance to our nation. They involve the interpretation of
Commission on Appointments may perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a Commission on Appointments. Where
senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists. constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a
Same; Same; Court declares the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto relatively minor significance, and the “transcendental importance to the public of the case demands that
Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the rule they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside x x x technicalities of procedure.”
on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
—In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the matter Same; Same; Provision of Section 18 on proportional representation mandatory in character.—
before this Court, We declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Ta ñada as The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
members of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the rule on any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional
proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of
Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator Romulo and Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority.
Senator Tañada to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of members of the Same; Same; Court does not agree with respondents’ claim that it is mandatory to elect 12
Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondent Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his Senators to the Commission on Appointments.—We do not agree with respondents’ claim that it is
capacity as exofficio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, to desist from recognizing the mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution does not
contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators and
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3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political parties membership of the respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and
and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments. participating as members of said Commission.
4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multiparty system which CAMPOS, JR., J.:
contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the
Commission. In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Tañada on October 27, 1992 and
respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992, said
On December 16, 1992, the petitionerin intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed its respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following
separate Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7, 1993 grounds:
their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents.
Senator Tañada alleges that:
Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the
reasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the 1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents;
following grounds:
2) The decision ignored the reality of the multiparty system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the
1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 1935 and 1987 Constitutions;
Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof.
3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of the
political parties represented in the Senate is as follows: 4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Tañada to the
Commission on Appointments.
LDP — 7.5
LPPDPLABAN — .5 In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:
NPC — 2.5
LAKASNUCD — 1.5 1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng vs.
Mitra, Jr.1 and Daza vs. Singson.2
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the
basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of 2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The function as a constitutional body.
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP
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power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by
membership in the Commission. 3
adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on
The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada in the Commission on Appointments for the year Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of
alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the former Senator's Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be
Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 19531954. 4 In the following years based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave
the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from the Nacionalista more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party — either the
Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within their own ranks. LAKASNUCD or the NPC.
During this period, his membership in the Commission was acquiesced to by the other members of the
Senate, including the Nationalista Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in the Commission xxx xxx xxx
was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the Senate so that the question of whether
his sitting as member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
older Tañada's membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by respondent election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Senator Tañada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that
Constitution. twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the
It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada, he had his Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
Citizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the banner of proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing
the latter party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone
representative of the Citizens' Party.5 Senator Tañada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in 1953 The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional
of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again got representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of
reelected in 1965 for another 6year term under the Nationalista Party. The NationalistaCitizens Party Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a
coalition of 12 Senators in the Senate from proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on
19651967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late Senator the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than
Lorenzo Tañada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional representation in what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to
the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more
membership in the Commission. This practice was repeated in
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Senator Tañada (along with the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties — NPC and LAKAS 19681970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the
NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for election and votation those previously nominated by Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional
the various political parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in the Commission representation to the Commission, with the late Senator Tañada becoming the 16th Senator of the
on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved: Coalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator Tañada
filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing the Coalition in the
Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for election to the Commission.
Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its membership : Senators Angara, Herrera,
Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and Osmeña for The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect any
NPC; Senator Rasul, for LakasNUCD; and Senator Tañada for LPPDP, Mr. President. 9
practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of the
constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No practice
4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multiparty or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of
system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of the
minimum membership in each house. The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson to the effect
10 11
constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative interpretation of a
that "under the Constitutional provision on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature.6
members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority parties therein but extends to all the
political parties represented in each house of Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean 2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of the
that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in the Senate, are entitled by Senators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and
Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the subsequent including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the LakasNUCDP. Respondents, however, accepted
case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. made this clear where it ruled that proportional representation in the
12
the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political party to the
Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each house. The mere Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each political party at
presence of one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate. 7 In fact,
membership in the Commission on Appointments. respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the LakasNUCDP upheld the doctrine
enunciated in Daza vs. Singson,8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the Commission
5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on
elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and Appointments. The issue therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision.
that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI,
Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of 3) Senator Tañada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the party must
the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LPLDPLABAN. It was the
is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to elect respondent
380 of 669
Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even
quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the case at bar.
validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto.
Even if respondent Senator Tañada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:
the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the Commission
in the presence of house members from the LPLDPLABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of proportional
Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the representation . . . .
impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote:
The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the composition of
. . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition with the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of
another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision. 15 Section 18 which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation. This interpretation finds support in the case of Tañada vs. Cuenco, 13 where this Court held
The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to the
case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be elected on the basis of proportional
explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring
join their halfmemberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition to proportional representation must prevail. Such interpretation is the only correct and rational interpretation
the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and the LAKASNUCD may join their half which the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the Constitution and give effect
memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the the meaning intended by its framers to every clause and word thereof.
LDP and the LPPDPLABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Tañada to fill up the other slot to
complete the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve
Tañada and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the
proportional representation. Commission on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only
Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as members while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such
of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed by the powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the
Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to
proportional representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional representation constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum
has been a settled rule — that it belongs to this Court. should come from either house". 14 Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the
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The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse concerning
the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the Supreme Court
is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18
of the Constitution is a function of this Court.
Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this
Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The framers
of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in the Supreme
Court the role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the fundamental law. In this role,
the Court serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence the
minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by force of numbers.
The election of respondents Senators Tañada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional
provision and when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion. We quote from our decision:
. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments
by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers
during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where
power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of
numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority
granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. 16
For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
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respected”. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS
Same; Same.—As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the
JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO
jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it
CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO
vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned
LIMJAP, petitioners,
Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator
vs.
which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through
the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an
the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
inquiry is proposed to be made.
Same; Judicial power.—It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decided to
conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 had already been filed
with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action Constitutional Law; Judicial review of legislative actions.—The “allocation of constitutional
against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations boundaries” is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
belonging to Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by case, “(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
the filing of petitioners’ respective answers thereto, the issue sougth to be investigated by the respondent claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
been preempted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.” The Court is thus of the considered view
issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of
between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee’s judgment were to be the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid
reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the of legislation.
ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted. In fine, for the respondent Committee to Same; Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.—The 1987 Constitution
probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. xxx
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, xxx, absolute or
Same; Rights of accused; Right against selfincrimination.—One of the basic rights guaranteed by unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
the Constitution to an individual is the right against selfincrimination. This right construed as the right to provided therein, the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may be invoked by rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
other witnesses only as questions are asked of them. xxx Moreover, this right of the accused is extended
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(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal
Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, the Court reiterated the
Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right
Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings against selfincrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit.
groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S.
Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business enterprises in PADILLA, J.:
the Philippines, such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial schemes and techniques This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to
negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez... testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirtysix (36) or thirtynine (39) corporations.
x x x x x x x x x
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairman Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035
Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for
M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the
amount of P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the
viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as
more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987. party defendants.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986 The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers
of the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. 14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves
Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
intended to conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in
jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the
and collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant Complaint. Filipino people, among others:
384 of 669
unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the excess (o) manuevered, with the technical knowhow and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and
over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.,
for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986); Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant
Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial expertise & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI)
of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported
Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3,
Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government on February
Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the illgotten wealth of Benjamin T. 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and
Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his ownership of
Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to PCGG the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S.
despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior managers who still control and
shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious sale, the
Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger abovenamed defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the Government;
company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly owned by them although the truth is
that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez. (p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented by
Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta,
x x x x x x x x x Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI
August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b)
carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had "Deposit in Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million
not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment
lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the
March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting
for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves
Lopa, the President's brotherinlaw, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for the unlawful dismantling or
the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30percent ceiling prescribed by
value of their assets. 3 Section 12B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law declares as
385 of 669
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "takeover
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional
personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and
question raised by the respondent Committee. called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5
Thereafter,
the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa
regular and special commitees — like what petitioners seek — from making inquiries in aid of legislation,
were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the
under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government.
"sale of thirtysix (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not hrough may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose
exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution as those of the other petitioners who are his codefendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided Sandiganbayan.
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file
departments of the government...
their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June
x x x x x x x x x 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and
continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping and
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no
interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning
to say just where the political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
order and/or injunctive relief.
or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention, 8
which the Court
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
granted in the resolution of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
9
x x x x x x x x x Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.
386 of 669
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into;
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15
Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
thatn that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in the determination
inquiries may refer to the implementation or reexamination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone. their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16
the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it,
Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
legislate or to expel a member.
given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 13
speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue
legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the
Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation.
speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was
published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having
387 of 669
The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President: taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to
Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because they said Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview
another representation was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and
sequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are
discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we malicious.
attempted to carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our
request to make available to us the records of the company. In fact it was obviously clear that they will The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail
meet us with forcethe moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation
threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges
more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly influential represetation being made that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in
by SOLOIL for us not to continue our work." his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I received,
Mr. President: Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa,
wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies
"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant which includes SOLOIL Incorporated.
Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that
there have been divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is xxx xxxx xxx
the brotherinlaw of the President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who
we know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential
When he demanded for supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose
Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July
submitted directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a
this Commission and even to the President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him
government." that relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so
that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa.
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally
confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988. I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.
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Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make its own xxx xxxx xxx
conclusion.
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."
upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The
AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:
respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at
therefore, no intended legislation involved. issue.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious
to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator statements.
Jose D. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
of nongovernmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look
into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the
adopted a "getrichquick scheme" for its nomineedirectors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The
case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section
pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
5 of which reads as follows and I quote:
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by
consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the SolicitorGeneral has stated that the
President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of
to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
"ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to
Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of
answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "getrichquick
office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government
scheme" for its nomineedirectors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;
along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of
WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of nongovernmental organization had which is not discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with
made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a
profession.
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Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA
unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in revolution took place and that the illgotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will
terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this benefit our people such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration,
case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and and employment generation for rural and urban workers;
judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance
of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of the WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and private lives
investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied) integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and
lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom,
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.
petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of
that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be
therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article
Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers XVIII of the Constitution. 19
thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the
been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been preempted by that court. To allow the
implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan
would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and,
possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be
secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
discounted.
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "AntiGraft and
before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa
that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, it was held that:
21 died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held held:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into ... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is
those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or
within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the
purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
390 of 669
of witnesses to invoke the right against selfincrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.
other types of suit Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...
It was held that: Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant
We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 22
refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against selfincrimination only
when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly In another case —
then, it is not the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The
... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the
privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. that overbalances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not
unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 23
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against selfincrimination. 24
Thir right constured as the right to
questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of
remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by
separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the
other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.
Constitution.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the
al. 25 thus —
circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan,
which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry. requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand
and refuse to answer any all questions.
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if
they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs.
Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right
391 of 669
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007
court or a quasijudicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation—the
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA
exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI CHANDRASHEKAR,
component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.— The mere
MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS,
filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasijudicial body should not
RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and FERNAND TANSINGCO, Petitioners,
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
vs.
subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, as
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
represented by its Chairperson, HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA, Respondent.
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation. As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 Legislature; Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; Judgments; Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon, Jr. v.
(1950)—[T]he power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 (1991)—that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation—was the Court’s dete
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the rmination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation.—It is true that in Bengzon, the Court
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which is not infrequently true— declared that the issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction had already been acquired by the
recourse must be had to others who possess it. Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create
the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would
Same; Same; Same; Contempt; The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier. To the
to punish contempt is based on the principle of selfpreservation—as the branch of the government vested extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and
with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign
contumacious acts against it.— The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to securities, there is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.
punish contempt is based on the principle of selfpreservation. As the branch of the government vested Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon—that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any
with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation—was the Court’s determination that the
contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which
functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and sought such investigation contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon
coordinate branches of government. In this case, petitioners’ imputation that the investigation was “in aid the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019.
of collection” is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive
to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.
392 of 669
In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling Same; Same; Contempt; It is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the
state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA power to compel the attendance of witnesses, and corollary to the power to compel the attendance of
424 (1968), there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative
information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in investigation.—It is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the
regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to
state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at
investigation. bench, considering that most of the officers of SCBPhilippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily
Same; Same; Same; Right against SelfIncrimination; Witnesses; The right of the accused against evade the compulsive character of respondent’s summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the
selfincrimination is extended in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said
analogous to criminal proceedings—the privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a
sanctioned by law; and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying
party or not.—As regards the issue of selfincrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCBPhilippines, are petitioners’ intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them.
not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent merely as
resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this Court—[An] accused Same; Same; Same; Right to Privac y; Right to Information; Rational Basis Relationship
occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be Test; While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of
compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be
answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry; The right of the people to access information on
any and all questions. Concededly, this right of the accused against selfincrimination is extended to matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions;
respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal Under the rational basis relationship test, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy
proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and where the requirement to disclose information is for a valid purpose, such as, to ensure that the
to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. However, government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who
in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by the invest in foreign securities.—With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI
before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation,
answer is propounded. not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It may be conceded that Congress is In Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 (2006), we have held that the right of the people to access information
without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits but the on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions.
393 of 669
investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of authority of that body, directly or through its Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its
persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such own constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use
a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the in such suits; The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is
liabilities of the offender. for the punishment of persons who transgress the law while the intent of legislative inquiries, on the other
hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law.—Petitioners’
NACHURA, J.: argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a recommendation for their prosecution
by the appropriate government agencies, such as the Department of Justice or the Office of the
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Ombudsman, does not persuade. As held in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692, 698
Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate Committee on
(1928)—It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by its Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara
aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its Committees,
(respondent).
to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the
information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. x x x It is plain that investigation of the
Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)Philippines is an institution incorporated in England with
limited liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the Philippines. matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution
Petitioners Paul Simon Morris, Sundara Ramesh, Owen Belman, Sanjay Aggarwal, Rajamani of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action. The
Chandrashekar, Marivel Gonzales, Ma. Ellen Victor, Chona G. Reyes, Zenaida Iglesias, Ramona Bernad, prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is for the punishment
Michaelangelo Aguilar, and Fernand Tansingco are the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a
Officer, Country Head of Consumer Banking, General Manager for Credit Card and Personal Loans, policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law.
Chief Financial Officer, Legal and Compliance Officer, former Trust and Investment Services Head,
Country Tax Officer, Head of Corporate Affairs, Head of Banking Services, Head of Client Relationships, Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Except only when the Congress and/or its Committees
and the Head of Global Markets of SCBPhilippines, respectively. Respondent, on the other hand, is one exercises the power to punish for contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming
of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines. evidence of criminal culpability—it can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a
The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1)
recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable.—Except only when it
proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling
exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the other Committees of the Senate or
petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCBPhilippines to attend and testify before any further hearing
of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of
to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold
criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent can
departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be
rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the
394 of 669
WHEREAS, Standard Chartered Bank was among the foreign banks granted the privilege to do business prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being
in our country under Republic Act No. 7721; conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.
WHEREAS, there are complaints against Standard Chartered Bank whose actions have reportedly The facts are as follows:
defrauded hundreds of Filipino investors of billions of pesos through the sale of unregistered securities in
the form of highrisk mutual funds falsely advertised and marketed as safe investment havens; On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege
speech entitled "Arrogance of Wealth" 1 before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo
WHEREAS, there are reports that Standard Chartered Bank clearly knew that its actions were violative of denouncing SCBPhilippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities
Philippine banking and securities laws but cleverly disguised its illegal acts through the use of proforma Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
agreements containing waivers of liability in favor of the bank; legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator
Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile
WHEREAS, there are reports that in the early stages of conducting these questionable activities, the had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166,2 to wit:
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas warned and eventually fined Standard Chartered Bank a measly ₱30,000 for
violating Philippine banking laws; RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the sale of unregistered securities is also a clear violation of Republic Act No. 8799 or "The WHEREAS, to promote greater competition in the Philippine Banking Industry, foreign banks were
Securities Regulation Code of 2000" which states: accorded the same privileges, allowed to perform the same functions and subjected to the same limitations
under relevant banking laws imposed upon domestic banks;
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Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial "Section 8.1 Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale or distribution within the Philippines, without a
hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and registration statement duly filed with and approved by the Commission. Prior to such sale, information on
resolution filed by Senator Enrile. the securities, in such form and with such substance as the Commission may prescribe, shall be made
available to each prospective purchaser."
Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their
written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter 3 dated February 24, WHEREAS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reportedly issued a CeaseandDesist Order
2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly (CDO) against Standard Chartered Bank for the sale of these unregistered securities but the case was
involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction reportedly settled administratively and dismissed after Standard Chartered Bank paid a fine of ₱7 Million;
of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
WHEREAS, the SEC reportedly made an official finding that Standard Chartered Bank actively engaged
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among in promoting and marketing the socalled "Global Third Party Mutual Funds" to the investing public and
those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved even set revenue quotas for the sale of these funds;
that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the
Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing
and/or include them in the Bureau’s Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the
was approved. investing public from fraudulent practices;
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in preventing
through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of
4 the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing public;
proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack
of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind the
there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCBPhilippines of imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives
unregistered foreign securities. among other additional regulatory measures;
The February 28, 2005 hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next hearing date. However, Now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to direct the Committee on Banks,
petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum to compel Currencies, and Financial Institutions, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the reported sale of
them to attend and testify at the hearing set on March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition. unregistered and highrisk securities by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to
the investing public.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners are as follows:
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IV. I.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING ITS OWN RULES. 5
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN CONDUCTING AN
INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY PROBING INTO
Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject matter is THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE STANDARD CHARTERED BANK HAD SOLD UNREGISTERED
the very same subject matter of the following cases, to wit: FOREIGN SECURITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES. SAID ISSUE HAS LONG BEEN THE SUBJECT OF
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS NOW PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS,
(a) CAG.R. SP No. 85078, entitled "Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza P. Rosario, et al., pending REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY
before the 9th Division of the Court of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF MAKATI CITY.
the dismissal by the Department of Justice of his complaint against Standard Chartered Bank and its
officers accusing them of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN VIOLATION II.
OF P.D. NO. 1869 (SYNDICATED ESTAFA) AND ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE. THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION BY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY "IN AID OF
(b) CAG.R. SP No. 86200, entitled "Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Rafael Buenaventura, et al.", pending LEGISLATION," BUT IN REALITY IN "AID OF COLLECTION" BY A HANDFUL OF TWO (2)
before the 15th Division of the Court of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside CLIENTS OF STANDARD CHARTERED BANK OF LOSSES WHICH WERE FOR THEIR
the termination for lack of probable cause by the AntiMoney Laundering Council ("AMLC") of the ACCOUNT AND RISK. AT ANY RATE, SUCH COLLECTION IS WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF
investigation of Standard Chartered Bank for money laundering activities BY SELLING THE COURT RATHER THAN OF THE LEGISLATURE.
UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
III.
(c) CAG.R. SP No. 87328, entitled "Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza Paglinawan Rozario, et
al.," pending before the 16th Division of the Court of Appeals. The petition seeks to annul and set aside THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
the dismissal by the Department of Justice of Mr. Baviera's complaint accusing SCB and its officers of OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN COMPELLING PETITIONERS,
violation of the Securities Regulation Code by SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SOME OF WHOM ARE RESPONDENTS IN THE PENDING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS
SECURITIES. BROUGHT BY SAID CLIENTS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS’ RIGHT AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION AND RIGHT TO PURSUE AND DEFEND THEIR CAUSE IN COURT RATHER
(d) Civil Case No. 70173, entitled "Mr. Noel G. Sanchez, et al. vs. Standard Chartered Bank," pending THAN ENGAGE IN TRIAL BY PUBLICITY – A CLEAR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT
before Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Plaintiff seeks damages and recovery of their TO PRIVACY AND TO TRAVEL.
investment accusing the bank of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
397 of 669
inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of (e) Criminal Case No. 332034, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Manuel V. Baviera," pending before
judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier. Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner Morris is the private complainant in
this information for extortion or blackmail against Mr. Baviera for demanding the payment of US$2
To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and Million with the threat to EXPOSE THE BANK'S "LARGE SCALE SCAM" CONSISTING [OF]
administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign ILLEGAL SELLING OF UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES BY THE BANK, before
securities, there is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there. various government offices, such as the Department of Justice, the BIR, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
Regional Trial Courts, and both houses of Congress.
Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any
constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation was the Court’s determination that the (f) Criminal Case No. 331395, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Manuel V. Baviera," pending before
intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioners Victor and Chona Reyes are the
sought such investigation contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon private complainants in this information for perjury committed by Mr. Baviera in securing a hold
the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that departure order against the petitioners herein from the Department of Justice for their alleged involvement
the requested probe failed to comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the in syndicated estafa and swindling BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
Constitution, which states:
(g) I.S. No. 2004B227980, entitled "Aurelio Litonjua III and Aurelio Litonjua, Jr. vs. Antonette de los
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in Reyes, et al.," pending before the Office of the Prosecutor, Makati City. This is a criminal complaint
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing accusing SCB and its officers of estafa for SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.6
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,7 the petitioners claim that since the issue of
Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from proceeding with the legislative whether or not SCBPhilippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the
investigation in that case. courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach
upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not obtain in the
instant case. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not apply squarely to petitioners’ case.
being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.:
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one over which
WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon]
the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the
investing public from fraudulent practices;
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Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The Court notes WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in preventing
that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing public;
(SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical
scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind the
securities by SCBPhilippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives
remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity. among other additional regulatory measures; (emphasis supplied)
Still, petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by respondent was, in fact, "in aid of collection." They The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in
claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel Baviera, the latter a party to the pending court cases cited by petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile,
petitioners, were only seeking a friendly forum so that they could recover their investments from SCB was simply "to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign
Philippines; and that the respondent has allowed itself to be used as the conveniently available vehicle to securities x x x." This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his
effect this purpose. privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future."
However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in its Comment on the petition, Atty. Bocobo did not file
a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of recovering his investment. On the contrary, and as Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasijudicial body
confirmed during the initial hearing on February 28, 2005, his lettercomplaint humbly requested the should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely
Senate to conduct an inquiry into the purportedly illegal activities of SCBPhilippines, with the end view easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or
of preventing the future occurrence of any similar fraudulent activity by the banks in general. 9 Baviera, on an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
the other hand, was not a "complainant" but merely a witness in the investigation, invited to testify on the legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
alleged illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCBPhilippines, being one of the supposed administrative investigation.
victims thereof.
As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno 8 –
The Court further notes that when it denied petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the
hearing set on March 15, 2005,10 respondent proceeded with the investigation. On the said date, outraged [T]he power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
by petitioners’ imputation that it was conducting the investigation "in aid of collection," respondent held legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
petitioners, together with their counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, in contempt and ordered their detention respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
for six hours. body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be
had to others who possess it.
399 of 669
In this case, petitioners’ imputation that the investigation was "in aid of collection" is a direct challenge Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Court’s Resolution dated March 14, 2005
against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find only with respect to the denial of the prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified. injunction, alleging that their being held in contempt was without legal basis, as the phrase "in aid of
collection" partakes of an absolutely privileged allegation in the petition.
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the
attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to We do not agree. The Court has already expounded on the essence of the contempt power of Congress and
ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at its committees in this wise –
bench, considering that most of the officers of SCBPhilippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily
evade the compulsive character of respondent’s summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded
respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative
witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended
court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is
petitioners’ intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them. 13 impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted
the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that authority, it must have intended each department’s authority to be full and complete, independently of
privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees each other’s authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act
respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the
to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have 14
judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith,
held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over with affronts committed against its authority or dignity.11
the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is
not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the
relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc,15 there is no infringement of the individual’s right to principle of selfpreservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.
government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the
in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of
with the assailed legislative investigation.16 government.12
400 of 669
suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of suits for the As regards the issue of selfincrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCBPhilippines, are not being
cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action. indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent merely as resource
persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this Court –
The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is for the
punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to [An] accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse
Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the other to answer any and all questions.17
Committees of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even if there is
overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial Concededly, this right of the accused against selfincrimination is extended to respondents in
legislation, respondent can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The
be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in
criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.18
evidence, contained in such a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies
and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender. However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by
the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline
Finally, petitioners sought anew, in their Manifestation and Motion dated June 21, 2006, the issuance by
21
appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an
this Court of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent respondent from submitting its incriminating answer is propounded.19
Committee Report No. 75 to the Senate in plenary for approval. However, 16 days prior to the filing of
the Manifestation and Motion, or on June 5, 2006, respondent had already submitted the report to the Petitioners’ argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a recommendation for their
Senate in plenary. While there is no showing that the said report has been approved by the Senate, the prosecution by the appropriate government agencies, such as the Department of Justice or the Office of
subject of the Manifestation and Motion has inescapably become moot and academic. the Ombudsman, does not persuade.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Manifestation and Motion As held in Sinclair v. United States20
dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot and academic.
It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the
SO ORDERED. prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its Committees, to require
pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought
to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. x x x It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in
401 of 669
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. Sabio emphasizes the G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009
importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M.
incriminating questions are expected to be asked.
ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R.
CANLAS, Petitioners,
VELASCO, JR., J.:
vs.
At issue once again is Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides: SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT
AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, Respondents.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Same; Same; A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different
purposes; Ongoing judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.—A
The Case
legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand,
courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand,
injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other compulsory processes inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Development information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to
(Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any
Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. potential legislation. Ongoing judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation.
The Facts
Same; Same; Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate Committee from requiring persons to
On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of RII Builders, Inc., received from the appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
Committee an invitation, signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, which pertinently reads as
1
published rules of procedure.—With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other
follows: issues raised in this recourse. Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas
to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it
Dear Mr. Romero:
did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art.
VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit
Pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 537, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER OF THE FORMER a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in
402 of 669
Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum 4 on petitioner Romero II directing him to PRESIDENT RAMOS AND OTHERS, FOR THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF OWWA FUNDS IN THE
appear and testify before the Committee at its hearing on September 4, 2006 relative to the aforesaid SMOKEY MOUNTAIN PROJECT, CAUSING A LOSS TO OWWA OF P550.86 MILLION" and P.S.
Senate resolutions. The Committer later issued separate subpoenas to other petitioners, albeit for a
5
Resolution No. 543, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
different hearing date. EMPLOYMENT, IN ITS ONGOING INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE ALLEGED OWWA
LOSS OF P480 MILLION TO FOCUS ON THE CULPABILITY OF THEN PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS,
On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar the THEN OWWA ADMINISTRATOR WILHELM SORIANO, AND RII BUILDERS OWNER REGHIS
Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before ROMERO II," x x x the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development chaired
it pursuant to the invitations thus issued. by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the 23rd day of August
2006 at the Sen. G.T. Pecson Room, 2nd floor, Senate of the Philippines, Pasay City.
Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II appeared at the September
4, 2006 Committee investigation. The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments
to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a much needed
Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO 6 alleging, among legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions.
others, that: (1) he answered questions concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey
Mountain project and how much of OWWA’s original investment had already been paid; (2) when By virtue of the power vested in Congress by Section 21, Article VI of 1987 Constitution regarding
Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person, the latter spoke of the facts and inquiries in aid of legislation, may we have the privilege of inviting you to the said hearing to shed light
issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 7 none of which were related to on any matter, within your knowledge and competence, covered by the subject matter and purpose of the
the subject of the inquiry; and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation, he asked petitioners inquiry. Rest assured that your rights, when properly invoked and not unfounded, will be duly respected.
Romero II and Canlas to return at the resumption of the investigation. (Emphasis in the original.)
The manifestation was followed by the filing on September 19, 2006 of another urgent motion for a TRO In his letterreply2 dated August 18, 2006, petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from appearing
in which petitioners imputed to the Committee the intention to harass them as, except for petitioner and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of
Romero II, none of them had even been mentioned in relation to the subject of the investigation. Philippine Senate (PS) Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. He predicated his request on grounds he would later
substantially reiterate in this petition for prohibition.
Meanwhile, respondents, in compliance with our September 5, 2006 Resolution that ordered them to
submit a comment on the original plea for a TRO, interposed an opposition, 8 observing that the Senate’s On August 28, 2006, the Committee sent petitioner Romero II a letter informing him that his request,
motives in calling for an investigation in aid of legislation were a political question. They also averred being unmeritorious, was denied. 3 On the same date, invitations were sent to each of the other six
that the pendency of Chavez "is not sufficient ground to divest the respondents of their jurisdiction to petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of RII Builders, Inc., requesting them to attend the
conduct an inquiry into the matters alleged in the petition." September 4, 2006 Committee hearing. The following day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the
403 of 669
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid In this petition, petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the to the pendency of the Chavez petition; (2) since the investigation has been intended to ascertain
sub judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of petitioners’ criminal liability for plunder, it is not in aid of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled them to
Court. The rationale for the rule adverted to is set out in Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez:
11
appear and testify in violation of their rights against selfincrimination; and (4) unless the Court
immediately issues a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested, detained, and
[I]t is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of forced to give testimony against their will, before the Court could resolve the issues raised in G.R. No.
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided 164527.
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.12 In their Comment dated October 17, 2006, 9 respondents made a distinction between the issues raised in
Chavez and the subject matter of the Senate resolutions, nixing the notion of sub judice that petitioners
Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committee’s assailed raised at every possible turn. Respondents averred that the subject matter of the investigation focused on
investigation, is no longer sub judice or "before a court or judge for consideration." For by an en banc
13
the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid the Senate determine the
Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No. 164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez, propriety of amending Republic Act No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting laws to
as the petitioner in Chavez, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated August 15, 2007. In protect OWWA funds in the future. They likewise raised the following main arguments: (1) the proposed
fine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground, resolutions were a proper subject of legislative inquiry; and (2) petitioners’ right against selfincrimination
the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and was wellprotected and could be invoked when incriminating questions were propounded.
academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An
issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a On December 28, 2006, petitioners filed their Reply 10 reiterating the arguments stated in their petition,
determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual first and foremost of which is: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee’s inquiry is sub judice.
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition.14 Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness, save The Court’s Ruling
in certain exceptional instances,15 none of which, however, obtains under the premises.
The Court resolves to dismiss the instant petition.
Thus, there is no more legal obstacle––on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable––to the
continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in this proceeding. The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no Longer Sub Judice
At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the legislative inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez
in Sabio v. Gordon suggests as much:
404 of 669
body does not itself possess the requisite information––which is not infrequently true––recourse must be The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues
had to others who possess it. 19
being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative
before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or purpose.16
reason that these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases
and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand,
courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
The foregoing consideration is not all. The denial of the instant recourse is still indicated for another controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand,
compelling reason. As may be noted, PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letter inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to appear and testify in connection with the twin information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; 17 and to determine whether there is a need to
resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past Congress. On the postulate that the improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, 18 albeit the inquiry need not result in any
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before and after it, the aforesaid potential legislation. Ongoing judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
invitations and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted is, for legislation. Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial
all intents and purposes, terminated. In this regard, the Court draws attention to its pronouncements Institutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank) provides the following reason:
embodied in its Resolution of September 4, 2008 in G.R. No. 180643 entitled Neri v. Senate Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations: [T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasijudicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
Certainly, x x x the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its daytoday administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before it. The Rules legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative
of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: investigation.1avvphi1.zw+
x x x x As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno––
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same [T]he power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
status. legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present[ed] for the first time.
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%3E528,df%7C2006/OCT2006/174340.htm _ftn That this right may possibly be violated or abused is Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts. expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to
take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic
x x x x and practicality of such rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be respected by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. x x x (Emphasis added.)
by respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the
facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to Following the lessons of Neri, as reiterated in Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees on
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to Public Information, Public Order and Safety, et al.,20 it can very well be stated that the termination of the
matters within the realm of proper investigation.22 (Emphasis supplied.) assailed investigations has veritably mooted the instant petition. This disposition becomes all the more
impeccable, considering that the Senate of the present Congress has not, per available records, opted to
As a matter of long and sound practice, the Court refrains from touching on the issue of constitutionality take up anew, as an unfinished matter, its inquiry into the investment of OWWA funds in the Smokey
except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis mota23 of the controversy. So it must be here. Indeed, the Mountain project.
matter of the constitutionality of the assailed Committee invitations and subpoenas issued visàvis the
investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 has ceased to be a justiciable With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this recourse. Suffice
controversy, having been rendered moot and academic by supervening events heretofore indicated. In it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
short, there is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of said resolutions; there is no more connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to
investigation the constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge. conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution,
which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. 21 Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of
No pronouncement as to costs.
those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are
expected to be asked:
SO ORDERED.
Anent the right against selfincrimination, it must be emphasized that ["this right may be] invoked by the
said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating question is being asked,
since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of
them."http://elibrary.supremecourt.gov.ph/DOCUMENTS/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/2006.zip
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Same; Same; Same; Same; When an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in
vs.
this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.—Respondent SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the “presumption that inclines heavily INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure” arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision,
no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its Presidency; Executive Privilege; Separation of Powers; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; There
entirety. Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege; The presidential communications
in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
(E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads: From the powers under the Constitution.—Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the
above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this presumption in favor of the presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our
jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA
courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. 286 (1995), affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v.
the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept.
recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among
being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and 744 (1998) and Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002). The Court articulated in these cases that “there
underscoring supplied) Obviously, the last sentence of the abovequoted paragraph in Senate v. are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public,” that there is a
Ermita refers to the “exemption” being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of “governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court
exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closeddoor Cabinet
given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines meetings.”
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
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reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Quintessential” and “NonDelegable,” Defined; The
—In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege “to a large swath of the executive branch” (a fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive;
fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of
Cabinet, thus, properly within the term “advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of substance; “Nondelegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if
her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor; The fact that the President has to secure the prior
Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision
Department of Justice, 365 F 3d. 1108, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 64 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.141. This goes to before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.—
show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege executive. “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated
only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by essence of substance. On the other hand, “nondelegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated
reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an
that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter
test is unfounded. into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or
protect.—It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Operational Proximity”; The doctrine of
specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with “operational proximity” was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications
another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated: The context in which privilege.—It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational proximity” was laid down in In re: Sealed
executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our Case, No. 963124, June 17, 1997, 121 F.3d 729, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 276, precisely to limit the scope of
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless
nature in which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to
further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has
protect. (emphasis supplied) Even in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), it was held that Congress “operational proximity” to direct presidential decisionmaking.
must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Organizational Test”; In determining which test to use—
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a whether the Operational Proximity Test or the Organizational Test—the main consideration is to limit the
coordinate and coequal department. availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by
408 of 669
recognized principle in other democratic States.—This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, the
respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official,
even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close
Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. —Considering that the
elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s
before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress
covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her
information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some
is not an absolute right. Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted
espouse an absolute right to information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased
right to the regulation of the law is unmistakable. frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The demand of a citizen for the production of documents of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decisionmaking process,
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.
issued by Congress and neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Right to Information; Accountability and Transparency; The
from government officials.—The right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public accountability
obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the and transparency are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government. —
reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the
in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), “the demand of a citizen for the production of documents constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces effective functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and
tecum issued by Congress” and “neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the
testimony from government officials.” As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the policies on public accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if
individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees access to such information of public concern is denied. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding
and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any individual executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right
citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the Legislature’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.
to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public’s right to information. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information is not an absolute right—that there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information covered by executive privilege is a
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conclusion that it bestowed a qualified presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed
As shown in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative
related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al. v. purpose of the Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning
Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all recognize that there is a statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance—the presumption of
presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information
Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications. covered by executive privilege.—It must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the respondent Committees’ inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent
burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific
Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot
need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to
uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness
enable them to craft legislation—for sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically
needed before legislative bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent Committees’ questions
by courts of law.—The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their
respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions
information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to
on executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the
exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and nonspecific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information sought by Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with
the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial
Concurring Opinion: …If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her power to adjudicate actual controversies.—The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be
executive officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from
equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to
recurring by remedial legislation, the answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or
the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of “pertinency” set
inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of
the president in enacting such legislation. For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between
critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the two (2) separate, coequal and coordinate Branches of the Government.
adjudication of cases by courts of law. Same; Same; Same; Same; Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting
Same; Same; Same; Same; Oversight Function; Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive
must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not presidential communications privilege.—Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the
as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature—curbing graft and conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the
corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.—Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, presumptive presidential communications privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of
it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which states: A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Courts; The Office of the Ombudsman is the body as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because
properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary
allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor, and the same holds true for our courts upon objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even
which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. —It is important to stress contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether
that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo and other or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent
personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
the duty “to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” The Office of the culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is
Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine simply not a task for the Senate to perform—the role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine
whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing.—The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to
courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President. While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate
rules of procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are welldefined and ensure that the the potential culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government
constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws,
safeguarded. not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the
Same; Same; Congress; The Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or
corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly prosecute.
covered by executive privilege.—Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress; There is no Congressional power to expose for the
crime in the course of their investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the sake of exposure.—No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot
appropriate agency or branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are
investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination
information validly covered by executive privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of
on graft and corruption even without the information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate.
petition. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an
Same; Same; Same; Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.
standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law; Every Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and “punish” those investigated are
person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.—Legislative inquiries, unlike
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Same; Courts; Judicial Review; While it is true that the Court must refrain from reviewing the court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate
internal processes of Congress, as a coequal branch of government, however, when a constitutional
factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith.—Anent the third
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that “technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial
argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation (the “Rules”) are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee.” Court rules
from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a coequal branch of government, however, when a which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to
constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public official to the
cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.
most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a
Same; Same; Contempt; The Court does not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion
competent court or body.
to set aside their rules anytime they wish, and this is especially true where what is involved is the
Same; Congress; An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked
contempt power; It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated to benefit legislative committees
Executive, generates its own abuses.—Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that
—more than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the
the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), requiring invitations or subpoenas to contain the
Rules.—Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt
“possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry” along with the “usual indication of the
order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof” is not provided for by the
Committees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing.
Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum. On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of
As a result, the contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of
compliance with these requirements. An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an
the proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the
unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of
contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.
Congress has been abused (or has the potential for abuse) have been raised many times. Constant
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any
exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively.
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit
published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the
be respected. (Emphasis supplied) All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of
“roving commissions” referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Likewise,
the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is
witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters
shattered. Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to
are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information and
arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a
documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too little political costs or burdens on the part of
majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater
Congress when viewed visàvis the immensity of its power of inquiry.
measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully
articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set
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public on notice.—Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the contempt
of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it
each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.
Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they Senate; Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not
are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members, but in the
“(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general conduct of its daytoday business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are Senate of the Congress before it.—On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit
amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members.
the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule However, in the conduct of its daytoday business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
on unfinished business. The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is states: RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise shall be taken up at the next session in the same status. All pending matters and proceedings shall
make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate for present for the first time. (emphasis supplied) Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress
adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity. are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of
Same; Same; Not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
void—only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.—Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no
that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
effective. legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same
shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put
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Senate; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; There is merit in the contention of respondent Senate Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; In a free and democratic society, the interests of
Committees that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries need not be published by the Senate of every these Executive and Legislative branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official
Congress, as the Senate is a continuing body.—It is my considered view that there is merit in the courtesy and respect.—On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the
contention of respondent Senate Committees that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries need not be Legislature are political branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these
published by the Senate of every Congress, as the Senate is a continuing body. The continuity of these branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This Court
rules from one Congress to the next is both an incident and an indicium of the continuing nature of the wholeheartedly concurs with the proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our
Senate. democratic institutions that we preserve the constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the
Same; The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the nature of the Senate different branches of government.
as a continuing body hinged on the staggering of terms of the Senators; The structure of the Philippine Same; Same; Accountability and Transparency; There is no question that any story of government
Senate being evidently patterned after the U.S. Senate, it reflects the latter’s rationale for staggering malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity, but the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in
senatorial terms and constituting the Senate as a continuing body.—Excerpts from the deliberations of the political branches of government—the customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted
the 1986 Constitutional Commission provide us a brief history of the Senate of the Philippines and its rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test
intended nature as a continuing legislative body, viz.: x x x The above deliberations show that the of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.—While this Court finds laudable the respondent
nature of the Senate as a continuing body hinged on the staggering of terms of the Senators, such Committees’ wellintentioned efforts to ferret out corruption, even in the highest echelons of government,
that the term of onehalf or twelve of the Senators (“remaining Senators”) would subsist and continue into such lofty intentions do not validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and
the succeeding Congress, while the term of the other half or twelve Senators (“outgoing Senators”) would granted instead to the other branches of government. There is no question that any story of government
expire in the present Congress. As pointed out by Commissioner Gregorio J. Tingson, this arrangement malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is founded on
whereby half of the Senate’s membership continues into the next Congress is designed to help ensure the constitutional command of transparency and public accountability. The recent clamor for a “search for
“stability of governmental policies.” The structure of the Philippine Senate being evidently truth” by the general public, the religious community and the academe is an indication of a concerned
patterned after the U.S. Senate, it reflects the latter’s rationale for staggering senatorial terms and citizenry, a nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this
constituting the Senate as a continuing body. noble undertaking is not in the political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the
Same; It is the staggering of the terms of the 24 Senators and allowing the terms of office of a portion of absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or
the Senate membership to continue into the succeeding Congress that provides the stability indispensable achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the
to an effective government, and makes the Senate a continuing body as intended by the framers of both people deserve a more exacting “search for truth” than the process here in question, if that is its objective.
the 1935 (as amended) and the 1987 Constitutions; Part of the stability provided by a continuing Senate
is the existence of rules of proceedings adopted pursuant to the power granted by the U.S. Constitution, PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion:
rules that continue to be in effect from one Congress to the next until such rules are repealed or amended,
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begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for but with the process for repeal and amendment also being governed by the subsisting rules.—In sum, it is
amendment or revision. “The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be the staggering of the terms of the 24 Senators and allowing the terms of office of a portion of the Senate
presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in membership to continue into the succeeding Congress—whether twothirds under the 1935 Constitution
the session shall be required for its approval.” (emphasis supplied) It is obvious that the above rules do or onehalf under the 1987 Constitution—that provides the stability indispensable to an effective
not provide for the expiration of the Senate Rules at the termination of every Congress. On the government, and makes the Senate a continuing body as intended by the framers of both the 1935 (as
contrary, Rule LI provides that at the opening of every Congress, the Senate President may endorse the amended) and the 1987 Constitutions. Part of the stability provided by a continuing Senate is
Senate Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision, which connotes that the Senate the existence of rules of proceedings adopted pursuant to the power granted by the U.S.
Rules must be subsisting for them to be subject to amendment or revision. If the Senate were not a Constitution, rules that continue to be in effect from one Congress to the next until such rules are
continuing body, the Senate Rules governing its proceedings would not be given continuing effect from repealed or amended, but with the process for repeal and amendment also being governed by the
one Congress to the next. subsisting rules. U.S. Senator Francis Warren cautions that a Senate that is not continuing, but instead
new in each Congress, opens all rules to debate as a new matter; the Senate will be totally and wholly
Same; Between the expiration of a Congress and the opening of the succeeding Congress, some functions without rules as it proceeds “at sea without rudder or compass regarding rules.” Thus, in the U.S., the
of the Senate continue during such recess—aside from the administrative functions performed by Senate Senate rules of proceedings provide that “(t)he rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to
employees for the continued operation of the Senate as an institution, legislative functions continue to be the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.” These rules, adopted on January
exercised.—While the present Senate Rules provide under Rule XLIV (Unfinished Business), Section 123 11, 1884 and made effective on January 21, 1884, continue to be in effect to this day alongside the
that “(a)ll pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) continuing membership of the Senate.
Congress,” between the expiration of a Congress and the opening of the succeeding Congress, some Same; The Senate Rules do not provide for their expiration at the termination of every Congress—
functions of the Senate continue during such recess. Aside from the administrative functions performed on the contrary, Rule LI provides that at the opening of every Congress, the Senate President may
by Senate employees for the continued operation of the Senate as an institution, legislative functions endorse the Senate Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision, which connotes that
continue to be exercised. The offices of the “remaining Senators” continue their legislative work in the Senate Rules must be subsisting for them to be subject to amendment or revision.—Patterned after the
preparation for the succeeding Congress. These continuing functions require continuing effectivity of the U.S. Constitution, the 1987 Constitution also provides under Article VI, Section 16(3) that “(e)ach House
Senate Rules. An example of a provision of the Senate Rules applicable to these continuing activities is may determine the rules of its proceedings…” As in the U.S. Senate, the Senate Rules (of proceedings)
Rule XXII (Filing and Consideration of Bills and Resolutions), Section 61, which provides that “(a)ll bills adopted by the Philippine Senate have a continued effect from one Congress to the next as shown by
and resolutions shall be filed with the Office of the Secretary whether the Senate is in session or not.” the following provisions of the Philippine Senate Rules: “Rule LII (Date of Taking Effect), Section 137:
Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; Prescinding from the continuing nature of the Senate and These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
the continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules (of proceedings), it is my considered view that the Rules of amended or repealed.” x x x x x x x x x “Rule LI (Amendments to, Or revisions Of, The Rules),
Procedure Governing Inquiries adopted by the Senate of the Tenth Congress on August 21, 1995 should Section 136: At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall
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the duration of its effectivity from one Congress to the next.—Following the principles likewise be recognized to have continuing force and effect after being “duly published” in two
of Ballin and Santiago, I submit that the Court ought to take a deferential stance in interpreting the rule newspapers of general circulation on August 24, 1995.—It should be noted that the termination of
making power of the Senate as a coequal branch of government, so long as rights of private parties are unfinished business upon expiration of one Congress is sanctioned by Rule XLIV, Section 123 of the
not infringed. The Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries is akin to the Senate Rules (of proceeding) in Senate Rules. The Senate Rules, may, however, be amended under Rule LI, Section 36. It remains to be
that the former governs the internal workings of the Senate and its committees, although admittedly seen whether by amendment of the Senate Rules, the Senate would allow a Senate Committee conducting
different in some respects from the Senate Rules because it affects rights of parties not members of the an investigation, for example, to continue its proceedings after the expiration of a Congress as in the
Senate and, hence, requires publication. To the extent that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries aforediscussed case, McGrain v. Daugherty. Prescinding from the continuing nature of the Senate and the
does not transgress the requirement of due process as its outer limit, the Senate should be given room to continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules (of proceedings), it is my considered view that the Rules of
interpret the duration of its effectivity from one Congress to the next. Procedure Governing Inquiries adopted by the Senate of the Tenth Congress on August 21, 1995
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; It is within the competency of the Senate to prescribe a method should likewise be recognized to have continuing force and effect after being “duly published” in
that shall reasonably conform to the dueprocess purpose of publication, and the Senate has validly two newspapers of general circulation on August 24, 1995.
provided the method of onetime publication of its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in two Same; Rules of Procedure; It cannot be gainsaid that rules of proceedings are a necessity in preserving
newspapers of general circulation.—Similar to Ballin, there is no standard set by Article VI, Section order, decency and regularity in a dignified public body.—It cannot be gainsaid that rules of proceedings
21 of the 1987 Constitution, as to the manner and frequency of publication of the Rules of are a necessity in preserving order, decency and regularity in a dignified public body. These rules are
Procedure Governing Inquiries. It is within the competency of the Senate to prescribe a method that weapons of the weaker party to defend themselves from irregularities and abuses “which the wantonness
shall reasonably conform to the dueprocess purpose of publication, and the Senate has validly of power is but too often apt to suggest to large and successful majorities.” Thomas Jefferson stated in the
provided the method of onetime publication of its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in two opening of his widely used, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, viz.: “Mr. Onslow, the ablest among the
newspapers of general circulation, in line with the ruling in Tañada. Speakers of the House of Commons, used to say, ‘It was a maxim he had often heard when he was a
young man, from old and experienced members, that nothing tended more to throw power into the hands
Same; Same; Same; The unbroken practice of the Senate of not adopting Rules of Procedure Governing of the administration and those who acted with the majority of the House of Commons, than in neglect of,
Inquiries and publishing the same in every Congress, owing to its nature as a continuing body, is not or departure from, the rules of proceeding; that these forms, as instituted by our ancestors, operated
something to be lightly brushed aside, especially considering the grave consequences of cutting this as a check, and control, on the actions of the majority; and that they were, in many instances, a shelter
continuity; Where rights are not violated, the Court ought not like lightning strike down a valid rule and and protection to the minority, against the attempts of power.’ ”
practice of a coequal branch of government, lest the walls delineating powers be burned.— Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Court ought to take a deferential stance in interpreting
The unbroken practice of the Senate of not adopting Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries and the rulemaking power of the Senate as a coequal branch of government, so long as rights of private
publishing the same in every Congress, owing to its nature as a continuing body, is not something to be parties are not infringed; To the extent that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries does not
lightly brushed aside, especially considering the grave consequences of cutting this transgress the requirement of due process as its outer limit, the Senate should be given room to interpret
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emotionally charged rhetoric from both sides and viewed in the light of settled constitutional and legal continuity. Holding itself to be a continuing body, the Senate has dispensed with the adoption not only of
doctrines, plainly lead to the conclusion that the claim of executive privilege must be upheld. Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, but also of Senate rules (of proceedings) at the start of every
Congress in the last ten years. As a consequence of the absence of rules if the Senate is held to be not a
Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (the "Decision"),
continuing body, its acts during these Congresses may be put into question. A mathematical calculation of
granting the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate
Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 1 Trade and Commerce,2 and National a quorum in view of the staggered terms of the Senate membership cannot simply subvert the deeply
Defense and Security (collectively the "respondent Committees"). 3 entrenched thoughtout rationale for the design of a continuing and stable Senate, shown to be necessary
in promoting effective government and protecting liberties. Where rights are not violated, the Court ought
A brief review of the facts is imperative. not like lightning strike down a valid rule and practice of a coequal branch of government, lest the walls
delineating powers be burned.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven
(11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded
by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists
("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the
to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure
NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President
that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and
Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming
further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution.
answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a)
The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, 4 (b) whether or not she directed him to
confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens
prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.6
and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring governmental powers.
him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate a hotly,
Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s
even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Court’s coequal branches of government. In this task,
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. 7 The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita pertinently
this Court should neither curb the legitimate powers of any of the coequal and coordinate branches of
stated:
government nor allow any of them to overstep the boundaries set for it by our Constitution. The
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and competing interests in the case at bar are the claim of executive privilege by the President, on the one
correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege hand, and the respondent Senate Committees’ assertion of their power to conduct legislative inquiries, on
(Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the other. The particular facts and circumstances of the present case, stripped of the politically and
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Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and
for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008; policy decision making process. The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations
In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on and correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the
the ZTENBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
and detention at the Office of the Senate SergeantatArms until such time that he would appear and give Presidential decisionmaking. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on
his testimony. the President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not
protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 8 He insisted that he had
not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his willingness to The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
testify on new matters, but respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the
questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the order dated Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
January 30, 2008 which declared him in contempt and directed his arrest and detention. designed to protect.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Court’s Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated January 30, 2008.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented 11hour
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing questions
communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE /
respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Anent the first NBN project be dispensed with.
ground, we considered the subject communications as falling under the presidential communications
privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, (b) they On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the
were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the
show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the showcause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29,
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second ground, we found that 2007, in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore
respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because ( a) the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered
there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain the by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new
questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the proceeding that matters to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to
led to their issuance of the contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution clarify."
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C. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS ADEQUATE SHOWING OF A COMPELLING NEED TO because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure," and (e) they
JUSTIFY THE DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT. issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.
D. TO UPHOLD THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE WOULD On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration, anchored on the
SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE RESPONDENTS’ PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PRIMARY following grounds:
FUNCTION TO ENACT LAWS.
I
E. FINALLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION, AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT
TRANSPARENCY OUTWEIGH THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE. THE ASSAILED ORDERS WERE ISSUED BY RESPONDENT COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO
THE EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND NOT MERELY THEIR
IV OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS.
D. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE VI, A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE MATTERS FOR WHICH EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
SECTION 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE BE IS CLAIMED CONSTITUTE STATE SECRETS.
DULY PUBLISHED, AND WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT
CONSIDERED THE OSG’S INTERVENTION ON THIS ISSUE WITHOUT GIVING B. EVEN IF THE TESTS ADOPTED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE DECISION IS
RESPONDENTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT. APPLIED, THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE ARE PRESENT.
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jurisprudence; (5) the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules renders the same void; and (6) E. RESPONDENTS’ ISSUANCE OF THE CONTEMPT ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY OR
respondent Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt order. PRECIPITATE.
I For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that: (1) there is no categorical pronouncement
from the Court that the assailed Orders were issued by respondent Committees pursuant to their oversight
There Is a Recognized Presumptive function; hence, there is no reason for them "to make much" of the distinction between Sections 21 and
Presidential Communications Privilege 22, Article VI of the Constitution; (2) presidential communications enjoy a presumptive privilege against
disclosure as earlier held in Almonte v. Vasquez9 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)10; (3) the
Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege, because all the
presumptively privileged reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that "inclines heavily elements of the presidential communications privilege are present; (4) the subpoena ad
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent Committees then claim that the Court testificandum issued by respondent Committees to petitioner is fatally defective under existing law and
erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.
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presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
underscoring supplied) communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The
Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that the presidential communications
Obviously, the last sentence of the abovequoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita,13 the case relied upon by respondent Committees,
their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege
mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive Government (PCGG),14 and Chavez v. PEA.15 The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain
official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor types of information which the government may withhold from the public, 16" that there is a "governmental
of disclosure. privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters";17 and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized
Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise: as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closeddoor Cabinet meetings."18
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a
certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines
the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a
allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be
considered in its entirety.19
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive
privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v.
is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those Ermita, which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads:
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and
by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress,
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
particular case. character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
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"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to which we accord "By order of the President", which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an
deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking. A words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason
President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence.
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege granted by
powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and italics supplied) the President to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this case.
Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a presumptive privilege for Presidential In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive
communication," which was recognized early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe the passage privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which
in Senate v. Ermita adverted to in the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Committees, referring to was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate
the nonexistence of a "presumptive authorization" of an executive official, to mean that the Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in
"presumption" in favor of executive privilege "inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of Senate v. Ermita.
disclosure" is to distort the ruling in the Senate v. Ermita and make the same engage in selfcontradiction.
Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this present case hews closely to the
Senate v. Ermita expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the Executive
22 ruling in Senate v. Ermita,21 to wit:
Department and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied authorization or
presumptive authorization to invoke executive privilege by the President’s subordinate officials, as Executive privilege
follows:
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the
Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and
power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
highlevel executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
respect accorded to a coequal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.
public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in
(Underscoring supplied)
Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted
the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
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enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior same be recognized and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical
concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision need for disclosure by the one assailing such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render
before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power. meaningless the presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In
fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence citing "the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege
The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of for Presidential communications."23
government by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and II
balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the There Are Factual and Legal Bases to
President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature. A good example is the Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President who shall approve or veto the same.
The fact that the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not render the power to Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are not covered
pass law executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law is generally a quintessential and non by executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are not
delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to enter into a present.
contract to secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature because of conditions laid down
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and nondelegable presidential
in the Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the
power."
Office of the President.
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the
"quintessential and nondelegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the
presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of report to Congress.
operational proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential
This argument is unpersuasive.
communications privilege to communications between those who are ‘operationally proximate’ to the
President but who may have "no direct communications with her."
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated
It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed
essence of substance.24 On the other hand, "nondelegable" means that a power or duty cannot be
Case27precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. 25 The power to
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C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by
balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White
the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct presidential decisionmaking, thus:
information.
We are aware that such an extension, unless carefully circumscribed to accomplish the purposes of the
Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the President’s invocation, through privilege, could pose a significant risk of expanding to a large swath of the executive branch a privilege
the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent Committees’ specific and that is bottomed on a recognition of the unique role of the President. In order to limit this risk, the
demonstrated need and the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the presidential communications privilege should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with ensuring that
balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the confidentiality of the President’s decisionmaking process is adequately protected. Not every person
the 1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of who plays a role in the development of presidential advice, no matter how remote and removed
information, specifically, Article III, Section 7;29 Article II, Sections 2430 and 28;31 Article XI, Section from the President, can qualify for the privilege. In particular, the privilege should not extend to
1;32 Article XVI, Section 10;33 Article VII, Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35 21,36 and 22.37 staff outside the White House in executive branch agencies. Instead, the privilege should apply only to
communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate White House
It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her advisor’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility for investigation and formulating the advice
generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita to be given the President on the particular matter to which the communications relate. Only
specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with communications at that level are close enough to the President to be revelatory of his deliberations
another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated: or to pose a risk to the candor of his advisers. See AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational
proximity" to the President that matters in determining whether "[t]he President’s confidentiality
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be interests" is implicated). (Emphasis supplied)
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear
provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the
privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied) Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of
her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant Department of Justice.28 This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not
to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and coequal department. considered conclusive in every case. In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit
the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her
reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure.
advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product
Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with
of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about
the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.
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In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s the agreement particularly while official negotiations are ongoing are matters which China will surely
representatives on the state of the then ongoing negotiations of the RPUS Military Bases Agreement. view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our
The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. We reiterate the
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of importance of secrecy in matters involving foreign negotiations as stated in United States v. Curtiss
access to information." The Resolution went on to state, thus: Wright Export Corp., 38 thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy, and
inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual
nature . Although much has been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with disparagement of the concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might
latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In the have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger
words of Mr. Stimson: and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent
reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the
"A complicated negotiation …cannot be carried through without many, many private talks and Senate, the principle on which the body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit,
discussion, man to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers
come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences with other respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
countries and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances
and would not do under other circumstances… If these reports… should become public… who US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing Congress access to all papers relating to a
would ever trust American Delegations in another conference? (United States Department of State, negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the recent case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party, et
Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282284) al. v. Thomas G. Aquino, et al.39 upheld the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations. In Akbayan,
the Court stated:
x x x x
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all
subjects is concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy . As The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing
expressed by one writer, "It can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere in the valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter
world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to
starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War declared that we must have "open covenants, reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld
openly arrived at." He quickly abandoned his thought. in People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the reasons
for the privilege in more precise terms.
No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is possible. In the moment
that negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An illtimed speech by one of
425 of 669
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides
constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the would quickly lead to a widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been
effective functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before it is
caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the approved . (The New American Government and Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194)
policies on public accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
access to such information of public concern is denied.
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. CurtissWright Export Corp. that
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, the President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries,viz:
did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency. "x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate
There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great arguments of
NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613…
of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)
rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions. We
have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view
democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right. that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even
her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve
Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted
information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased
law is unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions show the obvious limitations on frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face
the right to information, thus: of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decisionmaking process,
which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such arguments to support respondent Committees’ case.
limitations as may be provided by law.
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Respondent Committees Failed to Show That Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis
Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions supplied)
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees devote an unusually lengthy discussion on In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated that there are no specific laws
the purported legislative nature of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an oversight inquiry. prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may
be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national
At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
Committees’ inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as
power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot uphold the view well as information on intergovernment exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they
legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently must be "examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."
supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole
may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information
privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we
need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege. stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v.
Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does
In the Decision, the majority held that "there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does the
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials." As pointed
appropriate investigating authority." In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture
the information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for
functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
corruption. distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the
public's right to information.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interests from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are
and it is necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve the essential covered by executive privilege.
functions of each branch. There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege and the legitimate
claims of the judicial process. In giving more weight to the latter, the Court ruled that the President's III.
427 of 669
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a criminal trial.
privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis supplied)
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified privilege would stand in the way of the primary
xxx xxx xxx constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. The said Court further
ratiocinated, through its ruling extensively quoted in the Honorable Chief Justice Puno's dissenting
...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial opinion, as follows:
would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of
the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office "... this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law.
is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold aim (of criminal justice) is
proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the that guild shall not escape or innocence suffer.' Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88, 55 S.Ct., at 633.
administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues
frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communication will not be before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both
vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were
bearing on the pending criminal cases. to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of
criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The prosecution or by the defense.
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The
criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions. This Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right 'to be confronted
leads us to consider once again just how critical is the subject information in the discharge of respondent with the witness against him' and 'to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.'
Committees’ functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without
intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to
said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation. accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon 41 expounded on the nature of a
legislative inquiry in aid of legislation in this wise:
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there is a presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether
v. Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications. the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. There is a clear
difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate engaged in like functions. While factfinding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its
Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed
elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events ;
Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power Congress frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast,
to legislate and a broad and nonspecific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is probable
relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information sought by the three (3) cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as
questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring in Nixon v. Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of certain conversations, the
Opinion: grand jury's need for the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their original
form, is undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative process, at least not in the
…If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive officials circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have been in the Committee's
have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative judgments has been substantially
legislation, the answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)
from proceeding with such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in
enacting such legislation. Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the
can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. Interestingly, instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, coequal and coordinate
during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted Branches of the Government.
that the Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3)
questions. In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all. Thus: Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive
and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which
states:
So can you tell the Court how critical are these questions to the lawmaking function of the Senate. For
instance, question Number 1 whether the President followed up the NBN project. According to the other A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified presumption in
counsel this question has already been asked, is that correct? favor of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon,
as well as the other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
ATTY. AGABIN
Activities, et al., v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all recognize that
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Again, about the second question, were you dictated to prioritize this ZTE, is that critical to the Well, the question has been asked but it was not answered, Your Honor.
lawmaking function of the Senate? Will it result to the failure of the Senate to cobble a Bill without this
question? CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
ATTY. AGABIN Yes. But my question is how critical is this to the lawmaking function of the Senate?
I think it is critical to lay the factual foundations for a proposed amendment to the Procurement Law, ATTY. AGABIN
Your Honor, because the petitioner had already testified that he was offered a P200 Million bribe, so if he
was offered a P200 Million bribe it is possible that other government officials who had something to do I believe it is critical, Your Honor.
with the approval of the contract would be offered the same amount of bribes.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Why?
Again, that is speculative.
ATTY. AGABIN
ATTY. AGABIN
For instance, with respect to the proposed Bill of Senator Miriam Santiago, she would like to indorse a
That is why they want to continue with the investigation, Your Honor. Bill to include Executive Agreements had been used as a device to the circumventing the Procurement
Law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
How about the third question, whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being
told about the alleged bribe. How critical is that to the lawmaking function of the Senate? And the But the question is just following it up.
question is may they craft a Bill a remedial law without forcing petitioner Neri to answer this question?
ATTY. AGABIN
ATTY. AGABIN
I believe that may be the initial question, Your Honor, because if we look at this problem in its factual
Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere speculation. And sound legislation requires that a setting as counsel for petitioner has observed, there are intimations of a bribery scandal involving high
proposed Bill should have some basis in fact.42 government officials.
The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
sought or how the withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their
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although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate legislative purpose is very evident in the above oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the respondent
cases.46 (Emphasis supplied) Committees to successfully discharge this burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of
presidential communication stands. The implication of the said presumption, like any other, is to dispense
There, the Court further ratiocinated that "the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not with the burden of proof as to whether the disclosure will significantly impair the President’s performance
really ‘in aid of legislation’ because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, of her function. Needless to state this is assumed, by virtue of the presumption.
since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of R.A. No. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, a Anent respondent Committees’ bewailing that they would have to "speculate" regarding the questions
matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the covered by the privilege, this does not evince a compelling need for the information sought.
Legislature."47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Indeed, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon 43 held that while fact
finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability than
the President.48 While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high on a precise reconstruction of past events. It added that, normally, Congress legislates on the basis of
government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for conflicting information provided in its hearings. We cannot subscribe to the respondent Committees’ self
the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a defeating proposition that without the answers to the three (3) questions objected to as privileged, the
crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the distinguished members of the respondent Committees cannot intelligently craft legislation.
Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for
Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the
truth," which in respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search for persons inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight
responsible for "anomalies" in government contracts. function of Congress.44 And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three
(3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or
upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the
activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to Constitution.
court for prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding
anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,45 this Court ruled:
neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in
itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "the political question doctrine neither interposes an
indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. 49 In this regard, the obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
pronouncement in Barenblatt v. United States50 is instructive, thus: has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
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Respondent Committees assert that Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only investigate
Nixon does not apply to the case at bar because, unlike in the said case, no impeachment proceeding has into the areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are
been initiated at present. The Court is not persuaded. While it is true that no impeachment proceeding has within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power
been initiated, however, complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against President given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.
Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier, the Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. (Emphasis supplied.)
prosecutorial and judicial arms of government are the bodies equipped and mandated by the Constitution
and our laws to determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project are true and, if At this juncture, it is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been
so, who should be prosecuted and penalized for criminal conduct. filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our
Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "to investigate any act or omission of any public
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate improper, or inefficient."51 The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of evidence Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true
applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our courts upon which the Constitution reposes the
Committee." Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the Office of the
for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest Ombudsman and the courts are welldefined and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in all persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.
proper proceedings by a competent court or body.
Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of their
IV investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of
government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption
Respondent Committees Committed Grave cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order executive privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even
without the information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.
Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order because (1) there is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not violate the Corollarily, respondent Committees justify their rejection of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege on
requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they issued the contempt order in accordance with their the ground that there is no privilege when the information sought might involve a crime or illegal
internal Rules; (4) they did not violate the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution activity, despite the absence of an administrative or judicial determination to that effect.
requiring the publication of their Rules; and (5) their issuance of the contempt order is not arbitrary or Significantly, however, in Nixon v. Sirica,52 the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring
precipitate. confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material
might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of
We reaffirm our earlier ruling. which the material was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment.
432 of 669
seriously consider the constitutional implications of proposed courses of action in other areas, they The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having been fully discussed in the preceding pages, we
would serve that goal in the context of congressional investigations as well. see no reason to discuss it once again.
The key to this reform is in its details. A system that allows a standing committee to simply Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring
articulate its reasons to investigate pro forma does no more than imposes minimal drafting burdens. invitations or subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry"
Rather, the system must be designed in a manner that imposes actual burdens on the committee to along with the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
articulate its need for investigation and allows for meaningful debate about the merits of proceeding thereof" is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum.
with the investigation. (Emphasis supplied)
On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements.
Clearly, petitioner’s request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that
should have been granted by respondent Committees. An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own
abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or has the
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific reference to potential for abuse) have been raised many times. 53 Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its
any pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of the questions to be asked. As it were, the toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v.
subpoena merely commanded him to "testify on what he knows relative to the subject matter under Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must
inquiry." be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the "roving commissions" referred to in the U.S.
case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.54 Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They
Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too little
Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a coequal branch of political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed visàvis the immensity of its power of
government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into inquiry. The logic of these requirements is well articulated in the study conducted by William P.
Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution Marshall,55 to wit:
simply out of courtesy. In this regard, the pronouncement in Arroyo v. De Venecia56 is enlightening, thus:
A second concern that might be addressed is that the current system allows committees to continually
"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire investigate the Executive without constraint. One process solution addressing this concern is to require
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the each investigation be tied to a clearly stated purpose. At present, the charters of some congressional
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private committees are so broad that virtually any matter involving the Executive can be construed to fall within
individuals. their province. Accordingly, investigations can proceed without articulation of specific need or purpose. A
requirement for a more precise charge in order to begin an inquiry should immediately work to limit the
United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: ‘The Constitution empowers each House initial scope of the investigation and should also serve to contain the investigation once it is
to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate instituted. Additionally, to the extent clear statements of rules cause legislatures to pause and
433 of 669
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained."
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied) to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the
Rules provides that:
All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the
limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a "The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it
majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has who disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions
the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which by the Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)
the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when
the concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt order
that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is because during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were
especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are present. This number could hardly fulfill the majority requirement needed by respondent Committee on
not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators
the proper observance of the Rules. and respondent Committee on National Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18)
Senators. With respect to respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of
Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent Committees’ fourth argument. nine (9) Senators, only three (3) members were present. 57 These facts prompted us to quote in the
Respondent Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the same was Decision the exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the
published in 1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing body; thus, it is not former raised the issue of lack of the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt order.
required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.
When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008 hearing before this Court, Senator Francis
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, Pangilinan stated that any defect in the committee voting had been cured because twothirds of the
there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with Senators effectively signed for the Senate in plenary session.58
each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its dayto
day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the
contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the
RULE XLIV contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings
UNFINISHED BUSINESS that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order
were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.
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RULE LII SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT status.
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but
are amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied) may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied)
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even
an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term. expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound
the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
(2) newspapers of general circulation."59 The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with
of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the
of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the same status.
next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct
of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure)
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in states:
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules RULE LI
clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or
next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding revision.
effectivity.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for
conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights its approval. (emphasis supplied)
of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to
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In the present case, it is respondent Committees’ contention that their determination on the validity of protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such
executive privilege should be binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their assertion violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.
that their internal procedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into by this Court supposedly in
accordance with the principle of respect between coequal branches of government. Interestingly, it is a Respondent Committees’ last argument is that their issuance of the contempt order is not precipitate or
courtesy that they appear to be unwilling to extend to the Executive (on the matter of executive privilege) arbitrary. Taking into account the totality of circumstances, we find no merit in their argument.
or this Court (on the matter of judicial review). It moves this Court to wonder: In respondent Committees’
paradigm of checks and balances, what are the checks to the Legislature’s allencompassing, awesome As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of
power of investigation? It is a power, like any other, that is susceptible to grave abuse. respondent Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him. He
repeatedly manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters. His only
While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ wellintentioned efforts to ferret out request was that he be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to adequately
corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or accord to prepare as a resource person. He did not attend the November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive
Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of government. Secretary Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with his testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. Note that petitioner is an executive official under the direct control and supervision of
There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As the Chief Executive. Why punish petitioner for contempt when he was merely directed by his superior?
respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of transparency and Besides, save for the three (3) questions, he was very cooperative during the September 26, 2007 hearing.
public accountability. The recent clamor for a "search for truth" by the general public, the religious
community and the academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an On the part of respondent Committees, this Court observes their haste and impatience. Instead of ruling on
accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the Executive Secretary Ermita’s claim of executive privilege, they curtly dismissed it as unsatisfactory and
political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules ordered the arrest of petitioner. They could have informed petitioner of their ruling and given him time to
on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the decide whether to accede or file a motion for reconsideration. After all, he is not just an ordinary witness;
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a more exacting "search for he is a high ranking official in a coequal branch of government. He is an alter ego of the President. The
truth" than the process here in question, if that is its objective. same haste and impatience marked the issuance of the contempt order, despite the absence of the majority
of the members of the respondent Committees, and their subsequent disregard of petitioner’s motion for
WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is reconsideration alleging the pendency of his petition for certiorari before this Court.
hereby DENIED.
On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political
SO ORDERED. branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash,
but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with
DISSENTING OPINION the proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we
preserve the constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different branches of government.
PUNO, C.J.:
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IV. Contrary to this Honorable Court’s Decision, respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion in That the Senate is a continuing body is a constitutional notion often stated, but not much
issuing the assailed contempt Order, considering that: scrutinized.1 Upon this notion rests the continued life of Senate rules of procedure; hence, the need
to moor it on the proper doctrinal anchor.
A. There is no legitimate claim of executive privilege in the instant case.
The issues for resolution in respondent Senate Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration are as follows:
B. Respondents did not violate the supposed requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita.
"I. Contrary to this Honorable Court’s Decision, there is no doubt that the assailed Orders were issued by
C. Respondents duly issued the contempt Order in accordance with their internal rules. respondent Committees pursuant to the exercise of their legislative power, and not merely their oversight
functions.
D. Respondents did not violate the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution requiring
that its rules of procedure be duly published, and were denied due process when the Court considered the II. Contrary to this Honorable Court’s Decision, there can be no presumption that the information
OSG’s intervention on this issue without giving respondents the opportunity to comment. withheld in the instant case is privileged.
E. Respondents’ issuance of the contempt Order is not arbitrary or precipitate." 2 III. Contrary to this Honorable Court’s Decision, there is no factual or legal basis to hold that the
communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege considering
The Motion for Reconsideration presents a long list of issues, but I shall focus on the issue of violation that:
of the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution that the rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation be "duly published." As to the remaining issues, I reiterate A. There is no showing that the matters for which executive privilege is claimed constitute state secrets.
my position in my Dissenting Opinion to the March 25, 2008 Decision.
B. Even if the tests adopted by this Honorable Court in the Decision is (sic) applied, there is no showing
The textual hook for resolving the publication issue is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, that the elements of presidential communications privilege are present.
which provides, viz:
C. On the contrary, there is adequate showing of a compelling need to justify the disclosure of the
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in information sought.
aid of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (emphasis supplied) D. To uphold the claim of executive privilege in the instant case would seriously impair the respondents’
performance of their primary function to enact laws.
Publication as a due process requirement
E. Finally, the constitutional right of the people to information, and the constitutional policies on public
As the 1987 Constitution does not provide the manner of "duly" publishing the rules of accountability and transparency outweigh the claim of executive privilege.
procedure under the aforequoted Article VI, Section 21, the Records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission is a good place to start in interpreting this provision. The Records, however, are
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publication must be made in the Official Gazette because that was the requirement in Article 2 of the Civil also bereft of deliberations to shed light on the publication requirement. Nonetheless, I submit that the
Code. landmark case Tañada v. Tuvera3 is a lighthouse that can guide us in navigating through the publication
question.
Subsequently, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 200, allowing publication either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.6 In Tañada, the petitioners invoked their right to information on matters of public concern under Article
IV, Section 6 of the 1973 Constitution,4 and the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
In the case at bar, the Senate of the Tenth Congress adopted the subject "Rules of Procedure Governing published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. They sought to compel the
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation" ("Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries") on August 21, 1995 pursuant respondent public officials to publish or cause to be published in the Official Gazette various presidential
to Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. 7 Section 24 of the Rules provides that the Rules "shall decrees, letters of instruction, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation
take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The Senate thus and administrative orders.
caused it to be published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star and Malaya,
on August 24, 1995. The published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries indicated that it was adopted In ruling in favor of petitioners, the Court interpreted Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
in the Tenth Congress on August 21, 1995. states that "(l)aws shall take effect after fifteen days following completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided x x x." It held that the phrase "unless it is otherwise
The Senate of the Thirteenth Congress caused the republication of the Rules of Procedure Governing provided" refers not to the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, which is indispensable for
Inquiries on December 1, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine the law or regulation to take effect, but to the period of time from publication after which the law shall
Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer. The published rules appeared in the same manner it did in the August take effect. The Court allowed the fifteenday period to be extended or shortened, but not to the extent of
24, 1995 publication, i.e., under the heading "Tenth Congress" and with August 21, 1995 as the date of altogether omitting publication.
adoption.8 The publications also stated that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries had been
previously published in the August 24, 1995 issues of The Philippine Star and Malaya, and that "(n)o The Court reasoned that an omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
amendments have been made in the Rules since its adoption." public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. It noted that it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of the laws would be prejudiced as a result, and not because of a failure to comply with them,
Evidently, the Senate of the Thirteenth Congress did not adopt anew the Rules of Procedure Governing but simply because they did not know of their existence. Thus, the Court concluded that "…all statutes,
Inquiries, as the publications in December 2006 indicated that it was the Rules of Procedure adopted in including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
the Tenth Congress on August 21, 1995 and published on August 24, 1995. There was no amendment which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
made on it since its adoption on August 21, 1995; thus, republication was apparently done merely for legislature… Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
purposes of public information and not to give effect to a new or amended Rules of Procedure implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation."5
Governing Inquiries. As respondent Senate Committees correctly contend, "not having been amended,
modified or repealed since 1995, the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation remain While the Court acknowledged that newspapers of general circulation, instead of the Official Gazette,
in full force and effect."9 could better perform the function of communicating laws to the public as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly it was constrained to hold that
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constitutes a senate. Its action is the expression of the will of the senate, and no authority can be found I submit that the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries on August 24, 1995 has
which states any other conclusion. All difficulty and confusion in constitutional construction is avoided by satisfied the due process requirement to inform the public of a rule that would govern them and
applying the rule x x x that the continuity of the body depends upon the fact that in the senate a majority affect their rights.
constitutes a quorum, and, as there is always more than a quorum of qualified senators holding seats in
that body, its organic existence is necessarily continuous. x x x The senate of the United States remains a The Resolution of the majority, however, ruled that the respondent Senate Committees failed to meet the
continuous body because twothirds of its members are always, in contemplation of the constitution, in publication requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, as it is not sufficient that
existence.’] the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries be published once; instead, it should be published by the
Senate of every Congress.
"The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The
present Senate has twentyfour members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term Should the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a be published by the Senate of every Congress?
majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935
Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to ‘constitute a quorum to do business.’ [Section 16(2), In disputing the majority Resolution’s conclusion and supporting my position that onetime publication
Article VI, Constitution] Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 suffices, let me first lay down the premise of the Resolution and the Comments of the petitioner and the
Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). They all cite the disquisition on this matter by Justice Antonio T.
Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every Carpio in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion to the March 25, 2008 Decision in this case, viz:
expiry of the term of twelve Senators."10 (emphasis supplied)
"In Arnault v. Nazareno, [footnote omitted] decided under the 1935 Constitution, this Court ruled that ‘the
On the other hand, respondent Senate Committees point out that there is nothing in the wording of Article Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so
VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution that requires the Senate of every Congress to publish the Rules of divided that the seats of only onethird become vacant every two years, twothirds always continuing
Procedure Governing Inquiries. More than the absence of a textual basis for the requirement, respondent into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation.’ To act as a
Senate Committees contend that the Senate is a continuing body since the terms of its members expire at legislative body, the Senate must have a quorum, which is a majority of its membership. [Section
different times, and as such, it is not required to formally adopt and publish its Rules of Procedure 10(2), Article VI, 1935 Constitution; Section 16(2), Article VI, 1987 Constitution. Both the 1935 and
Governing Inquiries for every Congress, unless it is repealed or amended. 11 1987 Constitutions provide that ‘(A) majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.’]
Since the Senate under the 1935 Constitution always had twothirds of its membership filled up except
It is my considered view that there is merit in the contention of respondent Senate Committees that the for vacancies arising from death or resignation, the Senate always maintained a quorum to act as a
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries need not be published by the Senate of every Congress, as legislative body. Thus, the Senate under the 1935 Constitution continued to act as a legislative body
the Senate is a continuing body. The continuity of these rules from one Congress to the next is both an even after the expiry of the term of onethird of its members. This is the rationale in holding that the
incident and an indicium of the continuing nature of the Senate. Senate under the 1935 Constitution was a continuing legislative body. [See also Attorney General Ex. Rel.
Werts v. Rogers, et al., 56 N.J.L. 480, 652 (1844)]. The Supreme Court of New Jersey declared: ‘(T)he
The Senate is a continuing body vitality of the body depends upon the existence of a quorum capable of doing business. That quorum
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dislodge him anytime by impeachment, but that he believed that the Senate affords a sufficient critical Excerpts from the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission provide us a brief history of the
and methodical review of legislation. It assumes the role of moderating force in the formulation of Senate of the Philippines and its intended nature as a continuing legislative body, viz:
legislative policies. It serves as a fiscalizer on the actions of the Lower House, which in usual practice
is prone to passing excessive appropriations acts and other forms of legislations that may prove "MR. TINGSON: Madam President and colleagues of this honorable Assembly, I would like to speak
detrimental to the interest of the nation. The Senate, Madam President, according to President Quezon, briefly on the need for a bicameral legislature elected on a national basis. I would like to thank the Chair
will serve as a balance for harmony between the executive and the legislative departments and provide a and my colleagues for giving me this chance to express my personal view on the type of legislature that
training ground for future leaders. It may be said that it also serves as a vanguard against the activities of we may adopt as we undertake the task of drafting a new Constitution.
politicians and lobbying pressure groups and, likewise, safeguards any possible encroachment upon the
constitutional liberties of the people. "Perhaps an approach based on historical perspective is relevant at this point in time, when our decision
to adopt a more receptive form of legislature will not only determine our present but also direct our future
"As to representation, the Upper House provides national representation which the Lower House cannot as a nation. In the Malolos Constitution of 1899, the legislative power was exercised by an assembly of
attain. In so doing, a bicameral form fosters national unity and consciousness, rather than a representative representatives of the nation. Upon the cession of the Philippines to the United States under the Treaty of
form merely based on the respective districts of the members of legislature. The scope of legislative Paris, we had a military government which was later replaced by a civil government in 1900. During this
responsibility is, therefore, unified with the presence of the Senate. One of the most important features, time, the executive and the legislative functions were exercised by a Commission. With the passage of
of course, is that the Senate insures stability of governmental policies as the Senate is a continuing the Philippine Bill of 1902, a bicameral legislature was created, transforming the Philippine
body.12 Commission into the Upper Chamber and constituting the Philippine Assembly as the Lower House.
xxx xxx xxx "In 1916, pursuant to the Jones Law, legislative power was vested in an allFilipino bicameral
legislature with the Senate as the Upper Chamber and the House of Representatives as the Lower
"MR. RODRIGO: … I would like to state that in the United States Federal Congress, the term of the Chamber. The Senators then were elected from the twelve senatorial districts. In the 1935 Constitution,
members of the Lower House is only two years. We have been used to a term of four years here but I we again adopted a unicameral legislative body known as the National Assembly. The Convention then
think three years is long enough. But they will be allowed to run for reelection any number of times. In rejected the proposal for a bicameral legislature with an Upper House called the Senate. The failure of the
this way, we remedy the too frequent elections every two years. We will have elections every three bicameralist position was due to the division on the question of representation. The Committee on the
years under this scheme and we will have a continuing Senate. Every election, 12 of the 24 Senators Legislative proposed that Senators be elected throughout the Philippines on the basis of proportional
will be elected, so that 12 Senators will remain in the Senate. We will have a staggered membership representation. Others, however, advocated that each province shall be entitled to one Senator, as
in the Senate. In other words, we will have a continuing Senate.13 the practice in the United States. Still others preferred the system of senatorial district under the
Jones Law of 1916.
xxx xxx xxx
"During the time of President Manuel L. Quezon, an amendment providing for a bicameral legislature
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo): Commissioner Davide is recognized. was adopted. Senators were elected nationwide. I may say that the reason President Quezon advocated
for a bicameral form of legislature is not primarily that he was wary of a strong unicameral body that can
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The structure of the Philippine Senate being evidently patterned after the U.S. Senate, 15 it reflects "MR. DAVIDE: This is just a paragraph of that section that will follow what had earlier been approved. It
the latter’s rationale for staggering senatorial terms and constituting the Senate as a continuing reads: ‘OF THE SENATORS ELECTED IN THE ELECTION IN 1992, THE FIRST TWELVE
body.16 Much can be gleaned from The Federalist Papers in ascertaining the rationale of the Senate’s OBTAINING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL SERVE FOR SIX YEARS AND
design. The Federalist Papers was written by three "Founding Fathers" of the United States, namely, THE REMAINING TWELVE FOR THREE YEARS.’
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay. Madison subsequently became President of the U.S.,
while John Jay became the first Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Federalist Papers is a "This is to start the staggering of the Senate to conform with the idea of a continuing Senate.
collection of 85 essays that were written and first published in various New York newspapers in 1787
1788 to explain the U.S. Constitution and urge the people of New York to ratify it. As Madison and "THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo): What does the committee say?
Hamilton were both members of the Federal Convention of 1787, The Federalist Papers is largely used
"MR. SUAREZ: The committee accepts the Davide proposal, Mr. Presiding Officer.
as an authority to interpret the intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution.17
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none;
James Madison urged that the Senate be so constituted as to have permanency and stability.18 With
the proposed amendment is approved.
their staggered terms and longer tenure, Senators are expected to bring stability and wisdom to
legislative measures.19 Indeed, the framers of the U.S. Constitution considered stability and consistency
"MR. SUAREZ: May we submit that to a vote?
of law to be fundamental to liberty itself.
VOTING
In The Federalist Nos. 62 and 63, the Senate was extensively discussed. Madison elaborated in The
Federalist No. 62, the injurious effects of instability to a nation. Instability "forfeits the respect and "THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo): As many as are in favor of the Davide amendment,
confidence of other nations," and the latter would not want to "connect their fortunes" with that nation. He please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
also explained that the domestic effects of mutability are calamitous. "It poisons the blessing of liberty
itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws "As many as are abstaining, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be
repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who "The results show 25 votes in favor and none against; the proposed amendment is approved." 14 (emphasis
knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow." supplied)
Another evil of instability, Madison adds, is the "unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the The above deliberations show that the nature of the Senate as a continuing body hinged on the
enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people. Every new staggering of terms of the Senators, such that the term of onehalf or twelve of the Senators ("remaining
regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different species of Senators") would subsist and continue into the succeeding Congress, while the term of the other half or
property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, twelve Senators ("outgoing Senators") would expire in the present Congress. As pointed out
reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellowcitizens." An unstable by Commissioner Gregorio J. Tingson, this arrangement whereby half of the Senate’s membership
government "damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a continues into the next Congress is designed to help ensure "stability of governmental policies."
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Alexander Hamilton also stated in the debate during the New York ratification convention that "the main continuance of existing arrangements." Madison asks, "(w)hat prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes
design of the Convention, in creating the Senate, was to prevent fluctuations and cabals."20 Madison in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before
agreed with Hamilton’s assessment, writing: "Nothing is more certain than that the tenure of the Senate they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to
was meant as an obstacle to the instability, which not only history, but the experience of our any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and
country, had shown to be the besetting infirmity of popular governments."21 "In order to form some advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or
balance, the departments of government were separated, and as a necessary check, the legislative body laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy."
was composed of two branches. Steadiness and wisdom are better insured when there is a second
branch, to balance and check the first. The stability of the laws will be greater when the popular Madison then concludes that above all, the deplorable effect of instability "is that diminution of
branch, which might be influenced by local views, or the violence of a party, is checked by another, attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a political system which
whose longer continuance in office will render them more experienced, more temperate, and more betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government,
competent to decide rightly."22 any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly
respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability."
John Jay’s explanation was along the same lines as the thoughts of Madison and Hamilton, that
the Senate elections were staggered, so that "uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of In The Federalist No. 63 written by Madison or Hamilton, it was noted that the "objects of government
official information will be preserved."23 may be divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate
and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of wellchosen and wellconnected
In the deliberations on the U.S. Constitution by the Federal Convention of 1787, one of the measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter
considerations stated for a proposed staggering of nineyear senatorial terms in three divisions was to give description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And yet
other countries "confidence in the stability or efficacy" 24 of the American government, the lack of which it is evident that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or
has prevented Great Britain from entering into a commercial treaty with the U.S. 25 "Permanency and two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to
safety to those who are to be governed"26 were also cited as goals for creating the Senate. be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could
be justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than
In McGrain v. Daugherty,27 the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the view that the Senate is a half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of influence which their
"continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided into classes that the annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years.
seats of onethird only become vacant at the end of each Congress, twothirds always continuing into the It is sufficiently difficult to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a NUMEROUS body, for
next Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or resignation." 28 In that case, the investigation such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents."
by a Senate committee was ordered during the Sixtyeighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1925. Madison or Hamilton then suggests that "(t)he proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body
The Senate, however, amended the resolution authorizing the investigation to allow the committee to sit at in the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as
such times and places as it might deem advisable or necessary. In addressing the question of whether require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for
the investigation may be continued after the expiration of the Sixtyeighth Congress, the U.S. High the attainment of those objects."
Court, citing Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, held that the Senate as a continuing body, may
442 of 669
of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for give authority to its committees to continue through the recess following the expiration of a Congress. The
contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Court ruled that a Senate committee established in the Sixtyeighth Congress could be "continued or
revived" by motion after such expiration and, if continued or revived, would have all its original powers.29
"Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The Senate
has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is The Philippine Supreme Court cited McGrain in Arnault v. Nazareno.30 The issue in Arnault, however,
within its competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the was the validity of the exercise of the contempt power of the Senate after the expiration of the first regular
petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has session (of the Second Congress) in which the Senate resolved that petitioner Jean Arnault be arraigned
empowered the committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the for contempt, and not after the termination of the Second Congress. Nonetheless, in upholding the
questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and continuing contempt power of the Senate, the Court held, viz:
the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the
questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as "Like the Senate of the United States, the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose
long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only onethird become vacant
function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in every two years, twothirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru
which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so
but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside that the term of every Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on
from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing
adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and the Petitioner was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress, which began on the
succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation fourth Monday of January and ended on May 18, 1950.
is completed an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided." 31
"… We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end
The Resolution of the majority, the petitioner and the OSG make much of the fact, however, that two of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very
thirds of the membership of the Senate continued into the next Congress under the 1935 Constitution reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
when Arnault was decided, and only half of the Senate membership now continues into the next constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice
Congress under the 1987 Constitution. They contend that since both the 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
provide that a "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," 32 the Senate under the investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees
1987 Constitution has lost its continuing nature, as it no longer has a continuing quorum to do business the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that power
when half of its membership’s term expires at the end of every Congress. 33 Even following their is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function. It
contention that the satisfaction of the quorum to do business is based on the number of "remaining is but logical to say that the power of selfpreservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
Senators," a textual reading of the provisions on legislative functions under the 1935 Constitution
would show that even the continuing twothirds membership of the Senate (or sixteen Senators) "But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
cannot perform all the legislative functions of the Senate. A threefourths (or eighteen Senators) vote is continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or
443 of 669
3 of the 1935 Constitution provides: "The term of office of Senators shall be six years and shall begin on necessary to override the veto of the President with respect to "appropriation bills which appropriate a
the thirtieth day of December next following their election." sum in excess of ten per centum of the total amount voted in the appropriation bill for the general
expenses of the Government for the preceding year, or if it should refer to a bill authorizing an increase of
Thus, the Senate under both the 1935 39 and the 198740 Constitutions counted the quorum based on the pubic debt."34
the number of "remaining Senators" and "new Senators" upon opening of every Congress. This
unbroken practice of the Senate of counting the quorum at the start of every new Congress based on both More importantly, the reasoning of the Resolution of the majority, the petitioner and the OSG that the
the "remaining Senators" and "new Senators," and not only on the twothirds or onehalf "remaining continuing nature of the Senate depends on the presence of a quorum, counting the number
Senators," is not something to be lightly cast aside in ascertaining the nature of the Senate as a of "remaining Senators" falls under its own weight when we take a hard look at the
continuing body.41 In the U.S., the Senate of the 18th century 42 and the present day upper chamber43 have Constitutional provision on the term of Senators.
also counted their quorum based on the number of both the "remaining Senators" and "new Senators"
upon the opening of every Congress. Article VI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, provides that, "(t)he term of office of the Senators shall
be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
It is worth noting that in the June 25 and 26, 1787 debates of the Federal Convention of 1787 on the June next following their election." (emphasis supplied) Pursuant to this provision, the term of office of
staggering of terms of office of Senate members whether the term under consideration was nine years a Senator expires before noon on the thirtieth day of June, six years from commencement of his term.
or six years with triennial staggering the quorum requirement was not mentioned as a consideration Thus, upon expiration of the term of the twelve "outgoing Senators" on June 30, the term of the twelve
to maintain continuity in the Senate.44 Conversely, neither was the staggering of terms considered when "new Senators" will commence.35 The Senatorselect take their oath of office upon commencement of
the quorum requirement was taken up by the Convention two months later on August 10, 1787. 45 When their term and begin to exercise their functions; 36 the collective oathtaking of the Senators upon the
the quorum requirement was being set by the Federal Convention, there were proposals to peg it at the opening of Congress is normally but a tradition and a formality. 37 In the Fourteenth Congress, for
majority or less than the majority of the members of the Senate; or to leave it to the legislature to set the example, newly elected Senator Loren B. Legarda filed Senate Bill No. 225, entitled "An Act Providing
quorum requirement, considering the secession of some States that would not send delegates to the Senate for the Establishment of Barangay Drugstores, Otherwise Known as ‘Botica Sa Barangay’ and for other
and the inconvenience of not reaching a quorum. 46 There was also a proposal to fix the quorum at two Purposes," on June 30, 2007, the day her term commenced and before the opening of the Fourteenth
thirds of the members of the Senate.47 In setting the quorum requirement, the balance being struck Congress on July 23, 2007. Likewise, on the same day, newly reelected Senator Francis N. Pangilinan
was between the inconvenience of not being able to muster a quorum if it was set too high and the filed Senate Bill No. 138, entitled "An Act Providing for a Magna Carta for Students."
insufficiency in representation of the interests of the people if it was set too low. 48 The continuity of
the Senate, considering the staggered terms of its members, was apparently not part of the Contrary to the contention of the Resolution of the majority, petitioner and the OSG, at no point from
equation. one Congress to the next is there a lack of quorum based on the terms of office of the "remaining
Senators" and "new Senators." Under the 1987 Constitution, on the opening of a Congress on the
It may be argued that under the 1987 Constitution, some "outgoing Senators" might resign prior to the fourth Monday of July,38 the quorum is based on the number of both the "remaining Senators" and the
termination of their terms on June 30 to run for election in May, 49 thus, possibly diminishing the number "new Senators" whose terms have already commenced on June 30. A similar situation obtained under the
of Senators to only twelve or less than the quorum requirement. However, the argument also holds true 1935 Constitution, in which three sets of eight Senators had staggered sixyear terms. Article VI, Section
under the 1935 Constitution. It could happen that four of the sixteen "remaining Senators" would resign or
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"Rule LII (Date of Taking Effect), Section 137: These Rules shall take effect on the date of their die, such that there would be only twelve Senators left, or less than the quorum requirement under the
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed." 1935 Constitution. (Even Arnault acknowledged this eventuality; hence, as aforequoted, it ruled that
"the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and
xxx xxx xxx so divided that the seats of only onethird become vacant every two years, twothirds always continuing
into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation.") The point of the
"Rule LI (Amendments to, Or revisions Of, The Rules), Section 136: At the start of each session in illustration is that the nature of the Senate as a continuing body under both the 1935 and the 1987
which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President Constitutions cannot be made to depend on the actual presence of a quorum which, in turn, depends on
may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision. the tenure of the Senators.
"The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before In sum, it is the staggering of the terms of the 24 Senators and allowing the terms of office of a
its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for portion of the Senate membership to continue into the succeeding Congress whether twothirds
its approval." (emphasis supplied) under the 1935 Constitution or onehalf under the 1987 Constitution that provides the stability
indispensable to an effective government, and makes the Senate a continuing body as intended by
It is obvious that the above rules do not provide for the expiration of the Senate Rules at the
the framers of both the 1935 (as amended) and the 1987 Constitutions.
termination of every Congress. On the contrary, Rule LI provides that at the opening of every Congress,
the Senate President may endorse the Senate Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or Part of the stability provided by a continuing Senate is the existence of rules of proceedings adopted
revision, which connotes that the Senate Rules must be subsisting for them to be subject to amendment or pursuant to the power granted by the U.S. Constitution, 50 rules that continue to be in effect from one
revision. If the Senate were not a continuing body, the Senate Rules governing its proceedings would not Congress to the next until such rules are repealed or amended, but with the process for repeal and
be given continuing effect from one Congress to the next. amendment also being governed by the subsisting rules. U.S. Senator Francis Warren cautions that
a Senate that is not continuing, but instead new in each Congress, opens all rules to debate as a new
The earlier Senate Rules adopted in 1950 under the 1935 Constitution also evince the same intent of
matter; the Senate will be totally and wholly without rules as it proceeds "at sea without rudder or
the Senate to make its rules continuing, in conformity with its continuous nature as a legislative
compass regarding rules."51 Thus, in the U.S., the Senate rules of proceedings provide that "(t)he rules of
body. Chapter LII (Amendments to or Revisions of the Rules), Section 121 of the 1950 Rules,
the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in
provides, viz:
these rules."52 These rules, adopted on January 11, 1884 and made effective on January 21, 1884, continue
to be in effect to this day53 alongside the continuing membership of the Senate.54
"Sec. 121. At the beginning of each session in which the Senators elected in the last or preceding elections
shall begin their term of office, and as soon as the Committee on Rules shall have been organized, the
Patterned after the U.S. Constitution, the 1987 Constitution also provides under Article VI, Section 16(3)
President of the Senate shall endorse the Rules to said Committee for amendment or revision.
that "(e)ach House may determine the rules of its proceedings…" As in the U.S. Senate, the Senate
Rules (of proceedings) adopted by the Philippine Senate have a continued effect from one Congress
"An amendment to the Rules, may, however, be presented by means of a motion containing the proposed
to the next as shown by the following provisions of the Philippine Senate Rules:
amendment.
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would allow a Senate Committee conducting an investigation, for example, to continue its proceedings "This should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of a majority of the
after the expiration of a Congress as in the aforediscussed case, McGrain v. Daugherty. Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval." (emphasis supplied)
Prescinding from the continuing nature of the Senate and the continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules (of
proceedings), it is my considered view that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries adopted by the
Senate of the Tenth Congress on August 21, 1995 should likewise be recognized to have continuing While the present Senate Rules provide under Rule XLIV (Unfinished Business), Section 123 that "(a)ll
force and effect after being "duly published" in two newspapers of general circulation on August 24, pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress," between the
1995. expiration of a Congress and the opening of the succeeding Congress, some functions of the Senate
continue during such recess. Aside from the administrative functions performed by Senate employees
Deference to the legislative department for the continued operation of the Senate as an institution, legislative functions continue to be exercised.
in interpreting its rulemaking power The offices of the "remaining Senators" continue their legislative work in preparation for the succeeding
Congress. These continuing functions require continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules. An example of a
The power of each House of Congress to adopt its own rules of proceedings under Article VI, Section provision of the Senate Rules applicable to these continuing activities is Rule XXII (Filing and
1658 of the 1987 Constitution is so obvious that the 1986 Constitutional Commission hardly deliberated on Consideration of Bills and Resolutions), Section 61, which provides that "(a)ll bills and resolutions shall
the matter. Even the framers of the U.S. Constitution, from which our own provision on rules of be filed with the Office of the Secretary whether the Senate is in session or not."
proceedings was adopted, did not prescribe standards for the promulgation of internal procedural rules and
spent no time debating this power of each House of Congress; they conferred essentially openended To illustrate, in the current Fourteenth Congress, Senate Bill No. 1 entitled, "An Act Exempting the
discretion on each chamber to regulate its own internal proceedings. 59 In the 1787 Federal Convention, it Purchase of Medicine by Senior Citizens from the Coverage of the Value Added Tax, and Amending
was not a controversial principle that each chamber should have the ability to adopt rules binding on its Section 109 (1) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended" was filed by Senator Jinggoy E.
members. "The humblest assembly of men is understood to possess this power; and it would be absurd to Estrada on June 30, 2007 after the adjournment of the third or final regular session 55 of the
deprive the councils of the nation of a like authority."60 Thirteenth Congress and before the opening of the Fourteenth Congress.56 On the same date, Senator
Rodolfo G. Biazon filed Senate Bill No. 32 entitled, "An Act Providing for the National Defense and
It cannot be gainsaid that rules of proceedings are a necessity in preserving order, decency and regularity Security of the Republic of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes." Both bills were taken up on first
in a dignified public body. These rules are weapons of the weaker party to defend themselves from reading and referred to the proper Senate Committees in the Senate session on July 24, 2007, a day after
irregularities and abuses "which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to large and the Fourteenth Congress opened on July 23, 2007, when the Senate was organized with the election of its
successful majorities."61 Thomas Jefferson stated in the opening of his widely used, A Manual of officers, and President Gloria MacapagalArroyo delivered her State of the Nation Address.57
Parliamentary Practice, viz:
It should be noted that the termination of unfinished business upon expiration of one Congress is
"Mr. Onslow, the ablest among the Speakers of the House of Commons, used to say, ‘It was a maxim he sanctioned by Rule XLIV, Section 123 of the Senate Rules. The Senate Rules, may, however, be amended
had often heard when he was a young man, from old and experienced members, that nothing tended more under Rule LI, Section 36. It remains to be seen whether by amendment of the Senate Rules, the Senate
to throw power into the hands of the administration and those who acted with the majority of the House of
446 of 669
In ruling that the tariff law validly passed the House, the Ballin Court upheld the action of the Commons, than in neglect of, or departure from, the rules of proceeding; that these forms, as instituted
Speaker, viz: by our ancestors, operated as a check, and control, on the actions of the majority; and that they
were, in many instances, a shelter and protection to the minority, against the attempts of
"The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. [Rule 15 provides, viz: ‘... (3) On the demand of power.’"62 (emphasis supplied)
any member, or at the suggestion of the speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the house who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported Still and all, the rulemaking power of the legislature is not absolute. The outer limit of a legislative rule is
to the speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the reached when it collides with a constitutional proscription. The case in which the U.S. Supreme Court
presence of a quorum to do business.’ H. J. 230, Feb. 14, 1890.] The question, therefore, is as to the made its most extensive analysis of the nature and limitations of the congressional rulemaking power
validity of this rule, and not what methods the speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining was United States v. Ballin,63 a late nineteenthcentury case that involved the constitutional quorum
the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the requirement.64
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The The origin of Ballin was a quorumbusting technique used by both the Republicans and the Democrats in
constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules that era to halt business in the House of Representatives. Under the rules of the House at that time, the
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable Speaker established the presence of a quorum by counting the voting members. In the 1888 elections, the
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is Republicans won the majority for the first time in fourteen years. The new Speaker of the Fiftyfirst
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the Congress, Thomas B. Reed of Maine, found himself in the position of having 166 Republican members,
determination of the house, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would the exact number needed to meet the quorum requirement. 65 Democrats could thus stop business in the
be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a House by merely refusing to vote and requiring the Republicans to establish a quorum with their members
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one alone. On January 29, 1890, Democrats halted business on a contested election case by remaining silent to
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the house, defeat the quorum requirement.66 Speaker Reed retaliated by announcing the names of members "present
and, within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal. and refusing to vote," thereby establishing that a majority of the House was present and the House was
thereby able to conduct business.67 Speaker Reed’s famous interpretation of the quorum rule became
"The constitution provides that ‘a majority of each [house] shall constitute a quorum to do business.’ In "Rule XV"68 in the Fiftyfirst Congress, the constitutionality of which became the central issue in Ballin.69
other words, when a majority are present, the house is in a position to do business. Its capacity to transact
business is then established, created by the mere presence of a majority, and does not depend upon the Ballin involved a tariff law passed by the House in 1890 under Speaker Reed’s new quorumcounting
disposition or assent or action of any single member or fraction of the majority present. All that the rule.70 The plaintiff was a New York merchant who had imported worsted wool fabrics subject to that law.
constitution requires is the presence of a majority, and when that majority are present, the power of the The enactment passed the House by a vote of 138 to none, with the Speaker noting, in accordance with the
house arises. new Rule XV, that 74 members were in the chamber but not voting, bringing the total number of
lawmakers present to 212 a figure well above the 166 members needed to make a quorum. 71 The
"But how shall the presence of a majority be determined? The constitution has prescribed no method of merchant challenged the legality of the tariff, arguing that the law had not legitimately passed the House,
making this determination, and it is therefore within the competency of the house to prescribe any because a quorum had not been present to do business.72
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not members of the Senate and, hence, requires publication. To the extent that the Rules of Procedure method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact. It may prescribe answer to rollcall as
Governing Inquiries does not transgress the requirement of due process as its outer limit, the Senate the only method of determination; or require the passage of members between tellers, and their count, as
should be given room to interpret the duration of its effectivity from one Congress to the next. the sole test; or the count of the speaker or the clerk, and an announcement from the desk of the names of
those who are present. Any one of these methods, it must be conceded, is reasonably certain of
Similar to Ballin, there is no standard set by Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, as to the ascertaining the fact; and as there is no constitutional method prescribed, and no constitutional
manner and frequency of publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries. It is within inhibition of any of those, and no violation of fundamental rights in any, it follows that the house may
the competency of the Senate to prescribe a method that shall reasonably conform to the dueprocess adopt either or all, or it may provide for a combination of any two of the methods. That was done by the
purpose of publication, and the Senate has validly provided the method of onetime publication of rule in question, and all that that rule attempts to do is to prescribe a method for ascertaining the presence
its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in two newspapers of general circulation, in line with of a majority, and thus establishing the fact that the house is in a condition to transact
the ruling in Tañada. business."73 (emphasis supplied)
The unbroken practice of the Senate of not adopting Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries and In DefensorSantiago v. Guingona, Jr.,74 which involved an interpretation of the rules of the Senate but
publishing the same in every Congress, owing to its nature as a continuing body, is not something to be not private rights, the Court emphasized the respect due a coequal branch of government in the
lightly brushed aside,77 especially considering the grave consequences of cutting this continuity. determination of its internal affairs, viz:
Holding itself to be a continuing body, the Senate has dispensed with the adoption not only of Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, but also of Senate rules (of proceedings) at the start of every Congress in "On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
the last ten years. 78 As a consequence of the absence of rules if the Senate is held to be not a continuing internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
body, its acts during these Congresses may be put into question. A mathematical calculation of a quorum work.
in view of the staggered terms of the Senate membership cannot simply subvert the deeplyentrenched
thoughtout rationale for the design of a continuing and stable Senate, shown to be necessary in promoting xxx xxx xxx
effective government and protecting liberties.
"…Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this
Where rights are not violated, the Court ought not like lightning strike down a valid rule and practice of a Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant
coequal branch of government, lest the walls delineating powers be burned. nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the
law."75 (footnote omitted, ital. in original)
I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration.
Following the principles of Ballin and Santiago, I submit that the Court ought to take a deferential stance
in interpreting the rulemaking power of the Senate as a coequal branch of government, so long as rights
of private parties are not infringed. 76 The Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries is akin to the Senate
Rules (of proceeding) in that the former governs the internal workings of the Senate and its committees,
although admittedly different in some respects from the Senate Rules because it affects rights of parties
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Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure; The requisite of publication of
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.—As to the petition in G.R. No.
vs.
179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
REFORMS, respondents.
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of
the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for x x
it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation
vs.
in the Philippines.” The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present
Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, x x
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitionerinintervention
Same; Same; The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution; The constitutional x x
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
—Respondents justify their nonobservance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
F. TRILLANES, respondentsintervenors
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. The Court does
not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
449 of 669
results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. 1
with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have
undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
Same; Same; Statutes; Internet; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
Commerce Act of 2000, does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
—The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the
respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed threehour taped functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2 electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Same; Same; The recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. the instant petitions.—The Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we
of the resource persons.3 take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to
be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees
be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their
NACHURA, J.:
committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. 5
President of the Philippines and a highranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly
placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the nearcollapse of the
stopped.
Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
450 of 669
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a
Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to
their Comment on the petition on September 25, 2007.
16
provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the
alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17 participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two
179275. 18
bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the body were to
objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public
officials.9
I
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties’ standing,
Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
argued at length in their pleadings.
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar
the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello
Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury
451 of 669
public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional action.21
processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 22
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. 29 relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. MacapagalArroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has
been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings." 24 The fairly
intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, 30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a nonmember of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a
in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic. personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the
National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the
Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. 32 It Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have
should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted discretion given to them."26
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own
rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is
and of the legal profession–which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of
acts. 33
the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner
Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud.
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are
the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all. 34
concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt
to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of
452 of 669
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada
in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of II
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be
42 prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. 35 By actual cases, we mean existing
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes publication is set forth conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the
in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
the Philippines." 44 questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 36 Neither will the Court determine a moot
question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. 38
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. 45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14 th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from
including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, we said: 46
House and heard by its members. 39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on
the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for
21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
rules of procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation: about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 41
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules III
of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before
453 of 669
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for onehalf of the Senate’s
status. membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are therefore, procedurally
may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. infirm.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the following rationalization:
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present
practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress Senate has twentyfour members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v.
the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of
same status. the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct
of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration)
states: in the same case, viz.:
RULE LI On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly,
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with
each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its dayto
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
revision.
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
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If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before
next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for
effectivity. its approval.
Respondents justify their nonobservance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the RULE LII
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. 49
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance are amended or repealed.
of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after
in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in
these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating: date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from
the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity
the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate. The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
50
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law
51
455 of 669
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages
and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial
notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited
by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published
rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the
consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello
Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
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On the same day, the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs chaired by Senator Panfilo ARVIN R. BALAG, PETITIONER, V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE
Lacson (Senator Lacson) together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Constitutional ON PUBLIC ORDER AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND
Amendment and Revision of Codes, invited petitioner and several other persons to the Joint Public
HUMAN RIGHTS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND
Hearing on September 25, 2017 to discuss and deliberate the following: Senate Bill Nos. 27, [7] 199,[8] 223,
REVISION OF CODES AND MGEN. JOSE V. BALAJADIA, JR. (RET.) IN HIS CAPACITY AS
[9]
1161,[10] 1591,[11] and SR No. 504.
SENATE SERGEANTATARMS, RESPONDENTS.
Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing scheduled on September 25, 2017. Nevertheless, John Paul
D E C I S I O N
Solano, a member of AJ Fraternity, Atty. Nilo T. Divina, Dean of UST Institute of Civil Law and Arthur
Capili, UST Faculty Secretary, attended the hearing and were questioned by the senate committee GESMUNDO, J.:
members.
On the same date, Spouses Carmina T. Castillo and Horacio M. Castillo, Jr. (Spouses Castillo), parents of
Horacio III, filed a Criminal Complaint [12] for Murder and violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.)
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
No. 8049,[13] before the Department of Justice (DOJ) against several members of the AJ Fraternity,
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin the implementation of
including petitioner. On October 9, 2017, Spouses Castillo filed a Supplemental Complaint
Senate P.S. Reso1ution (SR) No. 504[1] and the October 18, 2017 Order[2] (Contempt Order) of the Senate
Affidavit[14] before the DOJ citing the relevant transcripts of stenographic notes during the September 25,
Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs citing Arvin Balag (petitioner) in contempt.
2017 Senate Hearing.
The Antecedents
On October 11, 2017, Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous
On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio III),[3] a first year law student of the
Drugs, and as approved by Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, issued a Subpoena Ad
University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ
Testificandum[15] addressed to petitioner directing him to appear before the committee and to testify as to
Fraternity) of the same university.
the subject matter under inquiry.[16] Another Subpoena Ad Testificandum[17] was issued on October 17,
2017, which was received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to attend the legislative hearing on
October 18, 2017. On September 19, 2017, SR No. 504, [4] was filed by Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri (Senator Zubiri)
[5]
condemning the death of Horacio III and directing the appropriate Senate Committee to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, to hold those responsible accountable.
On said date, petitioner attended the senate hearing. In the course of the proceedings, at around 11:29 in
the morning, Senator Grace Poe (Senator Poe) asked petitioner if he was the president of AJ Fraternity
but he refused to answer the question and invoked his right against selfincrimination. Senator Poe On September 20, 2017, SR No. 510, entitled: "A Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate
repeated the question but he still refused to answer. Senator Lacson then reminded him to answer the Committees to Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of Horacio Tomas
question because it was a very simple question, otherwise, he could be cited in contempt. Senator Poe Castillo III Allegedly Due to HazingRelated Activities" was filed by Senator Paolo Benigno Aquino IV.
[6]
retorted that petitioner might still be clinging to the supposed "Code of Silence" in his alleged text
457 of 669
APPROPRIATE SENATE COMMITTEES TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION, IN AID OF messages to his fraternity. She manifested that petitioner's signature appeared on the application for
LEGISLATION, TO HOLD ACCOUNTABLE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SENSELESS ACT recognition of the AJ Fraternity and on the organizational sheet, indicating that he was the president.
(SEN. ZUBIRI); AND Petitioner, again, invoked his right against selfincrimination. Senator Poe then moved to cite him in
contempt, which was seconded by Senators Joel Villanueva (Senator Villanueva) and Zubiri. Senator
Lacson ruled that the motion was properly seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeantatarms was ordered to
SENATE BILLS NOS. 27, 199, 223, 1161, AND 1591.
place petitioner in detention after the committee hearing. Allegedly, Senator Lacson threatened to order
the detention of petitioner in Pasay City Jail under the custody of the Senate Sergeantatarms and told
xxx him not to be evasive because he would be merely affirming school records.
For testifying falsely and evasively before the Committee on [October 18, 2017] and thereby delaying, A few minutes later, at around 12:09 in the afternoon, Senators Lacson and Poe gave petitioner another
impeding and obstructing the inquiry into the death of Horacio "Atio" Castillo III. Thereupon the motion chance to purge himself of the contempt charge. Again, he was asked the same question twice and each
of Senator Grace Poe and seconded by Senator Joel Villanueva and Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri, the time he refused to answer.[18]
Committee hereby cites MR. ARVIN BALAG in contempt and ordered arrested and detained at the
Office of the Sergeant atArms until such time that he gives his true testimony, or otherwise purges
Thereafter, around 1:19 in the afternoon, Senator Villanueva inquired from petitioner whether he knew
himself of that contempt.
whose decision it was to bring Horacio III to the Chinese General Hospital instead of the UST Hospital.
Petitioner apologized for his earlier statement and moved for the lifting of his contempt. He admitted that
The SergeantatArms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and make a return hereof he was a member of the AJ Fraternity but he was not aware as to who its president was because, at that
within twentyfour (24) hours from its enforcement. time, he was enrolled in another school.
SO ORDERED.[19] Senator Villanueva repeated his question to petitioner but the latter, again, invoked his right against self
incrimination. Petitioner reiterated his plea that the contempt order be lifted because he had already
Hence, this petition. answered the question regarding his membership in the AJ Fraternity. Senator Villanueva replied that
petitioner's contempt would remain. Senator Lacson added that he had numerous opportunities to answer
the questions of the committee but he refused to do so. Thus, petitioner was placed under the custody of
ISSUE the Senate Sergeantatarms. The Contempt Order reads:
PS RES. NO. 504: RESOLUTION CONDEMNING IN THE STRONGEST SENSE THE DEATH OF
FRESHMAN LAW STUDENT HORATIO TOMAS CASTILLO III AND DIRECTING THE
458 of 669
refused to answer the question; at 1:19 in the afternoon, he admitted that he was a member of the Petitioner chiefly argues that the legislative inquiry conducted by respondent committees was not in aid of
fraternity but still he refused to say whether or not he was the president, only saying that he is already legislation; rather, it was in aid of prosecution. He posits that the purpose of SR No. 504 was to hold
studying in another school. On November 6, 2017, at the resumption of the hearing, petitioner was still accountable those responsible for the senseless act of killing Horacio III, and not to aid legislation.
unresponsive. According to respondents, these acts were contemptuous and were valid reasons to cite Petitioner underscores that the transcripts during the September 25, 2017 committee hearing were used in
petitioner in contempt. the criminal complaint filed against him, which bolsters that the said hearings were in aid of prosecution.
He insists that the senate hearings would violate his right to due process and would preempt the findings
of the DOJ with respect to the criminal complaint filed against him.
Respondents highlighted that there were numerous documents showing that petitioner was the president of
the AJ Fraternity but he continually refused to answer. They added that petitioner cannot purge himself of
contempt by continually lying. Petitioner also asserts that he properly invoked his right against self incrimination as the questions
propounded by Senator Poe regarding the officers, particularly the presidency of the AJ Fraternity, were
incriminating because the answer thereto involves an element of the crime of hazing. Despite the
Further, respondents underscored that the question propounded to petitioner was not incriminating
questions being incriminating, he, nonetheless, answered them by admitting that he was a member of the
because an admission that he was an officer of the AJ Fraternity would not automatically make him liable
AJ Fraternity but he did not know of its current president because he transferred to another school. He
under R.A. No. 8049. They emphasized that the Senate respected petitioner's right to due process because
adds that his right to equal protection of laws was violated because the other resource persons who refused
the hearing was conducted in aid of legislation; that the senators explained why he would be cited in
to answer the questions of the Senate committees were not cited in contempt.
contempt; that he was given several chances to properly purge himself from contempt; and that no
incriminating question was asked. Respondents concluded that there was no violation of petitioner's right
to equal protection of laws because the other resource persons did not invoke their right against self Finally, petitioner prays for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction because the Senate
incrimination when asked if they were the officers of the AJ Fraternity. illegally enforced and executed SR No. 504 and the Contempt Order, which caused him grave and
irreparable injury as he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law. He contends that
respondents did not exercise their power of contempt judiciously and with restraint.
Respondents likewise explained that the legislative inquiry in aid of legislation may still continue in spite
of any pending criminal or administrative cases or investigation. They countered that the actions
for certiorari and prohibition were not proper because there were existing remedies that petitioner could In their Comment,[20] respondents, through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, countered that the
have availed of, particularly: a motion to reverse the contempt charge filed within 7 days under Section 18 purpose of the hearing was to reexamine R.A. No. 8049; that several documents showed that the
of the Senate Rules; and a petition for habeas corpus as petitioner ultimately would seek for his release legislative hearing referred to Senate Bill Nos. 27, 199, 223, 1161, and 1591; that the statement of the
from detention. senators during the hearing demonstrated that the legislative inquiry was conducted in aid of legislation;
and that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (Senate Rules) were
duly published.
Finally, respondents asserted that the recourse for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction was not proper because petitioner was actually asking to be freed from detention, and this was
contemplated under a status quo ante order. For invoking the wrong remedy, respondents concluded that Respondents emphasized that petitioner was first asked on October 18, 2017, around 11:29 in the
a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued. morning, whether he was the president of the AJ Fraternity, based on school records, and he denied it; he
was asked again at 12:09 in the afternoon whether he was the president of the AJ Fraternity but he still
459 of 669
Then, on January 23, 2018, the Committees on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs and Justice and Human In its Resolution[21] dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release of
Rights jointly adopted Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 and submitted the same to the Senate. petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition.
Committee Report No. 232 referred to the findings of respondent committees in the inquiry conducted in
aid of legislation; while Committee Report No. 233 referred to the recommendation that Senate Bill No.
In its Manifestation[22] dated February 20, 2018, respondents stated that on January 23, 2018, the
1662 be approved in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 27, 199, 223, 1161, 1591, and 1609. On February 12,
Committees on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs and Justice and Human Rights jointly submitted
2018, the Senate passed on yd reading Senate Bill No. 1662.
Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 recommending that Senate Bill No. 1662 be approved in substitution
of Senate Bill Nos. 27, 199, 223, 1161, 1591, and 1609. The said committee reports were approved by the
Evidently, respondent committees have terminated their legislative inquiry upon the approval of majority of their members.[23] On February 12, 2018, the Senate passed on 3 rd reading Senate Bill No.
Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 by the majority of its members. The Senate even went further by 1662, entitled: An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8049 to Strengthen the Law on Hazing and Regulate
approving on its 3rd reading the proposed bill, Senate Bill No. 1662, the result of the inquiry in aid of Other Forms of Initiation Rites of Fraternities, Sororities, and Other Organizations, Providing Penalties
legislation. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of petitioner likewise ends. Therefor, and for Other Purposes, with its short title as "AntiHazing Act of 2018."
Accordingly, there is no more justiciable controversy regarding respondents' exercise of their The Court's Ruling
constitutional power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, their power of contempt, and the validity of
petitioner's detention. Indeed, the petition has become moot and academic.
The petition is moot and academic.
Nevertheless, there were occasions in the past when the Court passed upon issues although supervening
The existence of an actual case or controversy is a necessary condition precedent to the court's exercise of
events had rendered those petitions moot and academic. After all, the moot and academic principle is not a
its power of adjudication. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide
assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution. In
cases, otherwise moot and academic. [25] This Court may assume jurisdiction over a case that has been
the negative, a justiciable controversy must neither be conjectural nor moot and academic. There must be
rendered moot and academic by supervening events when any of the following instances are present:
a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of the parties who have adverse legal
interests. The reason is that the issue ceases to be justiciable when a controversy becomes moot and
(1)Grave constitutional violations; academic; otherwise, the court would engage in rendering an advisory opinion on what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.[24]
(2)Exceptional character of the case;
(3)Paramount public interest;
In this case, the Court finds that there is no more justiciable controversy. Petitioner essentially alleges that
(4)The case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or
respondents unlawfully exercised their power of contempt and that his detention was invalid. As discussed
earlier, in its resolution dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release
(5)The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[26] of petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under the
Senate's authority.
460 of 669
Thus, a review of the Constitution and relevant laws and jurisprudence must be conducted to determine In David v. Arroyo,[27] several petitions assailed the constitutionality of the declaration of a state of
whether there is a limitation to the period of detention when the Senate exercises its power of contempt national emergency by then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. During the pendency of the suits, the
during inquiries in aid of legislation. said declaration was lifted. However, the Court still decided the cases on the merits because the issues
involved a grave violation of the Constitution and it affected public interest.
461 of 669
Then came Arnault v. Nazareno[39] (Arnault), where the Senate's power of contempt was discussed. In that imprisonment limited to the duration of the session was not considered sufficiently drastic as a
case, the Court held that the Senate "is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the punishment for contumacious witnesses. The purpose of the statutory contempt was merely to supplement
periodical dissolution of Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time [with] the inherent power of contempt by providing for additional punishment. On June 22, 1938, Section 102 of
the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted the Revised Statutes was codified in Section 192, Title II of the U.S. Code.[36]
xxx"[40] It was ruled therein that had contempt been exercised by the House of Representatives, the
contempt could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the said Congress. [41]
In our jurisdiction, the period of the imprisonment for contempt by Congress was first discussed in Lopez
v. De Los Reyes[37] (Lopez). In that case, on September 16, 1930, the petitioner therein was cited in
Notably, Arnault gave a distinction between the Senate and the House of Representatives' power of contempt by the House of Representatives for physically attacking their member. However, the assault
contempt. In the former, since it is a continuing body, there is no time limit in the exercise of its power to occurred during the Second Congress, which adjourned on November 8, 1929. The Court ruled therein
punish for contempt; on the other hand, the House of Representatives, as it is not a continuing body, has a that there was no valid exercise of the inherent power of contempt because the House of Representatives
limit in the exercise of its power to punish for contempt, which is on the final adjournment of its last already adjourned when it declared the petitioner in contempt.
session. In the same case, the Court addressed the possibility that the Senate might detain a witness for
life, to wit:
It was held therein that imprisonment for a term not exceeding the session of the deliberative body in
which the contempt occurred was the limit of the authority to deal directly by way of contempt, without
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and criminal prosecution. Citing foreign jurisprudence, it was thoroughly discussed therein that the power of
oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume contempt was limited to imprisonment during the session of the legislative body affected by the contempt.
that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this The Court also discussed the nature of Congress' inherent power of contempt as follows:
assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose
rights might thus be transgressed.[42]
xxx We have said that the power to find in contempt rests fundamentally on the power of self
preservation. That is true even of contempt of court where the power to punish is exercised on the
Further, the Court refused to limit the period of imprisonment under the power of contempt of the Senate preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Where more is desired, where punishment as such is
because "[l]egislative functions may be performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged to be imposed, a criminal prosecution must be brought, and in all fairness to the culprit, he must
with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearings relative to any proposed legislation. To have thrown around him all the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. Proceeding a step further,
deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very it is evident that, while the legislative power is perpetual, and while one of the bodies composing the
purpose for which that power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate legislative power disappears only every three years, yet the sessions of that body mark new beginnings
auxiliary to its legislative function. xxx."[43] and abrupt endings, which must be respected.[38] (emphases supplied)
Later, in Neri v. Senate[44] (Neri), the Court clarified the nature of the Senate as continuing body: The Court ruled therein that if the House of Representatives desires to punish the person cited in contempt
beyond its adjournment, then criminal prosecution must be brought. In that instance, the said person shall
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, be given an opportunity to defend himself before the courts.
there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with
462 of 669
The termination of the Senate's business and proceedings after the expiration of Congress was utilized by each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its dayto
the Court in ruling that the Senate needs to publish its rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress. day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
The pronouncement in Neri was reiterated in Garcillano v. House of Representatives[46] and Romero II v. before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
Estrada.[47]
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
The period of detention under the Senate's inherent power of contempt is not indefinite.
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same
status.
The Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that
may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
aid of legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein. Under Arnault,
however, a witness or resource speaker cited in contempt by the Senate may be detained indefinitely due
to its characteristic as a continuing body. The said witness may be detained for a day, a month, a year, or Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
even for a lifetime depending on the desire of the perpetual Senate. Certainly, in that case, the rights of legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
persons appearing before or affected by the legislative inquiry are in jeopardy. The constitutional right to expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
liberty that every citizen enjoys certainly cannot be respected when they are detained for an indefinite such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
period of time without due process of law. practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound
by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of selfpreservation and even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with
does not extend to the infliction of punishment as such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the
[48]
Even arguendo that detention under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is not entirely punitive same status.[45]
in character because it may be used by Congress only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or
to remove an obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said witness. It is when the restrictions
during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer Based on the abovepronouncement, the Senate is a continuing institution. However, in the conduct of its
intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the daytoday business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. [49] An indefinite and unspecified period of Congress before it. Due to the termination of the business of the Senate during the expiration of one (1)
detention will amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty. Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first time.
463 of 669
Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the Nevertheless, it is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of contempt is of utmost importance. A
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report. legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislations are intended to affect or change. Mere requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members. Concurring and dissenting reports
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed through the power of contempt during
may likewise be made by the members who do not sign the majority report within seventytwo (72) hours
legislative inquiry.[50] While there is a presumption of regularity that the Senate will not gravely abuse its
from the approval of the report. The number of members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions
power of contempt, there is still a lingering and unavoidable possibility of indefinite imprisonment of
of the Committee Report shall be taken into account in determining whether the Report has been approved
witnesses as long as there is no specific period of detention, which is certainly not contemplated and
by a majority of the members: Provided, That the vote of a member who submits both a concurring and
envisioned by the Constitution.
dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the majority unless he expressly indicates his vote for
the majority position.
Thus, the Court must strike a balance between the interest of the Senate and the rights of persons cited in
contempt during legislative inquiries. The balancing of interest requires that the Court take a conscious
The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business. These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and
the government's promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other. [51]
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred to the
Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases supplied) The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative
As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after the conduct of the inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process
legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in the Senate Rules because it may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within the range of
mandates that the committee begin the consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days from the legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that subject. [52] Accordingly, as
conclusion of the inquiry. The said Committee Report shall then be approved by a majority vote of all its long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be
members; otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject matter of the next order of properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent
business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the Committee Report is the culmination of power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.
the legislative inquiry. Its approval or disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is
now up to the Senate whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of
Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:
business. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be
released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise
ends. First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules
state:
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Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code, which Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one (1) Congress. As
penalizes the refusal of a witness to answer any legal inquiry before Congress, to wit: stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the
Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or subcommittees,
same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing institution, its
by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions. — The penalty of arresto
proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its last
mayor or a fine ranging from two hundred to one thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment
session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained
shall be imposed upon any person who, having been duly summoned to attend as a witness before the
witnesses likewise ends.
National Assembly, (Congress), its special or standing committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional
Commissions and its committees, subcommittees, or divisions, or before any commission or committee
chairman or member authorized to summon witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse, to obey such In Arnault, there have been fears that placing a limitation on the period of imprisonment pursuant to the
summons, or being present before any such legislative or constitutional body or official, refuses to Senate's power of contempt would "deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its
be sworn or placed under affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, performance."[53] Also, in view of the limited period of imprisonment, "the Senate would have to resume
papers, documents, or records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the
their functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall restrain another from witness until the investigation is completed xxx."[54]
attending as a witness, or who shall induce disobedience to a summon or refusal to be sworn by any such
body or official. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court is of the view that these fears are insufficient to permit an indefinite or an unspecified period of
imprisonment under the Senate's inherent power of contempt. If Congress believes that there is a necessity
Verily, the said law may be another recourse for the Senate to exercise its statutory power of contempt. to supplement its power of contempt by extending the period of imprisonment beyond the conduct of its
The period of detention provided therein is definite and is not limited by the period of the legislative legislative inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of the last session, then it can enact a law or amend the
inquiry. Of course, the enactment of a new law or the amendment of the existing law to augment its power existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify or produce papers during inquiries in aid of
of contempt and to extend the period of imprisonment shall be in the sole discretion of Congress. legislation. The charge of contempt by Congress shall be tried before the courts, where the contumacious
witness will be heard. More importantly, it shall indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which may
include a fine and/or imprisonment, and the period of imprisonment shall be specified therein. This
Moreover, the apprehension in Arnault – that the Senate will be prevented from effectively conducting constitutes as the statutory power of contempt, which is different from the inherent power of contempt.
legislative hearings during recess – shall be duly addressed because it is expressly provided herein that the
Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that
the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry, specifically, Congress' statutory power of contempt has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as reflected in the
upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt cases of In re Chapman and Jurney v. MacCracken. Similarly, in this jurisdiction, the statutory power of
is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing contempt of Congress was also acknowledged in Lopez. It was stated therein that in cases that if Congress
are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite. seeks to penalize a person cited in contempt beyond its adjournment, it must institute a criminal
proceeding against him. When his case is before the courts, the culprit shall be afforded all the rights of
the accused under the Constitution. He shall have an opportunity to defend himself before he can be
convicted and penalized by the State.
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In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced. The
Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry
against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately
when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the
said witness.
In addition, if the Congress decides to extend the period of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a
witness beyond the duration of the legislative inquiry, then it may file a criminal case under the existing
statute or enact a new law to increase the definite period of imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. However, the period of
imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation
should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.
The December 12, 2017 Resolution of the Court ordering the temporary release of Arvin R. Balag from
detention is hereby declared FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
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TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994
DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
G.R. No. 115754 August 25, 1994 vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA), petitioner, REVENUE, respondents.
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent. G.R. No. 115525 August 25, 1994
G.R. No. 115781 August 25, 1994 JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary
CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONSCHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and their
ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM G.R. No. 115543 August 25, 1994
FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC., and WIGBERTO
TAÑADA, petitioners, RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs. vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 August 25, 1994 G.R. No. 115544 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; PUBLISHING
vs. CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL DIMALANTA, petitioners,
REVENUE, respondents. vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON.
G.R. No. 115873 August 25, 1994
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B. Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution? COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee? HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B.
II. Substantive Issues: DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)? G.R. No. 115931 August 25, 1994
1. §1 PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE BOOKSELLERS, petitioners,
2. § 4
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO,
3. § 5
as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
4. § 10
MENDOZA, J.:
B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?
The valueadded tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on
1. Art. VI, § 28(1)
the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money
2. Art. VI, § 28(3) of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not all of administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self executing
and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government are equally charged with These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them. No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution?
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The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded ValueAdded
17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading. Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House
of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version
It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The
and Means. following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act
No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630, thereby become a law:
entitled
Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUEADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND
238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet
It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197." and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills 1 were
bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal
reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention. Revenue Code relative to the valueadded tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and
Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which,
after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUEADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS
reconciled and approved by the conferees." 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V,
AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V,
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUEADDED TAX
ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
(VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND
FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
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The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was
order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treatyratifying power and thereby equalize its
3
thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994.
powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It
dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two
chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation was
Representatives." The exercise of the treatyratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is
4
suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities. It would have been
the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its
legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has never been thought of as
5
giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives. First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
In the United States, the validity of a provision (§ 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight of consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out
vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against the claim that that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, 2 it is notable in two
the provision was a revenue bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, § 7 of the U.S. respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively"
Constitution. Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating
6
and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that
from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills following the enacting to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H.
clause and substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the enacting No. 11197.
clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House subsequently accepted the
amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the PayneAldrich This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is
Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to
bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. Given, then, the power of the Senate to
7 emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference
by the Constitution to originate in the House. committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same
Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to
into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
(which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand,
470 of 669
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on
days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. the same subject.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
"except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It
may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
requiring the calling of a special election for President and VicePresident. Under the Constitution such a House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1,
law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. 11 1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After
all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on
For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first
Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the
urgent. 12
Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630.
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate
requirement of three readings on separate days, also. days as required by the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were done on the same day,
March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
condition in this country. when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies
471 of 669
is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the
solely of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete remarks certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the
of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are Senate accepted the President's certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court,
probably due to the stenographer's own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third
conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a
the United States. vital piece of legislation?
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 17 If the executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court
472 of 669
Rules of the House of Representatives cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After
Rule XIV: all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act
of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
§ 85. Conference Committee Reports. — In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18
amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of
both Chambers. Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and that
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when the journal is contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions not found in the bills submitted to
being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of it. The following provisions are cited in support of this contention:
such reports shall be signed by the conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure. Rules of the Senate
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the Rule XII:
Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed sufficient that
three copies of the report, signed as above provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General. § 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any
bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
(Emphasis added) shall meet within ten days after their composition.
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with subparagraph
provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule (c), Section 3 of Rule III.
applicable to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be
resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the
then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual: changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them. . . and may The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary of
not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue. the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the (Emphasis added)
legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in
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passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been
referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No.
it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill; 115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's
that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version; Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the
that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision
after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution provides that "Each
Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."
Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a
resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
20
"detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure." The
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in billdrafting.
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and
obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have
21 22
the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
reason now to depart from this rule. observance the courts have no concern." 19 Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case we "went behind" an
23
they have been faithfully observed in these cases.
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since
enrolled bill to consider. each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that
it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed approved by both houses, another conference committee must be appointed. But then again the result
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both houses.
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled
copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
the other two departments of our government. either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three
readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was
474 of 669
. . . . Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, § 26(1) which provides that
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . . thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of
PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee
The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned. bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.
The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute
amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX
and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING
insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
content.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is § 103, which originally read:
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform § 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the valueadded tax:
the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at
bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect . . . .
in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some
event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any (q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the
more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL because it
tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is: was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of all "other taxes . . . now or in the
near future," in consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO ESTABLISH, 2%.
OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIRTRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN
THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES. As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:
The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not § 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the valueadded tax:
unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title
475 of 669
petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit organization engaged in expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus
the printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of their expressed. 24
rights under § § 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.
It is further contended that amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by special law, in view
The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the press under of § 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:
§ 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative regulation
with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of the possibility This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified, amended, or
that the exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary of Finance. repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically modify, amend, or repeal this
On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's power to grant exemption for two franchise or any section or provision thereof.
reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because this is vested in
Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a majority of all its members 26 and (2) the Secretary's This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere implication
duty is to execute the law. resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a franchise is a
contract which can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in Manila Railroad Co. v.
§ 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously Rafferty, 25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain
granted exemption were: goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted
it from all taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended
(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin by a general law.
which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is devoted
principally to the publication of advertisements. In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No. 1590)
by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No.
Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting ¶ (f) with the result that print media became subject to 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides
the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum of the that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or
Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 1194, dated June repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.
27, 1994, exempting the "circulation income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among others." The II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
exemption of "circulation income" has left income from advertisements still subject to the VAT.
A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and Religious Freedom
It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the authority of the
Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the exemption of the circulation The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of
newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other hand,
476 of 669
The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim that revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of the
Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory imposition of the VAT on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition
purpose was clear either from the background of the law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that no exemption has effectively been
v. American Press Co., the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived
28
granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in these cases.
from advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.
Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of its To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom.
circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed The PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due
four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune
which were in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the from general regulation by the State. It has been held:
thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Longdominated legislature of
Louisiana respondent by taxing what Long described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special
tax on lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S. privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for
Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the contempt of court. . . . Like others, he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his
case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is the power to destroy.
The PPI does not dispute this point, either.
In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because
What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions
everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax on
involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out
the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the privilege of
the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates
"using, storing or consuming in that state tangible personal property" by eliminating the residents'
against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this
incentive to get goods from outside states where the sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star
argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any
Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature
censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a valueadded tax on its
amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The
transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only
law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax"
because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is
since the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid on an "intermediate
all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been
transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale." Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential
delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would
treatment and it failed to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory
perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that
because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink
granted to the press. But that is not the case.
477 of 669
publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all and
unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the Free Exercise of Religion
36
even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose was thus very clear.
Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious
materials by a religious organization. More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which taxed general
interest magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was
This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, although of general
37
discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a small group
applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e., between general interest
essential freedom. The case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila is cited by both the PBS and
38
and special interests such as religion or sports) the law became "entirely incompatible with the First
the PPI in support of their contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."
ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the business of general
merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other religious literature. This Court These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press creates risks of
relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount and
39 suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods and
unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds
being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that reason, it P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit since it has not been
was held, the license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise." 40 limitation does not apply to the press along but to all sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact
that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions
But, in this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is
privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration requirement thus a reasonable basis for the classification.
is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person
who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that "owners of newspapers are immune
made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the from any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid because it
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. was "one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the
press." 34 On the other hand, Minneapolis Star acknowledged that "The First Amendment does not
For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and the Federal Government can subject
free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For the same newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems." 35
reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R. No.
115931 that the increase in the price of books and other educational materials as a result of the VAT What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of
printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and
478 of 669
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the requirement that would violate the constitutional mandate to the government to give priority to education, science and
"The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive system of technology (Art. II, § 17) to be untenable.
taxation." Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues: Structure,
42
Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that "VAT
payment by lowincome households will be a higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than
payments by higherincome households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners contend that as a B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Impairment
result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who are in the higherincome of Contracts
bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities,
There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of
which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.
speech, press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have on the essential freedom of
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by respondents the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of communication are open and
that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible particularly to those operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court's power of review.
which are within the reach of higherincome groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It
There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that
is thus equitable. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher
taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process and that equal protection of
income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the
the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on
ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment,
constitutional law thus: "[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a
hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business
momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect.
establishments, with annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This, according to
This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases,
respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business establishments. On the other
but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause." 41
hand, an occasional paper 43 of the Center for Research and Communication cities a NEDA study that the
VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure for
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and
the lowest income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is
underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of
P8,340 or 2.2%.
due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits
of the law. For the fact is that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and no
Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion
determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the
whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middleincome group in society
law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these
harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No.
suits.
115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress'
withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives,
479 of 669
the law would violate the constitutional provision that "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against the constitutional policy to
be passed." It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies such cooperatives the
discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation. 44
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), petitioner in
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 46 G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any more
concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because their profits
taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. Such is not the
47
from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while purporting to be based on the
case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as financial statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by
discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.
specific, law.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the
The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress, just like
the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that public the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the
actions by "nonHohfeldian" or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the
48
reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the right to
standing requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a "special function" "quality education" (Art. XIV, § 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to
of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have before legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
us in these cases a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of
actuality 49 to insure that decisionmaking is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we do not have At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran 45 should have laid to rest the questions now raised against
power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect the VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were
we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in these held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court found to be "hearsay
cases — to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation. and [without] evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system
and its coverage as provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of
We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on this the law should have shifted to Congress.
Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to
look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 is cited in support Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition of
of this view: the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of
480 of 669
authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according to Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day. which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
_______________________________ of the Government.
In the preceeding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No. To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803, to
7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before us. To sum justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:
up, we hold:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict
enactment of the statute; with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 50
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes — beyond those Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
prescribed by the Constitution — have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of
powers; And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. 51
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive,
oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in several
prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition. cases 52 of this Court following Angara.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED. It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention in what is
essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context
of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of "cases,"
and nothing but "cases." That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse
of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits
imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our
481 of 669
officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, G.R. No. L23475 April 30, 1974
before it becomes law, be presented to the President.”
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as ViceMayor of Manila, petitioner,
Same; Same; In the absence of attestation, courts may resort to journals of Congress for proof of
vs.
statute’s due enactment.—Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE
the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records
SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service,
of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his
Same; Same; Journals of Congress may be resorted to determine whether the text of House Bill
capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO
No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress; Case at
GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO
bar.—This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill 9266 signed by the Chief FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN,
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for that purpose. The EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their
the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This capacities as members of the Municipal Board, respondents.
Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We
do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their
Statutes; Enactment; 1935 Constitution does not indicate proof of due enactment of bill.—The
signatures therein.
(1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p the presiding officers to certify to the same.
Same; Same; Enrolled bill theory; Basis.—The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act due to coequal and independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, as
4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the ViceMayor of the City of Manila, Further
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated.”
Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as
Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila." Same; Same; Certification of bill by presiding officers of Congress; Effect of.—As far as Congress
itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanet in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed: merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by
both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith
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as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces
signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City
which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the ViceMayor in
Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment. case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature amendments to Section 11 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were
on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the
be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
Houses of Congress."
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of
order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies
ViceMayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065. thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of
the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then ViceMayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of
petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.
Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City
Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065. The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City
Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement
Respondents' position is that the socalled Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a
actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the
Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines,
explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well
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departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this
that respect." Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner ViceMayor Herminio Astorga
from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the ViceMayor of
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Manila under the socalled Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said ViceMayor under
Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled any other law until further orders from this Court."
copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section
313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as ViceMayor of
Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared
reads: as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the
parties.
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or
their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this
when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947),
be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof. 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it
cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the binding precedent.
signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It
has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an
that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the socalled parity rights
rejection. The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved
4
provision) had been passed by "a vote of threefourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House
after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the
statute invalid.5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran,
power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary There is less reason to make the
6 Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not
attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government.
presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the
reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
484 of 669
all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill
attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as
journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion conclusive proof of its due enactment.7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that
reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme Court
resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not point.
require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following
provisions: The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open
excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed
at the request of onefifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal." Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a
bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress
its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the
President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal." Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries,
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a coequal department of the respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact Constitution.
and indisputable in logic.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress,
485 of 669
This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when
President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure
such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the lawmaking body. signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris,
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the socalled Republic Act No. 4065 supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that
entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICEMAYOR OF the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill,
THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed
ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by
hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation
at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The
inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had
been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires
it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed
by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is
a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
486 of 669
ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A.
GONZALES, petitioners,
G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994 vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T.
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
taxpayers, petitioners,
vs. G.R. No. 113174 August 19, 1994
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate, NEPTALI A. GONZALES, Chairman of the
CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON Committee on Finance of the Philippine Senate, and EDGARDO J. ANGARA, as President and
AUDIT, respondents. Chief Executive of the Philippine Senate, all of whom also sue as taxpayers, in their own behalf and
in representation of Senators HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, RODOLFO G.
Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 113105. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR., ERNESTO F. HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H. OSMENA,
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,
Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766 & 113888. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and FREDDIE N. WEBB, petitioners,
vs.
Roco, Buñag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioners Raul S. Roco, Neptali A. Gonzales and THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
Edgardo Angara. and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, impleaded herein as an
unwilling
Ceferino Padua Law Office fro intervenor Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (Lamp).
copetitioner, respondents.
G.R. No. 113766 August 19, 1994
QUIASON, J.:
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as
taxpayers, and FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, petitioners,
Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims of authority between the Legislative
vs.
and the Executive in the clash of the powers of the purse and the sword. Providing the focus for the
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR
contest between the President and the Congress over control of the national budget are the four cases at
487 of 669
Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of bench. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on the claim that Congress
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 8890, 104105) and the President have impermissibly exceeded their respective authorities, and by several Senators on the
claim that the President has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate President Edgardo J. Angara, Senator exercise of his veto power.
Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. Roco, sought the
issuance of the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the I
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and the National Treasurer.
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also
Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) and to realign their respective operating budgets.
the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and Wigberto Tañada (a copetitioner in G.R. No. Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
113174), together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a nonstock domestic corporation, sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Department of Budget and Management, the National Treasurer, and the COA. Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY
Petitioners Tañada and Romulo sued as members of the Philippine Senate and taxpayers, while petitioner ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETYFOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of
Freedom from Debt Coalition sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the constitutionality of the Presidential 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions
veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic appropriation of of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
funds therefor.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
In G.R. No. 11388, Senators Tañada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provision added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of
488 of 669
the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which reads as (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
follows: CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary restraining orders to enjoin respondents Secretary of
Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of Budget and Management, National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the questioned provisions of the
the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General GAA of 1994, but the Court declined to grant said provisional reliefs on the time honored principle of
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes. according the presumption of validity to statutes and the presumption of regularity to official acts.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized (United States In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976]; Notes: Congressional Access To The Federal former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes to submit their
Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632 [1977]). respective memoranda as Amicus curiae, which they graciously did.
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President and the II
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the
petitions in Locus Standi
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary issue following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the conditions for the substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994. pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case (Luz
Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v. Commission
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill. While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he
claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191
Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]). SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of
Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of
489 of 669
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller,
and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries." Said Article provides: 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp.
For Fund requirements of countrywide 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
development projects P 2,977,000,000
——————— Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
New Appropriations, by Purpose This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having a substantial
Current Operating Expenditures interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the requisite injury to their rights
as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain
A. PURPOSE appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive
Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What
Personal Maintenance Capital Total cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
Services and Other Outlays privileges vested by the Constitution in his office (Memorandum, p. 14).
Operating
Expenses It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said
remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political
1. For Countrywide considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of
Developments Projects P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000 the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of
legislative jurisdiction begin.
TOTAL NEW
APPROPRIATIONS P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000 III
Special Provisions G.R. No. 113105
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase of 1. Countrywide Development Fund
ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to qualified
490 of 669
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of beneficiaries as proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the following allocations:
ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000 each; VicePresident,
beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a revolving fund to be
administered by a government financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for lending operations. Prior years
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the priority releases to local government units and national government agencies for this purpose shall be turned over
projects specified in the law. to the government financial institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit facilities released
from this fund.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of Allotments and Notice of Cash
examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning of
expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials concerned.
with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under
the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made 2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of Budget and Management shall submit within
by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory. thirty (30) days after the end of each quarter a report to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from this Fund. The report shall include the listing of
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or activities the projects, locations, implementing agencies and the endorsing officials (GAA of 1994, p. 1245).
under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into account and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature
the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that
Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
members of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or who hold cards for amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78 86).
"horsetrading," getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members of Congress also had to
reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to cancel from the Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs
appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator. to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but
still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under
the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
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Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000 to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266 project.
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130
Others 57,173 2. Realignment of Operating Expenses
————
Total Other Compensation 103,815 Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which P464,447,000.00 is
———— appropriated for current operating expenditures, while the appropriation for the House of Representatives
======= (GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4, 9, 12).
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as follows:
02 Traveling Expenses 32,841 Personal Services
03 Communication Services 7,666
Salaries, Permanent 153,347
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 1,220
Salaries/Wage, Contractual/Emergency 6,870
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 318
————
06 Transportation Services 128
Total Salaries and Wages 160,217
07 Supplies and Materials 20,189
=======
08 Rents 24,584
14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
Other Compensation
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 9,360
23 Advertising and Publication Step Increments 1,073
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325 Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731
29 Other Services 89,778 Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579
———— PagI.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184
Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 200,415 Medicare Premiums 888
———— Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791
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Others 106,140 Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447
———— =======
Total Other Compensation 202,863
———— (GAA of 1994, pp. 34)
01 Total Personal Services 608,063
======= The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of Representatives are as follows:
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses Personal Services
02 Traveling Expenses 139,611 Salaries, Permanent 261,557
03 Communication Services 22,514 Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 5,116 ————
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 1,863 Total Salaries and Wages 405,200
06 Transportation Services 178 =======
07 Supplies and Materials 55,248
Other Compensation
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940
14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
Step Increments 4,312
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325
Honoraria and Commutable
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
Allowances 4,764
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474
Compensation Insurance
20 AntiInsurgency/Contingency Emergency Expenses 9,400
Premiums 1,159
23 Advertising and Publication 242
PagI.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420
Medicare Premiums 2,281
29 Other Services 284,209
————
Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669
Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 557,234
Terminal Leave Benefits 29
————
Personnel Economic Relief
Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297
Allowance 21,150
=======
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53
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The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of Congress is authorized by (GAA of 1994, pp. 1112)
Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the Philippines provides:
Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the Philippines, no change or modification
shall be made in the expenditure items authorized in this Act and other appropriation laws unless in cases 4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A member of Congress may realign his allocation
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the for operational expenses to any other expenses category provide the total of said allocation is not
Constitution (GAA of 1994, p. 1273). exceeded. (GAA of 1994, p. 14).
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not the The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is further divided into expenditures for
individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated. salaries, personal services, other compensation benefits, maintenance expenses and other operating
expenses. In turn, each member of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a proportionate
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only share of the appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does not spend for one items of
determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his allocation in said item to another item of
They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are savings expense.
available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that
need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, these two operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 8292), claiming that this practice is
officials will have to see to it that: prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations: however, the President, the President of
the same are to be taken; and the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
transfer or realignment is to be made. appropriations.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives the power to augment items in an appropriation act for their respective offices
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it from savings in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such
appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners augmentation.
urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 ( Rollo, pp. 9394)
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education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as because under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest funding. They invoke
unconstitutional. Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which provides:
G.R. No. 113105 (5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract
G.R. No. 113174 and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of
job satisfaction and fulfillment.
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), where this Court held that
The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service) of the GAA Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus:
of 1994 which provides:
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign
Special Provisions the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of principal and interest satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
of foreign and domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount herein deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of state policies or objectives.
the Congress of the Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay
for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators. As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and
improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The
2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Department of Finance shall submit a amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
quarterly report of actual foreign and domestic debt service payments to the House Committee on General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department
Appropriations and Senate Finance Committee within one (1) month after each quarter (GAA of 1944, pp. budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority to
1266). education.
The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
for debt service in said Article. According to the President's Veto Message: good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater
portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to
IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to
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This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with the desire of Congress to reduce the debt burden by
that case, the issue was stated by the Court, thus: decreasing the appropriation for debt service as well as the inclusion of the Special Provision quoted
below. Nevertheless, I believe that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989 GAA. This must be addressed by revising our debt policy by way of innovative and comprehensive debt
Appropriations Bill (Section 55 reduction programs conceptualized within the ambit of the MediumTerm Philippine Development Plan.
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY
'90), is unconstitutional and without effect. Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated
pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
The Court restated the issue, just so there would not be any misunderstanding about it, thus: Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that the
constitutionality of such automatic provisions on debt servicing has been upheld by the Supreme Court in
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the itemveto power accorded by the case of "Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N. Carague, in his
the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.," G.R. No. 94571, dated April 22, 1991.
Bill?
I am, therefore vetoing the following special provision for the reason that the GAA is not the appropriate
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to those invoked in the present case, are stated as legislative measure to amend the provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No. 1177 and E.O. No.
follows: 292:
In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the President's lineveto power as Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of principal and interest
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her of foreign and domestic indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount herein
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the itemveto power but the Congress of the Philippines: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay
should veto the entire bill; (3) the itemveto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4)
the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt service
by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 93
of that power. 98; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 1618). The Solicitor General counterposed that the Special Provision did
not relate to the item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject of an item veto
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 5460; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 7282).
vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may
be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the
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the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution. general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution,
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations
Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 the entire bill.
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the
President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyond the
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item. executive power to veto, and Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto power.
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the
Executive, The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot include in a
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]). general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it
does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by the
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the U.S. Congress on President in the exercise of his itemveto power.
August 29, 1916. The concept was adopted from some State Constitutions.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as it
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting provisions, including conditions, restrictions and refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to
limitations, to items in appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention added the following sentence to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of 1991.
Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution:
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
. . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affect one or more items of the same, the President cannot Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court
veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates . . . . in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered to veto separately not only items in The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will
an appropriations bill but also "provisions". presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53
A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the aforementioned sentence added to Section 11(2) of Article
VI of the 1935 Constitution, it included the following provision: The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 37). That is why it is found in Article VI on
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immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (Art. VI, Sec. 25[2]).
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a coequal branch of government in contravention of the
separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of Section 16(2) of the 1935 Constitution
power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we in the 1987 Constitution should not be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the power of the President
are to allow the Governor to encroach on the Constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid to veto a "provision".
this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation
bill, such provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill
general appropriation bills. must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular
xxx xxx xxx item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate
provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of
. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general appropriation bill "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend
with vetoproof "logrolling measures", special interest provisions which could not succeed if separately other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of
enacted, or "riders", substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto . general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes,
. . (Emphasis supplied). as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the
exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for that would be an unconstitutional
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special Provision on the ceiling for debt intrusion into executive prerogative.
payment is valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate funds for debt payment without
complying with the conditions for automatic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:
amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the Administrative Code of
1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 915). Just as the President may not use his itemveto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature,
neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully execute the laws. The writ of prohibition executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in
will not issue on the fear that official actions will be done in contravention of the laws. separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be
abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item on debt service, Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing "items" of
including the provisions that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the expenditures essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it
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Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and Human Resources Development Center (HRDC). principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to
The income of Leyte State College derived from the operation of its LSC House and HRDC shall be pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisions are germane to and
constituted into a Revolving Fund to be deposited in an authorized government depository bank for the have a direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power
operational expenses of these projects/services. The net income of the Revolving Fund at the end of the to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said provisos,
year shall be remitted to the National Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund. The implementing being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
guidelines shall be issued by the Department of Budget and Management (GAA of 1994, p. 415).
We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the Special
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's are the following: Provision of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein requiring that "any payment
in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the
12. Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities and Colleges are authorized to use their Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . . ."
income from their extension services. Subject to the approval of the Board of Regents and the approval of
a special budget pursuant to Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. G.R. NO. 113174
No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty development, instructional materials and work G.R. NO. 113766
study program (GAA of 1994, p. 490). G.R. NO. 11388
xxx xxx xxx 1. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's.
13. Income of State Universities and Colleges. The income of State Universities and Colleges derived In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed special provisions
from tuition fees and other sources as may be imposed by governing boards other than those accruing to which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds. The
revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872 and 1026 and those authorized to be recorded as trust Special Provisions vetoed are the following:
receipts pursuant to Section 40, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be deposited with the National
Treasury and recorded as a Special Account in the General Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and P.D. No. (H. 7) West Visayas State University
1437 for the use of the institution, subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No.
292L PROVIDED, That disbursements from the Special Account shall not exceed the amount actually Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the University subject to Section 13 of the special provisions
earned and deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a cash advance on such income may be allowed applicable to all State Universities and Colleges shall be equally shared by the University and the
State half of income actually realized during the preceding year and this cash advance shall be charged University Hospital (GAA of 1994, p. 395).
against income actually earned during the budget year: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall
xxx xxx xxx
such funds be used to create positions, nor for payment of salaries, wages or allowances, except as may be
specifically approved by the Department of Budge and Management for incomeproducing activities, or to
(J. 3) Leyte State College
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expenditures of some agencies beyond the wellcoordinated, rationalized levels for such agencies. This purchase equipment or books, without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines pursuant to
corresponding increases the overall deficit of the National Government (Veto Message, p. 3). Letter of Implementation No. 29.
Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion when he disallowed by his veto All collections of the State Universities and Colleges for fees, charges and receipts intended for private
the "use of income" and the creation of "revolving fund" by the Western Visayas State University and recipient units, including private foundations affiliated with these institutions shall be duly acknowledged
Leyte State Colleges when he allowed other government offices, like the National Stud Farm, to use their with official receipts and deposited as a trust receipt before said income shall be subject to Section 35,
income for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 1516). Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing
similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their The President gave his reason for the veto thus:
income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying
such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the "one Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, Section 44, Chapter 5, Book
fund policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902A for the Securities and VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987 and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, all income earned by all
Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management's Procurement Government offices and agencies shall accrue to the General Fund of the Government in line with the One
Service). Fund Policy enunciated by Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution.
Likewise, the creation and establishment of revolving funds shall be authorized by substantive law
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance. pursuant to Section 66 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Section 45, Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways, the President vetoed the second
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum ration of works to be contracted for Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution and existing law, I have noted the
the maintenance of national roads and bridges. The said paragraph reads as follows: proliferation of special provisions authorizing the use of agency income as well as the creation, operation
and maintenance of revolving funds.
2. Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds allotted for the maintenance and repair of roads
which are provided in this Act for the Department of Public Works and Highways shall be released to the I would like to underscore the facts that such income were already considered as integral part of the
respective Engineering District, subject to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the revenue and financing sources of the National Expenditure Program which I previously submitted to
Department of Budget and Management. Maintenance funds for roads and bridges shall be exempt from Congress. Hence, the grant of new special provisions authorizing the use of agency income and the
budgetary reserve. establishment of revolving funds over and above the agency appropriations authorized in this Act shall
effectively reduce the financing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same time, increase the level of
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Management Project (IBRD Loan Of the amount herein appropriated for the maintenance of national roads and bridges, a maximum of
No. PH3430) obtained in 1992. thirty percent (30%) shall be contracted out in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Public Works and Highways. The balance shall be used for maintenance by force account.
In the light of the foregoing and considering the policy of the government to encourage and maximize
private sector participation in the regular repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, I am directly Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund appropriated herein to be applied across the board to
vetoing the underlined second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public Works the allocation of each region shall be set aside for the maintenance of roads which may be converted to or
and Highways (Veto Message, p. 11). taken over as national roads during the current year and the same shall be released to the central office of
the said department for eventual
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy of Congress and suballotment to the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That any balance of the said five percent
the President. While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only 30% of the total appropriation (5%) shall be restored to the regions on a prorata basis for the maintenance of existing national roads.
for road maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive study,
believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70% would be more efficient, No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead expenses shall be made, except as authorized by law or
economical and practical. upon direction of the President
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785786; Emphasis supplied).
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specified how the said item The President gave the following reason for the veto:
shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
While I am cognizant of the wellintended desire of Congress to impose certain restrictions contained in
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an some special provisions, I am equally aware that many programs, projects and activities of agencies
expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are would require some degree of flexibility to ensure their successful implementation and therefore risk their
"appropriate" in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]). completion. Furthermore, not only could these restrictions and limitations derail and impede program
implementation but they may also result in a breach of contractual obligations.
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the veto of this special provision. He merely argued that
the provision is a complete turnabout from an entrenched practice of the government to maximize contract D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure Agencies show that for practical intent and purposes,
maintenance (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 8586). That is not a ground to veto a provision separate from maintenance by contract could be undertaken to an optimum of seventy percent (70%) and the remaining
the item to which it refers. thirty percent (30%) by force account. Moreover, the policy of maximizing implementation through
contract maintenance is a covenant of the Road and Road Transport Program Loan from the Asian
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is therefore Development Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047PHI1990) and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF
unconstitutional. Loan No. PHC17199). The same is a covenant under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for the Highway
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In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the President vetoed the underlined proviso of 3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund," which requires the prior approval of Congress for the
release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provisions In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the special
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition": provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No.
6675). The vetoed provision reads:
2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority shall be given for the acquisition of AFP
assets necessary for protecting marine, mineral, forest and other resources within Philippine territorial 12. Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all Armed Forces of the Philippines units,
borders and its economic zone, detection, prevention or deterrence of air or surface intrusions and to hospitals and clinics shall strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
support diplomatic moves aimed at preserving national dignity, sovereignty and patrimony: PROVIDED, Department of Health (GAA of 1994, p. 748).
That the said modernization fund shall not be released until a Table of Organization and Equipment for
FY 19942000 is submitted to and approved by Congress. According to the President, while it is desirable to subject the purchase of medicines to a standard
formulary, "it is believed more prudent to provide for a transition period for its adoption and smooth
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional implementation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
S211 Trainer planes, 18 SF260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers (GAA of 1994, p.
747). The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply
with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an "appropriate"
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the provision. it is a mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an existing law, the Generics Act of
Constitutional mandate of nonimpairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall effectively 1988, that requires "the extensive use of drugs with generic names through a rational system of
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary procurement and distribution." The President believes that it is more prudent to provide for a transition
to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12). period for the smooth implementation of the law in the case of purchases by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as implied by Section 11 (Education Drive) of the law itself. This belief, however, cannot
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" and Special Provision No. 3 are justify his veto of the provision on the purchase of medicines by the AFP.
conditions or limitations related to the item on the AFP modernization plan.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for the AFP modernization program that AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao
the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
of the "congressional or legislative veto." By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby
the legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative 4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment.
control in the implementation of particular executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is
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2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of requiring disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action.
National Defense, to use savings in the appropriations provided herein to augment the pension fund being This device represents a significant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the executive to
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System as provided under Sections 2(a) and 3 of shared administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
P.D. No. 361 (GAA of 1994, Leash,
p. 746). 56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers.
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (Veto Message, pp. 78). veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other
grounds. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condition or limitation approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being
which is so intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated therefrom. "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What Congress cannot do
AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching conditions to the exercise of that power (of the
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. President as CommanderinChief) through provisions in the appropriation law."
Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under Section Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Funds for payment of the
29(1), no money shall be paid out of trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec.
exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the executive 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself.
branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds.
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's, including the payment of separation benefits but it
added the following Special Provision: In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new provision
authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. The
vetoed provision reads:
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p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 1416). They argue that the President cannot impair or withhold 1. CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for
expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor other the compensation of CAFGU's including the payment of their separation benefit not exceeding one (1)
legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 1516). year subsistence allowance for the 11,000 members who will be deactivated in 1994. The Chief of Staff,
AFP, shall, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies and
The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces of the procedures for the payment of separation benefit (GAA of 1994, p. 740).
Philippines, who should determine when the services of the CAFGU's are no longer needed ( Rollo, G.R.
No. 113888, The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item
pp. 9295.). on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A.. No.
6758. He gave the following reasons for imposing the condition:
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue.
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in proposing the amendment of Special
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Provision No. 1 of the CAFGU. However, it is premature at this point in time of our peace process to
Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1973]). earmark and declare through special provision the actual number of CAFGU members to be deactivated in
CY 1994. I understand that the number to be deactivated would largely depend on the result or degree of
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress has set aside the fund success of the ongoing peace initiatives which are not yet precisely determinable today. I have desisted,
for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to therefore, to directly veto said provisions because this would mean the loss of the entire special provision
implement the project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on to the prejudice of its beneficient provisions. I therefore declare that the actual implementation of this
the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws. special provision shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No.
1597 and
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the President in effect exercises a R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).
veto power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact, the Constitution does not
say anything about impounding. The source of the Executive authority must be found elsewhere. Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the deactivation of the CAFGU's when it appropriated the
money for payment of the separation pay of the members of thereof. The President, however, directed that
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the President. the deactivation should be done in accordance to his timetable, taking into consideration the peace and
Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is order situation in the affected localities.
the executive power drawn from the President's role as CommanderinChief. Third is the Faithful
Execution Clause which ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners herein. Petitioners complain that the directive of the President was tantamount to an administrative embargo of
the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's (Rollo, G.R.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from No. 113174,
implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through
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payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer
No. 918225C.A.; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement and other operating expenses of the courts' folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law (Notes: Presidential
libraries, including purchase of books and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and improvement of Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 Georgetown Law Journal 1295 [1973];
printing equipment; (e) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary employees, contractual and Notes; Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal 1686
casual employees, for judicial administration; (f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic [1973).
Data
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in international We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that
conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and representation Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to
allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorney appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
deofficio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in salary and allowances shall be manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the CommanderinChief and there are
subject to the usual procedures and policies as provided for under existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied). appropriations act cannot
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.
Commission on Audit
(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress added the
xxx xxx xxx following provisions:
5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Audit is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate The Judiciary
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to use savings for the payment of fringe benefits as may be
authorized by law for officials and personnel of the Commission (GAA of 1994, p. 1161; Emphasis xxx xxx xxx
supplied).
Special Provisions
xxx xxx xxx
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the appropriations for the
Office of the Ombudsman Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to
augment any item of the Court's appropriations for (a) printing of decisions and publication of "Philippine
xxx xxx xxx Reports"; (b) Commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme Court and
505 of 669
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval of the conditions included in the GAA of 1994. 6. Augmentation of Items in the appropriation of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is
He noted that: hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations to augment items
of appropriation in the Office of the Ombudsman from savings in other items of appropriation actually
The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX released, for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training and information materials;
B of the Constitution which states that "no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of OMB Central and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c) purchase of
additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law." I am, therefore, books, journals, periodicals and equipment;
confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the (d) payment of commutable representation and transportation allowances of officials and employees who
wellestablished principle on compensation standardization (Veto Message, p. 10). by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits as may be authorized specifically by
law for officials and personnel of OMB pursuant to Section 8 of Article IXB of the Constitution; and (e)
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal for other official purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p.
autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. 1174; Emphasis supplied).
In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not xxx xxx xxx
by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or
indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. Commission on Human Rights
In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be xxx xxx xxx
made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is hereby authorized,
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President imposed the condition that the implementation of the subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to augment any item of appropriation
budget of the COA be subject to "the guidelines to be issued by the President." in the office of the CHR from savings in other items of appropriations actually released, for: (a) printing
and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training materials and educational publications; (b) repair,
The provisions subject to said condition reads: maintenance and improvement of Commission's central and regional facilities; (c) purchase of books,
journals, periodicals and equipment, (d) payment of commutable representation and transportation
xxx xxx xxx
allowances of officials and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe
benefits, as may be authorized by law for officials and personnel of CHR, subject to accounting and
3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on Audit derived from sources authorized by the
auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied).
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not exceeding Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a revolving fund which shall be used for maintenance, operating
and other incidental expenses to enhance audit services and auditrelated activities. The fund shall be
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9. Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than five percent (5%) of the amount for deposited in an authorized government depository ban, and withdrawals therefrom shall be made in
infrastructure project released by the Department of Budget and Management shall be deducted by accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and implementing rules and
DPWH for administrative overhead, detailed engineering and construction supervision, testing and quality regulations: PROVIDED, That any interests earned on such deposit shall be remitted at the end of each
control, and the like, thus insuring that at least ninetyfive percent (95%) of the released fund is available quarter to the national Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the
for direct implementation of the project. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for school buildings, health Commission on Audit shall submit to the Department of Budget and Management a quarterly report of
centers, daycare centers and barangay halls, the deductible amount shall not exceed three percent (3%). income and expenditures of said revolving fund (GAA of 1994, pp. 11601161).
Violation of, or noncompliance with, this provision shall subject the government official or employee The President cited the "imperative need to rationalize" the implementation, applicability and operation of
concerned to administrative, civil and/or criminal sanction under Sections 43 and 80, Book VI of E.O. use of income and revolving funds. The Veto Message stated:
No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
. . . I have observed that there are old and long existing special provisions authorizing the use of income
(d) In the appropriation for the National Housing Authority (NHA), the President imposed the condition and the creation of revolving funds. As a rule, such authorizations should be discouraged. However, I take
that allocations for specific projects shall be released and disbursed "in accordance with the housing it that these authorizations have legal/statutory basis aside from being already a vested right to the
program of the government, subject to prior Executive approval." agencies concerned which should not be jeopardized through the Veto Message. There is, however,
imperative need to rationalize their implementation, applicability and operation. Thus, in order to
The provision subject to the said condition reads: substantiate the purpose and intention of said provisions, I hereby declare that the operationalization of
the following provisions during budget implementation shall be subject to the guidelines to be issued by
3. Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations for the specified projects shall be set aside the President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D.
for corollary works and used exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and construction of buildings, roads, No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act (Veto Message, p. 6;
pathwalks, drainage, waterworks systems, facilities and amenities in the area: PROVIDED, That any road Emphasis Supplied.)
to be constructed or rehabilitated shall conform with the specifications and standards set by the
Department of Public Works and Highways for such kind of road: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That savings (c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President imposed the condition that in the implementation of
that may be available in the future shall be used for road repair, rehabilitation and construction: DPWH projects, the administrative and engineering overhead of 5% and 3% "shall be subject to the
necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing laws." The
(1) Maharlika Village Road — Not less than P5,000,000 condition was imposed because the provision "needs further study" according to the President.
(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig) — Not less than P3,000,000 The following provision was made subject to said condition:
(3) Bagong Lipunan Condominium Project (Taguig) — Not less than P2,000,000
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There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines 4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount appropriated for the implementation of various projects in
he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or resettlement areas, Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,500,000) shall be allocated to the
inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan resettlement area, Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the Carmona
Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully Relocation Center Area (Gen. Mariano Alvarez) and Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan
executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful Sites and Services, all of which will be for the cementing of roads in accordance with DPWH standards.
Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution
the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the 5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) shall be set aside for
guidelines. the asphalting of seven (7) kilometer main road of Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
IV
The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the "operationalization" of the special provision on
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but those remedies can be used only when revolving funds of the COA "shall be subject to guidelines to be issued by the President pursuant to
respondents have acted "without or in excess" of jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse of discretion," Section 35, Chapter 5,
(Revised Rules of Court, Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing the Special Provision on the General Provisions of this Act" (Rollo, G.R.
appropriation for debt payment when he merely followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we say that No. 113174, pp. 5,78); (b) that the implementation of Special Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on the
Congress has abused its discretion when it appropriated a bigger sum for debt payment than the amount mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released by said Department "be subject to the
appropriated for education, when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona? necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo,
G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10, 1416); and (c) that the appropriations authorized for the NHA can be released
Article 8 of the Civil Code of Philippines, provides: only "in accordance with the housing program of the government subject to prior Executive approval"
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 1011;
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall from a part of the legal system 1416).
of the Philippines.
The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that the implementation of the items on
The Court's interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its enactment since the court's which the said conditions were imposed, should be done in accordance with existing laws, regulations or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the construed law purports to policies. They did not add anything to what was already in place at the time of the approval of the GAA of
carry into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the Supreme Court assume the 1994.
same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
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Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make bad laws and should be reversed,
such reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.
SO ORDERED.
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Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the 269 Phil. 472
President for consideration and approval.
MELENCIOHERRERA, J.:
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep.
Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were This constitutional controversy between the legislative and executive departments of government
vetoed. stemmed from Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on 2 February 1989.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset, further "Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the
expressed: Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55,
"WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is hereby Resolved. That the Senate express its sense that the veto by
of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B No. 19186) and For Other Purposes."
the President of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989
Petitioners are thus before us as members and exofficio members of the Committee on Finance of the
(H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without any force and effect; hence, the
Senate and as "substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by this case."
aforesaid Section 55 remains;
" x x x x x x x x x" Respondents are members of the Cabinet tasked with the implementation of the General Appropriations
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit Chairman, all of whom are being sued in
or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing their official capacities.
Rep. Act No. 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by the Court.
The Background Facts
The Comment, submitted by the Solicitor General on 25 August 1989 (after several extensions granted),
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the
was considered as the Answer to the Petition and, on 7 September 1989, the Court Resolved to give due
Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget
course to the Petition and to require the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Petitioners filed
submitted by the President.
their Memorandum on 12 December 1989. But, on 19 January 1990, they filed a Motion for Leave to File
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"SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and to Admit Supplemental Petition, which was granted, basically raising the same issue as in the original
and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget Petition, this time questioning the President's veto of certain provisions, particularly Section 16, of House
submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved Bill 26934, or the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1990, which the President declared to have
or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for become Rep. Act No. 6831.
"The provision violates Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would the filing of a memorandum on the Supplemental Petition, a revised Resolution requiring consolidated
nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President of memoranda, within thirty (30) days from notice, was released on 28 June 1990.
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
The Consolidated Memoranda were respectively filed on 26 June 1990 by petitioners, and on 1 August
Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
1990 by respondents. On 14 August 1990, both Memoranda were Noted and the case was deemed
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. A careful review of the
submitted for deliberation.
legislative action on the budget as submitted shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as
recommended by the President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the On 11 September 1990, the Court heard the case on oral argument and required the submittal of
Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An unwanted consequence of this provision is the supplemental Memoranda, the last of which was filed on 26 September 1990.
inability of the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
The Vetoed Provisions and Reasons Therefor
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of
appropriation of their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY '89] hereinafter), which was vetoed by the
even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential President, reads:
public services and infrastructure projects.
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Essentially the same reason was given for the veto of Section 16 (FY '90), thus: "Furthermore, this provision is inconsistent with Section 12 and other similar provisions of this General
Appropriations Act."
"I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution
A substantially similar provision as the vetoed Section 55 appears in the Appropriations Act of 1990, this
in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the
time crafted as follows:
President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the Executive Branch of the
Government. "B. GENERAL PROVISIONS
"Parenthetically, there is a case pending in the Supreme Court relative to the validity of the President's "Sec. 16. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
veto on Section 55 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 6688 upon which the amendment on the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional
prejudice the Executive Branch's position in the case. any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective appropriations. SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS BEEN DISAPPROVED OR REDUCED BY
Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their respective offices from savings APPROPRIATION FOR ANY PURPOSE RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET
in other items of their respective appropriations even in cases of national emergency or in the event of SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DISAPPROVED BY CONGRESS IF NO CORRESPONDING
urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services and infrastructure projects." APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE IS PROVIDED IN THIS ACT."
Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and without effect. vetoed provision have been commingled in Section 16 only, with the vetoed provision made to appear as a
condition or restriction.
The Contending Views
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With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional, and that charge In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the President's lineveto power as
being controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper House of regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her
Congress and the executive department that may be taken cognizance of by this Court. authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the
was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, counters that the issue at bar is a political
which power this Court has exercised in many instances" (Demetria vs. Alba, G. R. No. 71977, 27 question beyond the power of this Court to determine; that petitioners had a political remedy,
February 1987, 148 SCRA 209). which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to the Appropriations
We take note as well of what petitioners stress as the "imperative need for a definitive ruling by this Court Act and, therefore, merits the President's veto; that the power of the President to augment items in the
as to the exact parameters of the exercise of the itemveto power of the President as regards appropriation appropriations for the executive branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically
bills x x x in order to obviate the recurrence of a similar problem whenever a general appropriations bill is Sections 44 and 45 of Pres. Decree No. 1177, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6670 (4 August 1988); and
passed by Congress." Indeed, the contextual reiteration of Section 55 (FY 89) in Section 16 (FY '90) and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions or other "distinct and severable
again, its veto by the President, underscore the need for judicial arbitrament. The Court does not thereby parts" of an Appropriations Bill.
assert its superiority over or exhibit lack of respect due the other coordinate departments but discharges a
Judicial Determination
solemn and sacred duty to determine essentially the scope of intersecting powers in regard which the
Executive and the Senate are in dispute.
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The Extent of the President's Itemveto Power Petitioners have also brought this suit as taxpayers. As ruled in Sanidad v. COMELEC (No. L44640, 12
October 1976, 73 SCRA 333), this Court enjoys the open discretion to entertain taxpayers suits or
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the itemveto power accorded by
not. In Tolentino v. COMELEC (No. L34150, 16 October 1961, 41 SCRA 702), it was also held that a
the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions" of an
member of the Senate has the requisite personality to bring a suit where a constitutional issue is raised.
Appropriations Bill?
The political question doctrine neither interposed an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
Petitioners contend that Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are provisions and not items and are,
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
therefore, outside the scope of the itemveto power of the President.
abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution reading, in away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.
full, as follows:
"SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
"Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the be established by law.
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, twothirds of all the Members of such House shall abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall of the Government."
a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of cited cases are Bengsonv. Secretary of Justice (62 Phil. 912 [1936]), penned by Justice George A.
the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his Malcolm, which upheld the veto questioned before it, but which decision was reversed by the U.S.
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; Supreme Court in the same entitled case in 292, U.S. 410, infra, essentially on the ground that an
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. Appropriations Bill was not involved. The second case is BolinaoElectronics v. Valencia (G. R. No. L
"(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, 20740, 30 June 1964, 11 SCRA 486), infra, which rejected the President's veto of a condition or
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object." restriction in an Appropriations Bill.
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It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Section 27[2], supra), Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of
is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other words, also eliminated has the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the itemveto power or the line
been any reference to the veto of a provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a
Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same
bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts x x x of the bill (Bengzon, supra,
item.
at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11
S.E.. 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation bills and first came into being
of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice(299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an 'item' in the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. This was followed by the 1935
of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not Constitution, which contained a similar provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except that the veto
some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." power was made more expansive by the inclusion of this sentence:
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27(2) of the 1987 "x x x When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President can
Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President's veto power as not veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates
previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso x x x."
merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a The 1935 Constitution further broadened the President's veto power to include the veto of item of items of
separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The revenue and tariff bills.
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1st ed., 154155, [1988]).
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a more simple and compact form, thus:
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without
"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto not affect the item or items to which he does not object."
be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the
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But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, we are of the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any
opinion that Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution,
term. Article VI, Section 25(2) of the 1987 Constitution provides: Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations
Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to
"Sec. 25(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
the entire bill.
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates." Petitioners' further submission that, since the exercise of the veto power by the President partakes of the
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some nature of legislative powers it should be strictly construed, is negatived by the following dictum
"particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the in Bengzon, supra, reading:
vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all
"The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in
items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be
to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may
made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by petitioners
defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
themselves, i.e., the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office" (Annex B1 and B2,
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and
of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally
Section 16 (FY '90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should
passed by the Legislature" (Commonwealth v. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L.R.A., 882; People v.
be treated as items for the purpose of the President's veto power (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d,
Board of Councilmen [1892], 20 N.Y.S., 52; Fulmore v. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co v. State
157158).
[1927], 53 A.L.R., 258 [at 917]).
"Just as the President may not use his itemveto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the Inappropriateness of the socalled "Provisions"
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him
as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly
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Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general
Bill and where conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry with it the power to strike them out, legislation. . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation
and Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (No. L20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In other vetoing 'items' of expenditure essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location
words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are such conditions/restrictions and of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over
thus beyond the veto power. substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions
or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a coequal branch of government in contravention of the
shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature may include
separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation
in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of
power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we
funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an
are to allow the Governor to encroach on the constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid
appropriation, while allowing the appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320). That
this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation
was also the ruling in Bolinao supra, which held that the veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill
bill, such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over
which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without
general appropriation bills.
effect whatsoever.
x x x x x x x x x
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters "x x x Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general appropriation
which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation (Henry v. Edwards, La, 346, So 2d bill with vetoproof 'logrolling measure,' special interest provisions which could not succeed if separately
153). Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without
money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness. veto. x x x " (Underscoring supplied)
Inappropriateness of the socalled "Conditions/Restrictions"
"It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds are
appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such
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and 16 (FY '90) partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings; in other words, "a a connexity with money items of appropriation that they logically belong in a schedule of
Justice, supra). Tested by these criteria. Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) must also be held to
be inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY '90), have been "artfully drafted"
The Power of Augmentation and The Validity of the Veto
to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) because they nullify the substantive and, therefore, separate legislation.
authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in
Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The
the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
reason, as explained earlier, is that items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on
appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25(5) of the Constitution. Said provision reads:
the face of the enrolled bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected when compared with
"Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the original budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90)
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme themselves provide that an item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act."
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
Considering that the vetoed provisions are not, in the budgetary sense of the term, conditions or
appropriations" (Underscoring ours).
restrictions, the case of BolinaoElectronics Corporation v. Valencia (supra), invoked by petitioners,
Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.
becomes inapplicable. In that case, a public works bill contained an item appropriating a
ruled: available to places where there were commercial television stations. Then President Macapagal approved
the appropriation but vetoed the condition. When challenged before this Court, it was held that the veto
"x x x to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional
was ineffectual and that the approval of the item carried with it the approval of the condition attached to
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the
it. In contrast with the case at bar, there is no condition, in the budgetary sense of the term, attached to an
enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill which was struck out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY '89)
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"Sec. 45. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits. Except as otherwise provided in in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The
the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were
of the President be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations:" x x x made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
A more recent grant is found in Section 12 of the General Appropriations Act of 1989, the text of which is constitutional body" (G. R. No. 71977, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 214).
repeated in the first paragraph of Section 16 (FY '90), Section 12 reads: The 1973 Constitution contained an identical authority to augment from savings in its Article VIII,
Section 16(5), except for mention of the Prime Minister among the officials vested with that power.[1]
"Sec. 12. Use of Savings. The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of the Constitutional Commissions, In 1977, the statutory authority of the President to augment any appropriation of the executive department
and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices in the General Appropriations Act from savings was specifically provided for in Section 44 of Presidential
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once given, Decree of 1977." It reads:
the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are
"Sec. 44. x x x
afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The
"The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive
doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a
Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another department,
department (or branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to another
bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec. 16(5)
(CRUZ, lsagani A., Philippine Political Law [1989] p. 155).
of the Constitution (now Sec. 25(5), Art. VI)" (Emphasis ours). (N.B.: The first paragraph declared void
When Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90), therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by in Demetria v. Alba, supra, has been deleted).
augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and Similarly, the use by the President of savings to cover deficits is specifically authorized in the same
statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from Decree. Thus:
savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of
disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget,
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If, indeed, by the later enactments of Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90), Congress, as petitioners as petitioners contend, the leeway granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch
argue, intended to amend or repeal Pres. Decree No. 1177, with all the more reason should it have so concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings.
provided in a separate enactment, it being basic that implied repeals are not favored. For the same reason,
More importantly, it strikes us, too, that for such a special power as that of augmentation from savings,
we cannot subscribe to petitioners' allegation that Pres. Decree No. 1177 has been revoked by the 1987
the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is "one the
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution itself provides for the continuance of laws, decrees, executive orders,
primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the public treasury"
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution
(Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252). It is a legislative authorization of receipts
until amended, repealed or revoked (1987 Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3).
and expenditures. The power of augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be
If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a nonappropriation item inserted in an appropriation
unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be measure.
overridden by the votes of two?thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section
The same thing must be said of Section 55 (FY '89), taken in conjunction with Section 12, and Section 16
27[1], supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners' argument that
(FY '90), which prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved and or
the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override" (citing Bolinao) has lost force and effect with
reduced by Congress. They are nonappropriation items, an appropriation being a setting apart by law of
the executive veto having been herein upheld.
a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil.
As we see it, there need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government 912, 916 [1936]). It bears repeating that they are more of a substantive expression of a legislative
adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers with due deference to the objective to restrict the power of augmentation granted to the President and other key officials. They are
constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of actually matters of general law and more properly the subject of a separate legislation that will embody,
governmental powers remains on even keel. define and delimit the scope of the special power of augmentation from savings instead of being
inappropriately incorporated annually in the Appropriation Act. To sanction this practice would be to
WHEREFORE. the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this Petition is
give the Legislature the freedom to grant or withhold the power from the Executive and other officials,
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise of that power.
SO ORDERED.
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521 of 669
Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder roads were to be construed) were private properties G.R. No. L10405 December 29, 1960
of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of
the Senate of the Philippines; that on May, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner
Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; appellant,
that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor vs.
would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents
donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent appellees.
Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act. No. 920,
and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected feeder roads in Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A. A. Torres for appellee.
Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon" that inasmuch as the
projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of
CONCEPCION, J.:
Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to
dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued, without
believe that the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private streets of a private
costs.
subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the
aforementioned appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed on December 12, 1953, while he was a
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action
member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation — copy of which is annexed to the
for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act
petition — of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the
Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1C (a) thereof,
Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date,
an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of
accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation
Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas — Gen. Araneta — Gen. Lucban — Gen. Capinpin — Gen.
partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law
Segundo — Gen. Delgado — Gen. Malvar — Gen. Lim)"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of
prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract
said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not
with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the
yet constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal" (according to the
construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase
tracings attached to the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the
the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the
intersection between the latter and Highway 54), which projected feeder roads "do not connect any
burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said
government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio
projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless
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Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision, dated October restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement
29, 1953, holding that, since public interest is involved in this case, the Provincial Governor of Rizal and the aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only
the provincial fiscal thereof who represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities" to question the to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act No. 920; that "the legislature is without power
appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose", that the instructions and improvement of Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be declared null and void;
the feeder roads in question, if such roads where private property, would not be a public purpose; that, that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be "declared unconstitutional and,
being subject to the following condition: therefor, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from
The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the Republic of the ordering or allowing the continuance of the abovementioned feeder roads project, and from making and
Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street purposes only and for no other purposes securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920, and the
whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of the Republic of the Philippines disbursing officers of the Department of Public Works and Highways from making any further payments
violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land hereby donated shall, upon such out of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a
violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA. (Emphasis supplied.) writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from making and
securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from making
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or contract is "absolutely any further payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.
forbidden by the Constitution" and consequently "illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, declares in existence and void from the very beginning contracts "whose cause, objector Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue",
purpose is contrary to law, morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation may not be and that the petition did "not state a cause of action". In support to this motion, respondent Zulueta alleged
contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his "interest are not directly affected" thereby; and that, that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the Province of Rizal,
accordingly, the appropriation in question "should be upheld" and the case dismissed. pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; that said respondent is " not aware of any
law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvements of . . . private property";
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a decision granting the aforementioned and that, the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question, the
motions to dismiss, which as much, are deemed to have admitted hypothetically the allegations of fact same being a pure act of liberality, not a contract. The other respondents, in turn, maintained that
made in the petition of appellant herein. According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner of petitioner could not assail the appropriation in question because "there is no actual bona fide case . . . in
several parcels of residential land situated in Pasig, Rizal, and known as the Antonio Subdivision, certain which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily involved" and petitioner "has not shown that he
portions of which had been reserved for the projected feeder roads aforementioned, which, admittedly, has a personal and substantial interest" in said Act "and that its enforcement has caused or will cause him
were private property of said respondent when Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the a direct injury."
"construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of said roads, was passed by Congress,
as well as when it was approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The petition further alleges that the
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The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language: construction of said roads, to be undertaken with the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would
have the effect of relieving respondent Zulueta of the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, roads at his own expenses, 1and would "greatly enhance or increase the value of the subdivision" of said
discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for respondent. The lower court held that under these circumstances, the appropriation in question was
the advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645646; emphasis supplied.) "clearly for a private, not a public purpose."
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states: Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is selfevident. 2However, respondent
Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss that:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used only for
public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal because Congress is the
under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection source of all laws . . . Aside from the fact that movant is not aware of any law which makes illegal the
of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can appropriation of public funds for the improvement of what we, in the meantime, may assume as private
be made for other than for a public purpose. property . . . (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
x x x x x x x x x The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being inconsistent with the nature of the
Government established under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and the system of
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is checks and balances underlying our political structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this
designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, Court invalidating legislative enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or organic laws. 3
although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. (81 C.J.S. pp. 1147; emphasis
supplied.) As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a public purpose, the principle according
to Ruling Case Law, is this:
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which, apart from being patently
sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of government, which, as such, exists primarily It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a
for the promotion of the general welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established jurisprudence in public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
the United States, after whose constitutional system ours has been patterned, said views and jurisprudence determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the
are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law.lawphil.net degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation in question, upon the private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use
ground that petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above referred to because the same does public money. (25 R.L.C. pp. 398400; Emphasis supplied.)
not affect him directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following premises, namely: (1)
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a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 6Although there are that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity of the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that
some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American
7
the latter may not be annulled without a previous declaration of unconstitutionality of the said donation;
Jurisprudence as follows: and (3) that the rule set forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no exception. We
do not agree with these premises.
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not
also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an amendment
and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said
Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.) statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality
thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on,
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in Frothingham vs. Mellon (262 became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and
U.S. 447), insofar as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the relationship of a taxpayer of the the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act).
U.S. to its Federal Government is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
government. Indeed, under the composite system of government existing in the U.S., the states of the respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and
Union are integral part of the Federation from an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys internally void. 4 The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said
a substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution. In Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
fact, the same was made by representatives of each state of the Union, not of the people of the U.S., appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial
except insofar as the former represented the people of the respective States, and the people of each State nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
has, independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution. In other words, the Federal Constitution
and the Federal statutes have become binding upon the people of the U.S. in consequence of an act of, Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory enactments, is subject to exceptions. For
and, in this sense, through the respective states of the Union of which they are citizens. The peculiar instance, the creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article 1177
nature of the relation between said people and the Federal Government of the U.S. is reflected in the of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except only those which are inherent in his
election of its President, who is chosen directly, not by the people of the U.S., but by electors chosen person, including therefore, his right to the annulment of said contract, even though such creditors are not
by each State, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section 2, of the Federal affected by the same, except indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision.
Constitution).lawphi1.net
Again, it is wellstated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the other hand, and the Republic injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of
of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, 5upon the theory that "the expenditure of
U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes
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Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower people and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more fully direct than that of the states of the
respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered. Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type of our national government is not subject to limitations
analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of the Union, and those imposed
upon the Federal Government in the interest of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the right of
taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state public funds — which
has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) — has greater
application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States
appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the expropriation of a land by the
Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the purpose of contesting the
price being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs. President of the
Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the Government was not permitted to question
the constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of members of Congress. However, in
Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo vs. Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45
Off. Gaz., 4411), we entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations
of public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take such
position in said two (2) cases — the importance of the issues therein raised — is present in the case at bar.
Again, like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer.
The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most populated
political subdivision, 8and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the
Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify
petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this action should not have
been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been
maintained.
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There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines may bring this suit G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991
where a constitutional issue is raised. Indeed, even a taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful
3
expenditure of public funds. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, HON.
and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
budget pursuant to said decrees. AUDIT, respondents.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or amendment Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and not this Court.
In Gonzales,5 the main issue was the unconstitutionality of the presidential veto of certain provision GANCAYCO, J.:
particularly Section 16 of the General Appropriations Act of 1990, R.A. No. 6831. This Court, in
disposing of the issue, stated — This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims.
The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that As alleged in the petition, the facts are as follows:
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases. The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service)
and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Sec. 1. The judicial power shad be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,1 while the appropriations for the Department of
established by law. Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.2
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to
of the Government. Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
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employment and concerted actions by them to project their grievances, mainly over low pay and abject With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional and that charge being
working conditions. controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper House of Congress and
the executive department that may be taken cognizance of by this Court.
He pointed to the high expectations generated by the February Revolution, especially keen among public
schoolteachers, which at present exacerbate these long frustrated hopes. The questions raised in the instant petition are —
Mr. Ople stated that despite the sincerity of all administrations that tried vainly to respond to the needs of I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION 1990 BUDGET VIOLATIVE
the teachers, the central problem that always defeated their pious intentions was really the one budgetary OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION?
priority in the sense that any proposed increase for public schoolteachers had to be multiplied many times
by the number of government employees in general and their equitable claims to any pay standardization II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
such that the pay rate of teachers is hopelessly pegged to the rate of government workers in general. This, CONSTITUTION?
he stated, foredoomed the prospect of a significant pay increase for teachers.
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 29(l), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION?6
Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition by the Constitution of the highest priority for public
schoolteachers, and by implication, for all teachers, would ensure that the President and Congress would There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which this Court may properly take
be strongly urged by a constitutional mandate to grant to them such a level of remuneration and other cognizance of On the first issue, the petitioners aver —
incentives that would make teaching competitive again and attractive to the best available talents in the
According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
nation.
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract
Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before World War II, teaching competed most successfully against all
and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of
other career choices for the best and the brightest of the younger generation. It is for this reason, he stated,
job satisfaction and fulfillment.
that his proposed amendment if approved, would ensure that teaching would be restored to its lost glory as
the career of choice for the most talented and most publicspirited of the younger generation in the sense
The reason behind the said provision is stated, thus:
that it would become the countervailing measure against the continued decline of teaching and the
wholesale desertion of this noble profession presently taking place. He further stated that this would
In explaining his proposed amendment, Mr. Ople stated that all the great and sincere piety professed by
ensure that the future and the quality of the population would be asserted as a top priority against many
every President and every Congress of the Philippines since the end of World War II for the economic
clamorous and importunate but less important claims of the present. (Journal of the Constitutional
welfare of the public schoolteachers always ended up in failure and this failure, he stated, had caused
Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)
mass defection of the best and brightest teachers to other careers, including menial jobs in overseas
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To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt service while only
PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the 1990 budget. It plain, therefore, that
FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC the said appropriation for debt services is inconsistent with the Constitution, hence, viod (Art. 7, New
DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE Civil Code).7
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY
CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its
OF RELENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, provides: satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding interests, which the President of the state policies or objectives.
Philippines is authorized to incur under this Act shall not exceed one billion United States dollars or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the loans, credits and As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and
indebtedness are incurred: Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The
under this Act shall not exceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the approval of this Act, and amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
two hundred fifty million every fiscal year thereafter, all in United States dollars or its equivalent in other General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department
currencies. budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority to
education.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of every regular session,
to report to the Congress the amount of loans, credits and indebtedness contracted, as well as Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
the guarantees extended, and the purposes and projects for which the loans, credits and indebtedness were good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater
incurred, and the guarantees extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipino owned or portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to
controlled corporations and similar purposes. protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to
Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount out of any funds in the National Treasury education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
not otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credits or unconstitutional.
indebtedness as and when they shall become due.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following observations:
However, after the declaration of martial law, President Marcos issued PD 81 amending Section 6, thus:
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Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise Sec. 7. Section six of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to effect payments on foreign or domestic loans, or
foreign or domestic loans whereon creditors make a call on the direct and indirect guarantee of the Sec. 6. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and in order to enable the Republic of the
Republic of the Philippines, obtained by: Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures, securities or other evidences of indebtedness sold in
a. The Republic of the Philippines the proceeds of which were relent to governmentowned or controlled international markets incurred under the authority of this Act, the proceeds of which are deemed
corporations and/or government financial institutions; appropriated for the projects, all the revenue realized from the projects financed by such loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures, securities or other evidences of indebtedness, shall be turned
b. governmentowned or controlled corporations and/or government financial institutions the proceeds of over in full, after deducting actual and necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of said
which were relent to public or private institutions; projects, to the National Treasury by the government office, agency or instrumentality, or government
owned or controlled corporation concerned, which is hereby appropriated for the purpose as and when
c. governmentowned or controlled corporations and/or financial institutions and guaranteed by the they shall become due. In case the revenue realized is insufficient to cover the principal, interest and other
Republic of the Philippines; charges, such portion of the budgetary savings as may be necessary to cover the balance or deficiency
shall be set aside exclusively for the purpose by the government office, agency or instrumentality, or
d. other public or private institutions and guaranteed by governmentowned or controlled corporations
governmentowned or controlled corporation concerned: Provided, That, if there still remains a
and/or government financial institutions.
deficiency, such amount necessary to cover the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credit
or indebtedness as and when they shall become due is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the
Sec. 2. All repayments made by borrower institutions on the loans for whose account advances were made
national treasury not otherwise appropriated: . . .
by the National Treasury will revert to the General Fund.
President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which provides:
Sec. 3. In the event that any borrower institution is unable to settle the advances made out of the
appropriation provided therein, the Treasurer of the Philippines shall make the proper recommendation to
Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. –– All expenditures for (a) personnel retirement premiums,
the Minister of Finance on whether such advances shall be treated as equity or subsidy of the National
government service insurance, and other similar fixed expenditures, (b) principal and interest on public
Government to the institution concerned, which shall be considered in the budgetary program of the
debt, (c) national government guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically
Government.
appropriated; Provided, that no obligations shall be incurred or payments made from funds thus
automatically appropriated except as issued in the form of regular budgetary allotments.
In the "Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing Fiscal Year 1990," which accompanied her
budget message to Congress, the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino, stated:
and PD 1967, which provides:
Sources Appropriation
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Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of The P233.5 billion budget proposed for fiscal year 1990 will require P132.1 billion of new programmed
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the appropriations out of a total P155.3 billion in new legislative authorization from Congress. The rest of the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Emphasis supplied.) budget, totalling P101.4 billion, will be sourced from existing appropriations: P98.4 billion from
Automatic Appropriations and P3.0 billion from Continuing Appropriations (Fig. 4).
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, 10 then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize
said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of And according to Figure 4, . . ., P86.8 billion out of the P98.4 Billion are programmed for debt service. In
the Constitution which provides as follows –– other words, the President had, on her own, determined and set aside the said amount of P98.4 Billion
with the rest of the appropriations of P155.3 Billion to be determined and fixed by Congress, which is
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by now Rep. Act 6831.9
law.
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, 11 otherwise it is an Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one
undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on
appropriated for the debt service.12 February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new
legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not
The Court is not persuaded. approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an
administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said
decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides ––
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the
social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed,
or revoked. or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed to They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the
cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the Constitution, i.e.,
national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the
531 of 669
that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and
are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative million The only reasonable necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation
measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management
have expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner. policies. Its political wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the Solicitor General as he argues —
Wellknown is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is . . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market
the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not conditions by redeeming highinterest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from shortterm
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated. to longterm instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden
debttoequity, debt to asset, debttodebt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation
On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs. Ericta, this Court had 14
obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been
this to say –– previously programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance,
are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, "basket" of foreign exchange and
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal interest rate assumptions which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine
the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inequity Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically
its function when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen
authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which legislative process can go our debt servicetototal expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate
forward . . . payment even before due dates.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy . . . person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The
purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos. 13
The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the act considered as
whole . . . The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are
therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among
In People vs. Vera,15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by Congress
law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring authority or and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate
532 of 669
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four major phases as discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
aptly discussed by the Solicitor General: to the latter no valid objection can be made."
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases: Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so
that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except enforce it. If there are gaps
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and covers the in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have been
estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and exercise a discretion essentially legislative
constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid delegation. 16
priorities and activities into expenditure levels.
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and Management. Each conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the
general ceilings set by the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC). The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is
that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macroeconomic projections of interest rates Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
(e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate
Upon issuance of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government
the year for all direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same. to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the
country.
2. Legislative authorization. –– At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the
budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very
wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be
made by law. disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor already exists evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they
under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967. Precisely in the fight of this subsisting shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact
authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern itself amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof upon
due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has
533 of 669
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, the implementation or execution of the legislative wisdom.
except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly 3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the
(as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the
laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government
terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other
act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Release from the debt service fired is triggered by a request of the Bureau of the Treasury for allotments
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.17 from the Department of Budget and Management, one quarter in advance of payment schedule, to ensure
prompt payments. The Bureau of Treasury, upon receiving official billings from the creditors, remits
Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon C. Aquino payments to creditors through the Central Bank or to the Sinking Fund established for government
submitted to Congress the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the Fiscal Year 1990. The security issues (Annex F).
proposed 1990 expenditure program covering the estimated obligation that will be incurred by the
national government during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the proposed budget, P86.8 is 4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and initially
set aside for debt servicing as follows: approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with
the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved.
1âwphi1
National Government Debt There being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown, petitioners insist
Service Expenditures, 1990 nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue delegation of legislative power to the
(in million pesos) executive on the alleged ground that the appropriations therein are not exact, certain or definite, invoking
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Principal
Amortization 16,310 15,077 31,387
P53,171 P86,818
P33,647 1
Total ======= =======
======== 8
= =
as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as amended.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise
amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Department involved in the implementation of the release of funds appropriated in the Annual G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
Appropriations Law.
CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET
We treat the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as an Answer and decide the petition AL., petitioners,
on its merits. vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows: CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON.
ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.
On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the
Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in A.M. No. 918225CA April 15, 1992
the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70)
years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P. BARCELONA, JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, JUAN
receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement O. REYES, JR. and GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR READJUSTMENT OF THEIR MONTHLY
or resignation. PENSION.
Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21, 1957) which
provided that: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Sec. 3A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals is increased or The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the
decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of
the retirement pension which a Justice who as of June twelve, nineteen hundred fiftyfour had ceased to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
be such to accept another position in the Government or who retired was receiving at the time of his
cessation in office. Provided, that any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
shall not be affected thereby. receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. They
filed the instant petition on their own behalf and in representation of all other retired Justices of the
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals similarly situated.
Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595. On November 12, 1974, on the occasion
of the Armed Forces Loyalty Day, President Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague as
similar retirement benefits to the members of the Armed Forces giving them also the automatic Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalinda Cajucom, the Treasurer of
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President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975
her "it would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and repealing Section 3A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No.
enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired
known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional
should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of
laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants." salaries.
537 of 669
procedures and policies as provided for under P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws. (page 1071, General The pertinent provisions in House Bill No. 34925 are as follows:
Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
XXVIII. THE JUDICIARY
x x x x x x x x x
A. Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts.
4. Payment of Adjusted Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated for payment of
pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, supervision of courts, adjudication of
justices of the Supreme Court entitled thereto pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter constitutional questions appealed and other cases, operation and maintenance of the Judicial and Bar
No. 918225C.A. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992). Council in the Supreme Court, and the adjudication of regional court cases, metropolitan court cases,
municipal trial court cases in Cities, municipal circuit court cases, municipal, court cases, Shari'a district
x x x x x x x x x court cases and Shari'a circuit court cases as indicated hereunder P2,095,651,000
Activities and Purposes x x x x x x x x x
1. General Administration and Support Services. Special Provisions.
a. General administrative Services P 43,515,000 1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the appropriation for the
b. Payment of retirement gratuity Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to
of national goverment officials augment any item of the Court's appropriations for: (a) printing of decisions and publications of
and employees P 206,717,000 Philippine Reports; b) commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme
c. Payment of terminal leave benefits to Court and any payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to
officials and employees antitled thereto P 55,316,000 Administrative Matter No. 918225CA; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement, and other operating
d. Payment of pension totired jude expenses of the courts' books and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and improvement of printing
and justice entitled thereto P 22,500,000 equipment; e) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary employees, contractual and casual
employees, for judicial administration; f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic Data
(page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992) Processing; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in international conferences and
conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and representation allowances and fringe
C. COURT OF APPEALS benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chief of Offices and other Court personnel in
accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorneysdeoficio; PROVIDED,
that as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increases in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual
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1. Use of the Fund. This fund shall be used for: For general administration, administration
of personnel benefit, benefits and the
x x x x x x x x x adjudication of appealed and other cases
as indicated hereunder P114,615,000
1.3. Authorized overdrafts and/or valid unbooked obligations, including the payment of back salaries and
related personnel benefits arising from decision of competent authority including the Supreme Court Special Provisions.
decision in Administrative Matter No. 918225C.A. and COA decision in No. 1704." (page 11649 Gen.
Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied) 1. Authority to Use Savings. Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in
accordance with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the
On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 Presiding Justice may be authorized to use any savings in any item of the appropriation for the Court of
the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (General Appeals for purposes of: (1) improving its compound and facilities; and (2) for augmenting any deficiency
Appropriations Act, FY 1992, page 1071) and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section in any item of its appropriation including its extraordinary expenses and payment of adjusted pension
2, of the Special Provisions for the Court of Appeals (page 1079) and the underlined portions of Section rates to retired justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 918225C.A. (page 1079,
1.3 of Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments (page 1164, General General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
2. Payment of adjustment Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated for payment
The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this Honorable Court in of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to
Administrative Matter No. 918225CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the payment retired justices of the Court of Appeals entitled thereto pursuant to the Ruling of the Supreme Court in
of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have been enacted effectively Administrative Matter No. 916225C.A. (page 1079 General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
nullified the veto of the President on House Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided for the automatic
increase in the retirement pensions of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and XL. GENERAL FUND ADJUSTMENT
chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by reenacting Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No.
3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid provisions was further justified by reiterating the earlier For general fund adjustment for
reasons for vetoing House Bill No. 16297: "they would erode the very foundation of our collective effort operational and special requirements
to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy and standardization of compensation. We should not as indicated hereunder P500,000,000
permit the grant of distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement pensions under existing
laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil servants." x x x x x x x x x
Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that: Special Provisions
539 of 669
government do not go beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government 1) The subject veto is not an item veto;
itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial
duty was emphatically explained by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, 2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;
(63 Phil. 139 [1936]) to wit:
3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the 4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries it does not assert any
Raising similar grounds, the petitioners in AM918225CA, brought to the attention of this Court that
superiority over the other department, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
the veto constitutes no legal obstacle to the continued payment of the adjusted pensions pursuant to the
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
Court's resolution.
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. (Emphasis supplied)
On February 14, 1992, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. 918225CA with
G.R. No. 103524.
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested
power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto
The petitioners' contentions are welltaken.
power is not absolute.
I
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must prevail.
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or
The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article
persons including the highest official of this land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that
VI, Constitution)
the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she
nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is
cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to
dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to
their interpretation and application to cases and controversies.
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of
government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President
The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the
is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this
guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of
540 of 669
Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being
transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.
Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money
involved. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove
any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to
In the same manner, the provision which states that in compliance with decisions of the Supreme Court approve the remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])
and the Commission on Audit, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the general fund
adjustment is not an item. It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the item. This was not We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:
touched. It was not vetoed.
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a
More ironic is the fact that misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in the 1992 bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at
Appropriations Act were being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck something else. 916.) It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E.
2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281) The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v.
What were really vetoed are: Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L. Ed, 312) declared "that an "tem" of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not
(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." (id. at page 465)
(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter No. 918 We regret having to state that misimpressions or unfortunately wrong advice must have been the basis of
225CA. the disputed veto.
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the Government to
provisions of a law enacted thirtyfive (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither may the meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for
President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government.
power.
The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to
A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation. insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due.
Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which privilege was An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will
extended to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No. 3595. readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all
of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions.
541 of 669
Marcos' decrees which, while never published, were being enforced. Secret decrees are anathema in a free On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which repealed Republic Acts
society. 1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and
men was surreptitiously restored through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.
In support of their request, the petitioners in Administrative Matter No. 919225CA secured certification
from Director Lucita C. Sanchez of the National Printing Office that the April 4, 1977 Supplement to the It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of Justices and
Official Gazette was published only on September 5, 1983 and officially released on September 29, 1983. Constitutional Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed provisions through House Bill
No. 16297 in 1990. When her finance and budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned
On the issue of whether or not Presidential Decree 644 became law, the Court has already categorically provisions in the 1992 General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990
spoken in a definitive ruling on the matter, to wit: veto, she issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
xxx xxx xxx It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows
that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way
PD 644 was promulgated by President Marcos on January 24, 1975, but was not immediately or soon that it was enforced from 1951 to 1975, so should it be enforced today.
thereafter published although preceding and subsequent decrees were duly published in the Official
Gazette. It now appears that it was intended as a secret decree "NOT FOR PUBLICATION" as the House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly.
notation on the face of the original copy thereof plainly indicates (Annex B). It is also clear that the decree The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous
was published in the backdated Supplement only after it was challenged in the Tañada case as among the and nonexistent premises.
presidential decrees that had not become effective for lack of the required publication. The petition was
filed on May 7, 1983, four months before the actual publication of the decree. From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain provisions of the
1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is
It took more than eight years to publish the decree after its promulgation in 1975. Moreover, the beyond her power to accomplish.
publication was made in bad faith insofar as it purported to show that it was done in 1977 when the now
demonstrated fact is that the April 4, 1977 supplement was actually published and released only in Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717 never achieved that
September 1983. The belated publication was obviously intended to refute the petitioner's claim in purpose because it was not properly published. It never became a law.
the Tañada case and to support the Solicitor General's submission that the petition had become moot and
academic. The case of Tañda v. Tuvera (134 SCRA 27 [1985]and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]) specifically requires that
"all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in
x x x x x x x x x the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code." This was the Court's answer
to the petition of Senator Lorenzo Tañada and other opposition leaders who challenged the validity of
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Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is We agree that PD 644 never became a law because it was not validly published and that, consequently, it
arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no did not have the effect of repealing RA 1797. The requesting Justices (including Justice Lood, whose
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The request for the upgrading of his pension was denied on January 15, 1991) are therefore entitled to be paid
President's power is merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress. their monthly pensions on the basis of the latter measure, which remains unchanged to date.
II The Supreme Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure
stability in legal relations, and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetullo, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]) Like other
There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto power to decisions of this Court, the ruling and principles set out in the Court resolution constitute binding
set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 precedent. (BuligBulig Kita Kamaganak Association, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Regional Trial Court,
trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary. etc., G.R. 847500 16 May 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution)
Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that: The challenged veto has farreaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they
undermine the principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule
Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by a decision of the Supreme Court.
the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released. We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not within its powers to
pass laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or defining what the law is and whether or
We can not overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary. The Court has on not it violates a provision of the Constitution.
various past occasions explained the significance of judicial independence. In the case of De la Llana v.
Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982]), it ruled: As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds
It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, necessary to pay the retirement pensions under these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every
to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them year.
either expressly or implicitly certain powers. These they exercise not for their own benefit but for the
body politic. . . . Thus, Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and
savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. As
A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law long as retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the
may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM918225CA.
his responsibilities more efficiently. . . . It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer
justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more
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The above agencies are also required to submit to DBM monthly, quarterly and yearend budget likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from
accountability reports to indicate their performance, physical and financial operations and income, the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is
impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. (At pp. 338339)
The DBM reserves to itself the power to review the accountability reports and when importuned for
needed funds, to release additional allotments to the agency. Since DBM always prunes the budget The exercise of the veto power in this case may be traced back to the efforts of the Department of Budget
proposals to below subsistence levels and since emergency situations usually occur during the fiscal year, and Management (DBM) to ignore or overlook the plain mandate of the Constitution on fiscal autonomy.
the Chief Justices, Chairmen of the Commissions, and Ombudsman are compelled to make pilgrimages to The OSG Comment reflects the same truncated view of the provision.
DBM for additional funds to tide their respective agencies over the emergency.
We have repeatedly in the past few years called the attention of DBM that not only does it allocate less
What is fiscal autonomy? than one percent (1%) of the national budget annually for the 22,769 Justices, Judges, and court personnel
all over the country but it also examines with a finetoothed come how we spend the funds appropriated
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service by Congress based on DBM recommendations.
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and The gist of our position papers and arguments before Congress is as follows:
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans The DBM requires the Supreme Court, with Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman to submit
of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them budget proposals in accordance with parameters it establishes. DBM evaluates the proposals, asks each
in the course of the discharge of their functions. agency to defend its proposals during DBM budget hearings, submits its own version of the proposals to
Congress without informing the agency of major alterations and mutilations inflicted on their proposals,
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters and expects each agency to defend in Congress proposals not of the agency's making.
but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even
informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude. After the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, the tight
and officious control by DBM continues. For the release of appropriated funds, the Judiciary,
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence end Constitutional Commissions, and Ombudsman are instructed through "guidelines", how to prepare Work
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and and Financial Plans and requests for monthly allotments. The DBM evaluates and approves these plans
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated and requests and on the basis of its approval authorizes the release of allotments with corresponding
for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the notices of cash allocation. These notices specify the maximum withdrawals each month which the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers Supreme Court, the Commissions and the Ombudsman may make from the servicing government bank.
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and
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the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited
appropriations. their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy
should cease to be a meaningless provision.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for the
payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the abovestated In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to
pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy." The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
III shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary
must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due them priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
pursuant to RA 1797. augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been enacted Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the authority
by practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the
and presumably in most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that:
on retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied with the statutory
prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and may not, There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once given,
thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430) the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are
afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is to entice doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a
competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with department (or branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to another.
relative security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:
Starting From the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Fiveyear Period
of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]). Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
and Court of Appeals.
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high degree of independence in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Through
Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not be removed the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits.
until they reach age 70 except through impeachment. All courts and court personnel are under the
administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the lump
unless he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were
Court's supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be entitled was to be computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and
designated to any agency performing administrative or quasijudicial functions. We are specifically given representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his resignation. The Supreme Court in
fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent of, but also coequal and coordinate with the a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired
Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution) Judges and Justices which should include the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and
representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this Court and Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices, supra)
the ground that there should be no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential treatment" to retired
Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly favored is,
provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional again, a misimpression.
system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are
intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on retirement benefits of Justices. Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens of
thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70
One last point. while military men retire at a much younger age — some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or
earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both groups. Any ideas arising
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that: from an alleged violation of the equal protection clause should first be directed to retirees in the military
or civil service where the reason for the retirement provision is not based on indubitable and
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds, raised from taxes on constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of retired Justices whose retirement pensions are
other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already leading private lives and have ceased founded on constitutional reasons.
performing public service. Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller:
"To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections given by
bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.
law . . ." (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)
The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given the
power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a
546 of 669
encyclopedia which could not even spell "loan" correctly. Good lawyers are expected to go to primary The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of an
sources and to use only relevant citations. office whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the law.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary requesting Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muñoz
adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday living expenses not to Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the
mention the high cost of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Court of Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under
Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991); him who represent the government before the two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared
before these retirees, should show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these Justices who
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide are now in the evening of their years.
for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as engaging in
grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the "robbery" is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument is unfounded.
value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done
and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then quality of
lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was research in that institution has severely deteriorated.
rewarded for it.
In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government Topeka but Citizen's Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87
can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions. U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing cities
and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, waterpower, and other public works to aid
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and private railroads improve their services. The law was declared void on the ground that the right of a
unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.
The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal
autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that ancient
Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 918225CA dated November 28, 1991 is period. Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used for slum clearance,
likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated. lowcost housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only private persons are the
immediate beneficiaries. What was "robbery" in 1874 is now called "social justice." There is nothing
SO ORDERED. about retirement benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old textbook or
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D E C I S I O N G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
PERLASBERNABE, J.: GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ
REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
"Experience is the oracle of truth." 1
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF
James Madison BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA
V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his
Before the Court are consolidated petitions 2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the
constitutional challenge. x x
The Facts G.R. No. 208493
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Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lumpsum, discretionary funds of
own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act. In the 17
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to
1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of certain funds of the Executive.
Representatives and the Senate. 18
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
B. Martial Law Era (19721986).
A. PreMartial Law Era (19221972).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law
was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature," 19 the reprieve was only temporary. By Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered 11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork
1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post
(GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 3 12 provides that the sums
Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lumpsum appropriated for certain public works projects 13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may
assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said
Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the
assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to
SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so called "hard projects", but also "soft any other item hereunder."
projects",21 or nonpublic works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among
others, education, health and livelihood.22 In 1950, it has been documented 15 that postenactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of
fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the
C. PostMartial Law Era: public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from
the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (19861992). projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the representatives of the people, either on their
own account or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders.‘" 16 During this period, the pork barrel
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s
"Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lumpsum appropriations of ₱480 Million and allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the
₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of
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funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was
House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure
of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months and other priority community projects."
thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992, 25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required." released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of
projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of
The following year, or in 1998, the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements
36
allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has
were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while
sufficed for the release of CDF Funds. Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they could
identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships. 27
"Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional
Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda. 37 It has been articulated D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (19921998).
that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily
identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual
the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the VicePresident. 29 As
the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and
Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior the VicePresident, ₱20 Million.
consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned.” 40 Similarly, the legislators had
the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.41 In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund
release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (19982001). Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the
"Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund," 44 and the "Rural/Urban Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the VicePresident, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be
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Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision requiring "prior
for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School
Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
with the concerned Member of Congress61 anent certain aspects of project implementation. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF
funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the
governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits. 47 The
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the reenactment 48 of the 2000 GAA for the
law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million year 2001.
of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made
available to NGOs including the Federation of FilipinoChinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, F. Gloria MacapagalArroyo (Arroyo) Administration (20012010).
Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in the
construction of public school buildings x x x." 62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision
appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs." 69 submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was reenacted. 53
G. Present Administration (2010Present). In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects
under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 2011 PDAF Article included
70 agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept, 55 which is essentially a list of general programs
an express statement on lumpsum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the VicePresident: and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was reenacted 56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In
Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the VicePresident, similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into the 2007, 57 2008,58 2009,59 and
with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment 201060 GAAs.
of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision
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On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of Presidential also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local
Decree No. (PD) 910, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
81
Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and
and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of same project category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. Due to the energyrelated activities of the
82
been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence
government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gasto of the legislator concerned.71
Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD 1869,85 or of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator
issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the VicePresident, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as
in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR. 88 implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the projects. 77 Legislators were
also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships,
IV. Controversies in the Philippines. outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the
intended outsidedistrict, endorsed by the Speaker of the House. 78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, owing in no small part
89
funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all
to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support. 90 It required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City on Finance, as the case may be.79
Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of
government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." 91 He said III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low
19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lumpsum, discretionary funds of
rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings." "Other sources of kickbacks that
92 Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown
Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds
the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, and the Presidential Social Fund.
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audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig." 93 "The publication of the stories, including those about
respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman,
the audit period. Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 201203 (CoA Report),
102
sparked public outrage."94
entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103 Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the
2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
their respective allocations. Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
House. allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistleblowers who
GAAs. declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions
of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistleblowers
government. declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. 97 Thus, after its investigation on the
Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation
without considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement
of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some
projects.
of the lawmakers‘ chiefs ofstaff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. 98
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a threeyear audit
investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.
of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds
under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) 100 by the DBM, the
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies
and several governmentownedandcontrolled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the
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Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary ● EightyTwo (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents,
the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lumpsum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, 107 be declared ● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray used in the projects were not compliant with law.
that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistleblowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia
order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one
legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto";
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lumpsum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto." 108 Also, they
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently offbudget, lump
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society,
filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition),
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective
and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to
taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form
fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the
and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. 106 The
executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the
Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development
Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK14951.112
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M.
Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent
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On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b)
parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10,
which the parties subsequently did. 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting
under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the
The Issues Before the Court GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same
the Court‘s resolution: provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
I. Procedural Issues. On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment
(Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that
controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial
the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Comment.
Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management" 115 (LAMP) bar the relitigatio n
of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on
decisis. September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on
October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel." October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues
of powers; (b) nondelegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy. directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who
would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and
thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
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demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 121 In other words, "there infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
122
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
"A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." 123 "Withal, courts will decline
to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve The Court’s Ruling
hypothetical or moot questions."124
The petitions are partly granted.
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
I. Procedural Issues.
cases.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the
parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated
legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
– such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 118 Of these
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important 119 and, therefore, shall be discussed
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot forthwith.
and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed lineitem
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution
embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power
since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
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Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that
investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed? he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x. constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the
passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on
x x x x this point is the following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the
Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to
repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct? Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law, 127 correct? Solicitor General
Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF,
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘
the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The
saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor.
Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 129 stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the
Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they
that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of
separation of powers, nondelegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF
autonomy. because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice,
even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistleblowers, the President was
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
just exercising precisely the duty ….
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and
x x x x
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a
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The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the
ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA
estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the Report, the accounts of numerous whistleblowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are
findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF" 130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which
(Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. 132 Accordingly, only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘
there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionallymandated audit arm of the government. In
disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles. disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The 133
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF free budget for conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property.
2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course
134
The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check
of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a and balance system inherent in our form of government.
different collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the government had already backtracked on a
135 136
previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
order "to prevent similar questions from re emerging." The situation similarly holds true to these cases.
137 which is constitutionallycreated, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review. administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine. CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance supplied)
that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." 138 Essentially,
the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these
formulation of Baker v. Carr, applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable
139
cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an
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abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion." Cast against this light,
of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such,
prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did
not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied) The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the
of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
Constitution." To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co
144 discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The intrinsic
duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to
change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political
great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial
for judicial restraint. power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
C. Locus Standi. lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto, 142 the expanded concept of
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 145 as follows:143
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizentaxpayers and accordingly, To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they
146
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
559 of 669
in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are
the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that
their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF
Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they
the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
cannot apply. society, or of paramount public interest." 148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments
that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters abovediscussed, the seriousness of the issues involved
Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. 150 All told,
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issue.153 Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare
decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation
that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the
Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively
purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling
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excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are
pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (Abakada) has effectively
155
merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a
overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of postenactment legislator participation in view of the separation of separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring postenactment identification
powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination
detail in the ensuing section of this Decision. of (a) the interrelation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the
entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intrarelation of postenactment measures contained within
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but
hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal
these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply. analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a
wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
II. Substantive Issues.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
A. Definition of Terms. inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from
the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms
propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the
"Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to
power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
the ensuing discourse.
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the
power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a)
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive
it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority
branches of government to accumulate lumpsum public funds in their offices with unchecked
must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised
discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse." 156 They assert that the following
after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of
elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lumpsum funds are allocated through the appropriations
law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case
process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the
sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to
funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation
appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the
are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite
individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible."
constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official
As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the
by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two
CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
(2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently
postenactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
known as the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply
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The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it 162
1993.159
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." 163 To the legislative branch of Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court
government, through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by
government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of which lumpsum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lumpsum discretionary funds:
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." 167 Thus,
"the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lumpsum, discretionary
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The principle of fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various postenactment measures
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a postenactment measure that allows individual
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by coequal branches of legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lumpsum, discretionary
of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self
fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the
interest assertions of another or others.170
Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of Fund.
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these
principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere
cases.
impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; 171 and
"alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible
(a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
1. Separation of Powers.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function
a. Statement of Principle.
both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In
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and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution
Court ruled in Abakada:178 "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other
Any postenactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle. 174 This is rooted in the principle that the
investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in
them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture
when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
(Emphases supplied)
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law
b. Application.
making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the
national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF
concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176
Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to
allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that
the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an
"from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers." 180 Further, they point out that
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." 177 It must be clarified, however, that since the
the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators
restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation. 181
exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself
allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the
enactmentmeasure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis
President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final
discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals. 182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the
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Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded postenactment authority constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such
in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of proposal and identification are recommendatory." 183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special
legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains
Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the constitutional."184
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision
4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the would be the authority of legislators to participate in the postenactment phases of project implementation.
DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists, 185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 –
Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
have been consistently accorded postenactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment
authority of legislators to identify projects postGAA may be construed from the import of Special
received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator
Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1
concerned."
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual
Clearly, these postenactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall,
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or
of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice.
Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long
plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies
powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators" 188 and thereunder provides the
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. 191 That the said authority is treated as merely submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded postenactment authority to
identify PDAF projects.
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x x x x abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that
the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator? Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that
the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary,
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted
I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be
And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator. tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget
execution process:192
x x x x
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, the legislator be utilized?
"How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he
must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied) Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of postenactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
x x x x
unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly
observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no
identification.
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we
enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that
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Notably, the principle of nondelegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rulemaking neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how
authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of
enforcement (supplementary rulemaking) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things
(contingent rulemaking). The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rulemaking were
199
are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section
explained in the case of People v. Maceren as follows:
200
all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are
all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The grant of the rulemaking power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures
regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive
"the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
2. Nondelegability of Legislative Power.
x x x x
a. Statement of Principle.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rulemaking power must be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by
to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied) Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
b. Application. on initiative and referendum. 195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers postenactment wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of nondelegability of
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of nondelegability since said legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and
in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
201
(b) constitutionallygrafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. 198
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The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF
power of itemveto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for Article, individual legislators are given a personal lumpsum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
lawpassage as specified under the Constitution. As stated in Abakada, the final step in the lawmaking
204
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
after the required publication." 205
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
Elaborating on the President‘s itemveto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of nondelegability of legislative power, the Court
in Bengzon, explained that:206 hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which
contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an
integral part of the lawmaking power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially 3. Checks and Balances.
a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as
those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view. a. Statement of Principle; ItemVeto Power.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not
this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also
to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the various departments of the government.203
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item
the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied) process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s itemveto power is found in Section 27(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
The justification for the President‘s itemveto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent
logrolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive Sec. 27. x x x.
branch‘s role in the budgetary process. 208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US
Supreme Court characterized the President‘s itempower as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, x x x x
calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
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case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws,
power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
mechanism of itemveto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein
discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 For the President to exercise his itemveto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item"
Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of
by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item
5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public of appropriation as follows:
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law." An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular supplied)
lumpsum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation
type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to
purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
without a proper lineitem which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by
faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate
purpose, otherwise known as a "lineitem."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with
purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises nondelegability issues
its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly
considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount
veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the
to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute
Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then
the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
be considered as "line item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of nondelegability.
observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values;
b. Application. however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose
for such component to be considered as a proper lineitem. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lumpsum out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting
appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which
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appropriation abovecharacterized. In particular, the lumpsum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated President the chance to veto that item later on." 212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of
as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt lineitem budgeting" and that "Congress cannot
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionallygiven power of the President
setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for useless."213
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the President‘s power of item veto. On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is
intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lumpsum appropriations are
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lumpsum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue
relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more that the decision of the Congress to create some lumpsum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds." Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line
216
textuallygrounded.214
by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency." 217
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Hence, in view of the reasons abovestated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that personal lumpsum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends. 218 based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
c. Accountability. appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lumpsum/postenactment legislative identification budgeting
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial the abovedescribed system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion
interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
"financiallyinterested partners." They also claim that the system has an effect on re election as "the
219
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
PDAF excels in selfperpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the legislators with legitimate projects.215
power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of
senators.‘"220 Moreover, even without its postenactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lumpsum
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including any governmentowned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He The Court agrees in part.
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office
is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the
another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability, 221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same postenactment authority and/or the individual
legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, 222 congressional oversight
his PDAF for reelection purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and
casetocase basis. the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power
legislators and the Executive department, through the former‘s postenactment participation, may affect of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly
concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork
assessment. Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that
individual legislators are given postenactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult
In sum, insofar as its postenactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional. said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post
4. Political Dynasties. enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasijudicial and other administrative bodies.
Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that: Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
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removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
the organization and operation of the local units. dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Intermediate Appellate Court:228
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
local political subdivisions as "self reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of
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geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a farflung rural them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This
province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which
scrutiny is that even Senators and PartyList Representatives – and in some years, even the VicePresident are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today
– who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution. 229 (Emphases
certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the and underscoring supplied)
unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office. In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. 230 The Court agrees with
with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally petitioners.
mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction." 234 Considering that Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a
LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their 235 recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority
are national officers that have no lawmaking authority except only when acting as a body. The to be given each project." 231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the postenactment authority conferred to the latter was existence by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel
succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise: 236 complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to
depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms,
own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personalitydriven project President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy
identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government." cannot afford.233
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be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive
"detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.: 241
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be 1. Validity of Appropriation.
"made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD
but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an
special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD
1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR. 238 In view of the foregoing,
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave: 242 petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 239
The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An
appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a The Court disagrees.
public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is
plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied) "An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable 240 amount of
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of
"primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall
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12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of Constitution.
PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable
amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines
enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties,
appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource
appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as
occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation
of the nondelegability principle as aforediscussed.
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this
2. Undue Delegation.
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance
used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the
Analyzing the legal text visàvis the abovementioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a)
same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation
Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance
programs and projects of the government."244
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section
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the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; 250 and, third, the The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for nonenergy related purposes under the
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government." 251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the
910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible same law delegates rulemaking authority to the Executive 245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the
from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rulemaking, or (b) ascertaining facts to
the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rulemaking. 246 There are two (2)
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rulemaking are indeed adequate.
that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient
but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910. delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 under which it is to be implemented.248
has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the
same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as
parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality. may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of
authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, 249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase
the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from
"infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts
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The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system,
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and watersystems)
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the phrase "to
such limitations as may be provided by law. finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since
– similar to the aboveassailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission. any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for
mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256 D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive
may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case. schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List); 254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lumpsum,
and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" 255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as
supplied) follows:
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It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, concern.
while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by
petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a welldefined,
however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259 clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v.
to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, Subido, G.R. No. L28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of
the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners,
is meritorious. In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a welldefined, clear and certain legal right" to be
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners
and PDPLaban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access
to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations.
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern,
however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations. hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on
this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of
pursue through a separate petition.
all presently, offbudget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x
x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260
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cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the Suffice it to state that the abovestated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left
TRO by the DBM. 262
to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must
equally deny their prayer on this score.
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO
should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of
PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a released funds. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the
permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 20138 dated
for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined. September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 20138) which pertinently reads as follows:
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it 3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release
has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing
issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto
promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 20138. effected by the agencies concerned.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement
by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been
DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013
exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures TRO.
the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate
approval or clearance by competent authority."263 Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet
involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO,
not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of should remain enjoined.
placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be
withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated
the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, which is subsequent to the
264 allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency
concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they
578 of 669
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the
obligated but not released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such Oral Arguments:265
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b)
funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were
altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the x x x x
general fund as aforestated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to
Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able
unconstitutional.
to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor,
E. Consequential Effects of Decision. is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized governmentdisbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees
depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the
2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are
under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
withdrawn by the DBM.
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of
the operative fact doctrine.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional
and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been
explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 266 the
"released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by
doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which
obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s
has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing
had transpired prior to such adjudication." 267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision:
of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
579 of 669
think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact
its costewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision
today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray
from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In
in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the
(b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to
and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether wield, in varying gradations, nonoversight, postenactment authority in vital areas of budget execution,
individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators
various postenactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non
unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the
import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of
directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds
Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of intended by law for energyrelated purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
nondelegability of legislative power. public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once
more transgressed the principle of nondelegability.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be
PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance,
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to
580 of 669
SO ORDERED. Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by
Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether
obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent
injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to
be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or
detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘
access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must,
however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid
statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they
or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the
budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches
of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of
reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful
disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
581 of 669
MANUELITO R. LUNA, Petitioner, G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN;
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO
PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ALTER EGO OF THE CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP.
PRESIDENT, Respondents. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI
ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
x x SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN
PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR
G.R. No. 209155 VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MALV AR VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioner, BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
vs. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
x x
x x
G.R. No. 209135
G.R. No. 209164
AUGUSTO L. SY JUCO JR., Ph.D., Petitioner,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), REPRESENTED BY DEAN vs.
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO AND LEONOR M. BRIONES, Petitioners, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
vs. BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND HON. FRANKLIN MAGTUNAO DRILON, IN HIS CAP
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND/OR HON. FLORENCIO B. A CITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
ABAD, Respondents.
x x
x x
G.R. No. 209136
G.R. No. 209260
582 of 669
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner,
PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL vs.
OFFICE (SWEAPDSWD CO); ANTONIA PASCUAL, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
PRESIDENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES MANAGEMENT (DBM), Respondent.
ASSOCIATION (DAREA); ALBERT MAGALANG, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF
THE ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT BUREAU EMPLOYEES UNION (EMBEU); AND x x
MARCIAL ARABA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE KAPISANAN PARA SA
KAGALINGAN NG MGA KAW ANI NG MMDA (KKKMMDA), Petitioners, G.R. No. 209442
vs.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA; BISHOP REUBEN MABANTE AND REV. JOSE L.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Ill, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
GONZALEZ, Petitioners,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
D E C I S I O N G.R. No. 209517
583 of 669
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website 3 that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the
generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
(1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel Services appropriations that
4
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the
would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slowmoving projects and discontinued petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to
projects per zero based budgeting findings; and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for
5
allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the
slowmoving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution
Government. to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of
the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings, 6 namely: (1) Section 25(5), funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for
his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Antecedents
Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive
Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of What has precipitated the controversy?
2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and
augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings. On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the
Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to the entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program, 1 explaining that the funds
consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable. That the released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending
issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over Congressional to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on
pork barrel – "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or their letters of request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been
primarily to bring money to a representative’s district" – excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel
7 made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish
controversy. disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained
that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed Services;2 (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carryover appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and
within days of each other, as follows: G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (4) budgets for slowmoving items or projects that had been realigned to support fasterdisbursing
(Luna), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209164
8
projects.
584 of 669
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." (Araullo), on October 17, 2013; G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517
(COURAGE), on November6, 2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar as: In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Court’s attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of
Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012),
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of
agencies as "savings" as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of
2012 and 2013; obligations, both for continuing and current allotments.
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General
Executive Department; and (OSG).
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs. The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised and joined.
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in accord with the GAAs.
585 of 669
(3) A breakdown of the sources of savings, including savings from discontinued projects and unpaid During the oral arguments held on November 19, 2013, the Court directed Sec. Abad to submit a list of
appropriations for compensation from 2011 to 2013 savings brought under the DAP that had been sourced from (a) completed programs; (b) discontinued or
abandoned programs; (c) unpaid appropriations for compensation; (d) a certified copy of the President’s
On January 28, 2014, the OSG, to comply with the Resolution issued on January 21, 2014 directing the directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in NBC No. 541; and (e) all circulars or orders issued in relation
respondents to submit the documents not yet submitted in compliance with the directives of the Court or to the DAP.9
its Members, submitted several evidence packets to aid the Court in understanding the factual bases of the
DAP, to wit: In compliance, the OSG submitted several documents, as follows:
(1) First Evidence Packet 11 – containing seven memoranda issued by the DBM through Sec. Abad, (1) A certified copy of the Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to
inclusive of annexes, listing in detail the 116 DAP identified projects approved and duly signed by the Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment);10
President, as follows:
(2) Circulars and orders, which the respondents identified as related to the DAP, namely:
a. Memorandum for the President dated October 12, 2011 (FY 2011 Proposed Disbursement Acceleration
Program (Projects and Sources of Funds); a. NBC No. 528 dated January 3, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2011);
b. Memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate b. NBC No. 535 dated December 29, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2012);
Savings/Unutilized Balances and its Realignment);
c. NBC No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of
c. Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012);
Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment);
d. NBC No. 545 dated January 2, 2013 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2013);
d. Memorandum for the President dated September 4, 2012 (Release of funds for other priority projects
and expenditures of the Government); e. DBM Circular Letter No. 20042 dated January 26, 2004 (Budgetary Treatment of
Commitments/Obligations of the National Government);
e. Memorandum for the President dated December 19, 2012 (Proposed Priority Projects and Expenditures
of the Government); f. COADBM Joint Circular No. 20131 dated March 15, 2013 (Revised Guidelines on the Submission of
Quarterly Accountability Reports on Appropriations, Allotments, Obligations and Disbursements);
f. Memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate
Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment to Fund the Quarterly Disbursement Acceleration g. NBC No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 (Adoption of a Simplified Fund Release System in the
Program); and Government).
586 of 669
Executive Department for the use of the Constitutional Commissions and other branches of the g. Memorandum for the President dated September 25, 2013 (Funding for the Task Force Pablo
Government, as well as the fund releases to the Senate and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Rehabilitation Plan).
RULING (2) Second Evidence Packet12 – consisting of 15 applications of the DAP, with their corresponding Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and appropriation covers;
I.
(3) Third Evidence Packet13 – containing a list and descriptions of 12 projects under the DAP;
Procedural Issue:
(4) Fourth Evidence Packet14 – identifying the DAPrelated portions of the Annual Financial Report
a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies (AFR) of the Commission on Audit for 2011 and 2012;
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of (5) Fifth Evidence Packet 15 – containing a letter of Department of Transportation and
writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature Communications(DOTC) Sec. Joseph Abaya addressed to Sec. Abad recommending the withdrawal of
of the petitions is individually set forth hereunder, to wit: funds from his agency, inclusive of annexes; and
587 of 669
The respondents’ arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit. The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of
adverse claims between the parties;19 that the petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result of the adoption of the DAP
and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be the legal standing to sue considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of
established by law. NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or spending power of Congress; 20 and that even if the
petitioners had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
law available to them, like assailing the regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
Commission on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts.21
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions for
directly assailing the constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive
Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
issuances implementing the DAP.22
law. In creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that
court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of judicial In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding under the
power.25 However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or
its exercise of the legislative power. controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the constitutional question; that the
jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle
law or any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to
reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the President in violation of the principle of separation of powers;
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and NBC No. 541, any
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the
decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render. 23
concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable. The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can
question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either
The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution were laid
of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts by petition for review on
out during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R.
certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule
Concepcion (a former Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the proposed provisions on
64 of the Rules of Court.24
the Judiciary, where he said:–
588 of 669
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law
The second paragraph of Section 1 states: "Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle but cannot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
actual controversies…" The term "actual controversies" according to the Commissioner should refer to unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such
questions which are political in nature and, therefore, the courts should not refuse to decide those political are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
questions. But do I understand it right that this is restrictive or only an example? I know there are cases marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
which are not actual yet the court can assume jurisdiction. An example is the petition for declaratory enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity." This is why the first
relief. part of the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable…
May I ask the Commissioner’s opinion about that?
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system
MR. CONCEPCION. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments. of government, the Supreme Court has, also, another important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgmenton matters of this
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
nature.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. (Bold
as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction emphasis supplied)26
or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide. 27
Upon interpellation by Commissioner Nolledo, Commissioner Concepcion clarified the scope of judicial
power in the following manner:–
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the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the great
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. responsibility of the Judiciary in maintaining the allocation of powers among the three great branches of
Government. Speaking for the Court in Angara v. Electoral Commission,28 Justice Jose P. Laurel intoned:
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in
Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:30 x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt
to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
Chancery, or the King’s Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record the several department and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would
enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court’s x x x x
judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they
would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
judicial acts. but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior Constitution. x x x29
court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz: What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
x x x x Constitution?
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With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasijudicial or such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasijudicial powers acted in a capricious or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.31
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra. distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the reexamination of
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. 34
to the court itself.32 The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:33
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi
the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,
interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity
with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal
balances. 35
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against
judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasilegislative functions. Generally, the
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become more purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to
alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief Executive’s spending against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
power. handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief
b) Requisites for the exercise of the can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
power of judicial review were ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
complied with Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform
functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court
through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
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It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28, 2014 oral arguments that the DAP as a program The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must
had been meanwhile discontinued because it had fully served its purpose, saying: "In conclusion, Your bean actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe
Honors, may I inform the Court that because the DAP has already fully served its purpose, the for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of
Administration’s economic managers have recommended its termination to the President. x x x." 39
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case. 36
The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as a program, and urged that its The first requisite demands that there be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power by the
termination had already mooted the challenges to the DAP’s constitutionality, viz: Court.37 An actual case or controversy, in the words of Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa: 38
DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present cases brought to challenge its x x x is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge should no longer be at the level of the program, which is judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words,
now extinct, but at the level of its prior applications or the specific disbursements under the now defunct "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
policy. We challenge the petitioners to pick and choose which among the 116 DAP projects they wish to law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
nullify, the full details we will have provided by February 5. We urge this Court to be cautious in limiting "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
the constitutional authority of the President and the Legislature to respond to the dynamic needs of the "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
country and the evolving demands of governance, lest we end up straight jacketing our elected individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
representatives in ways not consistent with our constitutional structure and democratic principles. 40
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.41 hypothetical or moot questions."
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the
effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the
judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1) when requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness
there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are
character and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge
was capable of repetition yet evading review. 42
sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on
account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication by the Court.
592 of 669
who would assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such Assuming that the petitioners’ several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President Court here, these cases would definitely come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not
of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, AntiChinese League of the abstain from exercising its power of judicial review.
Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Did the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can
be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a court
Court liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable of justice on a given question."43 The concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,44 where the Court said:
way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to resolve the issues standi of the petitioners due to the everpresent need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the
raised by the petition due to their "far reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of
file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must
notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring their suits have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings. International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Accordingly, it
are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to
nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. MacapagalArroyo, the Court be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
aptly explains why:
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct injury test for
determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person
593 of 669
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the Case law in most jurisdiction snow allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The
outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them. distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s
suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by
In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As
disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right,
are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the determination however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to
of such important issues call for the Court’s exercise of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
questions raised."50 to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied."45
II.
Substantive Issues The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. 46 that
"[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by
1. parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by
Overview of the Budget System concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."
An understanding of the Budget System of the Philippines will aid the Court in properly appreciating and Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as
justly resolving the substantive issues. taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances
involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in preventing the further dissipation of
a) Origin of the Budget System
public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert
their right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the
The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that had derived from the Latin word
political branches of the Government.47
bulga (which means bag or purse).51
On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal standing to bring
In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined "budget" as the
cases upon constitutional issues.48 Luna, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as
financial program of the National Government for a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of
a lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed duty to work for the rule of
estimated receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to be effective based on
law and of paramount importance of the question in this action, not to mention its civic duty as the official
the results of operations during the preceding fiscal years. The term was given a different meaning under
association of all lawyers in this country."49
Republic Act No. 992 (Revised Budget Act) by describing the budget as the delineation of the services
and products, or benefits that would accrue to the public together with the estimated unit cost of each type
594 of 669
The budget process in the Philippines evolved from the early years of the American Regime up to the of service, product or benefit.52 For a forthright definition, budget should simply be identified as the
passage of the Jones Law in 1916. A Budget Office was created within the Department of Finance by the financial plan of the Government,53 or "the master plan of government."54
Jones Law to discharge the budgeting function, and was given the responsibility to assist in the
preparation of an executive budget for submission to the Philippine Legislature. 60 The concept of budgeting has not been the product of recent economies. In reality, financing public goals
and activities was an idea that existed from the creation of the State. 55 To protect the people, the territory
As early as under the 1935 Constitution, a budget policy and a budget procedure were established, and and sovereignty of the State, its government must perform vital functions that required public
subsequently strengthened through the enactment of laws and executive acts. EO No. 25, issued by
61
expenditures. At the beginning, enormous public expenditures were spent for war activities, preservation
President Manuel L. Quezon on April 25, 1936, created the Budget Commission to serve as the agency of peace and order, security, administration of justice, religion, and supply of limited goods and
that carried out the President’s responsibility of preparing the budget. CA No. 246, the first budget law,
62
services.56 In order to finance those expenditures, the State raised revenues through taxes and
went into effect on January 1, 1938 and established the Philippine budget process. The law also provided impositions.57 Thus, budgeting became necessary to allocate public revenues for specific government
a lineitem budget as the framework of the Government’s budgeting system, 63 with emphasis on the functions.58 The State’s budgeting mechanism eventually developed through the years with the growing
observance of a "balanced budget" to tie up proposed expenditures with existing revenues. functions of its government and changes in its market economy.
CA No. 246 governed the budget process until the passage on June 4, 1954 of Republic Act (RA) No. The Philippine Budget System has been greatly influenced by western public financial institutions. This is
992,whereby Congress introduced performancebudgeting to give importance to functions, projects and because of the country’s past as a colony successively of Spain and the United States for a long period of
activities in terms of expected results. RA No. 992 also enhanced the role of the Budget Commission as
64
time. Many aspects of the country’s public fiscal administration, including its Budget System, have been
the fiscal arm of the Government. 65
naturally patterned after the practices and experiences of the western public financial institutions. At any
rate, the Philippine Budget System is presently guided by two principal objectives that are vital to the
The 1973 Constitution and various presidential decrees directed a series of budgetary reforms that development of a progressive democratic government, namely: (1) to carry on all government activities
culminated in the enactment of PD No. 1177 that President Marcos issued on July30, 1977, and of PD No. under a comprehensive fiscal plan developed, authorized and executed in accordance with the
1405, issued on June 11, 1978. The latter decree converted the Budget Commission into the Ministry of Constitution, prevailing statutes and the principles of sound public management; and (2) to provide for the
Budget, and gave its head the rank of a Cabinet member. periodic review and disclosure of the budgetary status of the Government in such detail so that persons
entrusted by law with the responsibility as well as the enlightened citizenry can determine the adequacy of
The Ministry of Budget was later renamed the Office of Budget and Management (OBM) under EO No. the budget actions taken, authorized or proposed, as well as the true financial position of the
711. The OBM became the DBM pursuant to EO No. 292 effective on November 24, 1989. Government.59
c) The Philippine Budget Cycle66 b) Evolution of the Philippine Budget System
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disaggregation of key PAPs in the NEP, especially those in line with the National Government’s Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget
development plan. The Staffing Summary provides the staffing complement of each department and Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the
agency, including the number of positions and amounts allocated. others but they overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.
The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the President and the Cabinet c.1.Budget Preparation67
for further refinements or reprioritization. Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and
the Cabinet, the DBM prepares the budget documents for submission to Congress. The budget documents The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The
consist of: (1) the President’s Budget Message, through which the President explains the policy Budget Call contains budget parameters earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee
framework and budget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the (DBCC) as well as policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies in the preparation and
Constitution, which contains the macroeconomic assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the
68 submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget
expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two previous years; and (3) the NEP. Call, which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate
Budget Call, which is addressed to all governmentowned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and
Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital government financial institutions (GFIs).
expenditures or outlays; and (2) current operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses
whose usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the Government, including Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and agencies submit their respective
investments in the capital of governmentowned or controlled corporations and their Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM. To boost citizen participation, the current administration has
subsidiaries.69 Current operating expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in current tasked the various departments and agencies to partner with civil society organizations and other citizen
consumption the benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal year. 70 The two components of stakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget Proposals, which proposals are then presented
current expenditures are those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating before a technical panel of the DBM in scheduled budget hearings wherein the various departments and
expenses(MOOE). agencies are given the opportunity to defend their budget proposals. DBM bureaus thereafter review the
Agency Budget Proposals and come up with recommendations for the Executive Review Board,
Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their functions into: (1) economic development comprised by the DBM Secretary and the DBM’s senior officials. The discussions of the Executive
expenditures (i.e., expenditures on agriculture and natural resources, transportation and communications, Review Board cover the prioritization of programs and their corresponding support visàvis the priority
commerce and industry, and other economic development efforts); (2) social services or social
71
agenda of the National Government, and their implementation.
development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public health and medicare, labor and
welfare and others);72 (3) general government or general public services expenditures (i.e., expenditures The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program
for the general government, legislative services, the administration of justice, and for pensions and (NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of
gratuities); (4) national defense expenditures (i.e., subdivided into national security expenditures and
73 spending for each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP), and is submitted in the
expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order); and (5) public debt.
74 75 form of a proposed GAA. The Details of Selected Programs and Projects is the more detailed
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Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature of funds, i.e., general fund, special
fund or bond fund.76
General Income
On the other hand, public revenues complement public expenditures and cover all income or receipts of
1 Subsidy Income from National
the government treasury used to support government expenditures.77
Government
2 Subsidy from Central Office
Classical economist Adam Smith categorized public revenues based on two principal sources, stating:
3 Subsidy from Regional
"The revenue which must defray…the necessary expenses of government may be drawn either, first from
Office/Staff Bureaus
some fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and which is independent of the
4 Income from Government
Services revenue of the people, or, secondly, from the revenue of the people." 78 Adam Smith’s classification relied
on the two aspects of the nature of the State: first, the State as a juristic person with an artificial
5 Income from Government
Business Operations personality, and, second, the State as a sovereign or entity possessing supreme power. Under the first
6 Sales Revenue aspect, the State could hold property and engage in trade, thereby deriving what is called its quasi private
597 of 669
has formally transmitted its version to the Senate. The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on 1 Income Taxes
Third Reading. 89
2 Property Taxes
3 Taxes on Goods and Services
The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral 4 Taxes on International Trade and
Conference Committee for the purpose of discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their Transactions
versions of the GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to the President for 5 Other Taxes 6.Fines and Penalties-Tax Revenue
approval.90 The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message where budget items are 7 Other Specific Income
subjected to direct veto,91 or are identified for conditional implementation.
If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal
c.2. Budget Legislation86
year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and
effect until the GAB is passed by the Congress.92
The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the
President’s Budget, which is inclusive of the NEPand the BESF, up to the President’s approval of the
c.3. Budget Execution93
GAA. This phase is also known as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the significant
participation of the Legislative through its deliberations.
With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget
Execution Phase is primarily the function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following
Initially, the President’s Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives’ Appropriations Committee
procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to prepare an
on First Reading. The Appropriations Committee and its various SubCommittees schedule and conduct
Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.
budget hearings to examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies. Thereafter, the House of
Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB).87
The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the DBM. Prior to this, the
various departments and agencies are required to submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline
The GABis sponsored, presented and defended by the House of Representatives’ Appropriations
their plans and performance targets by laying down the physical and financial plan, the monthly cash
Committee and SubCommittees in plenary session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third
program, the estimate of monthly income, and the list of obligations that are not yet due and demandable.
Reading before the House of Representatives’ version is transmitted to the Senate. 88
Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a Cash Release Program
After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on the GAB. To expedite
(CRP).The ARP sets a limit for allotments issued in general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the
proceedings, the Senate may conduct its committee hearings simultaneously with the House of
monthly, quarterly and annual disbursement levels.
Representatives’ deliberations. The Senate’s Finance Committee and its SubCommittees may submit the
proposed amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate only after the House of Representatives
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An agency’s accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1) performance targets and Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued by the DBM. Allotments are
outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3) review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted lesser in scope than appropriations, in that the latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend.
by the Commission on Audit(COA). Allotments may be released in two forms – through a comprehensive Agency Budget Matrix (ABM), 94 or,
individually, by SARO.95
2.
Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to incur obligations 96 on behalf of
Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan the Government in order to implement their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like
hiring of personnel, entering into contracts for the supply of goods and services, and using utilities.
a. DAP was a program designed to
promote economic growth In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement authority so
that cash may be allocated in payment of the obligations. A cash or disbursement authority that is
Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any Administration. 99 The national budget periodically issued is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA), 97 which issuance is based upon an
the Executive prepares and presents to Congress represents the Administration’s "blueprint for public agency’s submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other required documents. The NCA specifies the
policy" and reflects the Government’s goals and strategies. 100 As such, the national budget becomes a maximum amount of cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period
tangible representation of the programs of the Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the indicated. Apart from the NCA, the DBM may issue a NonCash Availment Authority(NCAA) to
PAPs and services for which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and allocated. 101 Embodied in authorize noncash disbursements, or a Cash Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for departments with overseas
every national budget is government spending.102 operations to allow the use of income collected by their foreign posts for their operating requirements.
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memorandum, which contained a list of the funding sources for ₱72.11 billion and of the proposed spending.106 The Administration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1) streamlining the
priority projects to be funded,115 reads: implementation process through the clustering of infrastructure projects of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education (DepEd),and (2) front loading PPP
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT related projects107 due for implementation in the following year.108
x x x x Did the stimulus package work?
SUBJECT: FY 2011 PROPOSED DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM (PROJECTS AND The March 2012 report of the World Bank, 109 released after the initial implementation of the DAP,
SOURCES OF FUNDS) revealed that the DAP was partially successful. The disbursements under the DAP contributed 1.3
percentage points to GDP growth by the fourth quarter of 2011. 110 The continued implementation of the
DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2011 DAP strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29%
contraction to a 34% growth as of September 2013.111
Mr. President, this is to formally confirm your approval of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
totaling ₱72.11 billion. We are already working with all the agencies concerned for the immediate The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a policy instrument that the Government
execution of the projects therein. could use to direct the economies towards growth and development. 112 The Government, by spending on
public infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring profitability for prospective
A. Fund Sources for the Acceleration Program
investors.113 The PAPs funded under the DAP were chosen for this reason based on their: (1) multiplier
impact on the economy and infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3)
Amount translation into disbursements.114
Fund Sources (In million Description
Php)
b. History of the implementation of
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TOTAL 72.110 FY 2011 482 Unreleased
Unreleased appropriations (slow
Appropriations moving projects and
programs for
B. Projects in the Disbursement Acceleration Program discontinuance)
Agency/Project
(SARO and NCA Release)
FY 2010 21,544 Unreleased
1. LRTA: Rehabilitation of LRT 1 and 2 Carryover appropriations (slow
Appropriation moving projects and
2. NHA:
programs for
discontinuance) and
a. Resettlement of North Triangle residents to
savings from Zero-based Budgeting
Camarin A7
Initiative
b. Housing for BFP/BJMP
c. On-site development for families living
along dangerous
d. Relocation sites for informal settlers
along Iloilo River and its tributaries
FY 2011 Budget 7,748 FY 2011 Agency
3. PHIL. HEART CENTER: Upgrading of items for Budget items that can
ageing physical plant and medical equipment realignment be realigned within the
agency to fund new fast
4. CREDIT INFO CORP: Establishment of disbursing projects
centralized credit information system DPWH-3.981 Billion
DA – 2.497 Billion
5. PIDS: purchase of land to relocate the PIDS DOT – 1.000 Billion
office and building construction DepEd – 270 Million
6. HGC: Equity infusion for credit insurance
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and mortgage guaranty operations of HGC
15. DND-PAF: On Base Housing 9. BSP: First equity infusion out of Php 40B
Facilities and Communication capitalization under the BSP Law
Equipment
10. PCMC: Capital and Equipment Renovation
16. DA:
a. Irrigation, FMRs and 11. LCOP:
Integrated Community Based Multi-Species a. Pediatric Pulmonary Program
Hatchery and Aquasilvi b. Bio-regenerative Technology Program
Farming (Stem-Cell Research – subject to legal
b. Mindanao Rural review and presentation)
Development Project
12. TIDCORP: NG Equity infusion
c. NIA Agno River Integrated
Irrigation Project TOTAL
17. DAR:
a. Agrarian Reform
Communities Project 2 NGAs/LGUs
b. Landowners Compensation
Agency/Project
18. DBM: Conduct of National
Survey of
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local activities
Farmers/Fisherfolks/Ips
603 of 669
The memorandum of October 12, 2011 was followed by another memorandum for the President dated TOTAL
December 12, 2011116 requesting omnibus authority to consolidate the savings and unutilized balances for
fiscal year 2011. Pertinent portions of the memorandum of December 12, 2011 read:
C. Summary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
In addition, Mr. President, this measure will allow us to undertake projects even if their implementation
carries over to 2012 without necessarily impacting on our budget deficit cap next year. For His Excellency’s Consideration
BACKGROUND (Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD
1.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies’ operations, [/] APPROVED
particularly on the implementation of their projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking
the same, have identified savings out of the 2011 General Appropriations Act. Said savings correspond to [ ] DISAPPROVED
completed or discontinued projects under certain departments/agencies which may be pooled, for the
following: (Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III
1.1 to provide for new activities which have not been anticipated during preparation of the budget; OCT 12, 2011
1.2 to augment additional requirements of ongoing priority projects; and
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5.2 With respect to the proposed expenditure items to be funded from the FY 2011 Unreleased 1.3 to provide for deficiencies under the Special Purpose Funds, e.g., PDAF, Calamity Fund, Contingent
Appropriations, most of these are the same projects for which the DBM is directed by the Office of the Fund
President, thru the Executive Secretary, to source funds.
1.4 to cover for the modifications of the original allotment class allocation as a result of ongoing priority
6.0 Among others, the following are such proposed additional projects that have been chosen given their projects and implementation of new activities
multiplier impact on economy and infrastructure development, their beneficial effect on the poor, and
their translation into disbursements. Please note that we have classified the list of proposed projects as 2.0 x x x x
follows:
2.1 x x x
7.0 x x x
2.2 x x x
FOR THE PRESIDENT’S APPROVAL
ON THE UTILIZATION OF POOLED SAVINGS
8.0 Foregoing considered, may we respectfully request for the President’s approval for the following:
3.0 It may be recalled that the President approved our request for omnibus authority to pool
8.1 Grant of omnibus authority to consolidate FY 2011 savings/unutilized balances and its realignment; savings/unutilized balances in FY 2010 last November 25, 2010.
and
4.0 It is understood that in the utilization of the pooled savings, the DBM shall secure the corresponding
8.2 The proposed additional projects identified for funding. approval/confirmation of the President. Furthermore, it is assured that the proposed realignments shall be
within the authorized Expenditure level.
For His Excellency’s consideration and approval.
5.0 Relative thereto, we have identified some expenditure items that may be sourced from the said pooled
(Sgd.) appropriations in FY 2010 that will expire on December 31, 2011 and appropriations in FY 2011 that may
be declared as savings to fund additional expenditures.
[/] APPROVED
5.1 The 2010 Continuing Appropriations (pooled savings) is proposed to be spent for the projects that we
[ ] DISAPPROVED have identified to be immediate actual disbursements considering that this same fund source will expire
on December 31, 2011.
(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III
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In the event that a measure is necessary to further improve the operational efficiency of the government, DEC 21, 2011
the President is authorized to suspend or stop further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure
authorized in the General Appropriations Act. Withdrawal and pooling of unutilized allotment releases Substantially identical requests for authority to pool savings and to fund proposed projects were contained
can be effected by DBM based on authority of the President, as mandated under Sections 38 and 39, in various other memoranda from Sec. Abad dated June 25, 2012, 117 September 4, 2012,118 December 19,
Chapter 5, Book VI of EO 292. 2012,119 May 20, 2013,120 and September 25, 2013.121 The President apparently approved all the requests,
withholding approval only of the proposed projects contained in the June 25, 2012 memorandum, as borne
For the first five months of 2012, the National Government has not met its spending targets. In order to out by his marginal note therein to the effect that the proposed projects should still be "subject to further
accelerate spending and sustain the fiscal targets during the year, expenditure measures have to be discussions."122
implemented to optimize the utilization of available resources.
In order to implement the June25, 2012 memorandum, Sec. Abad issued NBC No. 541 (Adoption of
Departments/agencies have registered low spending levels, in terms of obligations and disbursements per Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30,
initial review of their 2012 performance. To enhance agencies’ performance, the DBM conducts 2012),123 reproduced herein as follows:
continuous consultation meetings and/or send callup letters, requesting them to identify slowmoving
programs/projects and the factors/issues affecting their performance (both pertaining to internal systems NATIONAL BUDGET CIRCULAR No. 541
and those which are outside the agencies’ spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate strategies
and improvement plans for the rest of 2012. July 18, 2012
Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/agencies have continued to post low obligation levels TO: All Heads of Departments/Agencies/State Universities and Colleges and other Offices of the National
as of end of first semester, thus resulting to substantial unobligated allotments. Government, Budget and Planning Officers; Heads of Accounting Units and All Others Concerned
allotments of agencies with low levels of obligations as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current Allotments as of June 30, 2012
allotments. This measure will allow the maximum utilization of available allotments to fund and
1.0 Rationale
undertake other priority expenditures of the national government.
The DBM, as mandated by Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), periodically
2.0 Purpose
reviews and evaluates the departments/agencies’ efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing budgeted funds
2.1 To provide the conditions and parameters on the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies as for the delivery of services and production of goods, consistent with the government priorities.
of June 30, 2012 to fund priority and/or fastmoving programs/projects of the national government;
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4.1.1 Constitutional Offices/Fiscal Autonomy Group, granted fiscal autonomy under the Philippine 2.2 To prescribe the reports and documents to be used as bases on the withdrawal of said unobligated
Constitution; and allotments; and
4.1.2 State Universities and Colleges, adopting the Normative Funding allocation scheme i.e., distribution 2.3 To provide guidelines in the utilization or reallocation of the withdrawn allotments.
of a predetermined budget ceiling.
3.0 Coverage
4.2 Fund Sources
3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all
4.2.1 Personal Services other than pension benefits; national government agencies (NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A.
No.10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:
4.2.2 MOOE items earmarked for specific purposes or subject to realignment conditions per General
Provisions of the GAA: 3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
• Confidential and Intelligence Fund; 3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and
projects, as well as capitalized MOOE; and
• Savings from Traveling, Communication, Transportation and Delivery, Repair and Maintenance,
Supplies and Materials and Utility which shall be used for the grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement 3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies
incentive benefit; concerned based on their updated/validated list of pensioners.
• Savings from mandatory expenditures which can be realigned only in the last quarter after taking into 3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover the identified programs, projects and activities of
consideration the agency’s full year requirements, i.e., Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants, Water, the departments/agencies reflected in the DBM list shown as Annex A or specific programs and projects
Illumination, Power Services, Telephone, other Communication Services and Rent. as may be identified by the agencies.
4.2.3 ForeignAssisted Projects (loan proceeds and peso counterpart); 4.0 Exemption
4.2.4 Special Purpose Funds such as: EGovernment Fund, International Commitments Fund, PAMANA, These guidelines shall not apply to the following:
Priority Development Assistance Fund, Calamity Fund, Budgetary Support to GOCCs and Allocation to
LGUs, among others; 4.1 NGAs
4.2.5 Quick Response Funds; and
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5.4.1 The departments/agencies’ approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be 4.2.6 Automatic Appropriations i.e., Retirement Life Insurance Premium and Special Accounts in the
implementationready and doable during the given fiscal year; and General Fund.
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower 5.0 Guidelines
thanprogrammed implementation capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a twoyear
timeframe. 5.1 National government agencies shall continue to undertake procurement activities notwithstanding the
implementation of the policy of withdrawal of unobligated allotments until the end of the third quarter,
5.5. Consistent with the President’s directive, the DBM shall, based on evaluation of the reports cited FY 2012. Even without the allotments, the agency shall proceed in undertaking the procurement processes
above and results of consultations with the departments/agencies, withdraw the unobligated allotments as (i.e., procurement planning up to the conduct of bidding but short of awarding of contract) pursuant to
of June 30, 2012 through issuance of negative Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs). GPPB Circular Nos. 022008 and 012009 and DBM Circular Letter No. 20109.
5.6 DBM shall prepare and submit to the President, a report on the magnitude of withdrawn allotments. 5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all
The report shall highlight the agencies which failed to submit the June 30 reports required under this departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the
Circular. following budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;
5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be: • Statement of Allotments, Obligations and Balances (SAOB);
5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the • Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and
allotments were withdrawn;
• Physical Report of Operations.
5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing programs and projects of the agency/OU; or
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agency’s latest
5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to fund priority programs and report available shall be used by DBM as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall
projects not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented during the current compute/approximate the agency’s obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as of
year. same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June
30 obligation level shall approximate to ₱1,600 M (i.e., ₱800 M x 2 quarters).
5.8 For items 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 above, agencies/OUs concerned may submit to DBM a Special Budget
Request (SBR), supported with the following: 5.4 All released allotments in FY 2011 charged against R.A. No. 10147 which remained unobligated as of
June 30, 2012 shall be immediately considered for withdrawal. This policy is based on the following
5.8.1 Physical and Financial Plan (PFP); considerations:
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(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD 5.8.2 Monthly Cash Program (MCP); and
Secretary
5.8.3 Proof that the project/activity has started the procurement processes i.e., Proof of Posting and/or
As can be seen, NBC No. 541 specified that the unobligated allotments of all agencies and departments as Advertisement of the Invitation to Bid.
of June 30, 2012 that were charged against the continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2011 and the 2012
GAA (R.A. No. 10155) were subject to withdrawal through the issuance of negative SAROs, but such 5.9 The deadline for submission of request/s pertaining to these categories shall be until the end of the
allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of the concerned agencies from which they third quarter i.e., September 30, 2012. After said cutoff date, the withdrawn allotments shall be pooled
were withdrawn; or (2) realigned to cover additional funding for other existing PAPs of the concerned and form part of the overall savings of the national government.
agencies; or (3) used to augment existing PAPs of any agency and to fund priority PAPs not considered in
the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented in 2012. Financing the other priority PAPs was 5.10 Utilization of the consolidated withdrawn allotments for other priority programs and projects as cited
"realignment" and "augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn unobligated allotments. the President, DBM shall issue the SARO to cover the approved priority expenditures subject to
submission by the agency/OU concerned of the SBR and supported with PFP and MCP.
Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be implemented and funded, that is — (1)
by declaring "savings" coming from the various departments and agencies derived from pooling 5.11 It is understood that all releases to be made out of the withdrawn allotments (both 2011 and 2012
unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; unobligated allotments) shall be within the approved Expenditure Program level of the national
and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other government for the current year. The SAROs to be issued shall properly disclose the appropriation source
priority PAPs. of the release to determine the extent of allotment validity, as follows:
c. DAP was not an appropriation • For charges under R.A. 10147 – allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2012; and
measure; hence, no appropriation
• For charges under R.A. 10155 – allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2013.
law was required to adopt or to
implement it
5.12 Timely compliance with the submission of existing BARs and other reportorial requirements is
reiterated for monitoring purposes.
Petitioners Syjuco, Luna, Villegas and PHILCONSA state that Congress did not enact a law to establish
the DAP, or to authorize the disbursement and release of public funds to implement the DAP. Villegas,
6.0 Effectivity
PHILCONSA, IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE observe that the appropriations funded under the DAP were
not included in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs. To petitioners IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE, the DAP,
This circular shall take effect immediately.
being actually an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law
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On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient for its validity. VACC maintains that the DAP, because it involved huge allocations that were separate
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic and distinct from the GAAs, circumvented and duplicated the GAAs without congressional authorization
situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify
127
and control.
the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification
of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and implemented the DAP violated
money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such the mandate of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the
actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
Constitution.
The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP
3. because of its being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the President as
unobligated allotments under the DAP the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.
were not savings, and the use of such
appropriations contravened Section 25(5), We agree with the OSG’s position.
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a plan or strategy validly adopted by the Executive to spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the
ramp up spending to accelerate economic growth, the challenges posed by the petitioners constrain us to Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to
dissect the mechanics of the actual execution of the DAP. The management and utilization of the public faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to
wealth inevitably demands a most careful scrutiny of whether the Executive’s implementation of the DAP implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget
was consistent with the Constitution, the relevant GAAs and other existing laws. Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which Congress "designates a particular fund, or
sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to
a. Although executive discretion some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense." 124 As
and flexibility are necessary in pointed out in Gonzales v. Raquiza:125 ‘"In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more
the execution of the budget, any than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
transfer of appropriated funds Treasury,’ while appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning
should conform to Section 25(5), to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its
Article VI of the Constitution creditors.’"126
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the purse but it would not protect the purse itself. The realities and complexities of public policy require We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come
executive discretion for the sound management of public funds. into play once the budget reaches its execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to
achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget implementation. The heads of offices,
x x x x particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable
them to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under changing
x x x The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial discretion for administrators. They conditions.128 In particular, the power to transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to meet
need to exercise judgment and take responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in
toward executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be discretion, but channel it and use the GAA.
it to satisfy the programs and priorities established by Congress.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the
In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective GAAs,129 particularly when the funds are grouped to form lump sum accounts. 130 It is assumed that the
offices, the Constitution itself ensures the fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide broader appropriation
the separation of powers among the three main branches of the Government. The Court has recognized items.131 This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the budget
this, and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon, viz: 133
execution phase. The DAP – as a strategy to improve the country’s economic position – was one policy
that the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate under the GAAs.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be counterproductive. In
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated Presidential Spending Power,132 Prof. Louis Fisher, an American constitutional scholar whose specialties
for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the have included budget policy, has justified extending discretionary authority to the Executive thusly:
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. [T]he impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be resisted. There are many number of
reasons why obligations and outlays by administrators may have to differ from appropriations by
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has legislators. Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in advance of expenditures.
not been the mere offshoot of established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in trying to legislate in fields that are highly technical and
time of the American GovernorsGeneral. 134 Act No. 1902 (An Act authorizing the GovernorGeneral to constantly undergoing change. New circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken the
direct any unexpended balances of appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury decisions reached by Congress at the appropriation stage. It is not practicable for Congress to adjust to
and to transfer from the general fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 each new development by passing separate supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control
by the First Philippine Legislature, 135 was the first enabling law that granted statutory authority to the expenditures by confining administrators to narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its power of
President to transfer funds. The authority was without any limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the
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members of the Committee objected to the ₱1,000,000.00 threshold, saying that the amount was arbitrary GovernorGeneral to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or office to
and might not be reasonable in the future. The Committee agreed to eliminate the ₱1,000,000.00 another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for that bureau or office.
threshold, and settled on the ten percent limitation. 141
From 1916 until 1920, the appropriations laws set a cap on the amounts of funds that could be transferred,
In the end, the ten percent limitation was discarded during the plenary of the Convention, which adopted thereby limiting the power to transfer funds. Only 10% of the amounts appropriated for contingent or
the following final version under Section 16, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit: miscellaneous expenses could be transferred to a bureau or office, and the transferred funds were to be
used to cover deficiencies in the appropriations also for miscellaneous expenses of said bureau or office.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional In 1921, the ceiling on the amounts of funds to be transferred from items under miscellaneous expenses to
Commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their any other item of a certain bureau or office was removed.
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
During the Commonwealth period, the power of the President to transfer funds continued to be governed
The 1973 Constitution explicitly and categorically prohibited the transfer of funds from one item to by the GAAs despite the enactment of the Constitution in 1935. It is notable that the 1935 Constitution did
another, unless Congress enacted a law authorizing the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the not include a provision on the power to transfer funds. At any rate, a shift in the extent of the President’s
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional omissions to transfer funds for the power to transfer funds was again experienced during this era, with the President being given more
purpose of augmenting any item from savings in another item in the GAA of their respective offices. The flexibility in implementing the budget. The GAAs provided that the power to transfer all or portions of the
leeway was limited to augmentation only, and was further constricted by the condition that the funds to be appropriations in the Executive Department could be made in the "interest of the public, as the President
transferred should come from savings from another item in the appropriation of the office. 142
may determine."136
On July 30, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1177, providing in its Section 44 that: In its time, the 1971 Constitutional Convention wanted to curtail the President’s seemingly unbounded
discretion in transferring funds.137 Its Committee on the Budget and Appropriation proposed to prohibit
Section 44. Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall have the authority to transfer any the transfer of funds among the separate branches of the Government and the independent constitutional
fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive bodies, but to allow instead their respective heads to augment items of appropriations from savings in
Department which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project, or activity of their respective budgets under certain limitations.138 The clear intention of the Convention was to further
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its restrict, not to liberalize, the power to transfer appropriations. 139 Thus, the Committee on the Budget and
enactment. Appropriation initially considered setting stringent limitations on the power to augment, and suggested
that the augmentation of an item of appropriation could be made "by not more than ten percent if the
The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive original item of appropriation to be augmented does not exceed one million pesos, or by not more than
Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another department, five percent if the original item of appropriation to be augmented exceeds one million pesos." 140 But two
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x x x x bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section
16 (5) of the Constitution.
The foregoing history makes it evident that the Constitutional Commission included Section 25(5), supra,
to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first paragraph of Section 44 for contravening
President and the other high officials of the Government named therein. The Court stated in Nazareth v. Section 16(5)of the 1973 Constitution, ruling:
Villar: 144
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the 16. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to
Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for their be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain language of amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which we should now dispose of Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.143
as untenable.
It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification by the people of the 1987
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of Constitution, whose Section 25(5) of Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973
the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is Constitution, to wit:
strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections: Section 25. x x x
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are x x x x
strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the 5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President
general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice. appropriations.
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the DAP; hence, transfers under the The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general
DAP were unconstitutional words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently,
the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not
Section 25(5), supra, not being a selfexecuting provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in
law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will
requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds. seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited
or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?
Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of a limitation on the President’s
In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the authority to discretion over the appropriations during the Budget Execution Phase.
transfer funds was Section 59, as follows:
b. Requisites for the valid transfer of
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the appropriated funds under Section
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item Constitution
in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a
In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit: concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions
Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item to transfer funds within their respective offices;
in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices;
In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by the DBM as justification for and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
the use of savings under the DAP.145 respective offices.
A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually b.1. First Requisite–GAAs of 2011 and
unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section 2012 lacked valid provisions to
25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize only transfers of authorize transfers of funds under
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relevant provisions of the GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be understood to refer to the excess funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of appropriation
money after the items that needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have within the Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and
been paid pursuant to the budget. The petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the PAPs
146
the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to
for which the funds had been appropriated were actually implemented and completed, or finally augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent
discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could not be realized with certainty in the middle of did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions
the fiscal year; and that the funds for "slowmoving" PAPs could not be considered as savings because cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a
such PAPs had not actually been abandoned or discontinued yet. They stress that NBC No. 541, by
147
constitutional commission.
allowing the withdrawn funds to be reissued to the "original program or project from which it was
withdrawn," conceded that the PAPs from which the supposed savings were taken had not been Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in the counterpart provision in the
completed, abandoned or discontinued.148 2013 GAA, to wit:
The OSG represents that "savings" were "appropriations balances," being the difference between the Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
appropriation authorized by Congress and the actual amount allotted for the appropriation; that the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional
definition of "savings" in the GAAs set only the parameters for determining when savings occurred; that it Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their
was still the President (as well as the other officers vested by the Constitution with the authority to respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their
augment) who ultimately determined when savings actually existed because savings could be determined respective appropriations.
only during the stage of budget execution; that the President must be given a wide discretion to
accomplish his tasks; and that the withdrawn unobligated allotments were savings inasmuch as they were Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed, there still
clearly "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation…free from any obligation or remained two other requisites to be met, namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings
encumbrances which are (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of from appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for the purpose of
the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized…" augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective offices.
We partially find for the petitioners. b.2. Second Requisite – There were
no savings from which funds
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in mind. The first principle is could be sourced for the DAP
that Congress wields the power of the purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?
to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that the Executive,
as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully execute the The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP — the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
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The three instances listed in the GAAs’ aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings could to faithfully implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit the expenditures within
be generated only upon the purpose of the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is authorized, subject to
appropriation being no longer existent. the conditions provided by law. The third principle is that in making the President’s power to augment
operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing,
The phrase "free from any obligation or encumbrance" in the definition of savings in the GAAs conveyed Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive.
the notion that the appropriation was at that stage when the appropriation was already obligated and the But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over the purse as to let the
appropriation was already released. This interpretation was reinforced by the enumeration of the three Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle is that savings should be actual.
instances for savings to arise, which showed that the appropriation referred to had reached the agency "Actual" denotes something that is real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as
level. It could not be otherwise, considering that only when the appropriation had reached the agency opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical. 150
level could it be determined whether (a) the PAP for which the appropriation had been authorized was
completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against expanding the scope of the power
without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost to augment. It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for
because of the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies. which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist,
for only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased transgressing Congress’ power of the purse.
appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the
year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per ZeroBased The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected this
Budgeting findings." interpretation and made it operational, viz:
The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any
unalloted appropriations as savings. obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions
items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the
can be generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been an allotment implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to
or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser
either an ABM (for those not needing clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and cost.
consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the case may be. Appropriations remain unreleased, for
instance, because of noncompliance with documentary requirements (like the Special Budget Request), or
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ON THE AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW UNOBLIGATED ALLOTMENTS simply because of the unavailability of funds. But the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to
which they were allocated under the GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo,
5.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies’ operations, unreleased appropriations refer to appropriations with allotments but without disbursement authority.
particularly on the implementation of their projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking
the same, have been continuously calling the attention of all National Government agencies (NGAs) with For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of
low levels of obligations as of end of the first quarter to speedup the implementation of their programs savings, would seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had
and projects in the second quarter. not even reached and been used by the agency concerned visàvis the PAPs for which Congress had
allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an
6.0 Said reminders were made in a series of consultation meetings with the concerned agencies and with allotment and NCA for such vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may
callup letters sent. already constitute savings for that agency under the second instance.
7.0 Despite said reminders and the availability of funds at the department’s disposal, the level of financial Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of
performance of some departments registered below program, with the targeted obligations/disbursements "savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free
for the first semester still not being met. from any obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the three
enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be
8.0 In order to maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances as of June 30, 2012, indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed.
both for continuing and current allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving This signified that the DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the definition of
programs/projects. savings under the GAAs.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring Opinion that MOOE appropriations are
projects to be identified by the agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM. deemed divided into twelve monthly allocations within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be generated
monthly from the excess or unused MOOE appropriations other than the Mandatory Expenditures and
It is apparent from the foregoing text that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments would be based on
Expenditures for Businesstype Activities because of the physical impossibility to obligate and spend such
whether the allotments pertained to slowmoving projects, or not. However, NBC No. 541 did not set in
funds as MOOE for a period that already lapsed. Following this observation, MOOE for future months are
clear terms the criteria for the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, viz:
not savings and cannot be transferred.
617 of 669
Section 65. Availability of Appropriations. — Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in 3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
this Act shall be available for release and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special
provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the year in which 3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and
such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays under projects, as well as capitalized MOOE; and
R.A. No. 9970 shall be made available up to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a report
on these releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House 3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies
Committee on Appropriations. concerned based on their undated/validated list of pensioners.
and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz: A perusal of its various provisions reveals that NBC No. 541 targeted the "withdrawal of unobligated
allotments of agencies with low levels of obligations" 151 "to fund priority and/or fastmoving
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. — Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in programs/projects."152 But the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be "[r]eissued for the original
this Act shall be available for release and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were
provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the year in which withdrawn"153 supported the conclusion that the PAPs had not yet been finally discontinued or abandoned.
such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be Thus, the purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not
submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations, either in yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible.
printed form or by way of electronic document.154
Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released allotments in 2011 charged
Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and its relevant issuances against the 2011 GAA that had remained unobligated based on the following considerations, to wit:
shortened the period of availability of the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays.
5.4.1 The departments/agencies’ approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be
Congress provided a oneyear period of availability of the funds for all allotment classes in the 2013 GAA implementationready and doable during the given fiscal year; and
(R.A. No. 10352), to wit:
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations.— All appropriations authorized in this Act shall be available thanprogrammed implementation capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a twoyear
for release and obligation for the purposes specified, and under the same special provisions applicable timeframe.
thereto, until the end of FY 2013: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be
submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the unobligated allotments for
form or by way of electronic document. continuing and current appropriations as of June 30, 2012, disregarded the 2year period of availability of
the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlay extended under Section 65, General Provisions of the
2011 GAA, viz:
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Contrary to the respondents’ insistence, the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself. The Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad sought omnibus authority to
text of NBC No. 541 bears this out, to wit: consolidate savings and unutilized balances to fund the DAP on a quarterly basis, viz:
5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all 7.0 If the level of financial performance of some department will register below program, even with the
departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the availability of funds at their disposal, the targeted obligations/disbursements for each quarter will not be
following budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012; met. It is important to note that these funds will lapse at the end of the fiscal year if these remain
unobligated.
• Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);
8.0 To maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances at the end of every quarter,
• Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and both for continuing and current allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving
programs/projects.
• Physical Report of Operations.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agency’s latest projects to be identified by the agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
report available shall be used by DBM as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall
compute/approximate the agency’s obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as of The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief Lifes pan of one year, was
same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June further shortened to only a quarter of a year under the DBM’s memorandum dated May 20, 2013.
30 obligation level shall approximate to ₱1,600 M (i.e., ₱800 M x 2 quarters).
The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger fund
The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments available for discretionary spending. They aver that the respondents, by withdrawing unobligated
and the pooling of unreleased appropriations; and that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated allotments allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing
and the retention of appropriated funds were akin to the impoundment of appropriations that could be appropriations under the GAAs.155
allowed only in case of "unmanageable national government budget deficit" under the GAAs, 157 thus
violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of The respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated allotments were being withdrawn
allotments. 158
upon the instance of the implementing agencies based on their own assessment that they could not
obligate those allotments pursuant to the President’s directive for them to spend their appropriations as
In contrast, the respondents emphasize that NBC No. 541 adopted a spending, not saving, policy as a last quickly as they could in order to ramp up the economy.156
ditch effort of the Executive to push agencies into actually spending their appropriations; that such policy
did not amount to an impoundment scheme, because impoundment referred to the decision of the We agree with the petitioners.
Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological reasons; and that the withdrawal of
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Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President and approved by Congress pursuant to allotments under NBC No. 541 was made pursuant to Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, or (ii) there are clear economic indications of an impending Administrative Code, by which the President was granted the authority to suspend or otherwise stop
occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee and further expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his judgment the public interest so
approved by the President. required.
The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions. The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and
the pooling of unreleased appropriations were invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be regarded as impoundment withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds cannot be considered as
because it entailed only the transfer of funds, not the retention or deduction of appropriations. impoundment.
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b.3. Third Requisite – No funds from notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of
savings could be transferred under funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act,
the DAP to augment deficient items except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.
not provided in the GAA
Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance with Section 38, supra,
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer should be "to augment an but instead transferred the funds to other PAPs.
item in the general appropriations law for the respective offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge or
increase in size, amount, or degree.160 It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the
end of the fiscal year were to be reverted to the General Fund.1âwphi1 This was the mandate of Section
The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, to wit:
item to be augmented must be deficient, to wit: –
Section 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.
x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an Unexpended balances of appropriations authorized in the General Appropriation Act shall revert to the
appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined unappropriated surplus of the General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be
to be deficient. In no case shall a nonexistent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation available for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment: Provided, that appropriations for
from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act. capital outlays shall remain valid until fully spent or reverted: provided, further, that continuing
appropriations for current operating expenditures may be specifically recommended and approved as such
In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient before it could be in support of projects whose effective implementation calls for multiyear expenditure commitments:
augmented from savings. Note is taken of the fact that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear, thus: provided, finally, that the President may authorize the use of savings realized by an agency during given
year to meet nonrecurring expenditures in a subsequent year.
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the annual budget preparation
Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their process and the preparation process and the President may approve upon recommendation of the
respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their Secretary, the reversion of funds no longer needed in connection with the activities funded by said
respective appropriations. continuing appropriations.
As of 2013, a total of ₱144.4 billion worth of PAPs were implemented through the DAP.161 The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and
unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
Of this amount ₱82.5 billion were released in 2011 and ₱54.8 billion in 2012.162 Sec. Abad has reported
that 9% of the total DAP releases were applied to the PAPs identified by the legislators. 163
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In refutation, the OSG argues that a total of 116 DAPfinanced PAPs were implemented, had The petitioners disagree, however, and insist that the DAP supported the following PAPs that had not
appropriation covers, and could properly be accounted for because the funds were released following and been covered with appropriations in the respective GAAs, namely:
pursuant to the standard practices adopted by the DBM. In support of its argument, the OSG has
167
submitted seven evidence packets containing memoranda, SAROs, and other pertinent documents relative (i) ₱1.5 billion for the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army;
to the implementation and fund transfers under the DAP.168
(ii) ₱1.8 billion for the Moro National Liberation Front;
Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we conclude that the
"savings" pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in (iii) ₱700 million for assistance to Quezon Province;164
the pertinent GAAs.
(iv) ₱50 million to ₱100 (million) each to certain senators;165
For example, the SARO issued on December 22, 2011 for the highly vaunted Disaster Risk, Exposure,
(v) ₱10 billion for the relocation of families living along dangerous zones under the National Housing
Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) project under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
Authority;
covered the amount of ₱1.6 Billion,169 broken down as follows:
(vi) ₱10 billion and ₱20 billion equity infusion under the Bangko Sentral;
APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS
CODE
(vii) ₱5.4 billion landowners’ compensation under the Department of Agrarian Reform;
A.03.a.01.a Generation of new knowledge and technologies and research capability building
in priority areas identified as strategic to National Development
(viii) ₱8.6 billion for the ARMM comprehensive peace and development program;
Personnel Services
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
(ix) ₱6.5 billion augmentation of LGU internal revenue allotments
Capital Outlays
(x) ₱5 billion for crucial projects like tourism road construction under the Department of Tourism and the
Department of Public Works and Highways;
the pertinent provision of the 2011 GAA (R.A. No. 10147) showed that Congress had appropriated only (xi) ₱1.8 billion for the DARDPWH Tulay ng Pangulo;
₱537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing for personnel services and capital outlays, to wit:
(xii) ₱1.96 billion for the DOHDPWH rehabilitation of regional health units; and
(xiii) ₱4 billion for the DepEdPPP school infrastructure projects.166
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It is worth stressing in this connection that the failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an Personnel Maintenance
expense category sufficiently indicated that Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much less Services and Other
implement, the PAP concerned. This indication becomes clearer when even the President himself did not Operating
Expenditures
recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP requiring expenditure that
did not receive any appropriation under the GAAs could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would
III. Operations
go beyond the authority laid down by Congress in enacting the GAAs. That happened in some instances
under the DAP. a. Funding Assistance to Science 177,406,000 1,887,365,0
and Technology Activities
In relation to the December 22, 2011 SARO issued to the Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and
1 Central Office 1,554,238,0
Emerging Technology Research and Development (DOSTPCIEETRD)171 for Establishment of the
Advanced Failure Analysis Laboratory, which reads:
APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS
CODE a. Generation of new
knowledge and
technologies and research
Development, integration and coordination of the National Research System for
capability building in
A.02.a Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology and Related Fields
priority areas identified as
Capital Outlays
strategic to National
Development 537,910,0
the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond to the program
specified in the GAA, whose particulars were Research and Management Services(inclusive of the Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by almost 300% the
following activities: (1) Technological and Economic Assessment for Industry, Energy and Utilities; (2) appropriation by Congress for the program Generation of new knowledge and technologies and research
Dissemination of Science and Technology Information; and (3) Management of PCIERD Information capability building in priority areas identified as strategic to National Development, the Executive allotted
System for Industry, Energy and Utilities. Even assuming that Development, integration and coordination funds for personnel services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby substituted its will to that of
of the National Research System for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology and Related Fields– the Congress. Worse, the Executive had not earlier proposed any amount for personnel services and capital
particulars stated in the SARO – could fall under the broad program description of Research and outlays in the NEP that became the basis of the 2011 GAA.170
Management Services– as appearing in the SARO, it would nonetheless remain a new activity by reason
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any public money without legislative authorization."181 To conform with the governing principles, the of its not being specifically stated in the GAA. As such, the DBM, sans legislative authorization, could
Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to not validly fund and implement such PAP under the DAP.
either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an
182
increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily In defending the disbursements, however, the OSG contends that the Executive enjoyed sound discretion
decreased. The terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated. in implementing the budget given the generality in the language and the broad policy objectives identified
under the GAAs;172 and that the President enjoyed unlimited authority to spend the initial appropriations
b.4 Third Requisite – Crossborder under his authority to declare and utilize savings,173 and in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the
augmentations from savings were laws.
prohibited by the Constitution
Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, faithfully execute the laws (which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required
authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was
delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress,
crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we not in the Executive.174 Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would
call such transfers of funds crossborder transfers or crossborder augmentations. threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers.175
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse
with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. 176 Its power of the
Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength, 177 and underpins "all other legislative
Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons. decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of
government."178 Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government,
Did any crossborder transfers or augmentations transpire? to appropriate public funds, and to spend the money. 179 Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the
purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money should be spent.
During the oral arguments on January 28, 2014, Sec. Abad admitted making some crossborder
augmentations, to wit: It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of
appropriations.180 For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a
JUSTICE BERSAMIN: Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the
government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of
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These cross border examples, cross border augmentations were not supported by appropriations… Alright, the whole time that you have been Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, did the
Executive Department ever redirect any part of savings of the National Government under your control
SECRETARY ABAD: cross border to another department?
They were, we were augmenting existing items within their… (interrupted) SECRETARY ABAD:
JUSTICE BERSAMIN: Well, in the Memos that we submitted to you, such an instance, Your Honor
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
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The respondents justified all the crossborder transfers thusly: No, no, in all instances, extreme or not extreme, you could do that, that’s your feeling.
99. The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings of his department to another SECRETARY ABAD:
department upon the latter’s request, provided it is the recipient department that uses such funds to
augment its own appropriation. In such a case, the President merely gives the other department access to Well, in that particular situation when the request was made by the Commission and the House of
public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that department whose fiscal autonomy is Representatives, we felt that we needed to respond because we felt…(interrupted). 183
guaranteed by the Constitution.188
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to ₱143,700,000.00 and ₱250,000,000.00 were
In the oral arguments held on February 18, 2014, Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, representing Congress, transferred under the DAP respectively to the COA 184 and the House of Representatives. 185 Those transfers
announced a different characterization of the crossborder transfers of funds as in the nature of "aid" of funds, which constituted crossborder augmentations for being from the Executive to the COA and the
instead of "augmentation," viz: House of Representatives, are graphed as follows:186
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
The crossborder transfers, if Your Honors please, is not an application of the DAP. What were these
DATE
crossborder transfers? They are transfers of savings as defined in the various General Appropriations Act. OFFICE PURPOSE
RELEASED
So, that makes it similar to the DAP, the use of savings. There was a crossborder which appears to be in
violation of Section 25, paragraph 5 of Article VI, in the sense that the border was crossed. But never has
it been claimed that the purpose was to augment a deficient item in another department of the government Commission on IT Infrastructure Program and hiring of 11/11/11
Audit additional litigation experts
or agency of the government. The crossborder transfers, if Your Honors please, were in the nature of
[aid] rather than augmentations. Here is a government entity separate and independent from the Executive Congress – Completion of the construction of the 07/23/12
Department solely in need of public funds. The President is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. He’s in House of Legislative Library and Archives
Representatives Building/Congressional e-library
charge of the whole operation although six or seven heads of government offices are given the power to
augment. Only the President stationed there and in effect incharge and has the responsibility for the
failure of any part of the government. You have election, for one reason or another, the money is not
enough to hold election. There would be chaos if no money is given as an aid, not to augment, but as an
The respondents further stated in their memorandum that the President "made available" to the
aid to a department like COA. The President is responsible in a way that the other heads, given the power
"Commission on Elections the savings of his department upon [its] request for funds…" 187 This was
to augment, are not. So, he cannot very well allow this, if Your Honor please. 189
another instance of a crossborder augmentation.
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JUSTICE LEONEN: JUSTICE LEONEN:
A while ago, Justice Carpio mentioned that the remedy is might be to go to Congress. That there are May I move to another point, maybe just briefly. I am curious that the position now, I think, of
opportunities and there have been opportunities of the President to actually go to Congress and ask for government is that some transfers of savings is now considered to be, if I’m not mistaken, aid not
supplemental budgets? augmentation. Am I correct in my hearing of your argument?
HONORABLE MENDOZA: HONORABLE MENDOZA:
If there is time to do that, I would say yes. That’s our submission, if Your Honor, please.
JUSTICE LEONEN: JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, the theory of aid rather than augmentation applies in extraordinary situation? May I know, Justice, where can we situate this in the text of the Constitution? Where do we actually
derive the concepts that transfers of appropriation from one branch to the other or what happened in DAP
HONORABLE MENDOZA: can be considered a said? What particular text in the Constitution can we situate this?
Very extraordinary situations. HONORABLE MENDOZA:
JUSTICE LEONEN: There is no particular provision or statutory provision for that matter, if Your Honor please. It is drawn
from the fact that the Executive is the executive incharge of the success of the government.
But Counsel, this would be new doctrine, in case?
JUSTICE LEONEN:
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
So, the residual powers labelled in Marcos v. Manglapus would be the basis for this theory of the
Yes, if Your Honor please.190 government?
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the crossborder transfers of funds, the plain text of Section HONORABLE MENDOZA:
25(5), supra, disallowing cross border transfers was disobeyed. Crossborder transfers, whether as
augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra. Yes, if Your Honor, please.
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The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined "unprogrammed appropriations" as appropriations 4.
that provided standby authority to incur additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
collections exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are generated. Contrary to the DBM’s
194
funds despite the original revenue targets
averment that there were three instances when unprogrammed funds could be released, the BESFs not having been exceeded was invalid
envisioned only two instances. The third mentioned by the DBM – the collection of new revenues from
sources not originally considered in the BESFs – was not included. This meant that the collection of Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds provided in the GAAs for 2011,
additional revenues from new sources did not warrant the release of the unprogrammed funds. Hence, 2012,and 2013. The respondents stress, however, that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under
even if the revenues not considered in the BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that the the DAP as savings, but as separate sources of funds; and that, consequently, the release and use of
revenue collections should exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in order to justify the unprogrammed funds were not subject to the restrictions under Section 25(5), supra.
release of the unprogrammed funds.
The documents contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG have confirmed that the unprogrammed
The view that there were only two instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released was funds were treated as separate sources of funds. Even so, the release and use of the unprogrammed funds
bolstered by the following texts of the Special Provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs, to wit: were still subject to restrictions, for, to start with, the GAAs precisely specified the instances when the
unprogrammed funds could be released and the purposes for which they could be used.
2011 GAA
The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the unprogrammed funds was that the revenue
1. Release of Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections collections must exceed revenue targets; and that the release of the unprogrammed funds was illegal
exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to because such condition was not met.191
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including savings generated from programmed appropriations
for the year: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the unprogrammed funds under the DAP
revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, were in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that the
That in case of newly approved loans for foreignassisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan unprogrammed funds could be availed of when any of the following three instances occur, to wit: (1) the
agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds: revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets proposed in the BESFs submitted by the
PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That if there are savings generated from the programmed appropriations President to Congress; (2) new revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally considered
for the first two quarters of the year, the DBM may, subject to the approval of the President, release the in the BESFs; or(3) newlyapproved loans for foreign assisted projects were secured, or when conditions
pertinent appropriations under the Unprogrammed Fund corresponding to only fifty percent (50%) of the were triggered for other sources of funds, such as perfected loan agreements for foreignassisted
said savings net of revenue shortfall: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the release of the balance of the total projects.192 This view of the DBM was adopted by all the respondents in their Consolidated Comment.193
savings from programmed appropriations for the year shall be subject to fiscal programming and approval
of the President.
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pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including collections arising from sources not 2012 GAA
considered in the aforesaid original revenue target, as certified by the BTr: PROVIDED, That in case of
newly approved loans for foreignassisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the 1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue
purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds. collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress
pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources
Consequently, that there were additional revenues from sources not considered in the revenue target not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations
would not be enough. The total revenue collections must still exceed the original revenue targets to justify in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of newly approved loans for foreignassisted projects,
the release of the unprogrammed funds (other than those from newlyapproved foreign loans). the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a
SARO covering the loan proceeds.
The present controversy on the unprogrammed funds was rooted in the correct interpretation of the phrase
"revenue collections should exceed the original revenue targets." The petitioners take the phrase to mean As can be noted, the provisos in both provisions to the effect that "collections arising from sources not
that the total revenue collections must exceed the total revenue target stated in the BESF, but the considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in
respondents understand the phrase to refer only to the collections for each source of revenue as this Fund" gave the authority to use such additional revenues for appropriations funded from the
enumerated in the BESF, with the condition being deemed complied with once the revenue collections unprogrammed funds. They did not at all waive compliance with the basic requirement that revenue
from a particular source already exceeded the stated target. collections must still exceed the original revenue targets.
The BESF provided for the following sources of revenue, with the corresponding revenue target stated for In contrast, the texts of the provisos with regard to additional revenues generated from newlyapproved
each source of revenue, to wit: foreign loans were clear to the effect that the perfected loan agreement would be in itself "sufficient basis"
for the issuance of a SARO to release the funds but only to the extent of the amount of the loan. In such
TAX REVENUES instance, the revenue collections need not exceed the revenue targets to warrant the release of the loan
proceeds, and the mere perfection of the loan agreement would suffice.
Taxes on Net Income and Profits
Taxes on Property It can be inferred from the foregoing that under these provisions of the GAAs the additional revenues
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services from sources not considered in the BESFs must be taken into account in determining if the revenue
collections exceeded the revenue targets. The text of the relevant provision of the 2013 GAA, which was
General Sales, Turnover or VAT substantially similar to those of the GAAs for 2011 and 2012, already made this explicit, thus:
Selected Excises on Goods
1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue
Selected Taxes on Services collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress
Taxes on the Use of Goods or Property or Permission to Perform Activities
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identified source of revenue – the dividends from the shares of stock held by the Government in Other Taxes
governmentowned and controlled corporations. Taxes on International Trade and Transactions
To justify the release of the unprogrammed funds for 2011, the OSG presented the certification dated NONTAX REVENUES
March 4, 2011 issued by DOF Undersecretary Gil S. Beltran, as follows:
Fees and Charges
This is to certify that under the Budget for Expenditures and Sources of Financing for 2011, the BTR Income
programmed income from dividends from shares of stock in governmentowned and controlled
corporations is 5.5 billion. Government Services
Interest on NG Deposits
This is to certify further that based on the records of the Bureau of Treasury, the National Government has Interest on Advances to Government Corporations
recorded dividend income amounting to ₱23.8 billion as of 31 January 2011. 196
Income from Investments
For 2012, the OSG submitted the certification dated April 26, 2012 issued by National Treasurer Roberto Interest on Bond Holdings
B. Tan, viz:
Guarantee Fee
This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period Gain on Foreign Exchange
January to March 2012 amounted to ₱19.419 billion compared to the full year program of ₱5.5 billion for NG Income Collected by BTr
2012. 197
Dividends on Stocks
And, finally, for 2013, the OSG presented the certification dated July 3, 2013 issued by National NG Share from Airport Terminal Fee
Treasurer Rosalia V. De Leon, to wit: NG Share from PAGCOR Income
NG Share from MIAA Profit
This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period
January to May 2013 amounted to ₱12.438 billion compared to the full year program of ₱10.0198 billion Privatization
for 2013. Foreign Grants
Moreover, the National Government accounted for the sale of the right to build and operate the NAIA Thus, when the Court required the respondents to submit a certification from the Bureau of Treasury
expressway amounting to ₱11.0 billion in June 2013. 199
(BTr) to the effect that the revenue collections had exceeded the original revenue targets, 195 they complied
by submitting certifications from the BTr and Department of Finance (DOF) pertaining to only one
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5. The certifications reflected that by collecting dividends amounting to ₱23.8 billion in 2011, ₱19.419
Equal protection, checks and balances, billion in 2012, and ₱12.438 billion in 2013 the BTr had exceeded only the ₱5.5 billion in target revenues
and public accountability challenges in the form of dividends from stocks in each of 2011 and 2012, and only the ₱10 billion in target revenues
in the form of dividends from stocks in 2013.
The DAP is further challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the system of checks and
balances, and the principle of public accountability. However, the requirement that revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets was to be construed
in light of the purpose for which the unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs as standby
With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal Protection Clause, Luna argues that the 203
appropriations to support additional expenditures for certain priority PAPs should the revenue collections
implementation of the DAP was "unfair as it [was] selective" because the funds released under the DAP exceed the resource targets assumed in the budget or when additional foreign project loan proceeds were
was not made available to all the legislators, with some of them refusing to avail themselves of the DAP realized. The unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as not to delay
funds, and others being unaware of the availability of such funds. Thus, the DAP practised "undue the implementation of the PAPs should new or additional revenue sources be realized during the
favoritism" in favor of select legislators in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. year.200 Given the tenor of the certifications, the unprogrammed funds were thus not yet supported by the
corresponding resources.201
Similarly, COURAGE contends that the DAP violated the Equal Protection Clause because no reasonable
classification was used in distributing the funds under the DAP; and that the Senators who supposedly The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding requirements of the proposed
availed themselves of said funds were differently treated as to the amounts they respectively received. programmed appropriations. In contrast, the unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, were to be
released only when there were revenues in excess of what the programmed appropriations required. As
Anent the petitioners’ theory that the DAP violated the system of checks and balances, Luna submits that such, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be
the grant of the funds under the DAP to some legislators forced their silence about the issues and dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue
anomalies surrounding the DAP. Meanwhile, Belgica stresses that the DAP, by allowing the legislators to target should be understood to mean that the revenue collections must exceed the total of the revenue
identify PAPs, authorized them to take part in the implementation and execution of the GAAs, a function targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds simply because there was an
that exclusively belonged to the Executive; that such situation constituted undue and unjustified excess revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure because it
legislative encroachment in the functions of the Executive; and that the President arrogated unto himself would disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the Government’s surplus
the power of appropriation vested in Congress because NBC No. 541 authorized the use of the funds budget policy.202
under the DAP for PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget.
We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents’ view.
Finally, the petitioners insist that the DAP was repugnant to the principle of public accountability
enshrined in the Constitution,204 because the legislators relinquished the power of appropriation to the
Executive, and exhibited a reluctance to inquire into the legality of the DAP.
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infirmities actually existed.205 Simply put, guesswork and speculation cannot overcome the presumption The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed discrimination in the release of funds under
of the constitutionality of the assailed executive act. the DAP could be raised only by the affected Members of Congress themselves, and if the challenge
based on the violation of the Equal Protection Clause was really against the constitutionality of the DAP,
We do not need to discuss whether or not the DAP and its implementation through the various circulars the arguments of the petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of the legislators to the funds, not to
and memoranda of the DBM transgressed the system of checks and balances in place in our constitutional the proposition that all of the legislators should have been given such entitlement.
system. Our earlier expositions on the DAP and its implementing issuances infringing the doctrine of
separation of powers effectively addressed this particular concern. The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of
funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and
Anent the principle of public accountability being transgressed because the adoption and implementation Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them
of the DAP constituted an assumption by the Executive of Congress’ power of appropriation, we have having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the
already held that the DAP and its implementing issuances were policies and acts that the Executive could Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the
properly adopt and do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement strategies others could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of
to ramp up or accelerate the economy of the country. equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and,
in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the
6. releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and
explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the
After declaring the DAP and its implementing issuances constitutionally infirm, we must now deal with
Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the Court
the consequences of the declaration.
do so despite the inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to
speculate, and the outcome would not do justice to those for whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides:
equal protection has been made.
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be
The argument that the release of funds under the DAP effectively stayed the hands of the legislators from
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
conducting congressional inquiries into the legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative. That
deficiency eliminated any need to consider and resolve the argument, for it is fundamental that
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
speculation would not support any proper judicial determination of an issue simply because nothing
latter shall govern.
concrete can thereby be gained. In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official acts of
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the Government, the petitioners must discharge the basic burden of proving that the constitutional
the laws or the Constitution.
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that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right
then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. or obligation.206 However, the generality of the rule makes us ponder whether rigidly applying the rule
may at times be impracticable or wasteful. Should we not recognize the need to except from the rigid
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a application of the rule the instances in which the void law or executive act produced an almost irreversible
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot result?
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular The need is answered by the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine, definitely not a novel one, has been
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.’" exhaustively explained in De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank:207
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the
effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of
effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to
208
paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: ‘When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.’ Administrative or executive acts, orders
play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
209
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its
application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently
its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone. realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have
executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
legislative and quasijudicial in nature. The Court held so in Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
Agrarian Reform Council: 210
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
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Commission No. 34, it was ruled that ‘military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasilegislative in nature. Thus, the
Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the minority concludes that the phrase ‘executive act’ used in the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National
President as CommanderinChief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing Bank refers only to acts, orders, and rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law. The
discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.’ minority also made mention of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Enrique Fernando in Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito, where it was supposedly made explicit that the operative fact doctrine applies to
Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive acts, which are ultimately quasilegislative in nature.
executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi
legislative in nature. We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates
what ‘executive act’ mean. Moreover, while orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the
Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the
like orders and rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions phrase ‘executive act’ does not have such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in
made by the President or the agencies under the executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of the cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it be found that the term ‘executive act’ is confined to the
justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the foregoing. Contrarily, the term ‘executive act’ is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative
executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in
to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi question or nullified by the Court.
legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified.
This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the
justice, equity and fairness. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC)
which was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. In said case, this
Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2,
because it has the force and effect of law, springing from the powers of the President under the Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of
Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced Elma as Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an executive act. Prior to the
acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected. It is on declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were made in good
this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from faith and in reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its
the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. (Bold underscoring supplied for subsequent invalidation.
emphasis)
In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, the Court likewise declared
211
jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians, certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have
that "for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’ meaning a existed so as not to trample upon the rights of the accused therein. Relevant thereto, in Olaguer v. Military
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recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. law or executive issuance." Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did not apply to a
That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden. mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz:
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time
implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given
country. To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or
could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative
apply the doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice
results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness. may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or
ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by those with informal contacts
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does with the government agency.
not always apply, and is not always the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It
can be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid law It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related
would result in inequity and injustice; but where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an
212
issuances were executive acts.1avvphi1 The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative
unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should apply. practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda
and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs different agencies and departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the
that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the third phase of the budget cycle – the budget
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary
of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national economy towards growth and development.
other liabilities. This is simply because savings could and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the
DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper
Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the Government in
of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely: clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without
recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the
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year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts;
(b) The crossborder transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a
certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non
compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.
SO ORDERED.
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his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
Commissioners, two representatives from the rankandfile employees and a representative from the
officials nominated by their recognized organization.6 ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees vs.
whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. 7 ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate D E C I S I O N
and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, 8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose.9 CORONA, J.:
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the Bureau of
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no service, regardless of employment status.4
valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies. The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. 5
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF)
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or
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adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.12 personnel.
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, 13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
petition is procedurally infirm.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of that will necessitate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that
constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to
dispute.14 invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies
the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government
Accountability of agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the
Public Officers executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states: the legislative policy and serves as a check to any overaccumulation of power on the part of the executive
and the implementing agencies.
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners
justice, and lead modest lives. have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall
hereafter be discussed.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the
benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with Actual Case And Ripeness
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees
have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act
necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial
thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
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either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law: revenuegeneration capability and collection.15
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials, The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by
examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where
negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.
performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business
establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely
speculative.
Equal Protection
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification,
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To
persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. 19 When things or legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,20 this Court declared: Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to
upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding onehalf of the net proceeds of forfeitures in
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things said:
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry
in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets.
In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be
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(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected; inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties; classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities; the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may
management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon appear.21 (emphasis supplied)
the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
the following functions:
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties; optimization of the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected; incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws; generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
The BIR performs the following functions:
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all
ports of entry; Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by
and subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate; appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the
following functions:
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
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Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" 29 the delegated power to the President to (8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
fix revenue targets:
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the
Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages: Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation.
Excess of Collection of the Excess the Revenue Targets Percent (%) of Indubitably, such substantial
the Excess Collection distinction is germane
to Accrue to the and intimately related
Fund to the purpose of the law.
Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the
30% or below – 15% demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining excess
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 28
BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the
distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the
law:
BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenuegeneration capability
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a
and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
President to Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
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xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied) On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions
under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the may be removed from the service:
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers
employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue and functions:
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting
the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of xxx xxx xxx
official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 32 The action for removal is also
subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due (b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
process. collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration
of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 33 In this case, the substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
declared policy of optimization of the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest. 1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newlycreated, not exceeding two years in operation, as
has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
Separation Of Powers
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides: under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint Congressional covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board,
of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.
two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight (c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided,
Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the
become functus officio and therefore cease to exist. criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without
prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. and the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act;
On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
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The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision. law may be considered moot and academic.
a. Scrutiny This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. laws for that matter).
Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In
the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved. oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:
xxx xxx xxx Concept and bases of congressional oversight
b. Congressional investigation Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance
its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily oversight concerns postenactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered,
conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
xxx authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.
c. Legislative supervision
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived
scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20 th century,
executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the
delegated lawmaking authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority. administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative
agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes
veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations Categories of congressional oversight functions
with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes
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much power. They submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after
Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority. They do not allow Congress the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the
to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become
and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the
executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the
veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power
chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise
means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as of such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this
declared by statute." arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of
unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the validity of
legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law
deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led Congress
House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing whether by actual or perceived necessity to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general
either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may
proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards,
Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the
Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to
constitutional authority to order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive
doctrine on separation of powers. branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance
with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied away
from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive
clause and bicameralism. It held that the onehouse veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. prerogatives. They urge that any postenactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch
As such, it is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x x x separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an
impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower court executive or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances
decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too
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(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42 invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the
approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed,
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. some of these veto provisions were not even exercised. 35 (emphasis supplied)
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the
effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the
inwardturning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. 43 It radically independence of the Commission on Elections.36
changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct
role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44 With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
its legislative competence. 45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. 46 In the prevents the overaccumulation of power in the executive branch.
latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rulemaking) Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. 37 It may not vest itself, any of its
or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rulemaking).48 committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. 38 And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. 49 Such rules and regulations
partake of the nature of a statute 50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. Thus, any postenactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 51 Congress, in the guise
of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation 40 and
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any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
shall become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied) exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
important stage in the passage of a bill. his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, twothirds of all the Members of such House shall
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes and likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by twothirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become
explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed. a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of
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refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three
assailing those provisions is brought before us.64 readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides: signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers… 59
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the The President’s role in lawmaking.
remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force
and effect. The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.60
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and
than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the determination as to when a law takes effect is
supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, wholly the prerogative of Congress. 62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed
intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the
role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law. 63
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
them. made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there
invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court
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portions can stand independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still
constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the
revenuegeneration capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of
rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May
30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation 66 and became effective 15 days thereafter. 67 Until and
unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the
remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the
provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 174177 October 17, 2006 G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATIONS, PHILIP G. BRODETT, LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE, DELFIN P. ANGCAO, ROBERTO L. ABAD, ALMA KRISTINA CAMILO L. SABIO, petitioner,
ALOBBA, and JOHNNY TAN, petitioners, J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL, petitionerrelator,
vs. vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS and PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and the
its MEMBERS and CHAIRMAN, the HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON and HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, its Members and Chairman, the HONORABLE AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate,
SENATOR JOKER P. ARROYO, respondents. HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN PONCEENRILE, in his official capacity as Member,
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President, SENATE SERGEANTATARMS, and the
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
x x
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, J.: G.R. No. 174318 October 17, 2006
Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and CAMILO L. SABIO,
issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
1
Chairman, NARCISO S. NARIO, RICARDO M. ABCEDE, TERESO L. JAVIER and NICASIO A.
(PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the illgotten wealth CONTI, Commissioners, MANUEL ANDAL and JULIO JALANDONI, PCGG nominees to
accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, petitioners,
associates. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be
2
vs.
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
concerning matters within its official cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, MEMBERS OF THE
unhampered performance of its task. 3
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, SENATOR JUAN PONCEENRILE, in his capacity as
member of both said Committees, MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President, THE SENATE
Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the SERGEANTATARMS, and SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Senate's power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads: x x
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WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their
respective board of directors. The facts are undisputed.
Adopted. On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.
455 (Senate Res. No. 455),4 "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and referred to improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors."
the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services.
However, on March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises. 5
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous year's mere P106 thousand;
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been
meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.6 allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
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With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative Araneta, Philip J. Brodett, Enrique L. Locsin, Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K. Lokin, Jr.,
inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure Julio J. Jalandoni, Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Alma Kristina Alloba and Johnny Tan.9
the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had
not been amended, repealed or revised in any way. Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he
reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors and
To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or repeal the officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the position paper they previously filed, which
provision in controversy. Until then, it stands to be respected as part of the legal system in this raised issues on the propriety of legislative inquiry.
jurisdiction. (As held in People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 11998788, October 12, 1995: Obedience to the
rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Gordon, sent another
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to notice10 to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men September 6, 2006. The notice was issued "under the same authority of the Subpoena Ad
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this Testificandum previously served upon (him) last 16 August 2006."
system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to 'protect and enforce it without fear or favor,'
4 [Act of Athens (1955)] resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter 11 dated September 4, 2006 to
of their own personal beliefs.) Senator Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
x x x x x x This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that the anomalous of the Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and
transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending cases before the regular Explanation,12 which partly reads:
courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court (Pending cases include: a. Samuel Divina v. Manuel
Nieto, Jr., et al., CAG.R. No. 89102; b. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule of law
Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case No. 06 requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the
095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City; d. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. (Brillantes, Jr., et al. v. Commission
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil Case No. 041049) for which reason they may not be on Elections, En Banc [G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004])
able to testify thereon under the principle of sub judice. The laudable objectives of the PCGG's functions,
On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme Court, of the PCGG will be put to naught if its
recovery efforts will be unduly impeded by a legislative investigation of cases that are already pending
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
before the Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
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Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203 SCRA 767, 784 [1991]) the Honorable Supreme
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for Court held:
certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar,
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the SergeantatArms, and the entire Senate. The case was docketed as G.R. "…[T]he issues sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had
No. 174318. been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been preempted by that court. To allow the
respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandigabayan
Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, namely: Philip G. Brodett, would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a
Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Roberto L. Abad, Alma Kristina Alobba and judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,
Johnny Tan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees on Government the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, be discounted.
and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174177.
x x x x x x
In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari and prohibition) Chairman
Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGG's nominees Andal and Jalandoni IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that the Commission decided not to
alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any attend the Senate inquiry to testify and produce evidence thereat.
justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of
legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order13 directing Major General
vested with the power of contempt. Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate SergeantAtArms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under
arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the
In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers majority of the Committees' members.
alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate
Res. No. 455; second, the same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senate's Rules of Procedure On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; third, the subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where
for having been issued without authority; fourth, the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. he was detained.
No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment by respondents into justiciable controversies over which several
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee
courts and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction; and fifth, the subpoenae violated petitioners' rights
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen,
to privacy and against selfincrimination.
Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
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On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by In their Consolidated Comment, the abovenamed respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has
proceeding, thus: been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt
power; fourth, Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any published; fifth, respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against selfincrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute
undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.
To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted provisions
that warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a brief During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were directed to submit simultaneously
consideration of the Congress' power of inquiry is imperative. their respective memoranda within a nonextendible period of fifteen (15) days from date. In the
meantime, per agreement of the parties, petitioner Chairman Sabio was allowed to go home. Thus, his
The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our petition for habeas corpus has become moot. The parties also agreed that the service of the arrest warrants
shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,15 cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.16 In those earlier days, American issued against all petitioners and the proceedings before the respondent Senate Committees are suspended
courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. during the pendency of the instant cases.14
MacKellar explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:
17
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O.
Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of
composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable them to Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees
legislate….It is wellestablished principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may institute any is justified. With the resolution of this issue, all the other issues raised by the parties have become
investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its inconsequential.
proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be
important that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be competent for Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting
it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain information upon any respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
matter which may become the subject of a law. It is essential to the full and intelligent exercise of
the legislative function….In American legislatures the investigation of public matters before The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
committees, preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing the inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and the right of either persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to punish for disobedience has
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branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being been frequently enforced….The right of inquiry, I think, extends to other matters, in respect to which it
a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for legislative aid.
inquiry is coextensive with the power to legislate."
Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, power of inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function," thus:
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to
22
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.
23 auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is
of any constitutional basis. not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it."
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made
"Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. 18 Then came the 1987
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935
justice, and lead modest lives." Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.19
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and
charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of
trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may "any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power
need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively
pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.20
their rulers.24
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, 21 where it
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
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Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability. In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Peña,25 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion of the majority
Article III, Section 7 opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against
the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the
such limitations as may be provided by law. literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import
as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability "for anything done or omitted in the
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policymaking and in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order," the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate irresponsibility and nonaccountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly
in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official
implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.27 the Court explained that an informed citizenry is essential of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy, thus:
x x x x x x
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG
for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted
to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is from complying with orders of this Court.
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. Chavez v. Sandiganbayan26 reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this
Court even before the filing of the present petitions.
Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but
also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions ensuring the people's
therein in order to protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely depend on the access to information:
information gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to information really goes hand
inhand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is Article II, Section 28
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The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters of meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decisionmaking as well as in
instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed. checking abuse in the government.28 The cases of Tañada v. Tuvera29 and Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission30 have recognized a citizen's interest and personality to enforce a public duty and to bring an
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters action to compel public officials and employees to perform that duty.
of instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent with the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor
General,33 the Court considered repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff
authorizing the Executive to change the seat of the government of any subdivision of local governments, information and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced.
upon the approval of the 1935 Constitution. Section 68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with In Senate v. Ermita,31 this Court stressed:
the Constitutional grant of limited executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic Da'wah
Council of the Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the Executive Secretary,34 the Court declared Executive Order To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
No. 46, entitled "Authorizing the Office on Muslim Affairs to Undertake Philippine Halal Certification," executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
void for encroaching on the religious freedom of Muslims. In The Province of Batangas v. Romulo, the 35 necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
Court declared some provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001 presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which
unconstitutional for violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy. And in Ople v. Torres, the 36 they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress – opinions which they can
Court likewise declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means
Computerized Identification Reference System," for being violative of the right to privacy protected by the allowed by their freedom of expression.
Constitution.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it
These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is "the creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including violates the Constitution or its basic principles. 32 As shown in the above discussion, Section 4(b) is
the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it inconsistent with Article VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of
conflicts with the Constitution."37 Consequently, this Court has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b) public accountability), Article II, Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right
of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution. to public information).
Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21, 2006, Chairman Sabio admitted that should this Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
Court rule that Section 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, he will answer the
questions of the Senators, thus: All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: revoked.
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The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of Senate, will you answer the questions of the Senators?
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees and the Philippine
Senate" was approved by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it can Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was here in the Supreme Court as Chief of Staff
be concluded that the Order is under the authority, not only of the respondent Senate Committees, but of of Justice Feria. I would definitely honor the Supreme Court and the rule of law.
the entire Senate.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of You will answer the questions of the Senators if we say that?
power to the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
out its significance:
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as far as I am concerned.
It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of
Congress but also of "any of its committees." This is significant because it constitutes a direct
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his Commissioners are shielded
conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means which the
from testifying before respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In effect, his
Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the
argument that the said provision exempts him and his corespondent Commissioners from testifying
Committees.38
before respondent Senate Committees concerning Senate Res. No. 455 utterly lacks merit.
This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of
Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that respondent Senate Committees have no
Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article
power to punish him and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.
VI, Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a
legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign and local.
The argument is misleading.
…But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the grounds of the decision are not very
clearly stated, we take them to be: that there is in some cases a power in each House of Congress to
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In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,44 the Court punish for contempt; that this power is analogous to that exercised by courts of justice, and that it
characterized contempt power as a matter of selfpreservation, thus: being the well established doctrine that when it appears that a prisoner is held under the order of a
court of general jurisdiction for a contempt of its authority, no other court will discharge the
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of selfpreservation as that branch of prisoner or make further inquiry into the cause of his commitment. That this is the general rule…as
the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its regards the relation of one court to another must be conceded.
authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui
generis x x x. In McGrain,40 the U.S. Supreme Court held: "Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No. 174177, the petition of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed." The Court,
directors and officers, this Court holds that the respondent Senate Committees' inquiry does not violate in Arnault v. Nazareno,41 sustained the Congress' power of contempt on the basis of this observation.
their right to privacy and right against selfincrimination.
In Arnault v. Balagtas,42 the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress is founded upon
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing in reason and policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every contumacious act,
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This is just another way of saying that the power of Congress has to resort to judicial interference, thus:
inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action." As held
in Barenblatt v. United States,45 "the Congress, in common with all the other branches of the The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded
Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative
governmental action, more particularly in the context of this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base
of Rights." intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of
First is the right to privacy. the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within
the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. 46 Within these zones, any form of intrusion is and complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority and
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy,
"constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men,"47 but also from our adherence to the because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary authority or dignity.43
interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."48
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for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that
administration. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the
53 54
explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person's "right to be let alone" or the "right to determine
former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed."49 Section 2 guarantees
and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Section 3 renders
financial transactions. inviolable the "privacy of communication and correspondence" and further cautions that "any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in any proceeding."
in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling
reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding unreasonable government intrusion.50 Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries
PCGG's efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable
officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been expectation of privacy?; and second, did the government violate such expectation?
violated by respondent Senate Committees.
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate on
Anent the right against selfincrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the said Senate Res. No. 455, particularly "on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in
be asked of them." That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying
55
the operations by their respective board of directors." Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts
respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly
such issue may be presented before the courts. At this juncture, what is important is that respondent Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over
Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to guide them when the right against selfincrimination is matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such
invoked. Sec. 19 reads: matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.
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Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public A witness can invoke his right against selfincrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer
hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455. that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an
executive session.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot. The
petitions in G.R Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED. No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an
incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his duty
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate to give testimony.
Committees' power of inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and Manuel In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum, shall
Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors determine whether the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall
and officers, petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad resume its investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered shall be repeated
Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public to the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the Committee may punish him for
hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455. contempt for contumacious conduct.
SO ORDERED. The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues
being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a
legislative purpose.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate
with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
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II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang Kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEZ kung ang mga G.R. No. 111230 September 30, 1994
sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng
Morong at Bataan: ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
(A). Ibalik sa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" — isang bundok na hindi nagagalw at punongpuno ng COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG,
malalaking punongkahoy at iba'ibang halaman. BATAAN, respondents.
(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan. Alfonzo M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioners.
(K). Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng salaping
ipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaang national o "Internal Revenue Allotment" (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at PUNO, J.:
sa Lalawigan.
The 1987 Constitution is borne of the conviction that people power can be trusted to check excesses of
(D). Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling "special economic zones" ang bawat bayan ng Morong, Hermosa government. One of the means by which people power can be exercised is thru initiatives where local
at Dinalupihan. ordinances and resolutions can be enacted or repealed. An effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's
initiatives ought to be rejected.
(E). Ibase sa laki ng kanyakanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, 1 the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed
(G). Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa. to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with
Republic Act
(H). Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito sa magbukas pa No. 7227.
ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin
ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan. On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition 2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition states:
(I). Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang MorongTalaOrani at MorongTasigDinalupihan para sa
kabutihan ng mga tagaBataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan. I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalangbisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang
Bayan para sa paganib ng Morong sa SSEZ na walang kondisyon.
(J). Magkaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong, Hermosa at Bataan.
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a) Ibabalik sa Morong ang pagaaring Grande Island, kabundukan at Naval Reservation; The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its
submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of
b) Ibase sa aring Lupa ng LGU ang kikitain at mapapasok na manggagawa nila sa SSEZ; 1991. 3 They started to solicit the required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said resolution.
Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding
c) Isama ang nasabing lupa sa pagkukuwenta ng "IRA" ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan; Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the Executive
Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum
d) Makapagtatag ng sariling "economic zones" ang Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan;
because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility." 5 We quote the
letter, viz:
e) Pabayaan bukas ang pinto ng Morong patungong SSEZ at magbukas ng dalawang (2) pinto pa;
The Executive Director
(f) Konkretohin ang daang Morong papunta sa Orani at Dinalupihan;
C O M E L E C
Intramuros, Metro Manila
g) Pumili ng SBMA Chairman na tagaibang lugar.
S i r:
ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SB OF MORONG
In view of the petition filed by a group of proponents headed by Gov. Enrique T. Garcia, relative to the
1. By virtue of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992, all
conduct of a local initiative and/or referendum for the annulment of Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
actions of LGU's correlating on the above issues are merely recommendatory in nature when such
Serye 1993, may we respectfully request to deny the petition referred thereto considering the issues raised
provisions were already embodied in the statute.
by the proponents were favorably acted upon and endorsed to Congress and other government agencies by
2. Corollary to the notion, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed and approved Pambayang the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of
For your information and guidance, we are enumerating hereunder the issues raised by the petitioners with
R.A. 7227, wherein it reasserted its position embodied in Pambayan Kapasyahan Blg. 08 and Blg. 12,
the corresponding actions undertaken by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, to wit:
Serye ng taong 1992, (Attached and marked as Annex "A:) which tackled the same issues raised by the
petitioners particularly items a), b), c), e), and g).
ISSUES RAISED BY PROPONENTS
3. Item d) is already acted upon by BCDA Chairman Arsenio Bartolome III in its letter to His Excellency
I. Pawalangbisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye ng taong 1993.
President Fidel V. Ramos, dated May 7, 1993 (Attached and marked as Annex "B") with clarifying letter
from BCDA ViceChairman Rogelio L. Singson regarding lands on Mabayo and Minanga dated June 3,
II. Palitan ito ng isang Kapasyahang Paganib sa SSEZ kung:
1993 that only lands inside the perimeter fence are envisioned to be part of SBMA.
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5.01 For certiorari, conformably to Sec. 7, Art. IX of the Constitution, to set aside Comelec Resolution 4. Item f), President Ramos in his marginal note over the letter request of Morong, Bataan Mayor
Nos. 931676 and 931623 (Annexes "E" and "H") insofar as it disallowed the initiation of a local Bienvenido L. Vicedo, the Sangguniang Bayan and Congressman Payumo, when the Resolution of
initiative to annul PAMBAYANG KAPASYAHAN BLG. 10, SERYE 1993 including the gathering and Concurrence to SBMA was submitted last April 6, 1993, order the priority implementation of completion
authentication of the required number of signatures in support thereof. of MorongDinalupihan (TasikRoad) Project, including the MorongPoblacionMabayo Road to DPWH.
(Attached and marked as Annex "C").
5.01.1 As an administrative agency, respondent Comelec is bound to observe due process in the conduct
of its proceedings. Here, the subject resolutions, Annexes "E" and "H", were issued ex parte and without Based on the foregoing facts, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong had accommodated the clamor of the
affording petitioners and the other proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be heard thereon. More petitioners in accordance with its limited powers over the issues. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of
importantly, these resolutions and/or directives were issued with grave abuse of discretion. A Morong cannot afford to wait for amendments by Congress of R.A. 7227 that will perhaps drag for
Sangguniang Bayan resolution being an act of the aforementioned local legislative assembly is several months or years, thereby delaying the development of Morong, Bataan.
undoubtedly a proper subject of initiative. (Sec. 32, Art. VI, Constitution)
Henceforth, we respectfully reiterate our request to deny the petition for a local initiative and/or
5.02 For mandamus, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court, to command the respondent Comelec to referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.
schedule forthwith the continuation of the signing of the petition, and should the required number of
signatures be obtained, set a date for the initiative within fortyfive (45) days thereof. Thank you and more power.
5.02.1 Respondent Comelec's authority in the matter of local initiative is merely ministerial. It is duty Very truly yours,
bound to supervise the gathering of signatures in support of the petition and to set the date of the initiative
once the required number of signatures are obtained. (SGD.) EDILBERTO M. DE LEON
Mun. Vice Mayor/Presiding Officer
If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Comelec shall then set a date for the initiative during
which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on
for their approval within sixty (60) days from the date of certification by the Comelec, as provided in the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance." 6 On
subsection (g) hereof, in case of provinces and cities, fortyfive (45) days in case of municipalities, and July 13, 1993, the COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.
thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the Benjamin N. Casiano, to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners. 7
results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Comelec. (Sec. 22, par. (h) R.A. 7160.
These COMELEC resolutions are sought to be set aside in the petition at bench. The petition makes the
following submissions:
5. This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
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rewritten to embody the lessons of their sad experience. One of the lessons is the folly of completely Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under the
surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. The result, in the perceptive words of Father Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. The same stance
Bernas, is that the new Constitution became "less trusting of public officials than the American is assumed by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. 8
Constitution." 11
We grant the petition.
For the first time in 1987, the system of people's initiative was thus installed in our fundamental law. To
be sure, it was a late awakening. As early as 1898, the state of South Dakota has adopted initiative and The case at bench is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue of first impression —
referendum in its constitution and many states have followed suit. In any event, the framers of our
12 13 delineating the extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate. Father Bernas explains
1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as an ultimate weapon of the people to that "in republican systems, there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative.
negate government malfeasance and misfeasance and they put in place an overarching system. Thus, thru Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative power is that which
an initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power
provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through of the people."9
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein." Our constitutional odyssey shows that up until 1987, our people have not directly exercised legislative
Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or power, both the constituent power to amend or revise the Constitution or the power to enact ordinary laws.
law by congress or local legislative body. Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI provide: Section 1, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution delegated legislative power to Congress, thus "the
legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a
Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a House of Representatives." Similarly, section 1, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended,
Senate and a House of Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on provided that "the Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa." 10
initiative and referendum.
Implicit in the set up was the trust of the people in Congress to enact laws for their benefit. So total was
xxx xxx xxx their trust that the people did not reserve for themselves the same power to make or repeal laws. The
omission was to prove unfortunate. In the 70's and until the EDSA revolution, the legislature failed the
Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and expectations of the people especially when former President Marcos wielded lawmaking powers under
the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws which could have bridled the nation's downslide from
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration democracy to authoritarianism to anarchy never saw the light of day.
of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereto. In February 1986, the people took a direct hand in the determination of their destiny. They toppled down
the government of former President Marcos in a historic bloodless revolution. The Constitution was
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though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
language used." 22
conduct of an initiative and referendum. 14 Worthwhile noting is the scope of coverage of an initiative or
referendum as delineated by section 32 Art. VI of the Constitution, supra — any act or law passed by
The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was Congress or local legislative body.
implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether
includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz: Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper
subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean; Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on section 120,
Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the
Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local
initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance. (Emphasis ours)
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by
the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black 20 defines an act as "an
Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies — Any proposition on
expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall
physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . . ." It is
not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from
basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the constitution. 21 In line
the date therefrom . . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its Resolution No. 2300
with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
entitled "In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized resolutions as proper
constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even
subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative — The power
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MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional,
version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none. provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance."
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intend resolutions to
House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation. be proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent. We quote some of the
interpellations when the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated.? No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were being considered in the House of Representatives, viz:
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker. THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the constitutional MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No.
amendment and national legislation. 17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative ad
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both
MR. ROCO. That is correct. versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum
and the House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum on the Constitution and
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
on national legislation.
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the Constitution
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be
done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution? THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
every five years. 23
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the local Government Code of
1991 which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More specifically, the MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX
Book I of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.
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Direct initiative on the local lever may, therefore, cover all kinds of measures provided that these are whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend
within the power of the local Sanggunians to enact, subject of course to the other requisites enumerated in any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local
the Section. initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. It states:
5. Form of Initiative. Regarding the form of the measure, the section speaks only of "ordinance," although Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more
the measure may be contained in a resolution. If the registered voters can propose ordinances, why are than once a year.
they not allowed to propose resolutions too? Moreover, the wording of Sec. 125, below, which deals not
only with ordinances but with "any proposition" implies the inclusion of resolutions. The discussion (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
hereunder will also show support for the conclusion that resolutions may indeed be the subject of local Sanggunians to enact.
initiative.
x x x x x x x x x
We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local
initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance — This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all "subjects
i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedly includes
temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to resolutions. This interpretation is supported by Section 125 of the same Code which provides:
persons or things in general. 25 Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy "Limitations upon Sanggunians. — Any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of
the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city. 26 initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the
sanggunian concerned within six (6) months from the date of the approval thereof . . . ." Certainly, the
In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the inclusion of the word proposition is inconsistent with respondents' thesis that only ordinances can be the
municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of subject of local initiatives. The principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, former Senator
conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far Aquilino Pimentel, espouses the same view. In his commentaries on the said law, he wrote, viz: 24
reaching implications in the governance of its people. This is apparent from a reading of section 12 of
Republic Act No. 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other 4. Subject Matter Of Initiative. All sorts of measures may be the subject of direct initiative for as long as
Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority For This Purpose, Providing these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to enact. In California, for example, direct initiatives
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." to wit: were proposed to enact a fishing control bill, to regulate the practice of chiropractors, to levy a special tax
to secure a new library, to grant a franchise to a railroad company, and to prevent discrimination in the
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. — Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the sangguniang sale of housing and similar bills.
panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong
and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Freeport Zone consisting of the City of
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factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval
income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the
municipalities contiguous to the base areas. territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter
referred to a as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a
In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of
Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter; this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein.
and futures shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;
The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of banks
and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone; (a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent
provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a
(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of selfsustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment
local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;
regulation;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into a exported out of the Subic Special
than Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and dutyfree importations of raw material,
one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. capital and equipment. However, exportations or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special
They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone without any Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines:
Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every
two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highlytechnical skills which no Filipino (c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local
within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by the Department of Labor and and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three
Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay percent (3%) of the of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special
Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government one percent (1%) each to the local
days after issuance thereof. government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other
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COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it. This (h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the National
procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan
people, their original power to legislate through the process of initiative. Ours is the duty to listen and the Authority shall provide and establish its own internal security and fire fighting forces; and
obligation to obey the voice of the people. It could well be the only force that could foil the mushrooming
abuses in government. (i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone
shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be governed by their respective charters and
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 931623 dated July 6, 1993 the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
and Resolution 931676 dated July 13, 1993 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs. as the Local Government Code of 1991.
SO ORDERED. In relation thereto, section 14 of the same law provides:
Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government Units. —
(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the Subic
Authority shall exercise administrative powers, rulemaking and disbursement of funds over the Subic
Special Economic Zone in conformity with the oversight function of the Conversion Authority.
(b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government units concerned on matters
affecting the Subic Special Economic zone other than defense and security, the decision of the Subic
Authority shall prevail.
Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the
people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but
logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the
municipality of Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring
effect on the welfare of the people of Morong.
Finally, it cannot be gained that petitioners were denied due process. They were not furnished a copy of
the letterpetition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of
their petition for a local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse, respondent
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