CANON 16

A.C. No. 10579 – Legal Ethics – Borrowing From Clients Not Appropriate
Civil Claims Cannot Be Litigated in a Disbarment Suit
In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a realty dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtang’s
acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.
For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee. He also advised Foster to shell out a total of
P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge and get a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtang’s
demands.
On various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his personal use, i.e., car repair. Such loan amounted
to P122,000.00. Foster, being prudent, asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to Agtang.
Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtang’s negligence and incompetence in drafting the
complaint. She also found out that the filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned out that
Agtang was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked Agtang to return her the balance, the said lawyer
failed to do so hence, she filed an administrative complaint against Agtang.
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to return the balance of the filing fee
(P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed from Foster (P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang
be suspended for three months only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.
HELD: No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light. Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme
Court.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled Foster into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than
the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra
expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to
depravity and dishonesty.
When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to do so and even had the temerity that it was all the client’s
idea. . A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.
It is clear that Agtang failed to fulfill this duty. He received various amounts from Foster but he could not account for
all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by Foster.
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
In the first place, Agtang should have never borrowed from Foster, his client. Second, his refusal to pay reflects his
baseness. Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment
of financial obligations.
The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private
capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the
lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer
of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the
determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions
which the parties may choose against each other. To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to
appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 10579 December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG) – Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated March
23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the
suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical
impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),received a complaint 2, dated
May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the
order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011,
the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on November
16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed
his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of documents
contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that
the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory
questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of
the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was
terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions 9 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and
her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem
regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their
discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which
they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter 12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem
referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty
(60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed
to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had
previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for
reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from
complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited
the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the
summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case
No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00
per trial court records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who
notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied
that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed
by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra
Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3]
the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very
anomalies she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be
brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of P70,000.00
or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the
sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to
be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition
but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that
the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2,
2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case,
because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount
of P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent, complainant
learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She
went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of
dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On
January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by
Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority
would not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant
was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that
the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant
discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on
respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present.
Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month. 19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a
letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted
with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her
the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since March
1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized
the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor.
He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as
acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was
complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them
at home and for his services. The transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment.
As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was
suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the
case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel accommodations.
Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan
of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would
be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who
was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally
present a bottle of wine to the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent
saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the
handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit,
complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent
demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts in her
possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also
emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent was employed
as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several
documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty.
Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.”
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20,
2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for estafa. 23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical
impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of
suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of
P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging
respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued. 26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified the
penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent
was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent’s
violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule
15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” It is well established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties.
A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.” 27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more
than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the
extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related
to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted
only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For
one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to
shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have
accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees,
but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and
good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.
Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.” 28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from complainant but
he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by
complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His
possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client. 30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately
return the money to the client.31 Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from
his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as
“representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision.
Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he
subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been dismissed.
Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome
of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in
the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe
their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act
that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed
by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse
him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To
tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent proved
himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to
personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty
to his client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise violated
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable
amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the
next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or
emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes
and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent
in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to
by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly
in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules.
The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus,
considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as
loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair
dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency,
but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. 32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s
behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found
guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of
respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client
should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that
must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part
of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.” 33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered
by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the
violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent
from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he
had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the
deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract,
and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the
purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the
complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent
that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire
document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action
when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction
under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him
from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other.
More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An
attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once
this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers.” 34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. 35 For the practice of
law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on
any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the
trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months
recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent.
The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence
and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the
trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,
for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and
the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of
disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private capacity.
In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she
acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no
intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the
Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other
judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly
with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence
required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is
“a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.” 40 In administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively
liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to
administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible. 42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the balance
of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer client relationship between
them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation
expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were
connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the
said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as
it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as
liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.” 43 The
Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of members
who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
of an attorney.”44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to
pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00. Let a copy of this
Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to ail courts.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5044 December 2, 2013
FELIPE C. DAGALA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR. and ATTY. AMADO T. ADQUILEN,* Respondents.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is an asministrative complaint1 filed by complainant Felipe C. Dagala (complainant) against
respondents Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (atty. Quesada) and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen (Atty. Adquilen), charging them
for gross negligence in handling his labor complaints.
The facts
On November 8, 1994 complainant, assisted by Atty. Quesada, filed before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando City, La Union (NLRC-RAB) Complaint2 for illegal
dismissal, overtime pay, separation pay, damages and attorney’s fees against Capitol Allied Trading & Transport
(Capitol), and owner and General Manager, Lourdes Gutierrez, as well as its Personnel Manager, Joseph G. De Jesus,
docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-1??1123-94. The said case was, however, dismissed without prejudice, through
an Order3 dated December 13, 1994 (December 13, 1994 Order), for failure of complainant and Atty. Quesada to
appear during the two (2) scheduled mandatory conference hearings despite due notice. Thereafter, complainant
engaged the services of Atty. Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter (LA) of the NLRC-RAB, who re-filed his labor case,
re-docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-10-1091-95 (LU).4
Similarly, the case was dismissed without prejudice on June 28, 1996, this time due to the parties' failure to submit
their respective position papers.5
Complainant and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case for a third time on August 27, 1996, docketed as NLRC Case No.
RAB-I-08-1191-96 (LU).6
During its pendency, the representative of Capitol purportedly offered the amount of ₱74,000.00 as settlement of
complainant's claim, conditioned on the submission of the latter’s position paper.7
Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint "for lack of interest and
failure to prosecute" as stated in an Order8 dated February 27, 1997 (February 27, 1997 Order). Atty. Adquilen and
complainant received notice of the said order on March 11, 1997 and March 24, 1997,9 respectively. On July 11,
1997, complainant – this time assisted by Atty. Imelda L. Picar (Atty. Picar) – filed a motion for reconsideration10
from the February 27, 1997 Order, which was treated as an appeal and transmitted to the NLRC-National Capital
Region (NLRC-NCR).11
However, the NLRC-NCR dismissed the same in a Resolution12 dated June 17, 1998 for having been filed out of
time, adding that the negligence of counsel binds the client.13
Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate letters14 dated November 18, 1998 to respondents, informing them that
complainant is in the process of pursuing administrative cases against them before the Court. Nevertheless, as
complainant remains open to the possibility of settlement, respondents were invited to discuss the matter at Atty.
Picar’s office. Only Atty. Quesada responded to the said letter and subsequently, through a Memorandum of
Agreement15 dated December 5, 1998 (December 5, 1998 MoA), undertook to compensate the damages sustained by
complainant in consideration of the non-filing of an administrative complaint against him. Atty. Quesada, however,
reneged on his promise, thus prompting complainant to proceed with the present complaint.16
In a Resolution17 dated June 21, 1999, the Court directed respondents to comment on the Complaint within ten (10)
days from notice. However, despite notices18 and the extension granted,19
Atty. Adquilen failed to comply with the directive and the subsequent show-cause resolutions.20 Accordingly, a fine
in the amount of ₱500.00 was imposed21 against him, which he duly paid on September 19, 2005.22 On the other
hand, Atty. Quesada, in his Comment,23 admitted having accepted and filed the initial labor case for complainant.
He, however, explained that he was unable to file the required position paper due to complainant's failure to furnish
him with the employment records and other relevant documents. He also claimed that when he was informed of the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, he advised complainant to re-file the case with the assistance of another lawyer
as he had to attend to his duties as Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino for the Second District of La
Union Province.24 Anent the December 5, 1998 MoA, Atty. Quesada alleged that he was merely prevailed upon to
sign the same for fear of losing his means of livelihood and license to practice law, and that he had no intention of
reneging on his promise to pay. Nonetheless, despite earnest efforts, he still failed to come up with the agreed-upon
amount.25
In a Resolution26 dated March 27, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation or decision.
The Proceedings Before the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) set the case for mandatory conference on August 25, 2006 and
required the parties to submit their respective briefs.27
Complainant was duly represented28 by his counsel at the hearing,29 while respondents filed separate motions to
reset, only to subsequently waive their respective appearances. Atty. Adquilen attributed the waiver to his medical
condition;30 on the other hand, in a complete turnaround, Atty. Quesada denied the existence of any lawyer-client
relationship between him and complainant.31
On March 25, 2009, Investigating IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. issued a Report and Recommendation,32
finding that respondents were grossly negligent in handling complainant's case in violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). As such, he recommended that each of them be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, Atty. Quesada was directed to comply with his undertaking
under the December 5, 1998 MoA to pay the amount of ₱68,000.00, with legal interest from January 20, 1999 until
fully settled; while Atty. Adquilen was ordered to pay the amount of ₱6,000.00, representing the difference between
the ₱74,000.00 settlement offered by Capitol and the above-stated settlement amount, with legal interest from date of
notice of the order of dismissal on March 25, 199733 until fully paid. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the afore-stated report and recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-262 dated November 19, 2011
(November 19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules. Consequently, it directed respondents to pay complainant the total amount of ₱74,000.00 within thirty
(30) days from notice.34
In a Resolution35 dated September 12, 2012, the Court noted the Notice36 of the IBP’s November 19, 2011
Resolution, and thereafter sent notices to the parties as well as the IBP-CBD, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Public Information Office. However, the notice sent to Atty. Adquilen was returned unserved with the notation "Return
to Sender, Deceased."37
Thus, in the Resolutions dated February 20, 201338 and June 10, 2013,39 the IBP was required to furnish the Court
with the death certificate of Atty. Adquilen.
On August 30, 2013, the IBP filed its compliance,40 attaching therewith the Certificate of Death41 of Atty. Adquilen
which indicates that the latter passed away on June 22, 2008 due to cardiac arrhythmia.1âwphi1 In view of Atty.
Adquilen's death prior to the promulgation of this Decision,42 the Court, bearing in mind the punitive nature of
administrative liabilities,43 hereby dismisses the case against him. Hence, what is left for resolution is the complaint
against Atty. Quesada.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Quesada should be held administratively liable for gross
negligence in handling complainant’s labor case.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent Atty. Quesada’s administrative liability, but deems
it proper to delete the recommended order for the return of the amount of ₱74,000.00. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.44
He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts.45
These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon
18 of the Code which respectively read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x x CANON 10 – A
LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice. x x x x
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, the Court finds Atty. Quesada to have violated the foregoing Rules and Canons. Primarily, Atty,
Quesada failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainant’s case by his failure to justify his absence
on the two (2) mandatory conference hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 despite due notice, which thus
resulted in its dismissal. It bears stressing that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and
diligence and not to sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty. To this end, he is oblige to
attend scheduled hearings or conferences, prepare and file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urge their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do
so.46
Atty. Quesada’s failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper
justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s cause in violation of Canon
17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Moreover, Atty. Quesada acted with less candor and good faith in the
proceedings before the IBP-CBD when he denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant, and claimed that the labor case was handled by another lawyer,47 despite his previous admission48
before the Court of having accepted complainant's case. To add a perusal of the complaint49 dated November 8, 1994
in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 reveals that Atty. Quesada signed the same as counsel for complainant.50
While the IBP-CBD is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary
action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his
character.51
Besides, Atty. Quesada failed to rebut the allegation that complainant's corresponding failure to appear during the
mandatory conference hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 was upon his counsel’s advice.52
Under the premises, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that Atty. Quesada had indulged in deliberate falsehood,
contrary to the prescriptions under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code.53
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.54
In Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,55 a lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for
inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and for misrepresentations committed
before the CA, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. In
the cases of Cheng v. Atty. Agravante56 and Perea v. Atty. Almadro,57 respondent-lawyers were similarly punished
for their negligence in the discharge of their duties to their client and for misrepresentation committed before the
Court, in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Hence, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends Atty. Quesada for a
period of one (1) year. The Court must, however, clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive
to return the amount of ₱74,000.00 as ordered by the IBP in its November 19, 2011 Resolution which represents the
settlement initially offered by Capitol in the dismissed labor case. The return of the said amount partakes the nature
of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an administrative-disciplinary proceeding such as this
case. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,58 the Court recently illumined that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only
confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar and that the only concern is his administrative liability. Thus, matters which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's
professional engagement, such as the liabilities of the parties which are purely civil in nature, should be threshed out
in a proper proceeding of such nature, and not during administrative-disciplinary proceedings, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule
10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with
a stern warning that a repitition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
On the other hand, the admnistrative complaint respondent Atty. Amado Adquilen is hereby DIMISSED in view of
his supervening death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7965 November 13, 2013
AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Azucena Segovia-Ribaya (complainant) against
Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin (respondent), the antecedents of which are detailed as follows:
The Facts
On November 18, 2005, the parties entered into a retainership agreement2 (retainer) whereby respondent undertook
to, inter alia process the registration and eventually deliver, within a period of six (6 ) months,3 the certificate of title
over a certain parcel of land (subject land) in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late
Isabel Segovia. In connection therewith, respondent received from complainant the amounts of ₱15,000.00 and
₱39,000.004 to cover for the litigation and land registration expenses, respectively.
Notwithstanding the expenditure of the ₱39,000.00 given for registration expenses (subject amount) and the lapse of
more than three (3) years from the retainer’s date, complainant alleged that respondent, without proper explanation,
failed to fulfill his undertaking to register the subject land and deliver to complainant the certificate of title over the
same. As complainant was tired of respondent’s excuses, she finally decided to just withdraw the subject amount from
respondent. For such purpose, she confronted the latter at his office and also subsequently sent him two (2) demand
letters,5 but all to no avail.6 Hence, complainant was prompted to file the instant administrative complaint.
In his Comment,7 respondent admitted that he indeed received the subject amount from complainant but averred that
after receiving the same, the latter’s brother, Erlindo, asked to be reimbursed the amount of ₱7,500.00 which the latter
purportedly paid to the land surveyor.8 Respondent likewise alleged that he later found out that he could not perform
his undertaking under the retainer because the ownership of the subject land was still under litigation.9 Finally,
respondent stated that he wanted to return the balance of the subject amount to complainant after deducting what
Erlindo took from him, but was only prevented to do so because he was maligned by complainant when she went to
his office and there, shouted and called him names in the presence of his staff.10
In the Court’s Resolutions dated December 17, 200811 and March 2, 2009,12 the case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After both parties failed to appear during
the mandatory conference, IBP Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag (Investigating Commissioner)
required the parties to submit their respective position papers.13 Complainant filed her position paper14 on October
8, 2009, while respondent failed to do so.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On November 6, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation,15 finding respondent
to have violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) for his failure to
properly account for the money entrusted to him without any adequate explanation why he could not return the same.
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent’s acts demonstrated his "lack of candor, fairness, and loyalty
to his client, who entrusted him with money and documents for the registration of the subject land."16 The
Investigating Commissioner likewise held that respondent’s failure to return the subject amount, despite being given
"adequate time to return"17 the same, "not to mention the repeated x x x demands made upon him,"18 constitutes
"gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even misappropriation of money"19 in violation of the above-stated rules.
In view of the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.20
In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification, ordering the return of the amount of ₱31,500.00,22
with legal interest and within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, to complainant.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent respondent’s administrative liability but deems it
proper to: (a) extend the recommended period of suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1)
year; and (b) delete the recommended order for the return of the amount of ₱31,500.00.
Anent respondent’s administrative liability, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent’s failure to properly account
for and duly return his client’s money despite due demand is tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the Code which respectively read as follows:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.1âwphi1 However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Records disclose that respondent admitted the receipt of the subject amount from complainant to cover for pertinent
registration expenses but posited his failure to return the same due to his client’s act of confronting him at his office
wherein she shouted and called him names. With the fact of receipt being established, it was then respondent’s
obligation to return the money entrusted to him by complainant. To this end, suffice it to state that complainant’s
purported act of "maligning" respondent does not justify the latter’s failure to properly account for and return his
client’s money upon due demand. Verily, a lawyer’s duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much so
that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance. In this case,
despite that singular encounter, respondent had thereafter all the opportunity to return the subject amount but still
failed to do so. Besides, the obligatory force of said duty should not be diluted by the temperament or occasional
frustrations of the lawyer’s client, especially so when the latter remains unsatisfied by the lawyer’s work. Indeed, a
lawyer must deal with his client with professional maturity and commit himself towards the objective fulfillment of
his responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the correct course of action is for the lawyer to properly account for
his affairs as well as to ensure the smooth turn-over of the case to another lawyer. Except only for the retaining lien
exception23 under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code, the lawyer should not withhold the property of his client.
Unfortunately, absent the applicability of such exception or any other justifiable reason therefor, respondent still failed
to perform his duties under Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which perforce warrants his administrative
liability.
The Court, however, deems it proper to increase the IBP’s recommended period of suspension from the practice of
law from six (6) months to one (1) year in view of his concomitant failure to exercise due diligence in handling his
client’s cause as mandated by Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 -
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court observes that respondent did not only accomplish his undertaking
under the retainer, but likewise failed to give an adequate explanation for such non-performance despite the protracted
length of time given for him to do so. As such omissions equally showcase respondent’s non-compliance with the
standard of proficiency required of a lawyer as embodied in the above-cited rules, the Court deems it apt to extend the
period of his suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year similar to the penalty imposed
in the case of Del Mundo v. Capistrano.24
As a final point, the Court must clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive for the return of the
amount of ₱31,500.00 as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. The same amount was given by complainant
to respondent to cover for registration expenses; hence, its return partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which
should not be dealt with during an administrative-disciplinary proceeding. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,25 the Court
recently held that its "findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the
parties involved which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's
professional engagement – as the same should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature." This
pronouncement the Court applies to this case and thus, renders a disposition solely on respondent’s administrative
liability.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16,
and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution with
a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
March 18, 2015
A.C. No. 10672
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE,* Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J:.
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated May 9, 2006 filed by complainant Eduardo A. Maglente
(complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr.
(respondent), praying that the latter be directed to return the amount of P48,000he.00 that received from the former.
The Facts
Complainant, as President of "Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III, Incorporated'' (Samahan), alleged
that he engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in order to determine the true owner of the
land being occupied by the members of Samahan.2 In connection therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount
of P48,000.00 intended to cover the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written
acknowledgment executed by respondent himself.3 Despite the payment, respondent failed to file an action in court.
When confronted, respondent explained that the money given to him was not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in
court.4 Thus, complainant asked for the return of the money, but respondent claimed to have spent the same and even
demanded more money.5 Complainant further alleged that when he persisted in seeking restitution of the aforesaid
sum, respondent told him to shut up because it was not his money in the first place.6 Hence, complainant filed this
administrative complaint seeking the return of the full amount he had paid to respondent.
In his defense,7 respondent denied spending complainant’s money, explaining that he had already prepared the
initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he discovered through the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay such
information to complainant who undertook to raise the amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant
administrative case was filed against him.8
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated October 3, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent
guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and accordingly, recommended that
he be: (a) meted with the penalty of Censure, with a warning that a repetition of the same will be met with a stiffer
penalty; and (b) directed to account for or return the amount of 48,000.00 to complainant.10
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent clearly received the amount of 48,000.00 from complainant,
which was intended to answer for the filing fees of a case he was supposed to file for the Samahan, but which he failed
to do so.11 In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed that had respondent prepared the complaint and
performed research works, as he claimed, then he could have kept a reasonable amount for his effort under the doctrine
of quantum meruit, but unfortunately, he could not present any proof in this respect.12
In a Resolution13 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended penalty from Censure to suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months. Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration14 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution15 dated May 3, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts
complained of.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP, except as to the penalty to be
imposed upon respondent.1âwphi1
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.16
Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR,17 which reads:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith]
shall render him liable.1âwphi1
In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case
in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of 48,000.00 to answer for the filing fees. Despite the foregoing,
respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he received from
complainant was not enough to fully pay the filing fees.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the
amount of 48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was
not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client.18 A lawyer’s failure to return the money
to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity,19 as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in such matters of professional employment,20 and hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty to be imposed.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and, at the same time, failed
to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court meted out the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his
failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to
him by the latter.22 Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino,23 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to
render any legal service to his client as well as to return the money he received for such purpose.24 In view of the
foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate that respondent be meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.
Finally, the Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for or return the amount of 48,000.00 to complainant.
It is well to note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around
the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule
remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature– for instance, when the claim involves
moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked
to his professional engagement."25 Since the aforesaid amount was intended to answer for filing fees which is
intimately related to the lawyer- client relationship between complainant and respondent, the Court finds the return
thereof to be in order.26
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01
and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the amount of 48,000.00 he
received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing
directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent’s record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 10438 September 23, 2014
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED, Complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS C. TORRES, Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint1 dated October 30, 2008 filed by complainant CF Sharp Crew Management
Incorporated (complainant) against respondent Nicolas C. Torres (respondent), charging him with violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in overseas maritime
employment.2 It hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who
was tasked, inter alia, to serve as its legal counsel and to oversee the administration and management of legal cases
and medicalrelated claims instituted by seafarers against complainant’s various principals. Among the cases
respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims Manager were the claims of seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi
(Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani (Sampani), Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and Edmundo M. Chua (Chua).3
In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondent’s request, complainant issued checks in the amounts
of ₱524,000.00, ₱652,013.20, ₱145,650.00, ₱97,100.00, and ₱296,808.40 as settlement of the respective claims of
Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua.4 However, complainant later discovered that, save for the check in the amount
of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the checks to the seafarers and instead, had them deposited
at International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1.5 With respect to
Sampani, complainant also discovered that he only received the amounts of ₱216,936.00 and ₱8,303.00 or a total of
₱225,239.00 out of the requested amount of ₱652,013.20, through checks not issued by complainant.6
On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline directly received the
instant complaint and on even date, issued an Order7 requiring respondent to file an answer, but the latter failed to do
so. Neither did respondent appear in the mandatory conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor did he file his
position paper.8
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent
administratively liable for violating the CPR, and accordingly recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.10
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent had indeed requested and was issued checks as settlement of
the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua onthe pretense that the requested amounts represented
what was lawfully due them.11 However, instead of giving the said checks to the named seafarers, he deposited the
same at the International Exchange Bank, Banawe,Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1,12 except
for the check in the amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado.13
Meanwhile, respondent belatedly filed his Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open Investigation)14 on March 24,
2010. He explained that he was not able to timely file an answer because complainant supplied a wrong address to the
IBP and filed non-bailable criminal cases against him which caused his detention in a regular prison cell and, thus, his
inability to comply with the IBP’s directives.15
On the merits of the complaint,respondent maintained that the seafarers’ claims had long been settled and that the
release documents signed by the named seafarers were already inactual custody and possession of the complainant.16
He further contended that he only signed the dorsal portions of the checks as a form of guaranty of their genuineness17
and that he could not have encashed them as they wereall payable to a particular payee.18 Lastly, respondent claimed
that when he resigned in August 2008, complainant forced him to sign promissory notes to reimburse certain amounts
which had not been accounted for by the latter in exchange for his clearance documents.19 But before he was able to
settle the promissory notes, he was already arrested in connection with the criminal cases filed by complainant against
him.20
In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the
aforesaid report and recommendation with modification, increasing the recommended period of suspension from the
practice of law to two (2) years, and ordering respondent to return the full amount of money he received from
complainant which is legally due to the seafarers, with legal interest, within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 on April 22, 2013 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution23 dated March 8, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the
CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP in its report and
recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent; and (b) the monetary
award in favor of the complainant.
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and ascribes to a lawyer a
great degree of fidelity and good faith.24 The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.25 This is the standard laid down
by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
In the foregoing light, it has been heldthat a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.26
In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had duly proven its charges against
respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed respondent’s modus operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance
of checks purportedly for the purpose of settling seafarers’ claims against the complainant’s various principals, only
to have such checks (except for the check inthe amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado) deposited to an unauthorized
bank account, particularly International Exchange Bank, Banawe,Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-
06902-1. It is well-settled that "when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose,the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does
not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client."27 This,
respondent failed to do.
Clearly, respondent’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence reposedin him by
the complainant, and betrayal of his client’s interests which he is duty-bound to protect.28 They are contrary to the
mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct." Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.29
Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty recommended by the
IBP.1âwphi1 Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers misappropriated their clients’ money, the
Court imposed upon them the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v.
Mijares III,30 the Court disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his client’s money intended for securing a certificate
of title on the latter’s behalf. Similarly, in Freeman v. Reyes,31 the same penalty was imposed upon the lawyer who
misappropriated the insurance proceeds of her client’s deceased husband.
As already discussed, respondent's conduct of misappropriating complainant's money has made him unfit to remain
in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful,
and grossly immoral acts.32 As a member of the Bar, he is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.33 Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege, and whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his
clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw the same,34 as in this
case. In view of the foregoing, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.
Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBP's recommendation regarding the return of the settlement money
respondent received from complainant, considering, among others, that it was not specifically prayed for in the latter's
administrative complaint and that the civil liability of respondent therefor may already be the subject of existing cases
involving the same parties. WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.