12. ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs.

SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondent.
[G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002]
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS : A petition was filed by respondent Sulu Resources Development Corporation for
Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA). Petitioner Armando C. Carpio filed an
opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang
and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential
right to explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties.

the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a
Resolution dated September 26, 1996, upholding petitioner’s opposition/adverse claim.

Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondent’s
failure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining Act’s Implementing Rules
and Regulations. On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed
Order dismissing petitioner’s opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the Board

Petioner appealed to CA. the CA relying in the case of Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate
Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the Decision of the Mines
Adjudication Board (MAB). The adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely
administrative in nature.

ISSUE : WON appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines Adjudication Board
should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and the
Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as contended by
herein petitioner

HELD : Petitioner submits that appeals from the decisions of the MAB should be filed
with the CA. the CA ruled and respondent agrees that the settlement of disputes
involving rights to mining areas and overlapping or conflicting claim is a purely
administrative matter, over which the MAB has appellate jurisdiction. The CA refused to
take jurisdiction over the case because, under Section 79 of the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, petitions for review of MAB decisions are to be brought directly to the Supreme
Court

In the case at bar, petitioner went to the CA through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 43, seeking a reversal of the MAB Decision. Given the difference in the
reason for and the mode of appeal, it is obvious that Pearson is not applicable here.

In Pearson, what was under review was the ruling of the CFI to take cognizance of the
case which had been earlier decided by the MAB, not the MAB Decision itself which was
promulgated by the CA under Rule 43. The present petitioner seeks a review of the
latter.

Pearson, however, should be understood in the light of other equally relevant

jurisprudence. In Fabian v. Desierto, the Court clarified that appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA, under
the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43. This Rule was adopted precisely to
provide a uniform rule of appellate procedure from quasi-judicial agencies

Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is

prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on
questions of fact. In Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have
appellate jurisdiction over CIAC decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions
included questions of fact and law. At the very least when factual findings of the MAB
are challenged or alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the
present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional duty of the
judiciary.

To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB
Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court

first Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by
this Court on a "petition for review by certiorari." This provision is obviously an
expansion of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not
consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction
of this Court would unnecessarily burden it

Second when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to
the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions, such
transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vested
rights of the parties. The aggrieved party’s right to appeal is preserved; what is changed
is only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided

Third the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.

Fourth the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by RA
No. 7902 factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies;
and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room
to resolve them

Fifth he judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort
from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for
the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 of RA
7942 is likewise to be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-91, BP Blg.
129 as amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA
through petitions for review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Court.
16. SHELL
PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V., vs. EFREN
JALOS G.R. No. 179918 September 8, 2010 ABAD, J.:
This case is about a question of jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum
contractor, whose pipeline
operation has allegedly driven the fish away from coastal areas, inflicting loss of
earnings among fishermen.
FACTS:
1. On December 11, 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the
Republic of the
Philippines entered into
Service Contract 38
for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in
northwestern Palawan.
2. Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and
pursued its
development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project, which entailed the
construction and
installation of a pipeline from Shell’s production platform to its gas processing plant in
Batangas.
The
pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea.
3. On May 19, 2003, respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares, and 75
other individuals
(Jalos, et al) filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch
41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. Jalos, et al claimed that they were all subsistence
fishermen from
the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely
affected by the
construction and operation of Shell
’s natural gas pipeline.
4. Jalos, et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of the
pipeline. As a result,
their average net income per month fell from a high of P4,848.00 to only P573.00. They
said that “the
pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs
and led [to]
stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea.” They now have to stay longer and farther
out at sea to
catch fish, as the pipeline’s operation has driven the fish population o
ut of coastal waters.
5. Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint. It alleged that
the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the action, as it is a “pollution case” under Republic Act (R.A.) 3931,
as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 984 or the Pollution Control Law. Under these statutes, the
Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for
related damages.
6. Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity
without the
State’s consent. Shell said that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent
of the
Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves.
7. Moreover, said Shell, the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not
specify any
actionable wrong or particular act or omission on Shell’s part that could have caused the
alleged injury
to Jalos, et al.
8. On March 24, 2004 the RTC dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the action was
actually pollution-
related, although denominated as one for damages. The complaint should thus be
brought first before
the PAB, the government agency vested with jurisdiction over pollution-related cases.
9.
Jalos, et al assailed the RTC’s order th
rough a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The latter court reversed such order and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
action.
It said that
Shell was not being sued for committing pollution, but for constructing and operating a
natural gas
pipeline that caused fish decline and considerable reduction in the fishermen’s income.
The claim for
damages was thus based on a quasi-delict over which the regular courts have
jurisdiction.
10.
The CA also rejected Shell’s assertion that the suit w
as actually against the State. It observed that the
government was not even impleaded as party defendant.
11. The CA also held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong. Jalos,
et al invoked their
right to fish the sea and earn a living, which Shell had the correlative obligation to
respect. Failure to
observe such obligation resulted in a violation of the fishermen’s rights and thus gave
rise to a cause of
action for damages
17.