TORRES (AND LUZ LOPEZ) VS MARGARITA LOPEZ

FACTS:

Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, on February 25, 1924, leaving a
considerable estate. Shortly thereafter, Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will, asked
that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the Crst cousin of
the deceased, on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of the
execution of the supposed will he was suffering from senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2)
that undue inMuence had been exercised by the persons beneCted in the document in conjunction
with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document
was obtained through fraud and deceit. After a prolonged trial, judgment was rendered denying the
legalization of the will.

On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila to name a
guardian for Tomas Rodriguez because of his old age and pathological state. At the conclusion of the
hearing, an order was issued by the presiding judge, declaring Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to take
care of himself and to manage his property, and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his guardian.

On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez, there is no dispute. On January 3, 1924,
Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He was suffering from anaemia, hernia inguinal,
chronic dyspepsia, and senility. Physically he was a wreck.

As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera
admit that he was senile. They, together with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke, further declare
that his memory was almost an absolute loss for recent events. His memory, however, for remote
events was generally good. He was given to irrational exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.

While, however, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties of the
patient are "sound, except that his memory is weak," and that in executing the will the "testator had
full understanding of the act he was performing, and full knowledge of the contents thereof," Doctors
De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez "was of unsound mind" and that they
"diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the simple type, approaching the deteriorated stage."
Without attempting at this stage to pass in judgment on the antagonistic conclusions of the medical
witnesses, or on other disputed points, insofar as the facts are concerned, a resolution of the case
comes down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess suEcient mentality to make a
will, or had he passed so far along in senile dementia as to require the court to Cnd him of unsound
mind?

ISSUE:
1. WON Rodriguez was of sound mind when he made the will. YES
2. WON undue influence had been exercised by the Luz Lopez fraction. No

HELD:
1. With teestamentary capacity
The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a will that the testator be of
"sound mind". A "sound mind" is a "disposing mind." One of the grounds for disallowing a will is "If the
testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution of such an instrument at the time
of its execution." Predicated on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following
deCnition of testamentary capacity: " 'Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend me nature
of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed
of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to
comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his
bounty.' "

The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of the execution of his will.

Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical inCrmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of
the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are suEcient singly or jointly to show
testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.

The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled
to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution
of the will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon.

The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have
clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a
testamentary document.

Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship at the time he made his
will. Citing section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they insist that the effect
of the judgment is conclusive with respect to the condition of the person. To this statement we cannot
write down our conformity.

t is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of senile dementia. This
is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which wills are most often contested. Senile dementia,
usually called childishness, has various forms and stages. To constitute complete senile dementia, there
must be such failure of the mind as to deprive the testator of intelligent action. In the Crst stages of the
disease, a person may possess reason and have will power.

It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all the leading cases which have gone forth from this court,
relating to the testator having a sound and disposing mind, and which have been brought to our notice
by counsel, every one of them has allowed the will, even when it was necessary to reverse the judgment
of the trial court. A study of these cases discloses a consistent tendency to protect the wishes of the
deceased whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also show great tenderness on the part of
the court towards the last will and testament of the aged.

In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag, Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for the court, laid down the following legal
principles:
 "Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with
it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally known as insanity or
idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has
been held that 'mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will
not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid
will, provided he has understanding and memory suEcient to enable him to know what he is about,
and how or to whom he is disposing of his property' (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2 Houst. [Del.], 418); that, 'To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or
unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise' xxxxxxx on the other hand, it has been held that
'testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an
unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great
bodily inCrmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator in — capable of
making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualiCes her from knowing or appreciating
the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in'.

In the case of Bagtas vs. Paguio, Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for the court, announced the following
pertinent legal doctrines:
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which a
person may exercise and this right should not be nulliCed unless mental incapacity is established in
a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated
in volume 28, page 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that —

" 'Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. A testator may be aTicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders,
or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid will.' (See the numerous cases there
cited in support of this statement.)

"The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and quoted
with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:

" 'To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the
full possession of his reasoning faculties.'

In the case of Ames’ will (US case), Mr. Justice Moore, delivering the opinion of the court, in part said:
"The appointment of a guardian of a person alleged to be non compos mentis, by a court having
jurisdiction, must necessarily create a presumption of the mental inCrmity of the ward; but such
decree does not conclusively show that the testamentary capacity of the person under guardianship
is entirely destroyed, and the presumption thus created may be overcome by evidence proving that
such person at the time he executed a will was in fact of sound and disposing mind and memory:

the inability of a person to recollect events occurring recently is evidence of mental decay, because
it manifests a want of power of concentration of the mind. The aged live in the past, and the
impressions retained in their minds are those that were made in their younger days, because at that
period of their lives they were able to exercise will power by giving attention. While the inability of
a person of advanced years to remember recent events distinctly undoubtedly indicates a decay of
 the human faculties, it does not conclusively establish senile dementia, which is something more
than a mere loss of mental power, resulting from old age, and is not only a feeble condition of the
mind, but a derangement thereof. . . The rule is settled in this state that if a testator at the time he
executes his will understands the business in which he is engaged, and has a knowledge of his
property, and how he wishes to dispose of it among those entitled to his bounty, he possesses
suEcient testamentary capacity, notwithstanding his old age, sickness, debility of body, or extreme
distress.

With special reference to the deCnition of testamentary capacity, we may say this: On January 3, 1924,
Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion, comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he was
engaged. He had had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to
contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the proper
places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him. While for some
months prior to the making of the will he had not managed his property, he seems to have retained a
distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income. Occasionally his memory failed him with
reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they were. He seemed to entertain a
predeliction towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was nearest to his own age. The
testator comprehended the manner in which the instrument distributed the property among the
objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed an insistence on giving all of his
property to the two persons whom he specified.

On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been physically
decrepit, may have been weak of intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a
guardian, and may have been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of
life, that strength of mind to form a Cxed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce
that intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity."

2. No undue influence

The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed "a preconceived plan on the part of the
persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez" to secure his signature to the testament. The trial judge
may be correct in this supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that men of the standing of Judge
Mina, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis, and Mr. Legarda would so demean themselves
and so sully their characters and reputations as to participate in a scheme having for its purpose to
delude and to betray an old man in his dotage. Rather do we entertain the opinion that each of the
gentlemen named was acting according to the best of his ability to assist in a legitimate act in a
legitimate manner. Moreover, considering the attitude of Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez
and her husband and his apparent enmity toward them, it seems fairly evident that even if the will had
been made in previous years when Rodriguez was more nearly in his prime, he would have prepared
somewhat a similar document.

One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
inMuence on the part of the beneCciary or some other person for his beneCt (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 634[4]). Undue inMuence, as here mentioned in connection with the law of wills, and as further
mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be deCned as that which compels the testator to do that
which is against the will from fear, the desire of peace, or from other feeling which he is unable to resist.

The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.

The judgment of the trial court will be set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez will be admitted
to probate,

ALUAD VS ALUAD

FACTS:
Petitioners' mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless
spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).

Crispin was the owner of six lots identi:ed as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar
Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself. 1

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property
Inter Vivos" 2 (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners' mother Maria 3 covering all the six lots which
Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided:

That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE
[Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by
these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property
above-described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of]
no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR
or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or
even all of the parcels of land herein donated. 4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On September 30, 1986, Original Certi:cates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde's
name.

On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. footx 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property. 5

Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, 6 devising Lot Nos.
675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.

Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.

On August 21, 1995, Maria's heirs-herein petitioners :led before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas
City a Complaint, 8 for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676,
and damages against respondent, alleging:
 That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-described until January
1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two (2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted
son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and
then retained the possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the
plaintiffs of the enjoyment of said parcels of land . . .;

That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by inheritance by right of
representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole and only daughter of
Matilde Aluad[.] 9

To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.

That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last Will and
Testament of Matilde Aluad . . . while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These
two lots are in his possession as true owners thereof.

The trial court, by Decision 18 of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any
right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria via the
Deed of Donation.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a
donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of
a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no
attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.

While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. footx 676, it did not so
declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde's last will and testament had not yet been probated.

ISSUE:
WON THE DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS' MOTHER IS IN FACT A
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA. Yes

HELD:
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners' mother one of mortis causa, it
having the following characteristics:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive;
2. That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. 27 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR"
admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership
of the six lots to petitioners' mother during her (Matilde's) lifetime. 28

The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone
of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of
land herein donated " 29 means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the
right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law is an attribute of ownership. 30 The phrase in the Deed of Donation " or anyone of
them who should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would
take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor
Matilde.

A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:

. . . [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners [donee] die ahead
of [donor] Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter
vivos.

As the Court of Appeals observed, ". . . [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is forti:ed by Matilde's acts
of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained under her name;
appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name".
35

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed 36 but they
were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil
Code. 37

Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause 38 the execution of which clause is a
requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the aLxing of signatures on the left-hand
margins of the pages of the will. So the Court has emphasized:

. . . Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign
each page of the will from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two classes of signature[s] are
distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among
others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On
the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are
referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation
clause is separate and apart from the disposition f the will. An unsigned attestation clause
results in an unattested will . Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of
the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses' undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.
 . . . It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the
will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the
witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public, 40 which is not in
accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page was not also followed. 41

The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the
formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners' mother. But even assuming
arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and
676 was transmitted to Maria. 42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last
will and testament, subject of course to the quali:cation that her (Matilde's) will must be probated.

CONCHITA GLORIA and MARIA LOURDES GLORIA-PAYDUAN , petitioners, vs . BUILDERS SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. , respondent.

• Spouses Juan and herein petitioner Conchita Gloria (Conchita) are registered owners of a parcel of
land located in Kamuning, Quezon City covered by Transfer CertiBcate of Title No. 35814 (TCT 35814).
6 Petitioner Maria Lourdes Gloria-Payduan (Lourdes) is their daughter.
• Conchita and Lourdes Bled before the RTC declaration of null and void real estate mortgage,
promissory note, cancellation of notation in the transfer certiBcate of title, and damages"
• Biag claimed that the title might need to be reconstituted; that Biag instead used the title to mortgage
the Kamuning property to respondent Builders Savings; that Conchita was fraudulently made to sign
the subject loan and mortgage documents by Biag, who deceived Conchita into believing that it was
actually Lourdes who requested that these documents be signed; that the subject Mortgage 11 and
Promissory Note 12 contained the signature not only of Conchita, but of Juan, who was by then already
long deceased, as mortgagor and co-maker; that at the time the loan and mortgage documents were
supposedly executed,
• subject property was foreclosed and sold at auction to the latter; and that the loan and mortgage
documents, as well as the foreclosure and sale proceedings, were null and void and should be annulled.
• RTC - dismissed complaint
• CA - In Bne, BSLA asserts that x x x Conchita voluntarily executed the real estate mortgage who
submitted supporting documents to secure the loan of Benildo Biag. The testimony of Maria Lourdes
assailing the contract was merely hearsay and could not be used as evidence and basis for the
nulliBcation of the contract.
ISSUE
WON PETITIONER MARIA LOURDES GLORIA-PAYDUAN AS COOWNER OF SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY, IS A
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN THIS CASE.

• Petitioners contend that Lourdes had proved that she was the daughter of Conchita and Juan; that
the subject property was conjugal property belonging to both Juan and Conchita; that when Juan died
in 1987, Lourdes became a co-owner of the subject property by virtue of her being a compulsory heir
of Juan; that as co-owner of the subject property, she has the required interest to prosecute Civil Case
No. Q-93-16621; that the CA erred in declaring that Lourdes must Brst obtain a declaration of heirship,
since Article 777 of the Civil Code speciBcally provides that successional rights are transmitted from the
decedent to his/her heirs from the moment of death of the former; that even if there were no pending
settlement proceedings for the distribution of a decedent's estate, there was no need for a prior
declaration of heirship before the heirs may commence an action arising from any right of the deceased,
such as the right to bring an action to annul a sale; 17 that the issue of lack or improper veriBcation was
never raised by the respondent at any stage of the proceedings, yet the CA unduly took cognizance
thereof;
• The evidence reveals that Lourdes is the daughter of Juan and Conchita. There is on record a
CertiBcation of Birth
• Being the daughter of the deceased Juan and Conchita, Lourdes has an interest in the subject property
as heir to Juan and co-owner with Conchita. The fact that she was not judicially declared as heir is of no
moment, for, as correctly argued by petitioners, there was no need for a prior declaration of heirship
before heirs may commence an action arising from any right of their predecessor, such as one for
annulment of mortgage. "[N]o judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may
assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.
• As regards the supposed defective veriBcation occasioned by Conchita's failure to sign the amended
complaint with its concomitant veriBcation and certiBcation against forum shopping, the Court has
repeatedly held that in a case involving co-owners of property where said property is the subject matter
of the suit, the failure of the other co-owners to sign the veriBcation and certiBcation against forum
shopping is not fatal, as the signing by only one or some of them constitutes substantial compliance
with the rule.
• As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and
detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner
may bring such an action, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit
is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
• Finally, the Court Bnds the trial court to be correct in issuing the March 12, 2004 Order granting
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and declaring the mortgage and promissory note as null and
void. The evidence indicates that these documents were indeed simulated; as far as petitioners were
concerned, they merely entrusted the title to the subject property to Biag for the purpose of
reconstituting the same as he claimed that the title on Ble with the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City
may have been lost by fire. Petitioners did not intend for Biag to mortgage the subject property in 1991
to secure a loan; yet the latter, without petitioners' knowledge and consent, proceeded to do just that,
and in the process, he falsiBed the loan and mortgage documents and the accompanying promissory
note by securing Conchita's signatures thereon through fraud and misrepresentation and taking
advantage of her advanced age and naivete and forged Juan's signature and made it appear that the
latter was still alive at the time, when in truth and in fact, he had passed away in 1987.
• As a consequence of Biag's fraud and forgery of the loan and mortgage documents, the same were
rendered null and void. This proceeds from the fact that Biag was not the owner of the subject property
and may not thus validly mortgage it, as well as the well-entrenched rule that a forged or fraudulent
deed is a nullity and conveys no title. "In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void."

MARGIE SANTOS MITRA , petitioner, vs. PERPETUA GUEVARRA, REMEGIO L. SABLAN, ET AL. ,
respondents.

• Margie Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the probate of the notarial will of Remedios
Legaspi y Reyes (Legaspi) with prayer for issuance of letters testamentary before the RTC. It was alleged
that the petitioner is the de facto adopted daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi, single, died on December
22, 2004 in Caloocan City; that Legaspi left a notarial will, instituting the petitioner, Orlando Castro,
Perpetua Sablan Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees; that Legaspi
left real and personal properties with the approximate total value of (P1,032,237.00); and that Legaspi
named Mary Ann Castro as the executor of the will.
• Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan (respondents), who claim to be Legaspi's legal
heirs, opposed the petition. They aver that the will was not executed in accordance with the formalities
required by law; that since the last page of the will, which contained the Acknowledgement, was not
signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will should be declared invalid; that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written; and that the will
was executed under undue and improper pressure, thus, Legaspi could not have intended the
document to be her last will and testament
• RTC
◦ Court having been satisfied that the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the time
of its execution was of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace and undue
influence, or fraud, the petition for the probate of the Huling Habilin at Pagpapatunay of the testator
Remedios Legaspi is hereby granted.
◦ The probate court explained that the last page of the will is but a mere continuation of the
Acknowledgement portion, which the testator and the witnesses are not required to sign.
• CA
◦ CA reversed the judgment of the RTC,
◦ CA adhered to the view of strictly complying with the requirement of stating the number of
pages of the will in the attestation clause. Moreover, the CA detected another supposed fatal defect in
the will: the photocopy of the will submitted by the respondents on appeal did not contain the
signatures of the instrumental witnesses on each and every page thereof.

ISSUE
1. WON CA erred in finding that the instrumental witnesses to the will failed to sign on each and every
page thereof on the left margin, except the last, as required under Article 805 of the Civil Code. YES
2. WON failure to state the number of pages comprising the will on the attestation clause renders such
will defective. NO
• According to the CA, while Legaspi signed on the left margin of each and every page of her will, the
instrumental witnesses failed to do the same, in blatant violation of Article 805 of the Civil Code which
states: ART 805 xxx The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign , as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the
left margin xxx
• The petitioner, in assailing the findings of the CA, argues that in the original copy of the will that was
offered before the probate court as Exhibit "L," it is clear that the instrumental witnesses signed on the
left margin of every page of the will except the last, as did Legaspi. 24 The petitioner advances that the
confusion arose when the respondents, in their record of appeal, submitted an altered photocopy
• In any event, it is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the instrumental witnesses signed on
each and every page of the will, except the last page.
• t should also be mentioned that the respondents take a skewed stance in insisting that the testator
Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses should have signed on the last page of the subject will. When
Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers
to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends. 29 As the probate
court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it
is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.
• As to whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause renders
such will defective, the CA, citing Uy Coque vs. Naves Sioca 31 and In re: Will of Andrada, perceived
such omission as a fatal Eaw. 32 In Uy Coque, one of the defects in the will that led to its disallowance
is the failufle to declare the number of its pages in the attestation clause. The Court elucidated that the
purpose of requiring the number of pages to be stated in the attestation clause is to make the
falsification of a will more dificult. In In re: Will of Andrada, the Court deemed the failure to state the
number of pages in the attestation clause, fatal. Both pronouncements were, however, made prior to
the effectivity of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950.
• in Singson vs. Florentino, 33 the Court adopted a more liberal approach and allowed probate, even if
the number of pages of the will was mentioned in the last part of the body of the will and not in the
attestation clause. This is to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical
considerations.
• The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article 809 thereof, which provides
that: Article 809 . In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influuence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall
not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
• What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions
must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."

• What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions
must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE
S. LOPEZ

• On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four
legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne
Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs.
Before Enrique's death, he executed a Last Will and Testament 4 on August 10, 1996 and constituted
Richard as his executor and administrator.
• September 27, 1999, Richard Fled a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament
before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth
opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and
attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and inGuence
on the part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted by Victoria.
• After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the
attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo
(Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco). The
instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each and every
page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence and of one another. Photographs of
the incident were taken and presented during trial. Manalo further testiFed that she was the one who
prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was made.
• RTC
◦ RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code
which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will
is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the
form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected
somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. While the
acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratiFication and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion.
◦ Aggrieved, Richard filed a Notice of Appeal which the RTC granted i
• CA
◦ RTC erroneously granted Richard's appeal as the Rules of Court is explicit that appeals in special
proceedings, as in this case, must be made through a record on appeal.
◦ CA found no valid reason to deviate from the Fndings of the RTC that the failure to state the
number of pages of the will in the attestation clause was fatal.

ISSUE
WON there was substantial compliance as stipulated in Art 809. NO

• The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or
some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
• While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last
will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratiFcation and
acknowledgment are written" 10 cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists
of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination
of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
• Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit: . . . The rule must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the
pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether
the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can
reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against
perjury in the probate proceedings.

In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado
CESAR ALVARADO , petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA.
ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate
Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO , respondents.

FACTS:
 On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled
"Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly
revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4
of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
 As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent
who were present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself.
Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the
same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary
public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously
furnished them.
 Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December
1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido
Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for
the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance
and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did
not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read
it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those
of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.
 A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death
on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor
 Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be
probated was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or
otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and
old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary who
stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator
was procured by fraud or trick.
  When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the
Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to
respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the
meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto were
executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not
complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.
 CA concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial
compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will
was served.

ISSUE:
1. WON Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of Art. 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its
codicil were executed? YES
2. If so, whether or not was the double-reading requirement of said article complied with. YES

HELD
1.YES
 there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the
will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers
at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years
and even prior to his Erst consultation with an eye specialist on 14 December 1977.
 The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez provides an insight into the scope of the
term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit: "The rationale behind the requirement of reading the
will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate),
is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes . . ."
 Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who,
for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their
execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us
but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in
Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the
lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instructions. Hence, to
consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain
whether Art. 808 had been complied with.

2.YES
 Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice;
once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will
was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of
the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to
his instructions.
 That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an
instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and
the Eve-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice
as Art. 808 requires.
 This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
 execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are
never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
 In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of
the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto,
the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner
does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator.
 Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on 5 November and 29 December
1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil,
albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O.
Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the testator
whether the contents of the documents were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the
affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it
can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those
which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing
on the typewritten documents.
 The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the
will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased):
APOLONIO TABOADA , petitioner, vs. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin) , respondent.

FACTS:
In the petition for probate =led with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will
and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two
pages. The =rst page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom
of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses.
The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end
of the attestation clause by the three 13) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the
testatrix.

The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned order denying the
probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. In the same order, the
petitioner was also required to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding
addresses so that they could be properly notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of
the estate.

The petitioner =led a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will.
Meanwhile, the petitioner =led a motion for the appointment of special administrator.

Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or
motion =led ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of special
administrator was likewise denied because of the petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring
him to submit the names of the intestate heirs and their addresses.

The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will
to be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but all the three subscribing
witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature
of the testator. It is not suIcient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the
left hand margin of that page.

ISSUE:
1. WON Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and
attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another. NO
2. WON the failure to state the number of pages in the attestation clause is a fatal defect. NO

HELD:
1. No

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing
the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are done
which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a
fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for
the purpose of identi=cation of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v.
Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this
case was subscribed in a manner which fully satis=es the purpose of identification.

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the =rst page of the will attested not
only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms
should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales,
90 Phil. 444, 449).

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the
provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but
with suIcient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue
and improper pressure and inJuence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern
tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will"

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satis=ed in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary
dispositions, especially so when the will was properly identi=ed by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang
to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the
questioned order.

2. No

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact
that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two
pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the =rst page which
contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the
bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as
"Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself
states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page."

In Singson v. Florentino, “The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause
must contain a statement of the number of sheets or passes composing the will and that if this is missing
or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the de=ciency cannot be supplied, not by
evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is
different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the
will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of
eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and
places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to
prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations."”

The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the will and to conduct further proceedings in
accordance with this decision

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO , petitioners, vs . HON. AMOR
A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR
D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES
D. SEANGIO , respondents.

FACTS:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents =led a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870 of the RTC, and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad
litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. (Wife of the deceased)

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended
that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo
executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
quali=ed to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certi=ed public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners
averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 99-93396, was =led by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners' motion, SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396 were
consolidated. 4

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on
the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the de=nition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code.

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:

A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,

clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and
Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she
not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.

ISSUE:
1. WON the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. YES

HELD:
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa 9 can be clearly deduced from the terms
of the instrument, and while it does not make an aLrmative disposition of the latter's property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. 10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules
of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention
of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. 11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated
in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator. 12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him
in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, 13 the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.

NOTES:
1. With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the
direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo.
Also, Segundo did not institute an heir 16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The
mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate
to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.

2. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be speci=ed. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes
that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a suLcient cause for the disinheritance of a child
or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be suLcient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of
the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
 (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Heirs of Ypon vs Ricaforte

DOCTRINE/S:
Special Proceedings
a) Determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding
for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession

b) Cause of action
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this
relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

c) Civil Action vs Special Proceeding

*Civil action - defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong (Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court)
*Special proceeding - a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. (Section 3, Rule 1
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court)

d) Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

Direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court via Petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is allowed if it raises a pure question of law.

FACTS:
The Ypons filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso). In their complaint, they
alleged that Magdaleno died intestate and childless leaving certain lots. Claiming to be the sole heir of
Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice
of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his
certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action
against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the
real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had
established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s
compulsory heirs Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s
son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted. The Court
also denied their motion for reconsideration due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued. Hence this instant petition
which directly appealed to the Supreme Court since it only raises pure questions of law.

ISSUE/S: WON the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action was proper

HELD: YES. Since the petitioners failed to establish their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous
special proceeding for purposes of heirship.

The General Rule is that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership
and/or possession.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provides that a civil action is defined as one by
which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

An exception to the general rule is for practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had
been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.

Rebusquillo v Domingo (2014)

AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and
SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners, vs. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ

Doctrine:
An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice
a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement. (Art. 1346, NCC)

Facts:
Petitioner was one of the seven children of deceased, Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal. Both of
them died intestate. The deceased left a parcel of land in Legazpi City. In 2001, respondent Emelinda
(daughter of petitioner), made petitioner sign two documents. In 2003, the petitioner discovered that
the two documents were an affidavit of self-adjudication, and a deed of absolute sale in favor of the
respondent spouses. Petitioner then filed an action to annul the two documents before the RTC. In the
respondents’ answer, they admitted the execution of the affidavit and deed, but they argued that it
was with the consent of all the heirs of Eulalio and Victoria, and that such was agreed to be done to
facilitate the titling of the property. Respondents further argued that the petitioner received the
amount of Php 50,000 for the sale.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and said that the affidavit
and the sale were valid.

Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication and the sale are valid

Held:
No. The petition is granted. Both the affidavit and the deed of sale are void.

Ratio:
An Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. (Sec.
1, Rule 74, ROC). As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as
admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of representation of his
mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is
the only daughter and sole heir of spouses Eulalio and Victoria. The falsity of this claim renders her act
of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid.

In effect, Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject
property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self- Adjudication
is void, the subject property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute
ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to
respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of
respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of
whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more
than a simulated contract.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties
do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not
prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.

In the present case, respondents admitted that the purpose of the sale was to facilitate titling and not
the transfer of ownership.

HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS VS RICARDO BASBAS

FACTS

Valentin Basbas is the son of Severo Basbas. Severo was the registered owner of the contested lot 39
and lot 40 in Laguna.

Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Severo executed by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo. In the
Extra-judicial settlement, they claim that they are the only heirs of Felomino Basbas (their father), and
that Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha (their mother) are the only heirs of the late Severo Basbas.
Thr Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severo Basbas on November 12, 1993, whereby
they (Crispiniano and Ricardo) adjudicated to themselves Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate
. . . . On the basis of the said Extra-Judicial Settlement, Crispiniano Basbas filed a Petition For The
Reconstitution of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate . . . before the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, and after hearing, an Order was issued granting the aforesaid
petition. Subsequently thereafter, TCT No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the names of the Heirs of Severo Basbas
was cancelled and a new title (TCT No. 294295) was issued in the names of Crispiniano Basbas and
Ricardo Basbas.

Petitioners, heirs of Valentin, filed an Action for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance with Damages
against Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo seeking to: (1) annul Transfer CertiEcate of Title No. T-
294295 issued in the names of Crispiniano and Ricardo covering the contested lot, and (2) recover
possession of the subject property before the Municipal Trial Court.

The undisputed facts uniformly found by all three lower courts, at the Erst instance, the MTC, the RTC,
Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals are:

Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo . . . died on July 14, 1911. They had a child
named Valentin (Basbas). During Severo's lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in Santa Rosa,
Laguna otherwise known as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Lot No. 39 is adjacent
to Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate which lot was acquired, by purchase, by Valentin
Basbas. Sometime in 1995, [herein petitioners Heirs of Valentin Basbas] discovered that
[respondents] Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas were able to secure for themselves Transfer
CertiEcate of Title No. T-294295 over Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate.

MTC Ruling
In ruling in favor of petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, the trial courts found that petitioners fully established
their Eliation with the decedent Severo, the original titleholder of Lot No. 39 and from whom all parties
trace their claim of ownership over the subject property. Oppositely, the trial courts found wanting,
lacking documentary evidence, the different claims of heirship of Crispiniano and herein respondent
Ricardo, through Severo's purported other son or nephew, Nicolas. The MTC, aMrmed in toto by the
RTC, declared, thus:

[Petitioners] have fully established their true Eliation with the late Severo Basbas from whom
the subject property came from. Through their own evidence, testimonial and documentary, it
was established that Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. They had one (1) child named
Valentin Basbas . . . . Valentin Basbas had no other brother nor sister. He (Valentin) was married
to Irene Beato. Valentin bore four (4) children, namely: (1) Pedro Basbas; (2) Lucas Basbas; (3)
Feliz Basbas, Sr.; and (4) Remigia Basbas. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

As shown, [petitioners] are now the great grandchildren of the late Severo Basbas who died in
Santa Rosa, Laguna on July 5, 1911.

The defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] on the other hand claim that they are
also the legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas. Such a claim, however, was not supported by any
document. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

As correctly pointed out by [petitioners] that assuming, for the sake of argument, that Nicolas
Basbas, predecessor of these defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo], was the son of
Severo Basbas, then Nicolas Basbas must have been an illegitimate child of Severo Basbas, in
which case his Eliation should be Erst established before he can claim to be an heir. But this
cannot be done anymore, simply because an action for recognition should have been made or
brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents . . . . It could not even be applied under the
exception of said law . . ., as no evidence was ever adduced to that effect. The only conclusion,
therefore, is that Nicolas Basbas was neither a legitimate nor an illegitimate son of Severo
Basbas, so that defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the
late Severo Basbas.

On appeal to the RTC by Crispiniano and Ricardo the judgment of the MTC was affirmed in toto.

Insistent on their stance, Crispiniano and Ricardo appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In a subsequent turn of events, the appellate court reversed, applying our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay
v. Hon. del Rosario , 7 and set aside the uniform rulings of the trial courts:

The court a quo erred in affirming the decision of the MTC, as the MTC had ruled on filiation and
heirship, matters which fall within the jurisdiction of a probate court, which the MTC or RTC of
 Sta. Rosa, Laguna were not designated to be. It is also proper that these particular matters be
threshed out in a special proceeding.

In Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario , it was ruled that it is decisively clear that
the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as it involves the
establishment of a status or right.

The case at bar is an action for annulment of title, reconveyance with damages, a civil action,
whereas matters which involve the settlement and distribution of the estate of a deceased
person as well as Eliation and heirship partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
requires the application of speciEc rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. With both parties
claiming to be the heirs of Severo Basbas, it is but proper to thresh out this issue in a special
proceeding, since [Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo] seeks to establish his status as one of
the heirs entitled to the property in dispute. Before the action for annulment of title,
reconveyance with damages can be resolved, this Court opines that the matter of heirship
should be adjudicated upon Erst. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the
civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING IN HEIRS OF
GUIDO AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY VERSUS HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, THAT PRIOR TO THE RESOLUTION
OF THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AND RECONVEYANCE, THE DETERMINATION OF WHO THE
HEIRS ARE SHOULD FIRST BE ADJUDGED IN A PROBATE COURT. YES

HELD: YES

In marked contrast, the Court of Appeals zeroed in on the claim of Crispiniano and Ricardo that they
are descendants, likewise great grandchildren, of Severo and inherited Lot No. 39 from their father
Felomino Basbas, Severo's grandson from the latter's son, Nicolas, who received the subject property
as his share in Severo's estate. On the whole, the appellate court ruled that the MTC and the RTC, acting
in their general jurisdiction, did not have authority to rule on issues of Eliation and heirship of the
parties to the decedent Severo, such matters to be sorted and established in a special proceeding and
falling within the jurisdiction of a probate court.

We cannot subscribe to the appellate court's ruling unqualifiedly applying Heirs of Yaptinchay.

The status of Valentin as a compulsory heir of Severo and of petitioners' statuses as heirs of Valentin
and Severo are stipulated facts agreed to by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo. On the other hand,
Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo miserably fail to establish the status of their ascendant and
purported predecessor-in-interest, Nicolas. In fact, the testimony of respondent Ricardo tells about the
status of Valentin, not about Nicolas' status, as a compulsory heir of Severo.

In all, Valentin's long-possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no longer be
the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court of Appeals.
There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo.
And, contraposed to the fact that Valentin's status as a legitimate child of Severo is already established,
Nicolas' status as a purported heir of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas' right thereto expiring
upon his death.

Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondent's end that Nicolas was born of a valid marriage, only
that he is Severo's son. Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded to establish the status of Nicolas,
whether he is a legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done.

Article 165, in relation to Articles 173 and 175, of the Family Code and Article 285 of the Civil Code
state:

Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise
provided in this Code.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate Eliation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period
speciEed in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172,
in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Our ruling in Raymundo v. Vda. de Suarez is instructive:

Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein
respondents must Erst be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can Ele an action to annul
the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.

We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.

Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and TeoEsta — and thus,
Marcelo Sr.'s heirs — has been Ermly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court
of Appeals.

In Heirs of Yaptinchay , the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain
TCT's was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a
semblance of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses
Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondent as Marcelo
Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of
Marcelo Sr. specifying TeoEsta's paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns
in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein
respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.

Thus, we find no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of Severo in order to
resolve petitioners' Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of the subject property.
We add that Valentin's rights to the succession vested from the moment of death of the decedent
Severo. 19 In turn, petitioners', as Heirs of Valentin, who is an uncontested heir of decedent Severo,
rights to the succession vested from the moment of Valentin's death. As such, they own Lot No. 39,
undisputedly titled in Severo's name and forming part of Severo's estate, and are entitled to the titling
thereof in their names.

One Enal note. Severo, as well as Valentin, have been long dead. It is well-nigh that title to the subject
property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, appear in the names of the petitioners, Heirs
of Valentin, herein declared heirs of Severo, or their successors-in-interest, to Enally settle title thereto
and prevent occurrences of fraudulent titling thereof. Hence, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin and their
successors-in-interest, are directed to take the appropriate action for titling of the subject property.