Republic of the Philippines On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on private
SUPREME COURT respondent as defendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74854 April 2, 1991
JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V.
BENEDICTO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal, and RUFINO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue? This is the issue confronting the Court in the case at
bar.
On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti,
Cainta, Rizal, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de
Guzman praying for the annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a
parcel of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private
respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon
petitioner's demand.
order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial
judge on the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found,
based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is a
real action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated deeds
of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject parcel of
riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, which in its decision of April 11, 1986,1 affirmed the order of
dismissal of his complaint.
In this petition for review, petitioner faults the appellate court in
affirming what he calls an equally erroneous finding of the trial court
that the venue was improperly laid when the defendant, now private
respondent, has not even answered the complaint nor waived the
venue.2
Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action
belongs solely to the defendant and that the court or its magistrate
does not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that
the venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable. In other words,
petitioner asserts, without the defendant objecting that the venue was
improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the case motu
proprio.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the dismissal of
petitioner's complaint is proper because the same can "readily be
assessed as (a) real action." He asserts that "every court of justice
before whom a civil case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the
defendant to raise that venue was improperly laid. The court can take
judicial notice and motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly denominated as
real action and improperly filed before it. . . . the location of the subject
parcel of land is controlling pursuant to Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 4 of the
New Rules of Court . . .3
We grant the petition.
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial
court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed
by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions
relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the
defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue
relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of
the parties rather than the substance of the case.4
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the
merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may
be had.5
In Luna vs. Carandang,6 involving an action instituted before the then
Court of First Instance of Batangas for rescission of a lease contract
over a parcel of agricultural land located in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
which complaint said trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the leased land, we emphasized:
(1) A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits involving
title to, or possession of, real estate wherever situated in the
Philippines, subject to the rules on venue of actions (Manila
Railroad Company vs. Attorney General, etc., et al., 20 Phil.
523; Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. De Leon, et al., 56 Phil.
169; Navarro vs. Aguila, et al., 66 Phil. 604; Lim Cay, et al. vs.
Del Rosario, etc., et al., 55 Phil. 692);
(2) Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an
action involving real property shall be brought in the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land lies is a rule on
venue of actions, which may be waived expressly or by
implication.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of
petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court vested with the
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in
accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. With
respect to the parties, there is no dispute that it acquired jurisdiction
over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now petitioner, the moment he filed
his complaint for annulment and damages. Respondent trial court
could have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, now private
respondent, either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal process
exercised over his person.7
Although petitioner contends that on April 28, 1963, he requested the
City Sheriff of Olongapo City or his deputy to serve the summons on
defendant Rufino de Guzman at his residence at 117 Irving St.,
Tapinac, Olongapo City,8 it does not appear that said service had been
properly effected or that private respondent had appeared voluntarily in
court9 or filed his answer to the complaint.10 At this stage, respondent
trial court should have required petitioner to exhaust the various
alternative modes of service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., personal service under Section 7, substituted service under
Section 8, or service by publication under Section 16 when the address
of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly
not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding,
particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first
instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where
defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as
provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the
trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or
in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong
venue, which is deemed waived.11
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid,
as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically
wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the
rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue
by motu proprio dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined
in the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take
primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial
court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the
defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated April 11,
1986, is hereby nullified and set aside. The complaint filed by petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch LXXI is revived and
reinstated. Respondent court is enjoined to proceed therein in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11647 January 31, 1958
FLORENTINO NAVARRO and BEATRIZ VINOYA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELOY BELLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, JUAN CABUANG, FLORENTINA BAUTISTA,
FLORENCIO GALICIA and CONSOLACION
BAUTISTA, respondents.
Villanueva, Resultan and Associates for petitioners.
Conrado M. Soriano for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction seeking the annulment of a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan dated July 30, 1956, dismissing the complaint
in Civil Case No.13099, adjudging the respondents-defendants owners
of two parcels of landdescribed in the complaint, and awarding
damages to the latter for theunlawful usurpation of the disputed lots by
the petitioners.
It appears that petitioners-plaintiffs filed a complaint on September 30,
1954, with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No.
13099) praying for the annulment of transfer certificates of title Nos.
15967 and 15968 and the corresponding deeds of sale executed by
respondents Florencio Galicia and Consolacion Bautista in favor of
respondents Juan Cabuang and Florentino Bautista over lots Nos.
20774 and 32540, of the San Carlos Cadastre, claiming ownership of
said parcels of land, and alleging actual possession. Respondents filed
their answer to the amended complaint on November 24, 1954, also
claiming ownership over the questioned lots with a counterclaim for the
damages allegedly arising out of the unlawful usurpation of the
possession of the above described parcels of land by the petitioners
through force and intimidation.
No answer to the counterclaim having been filed within the time
prescribedby the Rules, upon petition of the respondents, the
petitioners (plaintiffs below) were declared in default in an order of the
lower court datedFebruary 2, 1955, and the same order commissioned
the deputy clerk of courtto receive the evidence of the defendants. No
notice of this order wasfurnished the petitioners of their counsel. The
reception of evidence wasmade on February 8, 1955, and in
accordance with the evidence submitted bythe respondents, the court
rendered decision adjudicating the defendant'scounterclaim for
damages, declaring the respondents owners of the disputed parcels of
land, and dismissing the complaint. Copy of the decision wasreceived
by the petitioners on August 7, 1956.
On September 3, 1956, petitioners filed their first motion for
reconsideration to set aside the decision and order of default; it was
denied, and notice of such denial received by the petitioners on
October 1, 1956. A second motion for reconsideration filed on October
3, 1956, havingbeen also denied by the lower court, notice of appeal
was filed by petitioners on October 6, 1956, the same day when the
notice of denial of the second motion for reconsideration was received
by them, and with the notice of appeal they asked for a fifteen-day
extension within which to file therecord on appeal and appeal bond,
which was granted. But upon objection interposed by the respondents,
the court in its order of October 26, 1956, denied the approval of the
record on appeal on the ground that the decision sought to be
reviewed has become final and that the plaintiffs having been declared
in default, they have no right to appeal unless and until the order of
default is revoked and set aside.
There was no need for petitioners to answer respondents'
counterclaim, considering that plaintiffs, in their complaint, claimed not
only ownership of, but also the right to possess, the parcels in
question, alleging that sometime in May, 1954, defendants through
force and intimidation, wrestedpossession thereof from their tenants,
and that it was upon a writ of possession issued by the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan that they were placed back in possession by
the provincial sheriff. These averments weredenied by defendants in
their answer, wherein they asserted ownership in themselves and
illegal deprivation of their possession by plaintiffs, and as counterclaim,
prayed for damages allegedly suffered because of plaintiffs'alleged
usurpation of the premises.
It thus appears that the issues of the counterclaim are the very issues
raised in the complaint and in the answer, and said counterclaim is
based on the very defenses pleaded in the answer. To answer such
counterclaim wouldrequire plaintiffs to replead the same facts already
alleged in their complaint.
But in any event, whether or not plaintiffs have answered defendants'
counterclaim, they have the right to prove the averments of their
complaint, including their claim that it was by court order that they
secured possessionof the parcels in question from defendants. And if
plaintiffs are able to prove such allegations, then the court must
dismiss defendants' counterclaim for damages, since the illegal
usurpation of defendants' possessionallegedly committed by plaintiffs,
which is the basis of the counterclaim,would not have been proved. In
short, the issues of the counterclaim partakesof the nature of a special
defense which, even if not specifically challengedby plaintiffs in a reply,
is deemed controverted (Rule 11, sec. 1, Rules ofCourt; Rosario vs. J.
Martinez, 92 Phil., 1064; Luna vs. Apacible, 79 Phil.,8). There was,
therefore, no occasion for plaintiffs' default on defendants'couterclaim,
and the order of the court below declaring them in default, aswell as
the judgment by default, is improper and void.
It is plain from the records that the complaint and the aswer have not
as yetbeen set for trial in the court below. Only after the issues of the
complaint and aswer are tried, and the parties heard, may the court
resolve the defendants' counterclaim for damages. If the court finds for
plaintiffs,defendants' defenses, and counterclaim, must necessarily fail.
On the otherhand, if the court finds for the defendants, then plaintiff's
complaint must be dismissed, defendants would be declared owners of
the lands inquestion, and they would be awarded damages under their
counterclaim. Butuntil and unless the whole case is heard on the
merits, the court a quo can not decide on defendants' counterclaim,
without depriving plaintiffs theirday in court.
Even if plaintiffs had really defaulted on the counterclaim, still the
courtwas bound to limit its decision to the specific reliefs ask for. Sec.
9, Rule 35, of the Rules of Court provides:
A judgment entered by default shall not exceed the amoutn or
be differentin kind from that prayed for in the demand for
judgment . . .
Since the counterclaim was set to recover damages caused by the
petitionersalleged entering the land in question through force and
intimidation, thecourt could, at most, award the damages sought;
hence, in adjudging also thedefendants, Juan Cabuang and Florentina
Bautista, to be the owners of thetwo parcels of land described in the
complaint, when what was tried was thecounterclaim, the court below
exceeded its jurisdiction (See Lim Toco vs.Fo Fay, 80 Phil., 166).
the records. Their having defaultedon the counterclaim, if they did so at
all, did not operate to deprive theplaintiffs from any standing or remedy
in court in connection with theircomplaint.
Petitioner's timely motions for reconsideration and new trial were
denied bythe lower court, first, because it said the petitioners had lost
their standing in court in view of the order of default, and second
because such motions were not accompanied by affidavits of merits.
The first argument is, in view of what we have already stated, invalid
and untenable. As for the second, we have already ruled that affidavits
of merits are not necessarywhen the granting of the motion is not
discretionary with the court but is demandable as of right, as where the
movant has been deprived of his day in court, through no fault or
negligence of his own (Valerio vs. Tan, et al., 97 Phil. 558). This rule
applies in the instant case, since petitioners have been deprived of
their day in court through an illegal order of default.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari is granted, and the decision of July 30,
1956 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in its case No. 13099
is hereby set aside, and said court is directed to proceed with the trial
ofthe entire case on the merits. Costs against respondents Cabuang
andBautista. So ordered.

Since the ownership of the disputed land was put in issued by the
allegations of the complaint and the special defenses in the answer,
the correct procedure, assuming that the declaration of default was
properlyentered, should have been for the trial court to set the
complaint andanswer for the hearing. The lower court, even in the case
of a true defaulton the couterclaim, could not deny the petitioners-
palintiffs the right tobe heard and produce evidence in support of their
complaint, as that pleadingwas valid and had not been stricken from